Value in Ethics: Lonergan Perspective

Brian Cronin

Value Ethics:

A Lonergan Perspective.

Contents

Preface / [1]

Introduction / [5]

Chapter 1 Why A Value Ethics? / [21]

1 Introduction / [22]

2 Natural Law Ethics [24]

2.1 Historical Sketch / [25]

2.2 Evaluation / [28]

3 Virtue Ethics / [32]



4 An Ethic of Feeling / [40]



5 An Ethic of Reason: Kant / [48]



6 An Ethics of Value and Valuing / [54]



7 The Present Situation / [58]

8 Why a Value Ethics: Stages of Meaning / [64] [vi]

Chapter 2 Method in Value Ethics / [77]

1 Method and Methods / [78]

2 Self-Appropriation of Cognitional Structure / [82]

Value Ethics 3

2.1 Invariant Set of Interrelated Cognitional Activities / [83]

2.2 Immanent and Operative Norms / [88]

3 Consciousness / [90]

3.1 The Experience of Being Conscious / [91]

3.2 Levels of Consciousness / [96]

3.3 Reflexive Consciousness / [98]

3.4 Misconceptions of Consciousness / [104]

4 Self-Appropriation as Method in Ethics / [107]

4.1 Resources for Intentionality Analysis / [109]

4.2 Content to Activities / [115]

4.3 Activities to Norms / [117]

5 What Kind of Ethics will Emerge? / [117]

Chapter 3 The Question of Value Arises / [123]


2 Context of Question of Value / [127]

2.1 Remote Context / [127]

2.2 Proximate Context / [129]

3 Characteristics of Questions of Value / [131]

3.1 Arises Spontaneously / [131]

3.2 Arises from the Beginning / [132]

3.3 Arises in every Culture / [133]

3.4 Arises at every Stage of History / [133]

3.5 Unavoidable / [134]

4 Intentionality of the Value Question / [136]

5 Ordering of Value Questions / [143]

5.1 A Scale of Values? / [143] [vii]

Contents 4 4

5.2 Vital Values / [145]

5.3 Social Values / [146]

5.4 Cultural Values / [148]

5.5 Moral or Personal Values / [148]

5.6 Religious Values / [149]

5.7 Sublation in Scale of Values / [149]

5.8 Terminal and Originating Values / [153]

5.9 Values and Disvalues / [154]

6 Specifying Moral Values / [154]

6.1 Stating the Problem / [155]

6.2 Stating the Solution / [158]

Chapter 4 Deliberative Insight / [171]


2 Learning from Aristotle / [176]

3 Lonergan on Deliberation / [178]

3.1 Deliberative Insights – Primary Sources / [179]

3.2 Deliberative Insights – Secondary Sources / [183]

4 Knowledge of Reality Especially Human Reality / [185]

5 Deliberative Insight – Systematic Presentation / [187]

5.1 Deliberation as Insight / [188]

5.2 Structure of Deliberative Insight / [189]

5.3 Content And Criteria / [190]

5.4 Valuing Things / [191]

5.5 Scale of Values / [193]

5.6 Deliberative Insights in Moral Philosophy / [196]

Value Ethics 5

5.7 Link between Evidence and Conclusion / [200]

5.8 Sufficiency and Relevance of Evidence / [200]

5.9 Unifies and Organizes / [210]

5.10 Understanding in Three Modes / [202]

6 Conclusion: Is there a Deliberative Insight? / [203] [viii]

Chapter 5 Lonergan on Feelings / [209]


2 Learning from History / [213]

2.1 Aristotle on the Emotions in the Ethical Life / 213]

2.2 Place of Feelings in Ethics – The Empiricists / [219]

3 Lonergan on Feelings – Historical Sketch / [220]

3.1.1 Up to Insight (1953) / [221]

3.1.2 The Desire to Know / [221]

3.1.3 Interference of the Biases / [225]

3.1.4 ‘The Possibility of Ethics’ / [228]

3.2 From Insight to Method and Beyond / [232]

3.2.1 Influence of Max Scheler (1874-1928) / [233]

3.2.2 Influence of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) / [237]

3.2.3 Feelings in Method – A Summary / [239]

4 Broadening our Notion of Feeling / [245]

Chapter 6 Self-Appropriation of Feelings and Values / [255]


2 Intentional and Non-Intentional / [258]

3 Intentional Response to Value / [260]

3.1 First Approximation: Pure Desire to Know / [261]

3.2 Second Approximation: Transcendental Notion of value / [264]

Contents 6 6

3.3 Third Approximation: Transcendental Precepts / [267]

3.4 Intentional Response to Value / [271]

3.5 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Value / [272]

4 Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable / [277]

4.1 Unity of Human Person / [277]

4.2 Animal Sensitivity / [278]

4.3 Human Sensitivity / [282]

4.4 Characteristics of Intentional Responses to Agreeable or Disagreeable / [285]

[ix]

5 Complex Interrelationships / [286]

5.1 Principles of Integration – A Summary / [286]

5.2 Spiritual Feelings Sublate Sensitive Feelings / [289]

5.3 The Spiritual Orients Sensitive Feelings / [292]

5.4 The Spiritual Transforms Sensitive Feelings / [294]

5.5 Anger as an Illustration / [296]

5.6 Development and Decline of Feelings / [298]

5.7 Education of Feeling of Moral Responsibility / [299]

6 Hierarchy of Feelings / [303]

7 Unity of Cognitive and Affective Components / [311]

8 How do you Feel about That? / [316]

9 Summary of a Position / [319]

Chapter 7 Deciding – Free and Responsible / [325]


2 Identifying Deciding and Choice / [327]

2.1 What Deciding is not / [330]

2.2 What Deciding is / [334]

Value Ethics 7

2.3 Emergence and Differentiation / [338]

2.4 Levels of Decision-Making / [341]

3 Priority: Values and Decisions / [343]

3.1 Myth of Isolated Reason / [343]

3.2 Myth of Arbitrary Will / [345]

3.3 Some Priorities / [347]

3.4 Good Will / [352]

3.5 Good Decision-Making / [355]

4 Responsible Freedom / [356]

4.1 Towards a Definition of Freedom / [356]

4.2 Limitations to Human Freedom / [361]

4.3 Freedom as Achievement / [367]

4.4 Are we Really Free? / [368] [x]

5 Choice of Evil / [371]

5.1 What is Evil? / [371]

5.2 Stages of Moral Decline / [373]

Chapter 8 Moral Self-Transcendence / [383]


2 Self-Transcendence / [385]

2.1 Immanence to Self-Transcendence / [386]

2.2 Self-Development to Self-Transcendence / [388]

2.3 Development and Conversion / [390]

3 Understanding Moral Development / [391]

3.1 Understanding Development / [392]

3.2 Lonergan on Moral Development / [398]

3.3 Kohlberg on Moral Development / [399]

Contents 8 8

3.4 Critique of Kohlberg / [405]

4 Understanding Moral Conversion / [409]

4.1 General Notion of Conversion / [409]

4.2 Moral Conversion / [413]

5 Moral Self-Transcendence / [419]

Chapter 9 Judgments of Value / [427]

1 The Four Components / [429]

1.1 Four Components – Summary / [429]

1.2 Unity on the Part of the Subject / [432]

1.3 Structure and Content / 433]

1.4 The Four Causes / [436]

2 Characteristics of Judgments of Value / [438]

3 Various Kinds of Judgments of Value / [443]

4 Criteria Operating in Moral Judgments: Conscience / [447]

4.1 What is Conscience? / [449]

4.2 How does Conscience Work? / [452] [xi]

4.3 Development and Decline of Conscience / [458]

5 Objectivity of Moral Value Judgments / [459]

5.1 Critical Realist Position / [459]

5.2 Absolute Notion of Objectivity of Moral Values / [460]

5.3 Do we Create Values? / [462]

6 Clarification by Contrast / [463]

Chapter 10 Promoting Moral Value / [471]

1 Foundations / [471]

1.1 Where do Values Come From? / [472]

1.2 Self-Affirmation as a Responsible Subject / [477]

Value Ethics 9

1.3 Not Open to Basic Revision / [478]

2 Value Ethics in Practice / [481]

2.1 Making True Value Judgments / [481]

2.2 Generalists and Specialists: Foundations and Applications / [483]

2.3 Laws, Virtues, Rights, Values / [486]

3 Teaching Moral Values / [489]

3.1 Pedagogy of Four Components / [489]

3.2 Way up, Way down / [492]

3.3 Teaching Moral Philosophy / [497]

4 What is at Stake? / [499]

4.1 Value of Human Person / [499]

4.2 Formulation of Laws, Virtues, Values / [501]

4.3 Global Ethics / [505]

Epilogue / [513]

Illustrations Diagram One: Integral Cognitional Structure of Truth and Value / [82] D iagram Two: Four Components of the Value of Judgment / [428] D iagram Three: How Conscience Works / [453]

Preface

As students we were urging our professor of ethics to write an article on a

certain topic. His laconic reply was, “Why add to the confusion?” Confusion abounded

then in ethics in the sixties, and abounds all the more in our contemporary situation at

the beginning of the third millennium. There is confusion among the theorists and

academics about which system to follow, about what method to adopt, about what we

can know concerning good and evil. There is confusion amongst parents and teachers

about how values are to be taught, which values are to be preferred, where do these

values come from anyway. There is confusion on the world stage over our moral

obligation in the face of issues of war and peace, poverty and Aids, terrorism and social

justice, genetics and stem cell research, and the like.

Granted that, as Aristotle noted, you will never get the same precision in ethics

as you expect in mathematics, can we attempt to make some small contribution to

clearing up the confusion, to bring clarity, rather than adding to the confusion?

Penetrating to the root of the matter might help. Much confusion arises from seeking

ethical absolutes in the wrong places. My contention is that ethical absolutes are to be

found, not in formulated laws, not in lists of virtues and vices, not in systems of moral

philosophy, not in authority figures dictating to us, but in the ethical norms immanent

and operative in each one of us and unfolding in an invariant pattern of cognitional and

volitional activities by which we know moral values, we decide for and implement these

values. If we can find the source of moral values, then, surely we will have found a key

to distinguishing true from false values, which might enable us to teach values, and to

make ourselves and others better persons in a healthier society.

This text is designed to promote such ethical self-discovery. We have privileged

access to our own values, to our reception of values from parents and society, to our

own critique of values, our internal-[2]ization of values and our hesitant, partial,

Value Ethics 11

implementation of values in the concrete realities of life. This method does not provide

a simple, magic solution, but sets us on a slow, painstaking process of discovery of what

it is the be a free and responsible human person, motivated by moral obligation and

equipped with an ability to discern good from evil. We can learn to distinguish

authenticity from inauthenticity, genuine autonomy from spurious self-interest, true

operation of informed conscience from conscience as an excuse to do what you like.

Over forty years have passed since I was introduced to ethics by the professor,

reluctant to add to the confusion. I have been teaching philosophy during much of that

time, starting with the courses in the history of philosophy, which are relatively easy to

teach given the abundance of books and articles available, and moving on to the more

difficult challenges of systematic courses in the philosophy of science, epistemology

and metaphysics, where you take a stand and invite the students to do likewise. Finally,

I moved on to the most difficult of all subjects, the teaching of ethics, the knowledge of

good and evil, the making of ourselves as moral persons, the construction of moral

persons in a moral society. I did write a book on issues of cognitional theory and

epistemology which some people seem to have found helpful, as it is now in its third

edition.1 This text will bring the same method and approach to bear on the more

complex matter of value ethics. My original intention was a longer and more detailed

treatment of all foundational issues in ethics. I realized in the course of time that it is

better to concentrate on appropriating the foundational activities and norms, and to leave

the applications and elaborations of that base to wiser and better heads and hearts.

I owe a debt to our students who set the context for teaching and communication

and are always ready with a stream of searching questions, especially if the professor is

unsure of his ground and they sense a weakness. In that way it has been a collaborative

effort, where together we have explored what it is to be an authentic moral person in all

its complexity. I owe a debt of gratitude to Spiritan Missionary Seminary, where this

Preface 12 12

project was conceived and brought to [3] birth. I have been allowed to enjoy years of

absence to formulate this text, while others took on my work load.

I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Boston College, the Department of Philosophy

and especially the Lonergan Centre, which granted me a Fellowship for two years to

work on this project. I have to thank especially Father Joseph Flanagan, S.J., the

Director of the Centre, for his constant encouragement, as well as to the other members

of the Lonergan group for the stimulation and critique of emerging ideas. I am indebted

to Dr. Michael Shute of Memorial University for reading the manuscript and making

very helpful suggestions. My hope is that the text will promote clarity about foundations

of moral values and help to clear away some little of the confusion endemic to moral

discussion.

When is a book finished? When is it perfect? One can continue for ever

improving and perfecting, but then nothing would ever be published. I offer this text

painfully aware of its inadequacies in scholarship, in detail, and in poverty of

expression, but convinced that there is a view here on appropriating value judgments

from which many might profit.

Brian Cronin, December 2005

Note about the Author : Brian Cronin is an Irish Spiritan Missionary who has worked in East Africa since 1972. After pastoral work in Nairobi, he was appointed to teach Philosophy in Tanzania. Since doing doctoral studies in Boston College, he has been teaching at Spiritan Missionary Seminary, P.O. Box 2682, Arusha, Tanzania. Notes about Internet Edition: This work now being offered is the first Internet edition of Fr. Brian Cronin’s second book, Value Ethics: A Lonergan Perspective, which comes as a sequel following the publication of his earlier book, The Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory and Epistemology, which had been written to introduce readers to the first half of Fr. Bernard Lonergan’s Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. The print edition of this second work first appeared in 2006 and, like the first book, it appeared as a publication of the Consolata Institute of Philosophy, based in Nairobi, Kenya (PO Box 49789). Hence, it is not too readily available for purchase in Europe or America although orders for purchase can be placed with the Newman Bookstore in Washington, D.C. The full postal address is as follows: Newman Bookstore; St. Paul's College/Hecker Center; 3025 Fourth St. NE;

Value Ethics 13

Washington, D.C.; 20017; U.S.A.; tel. 202-526-1036. On Internet, Fr. Cronin’s book can be ordered from the Newman Bookstore at [email protected].

In preparing this Internet edition, to synchronize the pagination in tandem with the print edition for easy reference purposes, numbers within square brackets have been inserted in the text to indicate where the pages break in the print edition, as in [267]. The Table of Contents above has been similarly synchronized. The numbers cited within square brackets indicate the pagination of the first print edition.

In preparing this edition, many thanks are owed to Mr. Anthony Russo who inserted the pagination within square brackets to synchronize this Internet edition with the print edition and many thanks are also owed to Mr. Kin Koerber who combined all sections and chapters into a single document using MS Word. Please note that if grammatical or typographical errors are noticed, it would be an act of charity for you, the reader, to inform us of these matters so that appropriate corrections can be made within the Internet edition. In closing, special thanks are owed to the author, Fr. Brian Cronin, for permitting and encouraging the publication of this Internet edition. 1 Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory and Epistemology, (Consolata Institute Press, Nairobi, 1999, 2005).

Introduction

The unavoidable fact is that we are continuously making judgments of value,

that is, knowing values and living our lives on the basis of these values. We distinguish

between good and bad schools, good and bad policies, honest and dishonest politicians,

good and bad actions. We function in society on the basis of these values. Most people

agree in condemning genocide, terrorism, world poverty, political corruption, child

abuse, etc. We have little hesitation lauding the values of democracy, freedom,

accountability, transparency, and condemning the absence of these values in a tyranny

or dictatorship. We are constantly approving and disapproving of aspects of our own

behaviour; we are exhorting our children ‘to be a good boy and do what you are told’;

we are chiding our friends for letting us down or losing their temper or thinking too

much of themselves. For the most part we pass these judgments easily, freely, without

any special effort and in many cases our evaluations are correct.

It is evident that sometimes we make mistakes. What we thought was a good

friend can turn out to be a fair weather friend. The politician we voted for turns out to be

self-serving and corrupt. The good school we chose for our daughter turns out to be a

disaster. But the salient point is that we can recognize our mistakes; we can correct our

mistaken judgments; we can readjust our evaluations in the light of further experience

and new data. What is this extraordinary ability we have to know good from evil; to

evaluate people, actions, policies and things, from the point of view of good, better, best

or bad, worse, worst?

Academics and philosophers have great difficulty giving an adequate account of

this ability to affirm judgments of value. The history of axiology, the philosophy of

value, is only about two hundred years old and was mostly confined to the

Phenomenologists and Existentialists. Nietzsche made prolific use of the language of

values [6] but usually in the context of unmasking ideological values, revealing the

Value Ethics 15

hidden motivations and feelings behind supposed evaluations. Relativists assert that all

our evaluations depend on our point of view, our culture, our age or sex, and that there

cannot be absolute, universal, true value judgments. Others are so sceptical about our

knowledge of truth that knowledge of values becomes an impossible dream. Others see

no need for this value language: we have our traditional moral laws and

commandments, we have our lists of virtues and vices; this business of values is leading

us into moral chaos.

My contention is that approaching ethics in terms of values, evaluations and

value judgments, represents significant progress in our understanding of morality.

Finally, we seem to have reached the core of the issue, the source of values; we can now

identify the activities and norms that allow us to make value judgments. We can identify

and isolate this ability that we have to make value judgments. From the ability to

recognize mistakes we can learn what is necessary in order to pass a true judgment of

value and know that it is true. What are the activities that we need to perform in order to

produce a true judgment of value? What are the norms that we need to follow to be sure

that it is an authentic evaluation? These are the two basic questions we are answering in

this text.

In a previous text entitled, Foundations of Philosophy,1 I outlined how we reach

judgments of truth. The text identified the interrelated set of activities which we perform

when we question something, understand what is involved, refine our concepts and

definitions and theories, proceed to ask whether there is evidence to assert their truth,

gather the evidence, line it up with the conclusion and, behold, the conclusion follows:

it can be affirmed and you know it is true. We explored in that text each of the various

activities, how they were self-assembling or unfolding, what criterion was operating,

how you reached a conclusion and whether it was certain, highly probable or merely

probable. We discovered that, yes, you sometimes make mistakes, but you are usually

Introduction 16 16

able to recognize the mistakes, correct them and proceed to find the correct solution.

What is this extraordinary ability that we have to ask questions, not knowing the

answer, put various ideas and examples together, combining knows and un-[7]knowns,

and end up discovering the answer and recognizing it as the correct answer? We have

this ability to know the truth, at least in some cases; to distinguish history from legend,

chemistry from alchemy, fact from fiction, science from humbug. It is of some

importance to know the truth in medicine, in mechanics, in politics, in philosophy. How

much more important in the field of moral values!

This text is an effort to extend the methods, procedures, style of that previous

text to the field of knowledge of values. We use the word 'values' freely nowadays, in

everyday contexts, in economic affairs, in politics, in education, in cultural studies, in

philosophy and religious studies. But it is difficult to define the notion, to pin it down,

to show where values come from, to distinguish values from disvalues, to elaborate a

justification for true value judgments. This text is about the subject asking questions

about the worth of something; sorting out evidence, examples, arguments, criteria,

definitions, and so on, that are relevant to a solution; putting it all in order; and finally

realizing what is the correct judgment of value. It is about all levels and types of value,

but especially about moral values, the values of the best way to live, the actions that are

right or wrong, the values by which we live our interpersonal lives. It is a text in value

ethics: an attempt to give a coherent and correct account of how we know values, how

we recognize our mistakes in the field of values and how we correct our mistakes.

Obviously, if you are already familiar with the earlier text, the method employed

and the background from which it springs, it will make it easier to understand this

foundation of ethics. Value judgments seem to presuppose correct factual judgments but

go beyond them; making a choice between different courses of action presupposes that

you understand correctly the range of alternatives available. However, a detailed

Value Ethics 17

knowledge of cognitional theory is not an absolute prerequisite for understanding this

text on ethics. It might actually work the other way round. If you become familiar with

the method of self-appropriation used in this text and learn the immanent source of

judgments of value, it should be much easier to return to judgments of truth and

appropriate the activities by which we grasp truth. [8]

Moral and Religious Values

Can you have an ethics of value without God? Is it really hubris for human

beings to aspire to a knowledge of good and evil, without invoking religious values?

Many who espouse religious values do not see the need for a defence of distinct moral

values. Religious groups normally teach moral values as part of their religious way of

life; religions provide powerful motives to live well, to condemn immoral behaviour, to

promote virtue and curb vices. Religions can have a strong influence on the moral

behaviour of people in the society; it can promote progress and prevent decline. Thus,

religious leaders and religious traditions are entitled to calls to discipleship, to follow

the beatitudes, to insist on rules of moral behaviour, to defend moral values. Any

religious tradition will call on its followers to a way of life based on belief in the tenets

of their faith, but will also usually include moral values. Why then write about moral

values as if God did not exist? Let us be content with a very brief answer to a very large

question.

Generally, I consider it true that religious values trump moral values. A religious

perspective is more comprehensive, more ultimate, and more profound, than a moral

perspective. By religious values I mean holiness, unconditional love, self-sacrifice, and

relationship with God, prayer, worship, spiritual life, and the like. Religious themes

such a salvation, grace, heaven and hell, redemption, faith, divinization, ultimate destiny

and meaning, are more comprehensive and important in themselves than moral values.

A religious perspective has its own legitimacy based on revelation, or scripture, or

Introduction 18 18

tradition, or faith; it appeals to religious authorities, Elders, Bishops, Imams, Rabbis, for

teaching, interpretation and guidance. So why should we not be content with the

teachings of religious groups on moral matters? The Catholic Church has always

claimed to be competent to teach both matters of faith and of morals. Can we rely on

religious authorities to uphold and teach moral values?

There are a number of problems. (1) No religious tradition is free from the

dialectic of authenticity and inauthenticity. There is no guarantee that a pronouncement

of a religious leader is automatically [9] progress rather than decline. Religious groups

are always on the road to renewal and repentance. (2) A faith which is not guided by

intelligence, understanding and reason can easily tend to a fanaticism, or

fundamentalism, or fideism, where there is no check or balance on the religious teaching

authority. A religious tradition which does not value human understanding can presume

to a knowledge for which there is no basis. How often have church leaders pronounced

on matters of social justice or economics or medicine, without bothering to become

proficient in these areas? Moral theology often surreptitiously invokes the methods,

principles, and procedures of a moral philosophy in its dealings with contemporary

problems. But it were better that they become good philosophers and acknowledge

openly these methods, principles and procedures. (3) Distinct spheres of competence

need to be recognized. Is it so long ago that the Bible was understood to be teaching

history, biology and astronomy? Do the Scriptures give you answers to contemporary

moral problems such as stem cell research, genetics, currency manipulations, how to

alleviate world poverty, the definition of marriage? There are numerous dangers

emerging if religious and moral perspectives are confused or compacted together. The

alternative to confusion is clear differentiation and distinction – which does not mean

separation. We recognize the distinct sphere of religious beliefs and vales, but at the

Value Ethics 19

same time insist on the integrity, importance and validity of moral philosophy and moral

values.

Our world contains a plurality of religious traditions; each appeals to a different

set of beliefs, a different book, a different code of conduct; each has its way of worship,

its organization, its hierarchy, its authority. Although there is an increasing trend for

religions to dialogue with one another, they remain as different beliefs, different

priorities, different ways of life. In our contemporary secular and global world how are

we to teach, know, promote and agree upon simple moral values? On what do we base

our common values, our talk about rights, the institutions built on such principles, the

recognition that in come cases we are obliged to help suffering humanity and in other

case we are obliged to intervene to protect human rights? On what do we base our

discussions of abortion, stem cell research, war [10] and peace, tax cuts for the rich,

genetics, poverty, climate change, terrorism, detention without trial, trade imbalances,

homosexuality, definition of marriage, and the like? All these have profound moral

implications. They are each specialized areas requiring study, specialized research,

evaluations of possibilities and consequences, and moral evaluation. Many of these

issues are of recent origin or have been affected by technology, modern economies,

advances in medicine and scholarship; for many of them there is no ready-made answer

in the bible or religious tradition. We have to work it out for ourselves. We need an

independent, integral, methodical, critical ethics to forge a global community based on a

common vision of the value of each human person, working in cooperation, towards a

better future for the whole of humanity.

My point is that the field of human values has an integrity of its own. It needs to

be treated at its own level, using its own methods and procedures, reaching its own

conclusions, learning from its own mistakes. We do have the tools and capacities that

we need to know values. We do not need to appeal to the authority of a religious

Introduction 20 20

tradition to answer moral questions. Although the influence of religious teaching is

often beneficial, we cannot forget that religious leaders and traditions are also either

developing or declining; they too are called to constant renewal. We cannot totally

forget religious wars, crusades, inquisitions, witch-hunts, fanaticism, abuse of authority

and distortions of priorities, to which the religions are prone.

The choice is between differentiation and confusion. This differentiation of the

moral from the religious point of view needs to be made – to preserve the integrity of

both. The religious point of view is valid as a faith, as a comprehensive world view

incorporating God, human destiny, salvation, revelation, providence, and the like. But

there is also a legitimacy of the power of reason; there is legitimate human knowing of

values. We can know in terms of experiencing, understanding and judging the truth on

the basis of sufficient reason. We can know by way common sense; we can know the

basic sciences, mathematics and the human sciences. We can know in terms of

methodology and philosophy. Finally, we can know about values, we can attain

knowledge of good and evil, and we can do so on the [11] basis of our own inherent

natural ability to seek, to understand and to know.

Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (1904-1984)

The inspiration for this elaboration of the ethical perspective comes from the

writings of Bernard Lonergan. His thought has profoundly changed me and the whole

structure and method and thrust of this book is a reflection of this. However, my

approach to Lonergan is not to repeat the words of a great thinker in scholarly detail but

to appropriate the method and ideas, make them your own, test them on examples, put

them into practice, and communicate them fruitfully to others. The power of his method

is that you can made it your own and work out the implications from there. This has

been my approach over twenty-five years of teaching and writing.

Value Ethics 21

For those who are not familiar with Lonergan, you will still be able to

understand and appreciate all that is said in this text. I am at pains to explain the method

and presuppositions and ideas as we go along. This text does not require a previous

familiarity with his writings. Obviously it would help. He is worth getting to know

because he helps us to know ourselves, both in the field of knowing fact from fantasy,

and now in the field of knowing values. There are an increasing number of introductions

to his thought being published.2 Perhaps this text will spur you to read more and perhaps

tackle his classic works of Insight 3 and Method in Theology.4

For those who have some familiarity with Lonergan's work, I offer this as a

modest contribution, hoping it will be a source of enlightenment rather than additional

confusion. Most of this text is very elementary, basic, Lonergan ‘stuff’. If it has any

originality or value it lies in the putting together of disparate pieces into a coherent

whole. Most of us struggle with the thought of this great thinker. We will eventually

have twenty-five volumes of the Collected Works Edition to cope with. One could get

lost in just trying to keep up with the primary and secondary texts that continue to be

published. But to get lost in texts would be to miss the point; for the point here, as

always, is appropriation; to make it your own, to recognize yourself in his [12] writings,

to take firm possession of you own native ability to know truth and value and to put that

into practice in a life well lived. Elaborating an explicit value ethics has been very

difficult. Whereas for cognitional theory and epistemology you have the richness and

detail of Insight, for ethics you have important principles and definitions, some

sketches, but no elaborate working out. I hope this will be a positive contribution to

fostering a much-needed value ethics.

For those who are proficient in Lonergan studies I offer this, not as a work of

scholarship, but as a work of elaboration, implementation and communication. It is true

that Lonergan never elaborated a systematic ethics in the same way as he explained

Introduction 22 22

cognitional theory in Insight. Yet he has made valuable contributions to an ethics in

chapter eighteen of Insight on the ‘Possibility of Ethics’, in Chapter Two of Method in

Theology on ‘The Human Good’ and in Topics in Education.5 These contributions date

from different periods in his intellectual development and although crucial and correct,

they are somewhat incomplete and lacking specification. Thus, one of the aims of this

text is to work these central ideas into a coherent framework, to fill out the meaning of

crucial terms, to fill in some gaps, to specify with examples, to make a complete

readable text, a systematic presentation of knowledge of moral values.

I will be quoting from Lonergan at key points and referring to his various

writings. But this is not a dissertation on Lonergan's ethics, relying entirely on his every

word. It is an attempt to use the method of self-appropriation, to put things in order, to

elaborate clearly, to apply a method, to indicate definite conclusions. It will be easier if

you are already familiar with his thought; but on the other hand, this text should be

understandable on its own terms. I am conscientious in explaining the method, situating

it in the context of other methods, applying it step by step, systematically and slowly, to

build up a picture of the whole field. I feel it must be the aim of the Lonergan enterprise

to translate his thought into more digestible form, to encounter students, opponents, the

contemporary situation, to show what a valuable heritage there is for the betterment of

persons and society. [13]

Aims and outline.

Consonant with the previous work then, the starting point of this text on value

ethics is persons as they are. Our approach is inductive in the sense of starting from

actual behaviour, motivation, activities, whether good or bad. We start with the realities

of the moral life, the fact that as human beings we grow physically, psychologically,

intellectually and morally. Few would deny this, but can we identify the movement, the

Value Ethics 23

activities, the criterion of moral progress and, conversely, identify the realities of moral

decline? Most of us are a complicated amalgam of both progress and decline.

This is not a book of rules, neither of commandments, nor of what specific

actions should be done or not done. It is not a list of specific answers to concrete moral

problems or dilemmas. It is in the field of meta-ethics, as it is called, and does not

address specific examples except by way of illustration. We are concerned with the

foundation of ethics, to identify the contrary pushes and pulls of desires and

inclinations. Ethical rules appropriate to each area of human behaviour are desirable and

necessary. We hope to show how such codes should be worked out, rather then detailing

them ourselves. General moral norms can be identified fairly easily but specifying

detailed conclusions in areas like business or medicine may require the participation of

specialists. So we are rather weak on specific answers to concrete cases, but hope to

elaborate a method for finding the answer to all cases, in every situation, for all possible

subjects.

Nor is this a book about theory. Theories give coherent, abstract, conceptual

explanations of how or why things happen. There have been many theories of ethics,

moral philosophies, conceptual explanations of principles, deductions, definitions,

methods, conclusions. Some are highly elaborate, intellectually satisfying, impressive

systems or structures. But theories relate things to one another and so tend to abstract

from the moral subject in his/her concrete, complicated, ambiguous reality. Just as in

epistemology you cannot have a truth that prescinds from knowing subjects, so in ethics

you cannot have an abstract good that prescinds from moral subjects. Theories [14] are

valuable; they represent a stage in the objectification of moral value; but now we need

to return to the subject in all his concreteness as one of the terms of any system of

concepts, definitions or relations of an ethical philosophy.

Introduction 24 24

This is a book about self-appropriation of ourselves as moral persons. By self-

appropriation we mean taking possession of ourselves, becoming explicitly aware of the

activities and norms involved in moral judgments and decisions; being aware of the

factors making for true moral judgments and the factors hindering, and making it more

difficult to reach true moral knowledge. Let me attempt a summary, chapter by chapter,

so that the reader can get an overall view, and also pick and choose what is most

interesting or relevant.

In the first chapter we give an answer to the question of why we approach the

questions of moral philosophy in terms of values. There have been many different ways

of systematizing the data of morality in terms of laws, virtues, feeling, reason, and

others, but a value approach seems to go to the heart of the matter. We give a brief

summary of these various approaches and evaluate them in terms of advantages and

disadvantages. Our purpose is to set off the distinctive approach of value ethics and how

this promises to give a foundation for ethics. We review the present situation as

represented in the various schools in the academy and the practice or lack of it on the

streets. We summarize the historical development in terms of a shift from common

sense to theory, from common sense and theory to interiority. It is time to make ethics

empirical, in the sense of starting with people as they are, learning from our innate

ability to make moral judgments, focusing on exact descriptions and explanations of

how we actually make good evaluations. Those who are familiar with the history of

moral philosophy and the contemporary situation might skip or skim this chapter.

In our second chapter we elaborate a method appropriate to a value ethics. How

is it possible to identify and define mental activities and norms? How can private mental

acts become the data for an inductive method? Some would exclude such an approach

entirely as impossible and unverifiable. I try to show that we are actually doing [15]

such self-appropriation whenever we describe our dreams, our feelings, our processes of

Value Ethics 25

thought, our state of mind, or the state of our conscience. Such elementary efforts can be

systematized, make explicit, and can become the basis of an empirical method that

studies not the data of sense, but the data of consciousness. This method can and has

been used in a cognitional theory and epistemology in the search for truth; now it is

being extended to our knowledge of values and decisions. The moral norms are

immanent and operative in a basic set of activities. The method needed to identify them

is a method of self-appropriation. Obviously, if you are familiar with the method

already, then, this chapter is unnecessary for you; it is written to those who are new to

such an approach and might find it problematic or puzzling.

In the third chapter we start by examining the question of value. We are looking

for the source of values and this would seem to be the question as it arises in concrete

situations. The importance of the question lies in the notion of intentionality: each

question intends an answer and so points towards the answer. The question motivates

the activities towards the conclusion. The question sets the conditions that are only

satisfied if the answer is correct. The levels of consciousness are distinguished by the

question for understanding, the question of truth, and the question of value. All normal

persons, at all times and places raise the question of values, distinguish right from

wrong, good from bad, true values from false values. The value question and the

process of evaluation actually pervade our lives: we are doing it all the time – it might

help to recognize this explicitly. The general value question splits into different species,

when we ask about special classes of values and disvalues. This enables us to

distinguish between value, in a general sense referring to all values, and value in a

specifically moral sense. Our main interest is in this specifically moral meaning of

value.

Our fourth chapter considers how we reach an answer to the value question. If it

is knowing, then, it must be some cognitive activity, some kind of act of understanding,

Introduction 26 26

some kind of justification for the positing of an answer in a judgment of value. We draw

here on a parallel between the activities proper to knowing truth and the active-[16]ties

proper to knowing value. To know a truth we ask a question, assess the sufficiency of

the evidence for the conclusion, grasp this sufficiency in a reflective insight, and posit

the judgment. To know a value we follow a parallel procedure, asking questions about

values, thinking, understanding, assembling evidence and arguments pro and con, grasp

the sufficiency or insufficiency of this evidence in a deliberative insight, and then posit

the appropriate judgment of value. The structure of the judgment of value is similar to

that of the judgment of truth; the content – truth or value – differentiates the two

judgments. We are uncompromising in asserting that knowledge of values is a cognitive

activity, an act of human understanding, an act of intellect, and whatever role feelings

are to play, they cannot usurp the activities of understanding and knowing value.

What role do feelings play in our knowledge of values? Chapter five devotes

itself to a study of Lonergan’s writings on this question. It is a difficult and complicated

matter. Lonergan’s position evolved and his terminology shifted. He did not seem to

have reached a totally adequate position even in Method in Theology. But there is a

benefit from studying his struggle, as he is convinced of the positive contribution

feelings make to evaluations, but is not quite sure how to formulate this. We can benefit

from studying his development, noticing ambiguities and gaps, consistencies and

inconsistencies. As this chapter is largely an interpretation of Lonergan texts, it may not

be very enlightening to those already familiar with the texts and the problematic that

arises from the oft-quoted passages.

Chapter six attempts a systematic presentation on the role of feelings in moral

evaluations. It is consonant with the markers, distinctions and signposts identified by

Lonergan, but goes beyond them in filling in gaps and identifying more concretely the

feelings involved. There are a group of feelings which are indispensable to knowing;

Value Ethics 27

these can be referred to as the desire to know, the transcendental imperatives, the

notions of truth and value. These are deep, permanent, feeling orientations which initiate

the process of knowing, motivate the unfolding of the activities, point the activities in

the right direction and recognize with satisfaction when the answer is found. Far from

usurping cognitive activities, these feelings are a constitutive as-[17]pect of the

dynamism, the intentionality, the criterion and the content of our knowing values. There

are also sensitive feelings which might hinder and might help the process of knowing;

they might be in harmony with the deeper feelings or might not. In the virtuous person

the deeper and better feelings predominate and sensitive feelings have been educated to

fall in line. In the vicious person the deeper and better feelings have been submerged,

co-opted, suppressed, in the search for self-interested satisfaction of sensitive goals.

This single chapter can only outline a basic, consistent position on the role of feelings in

evaluations. Much elaboration and improvement is called for, but a basic coherent

position seems to have been reached.

Chapter seven distinguishes deciding from knowing, from desiring, and from

doing. Discussion of moral cases often conflates knowing value, deciding about values,

and the consequent implementing in action. In concrete experience it is often difficult to

separate them. Normally, good decisions presuppose good judgments of value, though

there are some exceptions. The goodness of decisions in themselves is the goodness of

freely and responsibly deciding for what is good. Such decisions can be deep or

superficial, permanent or temporary, extending to all areas or limited to some,

unflinching or hesitant. It seems better not to assign ‘deciding’ to a level of cognitional

structure; first, it is not cognitional but volitional; second, all human activities that are

free and responsible flow from decision, including the very activities of experiencing,

understanding and judging. A little excursion into moral decline illustrates the results of

weak deciding for the good.

Introduction 28 28

Chapter eight describes the twin processes of moral development and moral

conversion, which are included in the process of self-transcendence. These processes

involve the whole person as knowing, as feeling, as deciding, as embodied, as doing, as

being. Kohlberg helps us to identify the stages of moral development. Lonergan helps

us to identify a concomitant process of moral conversion. It is the whole person who

decides, who constitutes himself by his decisions, who thereby constitutes himself as

criterion of moral goodness. It is the good person who knows and implements moral

values. [18]

In Chapter nine we deal with judgments of value, that is, knowledge of moral

values. We identify the judgment as an affirmation or denial that brings knowing to a

term: we take a moral stand, the moral question is answered, and the criterion of moral

conscience assures us that we are right. We apply the principle that genuine objectivity

of moral judgments is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, not a suppression of

subjectivity.

Having identified the activities and norms involved in moral knowing, Chapter

ten can only point to how this foundation can be developed in various directions. Some

guidelines seem necessary to indicate how these general conclusions can become more

concrete rules and guidelines to conduct. It can also be a foundation for a pedagogy at

all levels of moral development. Such a foundation should become an agreed moral

framework for tackling community, social, national and international global problems.

To emphasize that this text is about self-appropriation, we begin each chapter

with personal questions for deliberation. These questions are designed to help the

process of personal identification and appropriation of the activities and norms spoken

about in the text. They present some typical kinds of moral questions, dramas,

dilemmas, that we face in life. They invite you to stop and work things out for yourself.

They might help to point you in the right direction. If the source of moral values is to be

Value Ethics 29

found in a set of personal activities and norms, then, it would seem important to identify

what these mean in your own experience. Without that identification, we would be like

blind men talking about colour. If you do not find the questions and examples helpful,

perhaps you can think of others closer to your own experience and state of life. At the

end of each chapter I give my own suggestions and distinctions relevant to each of the

questions.

To summarize, the aims of this text are:

– to promote awareness and sensitivity to the source of moral values in

ourselves; awareness of the activities and norms operating in coming to know values;

awareness of true as op-[19]posed to false values; awareness of the impact of values on

ourselves, our families, our communities, and our societies.

– to give a justification and explication of the meaning of the moral dimension in

life, defending it from reductionism, rationalization, relativism and deconstruction.

– to heighten awareness of dialectic of free responsible human person, pulled in

opposing directions by desires, appetites, longings, ambition, inclinations; struggling

between the search for real self-transcendence and the cheaper version that views

success, wealth, power, fame, or pleasure as self-fulfilment.

– to provide a foundation for ethics: an intelligent, clear, comprehensive method

for deciding moral issues based on the value of the human person in all his/her

unfolding potential.

1 Brian Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergan’s Cognitional Theory and Epistemology, (Nairobi: Consolata Institute of Philosophy Press, 1999). 2 A classic in this field is: Frederick E. Crowe, S.J., Lonergan (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992). 3 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (London: Longmans, 1957). 5th ed., ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992). 4 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972).

Introduction 30 30

5 Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

1

Why a Value Ethics?

The word 'morality' is the sort of thing that can be systematized in different ways, and one can discuss at some length the value of the different ways. Is morality conceived as a means to a summum bonum, is morality conceived in terms of natural law, or is morality conceived in terms of values? There are different approaches. They are all useful in certain respects. I think that one of the most fruitful ones is the approach through values, and I think that it is through values that one arrives at something true about morality.1

Questions for Deliberation:

(1) Can you remember an occasion when you had to break a law in order to do good? (2) Did an unjust law even impinge on you personally? (3) Can you imagine a family – husband, wife and four children – living together without any rules? (4) "Rules are made for the guidance of wise men and the observance of fools". Please evaluate this proverb. (5) How do you teach a soldier to be brave? (6) Would you want your children to be honest? [22] (7) Would you be able to give an account of your own personal value priorities? Where did these priorities come from? (8) Do human institutions, e.g. a restaurant, a software company, a department of philosophy in a university, have value priorities built into them? 1 Introduction

How do you go about solving a moral dilemma in which you have become

personally involved? It might be something like, how to deal with a person whom you

thought of as a friend, but you discover that he/she has been seriously unfaithful,

betrayed you or has accused you falsely. Do you fall back on the rules of thumb from

Why a Value Ethics?

32

your religious tradition, such as turn the other cheek, forgive and you will be forgiven,

an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, correct your friend and you will be blessed,

and so forth? Do you invoke principles of justice and reciprocity to show how you have

been unfairly treated and deserve recompense? Do you invoke the ideal of friendship

and wonder how a friend can behave like that? Do you allow your emotions to boil over

and lead you to seek revenge and retribution, perhaps by treating him/her in the same

way? Do you reason out the issue in terms of ends and means, distributive and

rectificatory justice, lawyers, suing, and compensation? Do you seek the advice of

friends, parents, priest, teacher, or counsellor? Do you think in terms of your own value

system, evaluating what harm has been done, assessing what is the best response, and

deciding to resolve the dilemma with the best possible outcome for yourself and your

putative friend?

You will probably find that it is quite difficult to articulate the procedure you

would follow, or have followed in the past. There are many alternative ways of

evaluating the various options in our moral lives. You may be quite confused about how

to deal with such an issue and at a loss as to how to handle it. Our minds are a residue of

various moral systems that have helped to form us in the past and parts of which remain

with us still. We have been bawled at by our parents and teachers to do this or don't do

that – or else. We have been exhorted from the pulpit to be virtuous, kind, forgiving,

patient, [23] and just. Our culture and media encourage us to follow our bliss, seek

happiness and success – even if it means trampling on your neighbour in the process.

Some say, 'look at the consequences, the end justifies the means.' Others say 'follow the

rules and the rules will keep you.’ Others cry, 'follow your conscience, and forget about

the rules.' Others will whisper, 'the only rule is to love; after that, do as you will.' Our

culture presents many procedures for solving moral dilemmas and they are quite

Value Ethics 33

different; different systems of judging right and wrong, different methods for working

out that is the right thing to do, different criteria for judging what is moral goodness.

We are confused because our culture is confused. The homogenous culture with

one language, one set of beliefs and values, one stable social and political system, the

same from birth to death, is long a thing of the past. Today culture is pluralist,

incorporating influences from many religions, languages, philosophies, value systems

and social systems. Our moral climate is shaped by the moral systems of the past; the

new procedures and methods of pragmatists, consequentialists, emotivists, rationalists,

relativists, deconstructionists, axiologists, and the like. None of these systems gained

universal acceptance but all have left their mark, each pointing us in different directions.

Our first task, then, is to take our bearings, to assess our present cultural

situation, to ask how we got into this mess in the first place, where did all these

influences come from anyway? Our present situation is a result of history and so we

look at history to learn from genuine achievements and to avoid the mistakes of the past.

This historical review is merely a sketch; it is not scholarship but pedagogy. What can

we learn from the procedures, the ideals, the methods, the innovations of different moral

systems that will help us to get our bearings today, and allow us to take a stand on moral

issues for ourselves in a coherent and critical manner.

Despite all the detailed ups and downs of history there does seem to be a

direction, a movement forward, a progression in thinking about morality. There seems

to be a general movement from law, to virtue, to values. There seems to be a movement

from an ethics of re-[24]straint, to an ethics of internalized values, autonomy, and

conscience. There seems to be a progression from observance of the law, to the self as a

moral subject, learning how to value correctly, how to decide freely and to act

responsibly. That is the brunt of our citation from Lonergan at the beginning of this

chapter; that there are various ways of systematizing moral data; that each has its

Why a Value Ethics?

34

advantages and disadvantages; but that there seems to be a special advantage in the

'value' approach, where we find something 'true' about morality. Such a suggestion

requires us to take our bearings in terms of how these systems are to be related and

evaluated. It is certainly true that there are many systems of morality, as anyone who

has looked through the ethics shelf in his local bookshop or library will attest. But are

these equally valid alternatives or are they mutually exclusive? Are some of them true

and the others false or are there degrees of truth or falsehood in the various systems? Is

there steady progress to be perceived in the later systems emerging from earlier or is

there a decline? Are the systems, contradictory, or contrary, or complementary? What is

so special about value ethics? These are the kinds of questions we seek to answer in this

first chapter in an attempt to orient our study in terms of learning from the past,

assessing the present and pushing towards the future.

Keeping in mind then that we are simply trying to get our bearings from history,

let us do a sketch of natural law philosophy, virtue/vice philosophy, rationalist moral

philosophy, empiricist ethics and how they come together to form the present situation.

Scholars of history should excuse the generalizations and simplifications as we are just

learning from history and not strictly speaking doing history. Each system will be

evaluated tentatively as we grope towards the meaning and implications of a moral

philosophy based on values.

2 Natural Law Ethics

There are two central ideas here, that of 'laws' and that of 'natural'. It is common

enough to think of morality in terms of laws, precepts, rules, commandments. We often

think of morality in terms of do's and don'ts: perform human actions which are deemed

good, avoid human behaviours which are deemed bad. It is a com-[25]mon sense

approach used by parents, teachers, philosophers, religious leaders and politicians, in

many cultures and eras of history. All this requires is a list of human actions to be

Value Ethics 35

avoided and a list of those that are commended. The good person we can recognize as

the one who conforms to the laws; the bad person as the one who breaks the law.

But where do these laws come from? How do we get this knowledge of good and

evil? The justification for a particular list of do's and don'ts can be religious or

philosophical. The natural law tradition claims that we can know these laws by using

our reason. We study the nature and final end of a human person and deduce from this

how he should behave in order to reach his final end. Historically, this natural law

tradition was closely linked with the Biblical tradition and a religious justification for

the particular rules and commandments.

2.1 Historical Sketch

The religious roots of this tradition go back to the Old Testament, to the giving of

the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai. Here is a powerful symbol of the

rules carved out on stone tablets and reinforced by the authority of God himself. The list

of Ten Commandments was later elaborated by priests, scribes and teachers into

thousands of detailed prescriptions to cover nearly every aspect of religious, moral and

social life.

Collectively this teaching was referred to as the Torah, the Law. It actually

included religious precepts, moral laws, and regulations for hygiene, civil laws

concerning marriage, property, justice and finance.

It was a powerful system because it was backed by the authority of God himself:

to break these commandments was to disobey God – to invoke his rage and punishment.

The system hinged on obedience to the Law which meant fulfilling all that the law

required and avoiding all behaviour that was forbidden. This emphasizes obedience and

requires detailed and clear laws and interpreters of the law. There were times in the

tradition when the law was regarded legalistically, narrowly, literally, slavishly; other

times when it was interpreted according to the spirit, recognizing the purpose of the law

Why a Value Ethics?

36

as primary [26] and interpreting the law as to its intent rather than its literal meaning.

The Jewish, Christian and Islamic religious traditions share these origins in the Old

Testament.

The first step in possibly secularizing this system of morality was taken by

Aristotle. Aristotle distinguished what is right by nature from what is right by

convention (N.E. 1134b20)2. There were a variety of constitutions and systems of law in

the various Greek cities depending on their history and needs. For the Sophists it was no

problem that laws should differ from city to city and by implication behaviour which is

wrong in one place is right in another. Aristotle accepts that conventions and laws vary

according to acceptance and the needs of each city, but he was not prepared to accept

that lawyers were totally free in writing these constitutions. Is there not a higher

criterion to guide the formulation of laws? Is there not a limit to what laws we can

make? Is there not a difference between just and unjust laws? So Aristotle appealed to a

natural right, which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend on

acceptance; these natural laws are immutable (N.E. 1134b24). There is a higher standard

of right and wrong, which does not change. He is formulating the notion that some

things are wrong in themselves and no conventional law can make them right; he is

reacting against the Sophist position of ethical relativism. Aristotle does not elaborate

on this distinction; he is more interested in virtues and vices than in laws.

The Stoics seem to have developed this idea of a natural law understood as

'acting according to reasonable nature'. Reason was the criterion of good or bad and not

emotion. However, they emphasized virtue and the intention of the activity, rather than

specifying actions as good or bad in themselves.

The idea of a natural law that could be formulated by reason was taken over by

the Christian Church of the Middle Ages along with much of Roman civil law and its

own developing Church Law. It was Aquinas who best systematized and articulated the

Value Ethics 37

basis of a natural law philosophy.3 He distinguished Eternal Law, Natural Law and

Human Law. [27]

Eternal law is God as exemplar cause: the laws of nature and human behaviour

existing eternally in the mind of God. God has a plan of how things should behave both

in nature and in human behaviour. These laws are embodied in the nature of things and

in the nature of man. Just as there are laws of nature by which fire behaves as fire, so

also there are natural moral laws by which human persons should know how to behave

as human persons.

Natural law is human participation in this Divine law. Natural moral laws are

embodied in man's nature. By studying human nature we can grasp how human beings

ought to behave. We can discover God's intentions for us by studying the nature of man,

his perfection, his purpose, his final end, and the means to achieve this purpose.

Aquinas considered the nature of man as a substance, man as a living being and man as

rational, in order to elaborate our teleology as human persons.

The primary precept of the moral law is to do good and avoid evil; this is

naturally known; it is known to everybody; you do not have to do any moral reasoning

to discover this; rather all moral reasoning presupposed this basic first principle. Using

this first principle we can study, for instance, the nature of marriage, the purpose of

marriage and deduce further moral principles appropriate to married life. Such

secondary precepts can be deduced also for justice, health, warfare, and so on; thus, you

can build up a code of moral behaviour appropriate for each area of human life. The

individual, using prudence, applies these precepts to the concrete situation to evaluate

what is right and wrong here and now.

Human law - also called positive or conventional or legal - is law for the sake of

order in the community and nation. They are dictates of reason, promulgated by a lawful

authority; they should be for the common good, they should be just rather than unjust.

Why a Value Ethics?

38

The intellectualist tradition of natural law, defining law in general as an

ordinance of reason, has continued as the foundation of Catholic moral teaching. The

Church claims the right to teach morals as well as doctrines and uses natural law

tradition as its philosophical basis. A clear example of natural law thinking can be found

in [28] Humanae Vitae.4 The bare bones of the argument can be stated as follows. The

nature and purpose of marriage and sexual intercourse is (1) to foster the relationship

between husband and wife and (2) to produce and educate children. Hence, of its very

nature every act of sexual intercourse must remain open in principle to the possibility of

conception. Hence, any artificial contraception frustrates the natural purpose of the act;

hence, it is against the natural law and is forbidden.

There is a minority voluntarist tradition which regards law as arbitrary,

emanating from the will rather than from reason, depending on the authority of God or

the State rather than reason. Scotus is usually considered as a medieval proponent of

such a view. Hobbes was, perhaps, its greatest proponent in later times. In the secular

world of today that view of law as arbitrary, an exercise of power, based on the will of

the people, not answerable to rational foundations, seems to prevail. However, there is

increasing interest in a rational basis for natural law inspired by the Nuremburg trials,

the United Nations work for Human Rights, and the International Criminal Court. Is

there a rational basis for saying that some behaviours are wrong in themselves,

regardless of where, when and by whom they are committed; and that they should be

punished?

The natural law tradition has a rich and distinguished history even though we

have reduced it to a few paragraphs. Our interest is not in the historical details but in our

assessment of the efficacy and validity of this approach – to which we now turn.

2.2 Evaluation: Advantages

Value Ethics 39

(1) From a pedagogical point of view, the natural law approach would seem to

be the simplest, most direct and clearest way of teaching people how to behave morally.

It is particularly obvious in the education of children, who are not yet capable of

discerning the reasons for not lying or not stealing or not playing with razor blades. The

most expedient approach is simply to command, ‘don't do it; you will understand the

reason when you grow up.’ So the simplest way to regulate good and bad behaviour is

to set out a list of rules of what to do and what not to do. Most families, most religious

groups, most in-[29]stitutions and communities keep order by having a clear set of

rules, which everybody knows and is expected to observe.

(2) This approach is reasonably effective; it produces immediate, palpable

results with a minimum of effort. If God commands, then, obviously the law is

important and cannot be questioned and obedience is called for. If the commandments

come from God, who are we to question, or to qualify, or to make exceptions? A parent

represents an authority figure for the child and again commands will usually be carried

out from fear of punishment or a desire to please.

(3) Obedience is the one important virtue in this schema. There is no need for a

long process of education, nor personal soul-searching, nor complicated moral

reasoning. You know where you stand; if you keep the law then you are a good person;

if you have broken the law then you are a bad person; there is little room for moral

ambiguity. If there is a clear list of good behaviours, the implication seems to be that

you just follow them and you are a morally good person.

(4) Compliance or non-compliance is easily verified when there is such a clear

set of rules. This allows for punishment and rewards. Hence fear of punishment and

desire for reward can be used as motivations to keep the law. The difficulty with vague

exhortations is that they are open to different interpretations. The advantage of specific

Why a Value Ethics?

40

clear rules is that there is little room for interpretation and it is clear to all whether they

are observed or broken.

(5) Natural law philosophy claims to have a solid rational foundation. It has a

coherent method, a way of proceeding; it can cope with new situations by applying the

basic method; it claims a uniformity that is based on human nature and hence

transcultural. It has a clear notion of right and wrong and preserves Aristotle's basic

intuition that some behaviours are wrong in themselves regardless of conventional law.

In the contemporary climate of relativism, natural law stands out in its claim to

objectivity of moral laws.

Disadvantages.

(1) The main disadvantage of an ethics of law or command would seem to be

that it is largely confined to the externals of behaviour [30] and misses out on essential

elements of intention, motive, responsibility, conscience and personal freedom. External

observance of rules may hide hidden motives, hypocrisy, doing the right thing for the

wrong reason. If external observance is all that is required, it can lead to a very

superficial moral life. External behaviour provides ready, verifiable evidence of

observance so it is tempting to be satisfied with that. But surely moral development

includes development of moral sensitivity, of an autonomous moral conscience, of

moral virtue and taking pleasure in doing good.

(2) Observance of law can never do away with the need for intelligence,

prudence and goodness in the application of general laws to particular situations. Laws

are of their nature general or universal. But the situation in which the law is to be

applied is always particular and concrete and unique. No matter how detailed you make

the laws there is still a gap between the law and the unique situation in which it is

applied. The act of applying the correct law to the appropriate situation in the right order

of priority requires both intelligence and rectitude. Aristotle recognized that knowing

Value Ethics 41

what is the right thing to do required the virtue of prudence, meaning, deliberating well

about matters conducive to the good life in general.(N.E. 1140a30) But he also

recognized the need for equity, which he defined as "a rectification of law in so far as

law is defective on account of its generality."(N.E. 1137b26) So applying laws to

concrete situations requires insight, prudence and equity. Circumstances alter cases and

every rule has its exceptions. Intelligence, goodness and discrimination cannot be

excluded no matter how many or detailed the laws may be.

(3) There are different kinds of laws, commandments of God, Canon Law of the

Church, natural law as a moral philosophy, civil laws, cultural rules, traffic laws, rules

of etiquette, local customs, regulations for hygiene, rules for keeping fit, and so forth.

Discrimination is needed to sort out which law is relevant, which one has priority, and

what has to be jettisoned. There are some rules that are more important than others; how

to balance them in a situation of conflict requires understanding and goodness. Further,

some laws are just and other laws are deemed unjust. Must you obey unjust laws? Who

is to say that a law is unjust? If something is legal does it [31] mean that it is also

moral? Is it a sufficient self-defence to claim that you were obeying the law or you were

following the order of a superior officer?

(4) You often find that moral laws tend to be negative. It seems to be easier to

define what not to do than what to do, to define what is wrong and immoral than to

define what is right and moral. The scope of what is wrong behaviour is perhaps

narrower and easier to specify that the scope of good behaviour. Parents' rules for their

children are usually a list of what not to do; 'Go and find out what Johnny is doing and

tell him to stop'. Many of the Ten Commandments are negatives. Moral laws tend to be

minimalist, defining the minimum necessary to avoid doing wrong. It is easier to list

what is forbidden, than what is required for living a good moral life.

Why a Value Ethics?

42

(5) Continued adherence to the mentality of obedience to laws actually hinders

growth in moral sensitivity and maturity. It is a characteristic of children to work by

such rules from their parents, their culture, their government and their church. But there

comes a time when they are expected to take responsibility for their own decisions and

lives. They have to sort out which of these laws continue to be relevant to adult life.

They realize that different criteria are needed to make good adult decisions. They grow

out of automatic obedience and ask what is the purpose of such laws. Moral maturity

seems to imply some degree of moral autonomy.

(6) Natural law, as a formal moral philosophy, is disputed on a number of

important points today. Does the authority of natural law come from the eternal law in

which it participates or does it stand on its own on the authority of reason? Is human

nature to be understood from a biological perspective or from a rationalist perspective or

from a holistic personalist view? What is this 'nature', which is rejected by empiricists,

existentialists, linguistic analysts, and situationists? Is this deductive method really

fruitful; should there not be more room for inductive method? Where do these

definitions of human nature, the nature of marriage, the common good, etc. come from?

Is it legitimate to move from the 'is' of nature to the 'ought' of moral laws, from fact to

obligation? Are laws to be under-[32]stood as arbitrary decrees of the will of the

powerful or are they dictates of right reason? How do we balance obedience to law and

the autonomy of conscience? Natural law moral philosophers propose different answers

to these basic questions.

The natural law tradition has been a pillar of moral teaching for millennia. It is

clear that there is something solid there in terms of asserting that some things are wrong

in themselves regardless of convention. However, the emphasis on formulated rules,

perhaps, leads to a neglect of motivation, conscience, moral autonomy and the problems

Value Ethics 43

of applying general rules to specific situations. How can we preserve what is good in

natural law philosophy and incorporate activities of personal evaluation?

3 Virtue Ethics

A virtue ethic systematizes the data of moral philosophy around a different

question. Instead of asking for a list of good and bad human actions, virtue ethics asks,

What is a good human person? What are the virtues to be developed and the vices to be

avoided in becoming a good moral human person? Instead of a list of rules about human

behaviour, we elaborate a list of virtues to be acquired and vices to be avoided in

becoming a mature moral person. Virtue ethics then focuses on the definition of the

virtues and vices, the education or discipline necessary to become virtuous, the

difficulties encountered and the end to be achieved. Educators and parents

spontaneously use this approach when they appeal to their charges 'to be brave', 'don't be

selfish', 'control your temper', 'act your age', etc. This tradition also has a respectable

historical pedigree and the dominant figure here is also Aristotle.


For Aristotle ethics is a subordinate part of politics. Politics asks, What is the

best way of organizing the polis in terms of leadership, constitution, good civic order,

the best system of education, and so on? Given that context, ethics asks, What is the

best way of life for the individual person in the city state? What is the best kind of life

for [33] the free citizen? What is his final end? Where is happiness to be found? What

are the virtues that he should strive for? What kind of a person should he strive to

become? Can we define this ideal person, this ideal way of living? He answers these

questions in terms of defining and dividing virtues and vices, but first he has to be clear

about basic terms and relations.

Socrates and Plato had tried to define piety, courage, justice and other virtues

but in most cases they seemed to fail. Probably they failed because they tried to define

Why a Value Ethics?

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these virtues in isolation, without having set a context or procedure for the effort.

Aristotle does not make the same mistake and so his first task in the Nicomachean

Ethics is to define the scope of ethics, the notion of happiness, the purpose of man, his

final end, the function of man; finally, virtue and vice, and ultimately the particular

virtues and vices individually. The advantage of this procedure is that you set up a

system of terms and how they relate to one another. He is moving from descriptive to

explanatory relations. Happiness is contrasted with pleasure; virtue is set off against the

vices by excess and defect; end is distinct from means; potency is related to act, etc.

Aristotle's approach to ethics is called 'eudaemonist', meaning orientated

towards happiness, determined by the end of seeking for happiness. His ethics is also

called teleological, meaning operating in terms of a final end. Aristotle clearly thinks of

man becoming. His basic metaphysical categories are potency and act. He sees humans

as developing from potentiality to actuality, childhood to adulthood and changing all

through life. We are not born actually virtuous; we are born with a potentiality to

become virtuous or vicious. He realizes that the main categories to be dealt with in this

struggle to become a good human person are happiness and pleasure. Happiness by

definition is the final end of man. It is that which is chosen for its own sake and for the

sake of which everything else is chosen. It is never a means but always an end; it seems

to be both a subtle feeling and a state of mind. It seems to mean a kind of self-

fulfilment. Jonathan Barnes says, "The notion of eudaimonia is closely tied, in a way in

which the notion of happiness is not, to success: the eudaimon is the man who makes a

success of his life and actions, who realizes his [34] aims and ambitions as a man, who

fulfils himself."5 The happiness that Aristotle is talking about is a total self-

transcending self-fulfilment of every aspect of the person; it is not to be confused with

the happiness of modern usage, which is often the same as pleasure.

Value Ethics 45

He defines virtue as "a purposive disposition, lying in a mean, that is relative to

us and determined by a rational principle and by that which a prudent man would use to

determine it." (N.E.1107a1) A virtue is a disposition or a habit; you could call it an

inclination, a spontaneous tendency, an orientation. It is built into the chemistry, the

biology, the emotions, the psychology, the mind of the person. Virtue is a mean

between two extremes: Aristotle hits on this trick of defining the virtues by contrasting

them with two flanking vices, one by excess and one by deficiency. In this way he is

able to work out a table of the virtues flanked by their corresponding two vices. A

simple example is bravery, which is a mean between cowardice and foolhardiness in the

context of fear and danger. The coward is vicious because of deficiency; he has no

control of fear in the face of danger and runs away. The foolhardy person is vicious

because of excess; he overcomes his fear completely so that he does foolish things

regardless of the danger. This helps to set up the system of terms and relations where

the terms define the relations and the relations define the terms. The vices help you to

understand the virtue; and understanding the virtue helps you to understand the vices.

Also the virtues are related to one another in various ways. So we are getting an

explanatory account of the virtues and vices.

So Aristotle builds up a picture of the good man by defining the moral and

intellectual virtues. The moral virtues he defines are temperance, bravery, generosity,

munificence, high-mindedness, ambition, good temper, friendship, humour,

shamefulness and a whole book on justice. Intellectual virtues are those which perfect

the intellect: science, art, wisdom, intelligence, prudence, deliberation, understanding,

judgment and cleverness. Be aware that these are translations of Aristotle's terms and

may not correspond with contemporary usage. [35]

He establishes a very important principle, that the good and wise man is the

criterion and standard of goodness. He looks for this standard not outside in laws or

Why a Value Ethics?

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books, or traditions or beliefs or analysis of human action but in the person himself. It

is the good man who knows best about goodness. His affectivity and psyche and habits

are in harmony with his principles and so the truly good is identical with the apparent

good. "For the man of good character judges every situation rightly; i.e. in every

situation what appears to him is the truth. Every disposition has its own appreciation of

what is fine and pleasant; and probably what makes the man of good character stand out

furthest is that fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of

standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant."(N.E.1113a30)

In book seven he deals with the virtue of temperance and the vice of

intemperance. He identifies persons who are weak-willed and those with self-restraint;

those who are tough and those who are soft; those who can control their appetite for

pleasure and those who cannot.

Book eight and nine Aristotle devotes to friendship, which he considers a kind

of virtue. There is (1) friendship of utility, based on business, trade, practical co-

operation; (2) friendship of pleasure, where you get pleasure out of a person's company,

e.g. a witty person who tells interesting and amusing stories attracts friends; (3)

friendship of goodness is real friendship which Aristotle highly praises and values. It is

a kind of love of one another, unselfish and enduring.

In the final book ten, Aristotle considers the question of what is the highest

perfection of man, what kind of life is the most virtuous, the most pleasant and the

happiest. He has no doubt that it is a life of contemplation by which he means, wisdom,

philosophy, study of first philosophy, thinking about the highest things namely God. It

is in these activities that man reaches his peak and is at the same time happiest and

attains the highest pleasure. He speaks of intellect as the 'divine spark' in us. This is

certainly a reflection on the life of Aristotle himself, who surely devoted most of his

time to philosophy and got the greatest pleasure out of it. He had the habit of wisdom;

Value Ethics 47

the [36] sign that you have the habit is that you do it spontaneously and with pleasure.

Perhaps, our own experience differs from that of Aristotle because we have not got the

habit of studying – we do not get pleasure from it. For us it is a struggle; we are in-

between; we seek our pleasures in more accessible forms.

Aristotle's method of doing ethics, then, can be summed up briefly in the

following manner. First, establish the basic purpose of human nature, the final end of

man, get a clear notion of the target he is aiming at. Then, we ask what kind of qualities

will man need to achieve that perfection. These qualities are the virtues to be attained

and the vices to be avoided and this gives us a picture of the good man growing towards

his final end. The good life is a life of moral and intellectual virtue, justice and

friendship. The fullness of happiness and the most pleasure is to found in contemplation

of the divine. The ten books of the Ethics give us a systematic, explanatory, theoretical

account of the moral life.

Aristotle started a tradition of doing morality in terms of defining virtues and

vices. He presents a high vision of what it is to be a human person. It is a classic in the

tradition of moral philosophy because it is so well written, so coherent and detailed, so

sensible in terms of keeping his feet on the ground, and so rich in its appreciation of

virtue and vice.

The Christian tradition as well as adopting a natural law approach, has also

invoked the virtue/vice morality. Many of the exhortations of the New Testament are

framed in that way praising virtues such as patience, humility, forgiveness, kindness,

love, trust, bravery etc. Much preaching is based on the vices to be avoided, the

attitudes that are evil, and the bad habits that will be punished. It is very natural to

invoke this approach of praising the virtues and condemning the vices.

Aquinas, as well as having a Natural law philosophy, also devotes much of his

writing to defining virtues and vices; about two thirds of the Summa Theologiae is

Why a Value Ethics?

48

devoted to the virtues. He elaborates considerably on Aristotle while accepting most of

what Aristotle has to say. As well as the moral and intellectual virtues we also have the

theologi-[37]cal virtues, the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity. The Catholic

tradition continues to invoke the virtue tradition in its spirituality, its moral teaching, its

preaching and exhortation.

After lying neglected for centuries, Aristotle and virtue ethics seems to be

undergoing a current revival.6 To counteract contemporary confusion about the basis of

moral obligation, it is easy to invoke the virtues, which are unquestionably desirable,

and the vices, which are equally obviously to be condemned. In reply to contemporary

emotivism, MacIntyre invokes the tradition of Aristotle's virtue/vice ethics. He

considers that we have lost an integral understanding of the good life as conceived by

Aristotle but claims that this intelligibility can be retrieved with effort. "My own

conclusion is very clear…..the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that

restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and

commitments."7

Again, we have but sketched the bare bones of the history of a virtue ethics with

a view to taking our bearings, appropriating the achievements of the past and learning

from their failures. Let us now evaluate this tradition, this procedure, and this approach

to systematizing the data of morality.


(1) A virtue ethics seems to include many interior aspects of intention,

motivation, and human aspirations, that are not found in a morality that confines itself

to the externals of human actions. Virtue ethics focuses on the person: what kind of a

person? what does he stand for? how does he react? what can you expect of him? Thus,

it is more holistic than an ethic of rules of external behaviour. Virtue ethics focuses on

Value Ethics 49

what kind of a person we want to become, how character can be formed, how emotions

can be guided, how good habits are ingrained.

(2) Virtue ethics is effective in that it appeals to deep human aspirations. It

presents role models that inspire people to imitate their heroes, their saints, their ideals.

Aristotle in defining the virtues and vices was drawing up a picture of the great-souled

person, the ideal [38] model for that time and place. We spontaneously admire great

persons and want to be like them. It is very effective pedagogy to have such a model to

imitate. Children's stories put before them models of heroes and villains which inspire

their imitation and abhorrence. Literature and drama present us adults with more

sophisticated models for admiration or condemnation. Virtue ethics can be a very

positive force for good, in contrast to laws which often tend to be negative.

(3) Virtue/vice ethics embodies a good understanding of the dynamics of moral

education. It recognizes that we are not born virtuous; that virtue has to be acquired;

that feelings need to be disciplined; that good models, good ideals, good examples must

be presented. It is a positive, flexible approach to moral education. It recognizes that

there is such a thing as moral development, that it does not happen automatically but

needs to be nurtured. It does embody a vision of self-fulfilment of human potential. It is

very close to character formation.

(4) Aristotle gave philosophical respectability to virtue/vice ethics – it is not just

pious exhortation. With Aristotle ethics becomes explanatory: we can talk intelligently

abut the purpose of human life, about happiness and pleasure, about virtue and vice,

about moral education, about voluntary and involuntary, deliberation, choice, wish,

feeling, etc. A positive development has taken place; his work is an example of the

permanence of genuine achievement.

However, we can also discern disadvantages and weaknesses in this approach to

systematizing morality.

Why a Value Ethics?

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(1) There is the difficulty of defining the virtues. Even when Aristotle has

defined bravery, he still has to point out five kinds of behaviour, which look like

bravery, but in fact are not. Many aspects of behaviour do not fit the schema of excess

and deficiency, e.g., continent and incontinent, justice and injustice, friendship. Some

would question his principle that virtues are always a mean between two extremes.

Further, definitions of virtue seem to change. How do we define prudence today? How

do we define tolerance? How do we define justice? How do we define chastity? We

would hardly be satisfied with Aristotle's treatment of these topics today. [39]

(2) The question arises: does defining virtue make you virtuous? Does knowing

the Nicomachean ethics inside out make you virtuous? Does studying virtue make you

virtuous? Are virtues taught by instruction? What have we gained by defining virtue if

we have not become virtuous? In what way does instruction contribute to becoming

virtuous? Aristotle recognizes four situations where we know what is the virtuous thing

to do, but do not do it.(See N.E. 1146b5-1147b17) Plato seems to have identified

wisdom and virtue. Aristotle is more realistic, recognizing our weakness, our tendency

to rationalize, to convenient forgetting, and giving way to passion.

(3) Are lists of virtues and vices really foundational or are they simply another

form of relativism? Aristotle's list of virtues and vices represents his vision of an ideal

aristocratic Greek, from the city of Athens, in the context of that social, political and

cultural situation. In many ways it is dated and would not coincide with a contemporary

list of virtues and vices. It can be argued that each culture has its own models of human

conduct and hence this ethics would be relativist. The Spartans praised warlike qualities

and personalities; the Greeks lauded intelligent and wise persons; the Cretans wanted

business people, hardworking and money-making. Today, Americans, Africans,

Europeans, Hispanics, might each draw up their own lists of virtues and vices with little

unanimity between them. Does this lead to relativism? Are all cultures different? What

Value Ethics 51

do they have in common? It would seem that the virtue/vice approach is not ultimately

foundational. How do we pick our list of virtues and vices?

(4) To acquire a virtue requires effort to restrain one’s inclination to pleasure;

hence it requires self-denial, discipline and character formation. From that point of view

it is difficult and unpopular in our modern culture, which seems to adopt a more laissez-

faire attitude to personality development. Discipline, punishment, character formation,

restraining emotions, postponing gratification, instilling habits, and the like, are not

often high on the curriculum of schools or families.

(5) Aristotle still did not have a clear notion of the basis of moral obligation,

human conscience, freedom, personal responsibility, will [40] and love. In that sense his

ethics is not fully critical. There still seems to be something missing.

(6) You might question the principle that the good man is the criterion and

standard of goodness and virtue. You might criticize him that his ethics is too vague; he

does not give specific answers to specific questions about human actions. He simply

appeals to the virtue of prudence to apply general principles to concrete situations. But

yet the specific question as to which human actions are to be praised or blamed are

legitimate and he does not seem to be able to answer them. It is only the good and wise

man who will know the answer to that question. But where do we find the good, just

and wise man when we need him?

In conclusion, we can see that the virtue tradition has a valid and important

place in the history of ethics and in any pedagogy or philosophy of morality. We

distinguish and contrast the natural law tradition and the virtue/vice philosophy but we

can see that in many ways they are complementary rather then contradictory. Which

raises the question as to how they are to be fitted together? In what way are they

complementary; why are they so different in method, principles, definitions and

conclusions? What is the role of virtue ethics in the moral education of our children?

Why a Value Ethics?

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4 An Ethic of Feeling

An alternative tradition systematizes the data of morality around the principle of

identifying the good with some specific feeling, such as pleasure, approval, efficiency,

or utility. This is more a grouping of philosophical schools than a single homogenous

tradition but we put them together for the sake of convenience. These schools have in

common the identifying of a single feeling that can be used as a criterion for

distinguishing right and wrong moral behaviour. The particular sensible criterion of

feeling chosen determines the method, the procedure, the principles and the conclusions

of the philosophy. This procedure yields concrete conclusions as to priorities, decisions

and actions in concrete living. In general it is an empiricist approach, excluding rational

judgments and abstract laws and appealing to the [41] sensible concrete data of the

experience of moral living. Let us conduct an overview of these schools, again not with

a view to advancing historical scholarship, but with a view to learning about the role of

various feelings in moral judgments and decisions and to what extent these feelings

give us knowledge of good and evil.


(1) Epicureans, Epicurus (341-270), also the Romans, Horace, Ovid and

Lucretius, explicitly defined the pursuit of pleasure as the final end of man. They noted

that animals naturally seek for pleasure and avoid pain and humans to a large extend

seem to follow the same example. They suggest that we organize our lives explicitly,

then, around the principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. This actually

requires a certain amount of ingenuity as certain pleasures often involve pain, e.g.

drinking too much wine can lead to a hangover. Pleasures are of different kinds, some

are more sensible, some more subtle and intellectual; pleasures vary in their intensity,

depth and duration. Discrimination has to be shown and life must be viewed long-term

and not just the passing pleasures of the moment. The slogan of 'eat drink and be merry,

Value Ethics 53

for tomorrow we die' does not give a fair impression of the Epicureans. Tranquillity of

mind was pre-eminently valued: if you are at peace with yourself and the world and if

you are not in pain, then you are happy. The good life involves being independent of the

ups and downs of fortune. They actually worked out a system of virtues, evaluated

according to their power in producing happiness. They also emphasized the value of

true friendship as a source of lasting pleasure.

This Greek/Roman philosophy of life emerged often in later times as variations

of Hedonism, sometimes as a philosophical theory, sometimes expressed in the

priorities and values of a way of life. Aristotle always considered that the masses and

the youth were led by the principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. There is

something very human and perennial about hedonism; it is not by any means dead;

there is a bit of the hedonist in all of us. It does place the attraction of pleasure and the

avoidance of pain at the very centre of moral evaluations – in that it gives coherence to

a way of life. [42]

At some later point we will distinguish happiness and pleasure, and the role they

play in the moral life. I will suggest that there is some parallel with the distinction we

make between value and satisfaction, when we consider moral conversion.

(2) Moral Sense Theorists. This group of moral philosophers focused on

psychological analysis of the role of various feelings in the moral life. Anthony Ashley

Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), (1671-1713), Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) are classified as Moral Sense theorists because of their

shared conviction that there is a moral sense by which we know right from wrong.

Shaftesbury reacted against the pessimism of Hobbes view of ‘man as a wolf to man’.

He emphasized that generous affections for the good of others leads to happiness; that

goodness lies in the proper balance of affections; the moral sense inclines us to do good.

Bishop Butler distinguished three levels of feeling, the lowest being affections and

Why a Value Ethics?

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passions, the second being self-love and benevolence, the third moral sense and

conscience. Hutcheson defined the moral sense as the faculty of perceiving moral

excellence and its supreme objects. The aesthetic sense gives an immediate intuition of

the beautiful; the moral sense gives an immediate intuition of the good, namely, an

immediate, direct, simple perception of the good.

(3) The Classical British Empiricists. Empiricists claim that all knowledge is

really a form of sensation or laws of the imagination. How can ethical statements be

subsumed into this approach? How are statements about right and wrong, good and bad

to be verified in sensation? Let us take David Hume (1711-1776) as perhaps the most

radical of the classical British empiricists as an example. In his, Enquiry Concerning

the Principles of Morals, Hume uses empirical method to describe the workings of the

moral life; just as Newton has explained the movements of the planets, using the same

method Hume set out to explain moral experience. He discourses on the feeling of

benevolence, the usefulness of justice for order in society, deals with self-love, merit,

approval and disapproval. He is describing why we act, how we respond to sentiment,

how we come to have beliefs about right and wrong. He admires cheerfulness, courage,

tranquil-[43]lity, benevolence, politeness, wit, ingenuity, utility, happiness. But when it

comes to the crunch, whether we know right from wrong by reason or by feeling, Hume

unequivocally opts for feeling: "The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It

maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever

mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and

vice the contrary."8 "It appears evident, that the ultimate ends of human actions can

never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to

the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual

faculties."9 Approval or disapproval – knowing certain behaviours to be right or wrong

Value Ethics 55

– are matters for sentiment not for reason. In his view, moral perceptions are not to be

classed with the operations of the understanding but with tastes or sentiments.

(4) Utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) did not invent the principle of

utility; what he did was to expound it explicitly and universally as the basic principle of

both morals and legislation. The principle of utility judges human actions in terms of

their consequences in producing pleasure or pain. His presumption was that every

human being seeks by nature to attain pleasure and avoid pain, a psychological

hedonism. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,

pain and pleasure. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every

effort we make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.

Right actions are those which tend to increase the sum total of pleasure while wrong

actions are those which tend to diminish it. From this he formulates the greatest

happiness principle: the right end of human action is to seek the greatest happiness of

the greatest number of those involved in the question. He provides a hedonistic calculus

to help work out the sum total of pleasure involved in alternative courses of action. He

takes account of factors such as intensity of pleasure, duration, certainty or uncertainty,

propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity and extent. Government aims at the

harmonisation of interests to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. [44]

(5) Logical Positivism and Linguistic Analysis. This group of philosophers

question the precise meaning of ethical statements and analyze the propositions that

make up a moral philosophy. We will just consider briefly two examples of this trend.

G.E. Moore (1873-1958) published Principia Ethica in 1903 in which he

famously declared that 'good' is indefinable, by which he seems to have meant that it

cannot be explained in any other more basic terms or reduced to any other notion. This

gives him a weapon to criticize most of his predecessors who tried to explain moral

goodness in terms of happiness, pleasure, utility, consequences, etc. The notion of the

Why a Value Ethics?

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good is like the notion of yellow; it is simple, direct, immediately perceptible, and very

difficult to define or express in other terms. To explain 'good' in terms of pleasure is to

commit the naturalist fallacy, which is an illegitimate transition from an 'is' statement to

an 'ought'. This is always illogical and never possible; if the premises only contain

factual statements, the conclusion cannot contain statements of value or obligation. The

good is one thing and pleasure is another. We perceive goodness directly, just as we

perceive the colour yellow; we cannot confuse it with anything else.

A.J. Ayer published his Language, Truth and Logic in 1936.10 He presumes that

metaphysical statements are meaningless because they cannot be verified by reference

to sensible experience. Can the statements of ethics be saved from the same critique?

This is how he deals with the question.

We shall set ourselves to show that in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary 'scientific' statements; and that in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false. 11 A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements. But it should, by giving an analysis of ethical terms, show what is the category to which all such pronouncements belong.12 We begin by admitting that the fundamental ethical concepts are unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can [45] test the validity of the judgements in which they occur...We say that the reason why they are unanalyzable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more that if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.'...I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.13 In fact we may define the meaning of the various ethical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordinarily taken to express, and also the different responses which they are calculated to provoke.14 So according to Hume, ethical statements in so far as they go beyond factual

scientific statements are simply expressions of emotions. The task of ethics is the

analysis of ethical terms and to show what categories they belong to. Ethical judgments

are simply expressions of emotions of approval or disapproval. His example of the

Value Ethics 57

proposition 'you acted wrongly in stealing that money' being equivalent to the factual

statement, 'you stole the money' plus emotional of disapproval, has been much

discussed and criticized since.

(6) Contemporary Emotionalism. MacIntyre seems to consider emotivism as

the greatest challenge to ethical philosophy in the present time. His own writings are an

attempt to response to this challenge to the extent that he is able. I would agree that it is

a common view and pervades our culture as well as the empiricist philosophical

tradition. MacIntyre describes emotivism in the following terms:

Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.15 For what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no valid rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence that there are no such standards.16

The empiricist tradition concentrates on the feelings and sentiments that enter into

ethical judgments, decisions and actions. Propositions, if they are to be true, must be

verified in terms of sensible [46] experience and so ethical statements must be verified

in terms of pleasure, or happiness, or approval, or utility. Let us try to evaluate this long

and diverse tradition in general terms of advantages and disadvantages.

4.2 Evaluation: Advantages.

(1) One can certainly say that this tradition has highlighted the role of feelings in

the unfolding of human moral codes, decisions and actions. It is certainly true that we

act out of emotion and that all our judgments, decisions and actions are coloured by our

loves and hates, our likes and dislikes, our pleasures and pains, our approvals and

disapprovals. It would seem to be very one-sided to think that we act on the basis of

pure or practical reason alone. The likes of David Hume and Adam Smith have given us

rich descriptions of the sentiments in the ethical life.

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(2) The empiricists attend to how people actually behave and how feelings do

play a part in their moral lives. They use empirical inductive method in their

observations. They penetrate behind the action to the motive, feeling, passion that

inspired it. They use introspection in sorting out these various feelings. They have

identified various feelings and shown how they enter into moral decisions and actions.

It would be foolish to exclude feelings entirely from a system of morality. It is a very

difficult area and we should appreciate their contribution to identifying and highlighting

the emotional side of ethics

(3) They remind us to be very precise and accurate in our use of language and

attend to the meanings, functions and use of propositional statements. They raise the

question of how to define and identify moral goodness, which is not as easy as it might

seem at first sight. We will have our own difficulties sorting out the various meanings

of 'good' and identifying the specific meaning of moral goodness. They provide a

background from which we can pose the question of the good very precisely. Above all

we now need to be clear on relating feelings and understanding, pleasure and happiness,

factual and value statements. [47]

Disadvantages .

(1) It would seem to be very one-sided to think that all moral philosophy can be

reduced to the level of feelings. Just as it is a major oversight in epistemology to think

that verification is to be found in sensation, so it seems a parallel oversight to think that

right and wrong are a matter of feeling good or feeling bad. What happens when

someone approves of robbery? Why are your feelings of disapproval superior to his

feelings of approval? Does an ethics of feeling stand up to critical analysis? The crucial

task would seem to be to assign feelings their proper role in moral judgments, decisions

and actions rather than to eliminate entirely critical questions, sound arguments and

good judgments.

Value Ethics 59

(2) It is hard to see emotivism as a basis for moral education. If the good is a

matter of personal emotional preference why should the preference of the professor be

better than that of the student? Which preferences are best? Are they all equal? Is this a

coherent position? What if my emotive preference impinges on your preferences? I find

it hard to imagine an emotivist professor returning home from lecturing in a department

of moral philosophy and then teaching his children that it is alright to steal, if they feel

like it; that they can lie, if that is their preference. Why should the preferences of the

parent be better than that of the child?

(3) How do you argue with someone who holds that you cannot argue? If all

morality is about feeling, why so much argumentation, so much demonstration, such an

effort to prove that this is the correct position? Surely reason has something to say

about this! If there cannot be reasonable discourse about moral principles, what are we

all talking about? How can empiricists claim that there can be no rational justification

for moral positions, when they are clearly making a rational justification for their own

position?

This review of various approaches to feelings in ethics enables us to pose some

questions, precisely and critically. (1) Which feelings are relevant to ethics as the end of

human life, or as the criterion of right and wrong? There is surely a prior question as to

whether pleasure, happiness, utility, virtue, and so forth are the final end of human life.

[48] (2) How do feelings know right from wrong? Is ‘approval’ a feeling or a

judgment? Does conscience operate as a feeling or through feeling? In what way are

feelings a criterion of good and bad? (3) Are there good and bad feelings? Or are

feelings neutral? (4) Description of the influence of feelings on our decisions needs to

yield to discrimination and critique of the positive and negative contributions to feelings

in the moral life.

5 An Ethic of Reason: Kant

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It is not hard to find serious lacunae in an ethic based on feelings alone. Hence it

is not surprising that some moral philosophers went to the other extreme to establish an

ethics on the basis of reason alone. The prime example of this seems to have been

Immanuel Kant in his efforts to purify moral obligation from all empirical elements.


Kant focused on the basis of moral obligation. In his monumental Critique of

Pure Reason17 he tried to identify the pure, a priori elements of human knowing at the

levels of sensation, understanding and reason. He outlined the concepts of sensation,

space and time; the twelve categories of understanding including substance, cause,

relation, existence, etc; and finally the idea of the world, of God and of the immortality

of the soul. His concern was to strip human knowing of all empirical or a posteriori

elements and to identify the purely a priori elements. This was his Copernican

revolution: knowledge was not receiving forms from the world, but the mind imposing

a priori forms on our sense perception of the world.

His efforts in the field of moral philosophy follow a similar path. He is trying to

find the one principle of moral obligation which is purely a priori, solely from the mind

and which is totally unmixed with any empirical, anthropological or psychological

matters. There are many elements involved in moral behaviour; feelings, habits,

intentions, consequences, principles, values, etc. He is not concerned with these; he

does not deny that they are there and that they are im-[49]portant but his task is to find

the one source of moral obligation that will be the same for all. He wrote three books on

ethics, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason

(1788) and Metaphysics of Morals (1797). The Groundwork starts from common

knowledge of morality to strip it step by step of empirical and a posteriori elements, in

order to find the a priori moral law. The Critique of Practical Reason is more detailed;

it begins with principles and uses them to organize and conceptualize various moral

Value Ethics 61

experiences; it is a complement to the Critique of Pure Reason to show the full scope of

reasonable knowledge. The Metaphysics of Moral treats of various problems of moral

judgment and choice in concrete situations. We will follow the outline of the

Groundwork.

He is looking for the basis of moral obligation; this is now called deontological

ethics. He claims that moral obligation is to be found in rationality itself. It is not to be

found in human nature, as the proponents of natural law would hold. Nor is it to be

found in empirical elements like utility, or happiness, or perfection, or feeling, but

simply in the a priori elements of pure reason.

He begins the first section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals by

saying clearly, "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even

beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.” 18 This

is at the beginning of what he calls the First Transition, namely, the transition from the

common rational knowledge of morality to the philosophical. It is the first stage in the

purification of the common idea of morality and he is working towards his concept

based on pure rationality. The only ultimate good then is a good will. There are many

other things, which can be called good but not without qualification. The good will is

good without qualification or reservation. So many things like courage, resolution,

perseverance, riches, power, etc., can be called good but not without qualification

because they can always be abused. "A good will is not good because of what it effects

or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of

its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued

incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought [50] about by it in favour of

some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations."19

To clarify this further he asserts that a good will is one which acts ‘for the sake

of’ duty and not one that acts ‘in accordance with’ duty. Here he is trying to purify the

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will from selfish motives and inclinations by stressing duty. We have an inclination to

seek happiness, but if actions are done for the sake of happiness then, even though they

are done in accordance with duty, they are not done for the sake of duty and therefore

have no moral worth whatsoever. If you keep the law simply for fear of being put in

prison, then, that has no moral worth whatsoever, and is not done for the sake of duty.

It is only those actions which are done for the sake of duty that have moral worth. The

difficulty here is that actions done in accordance with duty often correspond with

actions done for the sake of duty; consequently our motivation is often very mixed and

hard to sort out. But Kant's principle is clear and he tries to maintain it, even though he

realizes the difficulties.

To clarify further the idea of duty Kant introduces the idea of law. Duty is the

necessity of acting out of reverence for the law. The aspect of law that is attractive to

Kant is its necessity and universality. He is trying to find the basis of moral obligation

that is common to all humanity, at all times and in all circumstances and so something

that is necessary and universal is required. The essential characteristic of law is its

universality. It would seem then that the basis of moral obligation is some kind of law.

He then sets out to try to formulate this law and moves on to the Second Transition, the

transition from popular moral philosophy, to a metaphysic of morals.

He formulates the famous Categorical Imperative in this second transition. The

categorical imperative is an imperative or command, which binds of itself and by itself

regardless of purpose, end or consequences. He distinguishes it from a hypothetical

imperative, where there are conditions attached and where something is done simply to

attain some other end. You may work hard in order to get money; that is a hypothetical,

not a categorical imperative. You have a further end in view and you are bound simply

because you have to take the [51] means to attain that end. A categorical imperative

commands actions, not as means to an end, but as good in themselves. The categorical

Value Ethics 63

imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to

any purpose or any other end. His first formulation of this categorical imperative is,

“Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will

that it become a universal law.”20

He gives a second formulation as, “act as if the maxim of your action were to

become by your will a universal law of nature.”21 If you are in a moral dilemma, then

ask yourself could your proposed way of acting be universalized; could you visualize

everybody in the same circumstances following the same course of action, without

producing social chaos. He gives as an example a person tempted to commit suicide.

Could it possibly be accepted that everybody who feels miserable should be permitted

to commit suicide? There might be few people left and thus he concludes that such an

action is not permissible according to the categorical imperative. It is true that this

principle seems to work in very simple examples but the more difficult the examples

become the more problematic this principle becomes. This formulation of the

categorical imperative is known as the universalizability principle. Ask can a moral

choice be universalized and that will reveal whether it is permitted.

He does later give a third formulation of the categorical imperative, namely, “So

act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,

always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”22 He argues that if you

find something that is always an end and not a means, then that will always be

something commanded by the categorical imperative. But human persons are values in

themselves, ends in themselves and so never to be treated as means. Rational nature

exists as an end in itself and so rational nature is the ground of the categorical

imperative. This is an alternative way of asking whether something is permissible; we

ask, are we treating persons as ends or as means. He is thinking of examples where the

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rich exploit the poor and the powerful oppress the powerless. There the principle seems

to apply. [52]

Thus, Kant conceives man as the source of the laws which bind him. Man is

autonomous, the autonomy of the will; man is not bound by laws which come from civil

society, or God, or Church leaders, but by laws which spring from his own practical

reason. To say that a moral will is autonomous is to say that it gives itself the law,

which it obeys. The opposite of this would be the heteronomy of the law; if we accept

the heteronomy of the will we accept the assumption that the will is subject to moral

laws which are not the result of its own legislation as rational will.

That is the kernel of Kant's moral philosophy. He does go on to a consideration

of freedom, immortality and the existence of God. These he has bracketed in his

Critique of Pure Reason because there are no sensible intuitions corresponding to these

ideas. He reinstates them in the Critique of Practical Reason because they are

necessary postulates for a philosophy of morals. It is necessary to presuppose the

existence of freedom, if moral obligation is to have any meaning; hence we are justified

in asserting that we are free. Similarly, it is necessary to think of the immortality of the

soul, so that evil people who triumph in this life may be punished in the next; therefore,

we are justified in saying that the soul is immortal. Similarly, if there is to be a

proportion between happiness and virtue, then we must postulate the existence of God.

His method in summary form was to find the real source of moral obligation in

the dictates of practical reason alone. Here we witness an attempt to ground moral

obligation in reason alone with feelings, motives, inclinations, and other empirical

elements brushed aside. If you can establish moral philosophy on such a basis, then,

you have saved moral obligation from the empiricists, from the emotivists and from the

relativists. Kant claimed that he had established that foundation. It is a different

foundation from that of natural law philosophy or virtue/vice approach of Aristotle.

Value Ethics 65


(1) It is philosophically satisfying to be able to defend the objectivity of moral

obligation in a logical, coherent, comprehensive, convincing formulation. The

categorical imperative is a universal, [53] necessary, first principle. Once you have that

starting point you seem to have a foundation, a universal source of moral obligation.

Particular laws can be justified as applications of the general law to particular cases. It is

satisfying to derive particular moral stipulations from reason, because then you can

claim it is universal and necessary and immune to the vagaries of feelings and passions.

(2) The intention of rational moral philosophy is to defend moral obligation

against the relativists, the empiricists, the nihilists and the sceptics. In this it is well

intentioned and certainly nearer the mark than its adversaries.

Disadvantages.

(1) From a philosophical point of view it might be an advantage to have a

system that is abstract and universal. But for the person in the street this is not much

help in reaching moral decisions and living a moral life. Does anybody actually use the

categorical imperative in any of its three formulations to solve actual real life moral

dilemmas? So much of the drama of human life has been excluded, feeling, motivation,

intention, responsibility, conscience, conversion, pleasure, happiness, all seem to have

been sidelined, if not eliminated totally from moral philosophy. A rationalist morality

seems to imply that humans are reason alone, rather than a more complicated unity in

tension of physical, chemical, biological, sensitive, intellectual, and volitional attributes.

(2) A rationalist morality starts with a logically coherent, universal and

necessary principle. Perhaps it would be better to start with subjects as they are; maybe

there is something to be learned from how persons actually work out their values, make

their decisions and carry them out in a mixture of success and failure in all the contexts

Why a Value Ethics?

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of life. Perhaps, a more inductive approach would be more fruitful and more in touch

with the reality.

(3) Logically coherent, philosophically satisfying formulations of a theory of

moral obligation tend to be static. But it is clear that moral subjects develop through

distinct stages of moral reasoning. Moral education takes them at their present stage and

moves them on [54] to the next. An understanding of the subject's feelings, ambitions,

ways of thinking, and problems at that particular stage is necessary for a good moral

education. It is not enough to present a single, static, system that is the same for

kindergarten, adolescence, adulthood and maturity. Growth and the challenge of

conversion are the reality of moral life with all its success and failure.

Conclusion. Kant sought the principle of moral obligation in reason, either in

the practical or speculative aspect. In both cases moral obligation seems to be the

conclusion of a line of reasoning, a rational necessity. But that would leave Kant open

to the naturalist fallacy, deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. It would also seem to imply

that the rational process comes first and the obligation comes as a consequence. But

children have a sense of moral obligation long before they are capable of syllogistic

reasoning. Traditional cultures often do not have courses in formal logic; does that mean

they have no sense of moral obligation? Is moral obligation – the pangs of conscience –

an imperative of reason or is it a feeling?

6 An Ethics of Value and Valuing

Which brings us, finally, to the last of our major systematizations of the data on

morality in terms of values and valuing. The term value is of recent origin and the

history of axiology – the study of values – covers a short span of two centuries. What is

the significance of this new term and of this shift from talking about the good to talking

of values? It seems that talk of values always brings to mind the valuing subject, the

source of values, the creation of values, and the process of valuing of the concrete

Value Ethics 67

person. Considerations of the good often lead in the direction of metaphysical

speculation, abstract good, the good as a transcendental property of being; value

immediately invokes the subject as valuing, choosing, feeling, thinking, living out

priorities. Hence, it is within the existentialist and phenomenological tradition that the

notion of value began to emerge. This approach seems to be the most promising as it is

focusing on the thinking, feeling, valuing subject in the concrete. Although the word

quickly passes into everyday vocabulary, there is little una-[55]nimity as to the precise

meaning of the term or the critical foundation for its use.

6.1 Historical Sketch.

The term ‘value’ occurs occasionally in Kant, Hume and Marx but in a pre-

modern sense, as equivalent to good. Marx formulated a labour theory of value: a

method of valuing manufactured goods according to the work put in to produce it.

The term ‘value’ began to take on its modern meaning in the works of Rudolf

Hermann Lotze (1817-1881), who propounded a philosophical theory of value. The

context is a post-Kantian problematic, where we cannot talk about values in the external

world without first considering the epistemological conditions for knowing values. He

proposed that the beginning of metaphysics is not in metaphysics itself, but in ethics. In

other words, the good was more universal than being. He sought to view all being in

relation to value. The existence of the world has to be explained in terms of its value, its

purpose and function.

His work was developed by Franz Brentano (1837-1917) in the direction of

psychology and epistemology, rather than metaphysics. He introduced the notion of

intention: psychical phenomena are defined as those phenomena which contain objects in

them by way of intention. "There is no hearing, he says, without something heard, no

believing without something believed, not hoping without something hoped for, no

striving without something striven for, no joy without something to be joyful about – in

Why a Value Ethics?

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short, no act of valuing without a value." 23 He finds a close parallel between theoretical

judgment and emotive acts like loving/hating. "When we know that a thing is good in

itself, what we know is that the feeling of love towards it is right (or justified). When we

know that a thing is bad, what we know is that the feeling of hatred toward it is right."24

He was an intuitionist: he held that there is a definite intuitive experience attached to

both specific judgments and to general moral ideas. The source of moral ideas is intuitive

awareness. His Vienna lectures on the origins of moral knowledge were published in

English in 1902 and greatly influenced G.E. Moore. This latter developed a kind of [56]

ethical intuitionism, which as we have mentioned earlier, was to be very influential in the

English-speaking world.

Alexius Meinong (1853-1921) was a student of Brentano and treated valuation

"as primarily a matter of feeling and secondarily a matter of desire." 25 The primary focus

of values is personal relations. "Value is attributed to things by virtue of their relatedness

to subjects. What lends objectivity to values is the validity of the evaluation by which

they are grasped."26

It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-

1900), as the first existentialist to talk freely in a modern sense of values and their

genesis. He was deeply suspicious of the origin and role of traditional moral values and

claimed they were inventions to preserve the status quo: the master and the slave in their

place of domination or submission. He regarded his task as the unmasking of these false

ideologies and to set man free to become the creator of his own values. Christian values

of love, humility, obedience and meekness arose out of the ressentiment of the slaves of

the power of their masters. Nietzsche was not aiming at a coherent system but was railing

at the poverty, slavery, and superficiality of traditional moral philosophy.

Despite the strong negative streak in Nietzsche's thought, he does affirm the

values of courage, insight, sympathy and solitude. He embodies his ideal man in the

Value Ethics 69

Superman, the man who has taken the place of God, who takes responsibility for his own

thoughts actions and values. He talks of the transvaluation of values; traditional values

undermined because of their dubious origin; his values extolled as authentic, the true

man, the fruit of the will to power.

Nietzsche talks of valuing and the genesis, source, emergence, foundations of

values. It is the process, the source, the origin, the genealogy of moral that captivates his

attention. This is the specifically modern sense of the word value. It is in this context that

the authenticity of values, the truth of value judgments is to be dealt with. His process of

unmasking the hidden motivations, the hermeneutic of suspicion, is of course legitimate

but a dangerous weapon as it can so easily be turned on himself. [57]

Max Scheler (1874-1928) steered a middle course between Kant and Nietzsche.27

Kant's ethics was too formal; it was empty of content, concerned only with the a priori

element in moral judgments. Scheler wanted to incorporate values and feelings into

ethics. He disagreed with Nietzsche who concentrated on the varying contents of moral

teaching over history and hence tended to be a relativist and a nihilist with an undue

emphasis on the will to power as the hidden motive behind ethical theories.

Scheler calls his position emotional intuitionism and non-formal apriorism. "His

central contention is that the meaning of the whole universe is finally measured in terms

of the worth of persons – in terms of the richest fullness and most perfect development of

persons, the purest beauty and harmony of persons."28 He does not want to be a

subjectivist even though he says that values are given in emotional intentionality. "But

he clearly distinguishes between responding emotionally to something as desirable or

beautiful and reflectively judging something to be good or beautiful."29 Emotional

intentionality can point to the presence of values but it also needs an insight into

objective values. We will return to Scheler later to help understand Lonergan’s phrase

‘intentional response to value’.

Why a Value Ethics?

70

This line of thinking was continued by Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) who

declared the need for an awakening, deepening, and broadening of value consciousness.

We discover values and do not create them. Values are given in experience in emotions,

as a hierarchy. Ethics is not just a question of what is to be done but to understand what

is valuable and worthwhile in our universe and our human world. The realm of values is

rich and complicated. He wrote a three volume study of moral values.30 Unfortunately, as

he invoked a simple, direct immediate intuition of value essences, he has little to say on

the constant struggle in each one of us to think, to feel, to deliberate, to know and to live

our values.

Philosophical interest in values and valuing seems to have waned in the second

half of the twentieth century. Although value talk passed into popular vocabulary, there

were no further attempts to give values a critical philosophical foundation. Often the

assumption [58] was that values are subjective, creations of the subject, arbitrary and to

be confined to private life as much as possible.

6.2 Evaluation

It would be premature to evaluate a value ethics in terms of advantages and

disadvantages, as we have yet to elaborate a comprehensive and critical ethics of value.

However, we can already perceive certain preliminary promises and difficulties.

It seems that values and valuing have already passed into popular culture and

many already think and act in terms of moral values, autonomy, authenticity,

conscience, the subject creating values, choosing values, defining values. Surely there

must be some reason for this and there must be some philosophical underpinnings for

this activity. The turn to the subject is surely a positive advance. If we can empirically

describe and identify the activities of coming to a judgment of value, maybe we will be

able to discover some control over true and false values. It seems to offer possibilities

of a flexible, comprehensive, foundational approach to systematizing moral experience.

Value Ethics 71

Perhaps the most apparent disadvantage of a value ethic is the difficulty in

working one out. Value philosophy seems to have been abandoned because of the

difficulty of saving values from subjectivism and relativism. Is it possible to develop a

philosophy of values which will be objective, foundational, critical and creative? The

present text attempts to do precisely that.

7 The Present Situation

Where have all these titanic intellectual struggles left us today? Have we solved

the problem of ethics? Are we moving towards agreement, coherence, deeper

understanding and moral sensitivity or towards disagreements, incoherence,

interminable arguments, misunderstanding and insensitivity to moral issues? We did our

historical review to get our bearings, to learn from history, to appropriate the past in

order to progress into the future. But what about the present? How much of these

traditions are alive and well today? What is the predominant ethos, set of values, theory

of morality being taught in [59] the institutes of higher learning and operating in the

minds of people? Diagnosis precedes treatment, so let us survey the present situation in

the academy, the market place, the schools and the mentality of contemporary culture.

Let us indulge in some gross generalizations to get an overall view of the present

situation of ethics as a professional discipline.

(1) Extensive Menu. Perhaps the first thing that would strike a Martian visiting

higher institutes of learning and inquiring about the teaching of ethics would be the

wide variety of theories, systems, approaches, and alternatives that are on offer. One

introductory text on ethics offers chapters on cultural relativism, subjectivism,

supernaturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism, consistency, the Golden Rule,

moral rationality, consequentialism, non-consequentialism.31 Some very learned scholar

might like to point out that this author seems to have forgotten descriptivism,

eudemonism, proportionalism, probabilism, deontologism, axiology, antinomianism,

Why a Value Ethics?

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rule-utilitarian, act-utilitarian, situationism, discourse ethics, to name but a few. How

many ways are there to skin a cat? Why is it so difficult to answer the question of the

best kind of human life to live?

Some of these are minor groups which we left out of our survey. Situation ethics

holds that as each situation is unique no universal moral norms can fit perfectly.32 The

only rule that applies to every situation is to do the loving thing: love is the only

absolute principle. Other directives only apply if they conform to the law of love. It tries

to steer a middle course between lawlessness and legalism – between being against all

laws and thinking that laws solve all problems. Discourse ethics tries to establish moral

norms in the community. If the forms of communication and dialogue in the community

are open, free, responsible, then the proper order of society and moral behaviour will

emerge. This arose in a post-Kantian context where we cannot have knowledge of moral

norms from experience. This is associated with the work of Jurgen Habermas.

Existentialist thinkers, such as Kierkegaard, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, each made their

own individual contribution to an ethical philosophy and have left their mark on

subsequent generations. Structuralism, Post-Structuralism [60] and Post-Modernism all

have an impact on ethical teaching. Post-Modern philosophers distrust the power of

reason, do not believe in universal laws, want to put behind them the illusions of

enlightenment thinkers. They view any attempts at overarching theories of philosophy

as illusions, as illegitimate totalitarian ambitions. They like to undermine such systems

by revealing the hidden motives behind such schemas, how they are used as instruments

of power to manipulate others, how they can be deconstructed by the hermeneutic of

suspicion. They like to think they have rediscovered the individual, the difference of

each unique singular, the value of the concrete.

(2) Splintered Traditions. Perhaps the second thing that our Martian might

notice is that all the great traditions have splintered and fragmented. There is seldom, if

Value Ethics 73

ever, unanimity even within one tradition as to the interpretation and presentation of the

theories of the founders; and even more so how those teachings are to be preserved,

applied, and taught, in new situations today. MacIntyre compares the present situation

in moral philosophy to the detritus left on a battlefield after near mutual annihilation.

His contention is that only bits and pieces of the great traditions have survived and that

the whole can never be recovered or reconstructed. “The hypothesis which I wish to

advance is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the

same state of grave disorder as the language of natural science in the imaginary world

which I described. What we possess, if this view is true, are but fragments of a

conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance

derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key

expressions. But we have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both

theoretical and practical, of morality.”33 This is a rather pessimistic view of the situation

but he is a respected scholar and is living in the midst of that situation.

The situation is further characterized by him as, firstly, dominated by endless

disagreements and debates which go on interminably, without showing promise of ever

coming to a conclusion. All the debates, analysis, reasoning of intelligent moral

philosophers do not [61] seem to bring agreement. Secondly, he holds that the various

positions are conceptually incommensurable, i.e. “the rival premises are such that we

possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as against another.”34 The

conceptual positions are mutually exclusive; there is no common ground, no way of

solving the dilemma. Thirdly, he notes the predominance of impersonal rational

arguments in these debates: “Its use presupposes the existence of impersonal criteria –

the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer, of

standards of justice or generosity or duty.”35 Not only are the rival traditions

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incommensurable with one another but the remnants of each tradition have lost coherent

context and, like Humpty Dumpty, can never be put together again.

(3) Pluralism. Our world is no longer simple and homogeneous as village

societies once were. We now live in a pluralist, diversified, stratified, variegated,

specialized world. There is a legitimate pluralism of specialization, where each is

trained in his special task, knows more and more about less and less, but is invaluable in

the overall scheme of things, makes his contribution to the whole and benefits from the

specialist knowledge of others. There is a legitimate pluralism of cultures; we speak

many languages, have many characteristic ways of dressing, eating, ways of life, and

styles of relating, meanings and values informing a common way of life. There is a

legitimate pluralism of people of common sense, theoreticians, scholars, holy persons,

artists, and philosophers of consciousness. There is a pluralism of young and old, male

and female, rich and poor, sick and healthy, etc. We are accustomed to this wide variety

of meanings and values, this diversity of styles, tastes, life styles, and ways of doing

things.

Can the same pluralism apply to moral rules, to moral virtues, to moral values?

Can one choose one’s moral values in the same way that you choose a new car? Are the

alternatives good/bad, virtue/vice, right/wrong, value/disvalue, correct/incorrect,

approval/disapproval, free choices in the same way as a brand of toothpaste? Is

pluralism illegitimate when applied to morals? There is a tendency to extend the

legitimate pluralism of cultures, specializations, classes, and so on, to moral rules and

values. So the faculty of philosophy is approached as if it were a supermarket offering a

wide [62] variety of attractive wares and you choose what you wish. The diverse menu

we mentioned is evaluated in terms of personal likes and dislikes, tastes and

preferences, with no rational way of judging which is correct or incorrect, right or

wrong.

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(4) Hermeneutic of Suspicion. One notices a pervading negative streak in terms

of knocking down rather than building up in contemporary moral philosophy. The

hermeneutic of suspicion invites us to suspect any claims to absolute truth or value, to

perceive such claims as manipulation of persons, as expressions of the will to power.

Unmasking invites us to discover the class interests, the bias, the ressentiment, the

hidden ideological interests that lie behind the mask. Claims to know truth and value are

derided as hubris, as illusions, as totalizing systems steamrolling the rights of individual

freedom. Allan Bloom paints a detailed picture of the scepticism, the relativism, the

individualism, materialism and the quiet nihilism of the contemporary college student.36

The pluralism of modern technological society is often taken to imply that just as you

can choose your specialization, your home your bank your toothpaste, so you can

choose your own system of truths and values. A professor can do anything he likes in

the classroom – except teach a set of meanings and values that he considers true. It is

indeed easier to destroy than to construct. The moral landscape does seem to resemble

the post-battle wasteland envisaged by MacIntyre.

(5) Life Goes On. What might surprise our Martian friend is that, despite the

total disarray among moral philosophers, every individual and community, including the

professors of moral philosophy, continue to operate in terms of good and bad, right and

wrong! Parents continue to teach their children not to tell lies, to share their toys with

others, not to use bad language, to eat healthy food. Children are punished for being

selfish and greedy; they are rewarded for working hard, for cleaning their room, for

getting good grades. Professors teach an empiricist emotivism, but then are

conscientious in arriving in time for class, are scrupulously fair in grading papers, teach

their students not to plagiarize, and demand that the department maintain a high

standard of ethical integrity. Society continues to administer justice, punishing crimes

appropriately, demanding just distribution [63] of wealth, upholds the rights of

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minorities, rails at corrupt politicians, or dishonest financiers. We continue to judge

people’s character, classifying some as trustworthy, honest, sincere, devoted, brave, and

others as frauds, cowards, hypocrites, self-serving knaves. As individual moral subjects

we continue to feel satisfied when we fight for justice for the oppressed; we feel guilty

when we do not stand up for a friend unjustly dismissed from his job. We continue to

argue about the rights and wrongs of abortion or stem cell research or issues of war and

peace. We continue to judge the value or disvalue of persons, policies, actions,

programs and institutions. We continue to appeal to conscience, to personal autonomy

and responsibility. We are aware of our personal moral failings, we feel guilty and

ashamed every year we try to do better – not always succeeding.

In conclusion, would our Martian friend note a strange disjoint between what

you and I are actually doing and the theoretical schemas of the philosophers and

professors? Does anybody in his right mind actually operate in terms of applying a

categorical imperative – in any of its three formulations? Does anybody choose and act

in moral matters simply on the basis of feelings of approval and disapproval? Or does

anybody totally exclude feelings in favour of rational argument, reasoned deduction and

theoretical schemas? We seldom operate solely in terms of applying automatic moral

rules to situations and usually appeal to intelligence and conscience in discovering

exceptions and mitigating circumstances. We are helped by imitating our heroes and

abhorring our villains but we recognize the limitations of this procedure. Persons show

remarkable discernment, flexibility and competence in dealing with moral challenges in

everyday life – and they have not done any course in moral philosophy! They have not

studied ethical theory. They are not versed in the history of ethics; they have not read

the classic tomes of the great moralists. There is a disjoint between the theories in the

books and the performance of persons. How has this come about and how can a value

ethic help to bridge the gap?

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To show how this has come about, we will need to distinguish the three stages of

meaning, common sense, theory and interiority. This in turn will help us to diagnose the

contemporary malaise about eth-[64]ics and to show the relevance and possibility of a

new method leading to a value ethics.

8 Why a Value Ethic: Stages of Meaning

We have given a historical review of the principal traditions in ethics and done

so with broad strokes of the brush. But it is possible and helpful to look at the historical

material from an even broader perspective and that helps us to diagnose the present

malaise. We are going to briefly consider three stages of meaning: (1) common sense,

where knowing is undifferentiated and descriptive; (2) theoretical, where knowing is

explanatory, by way of measurement and definition; and (3) interiority where knowing

is of invariant activities rather than specific content. Most of the theories of ethics that

we have considered belong to the theoretical stage. However, value ethics is

characteristic of the third stage of meaning, attend to the activities of the subject rather

than the content of propositions. My diagnosis of the present malaise is that we are

currently moving from the second stage of meaning to the third: from the theoretical

mode to the mode of interiority.37

(1) Common Sense. In the first stage of meaning, each culture has a distinction

between right and wrong, what they value and what they don't value, what is approved

and disapproved of. This is true of traditional cultures as well as modern; we start with

values which are implicit rather than explicit, operative rather then thematized. We do

not start from a state of valuelessness; nobody professes that they have no moral values

in their society! Moral obligation is immanent and operative in everyone. In every

society there is a distinction between good and evil, good people and bad people, right

conduct and wrong conduct, there are laws and rules about how to behave. Evil people

are punished; good people are praised and rewarded. Children are taught a moral code.

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There are various ways of administering justice in the group, settling disputes, and

punishing the guilty.

Traditional cultures are at a descriptive level: values are what seem to me to be

important. In description we relate things to ourselves, we assume a personal

perspective, and we look at things from our [65] own point of view. Near/far, right/left,

up/down, big/small, hot/cold are largely descriptive terms. You understand correctly

only if you grasp the commonsense context of a particular time and place. What is cold

in one place is considered hot in another; what is a big tree in one area is small in

another; what is sweet for one person is sour for another.38

Consciousness is operating in an undifferentiated manner in common sense

mode. The moral, the social, the cultural, the religious obligations have not yet been

named, identified, made explicit and defined. Taboos are confused with moral laws;

feelings of guilt are confused with real guilt; if you are close to a person who is guilty,

then you are often held to be guilty. Laws of hygiene are confused with moral laws.

Legal and moral are not differentiated. You find great variations in the particular mores

of different cultures. Values are operating but there is little or no explicit control of

meaning.

At the stage of description, there are no definitions of virtue and vice, no

concepts of natural law, no definitions of freedom and responsibility, and no distinction

between moral obligation and legal obligations. The moral imperative is operating, but

it has not been identified, made explicit, named, formulated, defined and implemented.

Words are used in a vague sense; writing may not have been invented; grammars have

not been written; terms have not been defined; there is little or no formal moral systems

or codes.

We all start as children operating in a common sense mode; where everything is

related to ourselves as we perceive it; where consciousness is undifferentiated; where

Value Ethics 79

sensing and feeling predominate, when it is difficult to prescind from the view of the

observer. Gradually, we have to learn to share, to follow rules, to satisfy others, to learn

to live in a social world; to understand that we are not the centre of the world

(2) Theory. The second stage of meaning is characterized by the theoretical

mode. Theory relates things to one another; it prescinds from the observer; it sets up a

system of terms and relations. Theory emerges because of the deficiencies of

description. We want to escape the relativity of private perspective, the vagueness of

descrip-[66]tive terms, the ambiguity of undifferentiated consciousness. In the sciences

measurement represents the breakthrough to theory; instead of big we say twelve

meters; instead of cold we say minus five degrees centigrade; instead of up there we say

north northwest. In each case we set up a system of relating things to a standard that

prescinds from the observer’s point of view.

In the human sciences and philosophy it is definition of terms which leads from

description to explanation. Aristotle's Ethics is a prime example of defining a basic set

of terms and relations at the core of ethics, namely, happiness, pleasure, virtue, vice,

perfection, final end, friendship, intellectual and moral virtues. Then he was able to

define each individual virtue with reference to excess and deficiency. Each of the

theories we considered in our historical section are constituted by a basic set of

principles and presuppositions, a method of proceeding and a way of reaching

conclusions. So you build up a coherent system of interrelated definitions within a

system and you have a theoretical moral philosophy.

In our brief historical sketch above, we recognized the ethical theoretical

movements of natural law, virtue ethics, rationalist ethics and emotivist ethics. They

are in theoretical mode. As theories, they start with principles, define concepts, give

explanations, apply universals to human conduct, and reach particular conclusions.

Such theories represent a great advance over the common sense assumptions of

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descriptive thinking. They add clarity, coherence, system, universality, uniformity,

‘objectivity,’ and comprehensiveness to moral understanding. But the theoretical mode

cannot be the final solution: what if you have contradictory theories? In the field of

ethics we have mutually contradictory theories: theories based on natural law, theories

based on virtue and vice, theories based on rationalism, theories based on feeling. What

are the limitations to all theoretical approaches to ethics?

The limitation of any theoretical position shows itself in the choice of first

principles and method. Conclusions can usually be traced back to the principles at the

beginning of the system. But how do you decide on the principles? Why do ethical

theories start with [67] different principles? It seems somewhat arbitrary. We have

pointed out individually the advantages and disadvantages of each system.

Theory cannot explain its relationship to common sense. Theory cannot account

for the advantages of theory over description. Eddington was hung up on the dilemma

of which table was real, the one of common sense, or the one of science. Obviously

only one could be real. As a scientist he had to hold that the scientific table was real.

Therefore, he had to conclude that the table of common sense was an illusion. But it is

a strange position to hold that we live in a world of illusions and only the scientist by

some magic gets to the real. The ethics of Kant illustrate this strange dichotomy

between the abstract rational categorical imperative, and the fact that nobody in his

right mind uses it to make actual moral decisions. People have been acting out of moral

obligation, appetite, emotion, desire, ambition, long before Kant put pen to paper. What

a strange difference between the theoretical world of concepts of Kant, and the real

world of persons challenged by moral dilemmas, thinking and feeling their way to a

solution, looking for advice and information, testing out possibilities and consequences,

tentatively experimenting and learning, finally knowing the right thing to do and doing

it.

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Theory cannot explain why there are a succession of theories and why there are

contradictory theories. Are these theories totally incommensurable? From a logical

point of view the theories we have mentioned start from different principles and

therefore are logically incompatible. But is there no common ground on which theorists

of good will from different traditions might be able to dialogue with one another and

even reach agreement? What are all these theories aiming to achieve? We hold that

there is such a common ground and it is to be found in interiority.

(3) Interiority. The third stage of Meaning involves a shift from theory to

interiority. We have already assumed that more comprehensive higher viewpoint in

presuming to be able to evaluate theories in terms of advantages and disadvantages.

What enables you to look at conflicting theories and compare them to one another?

Such theories are logically incommensurable. The conflicting theories start from [68]

different first principles and so do not have common first principles. What do they have

in common? Each theory is just an answer to a particular question, a derivation from

certain first principles. It satisfies for a time until a more comprehensive viewpoint is

called for. Once you start comparing and evaluating common sense and theory, the

succession and variety of theories, you are moving into the world of interiority.

(a) Interiority represents a shift from the data of sense to the data of

consciousness, from data about the sensible world to data about the activities of our

own minds. In interiority we apply empirical method to the activities of questioning,

thinking, knowing truth and knowing values. When you observe how many activities

are involved in a moral judgment, you realize the one-sidedness of many ethical

theories. Note the strange phenomenon of Hume asserting that all knowledge is

sensation, but at the same time in his performance, understanding concepts, making

judgments, arguing with other philosophers and claiming that his position is the true

one. He failed to advert to the data of consciousness; if he had attended to how he

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actually understood and made judgments and argued with others he would have written

quite a different book. Theories of ethics are either incomplete or one-sided because

they do not attend to the data of consciousness: they do not attend to how decisions are

actually made and executed. It is always tempting to simplify; to reduce ethical

operations to reason, or to feelings, or to obedience to laws. But when we look at the

concrete we realise that ethical activity is highly complex; that many factors intrude;

that the only adequate treatment is one that includes all the elements, clearly names and

identifies them, shows how they are related to one another and to what is a human

person and what he should be. Like building a boat, it is not much use unless it is

complete. So we are suggesting that we look, not so much at a person’s outward

behaviour, not at previous theories, but at the inner workings of your own evaluations

and decisions.

(b) It is a shift from content to activities. The content of moral codes can fill

volumes; the Old Testament is full of laws, rules, precepts, prescriptions, norms, about

worship, marriage, purification, leprosy, eating and cleaning, etc. Other traditions have

their own [69] codes and canons. Many have tried to define and divide all the virtues

and vices. Each culture has its own moral code of conduct with its own variations to

suit local conditions. Such has it been since first homo sapiens emerged from the

forests. Codes of conduct constitute a multitude. But the mental activities, which

produced all these codes, seem to be basically questioning, thinking, formulating,

feeling, criticizing, knowing facts and knowing values. There are an infinity of things

about which you can question; but only one activity of questioning. There are an

infinity of things that can be thought about; but only one thinking.. There are an infinity

of concepts; but one act of conceptualizing. There are an infinity of things to be known;

but only one process of human knowing. There are a great variety of values; but one

activity of valuing. We do not have to know all the codes, rules, principles, applications

Value Ethics 83

of every culture and every time. We are looking for the invariant set of activities that

produce this infinity of instantiations.

(c) Identifying the activities helps us to identify the norms immanent and

operative in ourselves, in all cultures and in all human persons. Why is it that all

cultures have some kind of moral code? Why is it that everybody feels guilty when they

knowingly do something wrong? Why is it that to a large extent we agree that

corruption, injustice, exploitation of people is wrong? Why do we all approve of

progress, of development, of fair distribution of the goods of society? What are the

forces within us pushing us to approve of goodness and to disapprove of evil? What is

the dynamism operating in the activities of questioning value, thinking about what is the

right thing to do, judging what is the best, deciding and acting? These are all questions

we can ask ourselves and will try to answer more clearly in the text.

(d) When we move into the stage of Interiority we find it possible to identify the

source of moral theories. They are no longer incommensurable because we have

recognized the source of all theories. Natural law, moral sense theory and rationalist

ethics have no logical common ground; the starting point and principles of each are

quite different. Hence, there will be interminable disagreements between them at the

level of theory. They cannot even communicate with one [70] another because they are

each within a theoretical system and cannot comprehend any other theoretical approach.

They cannot communicate unless they have something in common; that common

foundation is to be found in interiority.

Interiority is a higher viewpoint which recognizes the source of all these

theories, evaluates their advantages and disadvantages, and finds the common source of

these in the activities of explaining the invariant activities involved in moral

questioning, deliberating, judging, deciding and acting. The conflicting moral theories

are contradictory contributions to the clarification of a single goal. They are resolved,

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not by interminable arguments, but by reaching a higher viewpoint which sees them as

dialectical contributions in the one process.

Conclusion. My tentative diagnosis of the present situation in ethics as a professional

discipline, then, is that we are in a state of transition from the theoretical stage of

meaning, to the stage of interiority. We are moving from thinking of ethics in terms of a

coherent, conceptual system of principles, terms, definitions, relations and conclusions,

to interiority where ethics is conceived in terms of appropriating the activities and

norms inherent in being a good human person. We are moving from system dominated

by logic, to a moving viewpoint dominated by method. We are moving from closed

system to open system; from ethics as a conceptual system imposed from outside, to

personal authenticity, conscience and autonomy properly understood.

The breakdown of theoretical systems is very evident today. The criticisms of

post-modern philosophers are often valid. It is not hard, as we have seen, to pick out the

inadequacies and disadvantages of any theoretical system. So logically coherent

theoretical systems of ethics are accused of being abstract, totalizing, static, inflexible

and impersonal – which they often are. But that does not mean the demise of moral

philosophy. It means it is time to move on to interiorly differentiated consciousness, to

method, to activities, to a personal ethic based on value and valuing. [71]

Many elements of interiority have already emerged in our times. Consciousness

is a common theme. Intentionality analysis is the stock and trade of phenomenology.

Values and valuing are part of everybody’s vocabulary. Conscience, as the ultimate

criterion of right and wrong has wide acceptance, even though sometimes conveniently

distorted. Moral autonomy is accepted as the goal of mature adulthood. Existentialism

has called attention to the subject, feelings, anxiety, choice, risk, self-constitution, the

notion of creation of self and values. The pieces are mostly there; we have to put them

together in a single comprehensive world-view.

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Perhaps what we are saying about interiority will only become clear as we

proceed with our identification of the activities and norms operating in moral life. The

key seems to be the method appropriate for such kind of identification. Our second

chapter will focus explicitly on finding a method that is empirical, critical, inductive,

progressive and foundational.

Suggestions Regarding Questions for Deliberation:

(1) Examples might be: telling a white lie out of loyalty to a friend; missing a lecture to

look after a sick student; break the speed limit on an emergency run to the hospital, etc

(2) You might consider compulsory military service unjust in certain instances. Parental

strictures might in some cases be too severe and unjust. You might consider certain

immigration laws unjust and feel justified in dodging them. You might consider a law

that allows abortion to be wrong. A tax that unduly favours the rich might be considered

unjust.

(3) It is almost impossible to live in peace and mutual understanding without clear

boundaries as to rights and duties, even concerning such mundane topics as, clean up

your own mess, don't disturb another's sleep, meals served at certain times only, etc.

Such rules concretize values such as respect, responsibility, tolerance, justice, love, as

lived in any community or society. [72]

(4) Wise and good persons are the criterion of goodness. Rules can guide them when

they are in unfamiliar territory, or have no time to think. Such a person will be able to

recognize when the rule applies and when an exception arises. The foolish person will

not recognize on his own when the rule applies or not; hence they are better off just

obeying the rule.

(5) You can easily instruct a person in the strategy and tactics of warfare, how to

assemble a rifle and to shoot it accurately, etc. You can simulate battle ground

conditions and indicate appropriate reactions. But can you teach bravery? You can work

Why a Value Ethics?

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on motivation, inspiration, group morale, loyalty and patriotism. You can define bravery

and discuss it endlessly. But in the end it is the person's free and responsible willingness

and desire to be brave that counts.

(6) I presume most parents want their children to be honest and good; it is hard to

imagine a parent who would be proud of his child's dishonesty. We esteem moral values

sometimes without being able to give a coherent account of why.

(7) Discussed in the text. Value priorities might come from parents, religious tradition,

culture, school, books, government, or from yourself – your own immanently generated

values.

(8) A restaurant chain can pledge itself to certain priorities, quality food, fresh food,

prompt service, customer satisfaction, friendly atmosphere, reasonable prices. These are

their values as an institution; this is what we come to expect; this is what we are willing

to pay for; this is what makes the chain a success or a failure.

A philosophy department will have a history, a set of procedures for decision

making, committees, a tradition, a distribution of roles and status, a physical layout of

offices and space, windows and views, large or small desks. All embody values,

importance, a right and wrong way of doing things. The history will embody a certain

tradition, a favouring of one set of values over another; it might favour orthodoxy,

innovation, scholarship, originality, popularity, truth, academic excellence, freedom of

expression, rigor in argumentation, and so on. [73]

A political party fairly obviously embodies certain political values, sometimes

verbalized in constitutions, statutes, written rules of procedures, vision statements,

policy statements, election manifestos, etc. Parties might favour, care for the weak and

marginalized, tax cuts for the rich, jobs for everyone, more efficiency in government

services, reduce or increase defence budget, more money for schools, self-reliance,

competition, affirmative action, reducing discrimination, more law and order, internal

Value Ethics 87

security, etc. These are all values produced by value judgments of various kinds. [74]

Endnotes

1 Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 17, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), “Horizons”, 29. 2 The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, Translated by J.A.K. Thomson, Introduction by Jonathan Barnes, (London: Penguin Books, 1955). I use this translation of the Nicomachean Ethics throughout this book because of its accessibility and readability. 3 Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q 90-94. 4 Pope Paul the Sixth, On the Regulation of Birth, July 1968. 5 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Trans by J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Books 1955) Introduction by Jonathan Barnes, 34. 6 Just to mention a few texts at random: Yves R. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986). Robert Bellah, and others, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, (New York: Harper and Row, 1985). Donald DeMarco, The Heart of Virtue, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996). 7 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 259. 8 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983) 85. 9 Ibid., 87. 10 A. J. Ayer, Language Truth and Logic, (England: Penguin Books, 1936, 1971). 11 Ibid., 136. 12 Ibid., 137. 13 Ibid., 142. 14 Ibid., 142. 15 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 12. 16 Ibid., 19. 17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans by Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965).

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18 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Trans by Mary Gregor, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7. 19 Ibid., 8. 20 Ibid., 31. 21 Ibid., 35. 22 Ibid., 38. [75] 23 Robert T. Sandin, The Rehabilitation of Virtue: Foundations of Moral Education, (New York: Praeger, 1992). 98. I am indebted to his outline of the history of axiology. 24 Ibid., 99. 25 Ibid., 99. 26 Ibid., 99. 27 See Manfred S. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction to a Great Thinker, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1966, 1996). Also Max Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing and Valuing, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 28 R. Sandin, Rehabilitation of Virtue, 101. 29 Ibid., 101. 30 Nicolai Hartmann, Moral Phenomena, Vol 1 of Ethics, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1932, 2002). Moral Values Vol 2 of Ethics, (London: Transaction Publishers, 1932, 2003). 31 Harry Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction, (London: Routledge, 1998). 32 Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966). 33 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2. 34 Ibid., 8. 35 Ibid., 9. 36 Allan Bloom, On the Closing of the American Mind, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). 37 For more on stages of meaning in the context of epistemology see, B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, 24-37.

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38 For more on description and explanation in knowing truth see, B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Three.

2

Method in Value Ethics

For the root of ethics, as the root of metaphysics, lies neither in sentences nor in propositions nor in judgments but in the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness… Accordingly, ethical method, as metaphysical, can take subjects as they are; it can correct any aberration in their views by a dialectical criticism; and it can apply these corrected views to the totality of concrete objects of choice.1


(1) Which systematization of ethical phenomena in the previous chapter best fits your own personal experience of the moral life? (2) How would you explain to your child why it is wrong to tell lies? How would you explain to your self why it is wrong to tell lies? (3) Describe a personal moral judgment, decision and action they you personally made recently – either good or bad. (4) Your house is on fire. You have time to save only three personal items of value. What do you save? [78] (5) A pregnant woman, a professor of philosophy, an old man, a priest, a doctor, a child, an engineer, a navigator, a sailor, a cook, find themselves in a life-boat which will only hold five people. Who would you throw out and why? (6) Close your eyes, be still, think of nothing for five minutes. (7) Do you accept that some kinds of behaviour are absolutely wrong, at all times, in all places, for whatever reason? (8) How would you go about solving a new moral dilemma, such as is involved in stem cell research? 1 Method and Methods

The previous chapter outlined various systems of moral philosophy – however

briefly. Implicit in each of them is a method of doing ethics, beginning with first

principles, and establishing procedures for reaching concrete conclusions. Natural law

ethics relies largely on a method of deduction from primary principles of morality

known naturally, through secondary derived principles, and by the use of prudence to

Value Ethics 91

apply the law to each concrete event. Virtue ethics puts before us an ideal, what kind of

person would we like to become; it defines appropriate virtues and vices and we imitate

and aspire to become that sort of person. An ethic of reason simply requires a lot of

serious thinking about the problem, apply moral reasoning, formulate concepts such as

consistency or universalizability, and with clear definitions and correct reasoning you

will find what is the good thing to do. An ethic of feeling asks you to attend to specific

feelings – either pleasure or utility or approval or sympathy or love. The good is to be

understood in terms of these feelings. These feelings provide a guide for practical

conduct. So you can build up various theoretical systems of ethics in great detail, with

great sophistication, at great length.

But we have already begun to question and evaluate these various systems. We

tend to think that if you have a variety of different theories, then one must be true and

the others false; otherwise it would seem that all systems are equal and you become an

ethical relativist. [79] You may have been surprised that we dealt with these systems –

not in terms of true and false – but in terms of advantages and disadvantages. We

simply compared these theories as to their pedagogical efficacy, their clarity and

coherence, their ability to guide concrete behaviour, their helpfulness in solving

concrete moral dilemmas, their adequacy or inadequacy, their comprehensiveness or

narrowness. It may be that the question of true and false may arise later but for the

moment let us stay with comparing and evaluating the systems as systems. Are these

systems complementary, contradictory, or free equal alternatives? One could ask many

similar questions about value ethics, but that we will do later. To be relating, comparing

and evaluating systems seems to imply that you have reached a higher vantage point

which we have called interiority. How do you do ethics in the stage of interiority? What

is the appropriate method?


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This chapter is devoted to set out an appropriate method which will be empirical,

critical, foundational and progressive. It will be empirical in the sense of verifiable with

reference to data – in this case the data of consciousness rather than the data of sense; in

that sense it will be inductive, starting with data, moving to understanding and ending in

verification. It will be critical in the sense of true; not all hypotheses, fancy ideas,

interesting connections are true. It will be foundational in the sense of going to the

source, discovering the activities and forces behind moral behaviour. It will be

progressive in the sense leading to better understanding, adding to the wisdom of the

past, capable of incorporating improvements, flexible enough to deal with the very

general as well as the incorrigibly concrete. We are not looking for rules, which if

followed will automatically produce results; method is not just following instructions,

but being inventive, creative, flexible and resourceful.

However, let us start at the beginning which would seem to be, start with people

as they are. Each person, in every situation of time and space, is a unique instantiation

of moral behaviour. Behind the richness and diversity of the individual variations, there

seems to be a basic commonality, that we all refer to as moral experience. We feel

guilty, happy, proud, puzzled, shameful, insecure, determined, uneasy, weak or strong.

We experience the emotions of love and hatred, [80] fear and courage, pleasure and

pain, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, happiness and unhappiness, hope and despair and

complacency, loyalty and betrayal, honesty and lying, justice and injustice. We are

embedded in sets of human relationships in the family, the school, the community, the

ethnic group, the society and the nation. Some of these are criminals, some are heroes;

some are hardworking, others selfish and lazy; some are religious, others practical

atheists; some are kind, others are unkind; some are faithful, some cannot be trusted. We

ourselves feel ourselves morally responsible but know that we sometimes succeed and

sometimes fail in our moral obligations. We all share the same underlying activities,

Value Ethics 93

feelings, tensions, successes and failures. Why does the systematization of this data lead

in contrary directions and reach opposing conclusions?

We noticed a strange disjoint between the theories of moral philosophers, and

the universal human experience of moral life. People seem to know that it is wrong to

lie, without doing a course in moral philosophy. Parents seem to be able to teach their

children to be good, without a course in the metaphysics of goodness. Perhaps, if we

explore this innate ability to deal with right and wrong we might have a better starting

point than definitions and axioms. Definitions and principles can be chosen rather

arbitrarily; different definitions and principles will lead to different systems and a

variety of conclusions. Abstract systems lose touch with the experience of moral

discernment, the ethical struggle, the feelings and activities actually involved in moral

living. If we start with people as they are we might be able to learn from them; to make

what is implicit, explicit; to objectify what is performed; to identify, name, interrelate

the various elements involved in moral judgments. Our method is to start with people

as they are in the total diversity and richness of concrete moral experience. We aim to

discern in that diversity the pattern of related activities, that underlie, that are operative,

that are normative in this experience. Hence we move from the richness and diversity of

contents, to the basic invariant pattern of activities, that produces and underlies this

diversity. We move from that to discern what norms are operating within these

activities. [81]

The person, we are taking as our starting point, is obviously yourself. We start

each chapter with suggested questions for deliberation. They are to help you to read

yourself, to check everything that is said in the text with reference to your own moral

experience, to connect with your daily moral triumphs and failures. This is a voyage of

self-discovery; an invitation to discover the moral imperative, the moral activities, the


94

moral feelings, already operating within you. This kind of self-reflection is not easy; but

it is possible and if you are curious about moral systems surely that is the place to start.

We have used this method before in the field of cognitional theory reaching truth

of factual judgments – we called it self-appropriation.2 However, we do not presume

that you are familiar with that text; hence we will give a summary of where we reached

in applying the method to cognitional structure understood as a three level affair. We

will then elaborate on consciousness and self-appropriation as a method in value ethics.

Finally, we will anticipate the kind of ethics that this procedure might produce. Those

already familiar with the method may skip this meagre summary. [81]

Transcendental Desire/ Proper Product Precepts Questioning Activity Question for VALUING Be Value Deliberative Judgment Is it good? Is it of Level Four Responsible worthwhile? Is it Insight Value right? Question for JUDGING Be Reflection Reflective Judgment Is it true? Is it of Level Three Reasonable correct? Insight Truth Question for UNDER- Be Intelligence Direct Formulation STANDING What? Why? Expression Intelligent Where? etc. Insight Definition Level Two EXPERIENC- Be Sense Internal and Images ING External Attentive Appetite Sensing Memories Level One Diagram 1 Integral Cognitional Structure of Truth and Value3 2 Self-Appropriation of Cognitional Structure

Fortunately, we have an example of the method in use as it applies to cognition,

to knowing the truth, and knowing that you know the truth.4 This section will give a

summary of that method in operation as applying to the first three levels of cognitional

Value Ethics 95

operations (See Diagram 1). This will serve us well as a foundation on which we can

build further in terms of further questions and parallel operations at the fourth level. The

problem of knowing values is broader, deeper and more difficult than the question of

knowing [83] the truth. But ethics does seem to presuppose that you can know the truth,

and that there is a method of reaching the truth; values seem to presuppose facts; values

seem to be built on facts. Surely values built on falsehoods will never stand. So a

summary of our main conclusions about human knowing will serve as a jumping off

point for our work in value ethics.

Our reprise of cognition will also serve as an example of the method of self-

appropriation in action. It is a method, namely, "a normative pattern of recurrent and

related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results".5 It is methodical in that

we state our procedure, apply the method, line up the results, check the conclusions,

clarify the terms, attain our position, and account for other views. The method of self-

appropriation can be seen to be effective, to be critical and verifiable in the limited case

of knowing the facts. We can use the same method to apply to the knowing of values,

and then to deciding and acting according to true values.

2.1 Invariant Set of Interrelated Cognitional Activities

The starting point is people as they are in their native confusion and

bewilderment. Theories of knowledge abound; but each theory seems to contradict the

one that came before it. Why are there so many theories, so many disagreements, such a

variety of approaches, so many arbitrary assertions about the power or limits of human

knowing? We found that epistemology was in need of a new foundation, an agreed

starting point, a new method. We found that method in cognitional self-appropriation.

We asked the question, What do you do when you know? Everybody has

experienced some successful examples of knowing, either in solving practical problems,

in solving theoretical puzzles, in applied mathematics, in experimental science, in word


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games, chess and the like. Our focus was on the pattern of activities underlying the

solving of puzzles. Solutions do not come immediately, do not come without a struggle,

do not come without invoking a series of related activities. We appealed to our own

personal experience, because it is here that we have privileged access to examples of

successful knowing. Initially, we were not interested in theories of knowledge but in

[84] the experience of knowing; describe what you do when you engage in a problem

seeking a solution.

The process seems to start when we question something presented to our senses.

It may be a strange object and we ask, what is it; or a leaking pipe and we ask, how can

we fix it; it may be an unfamiliar person and we ask, who is he? There are two elements

here, the presentation of sense and the question. We are presuming the structure of

sensitive knowing characteristic of purely animal knowing continuing to operate in us.

Our sensitive activities of imagining, remembering, coordinating, instinctive reacting,

seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling, we share with animals. The intelligent

question marks the emergence of the purely human knowing, transforming sensitive

knowing into a knowing of universals, of abstract laws, and of universal principles.

The question can be a why, a what, a where, when, how etc. It is intending a

solution but does not know what it is. The question is the dynamism behind the process

of finding a solution. But to be able to formulate a question you must know something

about the matter in hand, some ‘knowns’ from which we can work to the ‘unknowns’.

The question sets the criteria for what will constitute a correct answer. Aristotle referred

to the active intellect as the aspect of taking the initiative, throwing light on images so

that the potentially intelligible will become actually intelligible. The question

illuminates the data with a view to sorting out the relevant and the irrelevant, the

significant and the insignificant. The question initiates the procedure, aims the process

Value Ethics 97

in a certain direction, focuses on finding the correct solution, and continuously rejects

irrelevant or inadequate solutions.

Direct insight is the pivot between puzzlement and getting it, seeing the point,

grasping the idea, getting the solution. The stronger the desire to know, the more we are

likely to find the solution; if you have no personal interest in finding a solution, you

probably won't. Understanding comes suddenly and unexpectedly; we cannot force it,

we cannot presume upon it; we can merely set the conditions which are favourable to

the occurrence of insight. Insight pivots between images and ideas; the data is given in

the senses, the imagination and [85] memory; but the solution is an idea, a definition, a

universal. It is a function of inner conditions of tension, training, concentration, interest

and desire rather than outer condition of time and place; Archimedes found his solution

not in his laboratory but while bathing. The first act of understanding is difficult, a

personal struggle, a triumph; but the insight passes into the habitual texture of the mind;

once you have grasped the correct definition of a circle then each new circle is simply

another example of how the definition works; we do not have to start again with the

question of what is a circle.

Understanding is passive in the sense that it comes, we receive the insight; we

set the conditions but wait for the ideas to come. Understanding is active in that we ask

the questions, search for relevant examples and images, try out various strategies, and

concentrate on the matter in hand. Human understanding is always an idea related to an

image; a form emerging from a phantasm; it is an understanding of what has been

experienced. There is a very basic strategy for answering any question, namely, identify

and name the knowns, identify and name the unknowns, combine the knowns and

unknowns in equations or examples or juxtapositions. Anticipate the solution, write

down the conditions the solution will have to fulfil. Work forward; work backwards.

Sometimes analysis works, sometimes synthesis is more effective. There is a heuristic


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structure operating; thinking is purposive; there is a grand strategy; we can work from

the relatively unknown to the known.

Understanding can be expressed in words, which can either be clear or confused,

undifferentiated or differentiated, descriptive or explanatory. Formulating is a process

by which we put clearly into words the scope of the idea. It is easy enough to recognize

a circle when you see one, but to define it correctly is another thing. Socrates could

recognize individual instances of injustice, but could not find a universal definition. We

seek for clear and distinct ideas as opposed to confused and ambiguous ideas.

Philosophers are continually challenging one another, ‘what do you mean by that

statement?’ There is a continuous call for further clarity, definition, distinctions,

qualifications, reservations; meaning what you say, and saying what you mean. [86]

Some think that once you have clear and distinct ideas you have certain

knowledge but that is a dangerous illusion. A further question arises at this point,

namely, are these definitions correct, does this solution work, can this possibility be

verified in the real world. There have been many theories of astronomy, but which of

them is true? Aristotle distinguished between the question asking for further information

and the question asking, is it true. The truth question is recognized by the fact that the

anticipated answer is simply, Yes or No, Is it true or not? Is it correct? Is it so? Does it

work? Is this the solution we were looking for? This is the critical question. Ideas,

definitions, concepts, laws, generalizations, formulations, can belong to the world of

science fiction as much as to the real world. Presuming that we are asking questions

about the real world, then, we must ask and answer the critical reflective question. The

question for reflection can only be answered after understanding and formulating,

clearly and distinctly. We ask the critical question about what we have already

understood. Is ‘it’ correct? presupposes a sufficient understanding of 'it'.

Value Ethics 99

The question for reflection sets the criteria for a correct answer. How can you

know that this is the correct solution? Well, test it out, think it through to the end. Have

you sufficient evidence or not? Is there counter evidence? Are there gaps in the data? Is

there a clear link between the evidence and the conclusion? We ask these kinds of

questions in commonsense examples of mending pipes, fixing computers, diagnosing

noises in your car. We ask in mathematics when we can usually work backwards to

check if the answer is correct. We ask in experimental science where we can often

construct the crucial experiment. We do so in philosophy where we still must be able to

point to evidence for the truth of our conclusions. So we find that the reflective insight

has a basic structure on the lines of the hypothetical syllogism: Is B true? If A, then B;

But A, Therefore B. The question for reflection demands that a conclusion can only be

affirmed if there is a sufficiency of evidence to show that it is true.

The judgment is where truth is reached, where the true solution is found, where

hypotheses are verified in particular instances. The judgment is an affirmation or denial;

it is a mental act, a taking re-[87]sponsibility for what we hold to be true, or certain, or

probable or false. The cycle is completed and the original question has reached a term.

If we have sufficient evidence, it is only reasonable to affirm or deny. If we have

insufficient evidence it is only reasonable to postpone affirming or denying. We make a

certain personal commitment in the judgment, we take a personal stand. A certain

closure is reached, no further pertinent questions arise, the matter is finished, we can go

on to other fruitful questions and inquiries.

These activities that we have been identifying are structurally related to one

another. The later cannot occur without the earlier. We can summarize the position in

terms of three levels of activity. On the first level of ‘experience’ the senses are

operating – sometimes under the guidance of questions, sometimes not. On the second

level of ‘understanding’ we ask questions for intelligence, invite acts of understanding,


100

and formulate clear hypotheses. The third level is that of ‘judgment’ where we ask

questions for reflection, invite acts of reflective understanding producing judgments of

truth. (See diagram) We use the simple formula of ‘experiencing, understanding and

judging’ as shorthand to encompass this manifold of interrelated activities.

You can experience without asking further questions and the process can stop

there. You can understand and not ask the further question of reflection and you end

with a hypothesis. Or you can ask the further question and complete the process of

knowing. But you cannot have activities of the third level without presuming that you

have understood the hypothesis and know what it is about. You cannot understand

unless you are understanding something; and that something is ultimately given in

experience. Cognition is a structure where some activities presuppose and go beyond the

more elementary acts. Knowing is not accomplished in a single act but in a series of

interrelated acts.

Thus, we can define knowing as a set of interrelated cognitional activities,

beginning with the question of data and ending with the judgment of truth. It is

complicated, mediated, discursive, difficult and very human. It is not experience alone,

which tends to be the em-[88]piricist position, for example Hume. It is not

understanding alone which seems to have been Descartes’ position. It is not judgment

alone which seems to have been Kant's position. It is not intuition – a simple immediate

direct look – as proposed by the phenomenologists. How can we make such seemingly

arrogant assertions? Because we have attended to our own experience of knowing, the

data of our own consciousness and that is what we have found.

2.2 Immanent and Operative Norms

In our efforts to understand we usually discover fairly quickly that there is a

right way to do it and a wrong way.

Value Ethics 101

We usually discover that it is best to pay very careful attention to the data that is

given. It does not help to be selective and ignore large areas of what is given. It does not

help to screen out anything that might lead to an unpleasant conclusion. It helps to have

an open mind, to examine carefully all the relevant data, to be attentive to discrepancies,

peculiarities, differences which might be a clue to understanding. Look again, look

carefully, look attentively, if you want to describe accurately and understand correctly.

So we can summarize this in the precept, ‘be attentive’.

A student looks for advice on how he can improve his grades. So I advise him to

develop a good method of study, to take good notes, to concentrate on the essentials, to

focus on the important matters, to read the best books, to pick out the significant

chapters, to work on central issues. Finally, in exasperation I blurt out, be intelligent!

Unfortunately, the basic problem is that the unintelligent student finds it hard to

distinguish the important from the unimportant, the basics from the elaborations, the

best texts from the worst, the significant events from the insignificant. It is the work of

intelligence and only intelligence to make these distinctions. Rules, laws, study

methods, techniques, tricks, procedures, logic, can never be a substitute for intelligence.

So we can formulate our second precept as, ‘be intelligent’.

Juries work on the principle of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Our whole

legal system is built on this presupposition. But we are en-[89]titled to ask what is

reasonable? You can give guidelines, you can distinguish circumstantial from direct

evidence, primary and secondary sources, truthful or dubious witnesses, interested or

disinterested sources of evidence, motives, etc. But in the end, if you do not already

know what reasonable is, it cannot be taught. Being reasonable means balancing the

evidence to the conclusion, assessing probabilities or certainties, following the evidence

and not prejudice, bias, emotional involvement, etc. One is expected to have reasonable


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grounds for what we hold to be true. So we can briefly state our third precept as to ‘be

reasonable’.

These precepts do not come from logic; they come from the way the human

mind works. If you want to find the correct solution, these are the precepts that you have

to follow. They are the precepts which any intelligent and reasonable person would

follow even if he knows nothing about logic or cognitional structure. These norms are

immanent and operative in our knowing; they come from the inside not from the

outside. This is what it is to know correctly. There are few persons who would espouse

the contrary of these precepts and devote themselves to being inattentive, unintelligent,

and unreasonable. These precepts are the starting point from which rules are devised in

logic, in particular methodologies, in procedures of investigation. We call these

precepts, to be attentive, intelligent and reasonable, the transcendental precepts because

they apply universally, to all categories, in all cultures, at all times, where ever the

human mind seeks knowledge.

Start with people as they are; begin with the human mind as it unfolds in correct

and mistaken procedures. We can actually recognize correct answers when we find

them. We can actually recognize mistakes and correct them. We are involved in a self-

correcting procedure of knowing. The structure we build up is basically unrevisable; it

is so fundamental that it cannot be wrong. If we were to discover basic flaws in our

theory then we would have to attend to new evidence, understand the new theory, and

affirm the truth of the new theory in a judgment. But that would involve invoking the

structure that we are trying to go beyond. Any theory of knowledge therefore must be

coherent with the activities involved in producing it. Performance of [90] knowing must

be coherent with the content or objectification of that process.

3 Consciousness

Value Ethics 103

This account of cognitional activities and norms is a summary of cognitional

theory and epistemology using self-appropriation as a method. Our present project is to

extend the same method and procedure to the field of value ethics. Can we identify the

invariant, interrelated activities involved in judgments of value, decisions and actions?

Can we identify the immanent and operative norms? What method can we follow in

order to achieve that kind of self-knowledge? Can we start with people as they are and

apply a dialectical criticism to distinguish good behaviour from bad?

In our first chapter we have rather exhaustively reviewed the methods used in all

the main traditional and contemporary schools and evaluated them. It is now our task to

outline our own method – clearly and precisely. The method involves starting with

subjects as they are, you and I, in all the concreteness of our real situation. We are

trying to identify what makes a subject a moral subject. What are the activities we

perform which have moral import? How do we describe, identify and verify these

activities, not just for you or for me but for all human persons?

The method we use is that of self-appropriation: taking possession of one’s own

interiority, becoming aware, identifying and taking responsibility for moral obligation,

deliberating, moral value judgments, decisions and actions. But what is this method of

self-appropriation? How can you look at your own activities? How can you take

possession of your own mind? How can you be aware of your own mental acts? It is not

an entirely new method but, as it goes against some strongly ingrained contemporary

prejudices, it will be necessary to explain and defend the method before applying it.

Our first task is to make a personal identification of awareness, of consciousness

as immanent and reflexive. We then explain self-appropriation as a method, how it is to

be used, what resources can help [91] us in our task, and how it is possible to have

verifiable knowledge of private mental acts.

3.1 The Experience of Being Conscious


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To be ‘conscious’ is commonly understood to mean to be awake, to be aware, to

be noticing what is going on and reacting to it. To be ‘unconscious’ is to be unaware, to

be asleep, to be under anaesthetic, to have received a blow on the head and so to be

unconscious. 'Conscious' is grammatically an adjective; it must go along with a noun.

So you can talk about a conscious act, a conscious person, a conscious decision, a

conscious animal. Or you can say, he is conscious, I am conscious, I was not conscious,

etc. 'Consciousness' is the abstract noun made from the adjective. It simply refers to the

state of being conscious or aware. It seems to be a long difficult philosophical word, but

it simply refers to the common experience of being aware as opposed to the state of

being unaware. 'Conscience' is a noun referring specifically to our awareness of moral

guilt or righteousness; we will deal with that later.

The Latin origin is from con-scire, knowledge that goes along with. Aquinas

does use the word conscientia to refer to conscience, but for him it was an activity of the

intellect telling you the right thing to do. I do not think he had an equivalent of

conscious or consciousness simply as an awareness. It seems these terms were first used

by Hobbes and Locke. In the 19th and 20th centuries, they were very commonly used in

philosophical vocabularies. Even though it is a very simple notion, philosophers

contrive to make it difficult and to misconstrue its import. The big mistake seems to be

to think of consciousness as the same as knowing, as any kind of activity that goes on in

the head, as some kind of faculty, as a concept to be defined, as something abstruse and

mysterious. On the contrary, consciousness is an everyday experience; it is simply an

experience of being aware, awake; conscious as opposed to being unaware, asleep, or

unconscious.

In my early teaching days, I used to approach this topic of consciousness with

some trepidation, laden with texts, references, definitions and distinctions. The students

would be equally in awe, brows [92] furrowed, furiously taking notes, grappling with

Value Ethics 105

this most difficult of concepts. In my more mature years, I start with an exercise from

De Mello designed to help people to pray.6 It is simply an exercise in awareness. Can

you find a quiet place, find a comfortable position, put away distractions, and think of

nothing for five minutes. Empty your mind of thoughts, distractions, images; quiet all

mental activities, be simply at peace, complete silence of the mind. Students report that

it is quite difficult to attain complete silence of the mind; easy to suspend thinking, not

so easy to stop images, memories, feelings, flitting about, attracting us like little Sprites.

My point is that, whatever success you can have in arresting activities, there always

remains an experience of the self trying to be silent. Assuming that you do not fall

asleep, there is always a self that is aware, a subject that is conscious, ‘You’ are still

around. Consciousness is first and foremost a simple experience of awareness, of being

conscious. Identify that experience for yourself, then you can move on to the

definitions! There are learned tomes written on consciousness and I am quite certain that

the authors have never attended to this simple experience of awareness of self.

Consciousness is such a basic, simple, primordial, pervasive experience that it is

difficult to put into words and articulate correctly.

Lonergan deals with consciousness in his Christology, where it is of some

importance to distinguish divine from human consciousness. He defines consciousness

as an “Interior experience of oneself and one’s acts, where ‘experience’ is taken in the

strict sense of the word.”7 Note that it is an experience, that it is an inner experience. It

is experience taken in the sense of an unstructured awareness presupposed by inquiry; it

is not experience in the sense that we describe a mature dentist or a wise judge as

experienced. It is an awareness of the self that goes along with the activities of the self.

In Insight consciousness is defined as, “an awareness immanent in cognitional

acts.”8 In cognitional acts, such as thinking or deliberating, we are clearly aware of

what we are thinking or deliberating about. But at the same time, in the same activity,


106

we are immanently aware of the self, who is the subject of the activities. Consciousness

is a quality of activities; some activities such as thinking and deliber-[93]ating are

conscious; some activities such as digesting and growing are usually not conscious. To

be conscious is simply to be aware of the subject at the same time as being aware of the

object of the activity. Consciousness is not another activity added on to the activity of

thinking; it is immanent in the thinking.

There is one awareness, which is normally focused on the object, with the

subject in the background. Consciousness is one awareness but it has two poles of

awareness, one primary awareness of the object and one concomitant accompanying

awareness of the self as the subject of the awareness. If I am aware of typing on this

computer, my main concentration is on the thoughts, sentences, keyboard, screen, and

so on. But there is a concomitant awareness that it is I who is the self who is typing, I

who is the self who is thinking, I who is the self who is looking. The key characteristic

of consciousness is this experience of the subject concomitant with the experience of the

object. It is nothing more complicated that the experience of watching a movie but at the

same time being aware that it is I who am watching the movie. The double awareness is

immanent in the activity, that is to say, the awareness is not separate from but part of the

activity.

There is one activity but two poles of awareness, an objective and subjective

one. It is not two activities. To be conscious is not in itself an activity; it is something

that goes along with an activity. This is the import of the word ‘immanent’ implying

concomitant, going along with, part of, accompanying. It is not a quick look at an object

and then a quick look at the self; looking is a particularly inappropriate metaphor for

consciousness; looking is an activity, consciousness is an experience. The uniqueness of

consciousness comes from this characteristic of concomitant awareness of an object and

a subject in the same activity.

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To be conscious is an experience and not knowledge. It is given rather than

achieved. You do not have to study philosophy to be conscious. A child who is awake is

conscious; an uneducated person is usually aware of what he is doing and aware that it

is himself who is performing the actions. Aristotle was conscious of what he was do-

[94]ing writing the Ethics, but he was not able to articulate a definition of

consciousness. Descartes talked about the subject as a substance but did not identify the

experience of consciousness; but he was conscious nonetheless. You are conscious long

before being able to define consciousness. Theories about consciousness come after the

experience. What we want to be clear about is identifying this experience for yourself so

that you will know what we are talking about. It is a very simple experience, but

perhaps that is the difficulty.

Some philosophers seem to think that it is impossible to be aware of two things,

at the same time, in the same act.9 But this is because they think of consciousness as a

knowing, an activity in itself, a look outside and a look inside at the same time. These

are misinterpretations of the simple experience of being conscious of an object and at

the same time being conscious of the self who is looking at the object. Our appeal is not

to any theory or concept but to the simple experience. It is possible, because it happens

all the time.

Normally, the focus of attention is primarily on the object; it is only secondarily

an awareness of the self. Explicitly we are focussing on the object; implicitly there is an

awareness of self. Awareness of self is only an implicit part of our awareness when we

are playing football, solving a problem, digging a trench, studying philosophy. But it is

there in the background, an experience, immanent in the activities, implicit, indirect, and

concomitant. 'I am seeing the tree' is a rather simple conscious operation. The main

focus is on the tree as the object of seeing and awareness. The activity is basically

seeing but will usually involve some activities of understanding and identifying.


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Immanent in the seeing is an awareness of the self as the one who is doing the seeing. It

is not a question of imagining what consciousness looks like but of identifying a very

simple experience.

Some might argue that machines can 'see' or 'hear'; that copying machines can

see, print and reproduce it; that computers can hear the human voice and respond to

commands. But few people would call these activities conscious. They are activities of

responding to sights and sounds, but there is no evidence of a concomitant awareness of

the self. [95]

Dogs and cats can also see and hear, and they are also conscious. In their activity

of seeing there is also some kind of subjective pole, some centre of control, some sense

of identity, and some ability to coordinate what is seen with an appropriate response.

After all there is a big difference between a dog that is asleep and one that is awake.

When using the sense of sight we usually focus on a central object but we have

peripheral vision up to about 180 degrees. In other words we can notice a movement at

right angles to us even though we are looking directly ahead. Similarly, we can be

centrally conscious of studying, but peripherally conscious of pangs of hunger. We may

be focusing directly on driving a car but we are also listening to music, smoking a

cigarette and even answering a telephone call; and being immanently aware of the self

who is the subject of these activities.

There are degrees of consciousness in that we can be well aware that we are

studying but not so well aware that the chair is very uncomfortable. One can distinguish

what is unconscious, preconscious and conscious. The unconscious is what cannot be

brought to consciousness or only with difficulty; it is repressed or denied. The

preconscious is what can be recalled to consciousness easily and freely, what is stored in

the memory and imagination. But there is a gradation in awareness. Motives can be

explicit, they can be implicit or they can be more or less unconscious. Various theories

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of consciousness give different technical meanings to unconscious and preconscious;

our concern is simply identifying the experience.

One can talk about a stream of consciousness. William James seems to have

identified and named this aspect of consciousness. Our awareness seems to be always

moving. We are aware at different levels in different degrees and our focus keeps

moving; when we are studying we find ourselves distracted by thought of football,

home, friends; we are moved along on a stream of images, ambitions, hopes, fears,

feelings; with a start we bring ourselves back to the library. It is a way of writing

perfected by William Faulkner and James Joyce; we follow the characters from the

inside, see the world as they see it, and follow their every stray fantasy or association.

[96]

Consciousness is an experience of unity. We perform many different activities

from eating, feeling, seeing, thinking, deciding and loving. But we are conscious that it

is the same self who is doing all these activities. Some activities depend on others,

thinking often depends on seeing. But what connects thinking to seeing? It is the one

self, subject, who is doing both the seeing and the thinking. This is the unity of

consciousness as given. Sometimes in life we experience disharmony between elements

of the personality. We are involved in too many activities and we cannot get it all

together. Or there is conflict between professed priorities and actual performance. Or

there is tension between financial and moral aspirations. Then we have to work at

integration, restore harmony, and achieve unity.

It is also an experience of continuity. When I wake up in the morning I usually

do not have to ask, who am I? I am conscious of a continuity stretching back fifty years

of the same self, doing and failing, feeling and thinking, healthy and sick. Many things

have changed but this sense of self does not seem to have changed. There is an


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experienced continuity, a sameness, the same self but growing, changing, moving,

taking on various tasks moving through life's stages: different but still the same.

This experience is given. We do not teach children to be conscious. We do teach

them to be conscious of the danger of fire, or of their manners in front of guests, but if

they are unconscious this if rather fruitless. If it is not there we cannot make it to be. We

do not produce it by philosophical concepts or striving. We can expand or contract our

consciousness, but it is given as a datum at the beginning.

3.2 Levels of Consciousness

If we define 'to be conscious' as an experience of self immanent in activities of

knowing and doing, then, the experience of self will vary according to the kind of

activity involved. The acts determine the quality of the consciousness proper to that

level.

1. Empirical consciousness is characteristic of our activities at the level of sense.

It is a consciousness that goes along with activities of imagining and remembering;

touching, smelling, tasting, seeing and [97] hearing; feelings, impulses, instincts and

desires. In this sense we can say that animals are conscious. There is a difference

between a dog that is awake and one that is asleep. When the dog is asleep he is

unconscious; when he is awake he is conscious empirically. Before the emergence of

intelligence and will, the baby is conscious empirically. With the emergence of

questioning, naming, talking and thinking comes the possibility of intellectual

consciousness.

2. Intellectual consciousness. Humans can ask questions about their experience

and set the conditions for the emergence of understanding. Ideas emerge from images,

the universal from the particular, the abstract from the concrete. Now we have a

different kind of activity, a different level of consciousness and an awareness of self

characteristic of this level of activity. Students do a lot of thinking, arguing, studying,

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reading, research, writing, listening, understanding. They enter further into a world

mediated by meaning. This is a higher level of activity than that of mere sensing; it is a

different quality of consciousness that accompanies the activities.

3. Rational consciousness. It is not enough to have ideas and hypotheses; we are

usually in search of true propositions and correct explanations. The critical question

arises, is it true? This sets us off on another track, assembling evidence, weighing the

evidence, assessing the connection between the evidence and the conclusion. We are

preparing to take a stand as rational persons, to take responsibility for our opinions. It is

a different set of activities characterized by a higher level of rational consciousness of

self.

4. Moral consciousness. We constantly face the question as to what is the right

thing to do, what are our priorities, how do we spend our time, what is worthwhile, what

is of real value. We work out our priorities, we deliberate on our values, we formulate

goals and targets, we consider alternatives, we commit ourselves in value judgments.

Then, we decide to act or not to act, to go with our convictions of right and wrong, or

yield to the temptations of self-interest or advantage. The consciousness characteristic

of these activities is called conscience. [98]

We have devoted many pages to talking about consciousness. In itself it is a very

simple experience, an awareness of self immanent in awareness of activities and objects.

What is important is identifying that experience for yourself. If you do not do that now

or have not done it already, then, all that is said in the rest of this text will be so much

gibberish. It is not a complicated notion, but it is necessary to be precise in the

definition so that we can be clear about the process of self-appropriation. It is difficult to

deny this notion of consciousness – it is hard to read a book and be unconscious at the

same time.

3.3 Reflexive Consciousness


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Is it possible to shift the focus of awareness from the intended content of

cognitional activities to the activities themselves? Is it possible to focus on the activities,

by which we know or intend objects? This is all that is meant by reflexive

consciousness. It is not another kind of awareness but a shifting of awareness from the

content intended to the activities by which they are intended.

Again it seems to be possible because we are doing it all the time. If your doctor

asks you how are you feeling, you are usually able to give a detailed account of your

aches and pains, your feelings of loss of appetite, or fatigue or blurred vision; how these

internal symptoms have changed over the last day. If you are doing a post-match chess

analysis, you can ask your opponent, what did you intend by moving your knight to

queen four on your fifteenth move. He can give a detailed reply outlining his thoughts,

expectations, reasoning, anticipations and fears regarding possible continuations and

combinations. If you are visiting your psychiatrist you are usually able to recount your

dreams, to describe your motivations, to express your anxieties. If you are accused of

misconduct you can usually defend yourself with detailed descriptions of your

intentions, your motives, your justifications and excuses for the alleged behaviour. We

seem to be able to give an account of our feeling, our experiences, our thinking, our

dreams, our reasoning and our moral arguments. It does not call for special training or

expertise to do so in this commonsense mode. Thus, it seems that we are able to

reflexively shift the focus of attention from objects to the activities by which we intend

objects. [99] Can this ability be used systematically, explicitly, methodically in

examining how we understand, how we evaluate and how we decide? This seems to

have been possible in the field of understanding and judging; after all it has already

been done and so it must be possible.10 Is it possible to use the same method in

examining our moral choices, our stand on what is of value, our motivations and

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actions? It would seem to be possible for that is what we are doing; but let us be very

clear about the method.

A method which systematically describes mental activities must be some form

of introspection, that is, a reflexive consciousness whereby we focus our attention

inwards on the activities, feelings and intentions of the mind. Introspection is not to be

conceived as looking inwards instead of outwards; ‘looking’ is a poor metaphor for the

activity of introspection, just as it is a misleading image for knowing. If we try to look

inwards we will see very little; mental activities are strictly invisible, so it is not much

use looking for them. What we do is shift the focus of awareness from the object that is

being looked at, to the activity of looking; we shift awareness from moving the chess

piece, to the reasoning behind the move; from the act of misconduct to the motives and

intentions and feelings behind the behaviour.

Our normal, natural, spontaneous orientation seems to be towards the external

world, the objects of our senses, of grasping, seeing, tasting, smelling hearing. We are

attracted by bright colours; we are startled by loud noises, intrigued by strange smells.

We are at ease operating on objects, the child playing with coloured toys, the worker

cementing bricks in place, and the scientist collecting samples for examination.

Introspection is more demanding and difficult. In introspection we are describing not

objects but activities and states. Scientific samples can be put on the table, measured,

weighed, tested, preserved; everybody can see them and participate and check the

results. Mental activities on the other hand are fleeting, they start and stop, they cannot

be frozen, they cannot be looked at, they are difficult to discern. But we do such

introspection already in a commonsense manner; so why not elevate this technique into

a systematic, critical method? [100]

One of the obvious difficulties is that it is hard to perform an activity properly

and at the same time to be doing introspection; it is hard to play football and at the same


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time to analyze how well or badly you are playing. So introspection could more

correctly be called retrospection; we play football and the following day review the tape

and do the analysis. Similarly, for activities of knowing; we first attend to a puzzle,

work out the solution, check that it is correct; afterwards one can reflect back on what

you were doing, what images you used, how ideas came, what helped and what hindered

the process, what emotions were present; what were you doing for that half an hour that

it took you to solve the puzzle. Similarly, in the field of moral knowing and doing; it is

often retrospection as well as introspection. An examination of conscience usually

involves reviewing past actions, thoughts, and intentions with a view to moral

judgment. So these mental activities can be recalled, described, analyzed and

appropriated. They are fleeing in the sense that they do not stand still, pass quickly, but

in most cases can be remembered accurately and described just like the samples of the

scientist.

Empiricists have great difficulty accepting that such supposedly inaccessible,

private, fleeting mental activities can constitute data and so be verifiable. Scientists can

put their samples on the table; it is a public process, they can be measured, seen,

weighed and touched. The experiment can be repeated elsewhere, results checked and

so you seem to achieve 'objectivity'. But I cannot see what is going on in your head, and

you cannot see what is going on in my head and so how do you compare these private

mental acts to show that they are the same. In reply let us make a basic clarification

about verification and then show that it can be applied to the method of introspection.

For empiricists the verification lies in the seeing, in the sensible data presented

as proof, in the counting, the touching, and the weighing of scientific procedures. The

presupposition of this is that human intellectual knowing is fundamentally sensible in

origin, that all ideas, simple and complex come from the senses and that nothing beyond

Value Ethics 115

the sensible can be real. The procedure of verification is reduced to 'show me and I will

believe'; let me ‘see’ the evidence and, then, I will ‘see’ the conclusion. [101]

Our reply would be to ask what makes sensible data significant, that is,

meaningful in terms of a connection between a hypothesis and its verification. Why was

the seeing of the position of a star during an eclipse of the sun of such great significance

for proving Einstein's theory of relativity? What confers significance on sensible data?

A full account of scientific method would have to recognize three elements: theory,

verified, in instances. The instances are the sensible data experienced at a particular

time and place by the external senses. But it is theory that confers significance on the

data. Hypotheses are possible explanations or causes or correlations; they are products

of acts of understanding, sometimes concepts, definitions, axioms, principles, ideas that

are clearly different from sensible data. The verification is the judgment that this

sensible data are connected to the theory in such a way as to show that there is sufficient

evidence to affirm that it is correct. Hence there are three levels of operations going on

here; the forming of hypotheses in understanding, the reference to sensible

consequences in experience and the verification in judgment.

How then are descriptions of private mental acts verifiable? If I describe in detail

how I solved a particular puzzle and present this to students, they are able to recognize

the words, to identify the activity and to know what I am talking about. If I ask students

to describe their own acts of understanding I can recognize what they are writing about.

If one gives an example of remembering instead of understanding then we discuss the

difference between understanding and remembering. We identify the characteristics of

each activity; we note that animals can remember but cannot understand; remembering

refers usually to particular times and places whereas understanding usually produces

ideas; they are distinct activities; it does not take long to distinguish them; only

confusion will ensue if they are not distinguished. Communication about cognitional


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activities can take place. It can lead to agreement; mistakes can be recognized and

corrected; so descriptions of mental acts are verifiable – theory verified in instances.

Explanations of the relationship of cognitional activities to one another can be shown to

be correct, accurate, true by ref-[102]erence to each persons' awareness of their own

experience, in other words by of retrospection.

Fraud can occur in the empirical sciences; results can be forged, samples can be

doctored, the instruments can we interfered with, photographs can be altered. But

usually the scientific community will discover the fraudster by a process of comparing

results, repeating experiments in different places, an on-going process of correction is in

place. The same can be said for data of consciousness. Mistaken accounts of the process

of understanding can be shown to be mistaken. Truncated accounts of moral judging can

be shown to be inadequate.

We can distinguish data of sense from data of consciousness. Data of sense

refers to the data given in the experience of the senses; what are given in imagining,

remembering, feeling, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching. Data is from the

Latin 'datum' meaning simply the 'given' – before understanding, before interpretation,

before conceptualizing, before judgment. I am using the term data as raw data given in

the senses; not in the sense of census data or economic data or statistics. The higher

animals operate in terms of data of sense, activities of sensing, alone. The data of sense

is divided up among the empirical sciences as their starting point, their area of

investigation, the material object of their science. Thus, astronomers study the heavenly

bodies, botanists study plants, palaeontologists study fossils, etc.

Data of consciousness is what is given when we shift our attention from objects

of sense to the activities and feelings involved in sensing and understanding. When we

focus our attention on the activities of our mind, we are focusing on data of

consciousness. Just as the biologist can be conscious of frogs and dogs, so we can be

Value Ethics 117

conscious of the activities of seeing, hearing, understanding, desiring, and questioning.

Data of consciousness is simply given in experience, without selection or interpretation

or understanding. We have emphasised that consciousness is first of all an experience,

and then we can try to understand and define it. The first time we attend to mental

activities, we find a jumble of confusing and overlapping ac-[103]tivities which do not

seem to have any order or sequence. But once we start naming, describing, isolating

and identifying the activities, they begin to fall into recognizable patterns of interrelated

activities. The process of self-appropriation starts with this given data of consciousness

with a view to understanding the invariant pattern of relations existing between the

activities.

I can shift attention to my own thoughts, desires and feeling and have a direct

immediate awareness of them. I cannot become aware of your thoughts and feelings,

except mediately through your expression and my external senses. I have privileged

direct immediate access to the data of my own consciousness. Nobody else has such

access to my inner life. Nobody can see directly what is going on there. I can tell lies

and get away with it. You could say that data of sense are mediated by the senses of

seeing and hearing but we have immediate access to the data of consciousness; we are

nearer to the latter than to the former.

Furthermore, I am free to describe data of consciousness in as much detail as I

like. They are available to me just as the samples of the biologist are available to him.

Joyce takes seven hundred pages to narrate the thoughts and fantasies of Mr. Leopold

Bloom in the course of one single day. We are not so interested in details, but in the

patterns of relationships between the activities; we are not novelists, but scientists.

Some do not clearly distinguish between data and facts. For us this is a crucial

distinction. Data are given in experience; facts are affirmations of a judgment after

understanding the data. Facts, no matter how elementary, involve understanding and


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judgment. Animals are aware of data only; humans can move from data, to

understanding, to judgments. Data are given in experience; facts are truths affirmed in a

judgment. A cow can experience grass as green; it is only a human being who can

experience colour, distinguish, compare and name colours and affirm in a rational

judgment that this grass is green. Empiricists tend to conflate three quite distinct

activities of seeing, understanding and judging. We distinguish clearly three levels [104]

of cognitional activity; data is given at the level of experience; judgments are reached at

the third level of judging.

Consciousness is not self-knowledge but it is self-awareness – it is the beginning

of self-knowledge. Looking at samples of butterflies in a cabinet is not the same as

naming, identifying, defining and dividing them, as a biologist would do. Similarly,

being aware of mental activities is not the same as knowing them. First, there is an

awareness of activities and we have data. Then we go on to name, to identify, to

distinguish and compare these activities. Thus we are using the method of self-

appropriation and are on the way to self-knowledge. We reach self-knowledge when we

can affirm that our identification of the relations between activities is the correct one.

Then, we have another instance of theory verified in instances, except that in this case

we are starting with the data of consciousness and finishing with self-knowledge.

Consciousness can be undifferentiated as in the child or the person of common

sense, or it can be differentiated into the many possible specializations of intelligence. It

is undifferentiated when no distinctions are made between feelings and thinking,

between activities and contents, between practical and theoretical. Common sense in the

first stage of meaning is generally undifferentiated. With the development of

intelligence you can have a specialization in terms of science, or in terms of scholarship,

or in terms of holiness, or in terms of artistic development. These are differentiations of

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consciousness each with its own specialized patterning of sets of intellectual operations

appropriate in each area.

3.4 Misconceptions about Consciousness.

As we have seen, to be conscious is an experience or an awareness; to be

unconscious is to be unaware of anything. Consciousness, then, is primarily an

experience whereby in being aware of objects we are also at the same time aware of

ourselves. Concomitant consciousness is awareness of the self immanent in the activity

of knowing or relating to objects. Reflexive consciousness is when we shift the focus of

awareness from objects to activities. In reflexive consciousness the primary focus is on

the intentional activities, the secondary [105] focus is the objects intended.

Introspection is a conscious activity, a focusing of awareness from objects to activities;

but awareness of the self is immanent in the activity of introspecting – it is still 'I' who is

the self doing the introspecting.

This authentic notion of consciousness Lonergan names consciousness as

experience; to this he opposes a notion of consciousness as perception.11 Consciousness

as perception conceives of consciousness as an act of perception, an act of knowing,

where we know the self in an immediate intuition. But in perception there is already a

distinction between the subject who perceives, the act of perceiving, and the object that

is perceived. In consciousness as perception, then, the subject perceives the subject

through an act of perception or intuition. But this makes consciousness a distinct and

separate act from acts of seeing or thinking. Acts of thinking cannot be immanently

conscious, if consciousness is a separate act. Very strange conclusions follow from the

assumption that consciousness is perception, when it is applied to the consciousness of

Christ.

In contemporary science and philosophy, the most common misconception of

consciousness is to bypass the element of experience and immediately engage in a


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discussion of the concept of consciousness. The presumption is that consciousness is a

quintessentially obscure philosophical idea, which must be dealt with in an

appropriately mystifying manner. If you talk about concepts with no reference to

experience then you can formulate, compare, define and divide concepts in whatever

way you wish ad infinitum, but you have no criterion of truth because you have

bypassed the experience to which consciousness is referring.12 The discussion becomes

a verbal tangle without a basis in experience, a formulation of a concept without

understanding.

Without reference to the experience of being conscious, you enter into a

conceptualism where knowledge is knowledge of concepts, where abstraction is

impoverishing, where definitions and division of concepts can go on ad infinitum. There

is a mentality which sometimes emerges in philosophy or history of philosophy which is

totally absorbed in concepts, ideas, hypotheses, definitions, learning, being [106] clever,

living in a cerebral world; but it has nothing to do with life, with experience, with the

real world. It is conceptualism rather than intellectualism.

In intellectualism a concept is an effort to formulate in a clear, correct,

explanatory manner a definition or a theory or an explanation of certain data of

experience or sense. But forming concepts presupposes understanding and

understanding presuppose data that are to be understood. The data we are starting with

is the experience of awareness of self immanent in the activities of knowing objects. We

distinguish conscious, from unconscious and from preconscious. We distinguish

conscious and intentional. We distinguish awareness from activities such as thinking,

knowing or deciding. We have distinguished concomitant and reflexive consciousness;

we have distinguished, differentiated and undifferentiated consciousness, degrees of

consciousness, levels of consciousness. We start off with an experience, we refer back

to the experience; we understand and explain and define the experience. So the starting

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point for our whole study is a simply common experience of being conscious. Many

experts on consciousness seem to jump this first elementary step on which all else

depends.

Another common misconception of the meaning of consciousness is to identify

it with particular activities, with thinking, or perception, or anything that goes on in the

head. If consciousness is identified with thinking then, animals are not conscious, and

we are not conscious when we are not thinking. But this does not seem to fit the facts.

Consciousness is not a separate activity beside or apart from thinking, perceiving,

choosing, and evaluation. There are not two activities, (1) I am thinking and (2) I am

aware of my thinking. Descartes did not identify a notion of consciousness. In the "I

think, therefore I am", you have the ‘I’ conceived as a spiritual substance, the activity of

thinking, and the affirmation of existence; but you do not have consciousness. This is an

incomplete 'turn to the subject'. He is affirming a self, a thinking substance and an

existence, but has not been able to distinguish conscious and unconscious. [107]

When we assert that animals are conscious, some immediately conclude that we

are asserting that animals can think. Animals see, hear, remember, respond, desire, are

aggressive or friendly, they are conscious at the level of empirical consciousness. They

have external and internal senses. Many activities can be conscious other than thinking.

Sometimes animals are awake and conscious; sometimes they are asleep and

unconscious. Thinking is one thing; being conscious is another – they are as different as

chalk from cheese.

Finally, there are the misconceived efforts to explain away consciousness, to

reduce it to the level of neurons, or electrical impulses, biology or sheer physics and

chemistry. A typical argument would identify consciousness as an invention of

evolution to give a competitive advantage in the struggle for survival. Therefore, it is

nothing more than an epiphenomenon of Darwinian evolution. It is reduced to the level


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of its origins, its locus of emergence to what it was before it emerged. We are not here

concerned with the historical emergence of consciousness, or the biological conditions

for the emergence of consciousness. Such studies can be enlightening and can contribute

to our understanding. But there is the explaining of the origin of something and there is

the explaining away, the reduction of consciousness to some twist of evolutionary fate.

Our focus is the present, the reality of your consciousness, the richness of this notion,

and coming to terms with its possibilities.

4 Self-Appropriation as Method in Ethics

We have devoted considerable time and effort to be clear about consciousness

and our ability to be aware of data of consciousness, to describe, identify, define and

interrelate conscious activities, and to verify whether these definitions or explanations

are true or false. This preliminary work was necessary to prepare the way for explaining

self-appropriation. This is to be our method of ethics, the method appropriate in the

stage of interiority, the method that is intelligent, critical, foundational, and progressive.

The method can be called introspection, but as introspection is commonly

misunderstood as ‘looking inwards’, Lonergan preferred to use the term self-

appropriation or intentionality analysis. [108]

To 'appropriate' is to make one’s own, to take possession of oneself, to be in

control of oneself. Self-appropriation emphasizes that it is the subject who is

responsible for this process of self-awareness. It is to become aware of ourselves as

moral subjects, to recognize the feelings, inclinations, ambitions, motives, prejudices

and biases operating in the field of moral judgments, decisions and actions. This process

is first experience, then naming and identifying, then defining relative to one another.

Moral philosophy often emphasizes information, memory work, historical knowledge,

ability to manipulate concepts, comparing theories, expanding familiarity with sources

in scholarship; it can be very cerebral and conceptualist. Self-appropriation calls us back

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to ourselves, to recognize the meaning of moral terms in our experience, to evaluate

theories in terms of how they help to live a moral life.

Intentionality analysis seems to have been initiated by the phenomenologists. It

recognizes that all our knowing, deciding and doing are intentional. They are inspired

by a common intention and an intention specific to each activity. Seeing intends what is

to be seen, the visible. You cannot have a seeing without something that is seen;

grammatically it is a transitive verb; it must have an object, you see something. In

asking questions you are expressing an intention of finding the answer. Most of our

mental activities are both intentional and conscious. Moral questioning, value

judgments, decisions and actions are also intentional; they intend to achieve true values,

goodness, or happiness or pleasure. Phenomenologists did initiate a process of

analyzing and identifying the activities of the mind. Unfortunately, they conceived of

knowing as a simple, direct, immediate intuition of essences. Hence, they fail to

recognize the struggle initiated by asking the question, the active and passive aspects of

understanding, the formulation of concepts, the reflective insight and the final act of

judging. Phenomenology has given us the method, but not the results. Most of our study

will be a phenomenology of the activity of evaluating and deciding; by phenomenology

here we simply mean an accurate description leading to an explanation of the activities

and feelings involved in valuing and deciding. [109]

4.1 Resources for Intentionality Analysis

We are not suggesting that everyone go off into an isolated corner and starts

self-appropriation in solitary confinement. If you just look at the stars in the night sky

by yourself, you will understand very little and make slow progress in astronomy. You

need an astronomers’ guide, a map of the stars, a diagram of the planets, a compass,

binoculars; it is helpful to know where and when to look and what to expect. Similarly,

with self-appropriation; we need help from others, we need maps, we need to be told


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what to look for and where. This section gives some indications of the help we get from

exercises, biography, literature, psychology and philosophy. This text itself is written on

that assumption that we can draw a more complete, accurate detailed map of mental

moral activities than has hitherto been available.

1. Awareness movements. Our generation is familiar with the notion of

conscientization initiated by Paulo Friere as a pedagogy of the oppressed.13 Using this

method we become more conscious our situation, the fact that we are being oppressed,

and our power to free ourselves. These days we are becoming more conscious of gender

issues, the value of the environment, the depletion of the ozone layer, the number of

endangered species, justice and peace issues. These issues are being brought to our

attention, we are being made more aware of them, we are expected to do something

about it, to change our priorities and behaviour.

There are many trends, which call for expressing your feelings, your ambitions,

your hopes and fears. Career guidance needs answers to those kinds of questions in

order to give some professional help in choosing a path in life. Counselling involves

revealing your deep self, your problems, anxieties, fears and traumas; it involves

appropriating these feelings, recognizing them accepting them and coping with them.

Progoff initiated a movement of journaling as a method of recognizing the movements

in your life, the pulls, and counter pulls, the progress and decline, by way of

objectifying your feelings in a journal or diary.14 Enneagram15 and Myers-Briggs16 are

popular ways of recognizing your personality type, so that you can better use your

strong points and blunt the damage of your weak points. Awareness has even become a

prayer form when, instead of attending to gospel [110] stories or religious symbols, we

focus awareness on stillness or silence or the feelings at the tip of your nose.17 Any kind

of penitential service will invite us to an examination of conscience, to become aware of

our faults and failings, our actions and omissions. So in talking about self-appropriation,

Value Ethics 125

we are not invoking something entirely new, nor something alien to our culture and

times; it is more that our culture is crying out for an ethics based on self-awareness.

2. Exercises. When doing self-appropriation of cognitional activities it was

easy to compose puzzles, mathematical problems, crossword puzzles etc. to provoke the

activities of understanding and then to reflect back later on how each person managed to

reach the solution. It is relatively easy to compose such problems of varying degrees of

complexity; they can be designed to identify direct or inverse or reflective insights. It is

a flexible and useful pedagogical tool for intellectual self-appropriation. Are such

exercises available when it comes to appropriating moral activities? The difficulty is

that real value judgments, actual moral decisions and action belong to the real world of

persons and cannot be turned into an experimental learning experience. You cannot very

well send students out to steal, so that they will learn what it feels like to be a thief! But

many exercises can be devised through role plays, discussion exercises, case studies,

moral dilemmas, movies, etc. that help bring to the surface the feelings, values and

reasoning process of the participants.

Kohlberg's entire theory of stages of moral development rest on a technique of

moral dilemmas presented to children of varying age groups and asking them to judge

the behaviour of the person in the stories.18 The answers reveal the level of moral

reasoning reached by the child. Such techniques can be used to record moral reasoning,

evaluations and feelings in a more or less systematic way. The value clarification

movement also devised many discussion techniques, exercises, and games, role-plays

by which the participants become more aware of their actual value priorities.19 Cases of

conscience are a simple basic technique of moral education; what do you do if there is a

conflict between honesty and loyalty; can you rob the rich to help the poor; can you

perform a direct abortion if the health of the mother is in danger, etc. Such hypothetical


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questions and situations can be a [111] useful pedagogical aid and can reveal moral

reasoning, feelings, priorities and values.

3. Biography and Autobiography. Self-appropriation is not just reading

yourself but reading yourself in others. The ethical dimension of life is not just about

specific decisions or actions but is about all life’s decisions and actions. In including the

ethical dimension we move to a philosophy of life or action. The whole drama and

tragedy and comedy of life are included. In knowing and understanding the decisions

and action of others, we better understand our own decisions and actions. The better we

understand others, the more we understand ourselves. One simple way of objectifying

good and evil is in the form of story. Children learn to distinguish good behaviour from

bad in nursery stories, cartoons, stories of heroes and villains, of animal stories, of

success and failure of good girls and bad girls. Growing up we form our ideals from the

lives of the saints, gospel stories, from famous politician, war heroes, great inventors,

football stars, etc. These give flesh to our ambitions, nourish our dreams, encourage us

in our endeavours.

Biography presents us with real life heroes. It helps to see the basic sameness of

the human condition in the diversity of cultures, situations, times and personalities; their

struggles in the big theatre of life are mirrored in the simplest ordinary humdrum

aspects of our daily life. Good biography and especially autobiography gives us the

inner person, not just the external facts. We penetrate into the mind of the person,

his/her ambitions, intentions and struggles. We learn not just of plaster saints or ideal

models, but of the real struggle between good and evil in everybody. We can learn from

the biographies of villains and thugs, despots and tyrants, saints and sinners, because

there is a potential for that in all of us. Our own ethical drama unfolds as a story; a past

we are all too familiar with; a present we are struggling with; a future that is unknown.

Value Ethics 127

In biography we see the whole unfolding of a human life in all its complications,

dimensions and implications – its ups and downs.

4. Literature. Fiction takes leave of the limitations imposed by real life and

allows the author to create characters, imagine situations, [112] spin out stories as he

wishes. We identify or disidentify with his creations. It is enriching abstraction;

philosophers need to appreciate the diversity, richness individuality uniqueness of each

life and each situation and each person. The author can help us to see situations from

inside the head of someone else; we can go back in time, enter foreign cultures and

different classes. We form models of Mr Leopold Bloom, Hamlet, Lord Jim, Titus

Groan, George Smiley, etc. In moral philosophy we are looking for the invariants, the

absolutes, the foundations. But each one of us is an individual not an abstraction;

marriage is not just a definition, it is an individual drama. Reading good literature might

have more effect on people's behaviour than moral philosophy textbooks. Martha

Nussbaum argues for the central role of literature in moral development.20 Just as

knowledge of the individual complements our knowledge of the universal, so our

knowledge of literature complements our knowledge of moral philosophy. Our

perception of particular people and situations is somehow prior to our formulation of

abstract rules about people and situations. The classics of literature embody a deep

understanding of the human drama, its tragedy and comedy, and we continuously learn

from them about ourselves.

5. Empirical Psychology. We owe a debt to Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg for

their contribution on stages of moral development – these we will look at more closely

when we consider moral development. These are classical professional studies; even

though open to criticism, they seem to hit the mark and can be verified in our own

experience of moral growth or decline. The science of psychology has made a

contribution to our understanding of personality, temperament, character, motivation,


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feelings, behaviour change, etc. Most of what we are doing in chapters three to nine is

psychology i.e. an accurate and precise description of how we actually make value

judgments and decisions. Psychology has made a valuable contribution to understanding

our real freedom and the limits imposed by inhibitions, repressions, compulsions, etc on

the true realization of our freedom. As moral philosophers we are interested in

behaviour not from a total point of view but from the moral point of view. [113]

Unfortunately, much psychology is limited because of a constricted view of the

human person as in behaviourism, or other empiricist views of human being. Such

psychology, instead of helping us to understand moral values, reduces them to the level

of experience. Feelings of guilt are not considered as a possible symptom of real guilt,

but are simply a problem to be rid of, so that we can get a good night’s sleep. Good

psychology must start with an openness to all the levels of human operation, to a

recognition of the complex interaction between the levels and the centre of

consciousness in the free and responsible human person.

6. Philosophy. We have already outlined a great diversity of theories of

morals; we also gave a personal evaluation in terms of advantages and disadvantages.

The reason we were able to evaluate them was largely because of reference to personal

experience. For example does Kant's Categorical Imperative really illuminate the

experience of deciding to marry or even to divorce? Much of the complexity of the

experience seems to have been left out. Yet it is worth studying the history of moral

philosophy, because all the contradictory contributions can be seen as clarifications

leading towards a single goal. We can learn from their mistakes. We can construct

better systems; we can overcome the limitations of explanatory systems.

It is evident too that some of the best moral philosophers did use the method of

self-appropriation, albeit in a cursory and implicit manner. Socrates had taught that if

you have knowledge of the good you would automatically do it; one can only do evil

Value Ethics 129

out of ignorance he taught. Aristotle replies in his usual direct fashion, "Now this

reasoning is glaringly inconsistent with the observed facts:"(N.E. 1145b27). What are

the observed facts to which Aristotle is referring? They are the facts concerning human

behaviour, human thinking, knowing and doing. He identified four scenarios where a

person may have knowledge of the good and still not do it (1146b30-1147b17). He is

appealing to the facts of moral experience known only by some kind of introspection or

self-appropriation. He is pointing out inconsistencies between knowing and doing in the

actual behaviour of human beings. You usually find that good moral understanding is

based on an implicit appeal to the data of moral ex-[114]perience. Aquinas identified six

movements of the intellect and six activities of the will before we reach a final decision;

did this theory drop down from heaven or did he attend to what he actually does before

making a definitive decision?21

Good philosophy has the advantage of a correct notion of the human person as a

framework in which to find real moral activity and growth.

7. Contemporary Philosophy. There are many individual elements emerging in

contemporary philosophy, which favour or move towards self-appropriation as a

method in philosophy. We have already mentioned the intentionality analysis of the

phenomenologists which explicitly recognizes the possibility of treating mental

activities as data for description and analysis. Existentialism has turned to the subject,

not as a substance as in Descartes, but as experience, as struggling with the drama of

life, as subjectivity. It has focused on making choices, freedom, creating, dealing with

the absurd, feeling anxiety, facing death. There has been emerging a philosophy of

values which we deal with in our next chapter. So there have been individual positive

elements from various angles moving in the direction of interiority if in a somewhat

haphazard manner.


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So we are not totally alone in our appeal to self-appropriation. We are not alone

in using it as a method of describing and defining moral evaluations and decision. We

have help from a number of quarters. If we are justified in appealing to the data of our

inner experience then we can do so methodically and critically. Just as the biologist

implement scientific method in reference to his data of external sense, so we too can

apply scientific method to the data of our conscious awareness. Just as the biologist is

methodical in collecting his samples, classifying, defining, observing experimenting, so

we too can be methodical and critical in dealing with the data of consciousness.

Empirical method is not limited to the data of sense; it can also be applied to the data of

consciousness with the same criteria operating. [115]

4.2 Content to Activities

We have seen in our outline of the history of moral philosophy the variety of

positions, methods, systems and codes of ethics. Often these traditions are quite at odds

with one another, technically incommensurable, meaning they share no common

principles or criteria of evaluation. If we look also at the variety of cultures with their

ethical teachings on marriage, warfare, property right, respect for life, etc. we find an

equally bewildering variety of beliefs and values. If we compare different eras of history

from prehistoric times to the present day we see more variety, more apparent

contradictions. So we have such a variety of contradictory theories, codes of conduct,

systems of evaluating, variety of rewards and punishments. One could spend more than

a life time collecting all the codes of ethics that have been promulgated in different

cultures at varying time.

We are forced to ask what do all of these have in common. Many, who are faced

with this variety, these contradictions and mutually incompatible systems, accept the

seemingly inevitable conclusion of relativism. Some look for absolutes in basic

propositions like the categorical imperative or do good and avoid evil or justice. Some

Value Ethics 131

look for absolutes in the sacredness of law and order, intrinsically evil acts, absolutes of

duty or the absolute of love. Some look for a core content, the essentials of any system;

strip away the variety and you are left with the core essentials; the variety is either by

way of exception or corruptions. It seems to me that as long as you are looking at the

content or cultural expression of ethical teaching you will never find the absolute or the

invariant. For this you have to turn to the activities and the norms operating in the

activities. Garrett Barden expressed this well:

The thesis propounded here is that there are, indeed, no given or innate propositions; that our traditions do place us in different, and, at least sometimes, mutually incompatible, horizons; but that our traditions, with their irreconcilable basic presuppositions, are themselves not ultimate; that what is ultimate is a set of operations that give rise to traditions; that this set of ultimate operations is common and that, consequently, we are not irredeemably confined within the limits of our present selves.22 [116] Barden seems to have written in response to MacIntyre's After Virtue.

He shows that in cognitional and ethical theory what is ultimate is the set of

operations, which produce ethical traditions and theories. Theories may seem

to be incompatible, incommensurable, contradictory; but they all derive from

human beings performing the same operations well or badly. These operations

are questioning, understanding, verifying and evaluating. These are the source

of all ethical traditions, systems theories and practices. He identifies these

operations but does not elaborate on them in great detail.

Fred Crowe on the same lines identifies the invariants as the activities

questioning, experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding; the invariants are to be

found in the structural relations between these operations distinguishing the way up and

the way down; then in applying these to the person in the concrete and to history in its

actual unfolding. 23

I would tentatively summarize these invariant, transcultural, and activities as:


132

(1) Questions of Evaluation. The question of what is worthwhile arises in every

context. We are faced with choices and we ask ourselves which is the correct or the best

alternative. What is the right thing to do?

(2) Process of deliberation. We set about evaluating the act itself, the

alternatives, the consequences, the end to be achieved; the advantages and

disadvantages for oneself and for others. We consult our feelings, our expectations, our

obligations, our fears, our guilt or shame. We understand what is at stake, what must be

done.

(3) Value Judgments. We come to a conclusion, we reach a value judgment, we

give our answer to the question, what is the right thing to do. We affirm in general or in

particular that this is right and that is wrong, this is honourable or dishonourable, this is

a value or a disvalue, this fellow is to be trusted, this other fellow is dishonest.

(4) Decisions. To do or not to do? To decide to implement the value judgment or

not? We decide to act. I will do it. The choice is made, posited, assented to. Even

though the decision is an interior [117] invisible act, it is crucial and full of moral

import. We are on the way to good or evil. There are many situations where we know

the right thing to do and do not do it. Aristotle, Aquinas and Lonergan recognize

situations in which in various ways we bring our knowing into line with our doing and

not the other way round.

(5) We carry out the decision, the process is completed, full moral self-

transcendence has been achieved or failed. The action is irrevocable.

4.3 Activities to Norms

We perform these activities in response to desires, imperatives, feelings that

emerge from within. Some of these tendencies are purely self-centered, they are desires

for our own satisfaction, they are with a view to our success, they are purely self-

interested and greedy. The criterion we apply might be happiness, it might be pleasure,

Value Ethics 133

it might be utility, or it might be a mixture of them all. Can we also recognize a sense of

obligation operating? We seem to be obliged to look after our family, to tell the truth, to

respond to our conscience, to be responsible. Just as we discerned transcendental

imperatives operating in cognitional process, can we identify a transcendental

imperative operating in and through the activities of moral judgment, decision and

action? That will be the special task of chapters five and six.

5 What kind of Ethics will Emerge?

It should be clear by now that this is not a traditional textbook on ethics. It is not

proposing a list of rules to be followed, either general or specific. It does not give

answers to specific questions about stem cells, relations between the sexes, justice, or

honesty. It is not another theory about right and wrong based on principles, definitions

and deductions. Neither do we indulge in the oversimplification of claiming that this or

that single attribute is the key to ethical behaviour. So if we are clear about what we are

not expecting, then what kind of ethics are we hoping to emerge in this text? [118]

(1) It should be transcultural, invariant and universal, in that it goes to the

source of all moral obligation, valuing, deciding, acting and loving. It overcomes the

inherent limitations of theory to embrace the activities and norms which are common to

all human persons of whatever culture or time. It will be an ethic of value and valuing.

(2) It will be a personal ethic, namely, one based on appropriating the deepest

and best inclinations of the human heart. The whole person, head and heart, is included.

The whole of life is included, thinking, deliberating, judging, valuing, deciding acting,

feeling. It is an invitation to become a full human person, to realize potential, to develop

to full human maturity, autonomy and authenticity.

(3) It will be a verifiable ethics because it is based on the data of your own

consciousness, your own experience of moral judging and deciding. Every statement in

ethics should be verifiable in your own experience. Just as "every statement in


134

philosophy and metaphysics can be shown to imply statements regarding cognitional

fact",24 so every statement in ethics can be shown to imply statements concerning our

own experience of moral decision-making. We should, therefore, find a criterion by

which to judge theories and discard those that are clearly mistaken, incomplete, or

inadequate.

(4) It should be a maximalist ethics, as opposed to a minimalist ethics. It is not

just a list of what not to do, nor a list of what to do, but a recognition of the dynamic of

moral obligation leading to the fullest development of the integral human person. It is

not confined to the morality of individual acts, but includes attitudes, values, habits,

orientations underlying all individual actions. It is not just concerned with laws and

codes and external activities, but the source of the codes, the reason for the rules, the

function of rules in moral education and keeping order in society.

(5) It will be a creative ethics in the sense that we are setting up a method to

tackle new situations, new challenges, new dilemmas, posed by emerging technologies

and situations. Genetics, ecology, new medical procedures, evolving economic

interrelationships, changing cultures and meanings, all pose a challenge and call for a

new creative ethical response. [119]

(6) Not just a personal ethic but also a social ethics. There should emerge an

ethic of duties as well as rights. It recognizes that we become persons in a society and

we have a contribution to make to that society, to its health and progress. As inheritors

of a tradition, we receive through education, socialization and inculturation; but as

leaders, teachers and parents, we pass on the tradition by the lives we live, the values

we teach, the institutions we preserve.

(7) It will be pedagogical in the sense that we are not just learning abstract

theories about objects but we are moving to self-knowledge. It will recognize and

incorporate the inherent desires of the subject, the deep desire for authenticity. Good

Value Ethics 135

pedagogy will recognise the stages of moral development. It will use the methods and

images and stories appropriate to each level. It will invite development, not by a

sudden leap to moral maturity, but by slow steps from one higher stage to the next.

(8) It will be foundational in the sense that our appeal is not to any external law,

not to any authority, not to any tradition or system, but to the subject himself, his or her

deepest and best inclinations. It is an invitation to maturity, to authenticity, to

autonomy. It is an invitation to move into the stage of interiority, to a value ethics, to

appropriate the subject as valuing, deciding and living value.

Suggestions regarding Questions for Deliberation:

(1) You might find that you sometimes operate in terms of actions you consider right or

wrong; at other times you might think in terms of what kind of a person you would like

to be; at other times you might work out the values and disvalues involved in a

particular choice. The latter is the more foundational and underlies the others.

(2) You might find yourself being very pragmatic in explaining to a child that if you tell

lies you will be found out and punished; no one will trust you again; you will become a

liar and who wants to be a liar? For a mature moral adult it is wrong to tell lies because

it is wrong to tell lies; you do not need to appeal to pragmatic criteria or consequences

or punishment. Morally [120] right and wrong are meaningful categories in their own

right. You have become a lesser person by being dishonest.

(3) It is important to personalize and concretize the discussions of this chapter with

reference to real examples. You are invited to keep such personal examples in mind as

you peruse the text.

(4) This is an example of a value clarification exercise. It will usually clarify what are

the values really operative in your life. The operative values may be very admirable or

shameful. We usually aspire to higher values.


136

(5) This example of a value clarification exercise can be used in a group discussion.

Discussion can be quite lively and enjoyable; sometimes produce more heat than light.

(6) It is very hard to still the mind completely; you usually find memories, imaginations,

worries, intrude. However much you suspend the thinking and imagining, you can never

eliminate awareness of the self, being conscious, the experience of consciousness –

unless you fall asleep of course.

(7) There are absolutes in the field of moral philosophy. But are they to be found in the

actions, or in the intentions, or in the consequences, or in the values? This question we

will be able to answer after a long investigation.

(8) It is usual to set up a committee including biologists, economists, medical

practitioners, moral philosophers, and religious leaders. In this way it is hoped to

combine goodness, competence, right values, practical common sense and real

understanding. It does not always work out for the best and sometimes the opposite

process can occur. [121]

Endnotes

1 Insight, 627. 2 See Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy. This earlier text does deal with consciousness, self-appropriation, method, and interiority, in the context of cognitional theory and epistemology. Now the same notions are being extended to existential ethics. 3 Lonergan used a slightly more complicated diagram for the judgment of value, including a what-to-do? line and an is-to-do? line. See Bernard Lonergan, Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 18, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), Appendix A. The diagram I present in this text is simpler and suggests very fruitful parallels between the activities and the levels. I would include the what-to-do question as a question for second level operations. When we ask about the value of something, we review all previous relevant experience, understanding, and judging truth – with a view to the judgment of value; alternatives for action are parallel to alternatives for hypothesis. Judgments about possible courses of action are only one sub-set of judgments of value. I think it important that we see how simply the three-level structure of knowing facts can be expanded to become a four-level structure for knowing all values. We have struggled for two millennia to get the three level structure of cognition right. I hope we do not have to wait so long to be clear on judgments of value. These matters are further discussed in later chapters.

Value Ethics 137

4 Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy. 5 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4. 6 Anthony de Mello, Sadhana: A Way to God, Christian Exercises in Eastern Form, (New York: Image Books Doubleday, 1978). 7 Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 7, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 157. 8 Insight, 344. 9 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1949) 158. 10 Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy. 11 Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 173, 255-63. 12 See Eugene Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness, University of Washington Press, 1988. He seems to be comparing the concept of consciousness as found in Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard and Kierkegaard. You can do this comparing, contrasting, and distinguishing forever but end up with nothing unless you refer back to the experience of being conscious. See Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, (Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1991); after two hundred [122] pages of tortuous negations, Dennett eventually comes up with his definition of consciousness as: "Human consciousness is itself a huge complex of memes (or more exactly, meme effects in brains) that can best be understood as the operation of a 'von Neumannesque' virtual machine implemented in the parallel architecture of a brain that was not designed for any such activities. The powers of the virtual machine vastly enhance the underlying powers of the organic hardware on which it runs, but at the same time many of its most curious features, and especially its limitation, can be explained as the by-products of the kludges that make possible this curious but effective reuse of an existing organ for novel purposes" 210. I am not convinced that this definition advances our understanding of consciousness. 13 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Trans by M.R. Ramos, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). 14 Ira Progoff, At a Journal Workshop: The Basic Text and Guide for Using the Intensive Journal, (New York: Dialogue House Library, 1975). 15 See for example, Don Richard Riso and Russ Hudson, The Wisdom of the Enneagram: The Complete Guide to Psychological and Spiritual Growth for the Nine Personality Types, (U.S.A.: Bantham Books, 1999). 16 See for instance, Naomi L. Quenk, Essentials of Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Assessment, (Canada: John Wiley and Sons, 2000). 17 Anthony de Mello, Sadhana: A Way to God.


138

18 See chapter seven on moral development. 19 See Louis Raths, Merill Harmin, Sidney Simon, Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the Classroom, (Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishers, 1966). Jack R. Fraenkel, How to Teach about Values: An Analytic Approach, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977). 20 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays in Philosophy and Literature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 21 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Questions 7-17. 22 Garrett Barden, After Principles, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), vii. 23 Fred Crowe, "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value," Lonergan Workshop vol 7, 35. 24 Insight, Preface 5.

3

The Question of Value Arises

Spontaneously we move from judgments of fact or possibility to judgments of value and to the deliberateness of decision and commitment; and that spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it constitutes us as conscientious, as responsible persons, and its absence would leave us psychopaths.1


(1) (a) John is forty-three years old. (b) John is a good doctor. (c) John is a good football player. (d) John is a good person. Does the distinction true or false apply to each of these propositions? What is the meaning of 'good' in these statements? (2) Evaluate two political figures that you know well. How do you rank them and why? (3) Can you think of any nouns (substantives) to which the term good or bad do not apply? (4) Can an institution such as a university declare itself value-free? Can such a policy be actually implemented? [124] (5) What set of values or disvalues does the McDonalds chain of restaurants stand for? (6) Are values a matter of (a) personal preference, (b) arbitrary choice, (c) imposition from an authority, (d) responsible deliberation and appropriate decision? (7) Can you rank the values operating in your life? Are some values more important than others? (8) Can you avoid choosing? Can you avoid acting? Can you avoid evaluating? In what order do these three activities normally occur?

1 Introduction

Let us begin by trying to get some sense of how values pervade our personal and

social lives. We easily and often describe things as good or bad, right or wrong,

worthwhile or worthless, brilliant or useless. Such judgments come in a constant stream

from morning to night, as we react to the morning newspaper, relate with our family,

commute with our fellow workers, do our teaching or administration or digging or

talking; as we work and relax, as we eat and drink, as we get on with life’s business. We

take it for granted that we are competent to make these value judgments and can be

Questions of Value Arise

140

rather surprised if others do not agree with us. We are constantly evaluating ourselves

and other people, policies, actions, things, institutions, leaders, possible courses of

action. Just about everything we do is influenced by these evaluations; we are constantly

choosing between alternatives that we judge as good, better, best, or bad, worse or

worst.

Increasingly, political life and activity is interpreted in terms of value. We hear

talk of family values, conservative values, democratic values, liberal values, traditional

values. We invoke the values of freedom, equality, honesty, justice, compassion, and the

like, as justification for policies. Values are embedded in constitutions, laws,

institutions, rules of procedure, policies and programs. Politicians make their decisions

in the light of these values, about war and peace, distribution of resources, care of the

elderly, education of the young, [125] availability of medicines, protection of law and

order. Agreeing to a budget means that some are going to get richer and other poorer;

who are we to favour and why? Policies can change the organization of the society and

determine in some ways how we are to live – they are always value-laden. To favour

this legislation over that legislation is to evaluate one as better than the other; they are

judgments of value. Institutions, political parties, rules of procedure, civil laws, all

embody values. We are constantly judging our politicians as wise or foolish, responsible

or irresponsible, genuine or fake, good leaders or bad leaders, disinterested or self-

serving.

The question of values is faced explicitly in the educational system. What values

from the past do we hope to be passed on to future generations? What aspects of our

tradition or heritage should be taught in our schools? Or do we think of education as

only passing on information, technical knowledge and skills, so that we get a good job

and advance a career – but that too is a value judgment. What values does our

educational system embody in terms of facilities for disadvantaged, availability to the

Value Ethics 141

poor; what kind of character formation, ideals, discipline, respect, tolerance, do our

schools engender? What stand should a school take on bullying, use of alcohol, relations

between the sexes, drugs, moral values, and so forth? What kinds of priorities are in

effect in terms of sports, academics, or money-making? Who decides on these value

questions? How can they be taught? Which values should be taught?

Each one of us personally is faced with a determination of which values we will

espouse for ourselves; where do we take a stand for ourselves on issues of justice,

equality, honesty. What kind of person do we want to become? What ideals, visions,

values, hopes and dreams motivate us and drive us? Are we to be geared towards

personal advantage, egoism, exploiting others, always seeking satisfaction of our own

selfish desires? Or are we to respond to the needs of others, to the building of a just and

good society, to promoting progress, to loving our family, community, country and

humanity as a whole. We decide not only on our career choice, to become a dentist or a

pilot or a nurse, but also what kind of a person we are going to [126] be. Values impinge

on and constitute our social and personal lives at every turn.

With the language of values pervading our political and cultural discourse and

the reality of personal values challenging us existentially at every turn, you would think

that we would know the answer to such simple questions as, what is a value? where do

values come from? are there true and false values? what kinds of values are there? But

when you look for answers to such basic questions, you find the most divergent and

contradictory set of answers that you can imagine. Some claim that values are just

private arbitrary choices; some think they are the same as feelings; others that all values

are illusions to be unmasked; others that values are always being used by the powerful

to increase their power; for some they are a product of reason alone; for others values

are just social conventions invented for the convenience of living together, to be

discarded at will if situations change; for some values are simply bias, prejudice, already


142

predetermined. So we find an extraordinary confusion and disagreement continuing

about values, even though they form such an important part of our personal and social

lives.

It would seem to be important to sort out this confusion and so we begin our

own investigation in this chapter starting simply with the question of value and how it

arises. If we are looking for the source of value, for the genesis of value, surely the

place to look is the question of value as it arises and the contexts in which it arises. In

the later parts of this book we can examine how answers to these questions are reached.

But if we wish to identify the source, the origin, the foundation of value, surely we

should start with the context of the question of values. So in this chapter we will focus

on the context in which the question arises, the characteristics of all questions of value,

the implications of these questions, the ranking of these questions and, finally, identify

the specifically moral question of value. [127]

2 Context of Question of Value

2.1 Remote Context.

If you ask where do your values come from, it is probably helpful to distinguish

the values of the child, the values of the emerging adult and the values of the mature

adult. The values of the child come mostly from outside, from parents, teachers and

society. The values of the emerging adult are in a state of transition; it is the stage of

questioning. The mature adult has taken a personal stand and should know why and

where they stand on questions of value. Let us examine these three stages in more detail.

In the first instance, we receive our values from others. We are told what is

important, we are told what is right behaviour, we are told not to tell lies, nor to use bad

language, etc. We are receptive to parents, peers, teachers, the schools, the culture, and

the church leaders. In the process of socialization we conform to the patterns of

behaviour of the society. In the process of education we learn the skills, the traditions,

Value Ethics 143

the history, the heroes, the beliefs of the group. In the process of inculturation we

assume the culture, the meanings and values, of the ethnic or national grouping. For the

most part this is a reception; we conform to what we presume to be right. It is not a

totally passive reception: it is an intelligent, reasonable and responsible process. We are

respecting authority, presuming on their wisdom, goodness and competence. We are

accepting the values of the society as our values. We believe these are the best on the

basis of the authority of parents, teachers, leaders and society in general.

This is the way of belief. We accept these values not because we experience,

understand and judge for ourselves, but on the basis of trust in our elders and betters. It

is the way of heritage; the traditions of the society are handed on from one generation to

the next. It is called the "way down" precisely because it is belief, not immanently

generated knowledge of values.2 We made the same distinction in cognitional structure

between the way up of immanently generated knowledge and the way down of belief

and tradition.3 The way of belief is accepting as true on the basis of trust in another's

research or understanding or authority. This is an aspect of collaboration in [128] the

pursuit of truth; a scientist does not have to repeat all the experiments to prove all the

assertions in the textbook. You have to trust the authors, the experimenters, the

instruments, the conclusions of others. You do not do so uncritically, but you cannot

make your own instruments, you cannot repeat all the experiments, you have not

enough time to check all the assertions in the text. So you accept as true on the basis of

trust in fellow researchers. This is a quite reasonable procedure in the context of

increasing specialization and the imperative to push back the boundaries of knowledge

to discover new truths. But belief operates in the field of value judgments also. Our

values are first accepted on the basis of trust in those whom we respect as competent

and good and trustworthy.


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But there comes a time when we wish to internalize our values, when we

question the values of the tradition and want to know the rationale for these values.

Perhaps, we begin to realize the fallibility of parents and teachers. Perhaps, we begin to

discover that our history was not always one of glorious victories of the good and the

true, but a human mixture of cowardice, betrayal, self-interest and incompetence.

Around adolescence the young person seeks independence and this questioning of

values is just one aspect of that process. Instead of continuing to accept the value

tradition, the adolescent wants to challenge why these are values, where did they come

from, and why should they continue to be upheld. They are seeking a foundation for

values, the immanently generated reasons for values. They want to know for themselves

on the evidence of their own eyes, their own understanding, their own judging, as to the

basis of these values. Immanently generated knowledge in cognitional terms is

knowledge born of personal experience, personal understanding and personal judging;

you know for yourself that it is true. In the field of value the same process occurs; we

seek values that we have personally experienced, we have personally understood, we

have personally judged as true factually and now personally affirm as true values.

The time of adolescence and well beyond is a time for questioning values. It is a

time when we seek autonomy and authenticity. We are free to evaluate our tradition and

make the transition from belief to immanently generated knowledge of values. This is

the general con-[129]text in which the move to autonomous values is being made. The

authority of others is called into question and the authority of self and personal

experience is the only acceptable base for the mature adult. Presumably the reader, if

she has reached this point, has some interest in the source of values, the critique of

values, the appropriation of authentic values. To find a personal foundation for values is

a lifelong task of deliberation, evaluation, implementation, integration and autonomy.

Value Ethics 145

Mature adults then become the bearers of the tradition; they become the

innovators and the creators; the ones who apply the tradition to new circumstances and

keep it alive and well. They are the ones who articulate the tradition, express it in art,

literature, science, philosophy and theology. They are the ones who as parents, teachers

and leaders, pass the tradition on to the next generation of children.

We see ourselves as receivers of the values of our tradition, and also creators and

innovators in terms of appropriating and handing on the tradition. We are mediators in

historical process. We pass through three stages of accepting passively the tradition,

questioning actively and passing on creatively. For the moment we identify ourselves

with the process of questioning: the movement from values accepted on the basis of an

outside authority to values based on personal experience, understanding, evaluation,

decision and action.

2.2 Proximate Context

The remote context of the questioning of values occurs at this stage of life when

we wish to appropriate our values and become authentic persons of value. But in a more

proximate context in what form and in what shape do value questions arise? Let us

specify the form of the value question as it occurs in ordinary circumstances so that

there will be no ambiguity about what we are talking about.

It is usually in the context of choice that the question of value emerges. We are

faced with alternative courses of action. We have to decide between them. We ask,

What is the best thing to do? What is the best of these alternatives? How do I make a

good decision here? Normally, this will set us on the way of deliberating, adding up ad-

[130]vantages and disadvantages, anticipating consequences, comparing alternatives,

assessing the worth of each possibility. Life is full of situations of choice, where we

normally want to do the right thing, make a good choice, get the best out of the

situation. It is true that decisions can be posited without any thinking, without any


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evaluation, blindly, arbitrarily and at random. But in practice this is rather rare and has

little to recommend it. We come to recognize rather quickly that there are good

decisions and bad decisions; that there are various consequences that need to be taken

into account; that we learn from previous experience; that good decisions usually follow

from good evaluations.

In the context of personal relationships we are constantly reacting, is this person

trustworthy? Do I like this person? Do I want this person as a friend? Is this a good

professor? Is this a good writer? We are constantly asking about the worth of persons

from various points of view; their worth as academics, their worth as football players,

their worth as conversationalists, their worth as possible friends. We answer these

questions as best we can and so are constantly passing judgments on the value of the

people we meet, endlessly discussing the peculiarities of professors, the fads and foibles

of our friends, the triumphs and failures of our heroes. We are always assessing people

and our social life is largely determined by such judgments.

In the context of cognitional structure, after we have reached a judgment of truth

there arises the question of application, of worth, of where do we go from here. You

might have discovered the structure of DNA, or you might have understood nuclear

fission, or you might have discovered that the ozone layer is being depleted. So far it is

a matter of evidence, experiments, calculations, research programs and results. But now

the question arises as to what are the possible applications of this scientific

breakthrough, how can it be applied for good or for evil. These are value questions. You

can use nuclear physics to produce electricity or to make nuclear bombs. You can use

genetics to devise better medical procedures, or to make bio-chemical agents for germ

warfare. You can treat your discovery of depletion of ozone layer simply as an

interesting fact about which you intend to do nothing; or you can formulate remedial

action and push for ap-[131]propriate policies. Judgments of truth are relatively easy to

Value Ethics 147

handle, as there is one criterion of sufficient evidence operating. Judgments of value

expand enormously the range of possible criteria, the range of alternatives and

consequences and become much more difficult to handle.

In conclusion, then, we see that value questions can be immediate, concrete,

practical questions that we ask constantly and answer very quickly. These questions

usually arise in the context of choice of alternatives or in the context of personal

relations or in the field of applying or implementing discoveries or truths. Or

alternatively the question of value arises in the more remote context of the transition

from unquestioning acceptance of inherited values, to more reflective questions asking

about the ground of values, the criteria of value, the objectification of the process of

evaluating with a view to internalizing values.

3 Characteristics of Questions of Value

We are taking a position that the origin of values and value judgments is the

question of value. Values do not seem to arise from likes and dislikes, do not arise from

the unconscious, do not arise from simple looking and finding, do not arise from

sensitive feelings. If values arise from questions, then, it is worth while examining the

characteristics of this question and the immediate implications of this position. So let us

try to pin down some of the characteristics of this process of questioning as it occurs in

you and me by way of self-appropriation.

3.1 Arises Spontaneously

We cannot seem to avoid discriminating and evaluating. Questions of worth

arise from within, it seems to be a natural process, it is hard to prevent. It is difficult to

imagine a human person not evaluating; it would be a very truncated human being who

knows facts but has no knowledge of values. The ability and urge to ask, what is

worthwhile? seems to be part of our humanity. [132]


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You do not really teach children or students to ask questions of value. You teach

the content of what is to be evaluated, the criteria to be used in evaluation, give specific

answers to specific questions. But unless the basic ability to ask questions of value, to

seek answers is there, no amount of teaching can put it there. The question of value

emerges from within; you can say it is a priori or innate in that sense.

A baby operates in terms of likes and dislikes, what is agreeable or disagreeable,

what is satisfying or not satisfying. This is a purely sensitive criterion of being attracted

by what gives pleasure and repulsed by what gives pain. But gradually this criterion is

transformed by the emergence of intelligence, the emergence of questions of fact and

value. Once questions emerge then intelligence and reason are operating. If intelligence

is operating then a new criterion of truth and value is emerging. So likes and dislikes

give way to, Is this good for me? Can I have this now or later? Is parental approval more

important than bodily satisfaction? The child is moving from the immediacy of the

world of sensitive pleasure and pain, to the world mediated by questions of value and

judgments of value.

The question of value does not arise in animals, it does not arise from the senses,

it does not arise from sensitive feelings. Pets will have foods that they like and dislike,

behaviours that they enjoy and punishments that they fear. They can be trained by

manipulating rewards and punishments. But this is purely at the sensitive level and no

question of value arises.

3.2 Arises from the Beginning

Parents quickly identify a quiet baby, a good baby, a troublesome child, a willful

child. Sometimes the child will respond, sometimes not; sometime he will do what he is

told sometimes not; sometimes he will do one thing, sometimes another. The child is

learning to choose between different alternatives; she is valuing one thing more than

another, and changing these primitive valuations on different occasions. Even children

Value Ethics 149

question the value of different objects or courses of action. Well meaning parents can

buy their child a very expensive toy for Christmas. The child unwraps it on the big day.

Then, [133] spends the rest of the day playing with the box that contained the toy, rather

then the toy itself.

Intelligence and will emerge in an undifferentiated compound of child

behaviour. It is not that intelligence develops first and then value judgments and

decisions follow. They seem to emerge together but in an undifferentiated whole. Our

diagram of cognitional structure might seem to imply a temporal priority, by which we

experience first, then understand, then judge facts, then judge value. There is a

structured relation of dependence operating, but it is not a temporal priority. In its

emergence in the child the whole structure is operating from the beginning even though

in an undifferentiated and primitive manner.

3.3 Arises in every Culture

Cultural anthropologists studying the beliefs and customs of different cultures

often point to the diversity of clothing, building, marriage customs, languages, religious

practices, etc. These are the most obvious aspects of cultures when you look at them

from the outside and fail to penetrate to the meanings and values operating. But beneath

the diversity there a common element and the root of this is the question of fact and the

question of value. Every culture asks the question of what is important for our survival?

How are we to live? Who do we approve of? Who do we blame? What behaviour is

allowed and what is forbidden? All cultures have distinctions between what they

consider good and what they consider bad; what they consider right and what they judge

to be wrong. The answers may differ in some ways but the central thrust of the question

is always there. We have something in common with all the cultures of the world no

matter how simple or modern. All are seeking the best way of life; all are struggling to


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find answers to existential question of the best way to live, how to deal with sickness,

relationships, with justice and peace.

3.4 Arises at every Stage of History

Just because the term value only became current at the end of the nineteenth

century, does not mean that previous civilizations were [134] devoid of values. Once

you have intelligent human beings you have questions of value being asked and

answered in different ways. Traditional societies were very fixed in their ways; there

was a smaller range of choice for the individual; most behaviours were specified by

fixed roles and status and everyone knew what was expected of them. But where did

these traditions come from? Why were they different from other cultures? They came

from evaluations that this is the best way of living for us, at this time, and in this place.

This is the way we do things and it is the best way to do them.

So whether we are thinking of hunter gatherer societies, or the great civilizations

of China, or Egypt or Central America, or the Greek/Roman break through to

philosophy or the religious traditions of Buddhism or Judaism or Christianity or Islam,

each raised the question of value and gave their own particular answer appropriate to

their own stage of development and unique situation.

3.5 Unavoidable

Is it possible to exclude choices and values from your life? Is it possible to deny

that values are operating? It seems to me to be impossible. To choose not to choose, is

already a choice. To decide not to decide, is already a decision. To eliminate values

from your life is to judge that this is a valuable thing to attempt to do. A nihilist is

saying that my philosophy of value is better than yours! No matter how we twist and

turn we are faced with the process of questioning values and deciding what to do about

it.

Value Ethics 151

You can, of course, eliminate values from part of your life: you can simply

ignore, denigrate, disparage and eliminate religious values from your life. You can

eliminate values from some of your relationships and be guided only by sensitive likes

and dislikes. You can pretend that values do not operate: you can foster a pretence that

an institution is value-free. You can affirm certain values in theory but deny them by

practice. You can go against the values you believe in, but that all that is another story

for later.

One way of dealing with values is to try to eliminate or bracket them either

completely or from a certain defined arena. The notion of [135] a value-free sociology

was propounded by such as Max Weber in the laudable intention of making sociology

an acceptable academic discipline and distinguish it from the value-laden ideologies of

communism, socialism and free-market capitalism. The idea was that sociology could

have an objective method, rules of procedure, clearly defined concepts and methods.

The private values of the researcher, or interviewer or theorist could be systematically

excluded. This drew a picture of the neutral sociologist, just as the neutral scientist,

trusting in their methodologies to arrive at ‘objective’ results. Values were viewed as

irrational, arbitrary, private, ideological. Values were viewed as irrational because they

somehow go beyond knowing truth and do not seem to be amenable to reason and logic.

They were viewed as arbitrary, because there seemed to be no way of measuring or

controlling or reasoning about values. They were viewed as private, because they

characterize the person and his choices and that was considered their proper place. They

were viewed as ideological, because they were intertwined with the systems of

socialism, capitalism, communism and fascism, which were fighting for the minds and

hearts of people in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.

If you can have a value-free sociology, then surely you can have a value-free

economics, a value-free educational system, a value-free psychology, a value-free


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politics, a value-free morality of political correctness! Because values are so hard to

deal with, they tend to be pushed under the table. But they do not disappear! Lonergan

remarks that a value-free theory of values resembles a theory of knowledge that

prescinds from the knower!4

There is no such thing as a value-free position. We are human beings who seek

vital, social, cultural, moral and religious values. Values are implicit in all of our

choices. They may not be thematized but they are operative. In the narrow focus you

might argue that economic theory and research does not involve an explicit value

system but when economic policies are put into practice you can see the values

emerging.

A neutral educational system claims to leave religious and moral values to the

parents, to the private life of the person or family. It [136] concentrates on science,

intellectual development and claims not to discriminate or teach a particular value

system. But in fact it does; it is saying that religion and morals are a matter of private,

arbitrary choice; that the academy cannot make any contribution to such choices. In sex

education the facts of biology are explained in great detail with charts and diagrams and

the claim that it is value-free. They just give the biological facts and the rest is up to

personal choice. The message received by the student is that the biological facts are

important, but friendship, discipline, love, relationships, trust, intimacy, fidelity, have

nothing to do with sex!

So we have described in a rather compact descriptive way, how, when and where

the question of values come up. Let us proceed to try to pin down more precisely the

implications that follow from the assertion that values arise from questioning.

4 Intentionality of the Question of Value

The question of value is our starting point because it represents the source, the

beginning, the genesis of our knowledge of values. We have identified the various

Value Ethics 153

forms of the question of evaluation which arise in the practical, social, political or moral

life. We have seen that this question of value is spontaneous, universal and

unavoidable. Let us now examine some of the deeper implications of this process of

questioning.

The question is always a strange mixture of the known and the unknown. If we

knew nothing, we could not ask questions. If we knew everything we would not need to

ask questions. But because we are in the process of developing, we ask questions on the

basis of what we know, seeking further knowledge. The question is intentional in the

sense that it intends the kind of insight which will satisfy as an answer to the question.

We do not yet know the exact answer, but we set the criteria by which the correct

answer will be recognized. It is in this sense that intentionality is particularly useful.

When we ask questions for understanding, we are asking why? when? where?

etc. We are looking for more information in order to understand better and formulate a

hypothesis; we are in thinking, [137] brainstorming mode. The questions determine the

kind of insight that we are searching for and the kind of answer which will satisfy the

question. At the level of understanding we are looking for a possible explanation, a

hypothetical solution, a bright idea, a good definition, a possible course of action. We

are intending the intelligible. When we are satisfied that the hypothesis is sufficiently

clear, nuanced, and differentiated, then, we move on.

The question for reflection arises; it asks, is it true or not, is it correct or not, and

looks for a yes or no answer. This question intends the real, the truth, correct judgments

of fact and will not be satisfied until that is attained. Here we set off in a critical mode;

we are not looking for more information or ideas; we are looking for the simple yes or

no, affirmation or denial. Only what is relevant to this will be considered. We weigh

the evidence, we grasp its cogency, we posit the answer, we make a judgment. It is a

special act of understanding which grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for the


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affirmation of the conclusion. The question determines the level of consciousness on

which we are operating and the kind of activities to be performed in order to reach the

answer which will settle the question.

Similarly, the question of value determines that we are operating beyond the

level of facts and truth and at the level of evaluation and knowledge of values. The

question for deliberation is different from the question for reflection; that is what

determines the new level of consciousness. Lonergan in Insight talked about practical

reflection,5 by which he meant the question for action, namely, which of these possible

courses of action is the right one. Because he was thinking of only three levels of

consciousness this was just one kind of reflective insight emerging at the level of

judgment of truth. He was implicitly reducing the level of deliberation to that of truth

and fact. However, he later realized that this is a new kind of question of value which

means we are operating at a fourth level of consciousness.6 Just as we distinguished the

hypothesis from the judgment by distinguishing the question for intelligence from the

question for reflection, now we are further differentiating out the question for

deliberation, which raises us to a new level of consciousness. It is only by recognizing

that it is a new kind of question that we avoid [138] reductionism and recognize the kind

of activities and intentionality operating at this fourth level.

Intentionality is a notion that has become current in contemporary philosophy

because of the work of the phenomenologists. It is a useful tool for clarification and

here we focus on the question for deliberation. It is important to see that the question

for evaluation is different from the question for understanding and the question for

reflection. It is the intentionality of the question which determines the level of

consciousness on which we are operating. Value is defined by way of the question, not

just by way of an answer; value is what is intended in questions of value and found

when the question of evaluation is satisfactorily answered. The meaning of good and

Value Ethics 155

value is to be found in our own experience of asking questions about values, and

following that up with judgments of value, following up with decisions and actions. It is

only in reference to this universal human experience that we can identify the meaning of

good and value. The data to which we appeal to give meaning to talk about good and

value is the data of consciousness, the experience of being obliged, the activity of

asking questions for evaluation, the effort to sort out values, the judgments of values

and the consequent decision and action. Hence we can justifiably define values in terms

of intentionality: a value is what is intended in questions of value. Later we will be able

to expand this answer in terms of deliberative insights and judgments of value.

In this context the notion of value has become a transcendental notion. It is

transcendental simply in the sense that it is totally general, applies to all cases, at all

times and in all minds. It is opposed to categorial which is specific, limited and has a

definite content.7 Transcendental in this sense entails no specific reference to God or

metaphysics. Wherever people ask questions of deliberation, value is being intended

and we identify those values in terms of the question that is asked, and the answers

given.

The question of value, as a mixture of knowns and unknowns, sets in motion a

process by which we name the unknown, anticipate the characteristics it must have if it

is satisfy the question, combine it [139] with the already knows, work out the

combinations and find the correct answer. It was very puzzling for Plato that a slave

could find the answer to a question of geometry, simply by being asked leading

questions by an interlocutor. How can somebody, who at first does not know the

answer, in the end recognize the answer as the correct answer? The same process which

is operative in mathematics, geometry, science and common sense, is also operative

when questions of value are asked. There is a heuristic structure which is spontaneously

invoked, a basic procedure for finding answers. It is a process of thinking things out,


156

clearly and distinctly, step by step, until all pertinent questions have been exhausted. It

is a process of lining up evidence with a view to the conclusion. It is a process of being

sure about the criterion, being clear about what is intended, being responsible about

evidence, memory, examples, experience, definitions, feelings, etc. You can be

presented with a crossword puzzle and after half an hour have it solved correctly; you

know you are right. You can be presented with a moral dilemma; similarly, with clear

thinking, an appeal to previous experience and knowledge, a reasonable awareness of

possible alternatives, responsible seeking of true value, we can work out the solution

and then recognize it as the correct answer to the question. This is how the mind and

heart works in knowing the truth; this is how the mind and heart works in knowing

values.

The question of value sets the criterion which guides the process to a correct

solution. If you are looking for a good pair of shoes in a department store you have

implicitly set your criteria of what you mean by good: they must be your size, they must

be fashionable, they must be within your financial expectations, etc. If you are looking

for a good school for your child you implicitly set the criteria that will determine your

answer: academic standards, discipline, affordability, sports program, accessibility, etc.

If you are looking for a good tutor for your kids you will implicitly set the criteria:

trustworthiness, competence, wages, experience, etc.

We know that in our past experience we have made good judgments of value

and some mistaken judgments of value; we have answered the question of value

correctly or have been mistaken. Again, we have this strange ability to recognize a

correct and a mistaken an-[140]swer to the question. We know that there is a right way

to go about finding the answer to the question of value and a wrong way. The right way

involves careful deliberation, gathering of relevant experience, assembling a case for,

consulting our deepest feelings, consulting and getting advice, eliminating bias and

Value Ethics 157

short cuts, etc. The wrong way might be to jump to conclusions, to follow our biases, to

be moved by selfishness, to be seeking to manipulate people, not to think too much of

the consequences, etc. So there are norms operating in the unfolding process set in

motion by the question. These norms are immanent and operative in the very process.

They come from the inside and not imposed from outside.

The question we are identifying is not the question as formulated in words, but

the prior spirit of inquiry, the pure question.8 The formulated question presupposes

previous ideas, insights, concepts, and knowledge of language. The explicit question

might be well formulated and helpful in seeking a solution; or it might be a false

question leading you up a blind alley. But where do the formulated questions originate

from? In the beginning is the desire to know, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of inquiry,

the Eros of the mind, active intellect, the tension of wanting to understand. If you have

reached thus far in this text, you must be personally familiar with this wonder as the

beginning of philosophy, this determination to get to the bottom of things. We are not

blindly asserting an arbitrary starting point; we are reflecting on our own experience of

the crucial role of the desire to know in the genesis of values.

Succinctly then, we can assign six functions to the desire to know in the

unfolding of the process of knowing values. These will be elaborated further in our

discussion of feelings, but let us state them simply here.

(1) The question of value initiates the whole process. It takes the initiative, it

starts the process, it is hard to think of anything that could be prior to the question.

Aristotle insisted that the active intellect had to be in act, because it initiates the process

of throwing light on phantasms so that forms could be abstracted from images. In

intentionality analysis the active intellect is understood as the desire [141] to know. The

desire can also be referred to as a response: we hear a strange noise at night and we

respond with a question, what is it? We see a blind man begging and we respond with


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pity but also questions about what to do, the value of the welfare services, priorities in

the society, etc. The desire for value and the response to value become more sensitive,

stronger, more discriminating and accurate in the life well-lived. They become

submerged, distorted, distracted and blunted in the life not so well-lived.

(2) The question of value intends value. It points us in the right direction; it sets

in motion a heuristic structure for the finding of the solution; it guides the inquiry in the

direction of value; it is sensitive to clues and hints that seem promising; it senses a dead

end has been reached and a new approach has to be tried; it senses that we are on the

wrong path and redirects towards real value.

(3) The question motivates us to persevere until the end. It provides the mass and

momentum of the drive to know; otherwise our searching would be paper-thin. It carries

us through confusion, frustration and failure to a resolution. It is the determination, the

commitment, the resolve to find the true solution. It is the pure motivation of the search

for truth; not for academic success, not to impress the students, not to be famous.

(4) The question provides the dynamism of the process of knowing. The question

is always leading us on, never satisfied with half measures or superficial understanding.

It is always leading to higher viewpoints, more comprehensive visions, from descriptive

to explanatory, from the restricted to the unrestricted. Knowing is never a closed

system, but always leading to further questions and deeper understanding.

(5) The question specifies the content that is intended and eventually found.

Lonergan gave a technical meaning to the term ‘notion’. In Insight he spoke of the

notion of being, as an intention, an anticipation, a heuristic pointing, the desire to know

everything about everything.9 He contrasted this with a concept of being, which would

be a static, limited, formulated definition. In a similar fashion he speaks of the notion of

value as what is intended in questions of [142] value. Value is the content that is sought

in the question, grasped in the insight, affirmed in the judgment and implemented

Value Ethics 159

through the decision and action. In Insight he clearly distinguished between the proper

and the borrowed content of a judgment of truth.10 The borrowed content is the specific

determinations of a particular judgment of truth. The proper content is truth as such, the

yes or no of affirmation or denial. We can make a similar distinction here, between the

borrowed content of particular specific judgments of value and the proper content of

value as such. The proper content of the question of value is value as such, what will be

reached in the yes or no of the judgment of value.

(6) The question of value sets the criterion that must be satisfied if the question

is to be answered satisfactorily. The question for intelligence is answered when a

satisfactory level of understanding is achieved. The question for reflection is satisfied

when sufficient evidence for the conclusion has been found and no further pertinent

questions arise. The question of value is answered when we have responsibly

deliberated and judged, decided and implemented, as authentic persons, with a happy

conscience.

Perhaps we can begin to appreciate the importance of the question as the source

of values and valuing!

In taking the position that values begin with questions leading to understanding

and knowledge, we are in stark contrast to many of the contemporary positions on

knowledge of values. Some suggest that values are choices, personal preferences,

emotional reactions; this is sometimes the case but if you want to find the truly good as

opposed to the apparently good surely the question leading to understanding and

knowing is crucial. Some suggest that values are an irrational ideology imposed on us

by class interests, by society, by unconscious psychological forces, by the will to power;

but self-appropriation reveals the dangers of such deceptions, and also our ability to

understand correctly and know surely. G. E. Moore claimed that the good is indefinable;

in a sense he is right that it cannot be defined in more primitive terms; but we can give


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an indirect determina-[143]tion of the good by referring to our moral experience, our

moral questions, our moral insights and our judgments of value.

Conclusion: In the context of these incomplete, dubious or ambiguous accounts of

value, can we come up with a better solution? How do we define values in a way that is

convincing, intellectually satisfying and practically relevant? We have applied the

method of self-appropriation to identify and define at least indirectly the notion of

value. Now we are be in a position to identify different kinds of values, and later we

will focus specifically on moral values.

5 Ordering of Value Questions

Is there a chaos of conflicting values or can values be ordered in some

systematic way in terms of relative importance? Is there any principle on which we can

establish priorities among these questions of value and the values intended in the

questions? Can we be intelligent, reflective and responsible in deliberating on values?

Can we begin to sort out the confusion between economic values, medical values,

political values and moral values? Is there a principle we can use to structure these

values in some preliminary way? In this section we try to answer these questions

positively even though we are still focusing on the different types of questions of value.

5.1 A Scale of Values?

On what principle might we base our ordering of values? Aquinas, when he

came to specify the goods proper to a human person, considered first the good proper to

the human person as a substance; then the good proper to the human being as a living

thing, and, finally, the good proper to the human person as rational. Max Scheler talks

about an a priori emotive grading of values in terms of: first, sensible values; second

values of life or vital values; third, spiritual values – beautiful, right and wrong, truth:

and fourth, the value of the holy and unholy. His justification for this ranking is given in

value-feeling or intuitive evidence of preference. Higher values are more enduring,

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indivisible, independent, and yield deeper inner satisfaction.11 Lonergan asserts a

distinction between five types of value, without [144] clearly articulating the

justification for this: “Not only do feelings respond to values. They do so in accord with

some scale of preference. So we may distinguish vital, social, cultural, personal, and

religious values in an ascending order.”12 It is clear that the five kinds of value

correspond in some way with the levels of consciousness and that is the position I will

elaborate.13

The levels of consciousness are initially defined by the type of question asked.

The question for intelligence asks for more understanding, information, clearer

definition, and seeks intelligibility. The question for reflection seeks the truth, asks is it

so, assesses the evidence for affirming a conclusion. The question for deliberation seeks

true value of persons, actions, things, institutions. The religious question might be

something like, Is there salvation? What is the ultimate fate and meaning of human life?

We are suffering from an unconditioned, unrestricted love; with whom, then, are we in

love?14 Each question gives rise to activities proper to that level and reaches products

required at that level. We call them levels of consciousness because they are conscious

activities; because they are different levels of activity the consciousness proper to each

of them is different. We have already seen that these activities constitute a single

cognitional structure and the activities are defined in terms of five levels of

consciousness.

How can the levels of consciousness ground the distinction between five kinds

of value? We do so by asking, what is the good proper to each level of consciousness?

What is the value to be affirmed specific to each level? How is the good of each level to

be realized? In practice, we are operating at many levels at the same time; the levels are

distinct but not separate; we specialize at one level in the context of influences and

dependencies on other levels. But if we apply this principle of the value proper to each


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level of operation, we get at least a preliminary scale of values that has solid

foundations. If we can assume now that we are working in the framework of five levels

of consciousness, we can see that one way of dividing values is according to the level at

which they are intended. So we will talk about vital values at the level of experience,

social values at the level of un-[145]derstanding, cultural values at the level of judgment

and personal values at the level of deliberation and religious values at a fifth level.

Values are intended in questions of value and – as we will see later – are known

in judgments of value. Hence in asking, what is the value proper to the level of

experience, we are asking a question of value, deliberating and judging; we are

operating at all levels of consciousness in order to answer a question specific to one

level. Hence vital values are judgments; they are not the sensitive satisfaction of animal

needs and desires. Just as in functional specialization we are operating at all levels to

perfect the product of each level – data, hypothesis, truth, value – so now we are

operating at each level to find the good, the value, proper to each level.

5.2 Vital Values

We start by asking, what is the good proper to the level of experience? Now

experience incorporates sensitivity, the psyche, biological operations and all that is

characteristic of the human person as animal. What good needs to be achieved at the

level of experience to allow the proper functioning of the human person. These we will

call vital values.

Vital values are health, food, shelter, reproduction, warmth, sleep, etc. These are

material needs which we share with animals because we are animal. These have to be

satisfied in some minimal way to lay the groundwork for higher activities and values.

Psychological needs for security, sociability, family could be included. Nowadays, we

have a wide appreciation of the value of the environment, ecology, sustainable

development, endangered species, etc. Water, oil, rain, fish, food, climate, and the like,

Value Ethics 163

are important in terms of their fulfilling of our vital values. A considerable amount of

our time and effort we put into satisfying needs and desires at the level of experience. If

these values are not realized then higher values are harder, if not impossible to achieve –

primum vivere deinde philosophare (first live and then philosophize).

Animals satisfy their needs and desires simply in response to the instinct for

self-preservation and survival. Animals know nothing of [146] vital values; vital values

are a judgment of value affirmed by a mature knowing person. Eating is primarily a

biological activity, but it is done by the whole person and so incorporates elements of

intelligence, of moral and even a religious dimension. We do not eat as animals eat –

see the monkeys’ tea party. We spend much time and energy discussing what are

healthy foods and which promote health and which tend to promote heart attacks, or

strokes, or gout, or ulcers, etc.

5.3 Social Values

What is the good proper to the level of understanding, to the activities of

thinking and formulating? Here we advert to the fact that the person is a social animal;

that we live in groups, that we depend on one another; but that we are intelligent and

intelligence seeks order. We attend to the fact that private satisfaction of individual

needs, give way to social cooperation and organization so that individual needs can be

satisfied regularly, efficiently, in an orderly manner. Lonergan associates this second

level of consciousness with the good of order. It is not just a question of enough food

for me here and now as in vital values, but a system that will provide food for everyone,

at regular intervals, at reasonable prices, recurrently. A good of order is a system of

cooperation and specialization in a group, where all contribute to the society and receive

benefits from the society in a mutual complementary manner. Intelligence seeks order;

there are many systems of social organization where needs are met, not simply in terms

of me looking after my own vital needs individually, but in terms of a group


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differentiated in terms of status and roles, specialized tasks, skills, complementarity and

cooperation.

We take for granted this order in the society which makes this kind of

specialization and cooperation possible on a wide scale. But we notice that countries

sometimes degenerate and divide to such an extent that the good of order breaks down

altogether and the individual is left to fend for himself. What can you do if social order

has broken down? Money is useless; public institutions have disappeared; distribution

system has broken down; law and order are absent. You do what you can to survive;

look after yourself and your family. The [147] social group degenerates into competing

individuals and small groups.

The economy, the infrastructure of transport, institutions, distribution of goods

and services, production and communications are part of this good of order. It is the

common way of life of people living together. Lonergan usually defined culture as the

meanings and values informing a common way of life. The common way of life is the

social organization that is set up; it is the repository of higher values and also the

realization of vital values in an organized way. If the common way of life does not

provide for the vital values of individuals and families it will not survive; it must do so

efficiently, regularly, easily, so that people can devote themselves to other affairs.

Social arrangements, forms of marriage, kinship, rights and duties, will be a big

part of the good of order. The mode of production, exchange of goods and services,

money, the economy, will be important. Leadership structures need to be devised so that

the order can function, change, adapt and progress. A system of education, passing on

traditions and values, training in skills, learning new skills will be part and parcel of a

good of order. Law and order must be preserved by laws, punishments and rewards, a

way of administering such a system.

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Social values are higher than vital values in the sense that social organization is

with a view to satisfying vital values more efficiently and cooperatively. Social values

are values, they are judged to be good, the good of order emerges historically in

response to needs and opportunities. Goods of order are devised by human beings trying

to make the world a better place to live in. The social order is not an ant hill: human

beings deliberately devise social organizations, evaluate them regularly, change them

when necessary. It is the achievement of the good proper to the level of intelligence, but

all levels of consciousness are involved in deliberating on social values. Monarchy,

feudalism, tribal systems, great civilizations, aristocracy, democracy, socialism,

communism, fascism, dictatorship, are forms of social organization devised throughout

history. We continue to argue over the social value embodied in the best kind of social

order. [148]

5.4 Cultural Values

What is the good proper to the level of reflection and judgments of truth? We

will call these cultural values and they are the meanings, the beliefs and the truths of a

society. (We are using the word ‘cultural’ in a broader sense that the more usual sense

of ‘high class’ or ‘artistic’.) Every society has a core of beliefs which all accept, value

and hand on to the next generation. These beliefs are expressed in the myths of origin

and legends, in the laws and institutions, in the constitutions and charters, in the

celebrations and feasts, in the respect accorded to leaders, teachers, priests, story-tellers,

legislators, and heroes. A democratic society will have a core set of beliefs concerning

the rights of the individual, the freedom of each citizen, elections will allow

participation in democratic process, distinction and balance of powers of legislature,

judiciary and executive. A communist society will have a core set of beliefs about the

State, ownership, the individual in the collective, social welfare and organization. Now

the question of truth arises; what is the truth about the human person; what are his rights


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and dignity in context of larger society? Are the core beliefs of democracy true or those

of communism? What is the true notion of human person, rights, dignity, human

freedom, human potentiality?

Cultural values are not given, they are achieved. Truth is a value and needs to be

nurtured in the family, education, common sense, science, philosophy, and media.

History is a struggle to discover the truth about human persons; hence the need for

appropriate social and political and economic structures. Lonergan describes the

function of culture thus, “Over and above mere living and operating, men have to find a

meaning and value in their living and operating. It is the function of culture to discover,

express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, improve such meaning and value.”15 This

can be done individually, but also needs to be done in institutes, such as schools,

universities, churches, political groups, etc.

5.5 Moral or Personal Values.

Above and beyond the question of truth, there arises the question of moral value,

what is the best way to live as a person in society? [149] What is the proper way of

relating to others in terms or respect, justice, love, etc.? How do we develop as free and

responsible persons, knowing, deciding, and implementing an integral scale of values?

It is not so easy to formulate the question of moral value clearly, so we have postponed

it to a later section (Sect 6) to do so adequately.

5.6 Religious Values

Although we are not primarily concerned here with elaborating a fifth level of

consciousness, we recognize that it is there. What is the form of the question intending

religious values? To be fully human is to be open to the divine. We can recognize this

openness by the unlimited nature of our questioning, by our experience of the holy and

fascinating, by our openness of mind and heart to the possibility of God's intervention in

our lives. Hence worship, prayer, grace, unconditional love, meditation, asceticism, self-

Value Ethics 167

sacrifice, service, love of neighbour etc. are examples of religious values which go

beyond moral values.

However, it is helpful to recognize that religious values are there and they are

operating in most of us and influence our moral values. We often study morals in the

context of moral theology. But the level of moral obligation does not depend for its

validity on religious values. We need to be able to dialogue with men of good will on a

common ground. Similarly, we need to have a firm foundation for our religiously

motivated moral values: a religious teaching needs the best moral system that there is;

otherwise it can go astray when difficult situations arise or new moral dilemmas arise.

Fundamentalists fanatically affirm religious values but seem to have lost sight of moral

values of respecting human life.

5.7 Sublation in Scale of Values

We have done our best to identify the scale of values based on the good to be

found proper to each level of consciousness. This does seem to ground a basic

distinction and classification of groups of values. Because we operate as a whole with

many levels of consciousness operating at the same time, it is sometimes difficult to

separate in real life the values proper to each level. However the principle of the [150]

levels of consciousness and classes of values is relatively clear and sound.

Now we ask how are these classes of values related to one another? In what way

are they dependent on one another, emerge from one another, go beyond one another to

constitute something new? As before the notion of sublation16 helps us to articulate

these relationships. The activities of the levels of consciousness sublate one another.

Now we can extend this idea to the values proper to each level of consciousness.

Briefly, the notion of sublation holds that (1) something new emerges, (2) previous

levels are left intact, and (3) products of previous levels are enhanced, increased in

value and significance. Let us apply this framework to the scale of values.


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Firstly, something new is introduced in a higher level of value which cannot be

reduced to the previous level. Moral values are really new and distinct from cultural or

social values. One can argue that the good of order requires laws and therefore

punishment and reward and hence be built on principles of justice. But does that mean

that justice is simply a matter of intelligent social organization? If a person steals public

money, is this just a social inconvenience, a disruption of the good of order, or is it a

moral fault? Values go beyond facts; values are distinct from facts. Facts are answers to

the question of, is it so? Values are answers to the question, what is it worth? They are

distinct questions, distinct intentionalities, distinct activities and distinct levels of

consciousness. The value question cannot be reduced to the level of the fact question. In

asserting this real distinction we are refuting any form of reductionism which would

evacuate the meaning of religious, moral and cultural values to the status of vital or

social values. Much public discourse assumes that the only good of the society is the

good of the economy, the satisfaction of private desires and needs, equitable distribution

of goods and services, the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number of citizens. But

does that produce a society proper to human persons, or an ant hill proper to termites.

Secondly, the previous level retains its integrity, its criteria, its activities, its

achievements, its proper procedures. Reaching the [151] higher level does not destroy,

or negate, or bypass or belittle the previous achievements. Economics is a human

science concerned with production, distribution of goods and services, money, inflation,

economic development, imports and exports, etc. How do you alleviate the poverty of

millions of people in countries around the world? Good intentions alone are not enough.

The moral idealist can initiate fanciful plans and policies but if they are not grounded in

sound economics they can do more harm than good. The moral intention to alleviate

poverty must respect the laws of economics, of development, etc.

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In the same way that judgments of fact, depend on clear and distinct

understanding, so cultural values depend on social values. There is a structural

dependence of the higher values on the lower values. Religious values presuppose moral

values. It is strange to find a very religious person stealing from the collection box.

What kind of religious fervour can allow such basic moral ineptitude? One supposes a

religious person to be also prudent, just, brave and temperate.

Thirdly, the higher level enhances the value and significance of activities of the

lower level. The less comprehensive is swept up into a wider and deeper framework of

value. Hunger is satisfied by food in the animal as in the human. But for a human

person eating is not just a biological activity, but a vital value. We are concerned with

healthy food, balanced diet, proper proportion, not just satisfaction of hunger and eating

the most pleasant or satisfying food. But as persons living in a society we are concerned

with the production, distribution, preparation of food, regularly, efficiently, for

everyone equally, in an orderly fashion; vital values are swept up into social values. But

social life is an empty shell, if it is not infused with beliefs and truth, core meanings

mediated by judgments; social values are subsumed into cultural values. But is the

imposition of order, the equal distribution of goods and services, simply a matter of

convenience or is there a moral dimension involved? Is it right to allow gross

divergence of incomes in a society? War and peace, definition of marriage, use of

human embryos, world poverty, availability of medicines, are moral questions. There is

a distinct moral dimension that cannot be reduced to the convenient, the successful, the

more efficient. These [152] questions are swept up into the moral dimension and it is

only there that they get their appropriate, correct response.

The process of sublation represents a new integration, a higher viewpoint, a new

unity of the old and the new. The higher depends on the lower in the sense that it cannot

be reached without passing through the lower. The values of the higher levels are


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distinct, higher, more important, more valuable than those attained in lower levels.

Higher levels go beyond, add something new to lower levels. The values at lower levels

continue to be operative, continue to be valid, continue to be values even when higher

values are attained. The value of the lower levels is even enhanced in the context of the

attainment of the higher levels; a good moral philosophy is of increased value in the

context of a moral theology. Attainment of values at a lower level set the conditions for

the possibility of values at a higher level.

A common family meal gives us a good example of how the scale of values are

represent and lived; how they are distinct but not separate; how they are interrelated and

interdependent. Obviously, there are vital values being realized in healthy food,

refreshing drink, a balanced diet, the satisfaction of biological needs. But it is a social

occasion, roles and status are recognized, availability of goods depends on the good of

order, social conventions have to be maintained. It is also a cultural occasion with the

meanings and values of the culture being observed. A family represents a basic tool for

the inculcation of values and the passing on of values to the next generation.

Celebration of meals is cementing common meaning and value. There are moral issues

at stake in the personal relations between the members, respect, tolerance, freedom,

responsibility, duty, sharing in the work and sharing in the rewards. Finally, there is a

religious dimension in the grace before and after meals. We can see a hierarchy of

values in action, interdependent, interrelated, but distinct without being totally

separable.

In view of the counterpositions it is important to note that we have been able to

name a variety of value questions, recognize where they come from, talk intelligently

about them and, finally, we succeeded in establishing a real hierarchy of importance

among sets of [153] values. The principle on which this is based is that the values are

defined by what is intended in the question at the five different levels of consciousness.

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The pattern of relations between the levels of consciousness will be similar to the

pattern of relations between the values realized.17 We have noted for ourselves the

relations between the levels of consciousness in terms of the way up of immanently

generated knowledge, the way down of belief and the principle of sublation defining the

relation between the levels. So we can conclude that the same pattern of relations

applies to the values intended and realized at each level. This prioritizing is not

arbitrary; it is critical, verifiable and applies to all people at all times as it belongs to the

invariant structure of what it is to be a human person.

5.8 Terminal and Originating Values

This is another distinction which is useful to bear in mind if we want to be clear

about moral values.

Lonergan defines terminal values as those, "that are chosen, true instances of

the particular good, a true good of order, a true scale of preferences regarding values

and satisfactions."18 They are what are produced, the object of action; the money given

to the poor, the vegetables growing in the garden, the educational institutes that are

functioning for the good of the society, the books in the library, the buildings, the

policies being implemented.

Lonergan defines originating values as "authentic persons achieving self-

transcendence by their good choices."19 By doing good acts we constitute ourselves as

good people. By doing evil acts, producing evil objects, we constitute ourselves as bad

people. We normally attend to the goods that are produced because they are visible,

measurable, and tangible. But equally important is the self that is constituted as morally

good or bad by these activities. Our choices produce good objects; but they also make

us into good persons. They change us. By our choices we produce the one and only

edition of ourselves.


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Terminal values are subordinate to originating values, “for the originating values

ground good will, and good will grounds the realization of the terminal values.”20 [154]

5.9 Values and Disvalues

We must not forget the opposite side of the coin. As well as values there are the

opposites which can also be chosen and implemented. Good, bad; right, wrong; good,

evil; honesty, dishonesty; fidelity, infidelity; truth, falsehood; generosity, meanness;

freedom, slavery; happiness, unhappiness; peace, war; progress, decline; health,

sickness; etc. Although we are obliged to choose values, we are free not to do so and to

choose the opposite disvalue. Some mental ingenuity is needed to convince ourselves

that evil is really good or that a dishonest course of action is justified just this once. We

will study that process later.

There are gradations of good and evil; ambiguous moral situations; conflicting

value situations, grey areas in between the white and the black.

It is to be noted that the opposite of a value is often stated as a negation, value

and disvalue, honest and dishonest, etc. The opposite of a value is often the absence of a

value, the absence of something that should be there. Disvalues do not have the same

status as values.

6 Specifying Moral Values21

The first problem is to define clearly and specifically what makes moral values

to be moral values, as the good proper to the fourth level of consciousness. This is

central to our study and is not as simple as it might seem. Just as we defined the other

values as the good proper to that level of consciousness, can we now do the same in a

convincing manner for moral or personal values? We have identified five types of

values. What is the precise role of moral values in this hierarchy, what distinguishes

moral values from other values? The second problem – not unconnected with the first –

is to determine to what extent all values are moral values. If values are the good and if

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we have specified different classes of values, maybe from some point of view all values

are moral values? Do moral values include or exclude the other kinds of value? If we

buy a computer, are we performing a purely economic activity seeking only economic

values, or are there moral implications or aspects to the activity. It would seem [155]

that human actions can be many levelled at the same time, can be quite complicated,

multifaceted, on a par with the analogous nature of the values we seek.

6.1 Stating the Problem

If we can state the problem well, we will be on the way to solving it; so let us

look at some examples and debates which might hone the question to a finer point.

(a) Virtue and Skill. Aristotle had great difficulty distinguishing these because

they seem to have so much in common. It might be useful to examine the commonality

and the distinction between a skill and a virtue to help us define the specific nature of

virtue. Let us compare a program for teaching piano and a program for producing brave

soldiers.

The piano training course will involve instruction on scales, keys, tones,

semitones, etc but also rudimentary exercises with fingers in the correct position hitting

the right keys. The potential piano player will have to get access to a piano, start with

the elementary scales and keys, move on to reading music, music theory, hours of

practice of playing; more theory, more practice, more instruction, correction, repetition.

The program will be a combination of instruction and practice. It will take time, it

presumes the student wants to learn and is willing to give the time and has some talent

in music. If the student persists he will develop habits, reflexes, coordination; basic

techniques become automatic, attention can be diverted to more subtle improvements;

the person eventually becomes a good piano player. People will say, oh, he can play the

piano, he is a good piano player; he has developed his potential to become a pianist.


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Now can you have a training course to produce brave soldiers? Can you model it

on the above? You can have a program to teach soldiers to march in unison, to use

weaponry, to respond immediately to commands, to endure hardships. You can design a

program to eliminate the cowards; put the group in a dangerous situation and see how

they react. You can instil group loyalty, and blind obedience to a commander. You can

give instruction about bravery, you can teach the [156] definition of bravery, you can

put before the group many examples of bravery, you can try to instil a desire to be

brave, you can put a high value on bravery. But in the end can you teach real bravery?

Can you guarantee that your soldiers will act bravely when the crunch comes?

Learning to play the piano is a skill; it involves willingness, some basic talent,

instruction and lots of practice. Given those conditions you can almost guarantee

results; the person becomes a good piano player. To acquire a skill is to develop

sensorimotor habit, ingrained reflexes of fingers, nerves, brain, memory and

imagination.

You can teach a soldier many skills, you can instil reactions of obedience and

response. You can do a limited amount to instil bravery, but in the end can give no

guarantee of results. Bravery is a virtue, it seems to be a perfection of character, it seems

to come from the inside more than a skill, it is a quality of the person as a person rather

than a skill or talent. To acquire a virtue is to acquire a habit of will; it is to become a

good valuer and a good decider and a good doer. It is to develop at the fourth level of

human consciousness in terms of one’s values and decisions and actions as a person.

(b) Moral and intellectual virtues. Aristotle distinguished between

intellectual and moral virtues. What is the ground of this distinction? It is not difficult to

see that intellectual virtues are perfections of the intellect, the good of the intellect

realized in various habits of understanding. Aristotle identified the intellectual virtues

as, science, art, prudence, intelligence, wisdom, good deliberation, understanding,

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judgment and cleverness. Intellectual virtues are perfections of intellect; moral virtues

are perfections of character. But what is character? Aristotle struggles with the notion of

will as deliberate choice, with the person as originating cause of action, with the

voluntary and involuntary, the temperate and intemperate person. But he does not have

the notions of person, will, freedom, conscience, consciousness, value and so he finds it

very hard to pin down the notion of moral virtue.

(c) Indifferent moral acts?22 In traditional moral theology there has been a

long-standing dispute as to whether there can be human acts that are morally indifferent.

These acts are human acts and there-[157]fore free and responsible; but do they

necessarily have moral value? Can playing football, eating a meal, going for a walk, be

considered as morally indifferent, neither good nor bad. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus

held that you can have indifferent acts both in theory and in the concrete. Aquinas held

that all human acts, if they were not in some way bad, were of their nature good; hence

there are no indifferent human acts. Aquinas argued that even though a human act may

be neutral as to its object, the end at which the person is aiming is either what it ought to

be or what it ought not to be. A person acts well once the purpose of this activity is in

itself in agreement with reason, even though he intends to achieve nothing other than

what the activity is of its very nature aimed at achieving. Eating, even simply for the

sake of satisfying hunger, is a good action. Hence you cannot have indifferent acts. We

will see if the scale of values can throw light on this question.

(d) Moral Reductionism. There are many understandings of the human person

and his/her development which exclude a moral dimension altogether. Many forms of

psychology of self-actualization think in terms of success, adjustment, getting rid of

guilt feelings, achieving private selfish ambitions. There are interpretations of self-

actualization which exclude the moral perspective. So much of this psychology is

limited to vital and social values. You are happy if you are a well-adjusted, functioning


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efficiently, a respected member of a group which affirms your worth. Moral

development and religious awareness are eliminated from proper human flourishing.

Guilt is something to be dealt with; not something indicating that you might possibly

have done something wrong. Various self-help psychology's assist people to be more

aware of their feelings, to adjust better to their environment, to respond to good

inclinations, to be free of addictions, compulsions, etc. and promote psychic health and

flourishing. But they rarely have in mind the full potentialities of the human person as

free and responsible, with duties and obligations, with a moral dimension of what they

stand for as persons.

There are many views, as we have seen, where the moral is equated with the

useful, the pleasurable, the good of order, the self-interested. These are implicitly

reductionist views; they reduce [158] the meaning of moral to utility or pleasure or

success. To counter these we need to identify, name, discuss, assert and affirm moral

values as distinct from other values but as intimately related to all kinds of values.

6.2 Stating the Solution

1 Moral Good Specifically as Such.

We have seen how we defined vital, social and cultural values as the good

proper to that level of consciousness, the intentionality operative and the activities by

which that intentionality is realized. Now we apply the same schema to moral values.

We ask what is the intentionality proper to the fourth level, what is the perfection of the

activities of that level and what good is to be achieved. This is slightly more

complicated than previous levels because we have to include the activities of

questioning, judging, deciding, acting, being and becoming, progressing and declining.

Furthermore we have to consider that somehow the fourth level sublates other levels,

brings them into a unity, and we must consider the person as a whole, not just as parts.

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Knowing is the perfection of a part; moral virtues are somehow the perfection of the

whole.

2 Framework.

Defining the moral only makes sense in the context of a full understanding of the unity

and diversity of a human person: that the human person is free and responsible in his

actions; that the human person is moving from potentiality to actuality on each level of

consciousness; and that there is a dialectic between value and satisfaction operating in

this dynamic. These topics will be dealt with in due course but to understand the moral

question presupposes this broad context. So let us say a quick word about each of these

topics.

Unity. The human person performs many activities, seeing, eating, sleeping,

working, thinking, questioning, relaxing, knowing, doing, seeking, hoping, creating,

being honest, praying and worshiping. The diversity is sufficiently obvious to be

incontrovertible. However, there is a unity of the self or person which causes modern

philosohers some difficulty. We appeal to the experience of identity of the [159] self

perduring in all of these activities over long periods of time and awareness of the same

person operating at different levels. Our notion of consciousness has identified this

awareness of self immanent in most of our activities. Moreover, this is not just a

phenomenal unity but it is a substantial unity, the unity of one substance or central form

or thing grasped by direct insight.

Value judgments. To make correct value judgments normally precedes moral

decisions. To do so we need to be moral persons. As we have seen, we start by asking

the question of the worth of a person. We deliberate in terms of criteria operating. Many

biases, distortions, self-interest, twisting of evidence, ignoring of data, can interfere with

the proper unfolding of the deliberating process. To know what is the right thing to do

in a particular situation, is already a moral achievement. But it is only knowing and this


178

must be extended to living. But we can already assert that one aspect of the moral

person is that he judges well as to what is the right thing to do: he is a good judger of

values.

Deciding. The human person is both free and responsible; without that morality

has no meaning. We do not bring animals to court for stealing food to satisfy their

hunger. We do not hold the mentally incompetent responsible for their actions. We

accept that the human condition imposes limits on our freedom, but in principle we are

free and responsible for our actions and it is only those actions which can be deemed

moral or immoral. Both freedom and responsibility are open to misunderstanding. To be

free is not to be understood as license to behave in any way we wish; but as self-

determination, as assenting to doing the right thing rather than dissenting, saying yes to

goodness rather than no. Responsibility recognizes that we are obliged, duty bound, live

in a society with other people; we have responsibility to ourselves and to others. Later

we will elaborate an understanding of freedom and responsibility in a manner worthy of

what we are as human persons. Moral only has meaning in this context of authentic

freedom and responsibility.

Implementing. We become complete moral persons only when we have decided

and carried out our decisions. Knowing what is the [160] right thing to do is the first

step; deciding to do the right thing is the next step. But the process is only complete

when the right action has been performed. Many items can interfere between the

decision and the action; we can change our mind; chicken out when it comes to the

crunch; falter at the last jump. It is only at this stage that terminal values are achieved

and the person becomes a good person in consequence.

Developing. The person is a dynamic reality at each of the levels that we have

identified. He is a self-actualizing being, one that moves from potentiality to actuality.

He achieves his being not in one instant but in a process of growth over time where the

Value Ethics 179

development at one level interacts with growth or lags at other levels. The body

obviously grows through distinct and ineluctable stages; intelligence develops through

the asking and answering of questions and passing into the habitual texture of the mind;

we pass through distinct stages of moral development, identified and named by various

psychologists; we develop religiously and the prayer of a child is not the prayer of the

retired person. One expects more of the morally good adult, than you expect of the

morally good adolescent or child.

Dialectic. In the unfolding of the dynamic of the human person there is a

dialectic operating between true values and satisfactions. The process of self-actualizing

is not automatic, it is not necessary, it is open to many paths and directions. There are

tensions and conflicts operating between our desires, our convictions, our satisfactions.

There is the dynamic towards self-transcendence and true value; the following of the

deepest and best inclinations of our hearts; the pursuit of truth, goodness for ourselves

and others. But then there is another path which is often in conflict with that one, of

satisfying sensible appetites, going backwards instead of forward, choosing decline

instead of progress, horizontal finality rather than vertical finality. It is only in the

context of this dialectic that moral values and the moral question can be understood.

This dialectic will be spelt out in detail in the section on conversion.

We can see, then, that the good proper to the fourth level activities will be

manifold because the activities are many. So we look to the [161] perfection of the

person as one who knows well, a judger of values, a prudent person; as a free and

responsible, a good chooser of values: as a good doer or actor, implementer, an integral

person; as one who develops, growing, becoming; as one who struggles with tension

and does not always triumph. These are the perfection of the parts; what about the

goodness of the whole?

3 Personal and Interpersonal.


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But when we speak of a morally good person, we do not refer to the goodness of

the activities, we refer to the goodness of the whole. What do we mean by that?

When we speak of a good person, we are usually referring to the whole, to the

person as the centre of the activities of judging, deciding, implementing and developing.

We refer to the person as the centre of relationships with other people. Lonergan often

replaced the term ‘moral’ with the term ‘personal’ values. We can relate to other

humans simply on the level of experience, we eat together in the same place but we are

strangers. We can relate to others at the level of social organization and so we relate to a

waitress or a shop keeper or a bus conductor as part of the good of order. We relate at

the level of cultural values, when we have intellectual arguments, dispute the latest

theory of physics, insist that our theory is better than theirs. Finally, we relate as persons

fully when we enter into relationships of trust, of marriage, of family, of community, of

friendship with other persons.

Although we use the phrase self-actualization, we do not intend a private

morality of developing one’s personality apart from or in exclusion of the good of

friendship, the family, community, society and nation. The good is both personal and

social. Most moral choices take place in the context of interpersonal relations. Apart

from the context of community, moral values do not seem to have much content. Love

of the good includes equally the good of self and the good of others. In the true

friendship envisioned by Aristotle, there was no tension between love of self and love of

the friend provided that both are genuinely good. Love of self is not the same as selfish-

[162]ness. Selfishness is where we exclude the other unfairly for the benefit of

ourselves.

4 Sublation.

We used the schema of sublation to suggest how the values in the scale of values

relate to one another. The higher sublates the lower, in going beyond to something new,

Value Ethics 181

in leaving intact the lower levels, and in enhancing the value of lower levels. As we are

not considering religious values, we treat moral values as the highest values and

therefore the highest level of sublation and hence sublating all previous values. This

means firstly, that moral values are new, unique, specific, distinct from and higher than

any previous level of values. We reject any form of reductionism by embracing this

principle of sublation. But, secondly, it means that moral values enhance the importance

of all previous values and so the vital, social and cultural values are in some sense are

included, incorporated, part of moral values. Each level sublates the previous levels and

also integrates it into a whole. Intelligence integrates sense into an integrated whole

which is a definition or explanation. Judgment integrates previous levels into a whole

which is an affirmed truth. Judgment of value and will integrate the previous levels into

a whole person who is the one sole integrator and operator, the one who experiences,

understand, judges and decides. The person represents the whole, the centre of

consciousness, the integrator of all activities of the one human being.

The scale of values represent increasing levels of responsibility. We admit

readily that we are not responsible for the colour of our eyes, or the shape of our nose.

We admit more reluctantly that we have little control over our memory and do not feel

responsible for lapses of memory. But we are reluctant to admit that our judgments are

wrong; we take full responsibility for our judgments because we freely and responsible

affirmed them. In judgment we take a stand on what we hold to be true. This is coming

close to what you stand for as a human person. But more important are the moral values

which you espouse and for which you are also truly responsible. More than the truths, it

is the values we espouse that make us what we are as persons in the very core of our

freely constituted personhood. Moral values [163] are at the fourth level and so sublate

the other levels of value and so come close to the core of what we stand for as moral

persons.


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5 Free and responsible decision.

Lonergan often refers to fourth level activities as the level of deciding. But we

have seen that at the fourth level of consciousness there is first, knowing value, then

deciding, and then execution. So there is more involved that simply deciding, although

we will give it pride of place. Some think that all deciding is an exclusively fourth level

activity, and always a moral decision. But we decide to drink tea or coffee; we decide to

use a nine iron rather than an eight in a game of golf; we decide to take a bus rather than

drive, we decide to wear a blue shirt rather than white. These decisions do not seem to

have monumental moral import; but they are certainly decisions. Decisions in and of

themselves are not necessarily moral decisions. It may not be appropriate to assign

deciding to a level of consciousness and to think of it in broader terms.

The problem of decision is analogous to that of value. We decide at each level of

consciousness and the activities of each level are voluntary activities, willed freely and

responsibly. However, the decisions relating to personal relations, to moral judging and

doing, to the person as a whole, sublate all the other decisions. Moral decision-making

is a specific kind of deciding, it has pre-eminence in relation to other decisions, it

incorporates other decisions into the wholeness of the human person.

In this sense we decide what we are to become as human persons. We can speak

of volitional integration in the sense of the pre-eminence of deciding. We do not argue

like the medievals over the primacy of will or intellect; but we do note the reality of

how knowing interrelates with deciding. This we will explore further in chapter eight.

6 Conclusion.

So I think it is useful to distinguish a general sense and a specific sense of the

term moral. [164]

In a general sense, we can affirm that all values are values and are to be

affirmed, valued, chosen, and implemented. In all decisions we should seek the good

Value Ethics 183

and avoid evil, of whatever kind. The human person seeks for many different kinds of

values. We recognize a dynamic operating at each level of consciousness, sometimes

called the transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be

responsible. But the first three are not strictly speaking moral values, nor do they

represent a specific moral obligation. We have an obligation to develop our talents, but

it is not exactly a moral law. We have an obligation to observe norms of polite

behaviour but it is not a moral obligation. So we distinguish between a general

obligation towards development on all levels and a specific obligation, to be

responsible, at the fourth level of moral values and decisions.

In its specific sense, moral value refers to the value of the person as a whole

person sublating all other values, to the person as centre of interpersonal relations, to the

person as deciding freely and responsibly, to produce the first and only edition of

himself. In this sense, moral values have a specific meaning and are not reducible to

other kinds of value. If a certain attitude or behaviour is morally wrong, then, it is

wrong because it’s wrong. One might eschew a course of action like abortion because it

is dangerous, or because it is expensive, or because you might be found out; but none of

these touch the simple fact that it is a morally wrong course of action. In establishing

the meaning of moral, we cannot reduce it to what is useful, to what is practical, to what

is pleasing, to what is true, to what is feasible, to what is desirable. Moral values are

specifically distinct from other values; they cannot be reduced to other values or put at

the same level as other values.

Have we managed to solve the problems posed in the beginning of this section?

Perhaps, we can see better now that skills are acquired by instruction and practice but

belong to the part rather than to the whole. We acquire skills of playing musical

instruments, driving cars, using computer programs; we become musicians, drivers,

computer programmers, but we are not changed in what we are as persons. Moral


184

virtues change us at the very core of what we are worth as human beings. Virtues are

acquired only if we are willing to [165] change at the core of what we are. Virtue cannot

be forced on anyone. For that reason, it is difficult to have a training course in bravery,

or temperance, or kindness, or honesty, unless participants deeply want to change and

are willing to change at the core of their being.

Intellectual virtues, as Aristotle called them, are perfections of the intellect, and

thus only of a part of what it is to be a human being. Moral virtues are perfections of the

whole. Moral character, then, is the perfection of the activities of knowing moral values,

deciding for values, and living values; it is the perfection of the whole, the habits that

belong to the whole; the habits that belong especially to the will, to the activity of

deciding.

Are there human actions which are morally indifferent? We would tend to agree

with Aquinas. In our terminology, all correct value judgments, good decisions and

consequent actions are morally good in a general sense; vital values if they are realized

are good in themselves as vital values, but also contribute indirectly to the attainment of

moral values. All values are values, but that does not reduce all values to the same level

and moral values in their specific sense are pre-eminent. [166] Suggestions Regarding


(1) This illustrates the difference between judgments of fact in (a) and judgments of

value in (b), (c), and (d). It also illustrates that good is an analogous term, its various

meanings combine similarities and differences. Being a good doctor or football player

are skills. When we talk of a good person we are usually referring to moral qualities.

(2) You might evaluate politicians in terms of whether they are effective, rich, honest,

good speakers, good debater, persuader, competent, intelligent, trustworthy, decisive,

respects others, team player, leadership ability, or their opposites. You often find a

Value Ethics 185

mixture of good and bad qualities and find it difficult to choose one politician over

another.

(3) You usually find that most substantives can be classified as good or bad from some

point of view. Try a page of a dictionary at random. It shows the wide extension of the

term ‘good’ and the ubiquity of the process of evaluation.

(4) The actual values of a University are expressed in its constitution, its statutes or

charter, its vision statements, its tradition, buildings, institutions, programs offered,

distribution of finance, rules of discipline, criteria of admission, academic standards

required, time given to sports, size and quality of library, etc. To declare a department

value-free is usually an attempt to protect academic freedom, free speech, pluralism of

viewpoints, that no one viewpoint dominates, that students have a choice, that values are

relative. But that itself is taking a position on values, namely, that all values are equal

and that values are a matter of free choice. These tensions and contradictions become

evident when you try to put these policies into action. Advocates of academic freedom

can become quite intolerant of those who hold that values can be true or false.

(5) McDonalds seems to stand for fast foods, cheap food, food that is attractive to

children, quick polite service, do away with frills, uniformity of product and service,

some concessions to healthy food, young temporary employees, etc. It is a formula

[167] which seems to have worked. But it is a set of economic, vital, commercial

values.

(6) Our values are a matter of personal preference in the sense that we are responsible

for our values; but we do not choose our moral values in the same way that we choose

the colour of our clothes. They are a choice but not a random choice; we are what we

value; we become the originating value of good terminal values. Conversely, we

degrade ourselves by doing bad deeds. By your fruits you will know them. As children

we accept the values of our family, community and nation and church. Gradually we


186

appropriate these values for ourselves, accepting some and rejecting others. Hopefully,

this is done with forethought, responsibility and mature decision.

(7) Value clarification exercises help in this process of ranking our actual values. There

is a ranking going on even if we are unaware of it. How do you spend your money?

What do you do in your leisure time? What are your moral values?

(8) We usually evaluate, decide and act in that order. These are so much part of human

life that it is impossible to avoid them altogether. To stay in bed and try to avoid human

life is just another way of evaluating, deciding and acting. [168]

Endnotes

1 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 18. 2 Frederick E. Crowe, Old Things and new: A Strategy for Education, (Georgia: Scholars Press, 1985). This gives an excellent analysis of the way of heritage and the way of achievement and their proper integration. 3 See Cronin, Foundations, 263-7. 4 Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan vol 17. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004) 403. 5 Insight, 633-5. 6 In his own words Lonergan says, “In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience.” Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974), “Insight Revisited,” 277. 7 Method in Theology, 11. 8 Insight, 34. 9 Insight, Chapter 12. 10 Insight, 300. 11 See Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, 80-5. 12 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31. 13 Bob Doran asserts, “the relations among the levels of value are isomorphic with those among the levels of consciousness, to which the levels of value respectively

Value Ethics 187

correspond.” Theology and the Dialectics of History, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 95. 14 Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 206. 15 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 32. 16 We previously applied the notion of sublation in relation to cognitional structure in Foundations, 263-4. Now we apply it to ethics. See paper presented at Lonergan International Workshop in Toronto, 2004, by Kenneth Melchin, entitled, “Thinking About Sublation: Exploring One of Lonergan’s Contributions to Ethics.” 17 See Michael Vertin, "Lonergan on Consciousness: is there a fifth level" in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, vol. 12, No 1, 1994, 8. 18 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 51. 19 Ibid., 51. 20 B. Lonergan, Insight, 601. 21 I found the following readings helpful but not fully satisfactory on the question: Joseph de Finance, An Ethical Inquiry, (Roma: Editrice Portificia Universita Gregoriana, 1991), 67-86; Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Ethics, (Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press,1953), 169-79; Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), passim. M. Frings, Max Scheler, 71-94. 22 I am indebted to the treatment of this question in: De Finance, Ethical Inquiry, 426-34.

4

Deliberative Insight

In the judgment of value, then, three components unite. First, there is knowledge of reality and especially of human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself.1


(1) Is it ever good to act without thinking? (2) Give some criteria by which you judge between a good doctor and a bad doctor. (3) Can you expect to solve moral dilemmas in the same way that you would solve mathematical puzzles? What would be the difference? (4) Are really intelligent people more likely to solve moral dilemmas correctly than the less intelligent? (5) Can a computer solve mathematical problems? Can a computer solve moral dilemmas? [172] (6) Recall a conversation in which you argued the merits or demerits of a recent movie or book. How did the arguments unfold? Who won? (7) Your sister asks for advice on procuring an abortion. What do you do? (8) Does the end justify the means? 1 Introduction

The question of value, as we have seen, arises spontaneously, arises in many

different contexts, at various levels of consciousness, with varying relevance to the

quality of human living and flourishing. The questions intend an answer, which is

arrived at when we pass a judgment on the value, choose the course of action and

implement the decision. We deliberate on the various alternatives, we evaluate which is

the best, we choose and we act. We will later focus on the judgment of value, but the

next step in the process seems to be deliberation, namely, thinking, comparing,

Value Ethics 189

inferring, gathering evidence, seeking information, and so forth, so that we can arrive at

a confident judgment of value.

Decisions are more obvious and apparent than the evaluation that precedes it.

You decide to buy a Toyota Corolla, you sign the check, take delivery and drive off into

the sunset. You decide you want to be a doctor, tell your parent, apply to various

schools, plan the finance of your studies and off you go. You decide to tell the truth,

admit you had too much to drink, should never have been driving, were responsible for

the consequences, take the appropriate punishment and make restitution for the damage.

But what is less obvious and apparent is the thinking, reasoning, judging and evaluating

that leads to the decision. Human decisions and actions are not random occurrences –

they do not drop like magic from heaven. They mostly follow from good judgments of

value. You choose a course of action because you have judged that it is the best course

of action, for you, here and now, in this set of circumstances. You decide to buy a

Toyota, because you judge that it is the most suited to your needs and pocket. You want

to be a doctor because you have the desire to heal, the appropriate aca-[173]demic and

manual skills and you feel that you will be happy as a doctor – you value being a doctor.

Now where does this judgment about the best course of action come from? That is our

present concern and it is no easy matter.

We can learn a certain amount about this process of deliberation from the history

of philosophy and will summarize these points in Section Two. We can glean some

hints from Lonergan's use of 'deliberation, evaluation, choice, action', which we will

discuss in Section Three. But we do not wish to be dependent on historical authorities,

telling us how to deliberate and make good judgments of value. We have personal

resources of our own, by which we can identify good deliberation and distinguish it

from hasty, or incomplete, or mistaken deliberation. For that reason, we started the

chapter with questions for personal self-appropriation, an invitation to read the


190

deliberations of your own mind and heart when confronted by a moral question. When

we find ourselves in a moral quandery, we are being pulled in opposing directions by

conflicting feelings, confused ideas, incomplete inferences, tension between wanting to

do the right thing but also afraid of the unpleasant consequences of telling the truth. It is

from this maelstrom of conflicting feelings, desires, ideas, hopes, facts, consequences,

and alternatives, that our judgment of value and decision emerge. Together we are

daring to delve into these deepest recesses of mental activities and feelings, to find the

foundations and source of good moral judgments

It seems obvious that 'understanding and reasoning' have some part to play in

this process of deliberation. Some philosophers have argued that such deliberation is a

purely and exclusively a rational procedure and that feelings have to be excluded

entirely and explicitly. Without going that far, it is clear that we argue about right

courses of action; some arguments we recognize as strange, some as irrelevant, some as

convincing. We appeal to reasons, to evidence, to facts, to witnesses, to inferences. The

whole world was involved in the UN debates in assessing the justification for pre-

emptive invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Many arguments, facts, justifications,

precedents, judgments, laws, inferences, alternatives, consequences [174] etc. were part

of the debate. It is hard to imagine that such a debate could exclude understanding and

reasoning altogether!

Equally, it seems obvious that feelings have some important role to play. The

various branches of empiricism emphasize the role of experience, feelings, sympathy,

heart, feelings of approval and disapproval, as the determining or sole factor in moral

'thinking'. There have been many variations, in which feelings like pleasure, utility, self-

interest, sympathy, etc. are considered as primary factors in the process of deliberation

and evaluation. The empiricist tradition does not recognize the role of understanding

universals and judging as true or false, and so almost by definition they appeal to some

Value Ethics 191

kind of feelings to account for our experience of 'ought', of moral approval and

disapproval, our sense of guilt in doing wrong or satisfaction at doing the right thing.

But are we faced with two alternatives, that are mutually exclusive? Must we opt

for one extreme or the other? Does an affirmation of the central importance of

intelligence and reason in moral argument, automatically, by definition, exclude a role

for sympathy, egoism or altruism, responsibility, anger or fear. Even in the formal

presentations of the UN debate, one could sense the deep feelings of participants over

the alternatives before them. Does that vitiate their arguments? On the other hand, is it

tenable to hold that feelings of approval or disapproval are the sole element in moral

deliberation. Surely questions such as, where do these feelings of approval/disapproval

come from? Corrupt persons approve of certain actions which other people disapprove

of as criminal? Once questions arise we start thinking and reasoning and so are involved

in some kind of cognitive deliberation.

It seems unavoidable that both reason and feelings have a role to play in moral

deliberation. Further, I suspect that reasoning and feeling processes are in fact closely

intertwined. We are in search of an understanding of a deliberative process, which will

include rather than exclude the role of feelings. Similarly, we are looking for an

understanding of feelings which will discriminate between those feelings which drive

the process of deliberating, evaluating, choosing [175] and acting, from those feelings

that are simply transient, or irrelevant or obstacles to the process.

So let us propose an outline for our personal identification of the elements that

go into producing a judgment of value.

We started this chapter with the caption where Lonergan asserts that in a

judgment of value three components unite, namely, (1) 'knowledge of reality and

especially of human reality', (2) 'intentional responses to value' and (3) 'the initial thrust

towards moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself'.2 There is


192

some explanation before this assertion and a brief elaboration afterwards, but the

statements remains rather enigmatic and compact. Our task is to elaborate and identify

in our own consciousness these three elements and even more important to show how

these disparate elements unite in a single judgment of value.

The first component presumably encompasses the cognitive element, the

activities of questioning, understanding, reflecting, deliberating and judging. In this

present chapter we will deal exclusively with the activity of deliberating as a cognitive

activity. We will focus on Mind, the activities involved in knowing values.

The second component is the intentional response to value, which we treat as the

affective component, the feeling element, the contribution of Heart. This element we

will deal with in the following two chapters, to assess the meaning of Lonergan’s

statements on this area, and then to present out own systematic view of how feelings fit

into the process of evaluation.

The third component I understand as willing self-transcendence and subdivide

into the volitional element of free deciding and the notion of self-transcendence. Hence

I will refer to free deciding as the third element and the notion of self-transcendence as

the fourth element. The notion of deciding, of Will, we deal with in chapter seven. The

notion of self-transcendence, of Spirit, we will deal with in chapter eight. .

It is only in chapter nine that we will consider how these elements unite in a

single judgment of value. Our aim in this present chapter is [176] to capture the

cognitive or Mind element involved in the judgment of value. It is a rather obvious and

predominant aspect, but we hope to identify its precise shape and structure, without

excluding any of the components to be considered later.

2 Learning from Aristotle

We have already given a brief account of Aristotle's virtue ethics. We have seen

how he worked out an explanatory scheme of terms and relations in which he framed his

Value Ethics 193

approach. He succeeded in defining the basic terms of happiness, final end, function of

man, virtue and vice, voluntary involuntary and also each specific virtue and vice. It is

easy to see that some element of reasoning or intelligence was involved in these

operations. What has he got to say specifically on deliberating towards a practical

conclusion?

1. Aristotle clearly distinguishes between theoretical, practical and productive

sciences.3 The theoretical seek truth for its own sake; the practical concern the question

what is the best way to live; and the productive sciences concern the arts (techne) the

production of poetry or statues, or music. Practical science is mostly politics with ethics

conceived as part of politics. It is not just concerned with theoretical answers to

questions about the best way to live, human actions and purposes but is aimed to

produce a better state of affairs both for the society and for the individual. You can have

a practical science, systematic knowledge through causes, about the ways people live

together in the city and the laws regulating their interaction. In the Nicomachean Ethics

he discusses the final end of human life, virtues and vices, the aim of the science is

action, promoting a good way of living. He discusses happiness and pleasure,

intellectual and moral virtues, deliberation and choice, friendship and contemplation. He

recognizes that moral philosophy, as rational reflection on human action, has something

important to contribute to human life and happiness.

2. He explicitly recognizes a process of deliberation. This is a special form of

reflection appropriate for practical matters. We deliberate about what is possible, not

what is impossible; about difficult matters [177] and not about certitudes; hence we

deliberate more in the arts than in the sciences. We deliberate about practical things that

are in our power. Most controversially he affirmed that we deliberate about means and

not about ends. A doctor deliberates about practical things he can do to make his patient

healthy; he does not deliberate about whether health is a good thing; that is taken for


194

granted. Similarly, he asserts that the final end of human living is happiness or human

self-fulfilment. We do not deliberate about happiness as an end, but we do deliberate

about the means to achieve this end, through virtuous living and a modicum of the good

things in life. He distinguishes between deliberation and choice; the choice is a result of

deliberation, it implies a rational principle: choice is a deliberate appetition and directs

our aim according with the deliberation. Deliberation can be either correct or mistaken.

Resourcefulness helps the process of deliberation but is not identical with it. (N.E.

1112a17 - 1113a12)

3. There is a practical syllogism which differs from demonstrative syllogism in

that the major premise is a judgment of value, e.g. all dry food is wholesome or stealing

is wrong. This is combined with a minor premise which is a statement of particular fact,

e.g. this is dry food, or this is stealing. The conclusion is not so much a proposition as

an action. If the person is lacking knowledge of the major premise he/she is morally

corrupt. If knowledge of the minor premise is missing then the person is mistaken or

self-deceiving. If the person has knowledge of both premises the action should follow.

4. Prudence (phronesis), sometimes translated as practical wisdom, is

recognized by Aristotle as an intellectual virtue concerned with correct deliberation.

(N.E. 1140a24 - b30) The prudent person is the one who knows, not just what is right

in general, but what is morally right in this concrete particular situation. The prudent

person knows what is conducive to the good life. Prudence is not learnt by instruction

but by experience; young people can be good at mathematics but they cannot be prudent

because they lack the requisite experience. It is wisdom but a practical wisdom of

knowing what is the right thing to do in these particular circumstances. The virtue of

prudence is of great relevance, then, because all virtuous living eventually involves

[178] concretely doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right amount, for the right

reason, etc.

Value Ethics 195

5. Aristotle discovered the distinction between right by nature and right by

convention. (N.E. 1134b18 -1135a8) To be right by nature is natural justice which has

the same validity everywhere and does not depend on whether people recognize it or

not. To be right by convention is legal justice which is an action at first indifferent but

which once laid down become obligatory, e.g. what is the correct ransom for a prisoner.

Some, like the Sophists, hold that all laws are of the latter kind because they see the

variety of laws in different cities. Against them Aristotle asserts the existence of a

natural law which is universal, does not depend on acceptance and has the same validity

everywhere.

So we have picked out some of the more important ways in which reasoning is

invoked in the ethics of Aristotle. This is not to deny, as we will see later, that he also

assigns a very important role to feelings in moral education. He is a sound and sensible

guide in this as in many others matters philosophical.

3 Lonergan on Deliberation

The framework and inspiration of our study comes from the thought of Bernard

Lonergan. Our question now is what specifically can we learn from him about the

cognitive aspect of how a judgment of value is produced? We have already given a

resume of his cognitional theory.4 We recall the basic diagram of cognitional operations

to your attention. Our focus is now on fourth level operations, the question of value,

deliberative insight and the judgment of value. In our last chapter we explored the

question of value, namely, is it worthwhile? This question is explicitly recognized

Lonergan's writings and is not problematic. The judgment of value is also explicitly

recognized – even if it is not given detailed elaboration. What is problematic is what

comes in-between the question and the answer; what kind of cognitive activity produces

the judgment of value. Lonergan often uses the term 'deliberation', again without an

elaboration of what it entails; he never uses the term 'deliberative insight'. [179] In


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trying to figure out what Lonergan meant by deliberation, (1) we will consider his use of

the word in various contexts especially in combination with evaluation. (2) We will use

analogies of various kinds keeping an eye on our diagram all the time. If the structure of

judgment of value is the same as the structure of the judgment of truth, then surely there

will be a structural similarity between the insights that produce them. What kind of an

insight must you have, in order to answer a question of value, in a judgment of value?

(3) We check all this out constantly in our own cognitional experience which is the final

authority in the whole matter. Our present focus is on the cognitive activities, the

structure or form of reasoning involved in reaching a judgment and not the motivations,

the feelings, the desires, that underlie such activities, which we recognize in the

following two chapters.

3.1 Deliberative Insights – Primary Sources

Our present concern is the precise meaning of deliberation and how it answers

the question of value by producing a judgment of value. Let us do some textual

hermeneutics to discern what Lonergan meant by this term. "To deliberate about 'x' is to

ask whether 'x' is worthwhile."5 The question of deliberation is the question of value:

what is the value of 'x', where 'x' may be a thing, a person, an action, a policy, an

institution or anything else? Deliberation follows from the question of value and

produces the judgment of value. But what is it precisely as an activity, what is its

structure or form? Despite the infinite variety of particular deliberations, is there one

structure underlying all processes of deliberation?

1. Lonergan does talk about judgments of value in Insight in the context of the

act of believing. To believe requires, "(1) a preliminary judgment on the value of belief

in general… (2) a reflective act of understanding that, in virtue of the preliminary

judgments, grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of deciding to believe some

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particular proposition, (3) the consequent judgment of value, (4) the consequent

decision of the will, and (5) the assent that is the act of believing."6 [180]

So it is clear that Lonergan recognizes and analyses the judgment of value as

distinct from the judgment of fact already in the framework of Insight thinking. Also of

great importance is the recognition that the judgment of value emerges from " a

reflective act of understanding,….that grasps as virtually unconditioned the value of

deciding to believe".7 Here we have a clear statement of the similarity between the

reflective insight of judgments of truth and of value, and also the use of the terminology

of virtually unconditioned in the context of value judgments.

2. In later writings Lonergan regularly uses deliberation in conjunction with

evaluation. Typical would be, "There is a responsible level on which we are concerned

with ourselves, our own operation, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of

action, evaluate them, decide and carry out our decision."8 What is the difference

between these two terms 'deliberation' and 'evaluation'? Lonergan is not one to use

redundant terms. Deliberation always comes first in this listing of activities. Surely the

implication is that deliberation is a process of thinking or reasoning and that evaluation

is short-hand for the judgment of value.

There is a special little technical problem as to what brings deliberation to an

end for the judgments of value to emerge. Lonergan seems to think that it is a decision

that brings deliberation to an end: "Accordingly, the process of deliberation and

evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of

the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the courses of

action and proceeding to execute it."9 This seems to suggest, even though it is not

entirely clear, that it is a decision that terminates the process of deliberation. This notion

may be a carry-over from a difficulty raised in Insight where he discusses practical

insight and practical reflection in the context of the possibility of an ethics. He


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enunciates a series of six corollaries on the gap between practical reflection and

execution. On the one hand, he affirms that practical reflection as knowing can have an

internal term and we can know what is the right thing to do: "In so far as it (practical

reflection) is a knowing, it can reach an internal term, for one can grasp the virtually

unconditioned and thereby attain certitude on the possibility [181] of a proposed course

of action, on its agreeableness, on its utility, on its obligatoriness."10 On the other hand,

he asserts: "because the reflection has no internal term, it can expand more or less

indefinitely."11 "It is not reflection but decision that enforces the norm"12, "What ends

the reflection is the decision." 13

I find it very difficult to grasp a coherent interpretation of these conflicting

statements. He seems to be saying that practical reflection, i.e. reflecting on what is the

right thing to do, can expand indefinitely and it is decision and action that brings it to an

end. This would seem strange. (1) It would imply that practical reflection has no term of

its own, no term at which it reaches a conclusion, no point at which it knows what is the

right thing to do. (2) Why should decision arbitrarily interfere with the process of

reflection and bring it to an end! At what point? For what reason should decision

interfere? (3) What is the point of reflection, if it is not going to achieve some

contribution to a good decision; if it is not purposive, aiming at something, coming to a

term of its own? (4) How does the later terminology of deliberation and evaluation fit in

with the terminology of practical and reflective insights of Insight? (5) And where, pray,

is the judgment of value in all this? If decision brings deliberation to an end, then, the

judgment of value has been bypassed: we would pass from the question of deliberation,

through deliberation, to decision and action. This is hardly the normal case.

3. We might also ask, is the characterization of the cognitive component of a

judgment of value as 'knowledge of reality and especially human reality' adequate and

exact? I think not. How is this statement related to his oft repeated series of activities of

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questioning, deliberating, evaluating, deciding and acting? There is an obvious sense in

which we need a good understanding and knowledge of reality and human reality to

make true and relevant judgments of value. If you are going to raise interest rates, know

your economics. Lonergan here explicitly warns about 'idealists' whose intentions are

good, but whose knowledge is deficient and in the end they do more harm than good.

That we will discuss later. Such knowledge is presupposed as a general background to

the judgment of value but does [182] not accurately define the cognitive component that

enters into the judgment of value itself.

4. A last hint I wish to extract from Lonergan's text is from the statement,

"Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact".14

Judgments of fact and of value are both judgments, i.e. statements of what one affirms

to be the case, what is really true and what is really of value. In both cases the criterion

operating in the judgment is the self-transcendence of the subject, which is cognitive in

the case of judgments of truth but is headed towards moral self-transcendence in the

judgment of value. Now in Insight we have a detailed precise elaborated

characterization of the judgment of truth. Clearly, also in Insight the judgment of truth is

produced by the reflective insight, which in turn is analyzed in depth and in detail. Now

if judgments of fact and of value have the same structure, surely it is reasonable to

suppose that they are produced by similar or analogous insights. Reflective insight

produces the judgment of truth; I am going to suggest that 'deliberative insight' produces

the judgment of value. This is a step that Lonergan did not take – simple and obvious as

it may seem to us. Why did he leave us with such a patch work of bits and pieces?

(1.) I do not think he was clear in his mind about the role of the judgment of

value as knowledge of values, as an activity of the fourth level of consciousness. He

never worked out the fourth level in the same detail and richness as he did the first three

levels in Insight. Included at the same level are, the activity of deciding and religious


200

openness, faith hope and charity. So when he refers to fourth level activities in Method

it is not clear, whether he is referring to activities involved in knowing values, activities

involved in good decision-making, or activities involved in the religious dimension of

faith, hope and love.

(2.) He has performatively differentiated the way from below upwards and the

way from above downwards in Method in Theology; this is the basis for the eight

functional specialties of theology, research, interpretation, history and dialectics; then

foundations, doctrines, systematics and communications. But he has not thematized

these [193] two ways in the Background chapters of Part One. Hence the dynamic of the

pure desire to know, working towards immanently generated knowledge of truth and

value, is not clearly distinguished from the operation of love poured into our hearts by

the Holy Spirit, thus transforming our valuing, knowing, understanding and

experiencing.

(3.) Clearly and legitimately his focus in Method is on theology and its method.

Hence, he tends to skip or skimp on the possibility of an immanently generated

knowledge of moral values. He has given us Insight, which can be seen as a detailed

treatment of intellectual conversion. He has given us Method in Theology, which can be

seen as an extended treatment of religious and Christian conversion. For moral

conversion, we have to rely on some basic sketches and work out a detailed elaboration

for ourselves.

3.2 Deliberative Insights – Secondary Sources

This author would not be the first to suggest the notion or at least the

terminology of deliberative or evaluative insight producing the judgment of value. Most

discussion on the judgment of value has centred on the meaning of intentional response,

apprehension of value, and the role of feelings in producing the judgment of value.

However, Mark Doorley,15 Pat Byrne,16 and Bob Doran17 have used terminology

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suggestive of something like a deliberative insight, a grasp of the virtually

unconditioned of value.

But let me concentrate on Michael Vertin's excellent and detailed article on

"Judgments of Value in the Later Lonergan".18 The article aims at a coherent

interpretation and expansion of Lonergan’s treatment of fourth level intentional

consciousness. He draws many fruitful parallels between the levels of consciousness,

noting similarities and differences. His focus is to show how affective and cognitive

components combine in producing a judgment of value. He coins the term deliberative

insight; the term ‘insight’ showing the continuity of this term with the earlier Lonergan,

and the term ‘deliberative’ suggesting a discontinuity. He realizes that value judgments

are not always about possible courses of action; a value judgment about an actual value

belongs to the pattern of complacency, about possible [184] values belongs to the

pattern of concern. However, at the core of the issue there seems to remain an

unresolved ambiguity centring on deliberative insight. There is a shift from intellectual

cognition that is reflective, to affective cognition that is deliberative.19 Why should the

discursive cognitional response at levels two and three be intellectual, while at the

fourth level it is affective?20 Deliberative insight at one point seems to be a cognitive

grasp of the virtually unconditioned;21 while at other times it is identified with the

apprehension of value in feelings.22 One is left with many questions about affective and

intellectual cognition; deliberative insight, apprehension of value, and intentional

response to value; transcendental feelings and categorical feelings. These terms remain

up in the air unless we refer clearly to the experience of knowing value, and identify the

role of cognitive activities and feelings in the process. Questions remain as to which

feelings enter into the dynamism of knowing values; and which feelings are

concomitant, irrelevant or positively obstructive to the process.


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More recently, William F. Sullivan has applied Michael Vertin’s interpretation

of Lonergan to the euthanasia debate in Canada.23 He applies Lonergan’s principles

about judgments of value to concrete cases of euthanasia. He follows faithfully Michael

Vertin’s interpretation and expansion of Lonergan’s principles. It is an admirable effort

by an expert in his field – he is a medical doctor – to apply these categories to specific

cases in his area. He is respectful of how individuals reach opposing judgments of value

due to their history, the role of feelings in their life and their interpersonal relations. He

fleshes out many distinctions such as between value and satisfaction, judgment and

decision. It is a scholarly, detailed and systematic presentation. But the core ambiguity

seems to remain. We still have a jump from intellectual cognition at second and third

levels, to affective cognition at fourth level.24 We still have deliberative insights, which

are both a grasp of the virtually unconditioned and an apprehension of value in

feeling.25 He admits that there is an affective dimension to all knowing, but then the

affective dimension in knowing values is importantly different.26 There seems to remain

a fudge over the core issue: it is still not clear to me how feelings enter into a judgment

of value. [185] The articulation of these difficult matters is important and he has helped

us all with a clearly differentiated statement of a position.

Lonergan scholars have struggled with the questions of value, feeling and

judgments of value; we have not yet achieved an agreed, comprehensive, critical

framework. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the issue. I do not think that a

coherent interpretation of Lonergan texts will solve the issue – the texts are incomplete

and ambiguous. We need to apply the ultimate test of self-appropriation; the words have

to be given meaning in reference to the data of consciousness, the data of moral

experience. That is the ultimate authority and it is from there that we can correct and fill

in the gaps left by Lonergan’s incomplete treatment.

4 Knowledge of Reality especially Human Reality

Value Ethics 203

'Knowledge of reality especially human reality' is how Lonergan characterizes

the first component that unites with the other two components in a judgment of value.

As an account of the cognitive element in all judgments of value, this is strangely

vague and unsatisfactory. In Insight he makes it clear that reflective insights produce

judgments of truth and explains precisely at length and in detail, what is a reflective

insight. Surely there is a need for similar precision and detail in specifying where the

judgment of value comes from. That would surely lead in the direction of deliberation

or deliberative insight and not something vague like 'knowledge of reality'.

However, it is useful to point out that correct judgments of values, decisions and

actions presuppose correct and adequate knowledge of the area in question. If you want

to intervene in the economy by changing interest rates, or adjusting tax brackets, or

increasing government expenditure, be sure that you understand correctly how

economies work and what are the likely consequences of adjustments. If you are passing

moral judgment on trading practices, business transactions, bonuses, effects of

multinational corporations, again be sure you know what you are talking about. If you

want to set up a course in business ethics, you have to get a person who is competent in

business as well as in ethics. A commonsense approach to [186] economics will be

adequate in simple societies; but in a modern, technological, global economy

specialized knowledge is required. It is a little know fact that Lonergan spend his last

ten years teaching economics and his lectures have been published in Collected Works

15 and 2127. When asked why he was interested in economics he is reported to have

answered, 'so that the widows and orphans will not starve.' At the commonsense level,

we think of alleviating poverty by almsgiving, international handouts, welfare

payments, and the like. But it is the economic decisions of the Ministers of Finance, the

IMF, the World Bank, the oil cartels, the multinationals, which determine how the


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economy will develop, who will benefit, which country, class, or group will profit; and

in the end, whether the widows and orphans will starve.

Many areas of human reality have become so specialized that professional

competence is a prerequisite to know what is the right and good procedure. Medicine is

an obvious example with genetic engineering, stem cells, embryo research, new

advances raising new ethical questions all the time. The human sciences are needed

more than ever to promote and produce healthy human living conditions, promoting

mental health, family life, education, total human development. Ethics cannot stand still,

repeating the old nostrums and praising traditional virtues; it has to be foundational and

intercultural as well as detailed and specialized; ethics should combine competence in

human reality with moral sensitivity and goodness.

Further, it is clear from our diagram of cognitional activities that judgments of

value depend structurally on judgments of truth. When you ask the question for

deliberation, is this person good? is this action right? is this policy just? you are

presuming a correct and adequate understanding of the person, action or policy

concerned. The way from below upwards is the way of immanently generated

knowledge. Direct understanding depends on images, sensing, data, experiencing.

Reflective understanding depends on direct understanding of possible explanations,

definitions and hypotheses as well as on experiencing. Similarly, deliberation and

judgments of value will depend on and presuppose previous correct judgment of truth,

as well as understanding of possibilities, alternatives, consequences. [187] Hence, while

we appeal to the good person as the criterion of moral goodness, we must also

remember that he/she must be competent in the area of expertise and a wise person.

5 Deliberative Insight – Systematic Presentation

Having taken care of all these preliminary matters, we now come to the nub of

the question. We have a precise idea of the question for deliberation; an anticipatory

Value Ethics 205

notion of the judgment of value; the focus now is what happens in-between. Lonergan

seems to refer to this regularly as deliberation or deliberating. Now what is this process

of deliberation? How does it begin, how does it proceed and how does it end? Does it

have many different forms or is there one single basic universal form? I am proposing

that such an important process will have a single basic form, even though there may be

many specific variations. Using the various analogies available in the diagram of

cognitional activities, I am proposing that deliberation is in the end a single insight into

the sufficiency of the evidence for the conclusion in a judgment of value. I intend to call

this a 'deliberative insight,' to be understood on the analogy of reflective insight. It is a

cognitive activity by which we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the positing of a

judgment of value. It is similar in structure to the reflective insight; it differs from the

reflective insight in that it intends value and not truth. So let us explore the implications

of such a hypothesis and check if it coheres with our own experience of where

judgments of value come from. This is an attempt to give a systematic, comprehensive

overview of the structure of deliberative insight, an interpretation and expansion of

Lonergan's texts. It might help to refer to our diagram of cognitional activities and to

note again the parallels between third and fourth level activities. At the third level,

questions for reflection lead to reflective insights, which in turn produce judgments of

truth; at the fourth level questions for deliberation lead to deliberative insights, which in

turn produce judgments of value. [188]

5.1 Deliberation as Insight

Deliberative insight will be an insight, an act of understanding, embodying in

some way the five characteristics of all acts of understanding.28 It will come as a release

of the tension of inquiry; we are presuming the question, Is it worthwhile? operating

consistently, deeply, driving towards a solution. It will come suddenly and

unexpectedly: we cannot force such insights; we provide optimal conditions of


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concentration, attention to relevant data, manipulating images, data, examples in

suggestive ways – and then it comes. It pivots between the abstract and the concrete: we

have universal moral laws, but they have to be applied in a concrete situation. Which

laws apply in this situation? Is this a situation of killing, murder, manslaughter,

accidental killing, or what? Is this concrete situation an exception to the abstract

definition? The emergence of the insight depends on inner conditions more than

outward circumstances; the inner conditions are the questions, the habits, the feelings,

the intentions, the ambitions, the desires, and so on, moving to evaluation, decision, and

action. Outer circumstances, such as poverty or riches, male or female, time and place,

culture and language, may be quite irrelevant. Finally, the deliberative insight will pass

into the habitual texture of the mind: if we discover that a friend is really a fraud, we are

not likely to forget it; if we realize that we did the right thing is one situation, we are

likely to do it again in a similar situation; by means of individual judgments of value we

establish habitual value stances and priorities.

Deliberative insight, then, will not be intuitive, that is, a simple, single, direct

vision of value; it will be discursive, worked out painfully and slowly, open to

interference of various kinds; involving sensing, remembering, understanding, a context

of facts, a context of ideas, a context of previous deliberative insights. It will involve

active focusing, researching, questioning, thinking, writing, talking; and will also be

passive, waiting, listening, hoping, receiving. Many existential elements will tend to

intrude for better or worse – fear of consequences, mixed motivations, selfishness

struggling with altruism, willingness in tension with unwillingness. Deliberative insight

ushers us into the world mediated by meaning and value, not the world of [189]

immediacy of sensing of the out there now real. Deliberative insight will grasp a unity, a

connection, a whole, a value, a relation, a form immanent in a multiplicity of images,

situations, experiences and events.

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5.2 Structure of Deliberative Insight

But a deliberative insight will be modelled on reflective insight because it is

preparing to issue a judgment. If the structure of judgment of fact is the same as the

structure of the judgment of value, then surely the form of deliberative insight will be

similar to the form of reflective insight. Hence the unity we are looking for in

deliberative insights is the connection between evidence and conclusion; is it sufficient,

convincing, possible, probable, impossible or improbable? The descriptive way of

expressing this is 'weighing the evidence' for or against the conclusion.

All good or value is conditioned or contingent (except for God, the formally

unconditioned good). There is no necessary good, and so all judgments of value will be

of contingent values, values that will be real values, if certain conditions are fulfilled.

The judgment of value will start with a conditioned, proceed to establish a link between

the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions; determine if the conditions are in fact

fulfilled; then proceed to enunciate the virtually unconditioned value of this person, act,

policy, or thing. The deliberative insight is the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence

in the premises for the conclusion. It is a single insight that unites a vast multiplicity of

data, insights, facts, previous evaluations, and so forth. Hence deliberative insight

follows the form of the hypothetical syllogism of reflective insight, that is: If A, then B.

But A. Therefore B.

This analysis of the fundamental underlying structure of deliberative insight is

important because it reveals the structure of the human mind as it grasps the good and

knows value. We are not born knowing what is right, but we are born with the capacity

to work it out for ourselves. Listen to any argument about abortion, capital punishment,

just war, homosexuality, gender discrimination, for example, and underlying all the

partial points, whether they are valid or [190] not, is the structure of, (1) a question of

value to be answered; (2) arguments, connections, inferences, links, relevance; (3)


208

appealing to evidence, experience, facts, memories, previous experience; (4) an

appropriate conclusion emerging by which we affirm or deny the value. In all cultures,

at all times, this is the fundamental underlying transcendental structure of moral

reasoning. This is how the human mind works, how our mind works, how your mind

works, how all minds work. It is as clear as: if A, then B. But A. Therefore B. This is

the fundamental form of inference of value that we are in process of identifying and

objectifying.

We usually formalize this procedure in more detailed explicit ways so as to

apply to particular cases. We have the formal structure of deductive syllogistic logic; we

have the rules of inference and the fallacies that occur when the rules are broken; we

have inductive logic and principles of scientific method; we have many forms of

modern symbolic logic; many disciplines develop their own particular forms of

methodologies, procedures, rules, all the guide the process of inference from evidence to

conclusions. All of these may be relevant to procedures of moral reasoning. The

structure of moral reasoning is similar to the structure of scientific or philosophical

reasoning. It is the content and criteria that makes the difference between reflective and

deliberative insight.

5.3 Content and Criteria

The difference between reflective insight and deliberative insight will be in the

content rather than structure; reflective insights intend truth; deliberative insights intend

value. The transcendental notion of value motivates the intentionality of asking

questions until a satisfactory solution is found; the notion of value recognizes value

when it is found and provides the criterion of true value in the happy conscience of the

good person. This is transcendental in the sense that it is beyond categories, applying to

all human persons, making judgments of value, of any kind, in any time or place. This is

Value Ethics 209

a very high level of generality; let us try to be more categorial so that we can be clear

about what we are saying. [191]

The criterion of truth operating in questions for reflection is relatively univocal:

it has one meaning, one intention, guiding the activities to a successful conclusion. The

criterion of value is much more analogous: value takes on different meanings depending

on the context of the question that is asked. What is the value of this food and what is

the value of this person, are two value questions; but the first is intending vital values

and the second is intending moral values. Persons, things, policies, can be evaluated

from many different points of view. How do we know which point of view is operative?

Fortunately, it is the question which usually sets the criterion that is operative and that

must be satisfied. The criterion is goodness from one perspective or another. It is only

when we are clear about the criterion operating, that we can assess the relevance of

evidence for the truth or falsehood of the judgment. Perhaps we will be able to see this

in action in some of the following examples.

5.4 Valuing Things

We are constantly evaluating things in a loose sense as either good or bad. We

apply these judgments to cars, to dogs, to schools, to books, to paintings, to tools, to

institutions, to just about anything in the universe. Let us examine how and why we do

that with a few typical examples.

How do we evaluate a book, describe it as good or useless? Clearly we start with

a criterion of what we hope to get from reading the book – recreational reading,

escapism, help for an exam, a solution to a particular problem, general enlightenment,

inspiration, et cetera, all of which are legitimate and in turn a value. We judge the book

on whether it satisfies these criteria, how well it does so, with or without reservations or

deficiencies or qualifications. We set the conditions to be satisfied by reading the book;

if the conditions are fulfilled, we judge it as good. If they are not fulfilled, we judge it as


210

a failure, a waste of time, a useless book. If you are buying a book, you establish clearly

what you are looking for – line up possibilities, judge prices, presentation, material –

finally pick out what you evaluate as best and buy. [192]

How do we evaluate a painting, describe it as good or bad? Here we are in the

field of aesthetics – the appreciation of beauty, whether of painting, music, poetry,

literature, sculpture, and so forth. Different people will approach a painting from

varying points of view. A decorator may just be looking for something to go with the

curtains in the living room. A student may just be looking from a descriptive point of

view, with little technical knowledge of colours, shapes, harmonies, connections,

allusions, and so forth. Some may judge only by the feeling evoked; this is sad, that is

frightening, this feels horrible. A connoisseur will judge it from a developed

appreciation of harmony, shape, colour, tone, mood, skill; he or she will judge it in the

light of history as merely imitative, or creative, or a masterpiece. An art dealer will

evaluate in terms of hard cash, publicity, auctioning, commission, among other things.

Because criteria and appreciation differ so much you rarely get unanimity in art

appreciation. But we can see in each case a criterion operating and the work of art

fulfilling or not fulfilling that criterion. Art appreciation can be articulated, one can

defend a painting you admire; there is deliberative insight involved in art and art

appreciation; it is not random or arbitrary activity.

We can evaluate schools, and again we will be operating according to different

criteria. You will be looking for something affordable; some place within a reasonable

distance; a school that offers the kind of education you are looking for; well

administered, good teachers, high academic standards, small classroom numbers, good

sports program, and so forth. As you visit the school and talk to teachers and pupils you

be evaluating the information as to whether it satisfies these criteria of not. There will

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be a constant stream of tentative value judgments being made, leading to the final,

definitive judgment of whether it is a good school overall.

The value of things will vary as to the criteria operating in the situation. A good

book for holiday reading is not the same as a good book for passing exams. Gold is very

valuable but not much use if you are in a desert with nothing to eat or drink. King

Richard surrounded by his enemies would willingly have given his kingdom for a horse

to escape with his life. This does not mean that all values are subjective. Valuable is a

very flexible notion, depending on particular [193] criteria operating in concrete

situations with individual persons evaluating. But there is a single transcendental

structure underlying each of the examples – a conditioned value, a link between the

conditioned and its fulfilling conditions(criteria), the fulfilment of the conditions and

hence the judgment of value – the virtually unconditioned of value. Even though the

notion of good and value is analogous, there is one series of activities producing

knowledge of goodness, and one underlying heuristic structure by which we move from

questioning to knowing value. This can be seen in any of the above examples.

5.5 Scale of Values

There are different kinds of values, and many ways of slicing the cake. Let us try

a few distinctions just to become more concrete. Each level of consciousness and their

proper activities have an aim, a product, and a criterion to determine whether that aim

has been reached. In other words, there is a good or value proper to each level of

consciousness. Let us show how the invariant structure operates in each case.

Vital values would be those elements necessary for life, for survival, for self-

preservation as a living beings. Vital values will be those proper to the first level of

human consciousness. Hence, food and drink, security, clothing, shelter, health, et

cetera would seem to be basic vital values; if these are not satisfied in some way, it is


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difficult to think of higher values. Food is valuable from the point of view of survival.

So we talk about good food, good housing, good clothes, or their opposite.

But we dispute about what food is healthy. How do we solve these disputes?

Well, obviously, what is good food for a weightlifter, may not be good food for an

aging diabetic, so the individual person will set the criterion. Whatever food promotes

the health, life expectancy, etc of this person is good food. Now you look for evidence

to prove that this food is good for this person. You look for data from nutritionists,

doctors, dieticians, etc. sort out the nonsense from the sense, assess the value of the

information and eventually reach a conclusion. So we are following the schema of the

hypothetical syllogism. Is [194] this good food for me? This food will be a vital value, if

it promotes health, life, survival, and so on. But this food does promote health, life,

survival, and so on. Therefore it is a vital value. We can and do argue responsibly about

vital values.

Social values derive from our social nature. We cooperate as a group to survive

together, we organize, specialize, complement one another so that regularly, efficiently,

the needs of individuals are satisfied through a social order, a good of order. So we form

institutions, companies, communication systems, economic systems, productivity,

distribution, law and order, criminality, and social organizations of all kinds. The aim is

order, the criterion efficiency, the value cooperation. Understanding aims at order,

regularity, clarity, the good of order. So, you have a local good of order; also a regional,

national, international and global good of order to think about.

Again we follow the form, "x" will be a social value, if it promotes cooperation,

order, efficiency, etc. But "x" does promote cooperation, order, efficiency, etc.

Therefore it is a social value. Let us take an example from economics; should interest

rates be raised? It is a value question because it will seriously effect the distribution of

goods and services to various groups in the society. What is the criterion operating? It

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should be the intention of the best standard of living for everyone in the society. In view

of that, evidence is collected, previous experience is recalled, calculations are made,

probable consequences are assessed. In view of the whole a judgment is made, raise the

interest rates. Should interest rates be raised? Interest rates should be raised, if the

standard of living of the society calls for it. But the standard of living of the society will

be protected by raising interest rates. Therefore, raise the rate half a percentage point.

Cultural values are "the beliefs and values informing a common way of life."29

We include beliefs about equality, purpose of life, education, research institutions, truth

telling; a political economic educational system based on truth of history, the reality of

international relations, a kingdom of truth. Anything that promotes truth, understanding,

and expansion and implementation of knowledge will be a cultural value. Anything that

hinders correct understanding and truth [195] will be a cultural disvalue. A

communitarian arrangement should allow people to find the truth for themselves.

Systems should be accountable and transparent. Media should not distort the real

picture. Science, technology, medical developments, research for peace and progress are

all cultural values. Here the value is truth of common beliefs, of politics and politicians,

truth about human nature and human order.

We can and do argue successfully about cultural values. There is one basic

structure to these arguments though an infinite variety of examples and variations.

Always there is a question, is this the best science curriculum we can devise for this

group of students? Well, what is the criterion, what is the intention, what is the

particular good to be attained by teaching these students this science curriculum. If you

are aiming at the highest standard, then, does this curriculum regularly, efficiently,

achieve the highest standard? Consult science teachers, attend to previous experience,

learn from experience, devise new strategies, set up pilot schemes. We do value the best


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curriculum. We do posit deliberative insights on improving pedagogical efficiency. And

in doing so we implicitly follow the form of inference of the hypothetical syllogism.

Moral values recognize that the human person is free and responsible in his or

her knowing and doing, as an individual within a society. You can have healthy moral

individuals and also healthy moral societies, nations, institutions, corporations,

governments. If so, there is harmony rather than conflict. You can also have depraved

individuals as well as corrupt societies, deformed institutions, corporations in moral

decline. The human person develops in his potential as originating value producing

terminal values, freely and responsibly. You can have authentic individuals in conflict

with inauthentic traditions; or authentic traditions striving to convert inauthentic

individuals.

How do we argue about moral values? There might be a case of stealing in a

boarding school. What should be done? The criterion operating should be that stealing is

dishonest, that it should be discouraged, that just punishment be imposed. But you

might find that [196] there are extenuating circumstances; that suspension might lead to

a greater evil, that the person has learned his lesson; that a lesser punishment might be

better. Headmasters, judges, police, parents, are making these judgments every day.

They are judging what is the best punishment and reward, that will foster honesty and

justice in the family and the society. In moving from the question to the judgment, they

pass through the heuristic structure of deliberative insight, learning from experience,

assessing consequences, intending the good of all and judging finally that this is the best

course of action.

There is a good proper to each level of conscious intentionality; each level has

its own proper value. But the higher levels depend on the lower levels; so the higher

values will depend on the lower values. The higher levels of operation sublate the lower

levels; so the higher values will in turn sublate the lower levels. Hence we can talk of a

Value Ethics 215

legitimate true hierarchy of values relating to one another as higher and lower, as

mutually dependent and interrelated. In other words, some values are more basic than

others, some values are more excellent than others, not all values are of equal value. So

we can also have value judgments about value judgments.

5.6 Deliberative Insights in Moral Philosophy

The moral philosopher will make judgments of value about his method, about

his principles, about his criteria, about human nature, human action and human

purposes, and the consequences of human action. You can usually distinguish moral

philosophies as to what they value most in human life, whether it be virtue as an end in

itself as in the Stoics, or pleasure as understood by the Epicureans and Hedonists, or

utility as understood by the Utilitarians or Consequentialists. Sometimes power is

elevated to the status of a final end or criterion as in the philosophies of Schopenhauer,

Nietzsche, and what is called “real politik”. Moral philosophy must make value

judgments at the theoretical or methodological level but also give guidance or criteria or

applications to the concrete details of everyday evaluations, choices and actions. Many

moral philosophies err by way of simplification; concentrating exclusively on one value

to the exclusion of other values; concentrating on the consequences [197] and excluding

the motivations; extolling the rational, universal, moral imperative at the expense of

human feelings, aspirations and affects. Moral philosophy is fraught with multiple

possibilities of going wrong.

Let us look as some of the areas in which deliberative insights operate in order

to work towards a comprehensive grasp of human moral good.

(1) Moral Persons. Deliberative insights need to be made as to the real sphere

of the moral as distinct from all other values. They will be concerned with the free and

responsible development of human persons as good valuers, choosers and doers; it

pertains to persons in their relations with other persons; it pertains to the goodness of


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activities of the fourth level of human consciousness. We are not talking of skill,

intelligence, strength, beauty, talent, personality, or temperament; we are talking of

what a person has done, is doing with his life as a whole in relation to responsible

choice, promoting the good, doing the right thing, being virtuous, being a human

person, and flourishing in the fullest sense of that ambiguous term. Moral philosophy

will depend on how we value the life of a human person, human nature, its

development, its purpose, its proper self-realization.

We do normally distinguish between moral goodness and other kinds of

goodness, and have done our best to articulate this difference. We are in fact constantly

judging people as really good or evil, and these are either true or false judgments. We

judge their ability as bankers, footballers, conversationalists, teachers, but we also judge

them as moral persons – ‘he is a good guy behind it all, he is a good person’. He may

not be very intelligent but he is a good person. We judge the integrity of a person's

motivation – we live with them over a period of time and see how they react in various

situations – we check for consistency between what they say and what they do.

(2) Moral Acts. We deliberate about specific human actions and classify them

into classes and categories. We distinguish human actions that are free and responsible

from acts of the human being that are reflexes, instinctual, biologically or

psychologically beyond the [198] control of will and responsibility. We judge when

actions are due to ignorance, or misunderstanding, and decide whether it is culpable or

inculpable ignorance. We judge the quality of the freedom. Is the act premeditated,

planned, chosen deliberately; or is freedom lessened by compulsions, instinct, passion,

addiction or the like? We distinguish between actions that are serious from the moral

point of view, killing, stealing large sums of money, rape, et cetera, from those we

consider trivial like white lies, bad language, and being impolite.

Value Ethics 217

We can classify human actions into typical action situations such as adultery,

abortion, murder, genocide, corruption, lying, perjury, and fornication. Even though an

extreme situation ethics claims that there are only an infinite number of particular

concrete human actions and therefore we cannot apply general rules, we know that

human actions, although unique in their concreteness, can be understood, classified,

defined, and evaluated and thus general moral imperatives can be formed about these

categories.

(3) Moral Consequences. We evaluate human actions partly in terms of their

consequences. Consequences are sometimes intrinsic to an action, such as killing the

foetus in abortion, deceiving a friend in telling a lie. So all human action has immediate,

direct, intrinsic consequences, that condition the morality of the action. But

consequences can be extrinsic and they can be either, immediate or remote, foreseen or

unforeseen, direct or indirect. If you judge it appropriate to invade another country, then

the remote consequences years down the road bear on the morality of your judgment.

(4) Moral Intentions. We also evaluate moral actions in terms of intention.

What was the person intending to achieve? Moral idealism, in the sense of having high

ideals but little or no competence, will probably do more harm than good. Almsgiving

can sometimes cause dependency, encourage addiction, and demean persons. Planting

trees at random can do more harm than good. Good intentions by themselves are not

enough.

(5) Motivation. We also evaluate in terms of motive. What was the motive of

the crime, what was the person trying to achieve for him-[199]self by doing this; what

was a person’s motivation in choosing a career or embarking on a course of action?

(6) Moral Reasoning. How then does a person answer the question, What is the

right thing for me to do in this situation? A person thinking in terms of moral laws will

ask, What kind of an action is this? Which moral laws apply here? Which law has


218

priority? The solution will be a deliberative insight into the application of moral laws to

concrete situations. A person thinking in terms of virtue ethics might ask, Which virtue

is called for here? Which virtue has priority? If I want to become a good person what do

I do here? What would my role model do in this situation? The solution will be a

judgment of value in terms of grasping the virtuous course of action. If the person is

thinking in terms of moral values, he will understand the situation, the possibilities and

alternatives, the consequences in terms of moral and other values; he will deliberate,

judge, decide, and act, attentively, intelligently, reasonably and responsibly; he will be

guided by conscience and answerable only to a good conscience.

To be unqualifiedly good human persons, our actions must be wholly good, the

intentions benevolent, the motives wholesome and the consequences good for all. But

all that together is rather a rarity in human affairs. Yet we must establish this as the

standard of human moral judgment, and if anything is lacking the action must be judged

somehow defective. Goodness belongs to the whole, evil results from some kind of

defect, as Aristotle and Aquinas noted. Evil lies in some kind of absence of what should

be there, in the action, the amount, the time, the intention, the consequences, et cetera.

Many moral judgments of value will be comparative rather than absolute: this is better

than that, rather than this is wholly good and that is wholly bad.

In each case the value to be ascertained is a conditioned value. In each case it

will be a real value if those conditions are fulfilled. We assemble examples, distinctions,

evidence, previous evaluations and line them up as the fulfilment of the conditions. The

deliberative insight grasps the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence for the

positing of the judgment of value. [200]

5.7 Link between the Evidence and the Conclusion

Evidence should be relevant to the conclusion. There may be a long process of

reasoning to show the connection between the evidence and the conclusion. Forms of

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inference can be implicit or they can be formalized in moral arguments. Listen to a

moral debate and evaluate the arguments. There can be all sorts of red herrings thrown

into the procedure, items that distract deliberately from the issue at stake. Insults are not

a good argument but are present in many debates. The person who shouts the loudest

should not necessarily win; nor the one who keeps talking to the end, when everybody

else capitulates out of sheer exhaustion. It is not a question of scoring points by

cleverness or humour, or belittling the opponents. Understanding of good procedures of

inference should be flanked by understanding of fallacies, evasions, distortions, bias,

blindness, twisting of data, and ignoring of data.

Hence, we can see the necessity of a clear criterion of relevance, the need for a

coherent structure of thinking, a philosophy which determines what is relevant, a correct

grasp of argumentation and how it should proceed; a grasp of fallacies and how they

intrude and interfere.

5.8 Sufficiency and Relevance of the Evidence

Who decides what is sufficient? Are there any rules which will determine in all

cases what is sufficient? The final criterion is simply reason itself in its practical

application; in the case of judgments of fact it is reflective understanding; in the

question of judgments of value it is deliberative understanding; the former is oriented to

truth; the latter to the good.

We rely on juries to reach a verdict on the basis of ‘guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ You need rules as to what is permissible as evidence, rules about which

questions can be asked, distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence, etc. But

if the rules were sufficient, a computer could produce the verdict. The jury is

continually making judgments of value about witnesses, about evidence, about

arguments, about motives, about responsibility. They do not [201] need to study moral

philosophy to evaluate impartially – though it might help.


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Deliberation on a moral dilemma is purposive; it is aiming in the direction of a

judgment. At first we may be totally puzzled by a new situation or question. We ask

about it, do research, discuss it with friends, gain a personal acquaintance with the issue,

ask how we feel about it. Gradually, we find that we are moving in the direction of

approving, that the evidence is pointing in one direction, that counterarguments are

invalid or can be refuted. A point is reached when the mind is satisfied, when we have

considered all the angles, when no further pertinent questions arise, we know we are

right. At that point the deliberative insight issues in a judgment.

Very often we cannot be certain of our judgments of value. Consequences in the

future are by their very nature difficult to foresee. Information on possible courses of

action may be incomplete, unreliable, partial and mistaken. We do not have time to

collect all the relevant information, we have to trust in the advice of our friends, believe

what is written in the brochure. Values may be conflicting. There may be conflict

between a vital value and a moral value; we want to use the money for a new computer,

but we promised to use it to pay back a loan. There may be a conflict between different

moral values, as loyalty to the group and one’s duty to report wrongdoing.

Many of our moral decisions will be a question of probability, high or low as the

case may be. The degree of probability will be determined by the weight of the

evidence, and the link between the evidence and the conclusion. There are many cases

where we cannot fully understand the matter in hand, where full information is not

available, where many values impinge on the situation, where complicated moral

inferences are involved.

5.9 Unifies and Organizes

It is the function of understanding to unify and organize data of sense and data

of consciousness. In the context of deliberative insight, understanding unifies and

organizes in terms of the good, of value, knowledge of the good, all kinds of values.

Value Ethics 221

Insight sees what is [202] relevant and discards what is irrelevant; intelligence grasps

the important and leaves aside the unimportant. Intelligence is operative in working on

values because of the need to precisely grasp what is important from what is

unimportant.

The reflective insight is a single insight, which unifies a vast amount of evidence

in terms of inferring a conclusion about the real. It is an insight into the sufficiency of

the evidence for the positing of a conclusion. Days, weeks, months, years might be

spent assembling the evidence, and lining up a reasonable conclusion. The question of

truth is operative as a principle of organization, a principle determining what is

important or unimportant, what is relevant or irrelevant. All the preliminary work is

swept up into the unity of a single insight into the truth of a judgment.

Similarly, the deliberative insight is a single insight, which unifies and organizes

a vast amount of data in view of a judgment of value. The evidence is usually wider,

more subtle, more prone to bias and distortion, than in the case of judgments of truth.

Much of the data may already be previous judgments of fact and preliminary or

tentative judgments of value. But all of this preparatory work coalesces in a single

deliberative insight, a single grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence for the positing of a

value judgment. The judgment simply affirms or denies, yes or no, it is right or it is

wrong; it is good or bad..

5.10 Understanding in Three Modes.

I think it is helpful to think of understanding operating in three modes. First,

there is the mode of direct understanding of the intelligible in the sensible. In this mode

we are brainstorming, looking for definitions, divisions, forms, reasons, causes,

correlations, hypotheses, possible explanations. It is a relatively relaxed mode where we

can be creative, expansive, enjoy the process, rejoice in the results. Not that much is at

stake. It can be quite an enjoyable process especially if it is successful.


222

The second mode is the reflective, the asking of the critical question of truth, is

this true or not. Here things are getting a bit more serious. Most of us do not wish to tell

lies, nor do we wish to be [203] mistaken, nor do we relish the though of being shown to

be wrong. To affirm a truth is to take a personal stand. We are not forced to judge, we

do it freely and responsibly, on the basis of the evidence available to us. We cannot

plead that our data was inadequate, because we should have realized that before positing

the judgment. Reflective understanding is an intellectual process from the question to

the judgment. It is understanding in a critical, reasonable mode.

The third mode is that of the value question, what is this worth? is this

worthwhile? This is even more serious and touches the person in his inmost being. What

do we value? What are our priorities? What do we really love? What do we want to

become as free and responsible human persons? The deliberative process is an

intellectual process from the question of value, to the judgment of value. It is

understanding aiming at knowledge of good and evil. The story of the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil in the garden of Eden, seems to imply that such knowledge

is a divine prerogative to which humans should not aspire. Surely history has shown us

how difficult it is to acquire this knowledge and to live according to it. I would think of

knowledge of good and evil to be the highest goal to which we can aspire, a goal we all

grapple with in our own limited ways. We hear a lot about the mapping of the human

DNA in terms of the sequence of billions of proteins in the double helix. Of much more

importance is the mapping of the human mind, the processes involved in knowing truth

and value, the partial attainment of the knowledge of good and evil.

6 Conclusion: Is there a deliberative insight?

My answer is clearly yes and it is based primarily on self-appropriation: on

understanding correctly the data of consciousness regarding how we in fact make good

value judgments. It would seem to be of some importance to identify clearly the

Value Ethics 223

intellectual element in the judgment of value. It was of great importance for Lonergan to

find the one universal structure or form of reflective insight, issuing in judgments of

truth. Surely an elaboration of the universal structure of deliberative insights issuing in

judgments of value is of even greater importance. It does not answer all our questions,

but at least [204] we have the general structure of the deliberative insight in all its

generality, but which becomes specific in each instance of a value judgment. Now we

know that value judgments are not arbitrary preferences, not emotional outbursts, not

random choices. We can identify the criterion at work, the search for relevant evidence,

the link between the evidence and the conclusion, and the positing of the conclusion, as

a process of understanding in the deliberative mode. Nor is this just a matter of

terminology. For Lonergan knowing is an act of understanding correctly; but if we can

know value, then it is also an act of understanding correctly. It is not understanding in

the reflective mode, but in the deliberative mode.

Some might object that if you affirm the fully rational character of moral

knowledge, then you have automatically excluded any affective component in the

judgment of value. But that assumes that the cognitive excludes the affective. Our

position is that judgments of value can be fully rational and at the same time fully

affective. We can affirm that because of our inclusivist view. The cognitional aspect is

the structure or form of the judgment, the activity of understanding. The affective

dimension is the desire to know value, which initiates, underlies, motivates, drives

forward, intends and recognizes value when it is found. The judgment of value

synthesises the two aspects: the desire to know value is satisfied in the judgment of

value, when the virtually unconditioned has been attained and no further relevant

questions arise.

Lonergan did not use the term deliberative insight; he did point in that direction.

He wanted to grant a role to feelings but did not seem sure how to do it. The notion of


224

deliberative insight would seem to be faithful to his spirit and to pin down the cognitive

aspect of knowing value. I cannot conceive of what happens between the question for

value and the judgment of value, if it is not a deliberative insight into value. The

complementary task of elaborating correctly the role of feelings lies before us. [205]


(1) Normally, we evaluate possible courses of action; normally we know something

about a politician before voting for him; normally we think of the consequences and the

alternatives. There may be exceptions when we act out of habit, or impulsively, or

because there is no time for thinking.

(2) You would expect a good doctor to be competent, clean, well mannered, good

reputation, affordable, available, etc. Choosing a doctor is a judgment of value, where

these criteria apply. Choosing the criteria is also a judgment of value.

(3) Mathematical problems challenge intelligence, mathematical training, ability to

manipulate numbers, etc. Moral questions challenge your integrity, your feelings, your

experience, your judgment, your wisdom, your awareness of value.

(4) All else being equal, a more intelligent person will be more likely to solve a moral

dilemma than a less intelligent person. The more intelligent will understand the matter

better, the consequences and the alternatives. But that is leaving aside experience,

competence, wisdom, integrity, sensitivity to values, which have a bearing on the

outcome.

(5) A calculator can perform many complicated mathematical operations much more

quickly than a human. A computer with the right software can do accounts, calculate,

solve, differentiate and integrate very quickly. A computer might provide background

statistics on ozone layer, abortions, stem cell research, traffic accidents, but judgments

of value have to be made by humans.

Value Ethics 225

(6) We classify movies (or books) as good, thrilling, funny, entertaining, informative,

stunning, inspiring, demoralizing, depressing, romantic, etc. They all seem to be

judgments of value. We can legitimately argue with others about whether these criteria

are present or not. If you claim a movie is inspiring, you should be able to explain why

and how and where. If you gratuitously assert that a movie is inspiring with [206] no

evidence to back up this claim, you friend can equally assert that it is uninspiring.

(7) Whether abortion is moral or immoral is a basic moral judgment of value which

should incorporate knowledge of biology, of human relationships, of human

authenticity, scale of values, integrity, etc. Giving advice is a further judgment of value

as to how best you can help your sister to come to the right decision. It is not enough to

assert that abortion is wrong; you should be able to explain convincingly the reason.

You have to respect another's right to decide. Finally, you have to decide to support the

course of action or to condemn it or to stand aside and pretend neutrality. It is a series of

difficult moral judgments of value.

(8) Can you rob Peter to pay Paul? This does not seem to make much moral sense. It

seems to work as a general principle. There may be exceptions when the ‘good’ to be

achieved completely outweighs the 'evil' means. Absolutes in morals are to be found in

good judgments of good persons, rather than in written principles and propositions.

[207]

Endnotes

1 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 38. 2 Method in Theology, 38. 3 Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 27. 4 Chapter Two, Section 2. 5 Method in Theology, 102. 6 Insight, 729-30.


226

7 Insight, 729. 8 Method in Theology, 9. See also 6, 50, 79, 340. Also “The Subject” in Second Collection, 79 and 84. 9 Method in Theology, 50. 10 Insight, 634-5. 11 Insight, 635. 12 Insight, 635. 13 Insight, 635. 14 Method in Theology, 37. 15 Mark Doorley, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan's Ethics: The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality Analysis of Bernard Lonergan, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), "evaluative insight", 75. 16 Pat Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavour", in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 11, 2, (1993): 103-135, especially 115-116. 17 Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). "virtually unconditioned in the realm of value" P 58. 18 Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 13, 2, (Fall 1995): 221-48. 19 Ibid., 231, 236. 20 Ibid., 233. 21 Ibid., 237. 22 Ibid., 231, 233. 23William F. Sullivan, Eye of the Heart: Knowing the Human Good in the Euthanasia Debate, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 24 Ibid., 145,153, and other places. 25 Ibid., 151. 26 Ibid., 151. [208] 27 Bernard Lonergan, Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation analysis, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 15, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). Also Bernard Lonergan, For a New Political Economy, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan vol 21, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

Value Ethics 227

28 Insight, 28-31. 29 Method in Theology, 301.

5

Lonergan on Feelings

Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning.1


(1) Can you suggest ways in which feeling might influence moral judgments? (2) Are feelings good, bad or indifferent? Are some specific feelings good or bad? Can you list some good feelings and some bad feelings? (3) Trust your feelings! How do you feel about that? Are you comfortable with that? Do you appeal to feelings as indicators of value? (4) Would we be better human beings if we had no feelings? (5) How do you feel when two warring nations make peace and promise to cooperate with one another? [210] (6) How do you feel about the following: Martin Luther King; Adolf Hitler; Nelson Mandela; Saddam Hussein; President George W. Bush; Mother Teresa; Albert Einstein? (7) Do values derive from feelings or do feelings arise from our values? (8) Would you feel comfortable in a golf club that practiced racial discrimination?

1 Introduction

Lonergan names the first component of the judgment of value as ‘the knowledge

of reality especially human reality’. We made this more precise in our identification of

the activity of deliberative insight, the cognitive component of knowing value. In earlier

times we might have been content to get this cognitive component clear and then

presumed that our work had been done. But now we realize that the cognitive

component alone is like a skeleton, without flesh or blood or life. The cognitive

component alone is incomplete – it is an activity. But what feeling orientation, what

Value Ethics 229

intentionality, what motivation underlies, directs and gives mass and momentum to the

activity? To use another metaphor, the cognitive component is like a computer – but

without software, or power or a keyboard. In more technical terms, the cognitive

component by itself is a structure without a content; an activity without direction; it is

like Mind, without Heart, or Will or Spirit. We need to fill in the total picture. We now

turn our attention to these further components of the judgment of value, starting with the

difficult notion of feelings or Heart.

It is a difficult area because of the fluidity, the diversity, the extent of the field of

feelings. The terminology is loose and varied; emotions, feelings, passions, sentiments,

affects, have many different shades of meaning and change from one author to another.

These terms always have multiple meanings and shades of meaning in connotation and

denotation. Feelings can be seen as multilayered, subtle, wide and diverse; or as

obvious, superficial, and transient. Psychologists come up with various theories of

feelings but, unfortunately, [211] one theory seems to succeed another with no broad

agreement on terminology or basic principles.

Philosophers are not much at home when dealing with feelings. Leave that to the

self-help psychologists, to the poets and the artists, to the novelists and the literary

critics, to the symbolists and the psychiatrists. Philosophers have tended to be more at

home with concepts, arguments, reasoning, the thinking faculty, the Mind rather than

the Heart. But if we are to make any useful contribution to understanding the judgment

of value we must include the Heart, the feeling component. After all, the human person

makes judgments as a person not as a Mind. Even though we differentiate out the

cognitive, affective, and volitional, we are not suggesting that they operate in separate

compartments. We operate as one total, willing, knowing, valuing, feeling person with

all of these aspects interrelating in many ways.


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It is not difficult to see that feelings enter into our judgments in some way or

another – both as a help and as a hindrance. We choose a life partner not on the basis of

a calculus of advantages and disadvantages, but on the way we feel about the person.

We choose a career not entirely on the prospective cash benefits, but on how we feel

about being a nurse, a pilot, an astronomer, or a politician. We know that our feelings

sometimes get out of hand: we shout at the children, throw dishes on the floor, abuse the

referee, or retaliate against an opponent. Feelings seem to be very influential on our

judgments, our decisions and our behaviour. We cannot avoid facing the issue. The

unexamined life is not worth living, said Socrates; but a large part of our life is the life

of feelings and so we must come to terms with the issue.

It is more and more accepted that ethics must deal with the question of feelings.

A coherent conceptual system such as a natural law system, or a Spinozean ethics

demonstrated in the mode of geometrical principles, may satisfy the desire for

coherence and system, but is strangely removed from the realities of a pregnant teenager

contemplating abortion, a harassed mother beating her children, or a loving idealist

volunteering for service in an Aids clinic in Africa. Our [212] starting point is people as

they are. Feelings play an important part in our moral evaluations, decisions and actions.

We are not just minds, but total feeling beings. Feelings have a role to play and we

cannot ignore or eliminate or brush over that role.

It is important to be very clear about the scope of our interest in feelings.

Luckily, we are not obliged to provide a total comprehensive account of the feeling life

of the human person – that would take a couple of volumes in itself. We are interested

in feelings in so far as they enter into a judgment of value and, later, in so far as they

influence decision and implementation. We are asking a few very specific questions:

Which feelings enter into the judgment of value? How do these feeling enter into or

influence the judgment of value? How can these feelings unite with the cognitive

Value Ethics 231

component to constitute the judgment of value? Is the influence of feelings intrinsic or

extrinsic? Which feelings foster good judgments and decisions? Which feelings

interfere with the proper unfolding of judging and valuing and deciding?

We wish to be very concrete. We offer the preliminary questions for deliberation

in that spirit. We are not spinning theories out of the sky but doing some concrete self-

appropriation of feelings. The self-appropriation of direct insight turns out to be

relatively accessible and, with the help of a good teacher or text, quite attainable. More

difficult is the appropriation of the judgment of truth because it is more complicated, not

always very dramatic, not always clear, sometimes prolonged over time and emerging

slowly. Even more difficult, then, is the appropriation of the judgment of value, which

compounds the difficulty with the intrusion of vague and complex notions of value and

feelings. However, let us not be undaunted; it is the difficult tasks that are worth doing

well.

Our strategy is to distinguish the hermeneutical question from the systematic

presentation. We intend to devote this chapter to presenting and interpreting Lonergan's

various statements about feelings. Here we will try to summarize what is relevant;

identify what needs to be clarified; indicate what seems to be missing; accept what

seems to be right. In our next chapter we will make a systematic presentation [213] in

our own words of the role of feelings in ethics. There we will base ourselves, not on

texts, but on self-appropriation – on discerning the desires of the human heart.

2 Learning from History

We will again begin with a bit of background from Aristotle, who is surprisingly

rich on the topic of emotions in ethics. We will use our previous treatment of the

empiricists and emotivists to pose precise questions. This should set the background for

our study of Lonergan on feelings in value ethics.

2.1 Aristotle on the Emotions in the Ethical life


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We tend to think of Aristotle as the master of logic, metaphysics and physics.

We perhaps think of him as the one who defined happiness, the final end of man, virtue

and vice, the individual virtues and the vices, voluntary and involuntary, wish, choice,

deliberation, and the like. But his text on ethics is very concrete and so he deals with

many instances where emotions impinge on ethics. We will pick out the main points

with a view to learning from a great master and perhaps going a few steps beyond his

achievements.

(1) Neither virtue nor vice is innate in us. We are neither born good nor bad by

nature. We are born with a potentiality to be virtuous; if that potentiality is not realized

we become vicious. Whether we are to become good or bad will depend on the

development of habits through a process of education.

The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by, nor contrary to nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full development in us is due to habit. Again, of all those faculties with which nature endows us we first acquire the potentialities, and only later effect their actualization.2(1103a30) Nowadays, we seem to presume that humans are born good and so can be

allowed to develop naturally and to follow their natural instincts; anything which

inhibits such expression is discouraged. There was a time when it was presumed that

children are naturally bad and so a strict discipline of punishment and repression was

[214] needed to knock that out of them. Aristotle espouses neither extreme position. We

become good by actualizing our potentialities; we become bad by not actualizing this

potential.

(2) Happiness is the final end of the human person, that for which everything

else is chosen and it is never chosen for the sake of something else; it is the perfection

of man, self-sufficient. A life of virtue and contemplation, with some other

qualifications, leads to happiness. This happiness of Aristotle is quite different from our

Value Ethics 233

contemporary use of the word, in which happiness is akin to pleasure. For Aristotle

happiness is a kind of self-fulfilment or self-actualization.

(3) Young people tend to follow their feelings; the young are for that reason not

ready for instruction in ethics. Aristotle repeats this a number of times. (1095a5) The

search for pleasure and avoidance of pain is likely to lead the young astray, if they are

taken as ends in themselves.

Pleasure induces us to behave badly, and pain to shrink from fine actions. (1104b10) Now when people become bad it is because of pleasures and pains, through seeking (or shunning) the wrong ones, or at the wrong time, or in the wrong way, or in any other manner in which such offences are distinguished by principle. (1104b22)

In order to start the process of acquiring virtue, the subject has to go against his feelings

and do the virtuous act with great difficulty and pain.

But the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just as happens in the arts. Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by actually doing it. (1103a34) Desires can overcome rational convictions "the desire carries his body forward" (1147a35); “knowledge is dragged about by the emotions” (1147b15). (4) The process of education is largely seen as training the youth to take pleasure

in good things and to feel repugnance at evil. For Aristotle the process of moral

education is largely, if not wholly, a matter of training the emotions. This may seem

surprising at first as we [215] think of Aristotle mostly for his logic, his metaphysics,

and his theoretical wisdom. But actually he was a person who had his feet on the

ground. Feelings have to be trained by habit.

Hence the importance (as Plato says) of having been trained in some way from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things: true education is precisely this. (1104b15) Since to feel pleasure and pain rightly or wrongly has no little effect upon conduct, it follows that our whole inquiry must be concerned with these sensations. (1105a7)


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For it is with pleasures and pains that moral goodness is concerned. (1104b10) So it is a matter of no little importance what sort of habits we form from the earliest age – it makes a vast difference, or rather all the difference in the world. (1106b25) (5) Feelings do not respond very well to instruction or discourse but seem to

respond more to force. Aristotle is in favour of discipline and laws and an educational

system which will deliberately force pupils to do the right thing – even if it is against

their feelings. He is in favour of a state-sponsored educational system with good laws

and regulations. In the absence of such a system, the parents or a tutor might be a

substitute.

In general, feeling seems to yield not to argument but only to force. (1179b29) But to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard thing, unless one has been brought up under right laws. For a temperate and hardy way of life is not a pleasant thing to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason upbringing and occupations should be regulated by law, because they will cease to be irksome when they have become habitual. (1179b31) But law, being the pronouncement of a kind of practical wisdom or intelligence, does have the power of compulsion. (1180a6) (6) However, by doing repeated acts of virtue, even if it is under compulsion,

there is a kind of displacement of pleasure and pain – doing the virtuous thing becomes

easy, habitual and pleasurable. Education is about training the emotions to take pleasure

in good and to [216] feel grief at evil. By dint of repeated acts of virtue we develop a

habit of acting in that way; we build up a disposition to act spontaneously and easily in

the right way.

So with the virtues. It is by refraining from pleasures that we become temperate, and it is when we have become temperate that we are most able to abstain from pleasures. Similarly with courage; it is by habituating ourselves to make light of alarming situations and to face them that we become brave, and it is when we have become brave that we shall be most able to face an alarming situation. (1104b34)

Value Ethics 235

(7) The criterion that you have become virtuous is that you take pleasure in

doing the good act. What was at first done under compulsion and with difficulty and

pain, has now become a source of pleasure. The brave man takes pleasure in being

brave; the temperate person takes pleasure in being temperate.

Indeed we may go further and assert that anyone who does not delight in fine actions is not even a good man; for nobody would say that a man is just unless he enjoys acting justly, nor liberal unless he enjoys liberal actions, and similarly in all the other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be pleasurable in themselves. (1099a20) (8) Aristotle makes a distinction between the real good and the apparent good.

An evil person will consider some form of behaviour to be good for him; but because of

his evil dispositions and habits this may not be the real good but only an apparent good.

But if a good man considers a form of behaviour to be good, then it will be really good.

If these consequences are unacceptable, perhaps we should say that absolutely and in truth the object of wish is the good, but for the individual it is what seems good to him; so for the man of good character it is the true good, but for the bad man it is any chance thing. (1113a24) For the man of good character judges every situation rightly; i.e. in every situation what appears to him is the truth. (1113a30) How the end appears to each individual depends on the nature of his character, whatever this may be. (1114a30) [217] (9) The good man then is the criterion and standard of goodness. He is the

one who will be able to distinguish between real and apparent goodness. He also

distinguishes between true/real pleasures associated with the activities of the good

person and false/apparent pleasures of the bad man.

and probably what makes the man of good character stand out furthest is the fact that he sees the truth in every kind of situation: he is a sort of standard and yardstick of what is fine and pleasant. (1113a33) But in all such circumstances it is generally accepted that the good man's view is the true one. If this formula is correct, as it seems to be; that is, if the standard by which we measure everything is goodness, or the good man qua good: then the true pleasures too will be those that seem to him to be pleasures, and those things will be really pleasant that he enjoys. (1176a20)


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(10) Aristotle then outlines and defines the moral and intellectual virtues.

Paradoxically in the end it is the person who lives according to these virtues who will

also enjoy real pleasure in life.

So happiness is the best, the finest, the most pleasurable thing of all. (1099a24) So for a man, too, the life according to his intellect is the best and most pleasant, if indeed a man in the highest sense is his intellect. Hence, this life, too, is the happiest. (1178a1)

I would like to emphasize a few points from this summary regarding the relationship

between the emotional and ethical life.

(1) It is very clear that the training of the emotions plays a central role in moral

education for Aristotle. Emotions are not peripheral, they are not added on as an extra,

they are not a footnote; training in virtue is training to take pleasure in the good and to

be averse to evil. He has by no means a totally negative attitude to pleasure and pain. He

talks about pleasure and pain from Book One to Book Ten. We seem to have forgotten

this aspect of Aristotle's ethics and concentrated on the rational side of defining the

virtues.

(2) Aristotle seems to have achieved a recognition of the cognitive and affective

dimensions of moral philosophy. On the one hand, we [218] have the division of the

virtues into moral and intellectual; then the enumeration and definition of these virtues

flanked by the extremes of the vices; finally, we have phronesis or prudence by which

intellect grasps what is the right thing to do in this concrete situation. On the other hand,

we have the criterion of pleasure and pain leading the youth astray, but the virtuous

person spontaneously, easily and with pleasure recognizes the right thing to do and does

it. In the virtuous person there is a harmony between intellect and the emotional life.

The virtuous person is both knowing and feeling; these are two dimensions of one

virtuous act and one virtuous person; they can be spoken about separately but in any

acting person they are both together. However, I would call this a juxtaposition rather

Value Ethics 237

than a synthesis: Aristotle has not shown us precisely how these disparate elements

enter into a judgment of value in the life of a virtuous person.

(3) There is a certain ambivalence in this treatment of pleasure and pain. On the

negative side, the masses are ruled by the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain;

even virtuous people are prevented from doing the good and the noble by pleasure and

pain; it seems that the youth start off from a position of following their feelings in

seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, hence they are not fit to study ethics; when we seek

pleasure in depraved activity they are not really pleasures. On the positive side, he

seems to be saying, that true/real pleasure is to be found in seeking happiness, in

practicing the moral and intellectual virtues and especially in exercising the highest

faculty on its highest object in contemplation. He clearly recognizes a displacement of

emotional satisfaction. Pleasures and pains associated with youth and depraved actions

seem to be different from those associated with practicing the virtues.

(4) Clearly Aristotle has a notion of moral development. This is both intellectual

and affective. We are not born with the habits of virtue. We have to be forced to do the

right thing through discipline, good laws and punishment. We have to do acts of virtue,

with difficulty, out of fear or obedience, reluctantly. At a later stage the affective and

the intellectual are brought into line and we get pleasure in doing the right thing for its

own sake. [219]

(5) Most of what Aristotle says is good common sense. It is the method of

education adopted spontaneously by most cultures. There is something fundamentally

sound and true in what he says. He has a balanced approach, does not take up extreme

positions, allots everything its proper role. It is just so unfortunate that his style is so

obscure and his remarks scattered all over the text. But there is a basic healthy attitude

to be retrieved here.


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Perhaps the key question we would like to ask Aristotle is to be more precise on

which feelings help in moral development and which feelings hinder progress. The

pleasure of acting virtuously is surely a help to virtuous living; but pleasure also leads

astray, hinders, pulls strongly in an opposite direction. This is the key distinction we

need to focus on and Aristotle is vague on that distinction. Our questions are very

specific: Which feelings enter into the judgment of value, decision and action? Which

feelings are a help, which are a hindrance? We can take Aristotle as a good starting

point, but we need to be more precise in specifying the influence of feelings on value

judgments and decisions.

2.2 Place of Feelings in Ethics – The Empiricists

We have already given a historical summary of the contribution of the empiricist

tradition to the role of feelings in ethics. As a reminder perhaps we could summarize

some of the contributions they make to the discussion. For the Epicureans and

Hedonists, pleasure is the supreme purpose of human life and everything is to be

organized around that principle; they soon learn that there are different qualities and

quantities of pleasure and that a certain asceticism is involved in aiming for the

maximum of the best pleasure. But are they talking of pleasure or happiness? For the

utilitarians and pragmatists the organizing principle of social life is the greatest

happiness of the greatest number. But again we have to ask, what is happiness? Do they

mean pleasure or economics or standard of living, or quality of life? Moral sense

theorists asserted a sense faculty of knowing the good. But we ask, what is this faculty?

What is conscience? How do we in our own experience come to a knowledge of values?

The intuitionist school asserted that the good is indefinable and is known [220] only in

a simple, direct, immediate perception of the good. Let us see if we can find anything

like this intuition in our own experience of moral judgments.

Value Ethics 239

The contemporary situation is dominated by emotivism. The various forms of

emotivism are very much still with us; our culture is very much a sensate culture.

Emotivism holds that values are simply expressions of private likes and dislikes,

preferences, choices and feelings and that they are beyond rational analysis. The

advertising industry manipulates us by their clever use of images and evocation of

pleasant feelings. Our politicians are not far behind playing the game of sound bites,

one-liners, the picture that's worth more than a thousand words. The self-help

psychology industry helps us to be comfortable with ourselves, to have high-self

esteem, even though you might deserve by your actions to be in jail. Nor is there any

shortage in the academy of philosophical justifications of attending to emotions and

only emotions in assessing moral guilt. Contemporary emotivism is perhaps the most

serious challenge to the possibility of true moral judgments of value. As MacIntyre

says, "For what emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no valid

rational justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist

and hence that there are no such standards."3 Without endorsing his solution to the

problem, let us face challenge to reach a sophisticated, verifiable, assessment of the role

of various feelings in the unfolding of moral convictions.

3 Lonergan on Feelings – Historical Sketch

Let us now learn what we can from Lonergan’s texts. What contribution does he

make to the debate? What are the limitations of his contribution? To be crystal clear on

this topic we must divide out treatment into two parts: the period up to finishing Insight

and the subsequent work on Method in Theology and beyond. We find a significant shift

in Lonergan's terminology and focus between these two periods. To put them together in

one section would be to invite confusion. [221]

3.1.1 Up to Insight (1953)


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Lonergan in this period worked on his dissertation on Grace and Freedom4; he

worked on the Verbum articles, published as Word and Idea in Aquinas5; and finally he

worked on Insight. His ultimate objective was a method in theology and these studies

were considered as preparatory steps in the process. His focus was on human

understanding and knowing. As he said in his own words, "My purpose was not a study

of human life but a study of human understanding."6 Hence the focus in Insight was

cognitional theory, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of God and

apologetics. His focus was human understanding, but he did incidentally say something

about human feelings. I will treat this material on human feelings in three sections,

namely, the desire to know, interference of the biases, and ‘The Possibility of Ethics’.

3.1.2 The Desire to Know

Although Lonergan in Insight does not say that the desire to know is a feeling, it

is clear from what he does say that there are feeling elements involved in the desire to

know. This will be of great importance to us later when we discuss the intentional

response to value, so I wish to give a detailed account of the role and function of the

desire to know in the process of understanding and knowing as outlined in Insight.

The desire to know is a conscious, felt, pervasive, deep orientation of the whole

human person. It is pure in the sense of not being mixed up with other desires for

success or fame or advantage or satisfaction. It is detached in the sense of attachment to

the truth and an openness and willingness to follow the truth wherever it leads. It is

disinterested in the sense of passionately interested in understanding, in understanding

correctly, in assembling all the data, insight, concepts, facts, etc. needed to make a

correct judgment. The desire is in principle unrestricted; it produces an endless stream

of questions; the answers close off certain areas, but open up other areas to further

questioning. Questioning intends knowledge of everything; it excludes nothing, in

principle; thus being can be defined as the objective of the unrestricted desire to know.

Value Ethics 241

Even thought the desire is in [222] principle unrestricted, in practice we are limited in

time and space, we impose our own limitations and qualifications, we restrict ourselves

to a familiar world and fear to venture beyond it by further questioning. There is a clear

parallel between the functions assigned to the desire to know in Insight and the later

terminology of intentionality. These seem to be six.

(1) The desire to know initiates the process of knowing. The desire is prior to

any particular questions; specific formulations emerge from actuation of the desire. It is

a priori in the sense that if the desire is not there it cannot be given or taught. You can

teach specific answers to particular questions; you can encourage students to ask

questions. But if the desire to know is not rooted in the heart of the person, then you

cannot put it there; it is roughly equivalent to Aristotle's Active Intellect. It is deep,

permanent, the mass momentum drive of our intellectual and human lives.

(2) The desire to know is directional, it intends objects, it points to, it is

intentional. A formulated question intends an answer; the question already specifies the

kind of answer it is looking for. The question expresses a known/unknown. If a student

knows nothing about a subject he can't very well ask specific questions; if a student

knows everything about a subject then further questions are superfluous; it is the student

who half understands, is struggling towards understanding, who needs to ask questions.

Questions for intelligence intend the intelligible in the sensible. If you want to

answer such questions, you must attend to the data, the whole of the data, the data as

given (not as already filtered or interpreted). But attending to the data is for the purpose

of understanding the answer to what? why? where? when? questions. Questioning

intends the forms in the data, the ideas in the images, the universal in the particular. But

then further questions arise, Is it true? Is it correct? and then you are off on another

intentional direction looking for sufficient relevant evidence for a judgment of truth. A

further question arises as to the implications, applications, the worth of, the goodness of,


242

the value of, this conclusion and again you are directed by the question for the evidence

for the value of something. It is the [223] dynamism of questioning that reveals the

structure of conscious intentionality and the four-level structure of our diagram of

cognitional operations.

(3) The desire to know is the dynamic, the operator, in the constant stream of

further questions animating any research project or effort to solve a problem. It is

important to see how the desire to know is linked up with the activities of knowing.

Without this dynamism our cognition would be an activity going nowhere, in neutral

gear, static and lifeless. Lonergan often describes this desire as the Eros of the mind.7

The dynamism of the desire could not achieve anything without the activities of

imagining, remembering, understanding and judging. The dynamism is unrestricted.

Aristotle was on to something when he recognized the need for an Active and Passive

Intellect. Or to use a rather crude analogy: if you have a motor car (cognition) without

fuel (desire) then you are going nowhere; if you have fuel without a vehicle, you are no

nearer to your destination. But if you have both you are on your way. The desire to

know seems to have a constitutive, intrinsic role to play in the unfolding of knowledge

of truth and would seem to have a similar role to play in the emergence of judgments of

value.

(4) The proper content of the desire to know is the intelligible, the real and the

good.8 At the second level of cognitional structure, the desire to know intends the

intelligible in the sensible, and recognizes it when it is reached. At the third level, the

desire to know intends the real as opposed to the merely possible and recognizes when it

is reached. At the fourth level the desire to know intends real value as opposed to

apparent value. The desire to know intends the content rather than the act. So it is that

being can be defined as the objective of the desire to know. Similarly, when Lonergan

comes to define the 'notion' of being explicitly and explanatorily, it is in terms of the

Value Ethics 243

desire to know that he does so. "That notion must be the immanent, dynamic orientation

of cognitional process. It must be the detached and unrestricted desire to know as

operative in cognitional process. Desiring to know is desiring to know being:"9 Hence

we can again see the fundamental importance attached to the desire to know in the

beginning and unfolding of metaphysics. [224]

(5) The desire to know motivates us to be pure, detached and disinterested in the

search for understanding, truth and value. It is the desire that pushes us to be more than

weekend celebrities. It motivates to the intelligible, the true and the good, for their own

sake. There is strong motivation to overcome the biases to which we are prone.

(6) Finally, the question sets the criterion by which you recognize the correct

answer as correct. When you read a difficult piece of philosophy for the first time you

may feel disappointed, frustrated and confused because you have not understood

anything. When you continue to study the background, the history, the terminology, you

feel you are making progress, you feel better disposed to the author, and you are

encouraged to continue. If you continue to study you reach a point where you feel sure

that you have understood, you are delighted to have mastered a piece of philosophy, you

are satisfied and no further pertinent questions arise.

Lonergan distinguishes between a proximate criterion of truth and a remote

criterion of truth. 10 The proximate criterion is the virtually unconditioned; if there is

sufficient evidence, if the evidence is linked to the conclusion, then the conclusion must

be affirmed. The remote criterion of truth is the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to

know. If the desire to know is satisfied, if no further pertinent questions arise, if we

have been totally honest and open in our inquiry, then we can confidently know that we

have reached the truth. Why do we have two criteria of truth? Why does he sometimes

appeal to ‘the virtually unconditioned’, and at other times to ‘no further pertinent

questions arise’? I think it is because in a judgment of truth two components combine, a


244

cognitive and an affective; the activities must be performed correctly in harmony with

the intentionality of the desire to know. A correct judgment of truth can only be attained

when both of these aspects are fully implemented. We can expect a parallel in the

attainment of a judgment of value.

I have perhaps laboured the point to show that the desire to know is intrinsic

and constitutive to the process of knowing. It is not something external or peripheral or

accidental. It is a conscious desire. We [225] can operate or not according to this desire.

We can recognize this desire unfolding in curiosity, determination, conviction,

frustration, joy, satisfaction, a dynamism operating in and through our questioning and

understanding. Further, we can objectify explicitly the role this desire has to play in the

unfolding of the activities of imagining, remembering, understanding, formulating, and

judging truth and value. It is true that Lonergan focused on cognitional activities; that he

does not write a treatise on feeling; he does not seem to explicitly say that the desire to

know is a feeling. But he certainly acknowledges the crucial role of the desire to know

as the origin of questions, as the intention of truth and value, as the unrestricted

dynamism of understanding, as the detached disinterested motivation, as source of the

notion of being, as the criterion by which we know that we have reached the truth.

3.1.3 Interference of the Biases

If everybody everywhere lived according to the dictates of the pure, detached,

unrestricted desire to know there would be universal progress, development and

happiness. But such is, unfortunately, not the case. It is evident that the desire to know

struggles in a chaos of many other, personal, group and social desires and does not

always win out. One can present Lonergan's account of the four kinds of bias as the

obstacles to the proper unfolding of the desire to know and their implications for human

living. The biases are in the field of desires and feelings but distort, misdirect, stunt,

hinder the proper unfolding of the process of knowing.

Value Ethics 245

(1) Dramatic Bias. As well as the desire to know there are clearly unwanted

insights, a love of darkness, elementary passions submerging higher aspirations. If you

allow this process of excluding unwanted insights to continue, distortion spreads

through cognitional process, making knowledge of self and of others more and more

difficult and rare. If certain insights are unwanted, the questions that lead to these

insights have to be blocked. To systematically exclude a range of questions and data can

lead to rationalizations, blind spots, distortions, repressions, inhibitions, flights from

self-knowledge, loss of touch with reality. Although the blocking of unwanted ques-

[226]tions, images, and insights can be an unconscious activity of the censor, there will

normally be conscious connivance with the concomitants and consequences of dramatic

bias. Particularly in sexual development affect-laden images can be repressed only to

reappear associated with different images. Unconscious blocking of questions, and

insights can lead to lack of self-knowledge, loss of contact with reality, inappropriate

emotional reactions, distortions of the whole cognitive process of the individual.

(2) Individual bias. The egoist is a person who uses the whole range of

intellectual processes and skills exclusively for his own advantage: he is the “cool

schemer, the shrewd calculator, the hard-hearted self-seeker".11 This is taking care of

oneself to the exclusion of one’s obligations to society. There is in a sense in which we

are obliged to look after and love ourselves; but we are also obliged as members of

society to care for the welfare of others. The egoist thinks and feels only for his own

desires and fears, advantage and disadvantage. The source of individual bias is an

incomplete development of intelligence. An objective development of questioning

would reveal that intelligent courses of action are the same for all; that society cannot

survive if everybody acts on egotistical principles; that rights are balanced by duties;

that if you take from society you must give to society. The egoist is aware and

responsible for his self-deception, his refusal to ask these specific questions. This block


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on the Eros of the human mind leads to an uneasy conscience, an awareness of sin

against the light.

In the egoist sensitive desires and feelings are allowed to submerge the desire to

know. Sensitive desires seek their own satisfaction; they tend to be very strong, but

transient. They seek the good for me, not the good in itself, the apparent good not the

real good; they seek satisfaction of sensitive desires and impede the satisfaction of the

detached unrestricted desire to know. The egoist is looking for the satisfaction of his

desire for success, for money, for pleasure, for the agreeable. The desire to know would

pull him out of his egoism, but it is not allowed to operate. [227]

(3) Group bias. As human beings we are also social beings. We form groups,

we identify with family, community, school, ethnic and national groups. We feel we

belong to them, we defend them, our identity is linked with them, we sacrifice ourselves

for the good of the group. We respect loyalty to our family, we praise love of our

country, we admire putting the interests of the group before our own personal benefit.

That in itself is legitimate and praiseworthy

But it can also be a source of bias, in this case, group bias. We can become so

identified with our nation that we cannot believe it ever did anything wrong – so we

rewrite our history to reflect our bias. We identify with the interests of our groups so

that we cannot see things from an objective point of view. The group can be based on

class, religious affiliation, ethnicity, specialization, economics, politics or nationality. It

refers to the very human phenomenon of the in-group and the out-group. Feelings of

belonging, identification, loyalty to the group parallel feelings of distrust, resentment,

hatred and suspicion of the out-group. The desire to know is not allowed to transcend

group interest; it is not allowed to raise questions or challenges to the basis of group

interests, seeking a universal viewpoint, asking what interests all the groups have in

common. Struggle between groups often ends up with a dominant and oppressed group,

Value Ethics 247

winners and losers, the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak. The winners feel

vindicated, victorious, righteously celebrating their power. The losers are seething with

resentment, hatred, revenge and frustration. Such powerful group feelings militate

against the proper unfolding of the detached disinterested desire to know.

(4) General bias. General bias arises from common sense focus on the practical

and the concrete; again it is an incomplete development of intelligence, a blocking off of

further relevant questions, a disregard for theory, for the long-term view, for the need

for long-term strategy. Common sense is proper to each time and place; its success is

palpable, immediate and practical; it solves problems, is inventive within limits,

promotes short-term solutions but eschews the universal, the long-term, the explanatory.

General bias can lead to long-term decline; detached and disinterested intelligence

becomes increasingly irrelevant; the social situation deteriorates cumulatively [228] and

we end up with violence and a social surd. Lonergan appeals to cosmopolis as the force

for reversal of the long cycle of decline. There is such a thing as progress and its

principle is liberty. Intelligence is relevant in the short-term and in the long-term. We

need a social science that will understand the forces of history and how we are

becoming increasingly responsible for the unfolding of history. Detached and

disinterested intelligence and criticism is needed, more then ever before, to counter the

long cycle of decline.

Such is Lonergan's masterly treatment of bias. It is the contrary of the pure

detached unrestricted desire to know. Bias introduces distortions into the unfolding of

the desire. The distortions are in the area of feelings. In dramatic bias the subject is not

aware of how unwanted insights, images and feelings are not allowed to reach

consciousness and so continue to operate unconsciously to produce distortions,

unpredictable emotional reactions, unreasoned guilt feelings, abnormalities and

neuroses. In individual bias all the resources of intelligence are harnessed for selfish


248

self-interest. The desire to know is allowed free reign in terms of serving self-interest,

but blocked from thinking or feeling of the good of the whole. In group bias

intelligence and creativity and progress are embraced for the in-group but at the expense

of the out-group and to their disadvantage. Feeling of loyalty to the group are

heightened by fostering feeling of suspicion, distrust and hatred of the outsiders. In

general bias intelligence is limited to the practical, the concrete, the short-term solution.

The desire to know is not allowed to operate as detached, as disinterested, as

unrestricted. As Lonergan says "Were all responses made by pure intelligences,

continuous progress might be inevitable."12 Unfortunately, the polymorphism of our

desires and feelings does not allow this. Lonergan identifies these specific biases by

which sensitive human feelings interfere with the proper unfolding of the desire to

know.

3.1.4 ‘Possibility of Ethics’

Here we are confining ourselves Lonergan's position, as expressed in Insight.

Lonergan had embarked on a text on methods in general and had thirteen chapters

complete, when he was appointed [229] to teach in Rome. He decided to use the six

months remaining to round off his text and show the possibility of metaphysics, of

ethics, of proving the existence of God and showing that it was reasonable to think of

God intervening in history.13 He wrote chapter eighteen on the ‘Possibility of Ethics’

apparently as a reply to the Kantian position. There is much to be learned from this

chapter on freedom, the method of ethics, practical insight, moral impotence,

rationalization, and other matters. However, here we are interested only in the source of

moral obligation as expressed in Insight. He felt he had to say something on ethics and

that Kant would make a worthy adversary. Later, he develops a more sophisticated

position on feelings, values, the notion of value, judgments of value, decision, existential

ethics, and the like. Let us just isolate for now the source of moral obligation as

Value Ethics 249

presented in Insight and acknowledge his wider perspective later in our treatment of

feelings and values.

Lonergan in Insight is still thinking in terms of three levels of consciousness,

experiencing, understanding and judging. In this framework he has completed his

metaphysics and now he visualizes doing ethics as an extension or prolongation of the

principles of metaphysics, from knowing to doing. He talks about the parallel

interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics, seeming to mean that they are the same kind

of thing; nothing really new is involved in doing ethics; simply the extension of

principles of rationality from speculative intellect to practical affairs. Decision and

action are activities of the will and the will is conceived traditionally as rational appetite.

Decisions are rational, if they follow the dictates of reason. He is thinking of deciding

and acting as activities extending the activity of knowing to doing. He uses the

terminology of rational consciousness to deal with the three levels of cognitional

activity; he coins the term rational self-consciousness to deal with the extension of

rationality from knowing to doing.

The principle he appeals to is the exigence for self-consistency between knowing

and doing. "Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational

consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of

consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and

[230] doing." 14 This is the theme of the chapter and the basic tenet of his position on

moral obligation. It arises from the necessity of being consistent in your knowing and

your doing. It is hard to affirm that lying is wrong and still continue to tell lies. This is

an inconsistency, it causes tension; such tension can be relieved either by telling the

truth, or changing your knowing to suit your doing, in other words rationalizing.

He explicitly compares himself to Kant on the source of moral obligation: for

Kant it is found in practical reason, for Lonergan it is found in speculative reason. "In


250

brief, we have been dealing with the question, Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'?

Our answer differs from the Kantian answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical

imperative, we disagree inasmuch as we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence

and reason."15 There is a certain similarity between his position and that of Kant in that

both derive moral obligation from reason; Kant derives it from practical reason,

Lonergan derives it from purely speculative reason. Lonergan accepts that his exigence

of self-consistency between knowing and doing is comparable to a categorical

imperative.

He compares judgment with decision: "However, there is a radical difference

between the rationality of judgment and the rationality of decision. Judgment is an act

of rational consciousness, but decision is an act of rational self-consciousness. The

rationality of judgment emerges in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire

to know in the process towards knowledge of the universe of being. But the rationality of

decision emerges in the demand of the rationally conscious subject for consistency

between his knowing and his deciding and doing."16 “Further, willing is rational and so

moral.”17 Questions for reflection arise, we consider various possibilities. Only one

possibility can be the best. The principle of contradiction, which operates in judgments

of fact, also operates to demand consistency between knowing and doing; there cannot

be a contradiction between knowing and doing. There is a necessary connection between

the conclusion, this is to be done, and the rational grounds from which this conclusion

was derived. "Such is the meaning of obligation".18 It is because of the freedom of the

will that this necessity [231] becomes a contingency: what we conclude is the right thing

to do, is not always what we actually choose.

To sum up, I think it is clear that Lonergan appeals to speculative reason alone

for the source of moral obligation. It is a rational ethics. To emphasize the point we

could quote his apparent elimination of feelings from the field of moral obligation:

Value Ethics 251

"Accordingly, it will not be amiss to assert emphatically that the identification of being

and the good by-passes human feelings and sentiments to take its stand exclusively upon

intelligible order and rational value."19 Being is the sphere of knowing, the good is the

sphere of choosing. Feelings do not play a constitutive role in moral reasoning and

decision. How are we to interpret this explicit and emphatic statement? I think that his

statement reflected the way 'feeling and sentiment' was being used in Catholic ascetical

theology at that time. The word 'feeling' had a narrow, negative connotation, often

associated with concupiscence, sin, lust, anger, illicit pleasures. Feelings were regarded

as dangerous, a source of temptation, an obstacle to prayer, and the spiritual life. Feeling

were to be controlled by fasting, mortification, self-denial and even repression.

Pleasurable feelings were particularly dangerous and in need of control. This is the

meaning given to the word feeling at that time. In this sense, Lonergan's statement was

quite normal and acceptable. The word had this pejorative connotation and used in that

sense his statement was quite correct: if you do not overcome the biases of feelings, you

cannot have the proper unfolding of the desire to know.

Lonergan does have other occasional references to feelings and images in Insight

but they are not of great interest to us.20 Perhaps because of the narrow range of

meaning, he uses it so seldom. His focus was cognitional activities and not feelings.

This will change in Method.

However, it is appropriate to point out that Insight was written with feeling.

It is quite clear the Insight was written by someone with a passionate commitment to

understanding, to understanding correctly, to the development of intellect and to the

implications of that develop-[232]ment for personal living, for social progress, for the

moral and religious life. Insight is not an abstract emotionless thesis written to impress

or show off; it is deeply concerned at the plight of persons and societies caught in the

conflicting cycles of development and decline and what we can to do about it. Insight is


252

written by a person acting out of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know, for the

sake of better human living and development. If you want to grasp what he meant by the

desire to know, the Eros of the human mind, try to imagine his state of mind as he

worked on this monumental manuscript and rounded it off by writing the last six

chapters in about six months.21 He felt this was important; his desire to complete it

pushed aside distracting diversions, to focus, concentrate, write, rewrite; he was

absorbed devoted and this is revealed in every paragraph he wrote. His writing

embodies a feeling orientation towards the importance of knowing.

3.2 From Insight to Method and Beyond

Lonergan finished the writing of Insight in 1953 (even though it was not

published until 1957) before going to Rome to teach theology at the Gregorian

University. His focus naturally shifted to theology and his thought on method continued

to develop up to 1971 when Method in Theology was finally published. Fred Crowe has

described the shift in emphasis over the years by making four points.22 (1) Lonergan

shifted from constantly quoting 'the natural desire to know God', to quoting Romans 5.5

on God's love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit. This represents a shift from

predominantly intellectual interests to a focus on love, the affective and values. (2) He

shifts from 'our minds are restless' to 'our hearts are restless', from Aquinas to

Augustine. (3) Lonergan shifts from a use of the term ‘feeling’ that is narrow and

negative, to a positive broad appreciation and incorporation of the feeling element in a

theory of values. (4) Lonergan expands his three level cognitional structure to add a

fourth level incorporating, deliberating, evaluating, deciding and acting in a responsible

manner. It is not just intelligence and reasonableness that governs conduct but

responsibility, a new category or dynamism operating at the fourth level of

consciousness. [233]

Value Ethics 253

We might note here that it is not only Lonergan who is shifting from a narrow

negative notion of feeling to a broader positive one. It is the whole culture that is

moving in that direction. The Index to Insight of 1957 edition gives one reference to

‘feeling’; the Index of the Collected Works edition of 1992 gives about twenty-five

references. What has changed? The text has remained the same, but the theological and

philosophical community had moved on to a wider and more positive appreciation of

the importance of feeling in knowing. Lonergan had moved with them and so in Method

in Theology there is explicit acceptance of the positive role of feeling in theology and an

attempt to incorporate that in the process of doing theology. Hence in comparing the

role of feelings in Insight and in Method, we have to constantly keep in mind that the

word ‘feeling’ has changed its meaning – its connotation and denotation. What

previously was excluded from being a ‘feeling’, can now be included in the category of

‘feeling’. A change in the meaning of the word does not necessarily signify a

substantive change in the thinking of Lonergan on feeling. So we need to be very

careful in our semantics, when comparing the early Lonergan to the later, and must

always keep in mind this semantic shift that occurs in the whole community of scholars.

Let us now consider some of the influences on Lonergan in this period between 1953

and 1971 in this area of feelings and values.

3.2.1 Influence of Max Scheler (1874-1928)

One of Lonergan's sources for a new notion of feeling and value is Max Scheler

whom he refers to in Method. His introduction to Max Scheler was through reading

Manfred S. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise introduction into the World of a Great

Thinker.23 Scheler was a Catholic Intellectual who wrote copiously on all subjects of

philosophy. He also influenced Karol Wojtyla, who became Pope John Paul the

Second.24 Scheler was within the Kantian tradition but was reacting against the

formalism of Kant's philosophy. He was influenced by Brentano and Husserl and


254

attempted to extend phenomenological method to the field of ethics. He called himself

an ‘emotional intuitionist’ and the method he used a ‘non-formal a priorism’. Kant's

formal ethics excluded feelings (as empirical elements) from ethics. Scheler, by

contrast, grounded the universal and necessary [234] character of moral norms on the

non-rational yet revelatory character of feelings. Scheler wrote extensively on

sympathy, ressentiment, fellow-feeling, compassion, community, person, and the like.

There are fifteen volumes of his collected works.25

Against relativism, Scheler held that values are essences in the world

independent of our knowing them and that they constitute a graded realm of values. As

well as the external realm of values you have a corresponding range of emotional

responses to values. This is the aspect of Scheler’s ethics which interests us most and is

most pertinent to our consideration of feelings and values. He listed the graded realm of

values in terms of sensible values, vital values, spiritual values and religious values.

(1) Sensible values range from agreeable to disagreeable, including sensible

feelings of enjoyment and suffering and the feeling-states of pleasure and pain. "The

fact that the agreeable is preferred to the disagreeable is not given by way of induction

or observation, rather, this order lies in the essence (Wesen) of these values as well as in

the essence of sensible feeling." 26

(2) Vital values or values of life range from the noble to the vulgar, the good and

the bad (not in the ethical sense). "Corresponding states of this modality are those of

health, disease, states of aging, feelings of forthcoming death, weakness and strength."27

These first two categories are values relative to life.

(3) Spiritual values are given in spiritual feeling and spiritual acts of preferring,

love and hatred of the human person. In this category he includes aesthetic values,

values of right and wrong, the value of pure cognition of truth.

Value Ethics 255

(4) The value modality of the holy and the unholy – appears only with objects

pertaining to the absolute. Here he values cults, sacraments, forms of worship. Spiritual

values and values of holiness are values pertaining to the Person. The holy is a higher

value than the spiritual. [235]

Corresponding roughly to these objective value essences are the value-feelings

in acts of preferring which together form a typology of feeling.28

(1) Physical feeling-states (e.g. pain, sensation of tickling, itching, etc.) These

feelings are exclusively in time and place in a body. They are not intentional; they

belong to a determinate organ or part of a body; they are local and extended; they

encompass bodily pleasures and pains.

(2) Body or vital feeling states, such as health, illness, vigour, strength, etc.

"Vital feeling states spread through the body, and the whole body is given to us through

them which makes them deeper in depth than physical feeling-states."29 Vital feelings

form a unified lived experience of one’s own bodiliness: they indicate ascent or decline

of vitality. They are continuous not punctual; they have a retrospective and prospective

orientation.

(3) Psychic feeling-states are intentional and genuinely communicable, can be

felt and refelt. "Psychic feelings, motivated by the understanding of trans-vital values

and networks of value, are intentional feelings in the proper sense." "Value (or disvalue)

here is the object-correlate of intentional feeling; and the feeling itself is a value-

objectifying act."30

(4) Spiritual feeling-states of person (e.g. blissfulness, despair, conscience, peace

of heart) pour forth directly from the core of the person and shine through the person

and his life. They permeate every other content of our experience; the rest of our 'state

of mind' vanishes. "To have or not to have spiritual feeling-states is not dependent on


256

willful intentions at all. They appear only 'on the back' of comportment and never as a

given content for purposeful willing."31

Love is the fundamental spiritual act. "The seat of the value-a priori is in acts of

feeling, preferring (or rejecting), and ultimately in love and hatred, where cognitions of

values and value intuition (Wert-Erschauung) take place".32 Man is, before he can think

or will, ens amans. "The pursuance of love and hatred, however, is the deepest source of

sorrow, joy, blissfulness and despair as feeling states, and they in turn are fundamental

to all feelings."33 [236]

Evaluation, Although we have only treated of a few of Scheler's ideas, one can see why

Lonergan would be interested in his treatment of feelings and values. However,

although Lonergan admits a debt to Scheler, it is still unclear how much he buys into the

system of Scheler, even when he takes over terminology such as intentional and non-

intentional. From a Lonergan point of view, Scheler was in a counterposition on

knowing values in his emotional intuitionism. "Values cannot be grasped rationally;

reason is no more perceptive of them than the eye is of tone qualities. Values are given

in feeling-acts. Thus the object-region of values is governed by eternal, changeless laws,

which are not identical with, but analogous to logical laws. These laws can only be

grasped in 'emotional' acts."34 Lonergan will never say that feelings know values.

Feelings may reveal, point to, apprehend values but he will never say that feelings alone

know value. Knowing in Lonergan is always understanding. What he, perhaps, learns

from Scheler is that feelings influence and are in some way part of understanding.

Scheler was rejecting the empty formalism of a Kantian ethics based on reason alone.

But Scheler did not have a more adequate epistemology than Kant and so had recourse

to the direct intuitions of essences in phenomenology. Lonergan has worked out a

correct account of knowing truth and thus is in a better position than Scheler to account

for the knowing of values.

Value Ethics 257

Scheler is also in a counterposition on the objectivity of values as essences

ranked in a hierarchy independent of our knowing them. "In the totality of the realm of

values there exists a singular order, an 'order of ranks' that all values possess among

themselves. It is because of this that a value is 'higher' or 'lower' than another one. This

order lies in the essence of values themselves, as does the difference between 'positive'

and ‘negative' values. It does not belong simply to 'values known' by us."35 It is not

hard to see here the 'out there now real' of the counterposition on the real. Scheler is still

thinking of knowing as a confrontation or contact between a subject in here and an

object out there joined by an intuition, a simple single act of seeing or perceiving or

feeling. Although it is laudable to defend the objectivity of values in an environment of

relativism, we have to be careful to seek objectivity in the right place. [237]

Scheler converted to Catholicism when he was fourteen but seems to have left

the Church later. In his own private life he was not exactly a model of the virtuous man.

His life was plagued by divorce, scandals, expulsions from universities, money

problems and betrayal of his friends.36 Although a brilliant speaker and writer, his flow

of ideas sometimes got the better of him and so we find inconsistencies, shifts of

position and a lack of precision and system in his thought.

3.2.2 Influence of Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977)

Lonergan also acknowledges a debt to Dietrich von Hildebrand in this area of

feelings and value, particularly his Ethics published in 1952.37 Von Hildebrand was also

a Catholic intellectual in the phenomenological tradition. He also wrote voluminously

on the spiritual life, philosophy, ethics, marriage and transformation in Christ. He made

the acquaintance of Max Scheler during his student years and was much impressed by

him. Von Hildebrand converted to Catholicism in 1914, and remained a devout and

rather conservative Catholic all his life. Von Hildebrand left Germany before the war


258

and after a short period in Austria and Switzerland went to America and taught at

Fordham University from 1941 to his death.

One can see that Lonergan was indebted to von Hildebrand in his terminology –

value responses, intentional responses, affective response, satisfaction, moral

consciousness, the heart, subjectively satisfying and dissatisfying, merely teleological

trends, psychic states, intentional and non-intentional, are all terms used by von

Hildebrand. But we wonder what these terms mean for von Hildebrand and whether

they have the same meaning when transposed into a Lonergan framework. Von

Hildebrand studied Thomas Aquinas and Saint Augustine but remained a

phenomenologist at heart. He, like Scheler, wants to establish the unalterable character

of the moral law and the absolute nature of moral values against the relativists. He

wants to establish a true hierarchy of values based on Augustine's Ordo Amoris. But he

continues to speak in terms of intellectual intuition of essence, knowing as perception or

confrontation. He has a more central role for cognition than Scheler, insisting that: "All

responses necessarily presuppose a cognitive act. The ob-[238]ject must first reveal

itself in its nature, before it can become an object of our responses."38

I do not see much to be gained here by summarizing or further delving into von

Hildebrand. His way of thinking is similar to Scheler. Although he is discussing the

very thing we are interested in, feeling and values, he does so in a context that is quite

alien to our account of cognitional structure. He writes at length and in detail but it is

difficult to pin down his meaning precisely. Even if we manage to pin down von

Hildebrand’s meaning, there is no guarantee that that is the meaning imported into

Lonergan’s framework.

If one asserts that knowledge of values is an intuition, then, there is not much

more to be said about it. If intuition is a simple, immediate, direct act of perception, then

no further description or differentiation into parts is called for. But the problem arises

Value Ethics 259

when there are disagreements in judgments of value. If one person has an intuition that

'p' is true, and another person has an intuition that 'p' is untrue, how is the contradiction

to be resolved! Once you start debating about possible hypotheses, forming definitions,

gathering evidence, weighing the relevance of the evidence, arguing towards a

judgment, then, knowing is no longer an intuition but a complicated, critical, discursive

process, something like we have outlined. Similarly, our knowledge of value will be

knowledge by judgments of value and will be reached only after a complex process of

interrelated cognitional operations. We are searching for the source of values; we are

very aware of disputes and controversies about the source of values; it does not seem

that values are given in intuition, rather, through working through the controversies, the

arguments, the feelings, the insights and judgments. There is a question of

distinguishing true and false values; this is done by arguing, clarifying, assembling

evidence, following our better feelings, reaching conclusions.

Lonergan had recourse to Scheler and von Hildebrand because they were the

only philosophers talking about a morality based on values. The Catholic tradition was

still relying on natural law, as expounded by Aquinas and developed in moral theology.

The empiricists were splintering into conflicting groups arguing about the [239]

verification principle, language games, empirical reference, signification, and the like.

The existentialists were undermining – rather that providing a foundation for – values.

The value discussion of the first half of the 20th century was not continued into the

second half. It is Lonergan who takes up the baton but gets little help from his

predecessors or contemporaries.

3.2.3 Feelings in Method – A Summary

Let us assemble step by step Lonergan's statements on feelings in Method and

then we will be in a position to make an assessment and move on to a systematic

presentation.


260

(1) He makes a distinction between non-intentional and intentional feelings in

which he draws on Max Scheler and von Hildebrand. Non-intentional feelings are states

and trends. They do not intend objects; they are not a response to objects. Examples of

states would be: fatigue, irritability, bad humour, anxiety. The states have causes and

disappear when the cause is no longer operative or is removed. Examples of trends or

urges would be hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort; they tend to a goal and disappear when

the goal is achieved. In non-intentional states and trends, "the relation of the feeling to

the cause or goal is simply that of effect to cause, of trend to goal. The feeling itself

does not presuppose and arise out of perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or

goal."39

"Intentional responses, on the other hand, answer to what is intended,

apprehended, represented. The feeling relates us not just to a cause or an end, but to an

object."40 Intentional is being used in the phenomenological sense of a subject being

related to an object by way of an intention. We have seen that in the levels of

consciousness each question intends a particular answer. In this context now we are

talking of feelings relating us to objects intentionally. We feel good towards certain

people, certain classes of objects, we are attracted by them; on the other hand we are

repulsed by certain types of people, certain topics, certain activities. We have instinctive

feeling reactions either negative or positive or in-between. If you are watching a news

bulletin you will find yourself reacting to the persons who are presented, the events

which have happened, the crimes that have been [240] reported, the scandals and the

successes. It is perfectly true, as Lonergan says, that "Such feeling gives intentional

consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power."41 These are deeply ingrained feeling

responses. Without them our living would be paper thin. We have to feel strongly about

something to persevere to the end. Without such feelings our convictions would be very

Value Ethics 261

weak, we would give up easily. By our feelings "we are oriented massively and

dynamically in a world mediated by meaning."42

(2) Intentional feelings respond to two main classes of objects: "on the one hand,

the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying; on the other hand, values,

whether the ontic value of persons or the qualitative value of beauty, understanding,

truth, virtuous acts, noble deeds."43 Response to true values carries us forward towards

goodness and self-transcendence.

Response to the agreeable or disagreeable is ambiguous; it may be the road to

self-transcendence but then again it might be self-regarding moral decline. What is

agreeable may well be a true value; but it also may be something morally wrong, but

with an appearance of good. What is disagreeable may be a true value and we have to

grit our teeth and do it. On the other hand, we may find it so unpleasant that we do not

do it, meaning that we are operating under the criterion of pleasure and pain.

I find this distinction very fundamental and of crucial importance for

understanding how we know values. Lonergan does not give much assistance by way of

examples or illustrations for identifying this distinction in our own lives. Like many of

his terms it is heuristic: this is the bare bones – work out the specifics for yourself. This

we will try to do in detail in the next chapter.

(3) Lonergan also uses a phrase 'apprehension of value' which seems to be close

to the intentional response to value but not simply synonymous. This phrase is wide

open to misinterpretation, so let us give the quotations where the phrase occurs and then

try to divine the precise meaning. [241]

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feeling.44 Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements.45


262

Again, our apprehensions of values occur in intentional responses, in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feelings.46 Now the apprehensions of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of intentional response. Such response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings.47 In normal English usage the word 'apprehension' can be used as equivalent to

‘comprehension’ either as the activity of comprehending or referring to what is

comprehended. It can also be used in the sense of arresting, taking somebody into

custody, laying hold of somebody. It can also be used of a foreboding, a suspicious

feeling about something.

In Scholastic philosophy and in Lonergan's work on Word and Idea in Aquinas,

the term ‘apprehension’ refers to the activity of insight into phantasm. Simple

apprehension was the phrase used in Scholastic philosophy for the first act of intellect,

the direct understanding; the second act was division or composition which was the

judgment. So in the Verbum articles Lonergan talks of apprehensive abstraction as the

grasp of the form in the matter, the universal in the particular, the idea in the phantasm.

Occasionally, the phrase reoccurs in Insight where he speaks of apprehensions of

possibility or necessity,48 apprehensions of durations,49 and distinguishes affective from

apprehensive. In this context it seems to refer to a grasp of some content. It seems to be

another metaphor for understanding and to refer to the act of insight. Just as we talk of

seeing the point, or grasping the point, so we [242] can talk of apprehending the point.

But it occurs rarely, is not given a technical definition or significance and is not really a

technical term.

So much for the background. What about the phrase 'apprehension of value' as it

occurs in the above quotations and other later writings of Lonergan? Let us be clear

about the following points.

Value Ethics 263

(a) It is not knowledge of values but something intermediate and less than

knowledge. Apprehension, even as a metaphor for insight, was only an insight into

possibility. Knowledge occurs through a complicated and interrelated series of activities

of sensing and understanding, and reaches its term only in the judgment. Those who

think that Lonergan has gone soft in his old age and held that feelings on their own

know values are quite mistaken. He never says this. Apprehension is not knowledge.

(b) It would be quite inadequate to think – from the first quotation above – that

feelings only enter into the cognitional operations somewhere between judgments of

fact and judgments of value. This would be rather strange and artificial. Feelings

motivate all cognitional operations. It is probably true that just as responsibility for our

judgments is deeper and more personal that responsibility for our opinions, so

responsibility for our moral judgments is deeper and more personal than for our

judgments of fact.

It would also be inadequate to interpret this quotation as saying that the only

thing that occurs between judgments of fact and judgments of value are apprehensions

of value. He has already identified the question of value and the process of deliberation

and they surely are involved in some way intermediate between judgments of fact and

value.

(c) It is clear from the above that there is a strong feeling element in this

apprehension of value, but is it exclusively a feeling element? Are other elements of

cognition involved in the apprehension? An answer Lonergan gave at a question and

answer session seems to indicate that there are. "There are apprehensions of values, and

these occur insofar as one is apprehending things, experiencing, understanding, judging;

and further, there is added on to this an intentional response, a feeling that is not just a

feeling state like fatigue or hunger [243] or thirst, but a response to an object…as


264

something good."50 So it seems that the apprehension of value goes along with the other

activities of knowing and guides it in the right direction.

(d) Bernard Tyrell suggests that intentional response to value and apprehension

of value are roughly synonymous and interchangeable.51 However, he does suggest

some nuances.

"At the same time, by using the expression 'apprehension of values,' Lonergan

does indicate that he understands the grasp of values to involve a certain 'knowing of the

heart,' an activity that involves 'discernment' and 'recognition'."52 Love illuminates the

process of knowing and reveals or points to and recognizes values. It is in this limited

sense that you can have a 'knowing of the heart'

It may be that the two phrases complement one another, one being active the

other being passive. "It seems to me that the 'intentional response to value' as Lonergan

understand it involves both a receptive and an active dimension. As apprehensive the

intentional response is receptive of value; it recognizes value. As a response it actively

greets and discriminates values."53

(e) My own interpretation is that Lonergan assigns a precise, explanatory role to

‘intentional response to value’. He does not seem assign a precise, technical meaning to

the phrase ‘apprehension of values’. It is not a judgment of value; it is not pure feeling

and seems to go along with activities of knowing. It can be used in a rather loose sense.

It might be considered as a grasp of possible value. It seems to be used to describe our

sensitivity to values, hence it is used as a descriptive term. Good people will be

sensitive to, aware of, will recognize, apprehend values.54 Persons who are less

developed morally will be insensitive to values, unaware of value issues, be unable to

recognize and apprehend values.

(4) Lonergan assigns a special place to love as the supreme example of

intentional response. "But there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong,

Value Ethics 265

especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon,

direct one's life. Here the supreme illustration is loving."55 He often speaks of God's

love flowing into our hearts by the power of the Holy Spirit. (Rm. 5.5.) For the [244]

person who is fully in love with God his affective response will be in harmony and he

can follow his desires knowing that they lead to God. Ama et fac quod vis; love and do

what you will.

(5) Lonergan gives us his interpretation of Pascal's saying that the heart has

reasons which reason does not know. By reason he means "the three levels of

cognitional activity, namely, of experiencing, of understanding and of judging. By the

heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values."

"The meaning, then, of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge

reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of

knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a

person in love."56

(6) A somewhat similar distinction is needed in relation to the Latin tag, nihil

amatum nisi praecognitum, nothing is loved unless it is previously known. Knowledge

usually precedes love. But there is the minor exception of people who fall in love with

another person or country or cause. There is the major exception to the Latin tag,

namely, God's gift of love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of

being in love. But who it is we love, is neither given nor as yet understood. So the other

Latin tag has to be taken into account, namely, nihil vere cognitum, nisi prius amatum,

nothing is truly known unless it is first loved.57

(7) Lonergan has a rich appreciation of the relation between symbols, images

and feelings. He defines a symbol as "an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes

a feeling or is evoked by a feeling."58 Feelings relate us to objects; some we desire,

some we fear, some we seek, some we avoid. Feelings are related to one another. Some


266

sets of feelings are compatible; others are incompatible. Feelings are tied up in

interpersonal relationships. Feelings are related to the subject as the mass, momentum,

drive of conscious living. Symbols can be differentiated or undifferentiated. They can

mean different things to different people. The same feeling can be expressed in different

symbols. As our affectivity changes so old symbols loose their efficacy and new

symbols gain in their appeal. "Symbols obey the laws not of logic but of image and

feeling."59 [245]

(8) Although feelings are fundamentally spontaneous, we do not have complete

control over them, yet we can influence our feelings by reinforcement, approval,

curtailing or controlling. So our feelings can be enriched and refined by a process of

education through the arts and through appreciation of admirable persons and moral

values. Conversely there can be decline and aberration of feelings.60

Evaluation. How are we to assess these various statements about feelings? Have

they answered the questions we asked about the role of feelings in value judgments

decisions and actions? On the positive side there is a real appreciation of the importance

of feeling and an effort to come to terms with feelings and values in relation to

knowledge and theology. On the other hand there is a certain ambiguity, an absence of

elaboration and gaps that leave us tantalizingly unsatisfied.

One of the ambiguities is the role of feelings in knowing values. Two reputable

authors are already in print interpreting Lonergan as saying that feelings know values.61

This is probably based on a misunderstanding of his statements that we apprehend

values in feelings; but that is not the same as knowing values in feelings.

The elaboration is lacking in the distinction between intentional response to

values and to the agreeable/disagreeable. Unless we can identify in our own experience

what he is referring to in this distinction, then we will be like a blind person talking

about colour. Hence, in our systematic presentation in the next chapter we will launch

Value Ethics 267

out into the deep and try to identify what he is talking about and establish precisely how

the intentional response to value enters into our knowledge of values.

4 Broadening our Notion of Feeling

We have devoted some time and effort to Aristotle, the emotivists, the

phenomenologists and Lonergan in order to grasp the extent of the difficulty and as a

starting point for our own appropriation of feeling. We realize that facile

oversimplifications will simply not satisfy. We hope we have honed the questions that

arise, so that we will know what we are looking for, when we attend to our own feeling

[246] life. It is to ourselves, our own consciousness – the final arbiter in all these matter

– that we now return. Our question still is simply how do feelings enter into judgments

of value. Our first focus is on our very notion of feeling; the probability that we need to

move from a narrow notion of feeling, to a broader appreciation of their role in our life.

We still tend to operate out of a very narrow view of feeling, where we consider

feelings as occasional, superficial, transient, negative, undifferentiated and sensitive.

We tend to think of feelings as occasional, as something that comes and goes at

will. We think of ourselves as normally calm and without feeling, and suddenly

somebody annoys us and there is an irruption of anger. When the anger passes we return

to our state of neutrality, of calmness, of normality.

We tend to think of feelings as superficial; we recognize only the more obvious

expressions of feelings. We recognize passion, anger, joy, pleasure, guilt, grief and the

like, which are strong and obvious. But we do not recognize determination, conviction,

commitment, responsibility, hope, aspirations to a better life for ourselves, our children

and our society, as feelings. We recognize only our more obvious likes and dislikes, our

pleasures and pains.


268

We think of feelings as transient; very strong when they arise, but will pass

quickly and we will return to normal. We are advised not to act out of feeling, wait till

you calm down, cool it man, don't do anything you might regret later, sleep on it first.

Often we think of feelings from a negative point of view, suggesting that we

would be more rational without them. Wouldn't we be better off without these wild

animal impulses that we can hardly control. Why can't adversaries just sit down and be

reasonable and compromise? Why are the kids always fighting? Why do we spend so

much time on the education of the mind and so little on the education of the heart? We

might even think of our feelings as dangerous, that they have to be controlled,

suppressed, or even repressed. [247]

Our notion of feeling tends to be undifferentiated. We use the word globally,

generally, in no clearly defined sense. A normal dictionary will give about eight

different meanings for the word 'feeling'. Surely we must make an effort to sort out the

types of feelings, the definition of feeling, the function of feeling in living.

We tend to confine our notion of feelings to sensitive feelings, to bodily changes

associated with feelings, to physics, chemistry, and biology of feeling, and to the

sensitive psyche. But can we not feel the love of God flowing into our hearts? Do we

not experience the grace of conversion? Do we not feel an obligation to help those in

need? Do we not feel obliged to do our duty? Do we not feel responsible for causing an

accident? Are there other kinds of feelings that cannot be called sensitive?

Let us try to work towards a broader appreciation of the role of feeling in our

life.

First, we must think of feelings as permanent: we are always in a feeling

disposition towards the world and ourselves. Once we are awake, we are operating in

terms of the mass, momentum, power, drive of feeling or the absence thereof. I think it

is a mistake to think of feelings as occasional or transient; as if we act out of feeling and

Value Ethics 269

then revert back to a state of neutrality. But if you are in neutral gear, you go nowhere.

Love, convictions, determinations, commitments, hopes and dreams are relatively

permanent affective dispositions; they do not go away when we are eating our lunch or

playing golf. There are relatively permanent dispositions, inclinations, habits, feeling

responses, value priorities, various levels of enthusiasm, joi de vivre or depression.

Secondly, our feeling disposition at any one time is multilayered. On the surface

we can be 'happy' enjoying some pleasure and at the same time deeply uneasy or guilty

or depressed. There are feelings that are superficial, very obvious, very strong and on

the other hand counter-currents that are very deep and long-lasting. You can be grieving

because of some bad news but rejoicing because of some other good news. Feelings at

different levels can be conflicting. The image of a symphony seems appropriate for the

life of feelings; many different [248] feelings, operating at different levels, with varying

intensities, sometimes in harmony and going in the same direction; sometimes

conflicting and producing disharmony and chaos.

Thirdly, feelings vary in intensity, duration, depth, intentionality. They vary in

intensity; you can be mildly angry, deeply angry, red hot angry. Feelings can last for a

few minutes, a few hours or for the whole day. Feelings can be on the surface, not

disturbing your deeper calm and happiness. Or you can be deeply disturbed and

presenting a superficial appearance of tranquillity. Sentiments can be deep and

unnoticed: approval, esteem, sympathy, compassion, empathy, concern, contentment,

care, commitment, kindness, love, hatred, and the like. They can vary in intentionality,

in the sense of orientating us towards action, towards a response, towards a judgment

and decision. Lonergan distinguishes between non-intentional and intentional. I suspect

there may be a little overlapping here and certain gradations between totally non-

intentional and intentional.


270

Fourthly, our feelings not only motivate our outward behaviour but also the

inner life of the mind. Feelings motivate physical activity but equally all our

questioning, studying, thinking, formulating, reflecting, criticizing, judging truth,

deliberating and judging value. The intellectual life is shot through from beginning to

end with feeling. It is inadequate to think of feeling entering into our lives only when

moral values and decisions are at stake. Research, writing, experimenting, exploring,

concluding, putting things together is shot through with feelings such as dedication,

perseverance, frustration, exhilaration, anger, pride, ambition, love, aggression, and the

like. Typically moral sentiments, such as, approval, esteem, sympathy, compassion,

empathy, concern, contentment, care, commitment, kindness, love, hatred, dedication,

perseverance, are relatively permanent and motivate our behaviour to others.

Fifthly, feelings develop. Our feeling life develops along with our intellectual,

moral and religious development. Aristotle recognizes this; young people act out of

their feelings; they are not fit to study ethics; only the mature whose feelings are under

control can study goodness. Feelings develop by being encouraged, fostered, curtailed,

[249] trained and controlled. There can also be decline and aberration of feelings if they

are allowed to distort out perspective by bias, twisted resentments, repressions, and the

like.

The emotional reactions of the good man will be quite different from those of

the evil person. When we see a motor accident happen, we should normally respond by

feelings of sympathy and offering a helping hand; that is what a good person

spontaneously does. A thief on the other hand will spontaneously respond by thinking,

this is a good opportunity to steal and proceed to do so. When we are confronted by an

example of injustice, e.g. police beating up peaceful marchers, we should respond with

anger and indignation; the callous person will respond with a shrug of his shoulders and

move on.

Value Ethics 271

Sixthly, we should think of feelings not as disruptive elements but as parts of an

integrated whole. Feelings were considered to be dividing the person, preventing him

from doing good, a separate force over which we have little control. Now I think we can

better understand that the person is one. The one person who experiences, understands,

judges and decides is also the one who has emotions and is affective. The one subject is

the unifying centre of all these different activities. The activities are accompanied by

various emotional responses. But it is the one self, who understands and experiences the

joy of understanding, who does the right thing and experiences the satisfaction of

knowing that you have done the right thing. The image of the symphony is appropriate

here also; there is only one conductor, but many instruments. Some instruments play

deep and persistent; others are light and occasional. Mostly there is harmony, but

sometimes disharmony and tension. Usually the same mood pervades all the parts but

there can be subtle contrasts, suggestions, conflicts.

Seventhly, we should think of feelings as often interpersonal and often

concerned with values. We feel about persons more strongly that we feel about things.

Our feeling life starts in the close bond of baby and parent and works on from there.

Moral values are also personal values; they have to do with interpersonal relations.

[250]

Eightly, we might have to consider a range of feelings that cannot be called

sensitive, that do not originate in sensitivity, even though they might be accompanied by

sensitive changes. I am thinking of the desire to know, about the transcendental

imperatives, about the notions of intelligibility, truth, and value. Perhaps there is a range

of feeling that is deep, permanent, directing towards truth and value; a range of feeling

that does not originate in sense and might have to be called immaterial or spiritual. This

is a range of feeling that we do not often think of in the category of feeling, but are

feelings nonetheless.


272

Conclusion. Although it is still true that feelings can be disruptive, passionate,

dangerous elements in our life, we are coming to a more positive appreciation of their

role for good, the positive contribution they make to the intellectual and moral and

religious life. Above all we have to learn to appreciate the deep undercurrents of

permanent feelings towards the true and the good and the beautiful, which underlie the

more superficial, obvious expressions of feeling.

We have made a start on unravelling the confusion related to feelings and

values. We have looked at some background figures, picked out what might be of help

from the history, explored some basic distinctions, so that we will be in a good position

to put together a comprehensive understanding of the role of feelings in the moral life in

the next chapter.


(1) (a.) In some cases feelings can take control and overcome our better judgment.

Think of road rage, crimes of passion, quarrels, brawls on the football pitch, marital

squabbles, etc. Usually we regret afterwards, when we cool down.

(b.) On the opposite side, you can think of a person carried away by emotions to protect

his family from armed burglars; or a soldier sacrificing himself for his company; or a

person giving his life to the service of the poor, or the oppressed or the marginalized.

[251]

(c.) One can think of a selfish person, doing everything for himself, thinking only of his

own pleasure and convenience; unwilling to consider the feelings or rights of others; his

feeling life is totally centred on himself and his own convenience.

(2) We tend to classify love, compassion, sympathy, commitment, etc. as good; but that

presupposes an authentic and competent person. There is love of darkness, compassion

for rapists, sympathy for terrorists, commitment to discrimination. We tend to classify

anger, frustration, hatred, intolerance, and the like as bad; but anger at injustice,

Value Ethics 273

frustration in trying to improve a situation, hatred for evil, intolerance of sin and bad

will are commendable feelings. In our terminology, intentional response to value always

leads to self-transcendence; intentional response to satisfaction is strictly neutral.

(3) We do seem, as a matter of fact, to appeal to certain feelings as justification for

action or inaction. The problem really is which feelings, at what level, in what context?

Do such feelings replace, support, or go contrary to activities of knowing value? We

hope to answer these questions in the next chapter.

(4) Try to think of minds without hearts; computers without power; cars without petrol.

Where would we be without the mass momentum drive of feelings? Where would we be

with no desire for truth or value or God?

(5) The good person rejoices in goodness, peace, progress, justice, cooperation, even if

it does not impinge on himself or herself directly.

(6) The good person rejoices in other good persons; the good person is angered,

appalled, disappointed, ashamed, at the evil done by other human beings. How you feel

about these persons depends on how much you know about them, whether you

information is correct, and your own personal value system.

(7) Value judgments emerge from deliberative insights moved by the intentional

response to value. The unfolding of this feeling and thinking activity requires

detachment, disinterestedness, [252] purity, dedication. But there can be the

interferences of dramatic, individual, group or general bias which will produce a

distorted judgment of value.

(8) To feel comfortable can refer to the purely physical, a comfortable bed, couch,

position. Here it refers to feeling responses to values; is your value system at home with

racial discrimination? There is the comfort of a clear conscience, the knowledge that

you are in the right, that you have faced up to challenges, that you are trying to be

authentic.


274

Endnotes

1 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31. 2 The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans by J.A.K. Thomson; Introduction by Jonathan Barnes; (Great Britain: Penguin Edition, 1953). 3 MacIntyre, Alisdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 19. 4 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 1, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 5 Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 6 Phil McShane, Ed. Language, Truth and Meaning, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 310. 7 Insight, 97, 245, 355, 498. 8 Insight, 300, 373. 9 Ibid., 378. 10 Ibid., 573. 11 Ibid., 245. 12 Ibid., 248. 13 Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection, ( London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974) “Insight Revisited”, 268. 14Insight, 622. 15Insight, 624. [253] 16Insight, 636. 17Insight, 622. 18Insight, 637. 19Insight, 629. 20 For more detailed analysis of feelings in Insight see Mark Doorley, The Place of the Heart in Lonergan’s Ethics: The Role of Feelings in the Ethical Intentionality Analysis of Bernard Lonergan, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996).

Value Ethics 275

21 See Frederick E. Crowe, Lonergan, (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992) 71. 22 F. Crowe, "Lonergan's New Notion of Value", Lonergan Workshop III, Scholars Press. 23 Marquette University Press, 1996. 24 Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). 25 See Frings, Max Scheler, xiv. 26 Frings, Max Scheler, 80. 27 Ibid., 81. 28 Ibid., 30-3. 29 Ibid., 31. 30 Stephen Strasser, Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of the Heart, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1977), 48. 31 Frings, Max Scheler, 32. 32 Frings, Max Scheler, 41. 33 Ibid., 41. 34 Strasser, Phenomenology of Feeling, 46. 35 Max Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 221. 36 See Introduction by Harold Bershady in Max Scheler, On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing, where he paints a very unflattering picture of Scheler’s private life. 37 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Ethics, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1953). See also Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart: An Analysis of Human and Divine Affectivity, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977). 38 Von Hildebrand, Ethics, 197. 39 Method in Theology, 30. 40 Ibid., 30. 41 Ibid., 30. 42 Ibid., 31.


276

43 Ibid., 31.[254] 44 Ibid., 37. 45 Ibid., 38. 46 Ibid., 67. 47 Ibid., 245. 48Insight, 33. 49Insight, 180. 50 B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected Works Edition vol 17, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), "Horizons" 27. 51 Tyrell, Bernard J. "Feelings as Apprehensive-Intentional Responses to Values", Lonergan Workshop vol VII Ed F. Lawrence. 336. 52 Ibid., 336. 53 Ibid., 338. 54 See Bernard Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, 27-9, where the phrase ‘apprehension of values’ is used in the sense of ‘sensitivity to values’. 55 Method in Theology, 32. 56 Ibid., 115. 57 Ibid., 122. 58 Ibid., 64. 59 Ibid., 66. 60 Ibid., 32-3. 61 Louis Roy, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 136. John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983), 42-4.

6

Self-Appropriation of Feelings and Values

Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence.1

Questions for Deliberation

(1) Your counsellor asks you: How do you feel about that? It may be a career choice or marriage difficulty or financial proposition. What feelings do you refer to? (2) In looking for a job do you prioritize, job satisfaction, or salary, or career, or family? (3) Can you identify in yourself feelings, desires and aspirations that cannot be merely sensitive feelings? [256] (4) Is it always good to be: 1. sympathetic? 2. loving? 3. non-violent? (5) Is it always bad to be: 1. hateful? 2. angry? 3. revengeful? (6) List activities that give you satisfaction. Are there different kinds of satisfaction? (7) Try to imagine a human person totally void of any sense of moral obligation. Where does this moral 'ought' come from? Can we get rid of it? (8) What are your deepest and best inclinations and aspirations as a human person?

1 Introduction

In the previous chapter we elaborated on Lonergan's position regarding feeling

and values. We studied the texts carefully and found some invaluable contributions, as

well as certain ambiguities, gaps and further unanswered questions. From the phase of

indirect speech we move to direct speech: from what Lonergan said, we move to what

you and I say on the subject. We now take a stand for ourselves, acknowledging our debt


278

to Lonergan but appealing to the ultimate authority – the data of our own consciousness.

Can we present a systematic position on feelings and values that will build on

Lonergan's contributions, that will be coherent with the data of consciousness, and that

will make sense in our own experiences of moral concerns?

We are now looking at the second component that enters into the judgment of

value, namely, the affective component, the intentional response to value. We have to do

this in a way that it will unite with the deliberative insight, the cognitive component, in a

judgment of value. We are looking for an understanding of thinking and feeling that will

be complementary, rather than contradictory, inclusive rather than exclusive. As this is

crucial to our whole position on values, we do it slowly and carefully, step by step. Our

primary reference in this chapter will be to the data of your own experience rather than

to texts of Lonergan or anybody else. [257]

Perhaps, again, to put it in very down to earth terms, we have already identified

the cognitive element of the judgment of value as the deliberative insight. We have

identified the activities of exploring possibilities, knowing facts, assembling evidence,

weighing consequences and alternatives, linking the evidence to the conclusion, finally

uniting all in a deliberative insight and producing a judgment of value. But those are all

very cerebral activities; they rely entirely on the activities of the Mind. But will the most

intelligent person always make the best judgment of value? Is being a moral teacher,

leader and guide, simply a matter of superior intelligence? Surely, to trust a person’s

moral judgment, we must look for something more than speculative intelligence; we

look to Heart, to feeling orientation, to intentional response to value. Can we pin down

precisely what that means? Do feelings come into this business of moral evaluation at

all? And if we have many levels of feeling, to which feeling orientation do we refer?

How does the feeling orientation relate to the cognitive activities analyzed in

deliberative insight?

Value Ethics 279

Lonergan distinguishes between three kinds of feeling, (1) Non-intentional states

and trends, (2) Intentional responses to the agreeable and disagreeable, and (3)

intentional responses to values. Our procedure is to accept this as a working hypothesis:

this man is usually right, so let us understand the hypothesis and then assess the

evidence for or against. So we will identify and explore these three kinds of feelings

separately, one by one. The challenge of Lonergan's three-fold characterisation of

feelings is to be able to translate into more familiar terms, and relate them to our own

experience. In the adult person these three categories do not exist neatly, separate and

apart, but as interrelated and integrated in one single whole. My approach is to

differentiate these basic kinds of feeling and then to integrate them: the only alternative

is confusion. First, we will identify intentional and non-intentional. We will focus at

length on the intentional response to value with its basic characteristics (Section Three).

Then we will identify intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable in sensitive

animal consciousness and in human consciousness (Section Four). Having distinguished

clearly we will be in a position to see how they interact in many ways moving through

tension to a [258] kind of integration (Section Five). We will consider the possibility of

a hierarchy of feelings (Section Six) and finally show how the cognitive and affective

components unite in a judgment of value (Section Seven). We will briefly consider the

legitimacy of the question, How do you feel about that? (Section Eight). And conclude a

long chapter with a brief summary of principles (Section Nine). Please keep in mind the

questions for deliberation suggested above; that you are the subject of this text; that we

are working on the basis of self-appropriation.

2 Intentional and Non-Intentional

Let us try to be clear about the meaning of this term 'intentional'. Lonergan is

using it in the technical sense that it has in phenomenology especially in Husserl, where

intending, intentional, intentionality, refer to qualities of activities as directed towards,


280

as pointing to. Seeing intends colour and so is intentional. Hearing intends sound and so

is intentional. Knowing intends essence and so is intentional. Von Hildebrand uses the

term in the sense of any meaningful relationship between subject and object. Lonergan is

not using the term in the colloquial English sense of ‘deliberate’, as in 'he hit her

intentionally'.

Lonergan introduces the term of ‘intentional response to value’ after he has

explained the intentionality of questioning, the differentiation of levels of intentional

consciousness and the notion of intentionality analysis. So it is from that context that we

must get the precise meaning of 'intentional'.

They (operations) are transitive not merely in the grammatical sense that they are denoted by transitive verbs but also in the psychological sense that by the operation one becomes aware of the object. This psychological sense is what is meant by the verb, intend, the adjective, intentional, the noun, intentionality. To say that the operations intend objects is to refer to such facts as that by seeing there becomes present what is seen, by hearing there becomes present what is heard, by imagining there becomes present what is imagined, and so on, where in each case the presence in question is a psychological event.2 [259] By saying that operations intend objects, he is saying that operations make

objects present psychologically. If there are different modes of intentionality, then there

will be different levels of intentionality analysis and different intentional objects.

Cognitional activities are all intentional in the above sense. Empirical consciousness and

intentionality will be only a substratum for further intentional activities.

The novelty here is that Lonergan now uses the terminology of intentional and

non-intentional to refer to feelings and to distinguish three kinds of feeling: non-

intentional feelings, intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable, and intentional

response to value. This is the focus of our interest here. What does Lonergan mean by

these three kinds of feeling and in what way do they enter into judgments of value?

Non-intentional states and trends are relatively simple. They are feelings that do

not put us in a stance over against an object; they are not responses, they are not

Value Ethics 281

intentional, but they are usually called feelings. Hunger and thirst are simple examples.

Hunger has a cause and when the cause is removed the hunger disappears. Feelings in

this sense do not intend. These feelings do not enter into intentional consciousness and

there is not much more to be said about them. They may be part of the context of human

thinking, feeling, deliberating, judging and deciding but they do not enter into the

process itself. Not all feelings are intentional, not all feelings put us in a stance towards

objects, and not all feelings enter into the mass momentum drive of human evaluation,

decision and action.

Firstly, there are states such as fatigue, irritability, bad humour, anxiety, which

are feelings but are not intentional; they do not put us in a meaningful relation to objects;

they do not point to or intend, or make objects present psychologically. The feelings are

just there. These feelings have causes in over-work or chemical deficiency, or

unresolved conflict. The feelings are the effect of a cause. They are real and may provide

the context or circumstance in which we make moral judgments, but they do not enter

into the judgment itself. [260]

Secondly, there are trends or urges, such as hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort

which again are feelings but not intentional. The trends or urges have goals; hunger

urges to food and then disappears. These feelings do not presuppose or arise out of

perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or goal.3 They do not put us in an

evaluative stance towards objects.

Non-intentional feelings are not relevant to moral evaluations. They do not put us

in a stance towards objects, they do not help or hinder the process of evaluating; we

identify them in order to leave them behind, so that we can consider those feelings that

do enter in some way into making judgments of value.

3 Intentional Response to Value


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Now we focus on the human intentional response to value. It is 'intentional' in the

sense of meaningful pointing towards, intending, making present, recognizing. It is

‘response’ in the sense of appetite that is activated, potency that is actualized, a passivity

that becomes active. It is a ‘value’ in a sense to be defined. We will approach this by

way of explicating related notions that set the context for understanding, defining and

identifying the intentional response to value in our own consciousness.

Intentional responses, in simple language, might be called gut reactions, feeling

responses of approval or disapproval; they are spontaneous in the sense that we do not

will them or have total control over them. If you are watching the world news you will

be told about war in one country, a building collapsing in another place, a politician

rigging an election, an agreement between rebels and the government in another nation.

If you review your reactions, you will probably find that you have gone through a gamut

of emotional reactions to the persons you have seen and the events you have witnessed.

There may be anger that a despot has succeeded in rigging another election. There may

be joy, that peace has been restored to a suffering country. There may be horror at the

loss of innocent life in an earthquake. You might hate the very sight of some of the

persons presented, as you consider them to be total hypocrites, war-mongers, [261]

dictators, or plain thugs. Others you approve of for their genuineness, and you feel like

cheering when they are successful. Some events make you want to get up out of your

chair and go to join the rebels; in other cases you are moved to write a letter of protest to

your local member of parliament; in other cases you share the good news with a friend.

We are constantly reacting emotionally to persons, whether they are members of

our own family, students in class, fellow motorists, passengers in the bus, the shop

assistant or the counter clerk. Walking along the street, we might react with disgust to a

not so clean homeless person; we might react angrily to unruly children blocking our

Value Ethics 283

way; we might react with pleasure when somebody is polite and respectful; we might

feel attracted to a handsome well-dressed person of the opposite sex.

We have a wide repertoire of emotional reactions, but my particular reactions are

a product of my culture, education, parents, knowledge of the background of the news,

and previous value judgments. My emotional reactions have been formed and deformed

in many ways. The person sitting beside you may react in a different way, because of his

different understanding of the context, or because of his evaluation of the situation or

person. What particular person or cause moves you to anger is a function of your

development or decline, intellectually, morally, emotionally and religiously.

Is there any rhyme or reason to these reactions? Are they to be trusted? Can we

introduce some clarifications or principles to help us to discern these feeling reactions?

To do so we must return to the technical terminology introduced by Lonergan.

3.1 First Approximation: Pure Desire to Know

In our treatment of feelings in Insight, we have already seen the pivotal role

played by the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to know in the unfolding of cognitional

structure. We saw that it performs at least six functions in terms of being the source of

formulated questions, being the intentionality of each particular question, being the

dynamism of cognitional activities, motivating us, providing the con-[262] tent, and

being the criterion by which you judge whether you have reached the correct answer .

Lonergan did not refer to the desire to know as a feeling in Insight, as the term ‘feeling’

at that time had a very narrow, negative connotation. However, it is very clear that many

feeling elements were already identified as operating in the desire to know and that the

biases are largely distorted feelings interfering with the proper unfolding of the desire to

know.

In the perspective of Method and the expansion of three level cognitional

structure to four levels, Lonergan is clear that there is one desire to know which is now


284

extended to the desire to know value, the questioning of value, the grasping of value, the

affirmation of value, the deciding for value, and the implementation in action. "But as

the many elementary objects are constructed into larger wholes, as the many operations

are conjoined in a single compound knowing, so too the many levels of consciousness

are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the Eros of the human

spirit.”4 It is the same fundamental desire underlying the question of intelligence, the

question for reflection, the question for deliberation. The same fundamental desire is the

intentionality of the intelligible, the intentionality of the real and the intentionality of

value. It is the same dynamism operating in the activities of knowing the intelligible, the

activities of knowing the real, and the activities of knowing value. It is the same desire

which in the specific question sets the criteria by which we know whether or not we

have reached the correct answer.

I contend that in the context of Method in Theology the desire to know must be

named a feeling. In order to assign the desire to know its proper function in the activity

of knowing truth and value, we must recognize it as the affective element that unites

with the cognitive to form a judgment of value: we have to name it as a feeling, or else it

will fall into a black hole of anonymity. Is it surprising that the desire to know has an

important function to perform in the stream of activities leading to knowledge? It is not

'merely' a feeling or 'only' a feeling but it is a deep positive feeling orientation towards

the value of knowing. In the positive, deep, broad appreciation of the human Heart

evident in Method, we have to affirm that the desire to know is a feeling. If the Eros of

the human spirit is not a feeling, what is it? If a [263] desire is not a feeling what is it? In

the tripartite division of feelings, (1) non-intentional states and trends, (2) intentional

response to agreeable or disagreeable and (3) intentional response to value, the desire to

know must be placed in the class of intentional response to value. It is hard to think of

the desire to know as not being a vital part of "the mass, momentum, drive, power"5 of

Value Ethics 285

feeling. This is not difficult to understand or appreciate in the context of the broader

appreciation of the feeling life of the human person that I have outlined at the end of the

last chapter. Lonergan moved in the direction of appreciating the richness, importance

and basically positive orientation of our deep feeling life; we have to do the same.

This is our first approximation in our attempt to pin down the meaning of

intentional response to value. Few have difficulty identifying the desire to know in their

own experience and in others; what could be simpler or more obvious? I am suggesting

that the intentional response to value is a nuance on this desire; that it is a specification

of the unfolding of this desire at the fourth level of consciousness; that the intentional

response to value is an aspect of what can be referred to as the desire to know.

We identified six functions of intentionality in the unfolding of the activities of

knowing truth and value. In the earlier context of Insight these functions are performed

by the pure, detached, unrestricted desire to know. The same functions are also fulfilled

in the operations of knowing value: the questions of value are formulated expressions in

particular instances where value is being sought; it is the intention directing towards

value above and beyond that of truth; it is the dynamic moving towards the judgment; it

is the pure motivation of love of value; it intends the content specific to the question;

and it is the criterion by which we recognize the truth of a judgment of value. The

dynamic operating in activities of knowing value are analogous to the dynamic operating

in knowing truth. It is a single desire; it is always pure, detached, unrestricted; it always

performs the same six functions. The obstacles to its proper unfolding continue to be the

biases, the distortions of feeling towards the egoist, towards the self-interest of the in-

group, towards the practicality of general bias. [264]

3.2 Second Approximation: Transcendental Notion of Value

In Insight Lonergan defines value as "the good as the proper object of rational

choice".6 Also he states, values "are true in so far as the possible choice is rational, but


286

false in so far as the possibility of the choice results from a flight from self-

consciousness, or from rationalization, or from moral renunciation."7 The problem with

this formulation is the meaning of 'rational choice'; it seems to by-pass the judgment of

value altogether. Rational is a term he has used proper to activities at the level of

judgment of truth, the question for reflection and reflective insight. Choice is an activity

of the will, it is a form of decision; it is not a knowing but presupposes a knowing. But

no amount of reasoning about truth can get you logically to a knowledge of value. There

is no logical transition from third level operations to fourth level operations, from

knowledge of truth to knowledge of the good. Reasoning to the good from the truth

would involve the naturalist fallacy. In this G.E Moore was correct: you cannot reason

logically from a knowledge of what is true to a knowledge of what is good.

Lonergan gradually began to realize that his treatment of value in Insight was

inadequate. Knowing the intelligible presupposes a notion of the intelligible. Knowing

the truth presupposes a notion of the truth. Now Lonergan begins to realize that there

must also be a notion of value and this calls for an elaboration of a fourth level of

intentional consciousness where this notion is operative. In “Insight Revisited” he

describes this important shift in perspective in his own words:

In Insight the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In Method the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience.8 Lonergan elaborates on this notion of the good for the first time in “The

Subject”.9 [265]

Just as we can in the end only define truth as that which is intended in questions

for reflection, what is grasped in reflective understanding and expressed in a judgment

of truth, so we can only know about what is good, as that which is intended in questions

of value, what is grasped in deliberative insights and what is expressed in judgments of

Value Ethics 287

value. He extends his technical meaning of the notion of being to the notion of the good.

This seems to me a recognition that the only way to know the good is by appropriating

the experience of aspiring to know value and implementing value in decisions and

actions. Thus, it is futile to try to derive the good from speculative intelligence. Thus, the

good is a distinct notion to be known only by way of intentionality analysis. It cannot be

derived or deduced from any other notion and cannot be reduced to any other notion. We

can only know about ethical activities, judgments of value and decision and action from

how human persons in fact perform these activities – however well or badly they

perform them. Hence Lonergan began to express himself in terms of transcendental

method, transcendental notions and transcendental precepts. This is the terminology of

Method in Theology, even though some of the ideas expressed are already there in

Insight.

Crucial to this new terminology is the distinction between transcendental and

categorial. "Categories are determinations. They have a limited denotation. They vary

with cultural variations."10 Categorial is specific, can be pointed to; it has content. The

beliefs of a specific culture can be listed, written down, learned off by heart, they are

expressed in a language, at a particular time in a specific place. These specifics are

categorical.

"In contrast, the transcendentals are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted

in denotation, invariant over cultural change."11 Every culture asks questions and intends

to seek the truth. Every normal person asks about what is worthwhile, deliberates about

alternatives and affirms what is of value for him/her. The transcendentals are common to

all human beings of whatever time and culture. In appropriating the activities of

cognitional structure, we became familiar with three intentions characterizing the three

levels, the intention of the sensible, of the intelligible and of the real. [266] They are

what is intended in questions for intelligence and reflection. Now we add the notion of


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value. Value is a transcendental notion that is intended in questions for deliberation,

grasped in deliberative insight, affirmed in a judgment of value, decided for in a good

decision and implemented in appropriate action. This is transcendental in that it applies

to all cultures, of all times, to all human persons, of all ages and stages.

It is important to be clear on the distinction between concept and notion. A

concept is a formulated definition of something, a concept of a circle, a concept of time,

a concept of development. It is specific, expressed in a language, usually clear and

distinct, always limited. But where do concepts come from? Prior to concepts are the,

"the prior transcendental notions that constitute the vary dynamism of our conscious

intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere

understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action."12

The transcendental notions, “constitute the very dynamism of our conscious

intending, promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere

understanding towards truth and reality, from factual knowledge to responsible action."13

The notions are named as intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. These notions

are a priori. They are unrestricted and they are comprehensive.

So we see that the language of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know

from Insight is transposed into the transcendental notions of Method in Theology. The

transcendental notion of value gives rise to specific questions of value but precedes such

formulations. The transcendental notion of value is the dynamism moving the activities

of deliberation forward towards a judgment of value. The transcendental notion of value

intends value, gives the searching direction, points to, is sensitive to the good and value.

Finally, the transcendental notion of value recognizes value when it is found; it is the

criterion that the question has been answered and that the good has been found. [267]

It is in the context of this kind of terminology that Lonergan introduces the

intentional response to value. I would hold that the intentional response to value is again

Value Ethics 289

a nuance on the transcendental notion of value. We can recognize the transcendental

notion of truth operating in our questioning, our understanding and reflecting, our

judgments and the criteria by which we know the judgments are true. We can recognize

the transcendental notion of value operating in our questions for deliberation, our

deliberative insights and our judgments of value. Similarly, we recognize the intentional

response to value operating in this context.

3.3 Third Approximation: Transcendental Precepts

Lonergan always insisted that the proper unfolding of the activities of knowing

should be according to norms that are immanent and operative in the knowing. There is

a proper way to know and the rules do not originate from logic, or methodology, but

from the very activities themselves. The normativity is in the activities; it is not

extrinsic, but intrinsic, to the activities. This earlier reference to the normativity in

Insight is expressed more explicitly in the terminology of transcendental precepts in

Method. Here the normativity is differentiated into the five levels of intentional

consciousness: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, be in love.

They are called imperatives or precepts; they express an obligation, a command, an

ought, a conscious feeling of being bound to do the right thing.

These precepts are not pulled by magic out of the sky – despite the term

transcendental. They are in fact empirically based. Why are there five and only five?

Why are they expressed in these terms? These five precepts express in a masterly

synthesis the actual deep feelings of obligation that operate in our human living. They

are closely bound up with the activities of integral cognitional structure but also underlie

our deciding and doing and being and becoming. Beneath particular rules, or cultural

norms, or moral laws, or categorical imperatives, there are these feeling orientations

operating, deeply, permanently, consciously. [268]


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'Be attentive' is the imperative operating under the influence of the pure desire

directed to the level of experience. We are all familiar with the feeling of being drowsy,

distracted, day-dreaming, in a fantasy world, quite relaxed and at ease with the world. If

we were permanently in this state not much would ever be done. But there is a contrary

feeling of being alert, being attentive, being awake, conscious of our surroundings and

ready to move and react. The first condition of learning is to pay attention; how often

does a teacher remind her pupils, “pay attention, please”. We will not achieve much in

the library unless we concentrate, direct our attention, and control our wayward

fantasies.

If we want to understand what is happening to the ozone layer, better look at

what is happening, attend to all the scientific data, go back as far as you can, collect as

much data as is needed, do not ignore any of the data even if it does not seem to help

your hypothesis. Do not neglect data even if it is not what you expected. So not screen

data by already anticipated conclusions. Do not deny data that is staring you in the face.

Be totally open to reality and willing to accept the truth. To be attentive is a basic

postulate of scientific method; it is a basic postulate of all empirical methods; it is a

basic postulate of our own transcendental method where empirical method is applied

both to the data of sense and to the data of consciousness. It is so basic that it would be

inconceivable to espouse the opposite, to be inattentive, as a motto of procedure.

'Be intelligent' expresses the normativity of questions for intelligence spilling

over one another in the search for correct answers. At a first moment, our curiosity is

aroused, we are puzzled, something does not make sense, we wonder, we start looking

for a solution. We ask, Why? where? how? how often? what rate? when? what? All

express questions seeking further understanding. At a second moment there is a struggle

to understand, research has to be carried out, we need more information, we must

conduct controlled experiments. At this stage the tension of inquiry builds; we can feel

Value Ethics 291

frustrated that we are not getting results; we feel depressed when our hypothesis is

disproved and we have to start again; but we continue to be determined, committed,

resolved not to give up. There is a third moment when [269] we feel the joy of insight,

the release of tension, the satisfaction of understanding, the puzzle is solved, the solution

has been found.

It is not hard to see that if you want correct answers you need to understand your

hypothesis, your explanation, your theory. That you need to express your hypothesis in a

coherent, consistent, differentiated fashion. To be intelligent is to concentrate on the

important, the significant, the essential, the relevant and to abstract from the

unimportant, the insignificant, the unessential and the irrelevant. Again there are few

successful scientists who espouse stupidity in their method or procedure. To be

intelligent is, to ask questions, to assemble images, information, ideas, definitions,

examples in an effort to understand.

‘Be reasonable’ is to realize that there is a further normativity emerging in the

question, Is it true? Is it correct? Is the solution the right one? This is the critical

question. We feel differently when we face this question. We move from the mode of

brainstorming, to taking a stand on personal beliefs and truth. It is a serious business.

We assemble information, examples, definitions, explanations, evidence, arguments, in

such a way as to show that there is sufficient evidence for the truth of the conclusion. If

there is anything we assert to be true, we should be able to show the force and relevance

of the evidence that shows it to be true. We should be able to give a reasonable account

of what we hold to be true. That is to be reasonable, the opposite is to be unreasonable.

To be reasonable is to ask the critical question, to assemble the evidence and the

arguments in the right way and to show that the conclusion follows from the evidence.

Juries are asked to pass judgment ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. It is presumed that

everybody understands what a reasonable doubt is.


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Finally, 'be responsible' is to spontaneously move to the question of evaluation,

to realize that values are at stake. We feel obliged, we feel responsible, we realize that

there is a right way to act and a wrong way, that much hangs on the decision and

evaluation. It is a higher level of consciousness; there is more at stake. The issue is what

kind of person we are and what are we to make of ourselves by out evaluations,

decisions and actions; what do we stand for as free and respon-[270]sible persons. We

struggle to think clearly and to feel authentically. Our moral conscience is now

operating. It has a thinking component but also a feeling component. We feel guilty,

remorseful, shameful, depressed, discouraged my our moral failures. We feel happy, at

ease, satisfied, at peace when we rise to our moral obligations. Or we may be some

where in between these clear cut alternatives; we may feel perplexed, confused,

doubtful, unsure, anxious, or indecisive. These feelings propel the activities of asking

questions, deliberating, reaching a judgment of value, deciding and acting. We feel

differently when questions of value arise above and beyond questions of truth. We

recognize also the feeling of irresponsibility but few would espouse that as a principle of

action.

Note the difference between Lonergan's position in Insight and in Method here.

In Insight the meaning of moral obligation is derived from speculative intelligence and

reason. "Is there a meaning to the word 'ought'? Our answer differs from the Kantian

answer, for if we agree in affirming a categorical imperative, we disagree inasmuch as

we derive it wholly from speculative intelligence and reason."14 But in Method moral

obligation is a transcendental precept. It is a fact that human beings act in this way. It is

a given that humans are morally obliged. Whether they become moral or immoral adults

depends of many factors, but if you have a normal human person you have one who is

responsible in the sense of the transcendental precept.

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'To be in love' can be added as the transcendental imperative characteristic of a

religious experience at the fifth level of intentional consciousness. It is to be in love in

an unconditional manner; it is a religious conversion expressed in Christian terms, even

though it is intended as transcultural, referring to all experiences of religious conversion

wherever or whenever they occur.

Perhaps, all the precepts could be summed up in the simple precept, 'to be

authentic'. The dynamism unfolding in the various levels of consciousness is the one

Eros of the human spirit; it is not only cognitional but also affective. It is not only

knowing value but spills over into decisions, actions, becoming and being. This precept

is not something added on to a human person from the outside but is the [271]

normativity of what it is to be a human person. We are pointed in a certain direction by

these precepts to the intelligible, the real, the good, and ultimately the unrestricted

goodness of God.

3.4 Intentional Response to Value

I have gone into this background, because it is the context in which Lonergan is

working, when he introduces the terminology of intentional response to value. He is

referring to something in the area of the pure desire to know, the notion of value and the

transcendental precept to be responsible. It is the latter which seems to be closest to the

meaning of the intentional response to value

In using the term ‘value’ here, he is referring to the transcendental notion of

value underlying all questions, deliberations and knowledge of specific values. It is

value as known through our own experience of seeking for and implementing value. It is

recognizing value as a notion distinct from the notion of the intelligible or the true. It is a

notion that is not reducible to pleasure, to truth, to utility, to power, to anything else.

In using the term 'intentional', he is referring to the intentionality of the

transcendental notions. The question for intelligence intends the intelligible, the question


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for reflection intends the real and the question for deliberation intends the good and

value. Intentionality guides the subject, through the questions and the deliberation, to the

judgment. It sets up the heuristic structure combining knows and unknowns by which it

is to be found. Intentionality recognizes the answer when it is found.

The term 'response' suggests an appetite that is activated, a desire responding to

its proper object, a potentiality that is activated. A response seems to presuppose a

reaction to some stimulus. It is the first step in moving us to ask the question of value,

evaluate and judge. Desire lies dormant until it is awakened as a response to a situation,

a person or an incident.

I am suggesting that this ‘intentional response to value’ is conscious. If it is

conscious it can be adverted to, named, identified and defined. It is not in itself an

activity but the dynamism, the motiva-[272]tion, the intention, the mass momentum

drive power of an activity. It seems to be the normativity immanent and operative in the

activities of knowing value. It is a feeling.

If the intentional response to value is conscious, then, it must be present in the

data of consciousness and hence empirically verifiable in the sense of generalized

empirical method. Hence we have an empirically verifiable notion of human being that

is normatively bound. It is simply a fact that to be a human person is to be obliged as

intelligent, reasonable and responsible. Not only can we recognize the activities proper

to moral deliberation and knowledge but we recognize the dynamism, intentionality,

criterion and content operating in and through the conscious activities.

3.5 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Value

Let us identify some characteristics of this intentional response to value.

The intentional response to value is a priori.15 It is innate in the sense that it a

possible response, not a specific content; it is the pure question that precedes any

particular formulation of a question. It is a spontaneous capacity to respond in a certain

Value Ethics 295

way. Teachers can teach the categorial content of a moral code, but cannot impart the

transcendental notion of value. If the response is not there, no amount of teaching will

put it there. Teaching can help the emergence, give body, encouragement, expression to

the response, but if the intentional response is not there, you can do nothing. The

response is not learned from experience, it is not a posteriori.

The intention of value is unrestricted. It is not restricted to any particular value

or values but is open to value in general, to all values without limit or restriction; it

aspires to the infinite good. Just as the desire to know is unrestricted, so the desire to

know value is unrestricted. It would be a contradiction to say that there are some aspects

of value that, in principle, we do not want to know about.

It is universal in the sense that any human person as a human person has an

intentional response to value. We traditionally define a human person as a rational

animal. More correctly the person should be [273] called sensible, intelligent,

reasonable, responsible and open to the ultimate. We are born with a potential to be

actualized, a feeling to be stirred, a desire to be activated. This is not limited to one

culture, or one time or one place but applies to all persons of all times and cultures.

Hence it is universal and transcultural.

It is permanent. This desire cannot be totally extinguished from the heart of

persons. No amount of evil deeds, habits or feelings can totally extinguish a person's

conscience. No matter how habitual a life of thievery or corruption becomes there is

always deep down an uneasy conscience, a sense of guilt, a recognition of moral failure;

and that also constitutes the possibility of conversion. Conscience can be corrupted by

misguided teaching, by a decadent culture, a deviant social order, a dysfunctional family

background, etc. But the potential remains there for moral self-transcendence.

Response to this desire leads to self-transcendence.16 Hence, we recognize the

importance of identifying, naming, objectifying, articulating this response to value. This


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response is the beginning of moral behaviour, the foundation on which all behaviour and

all moral philosophy must be based. The more we are aware of this desire the easier it is

to live by it. The more we can discriminate between this desire and the multiplicity of

conflicting desires, the better we can discern the right thing to do in particular situations.

If it always leads to self-transcendence the intentional response to value is

fundamentally good. Whatever obstacles might prevent the actualizing of this goodness,

at the core of the human person is this thrust towards moral goodness. We are not born

actually good or bad, but we are endowed with an intentional response to goodness.

Emergence, development and actualization of the intention of value is not

automatic; it requires teaching, socialization, inculturation, maturation. We remain

always free and responsible. Just as intelligence and reason need a context of

stimulation, response, encouragement, and teaching, to emerge and operate, so the moral

sense, the sense of value needs the help of others to emerge and flourish. [274]

In what sense can this intentional response to value be classified as a feeling?

First, let us affirm that this intentional response to value is immanent and

operative wherever you have human beings operating. It is very often operating in an

undifferentiated manner, confused with many other desires. It can become very obvious

and powerful a force in the person who responds to it. It can wither and retire into the

background in those who have not responded to it.

Second, the desire operates on the conscious level and not on the unconscious.

For most people it is a principle of moral behaviour, it is a motive of action; it can be

implicit or explicit. It is conscious in the same way that the desire to know, or the

obligation to be reasonable, or even grace is conscious. It is first experienced but may

not be thematized. It is a significant aspect of the mass, momentum, power, drive of

human feeling. Hence it can be called a feeling: a felt awareness of a desire for the good.

It is not a feeling in the sense of transient, superficial, sensitive appetites. It is a feeling

Value Ethics 297

in the sense defined above, as deep, permanent, strong, pervading, feeling orientation in

life.

Third, it can be thematized, named, explained, distinguished from all other

desires. This is the foundation of ethics, the source of value, the beginning of the

normativity proper to the person as free and responsible. It is not the work of ethics to

prove moral obligation by a deductive syllogism, but to identify it in its operations, to

distinguish it from other impulses and obligations, to thematize and objectify this feeling

in all its implications. Just as the logician cannot prove the principle of contradiction,

because in doing so he has to presume that it is operating; so the moral philosopher

cannot prove moral obligation, because in doing so he must presume that it already

exists.

Fourth, it is a different category of feeling than intentional response to the

agreeable or disagreeable. It cannot be a sensitive feeling; it does not belong to the world

of sense. Animals do not operate according to the precepts of be attentive, intelligent,

reasonable and responsible. Lonergan talks of two categories of feelings. Intentional

response to value is special and unique because of what we have said [275] above. It is

not on the same level as sensitive feelings of anger, sensitive feelings of guilt, sensitive

feelings of joy. But it has to be classified as a feeling, because it is such an important

aspect of the mass, momentum, drive of human consciousness. If it is not a sensitive

feeling what kind of a feeling is it? I think we are obliged to use the term spiritual

feeling. We are obliged to grasp the nettle, to call a spade a spade. Let us be very clear

on the meaning of this term spiritual feeling.

Lonergan has clearly defined what he means by spiritual and material and his

analysis would seem to be correct.17 The spiritual is what is intelligent and intelligible;

the material is intelligible but not intelligent. Further, the spiritual is neither constituted

nor intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue, even though it may happen to be


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extrinsically so conditioned. The material is intrinsically constituted or conditioned by

space and time.

The activities of asking questions, understanding, formulating definition, asking

further question, reflective understanding and knowing the truth are spiritual activities,

in the sense defined explanatorily in Insight. Even though they are spiritual, they are

conscious, we can describe them, define them, relate them to one another in an

explanatory system. The intentionality, the norms, the transcendental precepts are

immanent and operative in the unfolding of these activities. We seem to be obliged to

refer to these desires as spiritual appetite. They must be spiritual also in the strict sense.

The intentional response to value is spiritual in the strict technical sense of the word. It is

not intrinsically conditioned by space and time; it is the dynamism of intelligence and

not merely intelligible.

But just as we can be aware of spiritual activities of understanding and knowing,

so we can be aware of the dynamism operating within the structure. We feel moral

obligation as the underlying dynamism of fourth level activities. We feel in the sense of

being aware, of experiencing. For most people it is operative but not identified, isolated,

named and defined. That is what we are trying to do in this text. The intentional

response to value is an experienced obligation to seek, to know and to do the right thing.

It is one of the deepest and [276] best of the inclinations of the human heart. Without

that intentionality we cannot reach a correct judgment of value.

But because we are human, our awareness of spiritual activities or norms is

extrinsically dependent on proper functioning of the brain, the nerves, the senses, the

psyche, the bloodstream and all the components of the biological pattern of experience.

There will be physical, chemical, neurological, organic and psychic concomitants to the

experience of spiritual activities or norms. We understand as human beings painfully

questioning, imagining, understanding and conceiving in a discursive process with many

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twists and turns. We do not understand as pure spiritual beings who, apparently,

understand universals directly and immediately, with no time or effort being expended.

The expression ‘spiritual feeling’ is open to many misinterpretations. I use it

reluctantly but do not see any suitable alternative. I do not intend any kind of religious

association here; we are not entering the field of prayer, spirituality, mysticism, or

religious feelings. Spiritual is simply opposed to material, just as intellectual is opposed

to sensitive. Just as we can assert that the activities of understanding and judging are

essentially spiritual activities, so we can assert that the dynamism operating through the

levels of consciousness is spiritual feeling. Just as we can identify, name, and interrelate

the activities, so we can identify name and interrelate the normativity inherent in the

activities. The challenge is to extend our connotation of the word feeling, just as

Lonergan has done, and to recognize these two distinct categories of feelings operating

in us.

We will return to this topic of intentional response to value later when we are in

a position to see how it relates to the intentional response to the agreeable and

disagreeable. We will then be more concrete and consider examples from concrete

experience to clarify this distinction. [277]

4 Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable

Let us now consider the other side of the coin – feelings that are intentional

responses to agreeable or disagreeable. Let us just remember that the human person is a

unity integrating many levels of operations, feelings, and conjugates. We can specify the

levels as physical, chemical, biological, neurological, psychological, intellectual and

volitional. We have considered some of the higher conjugate forms of human

functioning, questioning, understanding, knowing, knowing values, deciding and acting

and the dynamism operating in this structure. I am interpreting intentional response to

the agreeable and disagreeable as fundamentally sensitive feelings, sensitive appetites,


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likes and dislikes, which have a purely sensitive foundation. I am identifying it with the

pleasure/pain principle but recognize that this can be transformed in the service of

human flourishing. So our first task is to identify sensitive appetite, feelings that are

intentional but purely sensitive. Afterwards we can consider how they develop or decline

in the total human context and can contrast them more effectively with the intentional

response to value.

4.1 Introduction: Unity of Human Person

Again we are remembering our basic understanding of the human person as one

integrated whole, operating on many levels but all these levels are integrated according

to principles of sublation and dependence. There may be some who have a mind/body

problem. If you imagine the body as material, and the mind as spiritual, you create for

yourself an imaginary problem of how one influences the other. We are working in the

context of explanation; the unity of the human person is evident from experience; the

levels are evident from the various activities and characteristics; the interrelationship of

the levels is verified in everyday experiences of thinking and doing. The human person

has physical, chemical, organic, neural, psychic, intellectual and volitional attributes.18

The intellectual component can be subdivided into levels of consciousness, the

experiential, intellectual, rational, personal and reli-[278]gious. These components

interrelate in terms of higher integrations of lower manifolds, in one integrated human

person.

This is just to show that when we speak of levels of consciousness, we do not

think in terms of one layer piled on top of another extrinsically added from the outside.

There are a multitude of complex interrelations between the levels of activities and

feeling and valuing. The activities of knowing truth and value are not just added on to

sensibility from the outside, extrinsically, but knowing always continuously depends on

sensing, imagining, remembering, feeling.

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4.2 Animal Sensitivity

(1) Some feelings are non-intentional states and trends; they are not intentional,

do not make objects present, do not put us in a stance over against some object. But

sensitive feelings can also be intentional. Activities of memory and imagination, seeing

and hearing are intentional; so also anger, sensitive desire, fear, put animals in a stance

towards objects either by way of attraction or repulsion. So it is these sensitive

intentional responses that we need to identify.

(2) Animals operate according to basic instincts, drives, reflexes and appetites.

To explain why a weaver bird builds a nest in a particular way, you do not appeal to

decision or to understanding but to instinct. The bird is operating in the biological

pattern of experience. Its behaviour is not as fixed as that of a stone; it has a wider

flexibility; but that wider flexibility can be fully explained in terms of physics,

chemistry, biology and sensitive psychology of instincts, appetites, reflexes and drives.

It is the task of scientists in these disciplines to explain the origin, the function, the

development of these aspects of animal behaviour.

(3) Animals operate in terms of sensation. The higher animals have three internal

senses, instinct, memory and imagination; as well as five external senses, seeing,

hearing, tasting, touching and smelling. They often far excel human beings in the

sensitivity of their senses; it is said that the ability of a dog to smell is a hundred

thousand times as acute as that of a human being. The term ‘feeling’ can be used in the

sense of touching, or seeing, as a simple sensation. Animals also have [279] the internal

senses of imagination and memory and some kind of co-ordination of input and output.

These acts of sensation are intentional. Imagining intends images, seeing intends the

seen, hearing intends sound, etc. There is a structure of sensitive cognition operating;

animals know particular, sensible objects.


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Higher animals also have learning and development in terms of association,

imitation, pleasure and pain, reward and punishment. The sense faculties of memory and

imagination combined with external senses enable a dog to associate a behaviour with a

reward and to repeat it when given a certain sign.

(4) Animals can feel basic emotions like aggression, anxiety, affiliation. They

can feel happy, excited, depressed, tired, angry, even guilty. The limbic brain is

associated with these kinds of feelings. Mammals made a jump forward in the

development of feelings because of the need for the parents to take care of the young. It

is not hard to look at the behaviour of a dog and know whether it is friendly or

aggressive, timid or wild. Evolutionary biologists can help us to understand the function

of such responses in the evolution of the higher animals. These emotions are also

intentional; anger puts a dog in a specific stance towards an enemy. The word emotion is

said to derive from the Latin ‘movere’, meaning ‘to move’; emotions function as a spur

to response, to action, to self-preservation and survival of animal species.

(5) The higher animals, especially the mammals, experience sociality, feelings of

pleasure in being together, co-operative instincts, working together, recognition of

position within a group - you can have a pecking order among hens. There can be a

certain social order: mothers caring for their young, males seeking females, drones given

specific tasks in the whole hive, etc. Animals seem to enjoy playing, they groom one

another, they recognize a hierarchy, they can work as a group in hunting or feeding.

Animals experience sociability or spontaneous intersubjectivity; they hunt cooperatively,

care for their young, share food and show some form of reciprocity. A BBC program

showing monkeys grooming one another in some kind of a tit for tat system remarks

profoundly, 'this is the foundation [280] of human morality'. Perhaps the opposite is

more accurate, namely, if monkeys do it, is not human morality. It may indeed be the

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beginning in the sense of the biological infrastructure from which human morality

emerges; but it is hardly the foundation of human morality.

(6) Finally, animals are empirically conscious: have some sense of identity, some

sense of awareness of belonging to a particular species, some primitive sense of being a

subject. After all, there is a difference between a dog that is awake and a dog that is

asleep. There is a co-ordination in the dog that is awake by which incoming sense

information is processed and the appropriate response follows. A lion caused a sensation

in the Nairobi National park when it adopted and suckled a series of baby oryxes. Why

was this a cause for such excitement? Because it is more normal for a lion to make a

breakfast out of a baby oryx. This lion seems to have been disoriented by the loss of its

own cub and sought a substitute in an unexpected place. Lions usually recognize their

own kind; they usually recognize breakfast when they see it; there are established

interrelations between species that are usually respected. We notice when animals give

inappropriate responses.

Animals operate in the biological pattern of experience. They feel in many

different ways as we have described above. The physical, chemical, organic,

neurological, substratum is there to support the sensitive psychology of the animal. The

animal does have a sensitive psyche, a psychology, a pattern of behaviour, an affective

dimension that conditions its behaviour. Such feeling abilities have evolved over time

and are partly the reason for the survival of one species relative to another.

(7) The criterion of pleasure and pain, preferences based on satisfying appetites,

likes and dislikes, etc. are already operative in the biological pattern of experience.

Animals can experience intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable, to pleasure

and pain. They operate in terms of instincts and drives, appetites and desires. If they

have survived as a species it means that they have been successful in adapting to their


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niche in the environment and to changes and chal-[281]lenges from other species. They

operate in terms of survival, self-preservation, satisfaction of needs and desires.

(8) Do animals think, reflect, deliberate, evaluate, decide and act? We tend to

project our own thought process into animals. When we see them choosing what food to

eat, we tend to assume that they are choosing in the same way that we are choosing. But

we must bring in Occam's razor here or the Canon of Parsimony: realities are not to be

multiplied without necessity. All animal behaviour can be fully explained in terms of

reflexes, instincts, desires, and intentional responses to pleasure and pain. There is no

need to appeal to activities of understanding, judging and deliberating in the proper and

full sense of those terms. There is no evidence whatsoever that higher animals - except

humans – perform such activities. At most we can say that in a loose analogous sense

that animals evaluate and choose. Animals operate in terms of sensitive operations of

seeing, hearing, smelling, remembering, and imagining and the sensitive appetites

associated with these in terms of likes and dislikes, sense preferences, reflexes, sense

responses, needs and satisfaction of needs, pleasure and pain, survival.

Conclusion. (1) Animals experience non-intentional states and trends, e.g.

hunger and thirst, sexual tendencies, tiredness, etc. (2) Animals experience intentional

responses to the agreeable and the disagreeable. The activities of sense faculties, seeing,

imagining etc. are intentional; the experience of desiring, appetite, anger, etc. are

intentional feelings. These are intentional in the sense of putting them in a stance

towards; response in the sense of sense appetites, desires activated by stimuli. But this is

intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable, in other words, the criteria of

pleasure and pain operating. (3) Animals do not have intentional response to value, do

not intend value, do not know value. They operate in terms of preferences based on the

criterion of pleasure and pain, survival of the fittest, likes and dislikes, self-preservation,

etc.

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The intentional response to agreeable or disagreeable can be identified with the

affective sensitivity of the higher animals. It is roughly equivalent to the criterion of

pleasure and pain. It is organic, biologi-[282]cal, animal, sensitivity. The 'decisions', and

actions of animals can be explained totally in terms of sensitivity, appetites, feelings,

desires, responses. Moral categories do not apply to animals. They sense, but do not

think; they have likes and dislikes, but do not deliberate on which is of more value; they

choose in terms of pleasure and pain, but not as free and responsible. They act out of

desires but not as a response to value. These feelings can be said to be self-regarding in

that there is no element of self-transcendence in the animal beyond the sensation

intending the sensitive. All these appetites, desires reactions and actions are amoral; the

category of moral simply does not apply.

4.3 Human Sensitivity

Traditionally, the human person has been defined as a ‘rational animal’. We

prefer a more differentiated identification of the physical, chemical, organic,

neurological, psychological, intellectual, rational, responsible, religious components

integrated in the unity of one human person. Sensitive appetites, intentional responses to

the agreeable or disagreeable, can now be seen as belonging to the lower components

integrated into the unity of a higher form. In themselves these sensitive intentional

responses are amoral, ambiguous, neutral, just an aspect of what it is to be a human

person. Some, like perhaps Plato, have despised our sensitive nature as something to be

escaped from, to be suppressed, or eliminated if possible; more extreme forms have

regarded sensitive appetites as evil in themselves. Materialists and hedonists have

glorified our sensitive nature, as if it were the essence of the human and as if sensible

pleasure was the only pursuit worthy of a human person. We see our sensitive desires as

a real part of our human nature but in itself indifferently disposed either to moral

development or moral decline. Sensitive desires are amoral rather than immoral.


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We are entitled to say that the intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable

is lower than the intentional response to truth and value. In our view of the levels of

consciousness and the hierarchy of values, the intentional response to agreeable belongs

properly in the context of the physical, chemical, organic, neurological, psycho-

[283]logical in the list above. The intentional response to truth and value belongs

properly to understanding, knowing, valuing and deciding. So just as understanding

sublates experience, knowing sublates understanding, valuing sublates knowing,

deciding goes beyond all other activities to issue in free and responsible human action;

so sensible desire are analogously sublated by the intentional response to value. The

hierarchy of values is also to some extent a hierarchy of feeling responses. This we will

explore later.

Now the human person is a unity of levels, activities, conjugates, feelings,

purposes, finalities; all of these factors interact with one another in very complex ways.

In the concrete they are intertwined, inseparable, intermingled and influenced in many

ways by other factors. Further, the person is developing or declining and so over time

the pattern of interactions and causation may change. Above we have tried to identify

clearly the intentional response to value and later the intentional response to the

agreeable and disagreeable. As well as being influenced by many other factors, these

surely will influence one another so that our affectivity is some kind of harmony some

kind of unity. We will try to identify certain principles and threads of causation within

the field of feeling, recognizing that in the concrete many other factors come into play.

Sensitivity reaches its full potential not in the animal but in the human: "Thus

organic differentiation reaches its maximum in animals, and psychic differentiation

reaches its maximum in man."19 Human sensitivity is perhaps structurally similar to that

of animals, but sensitive feelings are open to enormous differentiation, specialization,

Value Ethics 307

redirection, sublation, sublimation, transformation in the context of a full human

functioning.

In the context of moral development, sensitivity becomes more differentiated and

refined. Books on animal feelings classify about six basic feelings: joy, distress, anger,

fear, surprise, disgust. These are described as innate and universal.20 However, it is

accepted that these can be divided and subdivided into subtler and more nuanced

feelings almost ad infinitum. Language, literature, poetry, art, tragedy, education, all

play a part in the continued development and different-[284]tiation of feelings. We are

making our own contribution to this development by our identification of a basic

distinction between intentional response to value and the intentional response to

agreeable and disagreeable.

Feelings can become more integrated into the intellectual moral and religious

development of the person. There should be a harmony between our convictions and our

feelings. It makes it much easier to do your work if you are happy in your job. A job that

you dislike intensely will probably require great effort of will and will probably not be

done well. It may take a lifetime to educate your feelings by redirection, reinforcement,

practice, discipline, encouragement, etc.

Feelings can be a powerful ally in moral development, in achieving your goals,

in overcoming obstacles. If you feel strongly that you want to be a doctor and would be

very happy to be a doctor, then you are prepared to pay for the education, do the slog

work, work your way up from the elementary tasks to become a proficient doctor.

Although I spent some time on animal sensitivity in order to be absolutely clear

what we were talking about, we now have to admit that sensitivity in the human is

influenced by the activities of understanding, judging, deciding and loving; and the

precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. So human sensitivity

is animal sensitivity transformed by the new context of activities and norms operative in


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the human being. Sensitivity in itself is morally neutral but will be a big influence in the

moral development or decline of the human person. We can recognize a tension

immediately between the already operating criterion of sensitivity, and the emerging

critierion of truth, value and goodness in the context of a morally developing human

person. We will discuss the principles of these complex interrelationships and examples

later on.

However, sensitive feelings remains in principle sensitive feelings no matter how

they may be transformed or redirected from outside. The sensitive psyche remains a

sensitive psyche even if it is redirected towards moral responsibility and action.

Sensitivity will always be intrinsically dependent on space and time; it will never be

intelligent; it [285] will always be essentially material. The proper science for studying

sensitivity will always be biology or psychology but not anthropology.

4.4 Characteristics of Intentional Response to Agreeable or Disagreeable

1. These sensitive feelings are intentional, that is, they are purposive, oriented in

a certain direction, put us in a stance towards things and people. They are integrated into

the mass, momentum, drive, power of our life mediated by meaning and motivated by

value and inspired by religious aspirations.

2. Sensitive feelings always remain material in the strict sense of 'intelligible but

not intelligent', and either constituted or intrinsically conditioned by space and time.

Sensitive feelings belong to the physical, chemical, organic, neurological conjugates of

sensitive feelings. You cannot have sensitive feelings without sensitivity, without senses,

without a body. The basic six emotions have characteristic facial expressions which

some psychologists claim are universal across cultures.21 Sensitive feelings are already

in place in the infant long before the emergence of questioning, understanding or

knowing truth or value. Intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable is already

operative before the emergence of the intentional response to value. Sensitive emotions,

Value Ethics 309

as sensitive, are constituted by physical, chemical, biological, and psychic components.

It would be nonsense to think of angels or God having sensible feelings.

Hence, intentional response to the satisfying and dissatisfying is intelligible but

not intelligent. We can understand the function of feelings in evolutionary biology. We

can identify the physical and chemical and biological basis of sensitive feelings. We can

develop explanations of emotions, theories of feelings, explanatory definitions of

feeling, etc. Although they are the context out of which intelligence emerge, they remain

sensitive. Although they can be co-opted by intellectual desire, they remain basically

sensitive.

3. Sensitive feelings are material and not spiritual. Hence they are not a priori in

the same sense that the intentional response to value is [286] a priori. They tend to be

superficial, short-term, and transient. Our tendency has been to think of feelings as

exclusively sensitive. Now we have to realize that the mass momentum drive power of

our feeling life is partly material and partly spiritual: in part sensitive appetite, in part

spiritual appetite. How do these interrelate in one human person?

5 Complex Interrelationships

Our procedure has been guided by the principle of differentiating in order to

integrate, distinguishing in order to eventually unite, breaking into parts in order to put

together again. The only alternative to such a procedure is confusion. Now that we have

set up the two ideal types of the intentional response to value and the intentional

response to the agreeable and disagreeable, we can consider their interrelationship in

human living. Because of the complex and difficult nature of this relationship, it will be

necessary to consider different aspects separately as we go along. Let us first state,

briefly, the principles which govern this interrelationship. Then, we will elaborate more

concretely.

5.1 Principles of Integration – A Summary


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(1) The total context is a mature human person, questioning, understanding,

knowing, feeling, evaluating, deciding and acting; developing or declining, moving

towards self-transcendence or away from self-transcendence. We are trying to identify

two feeling intentionalities operating, one focusing on values and the other focusing at

satisfactions. We will recognize that these intentionalities are complementary but can

also in some cases be in conflict. Value and satisfaction can become, respectively, the

criteria for evaluation, decision and action and set up a dialectic of linked but opposed

principles of change. This we will explore in more detail when we consider moral

conversion.

(2) The intentional response to value is a desire for value; it is spiritual, a priori,

transcultural, universal, permanent, basically good. It intends self-transcendence and

normally leads to self-transcendence. [287] There will be sensitive concomitants and

conditions but these are extrinsic.

(3) The intentional response to the agreeable or disagreeable is sensitive appetite

for sensitive satisfaction. It is material, it is conditioned by space and time, it can be very

intense and powerful; it tends to be transient and punctual; it has a finality to a higher

integration. It is morally neutral. It remains intrinsically sensitive in its origin and

conditions and operation.

(4) Intentional response to the agreeable and the disagreeable is already in place

and within this context emerges the intentional response to value as a new criterion of

value. As Lonergan says, "..for natural spontaneity takes care of itself while knowledge

and virtue have to be acquired." 22 This means that it is a long hard struggle to transform

the already in place criterion of pleasure and pain, and to slowly respond to value, know

values, decide on the basis of values and implement these right choices. There will be a

process of emergence where when sensitivity is ready, form emerges.

Value Ethics 311

(5) The intentional response to value has the advantage of being deeper and more

powerful than natural spontaneity. It is universal, permanent, transcultural, a priori, as

explained above. Furthermore, it is basically good, leading to self-transcendence. The

intentional response to satisfaction is morally neutral. Sensitivity is fixed in a routine

and can to some extent be controlled and redirected according to a higher criterion.

There is a hope that the desire for true and the good will win out in the end.

(6) Natural spontaneity is not to be destroyed but to be displaced, transformed,

redirected, integrated, developed, sublimated or sublated. We are not talking of

contradictory, mutually exclusive principles. Natural spontaneity can be harnessed in

the search for values and become the mass momentum drive power of the search for the

best way to live. There can be a basic complementarity operating.

(7) The emergence of the intentional response to value in the context of other

feelings can be traced by the psychology of moral development which is largely a

question of learning to take pleasure in goodness; it is a training of the emotions. It is

somehow parallel to [288] the emergence of understanding from imagination. Just as

understanding sublates imagining, so we can consider the intentional response to value

sublating the response to satisfaction. The response to value is something new, different,

higher and distinct. It enhances the value of the sensitive response to satisfaction. It

leaves the functioning of sensitivity to operate according to its own intrinsic nature and

laws.

(8) The dialectical tension between satisfaction and true value are basic terms for

understanding moral conversion. These are not to be understood as a struggle between

good and evil. Rather, a principle of good trying to transform a neutral sensitivity in the

search for goodness and truth. Sensitivity is morally neutral, neither morally good nor

evil.


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(9) Natural spontaneity is itself morally ambiguous. Anger is not a bad thing in

itself; we should be angry at injustice. Feelings of guilt can be out of proportion to real

guilt. Feeling is just one of the components of the judgment of value. Feelings by

themselves will never know what is of value. But they can be a help, point in the right

direction, add body to our resolutions.

(10) The two intentionalities are distinct but not separate. They are distinct

because we are talking about two really distinct intentionalities. But they are not

separate, apart, juxtaposed; rather, they are integrated into a whole, fused, interrelated,

mutually related in many ways. It is difficult to point to a particular emotional reaction

and claim that is completely sensitive or completely spiritual. These are not

compartmentalized but fused into the unity of an integrated functioning human person.

(11) The intentional response to value is not the totality of a criterion of the

good. It is the feeling component. But our thesis is that there are four components, the

cognitive, the affective, the volitional, in the context of the self-transcending subject.

Each has its own contribution to make to the good life and the criterion of right

behaviour.

(12) It is legitimate and necessary to ask, how do you feel about it? Moral

evaluations and decisions need the guidance of the intention [289] of value. But

discernment has to be used in sorting out our complex life of feelings and especially

distinguishing the response to value from that of satisfaction.

5.2 Spiritual Feelings Sublate Sensitive Feelings

To get a better understanding of the relation between intentional response to

value emerging from the intentional response to agreeable/disagreeable, it might be

helpful to use the analogy of activities of understanding sublating the activities of

imagining and sensing. The activities are easier to identify than the normativity and

intentionality that informs them. Insight goes into great detail about the activities but is

Value Ethics 313

not so explicit on the underlying intentional feelings. There is surely a parallel between

the activities and the feelings that underlie them. Here we will apply the principle of

sublation. Just as the activities of understanding sublate the activities of experiencing, so

intentional response to value sublates intentional response to the satisfying/dissatisfying.

Sublation has three elements: (1) it goes beyond, (2) enhances but (3) leaves intact what

is sublated. We will explain this in relation to the activity of understanding sublating the

activity of sensing and then show how spiritual feelings sublate sensitive feelings.

(1) Intelligence emerges from already established patterns of sensitive

imagination. Imagining is already in situ; it functions along with the external senses and

the sensitive memory; in animals it is linked to the biological pattern of experience and

animals seem to be very limited in their ability to operate out of free or creative images.

Images are always sensitive, particular and concrete. Early acts of intelligence such as

naming, relating, grasping cause and effect, go beyond images to ideas, to the universal,

the abstract and the intelligible. Activity of intelligence goes beyond the limitations of

imagining but continues to operate only in and through the use of images. Imagination

dominates the mind of the child and the power of images, pictures, examples diagrams

continue to powerfully influence the adult mind as advertisers, politicians and

rhetoricians know well.

In intellectual conversion the person grasps and accepts that the criterion of truth

is the sufficiency of the evidence for a judgment. In [290] the mind of the unconverted it

is the unquestioned imaginative assumption of knowing as contact between an 'in here'

and an 'out there' that operates as the criterion of reality. In the converted mind there is

still a dependence on images, but intellect has taken control, sets the conditions, uses the

images, sometimes creates new images in order to understand.

(2) Understanding neither eliminates nor destroys imagination and sensation; it

rather sets it free, enhances its value, transforms its operation and extends its range.


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Under the control of intelligence, imagination becomes creative, flexible, suggestive,

sophisticated and fertile. New images, various examples, a multitude of possibilities

enrich the search for understanding. Images that were crude and basic become more

ethereal and broad. Images of concrete, sensible individual things are replaced by

abstract symbols of mathematics, or the letters of alphabets, or by flow charts or

diagrams. The great achievements of science and mathematics, philosophy and theology

are only possible because of the work of the imagination providing phantasms, images,

diagrams, symbols, examples, illustrations, constructed pedagogical images. Human

understanding and knowing always continues to depend on images.

(3) Yet the basic functioning of internal and externals senses continue to operate

according to their own laws and limits. Images remain images, particular, sensible and

concrete. Spectacles improve your eyesight but do nothing for your intelligence.

Imagination continues according to its own principles and laws. The basic structure of

sensitive imagination and memory continue to operate according to their biological and

psychological laws. Proper functioning of understanding continues to depend

extrinsically on proper functioning of the brain, the senses, imagination and memory.

Now let us transfer the notion of sublation from the activities to the feelings

underlying them – to the desire to know in relation to sensitive desires.

(1) It is reasonably clear that the desire to know – questions seeking

understanding, truth and value – go beyond sensitive desires. This is a new reality which

begins to emerge in the two year old and [291] never emerges in the animal. It opens up

the possibility of a truly human life of knowing, valuing, deciding, loving and doing.

Here too in the field of desires and feelings, we have intellectual norms emerging within

the context of already operating sensitive appetites, but going beyond them, controlling

them, setting them free, co-opting them into their role as part of the mass, momentum,

drive, power of human feeling. This relentless desire to know is new: it is a desire for

Value Ethics 315

truth and value: it is not reducible to sensitive desires. Something new has emerged. The

desire to know is not on the same level as other sensitive desires. The normativity of the

transcendental imperatives is not the same as the normativity of good canine behaviour.

(2) The spiritual desires enhance the importance of sensitive appetites. Sensitive

appetites can be powerful tools in the search for truth and goodness. When we learn to

find pleasure in virtue and knowledge, such sensitive aspects become a powerful

reinforcement; it is easier to do because it is habitual, spontaneous and pleasurable.

Cerebral resolutions by themselves are usually ineffectual. But if you can call in the

required sensibility, discover the more refined pleasure to be got from being virtuous,

then resolutions can become effective. In this sense we can see that the transcendental

imperatives, underlie, penetrate, transform and unify the totality of human feeling.

(3) But sensitive appetites continue to be material, continue to have their

sensitive components, concomitant physical and chemical changes, activities in the

neurons of the brain, appropriate facial expressions and, basically, remain intact as

sensitive feelings. Sensitive appetite remains intact, integral, and continues to operate as

sensitive. We do not become angels; we continue to feel hunger, to desire satisfaction, to

seek comfort. The needs of the psyche, of the unconscious, of sensitivity have to be met.

We never eliminate sensitive appetite, but it can be redirected, controlled, developed,

and co-opted.

Conclusion. Our thesis suggests a very intimate connection between the

activities of knowing and the desire to know. Hence it is not surprising that there is a

useful analogy between the activities of knowing and the feelings involved in knowing.

Just as there is a struggle between the activities of intelligence and of imagination, so

also [292] there is a struggle between the desire to know and sensitive desires. We are at

present investigating the connection between the desire to know value and the desire for

satisfaction. The notion of sublation lays down clear parameters for this relation. Let us


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illustrate this relationship more concretely so that these principles may be recognized in

our own experience.

5.3 The Spiritual Orients Sensitive Feelings

We have identified the intentional response to agreeable and disagreeable as the

response to pleasure and pain, as the criterion of satisfaction (as opposed to value), as

self-regarding (as opposed to disinterested). They belong basically to sensitivity

appetite, the affective aspect of the biological pattern of experience; they are material in

the sense of being intelligible but not intelligent, intrinsically constituted or conditioned

by the empirical residue. Most feelings are conscious but there is a case for feelings that

are repressed, denied, unconscious. This kind of intentional response is morally

ambiguous; the category of moral does not apply; you don't blame a goat for eating

somebody else's maize. In this context, when psychologists say that all feelings are

morally neutral, they are correct; these sensitive feelings are just given; it is what we do

with them as free and responsible that introduces the moral dimension.

We have also identified the intentional response to value as the normativity

immanent and operative in activities of understanding, judging truth and judging value.

We further differentiated this normativity as being attentive, being intelligent, being

reasonable, being responsible and being in love. These are a priori, innate, permanent

dispositions of the human spirit. They are felt primarily in and through the activities;

they are not separate and apart from the activities; the intentional response to truth is a

constitutive element in the judgment of truth. These feelings are spiritual (spirit as

inquiry) in the sense of being the dynamic of intelligence, and are not intrinsically

conditioned or constituted by the empirical residue. Response to these feelings always

leads towards self-transcendence – whether intellectual or moral. Hence, these

intentional responses constitute the precise goodness of the human person, albeit a

potential for [293] goodness rather than an already actualised goodness. These deeper

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feelings are not neutral; they push towards what is intelligible, true and good. Without

them we cannot know terminal values not become originating values.

The human person is one integrated whole. You can distinguish the physical,

chemical, organic, neural, psychic, intellectual, moral and religious dimensions of the

one acting whole person. But the oneness of the person is not just the sum total of the

parts but the integration of many dimensions into one, rich, diverse, acting person. The

affective side also has many dimensions; but these do not exist as separated parts but as

integrated – more or less – into the whole. What we aim at in this section is to explore

how this integration takes place, to what extent it takes place and how we can recognize

in our selves the transformation of sensitive feeling by spiritual feelings. This is a

complicated process with many subtle interdependencies and interrelationships.

Very obviously, natural spontaneity is already in place before intelligence and its

concomitant desires emerge. The child is already acting in intentional response to the

agreeable and disagreeable – undisciplined squads of emotion. The biological pattern is

established, pleasure is sought, pain is to be avoided. The development of sensitivity,

especially of imagination and memory, prepare the way for the emergence of

intelligence and accompanying desires. Slowly the child starts to talk, to name, to

understand, to read, to count; this is accompanied by development of motor skills,

walking, running, throwing, catching, using instrument, putting on clothes, tying laces,

and becoming independent. Desires to be self-reliant, curiosity in seeing how things

work, asking questions, giving and receiving, agreeing and refusing, loving and being

loved, are part of the emergence of as yet undifferentiated spiritual desires, an inchoate

emergence of the transcendental precepts. Knowledge makes a bloody entrance.

Already there is a conscious and unconscious feedback effect of this emergence

of intellectual moral and religious feelings on sensitivity.23 Unconsciously, the

emergence of intellectual activities, such [294] as reading, automatically condition and


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pattern the focusing of the eyes, ability to attend and concentrate, pattern the muscles of

the eye, etc. Automatically, the activity of talking patterns the use of tongue, throat,

teeth, lips and breath in the production of sound. The emergence of intelligence

conditions the imagination and memory so that they can be harnessed for the purposes of

cognition. The emergence of the intellectual pattern of experience and attendant motor

skills, forms the muscles of face, hands and legs as well as the nerves, neurons, and cells

of the brain. Emergence is always followed by integration; the new emergence has to be

integrated into the whole, of which it is only one part.

But also consciously intellect takes control of one's sensitive living. The child

decides to go to school, values knowledge at the expense of more immediate

satisfaction, learns to control desires, begins to criticize fantasy and seek the truth, to be

good, to be kind, to be loving, to be obedient. The person assumes conscious direction of

life and conscious response to value as opposed to satisfaction. The sensitive appetite is

conditioned by the spiritual dimension and this is shown in manners, clothes, behaviour,

control of emotions, postponing gratification, sharing with others, and the like.

5.4 The Spiritual Transforms Sensitive Feelings

Sensitivity reaches its highest point of development, not in the animal, but in the

human. We have seen how this is so in the intellect's use of the imagination for its own

purposes. Now we wish to see how spiritual desires transform, redirect, differentiate the

sensitive appetites.

In what sense can we speak of the imperatives of intelligence – reasonableness

and responsibility and love – transforming already established sensitive feelings?

Although sensitivity has the advantage of being already in place, the spiritual

normativity that emerges is deep, permanent, penetrating, intentional of the intelligible,

the real and the good. These normally will become the dominant factors in human living.

Children and young people – as Aristotle keeps reminding us – follow their feelings for

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pleasure in sensible things. At the other end of the scale you have Aristotle asserting that

human [295] happiness is to be found in contemplation – which is also the most

pleasurable of all human activities. You also have Aristotle – again – asserting that the

real sign of virtue is that its exercise gives pleasure – the brave man gets pleasure out of

being brave. The temperate person finds moderation to be pleasurable, the just person

rejoices when he sees justice being done and injustice being overturned. So we can trace

a process by which we start by operating in terms of the agreeable and disagreeable;

these are slowly transformed and displaced when we aim at being intelligent, being just,

being patient, and learn to control our impulse for satisfaction.

But that does not mean that pleasure is evil or is eliminated from human life – we

find pleasure in work, job satisfaction, pleasure in seeking the truth, pleasure in doing

good and being rewarded with a happy conscience. One of the paradoxes of human life

is that if you seek pleasure in the satisfaction of sensitive appetites, you will probably be

very unhappy. But if you seek happiness in work, in building a good social order, in

using your talents for others, you will find both happiness and pleasure.

Happiness is to be found in responding to the imperatives of being attentive,

intelligent, reasonable and responsible and in love. It is to be found in the process of

self-transcendence. It is human potential being actualized through activity. It is the

human person striving towards his/her final, supreme end. Pleasure is primarily the

satisfaction of sensitive appetites; it is usually short-term, transient, self-centred, an end

in itself. But it can be transformed to accompany the search for happiness and the

activities of self-transcendence

Children tend to be are totally self-centred, self-regarding and pleasure oriented

and the whole world exists only to satisfy their physical and psychological needs. This is

natural and to be expected. But a long transformation of affective disposition takes place

by the time of maturity. A mature moral person loves the good both in himself and in


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others, in people and in things. The mature good person recognises all human persons as

equal and truly wishes them well in all things. The mature person seeks terminal values

and thereby constitutes herself as originating value. The self-centredness of the child

[296] is transformed into the disinterestedness of the authentic person. The pleasure

seeking of the child is transformed into the search for happiness, meaning the path of

self-transcendence.

5.5 Anger as an Illustration

We have seen in the relationship between intelligence and imagination,

intelligence never operates without imagination, but redirects imagining for its own

purpose. So here we are identifying how intentional response to value should control and

redirect intentional responses to satisfaction for its own purposes. It is the intentional

response to value that should be in charge, just as it is intelligence that should be in

charge of imagination. In moral conversion the person seeks value and not satisfaction.

Let us consider anger as an example of this transformation or redirection.

Animals get angry if you cross into their territory, threaten their cubs, take their

food, or disturb their peace. It is part of their way of surviving, it has worked – it

preserves some kind of order in the animal kingdom. Children too can be angry, if they

don't get what they want, are slapped by another kid, or just for no apparent reason can

throw a temper tantrum. So we inherit all the dynamics of the sensitive anger as it

functions in the biological pattern of experience.

But Aristotle says, "The man who gets angry at the right things and with the right

people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the right length of time, is

commended; so this person will be patient, inasmuch as patience is commendable,

because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by his feelings,

but indignant only in the way and on the grounds and for the length of time that his

principle prescribes."(N.E. 1125b33) We do not expect adults to throw temper tantrums

Value Ethics 321

at random; we do not expect an adult to get angry at some trifling inconvenience; we do

not expect an adult to get angry at a friend for no reason; we do not expect her anger to

continue when the cause has been resolved. There is a proper time, and place, and

manner to express anger in mature moral persons. [297]

Sensitive anger in itself is morally neutral, but in the mature person should be at

the service of the intentional response to value. It is proper to be angry at the sight of

prisoners being abused; it is proper to be angry if politicians lie to us; it is proper to be

angry if politicians are corrupt, if poor people have no medical assistance, if the poor are

exploited by the rich, if parents neglect their children.

They say that a person over forty years of age is responsible for his face;

meaning that by that time the face reflects the kind of person this is. Similarly, you could

say that a mature person is responsible for his-her spontaneous emotional reactions to

persons and situations. In the good moral person anger will be a reaction to evil, anger

will point to some injustice, it will be a spontaneous intentional response to a value or

disvalue expressed in the sensitive feeling of anger. Anger arises in a context of

perceptions, social situation, previous value judgments, previous history, etc. Anger in

itself even in a good person is no guarantee that the cause of the anger is evil. We might

be angry at somebody indicted for child abuse only to find that the person is innocent

and our anger shifts to the false accuser. We might be angry at some action we perceive

as injustice only to find when we go into the matter that it was a just and right action.

The mature person is not a person who has eliminated anger but one who to a

large extent, through good habits of life and intelligence and human relations has

brought his intentional response to satisfaction/dissatisfaction into line with the

intentional response to value. Anger is not in itself a criterion of evil; but the anger of

the just person in a context where he knows what is going on, understands the persons


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involved, is an indicator of evil and injustice. Righteous anger points to the possibility of

wrongdoing, is sensitive to evil, and may reveal situations of injustice.

The development from random childhood tantrums to the mature patient adult is

long and difficult, and to some extent is never complete, in that we never have complete

control over emotional reactions. But we realize that the developments need to be made.

We have all witnessed sports players involved in an angry brawl and remarked how they

are behaving like children. [298]

We should also note that in an evil person anger and hatred can be directed at

what is just and right and good. Groups like the Nazi's in Germany, the Pharisees in the

gospel, terrorist groups, the Ku Klux Klan and the like, are built on anger and hatred of

what is good. In a good person righteous anger is an indicator of evil; in an evil person

anger may well be directed at good people and an effort to destroy the order of society.

Just as there is moral development so there is moral decline and spontaneous feeling

reactions follow.

5.6 Development and Decline of Feelings

In some way the spiritual feelings we talked about above, underlie, penetrate,

transform and unify the more sensitive feelings. The spiritual feelings give basic

directionality to the feelings: to be angry at the right time, for the right reason, in the

right amount, etc. The spiritual feelings penetrate the other superficial feelings: what is

the difference between the road rage of an immature person and the righteous anger of a

person in search of justice? Spiritual feelings transform sensitive feelings: love

transforms sexual attraction into a deep and permanent interpersonal bond. The spiritual

orientation unifies the life of feelings: the determination to be a doctor eliminates

irrelevant attractions, brings into line recalcitrant feelings, makes sacrifices of time,

energy and money, all oriented to the single goal of becoming a good doctor. In this way

we can see that feelings develop along with the moral character of the person.

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But feelings can be an integral part of moral decline also. Strong feelings can

overpower our power of decision and lead us to do what we do not want to do: we will

the good but find ourselves doing the advantageous. We find likes and dislikes become

our criterion for action, the equivalent of good and bad for us. Emotional preferences

take the place of reasonable value judgments and become the basis for our decisions and

actions. Pleasure and pain become the criterion of our choices, the purpose in our life.

Feelings become soured in this downward spiral and we give way to dramatic

bias, individual bias, group bias, and general bias. Self becomes the centre of the

universe to the exclusion of the good of others, or the harm done to others by our selfish

behaviour. Everything [299] is skewed in terms of personal advantage. The apparent

good takes the place of the real good. We set our hearts on wealth, fame, exercise of

power, sensible pleasure as ends in themselves. We are disappointed when they do not

deliver the happiness to which we deeply aspire. We spiral downwards through

rationalization, avoiding self-consciousness, making excuses, blaming others, hating

ourselves more and more. The freedom to which we aspire becomes an addiction to

pleasure of one kind or another.

5.7 Education of Feeling of Moral Responsibility

We are now focusing on the desire to know the good, the desire to do the good,

the desire to be good. The sense of moral obligation, of 'ought', of what is right and fair,

is a continuation of the desire to know into the realm of goodness, action and society.

We can refer to it as the precept 'to be responsible'. Similarly, this feeling of being bound

to do the right things emerges from the plethora of other feelings and desires of

childhood and adolescence. We recognize the joy of insight, the frustration of failure,

the pride of achievement, the determination to persevere, as emotions closely associated

with the unfolding of the desire to know. In the context of values, we should recognize

the guilt of failure, the shame of being exposed, satisfaction in doing the right thing,


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remorse at the consequences of our evil deeds, the pleasure of being approved and

rewarded. Moral responsibility is a deep, permanent, feeling disposition towards

knowing and doing right actions.

Kohlberg, the great psychologist of moral development, has been rightly

criticized for focusing exclusively on the development of moral reasoning through its

three levels and six stages to maturity. He thought he was giving a complete picture of

human moral development by his acute analysis of reasons given for moral behaviour.

But moral development is as much about the development of feelings as it is about

reasoning and we have known that since the time of Aristotle. Where would reasoning

be without feeling, without motive, without felt obligation, desires and fears. Do

syllogisms really determine our behaviour so much? Erikson was more realistic in

treating moral development in terms of trust and interpersonal development. [300]

How does the education of moral feelings happen? It must be significantly

different than instruction about mathematics. Let us suggest certain ways by which

feelings are educated morally. This is not the place for a treatise on the moral education

of children but let us try to flesh out Aristotle's notion that the aim of moral education is

to train youth to feel pleasure in doing good; that it is wholly an education of the

emotions.

(1) Imagination. We tell children stories of heroes and villains, helpless females

and rotten witches, cowboys and Indians, cops and robbers; animal stories about the

clever hare, the forgetful elephant, the wicked snake, the evil dragon, etc. These stories

are designed to lead us to approve of goodness, to hate the evil one, to inspire to great

deeds, to disgust at cowardice or stupidity. The child's imagination needs to be filled

with images and stories, heroes and villains – persons with their defects or virtue writ so

large as to be a caricature, like Scrooge the miser, Tarzan the hero, Cinderella's goodness

contrasted with the ugly sisters, etc. These provide a kind of objectification of types of

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behaviour and ways of being, which both stir the desires and clarify the ideal. Later in

adolescence we are familiar with identification with pop stars, football players, actors

and actresses. Later on we study the more complex and ambiguous figures of Hamlet,

Macbeth, Jane Ayre, George Smiley and the like. Imagination lights up our feelings,

imagines possibilities, considers alternatives and heads for the stars.

(2) Imitation. Children imitate the behaviour of parents, siblings, peer group.

They learn to identify with family, community, ethic group. They tend to behave in a

way that is approved of in the group, and to avoid what is disapproved of. Children learn

proper behaviour mostly by imitation, imitating what they admire, avoiding what they

detest. This should normally take place in the context of close, intimate, feelings of

loving relationship with parents and siblings. There the trust that Erikson talks about is

born; basic trust in others, trust in the world, trust in oneself. Then sympathy,

compassion, and love grow and spread and develop. Hence children learn to feel

sympathy with the sick, to console someone in pain, to recognize the feelings [301] of

others, to follow the example of the good behaviour of others around them.

(3) Controlling emotion. The child goes from being a bundle of self-gratifying

emotions, the centre of the universe, demanding immediate satisfaction of needs and

wants, to a notion of sharing, right and wrong, a universe of equal persons. The child has

to learn that they are not the sole centre of the universe but there are other people,

siblings, parents, friends who also have feelings and needs and who are also centres of

consciousness. So some idea of fairness, sharing, reciprocity, respect has to be

inculcated. This is one of the first manifestations of the pure desire to be responsible, the

‘ought’ of moral obligation. It is the child moving into a world of valuable human beings

and appreciating their value; the world mediated by meaning and suffused with value.

The child has to learn to share; to postpone gratification, to substitute a higher kind of

pleasure for this immediate one. Feelings are not being repressed, but redirected,


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displaced, refined, and to some extent brought under control. Children have to learn to

recognize their own feelings, to name them, to accept them. They learn to feel

appropriately in different situations, funerals, accidents, sickness, celebrations, etc.

(4) Approval and disapproval. Approval from parents is a pleasant experience

and disapproval is unpleasant. We use rewards and punishments in the moral education

of children. They seek approval by behaving well. Pleasure in indulgence of their

sensitive appetites is replaced with a more satisfying feeling, that of being approved.

Slowly they are taught to take pleasure in goodness, enjoying sharing toys, feeling

satisfied that they have done the right thing, giving presents, and the like.

Moral obligation is a universal, persistent, pervasive, deep, orientation of the

human heart. There are corrupt human beings and corrupt societies but they are the

exception rather than the rule. Human persons persist in distinguishing right from

wrong, despite the relativists and sceptics and post-modernists. Moral obligation

operates in the context of deliberative insights, judgments of value, decisions and actions

and is closely related and bound up with these activities. [302] What Kohlberg says

about moral reasoning is true; but it is not the whole picture. The context of moral life

and behaviour is the feeling of moral obligation: there is honour among thieves.

Although Kohlberg explicitly focuses on reasoning process in moral

development, he actually cannot avoid talking of emotions. Punishment and reward

operate in terms of emotion, fear of punishment and pleasure in reward. Approval of the

group or their disapproval at someone who steps out of line is not only rational but

deeply emotional. Obeying the universal law and respecting all human beings is both a

rational and emotional position to take up. The final stage of autonomous good person

working according to his informed conscience is the good person responding to the

desire for goodness by good judgments, good decisions and appropriate actions. One of

Kohlberg's basic principles of education is that people feel the inadequacies and

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limitations of their present state and are attracted to the next stage as being more

adequate and complete. What is this 'attraction' to the next stage, if it is not some

expression of the finality of 'to be responsible'? Why should we be attracted to

something, if it does not present some answer to our desire for goodness?

(5) Satire and Humour. How do you shift a person out of the cycle of moral

decline? Direct logical arguments are usually not very effective, because the process of

rationalization has taken place and the declining subject has his answers all ready.

Appealing directly to feelings and human aspirations may not be effective either, as the

feelings have already been soured and twisted. A more indirect approach may be more

effective. So Lonergan in Insight24 suggests the possibility of satire and humour. Satire

would hold up to the audience the foolishness of the counterpositions by exaggeration of

its salient weaknesses. So we laugh at ourselves and might just realize how wrong our

position is. Humour keeps us in touch with the limitations of human persons. "It listens

with sincere respect to the Stoic description of the Wise Man, and then requests an

introduction."25 This is another subtle way of appealing to feelings in the pursuit of

moral excellence. [303]

Conclusion. From this section we have some slight notion of the emergence of

the intentional response to value from the midst of self-centred pleasures and

satisfactions. The emergence of the feeling of moral obligation is universal. It is helped

by the environment, by teachers, by examples, by stories, by correction, but if it doesn't

emerge from the inside all the teaching is in vain. Just as in teaching facts a teacher

presupposes a receptive, questioning audience, so teaching values presupposes a desire

to know value, an attraction to the good, an eagerness for value. These two categories of

feeling are not two separate sets of feelings, sensitive and spiritual, but one symphony of

interrelated transformed feeling, a result of sublation and dependence, and myriad of

other interrelationships.


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6 Hierarchy of Feeling?

We earlier introduced the metaphor of a symphony to symbolize how we have so

many levels of feeling, of varying intensity, some dormant, some active – sometimes in

harmony, sometimes in conflict. Now a symphony orchestra operates on a principle of

unity; hopefully, all the musicians are working from the same page, of the same score,

following the one conductor. Is there a principle that we can introduce to help in our

discernment of feelings? Is there a principle by which can determine the depth of our

feeling? Can we distinguish between feelings leading to self-transcendence and those

leading to selfish satisfaction?

Efforts have been made in this direction before. We remember Max Scheler who

established four categories of feelings (physical, vital, psychic and spiritual),

corresponding roughly to the four levels of value essences existing in the ontological

world (sensible, vital, spiritual, religious values). We do not want to follow the principle

of his emotional intuitionism, but can we establish a hierarchy of feelings on some

principle that we can validate following our own method and context?

Elizabeth Morelli, working from a Lonergan background, has proposed one

schema for such a hierarchy of feelings. She claims [304] that anxiety is the feeling

characteristic of the fourth level of consciousness. She states her position thus:

We have established, then, that the general form of anxiety is that of a feeling state. It bears the descriptive characteristics of pervasiveness, perdurance, and indefiniteness, and it functions as a quality of an underlying intention. It is one of the three basic or fundamental states in that it is an intrinsic or essential qualification of the transcendental dynamism of conscious intentionality. As such, it is an immanent quality of conscience, and it is identical with the consciousness of the fourth level of conscious intentionality – the level of freedom” 26 As anxiety is the feeling characteristic of the fourth level, wonder is the characteristic of the second and doubt the characteristic of the third: as wonder gives rise to inquiry and understanding and to such affects as perplexity and relief, and as doubt gives rise to reflection and judgment and to such affects a wariness and confidence, so anxiety gives rise to deliberation and decision and to such affects as boredom and excitement.27

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One is present to oneself on the second level as wondering, on the third level as doubting, and on the fourth level as anxious.28 Certainly there is some connection between decision making and anxiety; every

decision is a leap into the relatively unknown with consequent risks and the attendant

anxiety. The state of indecision seems also to be one of great anxiety. However, there

are many decisions that we make, even big decisions, where we decide with little

anxiety, not too much soul searching and it can still be a good decision. We can be

anxious about many things, not only moral judgments and decisions.

Fred Crowe suggests a different scenario.29 He accepts the principle that,

“Feelings accompany the cognitional on every level. They are as all pervasive as the

cognitional.”30 So he suggests an isomorphism between the levels of cognitional activity

and the feeling characteristic of that level. Just like animals we feel satisfaction of

sensitive desires at the level of experiencing. We feel the thrill of insight, of finding a

solution, at the level of understanding. We feel security in a conclusion based on

sufficient evidence at the level of [305] judgment. We experience the torment of a bad

conscience and the peace of a good conscience in the context of moral judgment,

decision and action. He does not claim that these terms – satisfaction, thrill, security and

peace – are definitive or exhaustive. He notes the tendency of the cognitional to absorb

feeling, to turn feelings into a kind of knowledge, to reduce feeling to a knowing. He

suggests that even though feelings are isomorphic with cognitional activities, feeling

should still be regarded as ‘independent and self-governing’; as an equal autonomous

partner in the human enterprise.

These various efforts suggest that it is possible and desirable to relate feelings to

the levels of consciousness in a useful and illuminating way. For Lonergan the levels of

consciousness are differentiated by the activities and the intentionality characteristic of

these levels. The levels are qualitatively different modes of intending and hence

qualitatively different modes of being conscious subjects.31 He suggests that feelings


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respond to values in accord with a scale of preference.32 He says explicitly in an

interview, edited by Philip McShane: “There are feelings that are intentional responses

and that do involve such a discrimination and put themselves in a hierarchy – and you

have your vital values, social values, cultural values, religious values.”33 He seems to

assert here that there is a hierarchy of feelings and that it does follow the schema of the

five levels of value – the five levels of consciousness.

So, is there such a hierarchy? What is its basis? Can such a hierarchy of feelings

help when we ask the question, how do you feel about that?

There does not seem to be any basis for such a hierarchy, if we only consider

sensitive feelings. Such feelings can be compared to one another in terms of intensity,

importance, degree of differentiation and refinement, their importance or unimportance,

but do not seem to yield a principle of an ordered hierarchy of feelings. Sensitive

feelings are all sensitive and all of a piece.

But if we recall our distinction between two classes of feeling – the spiritual and

the sensitive – then at least we have the beginnings of such a hierarchy of feelings. We

defined sensitive feelings – the in-[306]tentional response to the agreeable or

disagreeable – as material, as biologically based, as intrinsically conditioned by space

and time, as characteristics of animal sensitivity, as neutral from the moral point of view.

We defined spiritual feelings – the intentional response to value – as not originating in

sensitivity, as a spontaneous capacity, as innate, permanent, deep, as not intrinsically

conditioned by space and time, as orienting us positively to the intelligible, the true and

the good and beyond to the infinite. We related these two classes of feelings to one

another in terms of sublation. Spiritual feelings are higher, a new reality, irreducible to

the sensitive and should be the mass momentum drive towards human self-

transcendence. Spiritual feelings do not eliminate or destroy sensitive feelings; rather

they emerge in the context of sensitive feelings, slowly redirect and transform sensitive

Value Ethics 331

feelings and continue to depend on the proper functioning of sensitive feelings. Just as

the activities of understanding goes beyond imagining, uses imagination for its own

purpose, but continues to depend for its operation on images, so what we are calling

spiritual feelings sublate sensitive feelings. Spiritual feelings are higher, they should be

in charge, they should lead towards self-transcendence. When we ask, how do feel about

that? We must discern this basic hierarchy of two classes of feelings, one of which

guides towards self-transcendence and the other is morally neutral.

Within this class of spiritual feelings is there a further hierarchy to be discerned?

Although we have separated out our treatment of the affective and the cognitive in

separate chapters, we have indicated how closely they are related together. If the

activities form a structured hierarchy of interrelated activities, would one not expect that

the feelings permeating such a structure would also form a parallel hierarchy? Besides,

Lonergan has already given us a masterly synopsis of what these feelings are,

particularly by differentiating the five transcendental precepts permeating the activities

of the respective five levels of consciousness. We expect the quality of consciousness to

be different as we move from operations of sensing to understanding, to judging truth

and value, to worshipping God. We have already elaborated on these transcendental

imperatives as the felt obligation to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and

in love. Now [307] we are merely pointing out how they form a hierarchy, how they are

distinct intentionalities, and are clearly differentiated in terms of higher and lower.

Lonergan has already given us a hierarchy of feelings. Why are we still looking for

something that has already been found?

On the one hand, there is the single thrust of the Eros of the mind, the spirit of

inquiry, which permeates all the activities of understanding and judging, and leads on to

the knowledge and love of God. There is a continuity of this feeling element through the

five levels of consciousness. It is the one desire to know that is differentiated into the


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aim proper to each level. The desire to know performs its six functions at each level of

consciousness. It initiates the process by formulating a question or responding to a

challenge. It intends the end proper to that level of consciousness and directs towards it

– it senses when we are getting close or when we are heading into a blind alley. It

motivates us to be detached and disinterested and resists the biases. It provides the

determination and dynamism to win the struggle to understand. It provides the content

and criterion to be satisfied at each level. There is a deep feeling component, not just to

our active life of working, teaching and living, but also to our intellectual endeavours,

our scholarship, our research and writing. The deepest and best inclination of the human

heart is a single thrust towards what is true, what is of value and what is infinitely

valuable.

On the other hand, this single feeling component can be differentiated according

to each level of consciousness and we can distinguish the imperatives to be attentive

intelligent, reasonable, responsible and in love. These line up in a clear hierarchy of

importance based on the principle of sublation. I have given an elementary expose of

these principles. Our feeling life is so rich and diversified and differentiated and

sophisticated and refined that much more work remains to be done in this area.

There is a further aspect to the matter. It would seem that at each level you can

distinguish feelings proper to the initial phase of asking questions, feelings proper to a

middle stage of struggling to understand, and to a final stage of satisfaction in

achievement. Aristotle [308] pointed this out some time ago in relation to the senses.

First, there is a sensitive desire or appetite, then there is a struggle for attainment, finally

there is sensitive satisfaction in achievement. First there is hunger, then there is a

struggle to find food, then there is satisfaction of hunger probably followed by sleep. It

seems that there is a similar pattern of stages in the unfolding of the desire to know. At

each level there is a set of feelings characteristic of the initial stage – puzzlement,

Value Ethics 333

wonder, response, alertness, tension, desire and the like. Similarly, there is a set of

feelings characteristic of the phase of struggling – such as frustration, discouragement,

determination, commitment, pride, self-esteem, ambition, sheer grit, and the like.

Finally, there is the satisfaction of desire characteristic of success at each level. This is

important as it reveals the criterion operating at each level. Let us elaborate on this

feeling of closure as it operates in its own way on five levels.

Presumably, we are familiar with the satisfaction proper to sensitive appetites, to

satisfying hunger, to slaking of thirst, to resting when we are tired, to the gratification of

sexual desires, and the like. There is a joy in smooth performance of the activity proper

to each of the senses. It is better to be able to see well than to be squinting and groping

in the dark. Imagination is happy with fantasy, fiction, free flow of images and feelings,

stories, movies, novels and the like. There is a satisfaction in learning skills, learning to

walk, to ride a bicycle, to swim, to play football, and in exercising these skills well and

with ease. On visiting a restaurant for a meal, you will be dissatisfied if you are still

hungry at the end; it is unpleasing to the eye, if the food is presented badly; you are not

happy, if unpleasant smells radiate from the kitchen or toilet; raucous music can make

conversation difficult and spoil the evening.

However, these sensitive satisfactions are hardly comparable to the joy of

insight, the proper functioning of intelligence, the satisfaction of understanding clearly

and distinctly. Why do people spend so much time on crossword puzzles, FreeCell, card

games, Su Doku, draughts, chess, bridge, and other mathematical puzzles? It seems to be

the satisfaction of understanding well, bringing order out of chaos, winning by superior

exercise of intelligence, the satisfaction [309] of solving problems. There is nothing

much at stake at this level; it is a matter of opinion, a matter of definition; even if you

are defeated you console yourself with the thought that it is only a game. No issue of

truth, of life or death is at stake. Beginners in any of these fields feel nervous, confused,


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and anxious about their performance. Competent performers act with ease, conviction,

almost spontaneously – such performance is very satisfying. There is a feeling element

to knowing when we have understood.

There is a further, higher and deeper satisfaction in knowing well, in knowing the

truth, in knowing that we have reached the truth. It is an experience of closure: no

further pertinent questions arise. We are satisfied that we have been open and honest,

that we have done all the necessary research, that the insights are invulnerable, that the

desire to know has been satisfied. There are times when we are unsure of our

conclusions; we recognize that we are not masters of the field, that there are many

loopholes that have not been closed off. We feel shaky about our conclusions; we

present them tentatively, hesitantly, anxiously. We are open to correction, to learning

from our mistakes, we hope to understand better in the future. But there are other times

when we are sure, we feel confident, we present our conclusions with conviction, we are

ready to rebut adversaries. We do not need reassurance from others, we may in fact be

going against public opinion, we may be criticized by the establishment, but we are sure

of the immanent grounds for our conviction. There is a feeling of deep satisfaction in

knowing that you know correctly.

There is a further, deeper, satisfaction in knowing value and living a life in

conformity with value. This is the satisfaction of a happy conscience. The desire for

value has been satisfied; it is not only cognitional but is part of a life well-lived. It is an

experience of being at peace with oneself, knowing that we are in the right, convinced

that we are living according to the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart.

Opposed to a happy conscience is the guilty conscience, the confused conscience, the

doubtful conscience. The guilty conscience feels shame, division, tension; we knew

what was the right thing to do but did not do it. We may try to rationalize, to avoid

thinking of it, to repress the feelings, to lose ourselves in more activity. We [310] are

Value Ethics 335

divided within ourselves and it is not a pleasant experience. The confused conscience is

pulled in contrary directions by various feelings and arguments; it may be a difficult

issue and feelings conflict; from one point of view we approve, but from another we

disapprove; this creates a feeling of tension and anxiety that is only resolved when we

have sorted out the feelings and arguments. The doubtful conscience is still unsure;

sufficient information may not be available to resolve the doubt; it may be a grey area,

neither white nor black; there may be intrinsic ambiguities, contradictions, and conflicts

in reaching a resolution. There is a strong feeling element in acting according to one’s

conscience.

This would seem to be what Aristotle meant by happiness. He insisted that

happiness is found by living according to a life of virtue. He admitted that there were

certain minimum conditions of physical comfort and health, which seem to be

prerequisites of happiness. Finally, he insisted that happiness was to be found in the

exercise of our highest faculties on their highest object for the longest period of time. So

surely it is knowing what is of ultimate value, and living according to those convictions

that constitutes a happy life.

One could talk of a higher level of happiness and satisfaction to be found in

Beatitude, in the satisfaction of our religious aspirations. It could be described in many

ways, as unconditional love, as peace of soul, as holiness, as union with God, as

consolation, as a life of grace, and the like. It is a higher satisfaction, a higher feeling,

the satisfaction of a higher aspiration.34

It seems then that there is a hierarchy of feelings and that it runs parallel to the

hierarchy or structure of cognitional activities. Self-appropriation calls for such a

discernment and differentiation of feelings. We have shown above – in a somewhat

inadequate and incomplete manner – how this can be done. Discernment of the two

classes of feelings – sensitive and spiritual – are of great importance when it comes to


336

answering the question, How do you feel about that? It is important in discerning our

intellectual and moral state, our fidelity or lack of fidelity to the transcendental precepts.

Lonergan consistently and often referred to this structure of feelings – without [311]

ever calling it a hierarchy of feelings. He pointed out with great discernment the

functions of the desire to know; he spoke often of the normativity immanent and

operative in cognitional activities; he explicitly differentiated this normativity into the

transcendental precepts proper to each level of consciousness; finally, he spoke in terms

of apprehensions of value, the intentional response to the intelligible, to the true and to

what is of value.

7 Unity of Cognitive and Affective Components

We have identified the activities of knowing truth and value in our reprise of

cognitional structure and in extending it to the activities of questioning value,

deliberative insight and the judgment of value. We called this the cognitive component

of the judgment of value. We have now identified the normativity operating within these

activities of understanding; we have elaborated on the desire to know, the transcendental

precepts and distinguished two basic classes of feeling operating within these activities.

We have called this the affective component of the judgment of value. The question now

arises as to how these two components unite in a single judgment of value. We usually

operate from a dualistic scheme where, if you emphasize feeling, to that extent, you

exclude understanding; and if you emphasize understanding, to that extent, you exclude

feeling. What we were looking for was notions of feeling and understanding that would

be inclusive rather then exclusive. Can the judgment be fully cognitive and fully

affective at the same time? It is now that we need this inclusive notion, as we put

together reasoning and feeling in a single judgment of value. Feelings pushing

understanding along from the outside will not do; then feeing would be extrinsic and not

a component of the judgment itself. It is a synthesis we are looking for and not just

Value Ethics 337

sticking two diverse things together from the outside: "Now you get the synthesis of this

feeling side and the cognitional side on the level of the question, ‘is this worthwhile?’

the judgment of value, the decision, the action. So when you bring in the fourth (level),

you move into a philosophy of action. You're up there with Blondel." 35

Our position is that the cognitive component and the affective component, far

from being exclusive, include one another, demand [312] one another, require one

another and are intrinsic constituents of the judgment of value. They are distinct realities

but not separate. The simplest illustration is surely the relationship between the desire to

know and the activities of knowing. Can you have a desire to know, that is separate from

the activities of knowing? Can you have activities of knowing, that are not driven by the

desire to know? Is it difficult to view the desire to know and the activities of knowing as

complementary, constitutive, intrinsic elements leading to a judgment of value? Perhaps

it is easier to identify the activities of cognitional structure, and not so easy to discern the

dynamism, the intention, the desire that is moving the activities forward – from the

inside not from the outside. The unfolding of knowing might be compared to a double

helix of feelings and activities, intertwined at every stage, depending on one another and

supporting one another. The analogy limps, however, as it suggests that the affective and

cognitional components are two separate elements. Let us use some historical references

to further explore the unity of these two components in a judgment of value.

Conceptualism and Intellectualism. It seems Aquinas was very familiar with

the natural desire to know God, he acknowledged that philosophy begins in wonder, his

writings were governed by Questions and not by Theses. He recognized most of the

activities of knowing and the dynamism operating within them. He was always open to

further understanding and changed his position if necessary. His was an open system, a

way of asking questions rather than a list of answers.


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This is in great contrast to the conceptualism of neo-Thomism of the 19th

century. The conceptualists concentrated on concepts, definitions, syllogisms, inductive

and deductive arguments, propositions, ultimate and permanent truths. Theirs was a

closed system of theses and propositions. It was not open to further questions. It was

permanent truth. Their moral philosophy was a system of applying universally valid

rules to concrete cases. It was a basically static system of the interrelationships of

concepts by definition and division. This is what reason meant, the ability to define and

divide concepts. It was a [313] view of reason shared by the Enlightenment and by many

modern thinkers, who should know better.

In the revival of Thomistic studies, the transcendental Thomists, first Marechal,36

then Coreth,37 Rahner38 and Lonergan, rediscovered the dynamism of intellect. They

discovered intellectual light, the process of questioning, the power to discover new

truths, that intellect contained within itself the criterion of truth. They discovered the real

Saint Thomas as opposed to the Thomism of the Neo-Scholastics. They rediscovered the

flexibility of intellect and the active and passive intellect as one functioning mind.

Lonergan made his own contribution to this movement, especially in the Verbum

articles, when he rediscovers the intellectualism of St Thomas. He discovered knowing

as a self-assembling structure of operations moved along by the dynamic of questioning.

He discovered the source of concepts in the mind’s reflection on the limits and extend of

its own insights. He discovered the normativity intrinsic to the process of knowing. He

discovered intellect not as subject to the rules of logic, but as the source of the rules of

logic. Logical rules apply to arguments from the outside. The mind operates according to

rules which are of the very nature of reasoning. He discovered a mind that is intrinsically

dynamic, on the move, never satisfied, always creative. He discovered the importance of

the unrestricted desire to know, and what he later identified as the transcendental

precepts.

Value Ethics 339

Now it seems to me that the conceptualists would have no problem with the

cognitive component of a judgment of value. They are quite at home with concepts and

propositions, and the judgment looks like a proposition. But they seem to have excluded

the affective element, they seem to have excluded the role of the desire to know in the

dynamic unfolding of knowledge. They were not seeking further understanding, but

closed system. Hence the dominance of logic rather than method. Conceptualism

illustrates what happens to philosophy or theology, when the affective component of

knowing is excluded. It becomes static rather then dynamic, closed system rather than

open system. What Lonergan has rediscovered is the affective [314] component, the

feeling component, the normative component, the intentional component, which is

essential to the unfolding process from question to answer.

Active and Passive Intellect. Aristotle distinguished very clearly between an

Active and a Passive Intellect. He claimed that the Active Intellect must be in act itself

in order to make the potentially intelligible to become actually intelligible. The function

of the Active Intellect was to throw light on the phantasm, so that the intellect can

abstract the form from the matter. It is the Active Intellect which initiates the process of

knowing. The Passive Intellect, by contrast, is receptive, it is the tabula rasa (empty

blackboard) waiting to be filled. It receives the forms immaterially, so that knowing is a

becoming, an identity, but not as in material reception of forms.

Aristotle’s account of knowing is in metaphysical terminology, inevitably. So

knowledge was elaborated in metaphysical terms in the Islamic tradition, in the Middle

Ages and in Scholasticism. Sometimes this elaboration and differentiation was done

fruitfully and correctly as in Aquinas. Sometimes there were very strange interpretations

of the reality of Passive and Active Intellect. Of particular importance was Aquinas’

insistence that there is one human Intellect in each person and that Passive and Active

are not to be separated into two Intellects.


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Our task in intentionality analysis is to translate the correct metaphysical account

of knowing into recognizable, verifiable, psychological terminology. Aristotle’s crucial

distinction was between Active and Passive Intellect; our major distinction is between

the desire to know and the activities of knowing. I do not think there is a direct, perfect

parallel between these distinctions, but it does serve as a metaphor or guide. Hence we

can use as an approximate analogy, the Active Intellect is to the Passive Intellect, as the

desire to know is to the activities of knowing. The Active and Passive Intellects

cooperate and complement one another, and form one Intellect for one knowing. In

Aquinas there is one Intellect and it is immaterial. In our self-appropriation we affirm a

cognitive and an affective component and they form a unity and the unity is a spiritual

reality. [315]

Structure and Content. Finally, Lonergan appeals to the image of structure

and content in order to show the unity of the cognitive and affective components in a

judgment of value. The structure of the judgment of fact and the structure of the

judgment of value is the same; but they differ in content, the judgment of fact aiming at

truth, the judgment of value aiming at value. They are the same in that they are both

judgments, different in that one aims at truth, the other at value. The structure we have

analyzed in terms of the questioning, the deliberative insight and the judgment;

deliberative insight we analysed in terms of the hypothetical syllogism. In what way can

we now think of the intentional response to value as the content of a judgment of value?

It might help to take a parallel from third level activities. The question for

reflection intends the truth, reflective insight grasps the truth of the sufficiency of the

evidence for the judgment, the judgment expresses the truth in an affirmation or denial.

Lonergan clearly distinguished between the proper content of the judgment and its

borrowed content.39 The proper content of the judgment is its specific contribution to

cognitional process, namely, the yes or no of affirming the truth. So, one can say that

Value Ethics 341

truth is the proper content of the judgment of fact. The direct borrowed content is found

in the question, to which one answers yes or no; the indirect borrowed content emerges

in the reflective act linking the question and the judgment. In other words, the proper

content of questions for reflection, reflective insight and judgments of fact is the truth

simply as such. The borrowed content is the specific question, the specific evidence, that

is judged to be sufficient for the positing of the judgment.

If truth is the proper content of third level activities, then surely value or the

good is the proper content of activities at the fourth level of consciousness. On this

parallel the proper content of the judgment of value is precisely value as such; the

borrowed content is the value of this specific answer, grasped in deliberative insight, to

this particular question for deliberation.

When we affirm that the intentional response to value is the proper content of the

judgment of value what are we affirming? We [316] are affirming that in the question

for deliberation, what we are properly intending is the value to be found in this specific

question or situation. What is properly grasped in deliberative insight is the value to be

found in this person or this alternative or this action. The judgment of value properly

expresses, affirms, accepts this value in this particular case. Intentional response is the

dynamism of the process, sets the process in motion, seeks out alternatives and

possibilities, sets the criterion to be satisfied and gives its blessing to the judgment of

value in a good conscience.

It is in this sense that Lonergan says that intentional responses reveal values,

point to values, apprehend values, recognize values, are sensitive to true values. Never

does Lonergan say that feelings know values. Such would be a nonsense. If it is

knowing, then, it is cognitional; if it is feeling, then, it is affective; if it is willing, then, it

is volitional.


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We are claiming that the cognitive and affective elements are constitutive

elements in the judgment of value. We are admitting that in this clearly specified sense,

knowledge is affective. We could use the term affective cognition in this clearly

specified sense.40 This term is open to misinterpretation on the lines of feelings knowing

values and so we use it rather sparingly.

8 How do you feel about that?

We posed this question at the beginning of this long chapter in an effort to keep

our feet on the ground, and to avoid getting lost in the clouds of abstract terminology.

Our focus was how feelings enter into correct judgments of value. We imagined a

counsellor asking a student how he feels about being a doctor; and how a married person

might feel contemplating a possible divorce. Let us see whether this long expose on

feelings has helped us to assess the proper role of feelings in these situations.

First, let us note that the question is legitimate and necessary. We should attend

to our feeling reactions in deciding a career, in passing moral judgment, in making

decisions about our interpersonal relationships and way of life. We need to discern the

role of feeling be-[317]cause our feeling orientation can both help and hinder the process

of correct value judgments and decisions. Feelings play a legitimate, necessary and

important part in our judgments of value, our decisions and actions. What is needed is

discernment about which feelings are influencing us and in which direction are they

pointing us.

But secondly, we need to ask, which feelings help and which feelings hinder the

process of moral evaluation? We have many feeling reactions – some superficial,

transient, self-regarding; some deep, disinterested, permanent, intending the good of

value. We used the metaphor of a symphony to situate the various levels and kinds of

feelings. So we need to discriminate within the affective dimension. Which feeling

Value Ethics 343

should we listen to, follow, encourage? Which feelings need to be resisted, controlled,

and discouraged?

We have given the technical terminology and essential characteristics of two

groups of feelings in distinguishing intentional response to value as opposed to

intentional response to satisfaction. Putting this into more familiar language we can say

that the group of feelings that point in the direction of good evaluations are the deepest

and best inclinations of the human heart. They are the feelings that urge us to be

attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible and in love. They are the feelings that lead

us to true values, that when implemented constitute us as good persons. These feelings

intend true values, good decisions and consequent implementation. They are

disinterested as opposed to selfish. They point to the good rather than to the merely

satisfying. If they are followed, they lead to a happy conscience, a peace of mind, a

tranquillity of heart, which is very close to the happiness we all aspire to. We did the

right thing – even if we lost money in the process.

Feelings that intend satisfaction are in themselves morally neutral. Sensitive

appetites seeking satisfaction continue to operate in human persons. There is not

necessarily a contradiction between pleasure and value. However, there can be a conflict

of interests. If sensitive pleasures become an end in themselves, if they are contrary to

true values, if they become selfish, self-interested and self-regarding, they tend to

oppose the process of good valuing and deciding. They in-[318]troduce bias, they

override deeper feelings, they change the orientation of the person, then invite

rationalization and excuses and result in an unhappy conscience.

Feelings, even the intentional response to value, do not by themselves know

values. Feelings point in a certain direction, they guide a process, they are sensitive to

values in a situation, they recognize value, but they never know values. It is only when

the affective and cognitive aspects fuse together in a deliberative insight that we can


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know value in the resultant judgment of value. The intentional response to value initiates

the process by suggesting, or being sensitive to the value issue. It drives the process

forward by the felt moral obligation to assemble information, deliberate about possible

alternatives and consequences, judge truly the value of various courses of action, decide

wisely and implement willingly. The reward is feelings of a happy conscience.

We have assigned a very precise, clearly defined role to feelings in moral

evaluations, decisions and actions. Spiritual feelings make a primary essential

contribution and enter into the very intrinsic constitution of the knowledge of value.

Sensitive feelings can help by reorienting the momentum of sensitivity in the direction

of value; or they may hinder the search for true value by seeking their own finality in

satisfaction and going in an opposite direction to the search for value.

Some attempts have been made to establish ethics on the basis of feeling alone.

The empiricists have been doing this for a long time, but in more recent times, you have

an ethic of love, an ethic of sympathy, an ethic of the heart, etc.41 One presumes that

love, sympathy, empathy, the heart, etc are good things in themselves. But the question

is love of what? Of whom? For what reason? Terrorists love disorder and chaos.

Thieves love money and property. One can be so perverted as to love evil and hate the

good. Love taken in isolation can never support an ethics of value. Similarly, for

sympathy, empathy, compassion, pity, etc. The heart of light can also be the heart of

darkness. [319]

Emotional reactions of this sort can never by themselves be a sufficient criterion

for a judgment of value. You might react very negatively to a person on first

impressions; he doesn't dress well; seems to have little to contribute, seems to be a

nonentity; but as you get to know the person you find a deep perceptive mind, a kind

heart and a wonderful vision of life. You might feel that a politician is corrupt and self-

interested; but you can discover that it is the media who are presenting a deliberately

Value Ethics 345

negative image of the person. You might have a very negative view of the role of

multinationals but if you examine the economics and the details you might have to move

to a more positive feeling towards them; or vice versa.

Even the intention of value is blind. It points in a certain direction, is useful in

emergencies but does not of itself give knowledge of values. A developed sensitivity

helps to find direction, when there is no time to think, or when little information

available, or when we are faced with a new situation. But by itself feeling is blind, does

not give knowledge of values and is one component in four in the totality of a judgment

of value.

9 Summary of a Position

Let us state our position on feelings and values very precisely and briefly as a

concluding summary.

(1) The activities that constitute the cognitive component of the judgment of

value are clearly differentiated in the diagram of the integral cognitional structure of

truth and value. Formulated questions lead to insights and definitions; the question for

reflection leads to reflective insight and the judgment of truth; the question of value

leads to deliberative insight and the judgment of value.

(2) We can now define intentional feelings as the affective element that: initiates

activity, gives direction to activities, intends a goal, motivates towards achievement, is

satisfied in achievement. This applies to both sensitive feelings and spiritual feelings, to

both attraction and repulsion. We define feelings in terms of their function in relation to

sensitive and intellectual activities. It is a functional definition. [320]

(3) We are obliged to distinguish two classes of feelings. They are both feelings

in the sense defined above, but their origin and goal are quite different. I can find no

better terminology that that of ‘spiritual’ and ‘sensitive’ to differentiate these two

classes.


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(4) Spiritual feelings are the desire to know, the transcendental imperatives, and

the intentional response to value. These are spiritual in the technical sense of not

originating in sense, not being intrinsically conditioned by space and time, by being

innate and a priori as spontaneous capacity, by being permanent and deep felt

obligations, by always leading to moral development and conversion.

(5) Sensitive feelings are biologically based, are intrinsically conditioned by

space and time, are forms of aggression, affiliation or anxiety. They entirely dominate in

the behaviour of animals, in initiating response, directing aggression towards a goal,

motivating and satisfying in achievement.

(6) In the child sensitive feelings predominate; but there emerges the desire to

know, the obligation to be honest, truthful and good, which controls, redirects,

penetrates, transforms sensitive feelings into an integrated affective life of the mature

moral adult. There are a multitude of interrelations between sensitive and spiritual

feelings; they are distinct but not separate.

(7) The cognitive and affective components form a unity between the activities

of knowing and the underlying desire to know. The desire initiates the activities, directs

the activities, motivates the activities, is the dynamism of the activities, is what gives the

content and criterion to the activities. For a true judgment of value you must (1) perform

the activities of grasping the virtually unconditioned of value issuing in a judgment of

value, and (2) satisfy the desire to know in that no further pertinent questions arise.

These two criteria are equivalent. The feeling of moral obligation and moral arguments

are both involved in a happy or unhappy conscience.

(8) All knowledge of value is affective cognition in this clearly defined sense.

Without a desire to know, could we ever know anything? Without performing the

activities, the desire to know remains a frustrated feeling going nowhere. It is the affects

that we have called spir-[321]itual that constitute the dynamism of knowing. Sensitive

Value Ethics 347

affects can help or hinder both the search for truth and value; they help by way of

cooperation and reinforcement, being transformed or co-opted by the desire to know;

they hinder by seeking sensitive goals that conflict with truth and value.

(9) We recognize the importance of this feeling component in moral philosophy

and life. Discernment of the different feelings is a crucial aspect of moral judgment and

moral conscience. Self-appropriation of feelings seems to be still in its infancy.

(10) Moral obligation is situated in the transcendental precept ‘to be responsible’.

It cannot be derived from practical or speculative intellect; it is not knowledge but desire

for knowledge of value; it is not a categorical imperative derived from concepts of law

and duty; it is not the knowledge of first principles of the practical intellect. It is a

spiritual feeling, a desire to know what is of value, to seek, to become, to live according

to values. It is a felt obligation which, through the activities of deliberation and

judgment, issues in moral knowledge. Moral education must include the cognitive and

affective components.


(1) There are a multitude of sensitive feelings but also a hierarchy of spiritual feelings.

We should appeal to the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart and follow

them – but often we do the opposite.

(2) Job, family, career, are the most important value judgments that we make in life.

Usually a balance has to be reached; you cannot do all that you would like to do. Value

of family, spouse, children, career, prospects, money, future, yourself and others, all are

in play in a concrete judgment of value, followed by decision. Cognitive, affective, and

volitional elements are involved. There are no simple answers.

(3) Being bound by the truth, being obliged to be responsible, desiring wholeness, the

joy of a clear conscience, are difficult to account for in terms of sensitive feelings. [322]

(4) We often consider sympathy to be an unqualified good. But some can be sympathetic


348

to terrorists, to rebels, to criminals, to abusers. Sympathy should be for the right reason,

in the right amount, for what is good.

Similarly, we think of love as always good; but some can love evil, love stealing, love

destruction, love pleasure. Real love is seeking and rejoicing in the truly good, which is

known in a correct judgment of value

To decide on a policy of non-violence, as Ghandi, was a noble and heroic path. But

whether this can be universalized to families, to societies, to war situations, is doubtful.

Many difficult judgments of value are involved.

(5) Reverse of the above. We should hate evil and to that extent evil persons. We should

be angry at injustice, corruption, abuse of power, etc. It is hard to think of an example

of revenge as such, which would be commendable.

(6) You might list: 1. A steak, medium rare, with onions and chips on the side. 2. A

conversation with good friends. 3. Finishing a difficult task well. 4. Being at peace with

your conscience and God. 5. Listening to great music. There are clearly different kinds

of satisfaction, not all of them bad!

(7) A person with no sense of moral obligation is by definition a psychopath and you

hope never to meet one. In all normal persons, including criminals, there is some

remnant of a conscience, a sense of responsibility, an obligation to tell the truth, to

honour our word. It is when normal becomes psychic illness, compulsion, repression,

addiction, that responsibility is lost and a person is classified as insane and hence not

responsible. The moral ‘ought’ comes from inside, it is what we are as moral persons.

(8) Freud found the libido (a chaos of feelings for pleasure, parricide, incest) and

claimed this was what we are at our deepest level. But was he right? This does not fit in

with my experience of counselling or self-appropriation. I feel that the [323]

transcendental precepts represent our deepest and best inclinations.

Endnotes

Value Ethics 349

1 Method in Theology, 38. 2 Method in Theology, 7. 3 Method in Theology, 30. 4 Method in Theology, 13. 5 Method in Theology, 30. 6 Insight, 624. 7 Insight, 624. 8 B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, 277. 9 B. Lonergan, A Second Collection, 82. 10 Method in Theology, 11. 11 Method in Theology, 11. 12 Method in Theology, 12. 13 Method in Theology, 12. 14 Insight, 624. 15 Method in Theology, 11. 16 Method in Theology, 31. 17 Insight, 538-43. 18 Insight, 494. 19 Insight, 492. 20 Dylan Evans, Emotion: The Science of Sentiment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 21 Ibid., 7-14. 22 B. Lonergan, “Finality, Love, and Marriage”, Collection: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol 4, (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988), 26. 23 Insight, 538. 24 Insight, 647-49. 25 Insight, 649. [324]


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26 Elizabeth Morelli, “The Feeling of Freedom” in Timothy Fallon and Philip Boo Riley, Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. , (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). 103. 27 Ibid., 101. 28 Ibid., 102. 29 Frederick Crowe, S.J. “Lonergan at the Edges of Understanding”, in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 20, 2, (2002), 175-198. 30 Ibid., 184. 31 Method in Theology, 10. 32 Method in Theology, 31. 33 B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 223. 34 See Oscar Lukefahr, The Search for Happiness: Four Levels of Emotional and Spiritual Growth, (Missouri: Ligouri, 2002). 35 B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 223. 36 Joseph Marechal, Le Point de depart de la metaphysique: Lecons sur le developpement historique et theorique du probleme de la connaissance, (Bruxelles: L’Edition universelle; Paris: Deselee, De Brouwer, 1944-1949). 37 Emerich Coreth, Metaphysics, trans by J. Donceel, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968). 38 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968). 39 Insight, 300-301. 40 Our difficulty with this phrase as used by Michael Vertin is that he does not seem to clearly specify the meaning. See previous discussion in Chapter Four Section 3.2. 41 John Fletcher, Situation Ethics, (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1966) is really an ethic of love; love is the only absolute. Charles Shelton, Morality of the Heart: A Psychology for the Christian Moral Life (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997). He bases himself on empathy. Max Scheler also seem to rely on emotional intuitionism and hence largely on emotion.

7

Deciding – Free and Responsible

As the fourth level is the principle of self-control, it is responsible for proper functioning on the first three levels… Therewith vanish two notions: the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from reasonable decision; and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing between good and evil.1


(1) If you are choosing a University for post-graduate studies, what steps would you take to ensure you make a good decision? (2) Do we choose our own personal moral values, e.g. honesty, loyalty? In what sense is this a choice? (3) Identify a bad moral decision that you made in your own life. What led you to make this decision? What feelings were present? What intention had you in mind? How did you feel afterwards? Can you improve in good decision-making? (4) Are prisoners free? In what sense? (5) Are rich people more free than poor people? In what sense? [326] (6) Is a good moral person more free than a depraved person? In what sense? (7) Are we equally free to choose either good or evil? (8) Can you know clearly what is the right thing to do and still not do it? How does that come about? Can you know clearly and distinctly what is the wrong thing to do and still do it?

1 Introduction

We are basing our analysis of values on Lonergan's enumeration of the three

components of the judgment of value. Having dealt in detail with the first two elements,

knowledge and intentional response, we now come to the third component which he

states as: "Thirdly, there is the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence

constituted by the judgment of value itself."2 In the same paragraph he elaborates:

"Finally, the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to


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the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that

one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an

authentic human being or an unauthentic one." These statements are not self-

explanatory. One asks what is this "initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence

constituted by the judgment of value itself"? What is this notion of moral self-

transcendence? We are looking for the components of the judgment of value and we

find that somehow the judgment of value is itself one of the components. This seems to

involve some element of circularity; but is it the vicious circularity of logic or the

benign circularity of human developing.

This third component seems to include two distinct elements that are best

treated separately. There is the obvious element of self-transcendence, but also there is

the implicit element of choosing, deciding, free responsibility – the possibility of

deciding for or against self-transcendence. Everyone has the possibility of self-

transcendence but there are those who decide to respond to that aspiration and those

who refuse or hesitate or compromise. What is this mysterious power to say yes or no,

to assent or dissent, to freely decide as [327] responsible persons. So in this chapter we

will deal with the notion of free decision and in the next chapter the notion of self-

transcendence. These are distinct notions of considerable importance for moral

judgments, compacted here in Lonergan's third component, which we will expand into

two distinct elements of free deciding (Chapter 7) and self-transcendence (Chapter 8).

We have defined the cognitive and the affective components of the judgment of

value as intrinsic constituent parts of the judgment of value: there is the element of

judging or knowing or understanding and there is the element of value intended by the

desire to know and do the good. Now we are moving to the context in which this

happens – the human person who becomes, grows, develops or declines; who does so

freely, responsibly, deciding and choosing which direction to move in. I would define

Value Ethics 353

these as extrinsic elements to the judgment of value, setting conditions for the

possibility of judging, establishing the context in which affirming values makes sense.

They are necessary but extrinsic conditions for valuing.

Deciding can be regarded as the volitional element, the free deciding to seek

value and become centres of benevolence and beneficence. If we decide that we do not

want to make a particular judgment of value, we will usually find a device by which we

avoid it. We do not reach good value judgments without deciding to consider the

possibilities, to weight the evidence, to face the alternatives and consequences. Hence

deciding can be considered as the efficient cause of the process, the extrinsic but

necessary condition for the possibility of asking, deliberating, affirming and

implementing judgments of value.

2 Identifying Deciding and Choice

Deciding is a distinct activity from knowing, desiring, wishing and the like. In

this section we explore the characteristics of this activity of deciding and the

implications for values and moral behaviour. We are facing the question, To what extent

and in what sense do we choose our values? [328]

The Medievals argued in terms of a faculty psychology and argued strenuously

on the relations of priority or inferiority between intellect and will. Their method was to

start from acts, deduce powers from which the acts proceeded, deduce faculties as the

basis of these powers. The Voluntarists argued in favour of the superiority of will on the

grounds that (1) the corruption of the will is greater than the corruption of the intellect;

(2) the will is essentially free whereas the intellect is bound by necessary truths; (3)

even though the will is dependent on the intellect to know the good, the will can also

command and influence the intellect and hence is a superior cause; (4) in heaven we are

united to God primarily by the will and only secondarily by the intellect. The

Intellectualists argued for the priority of the intellect arguing that the intellect possesses


354

its object by identity whereas the will tends towards its object but does not possess it;

the will can only tend towards the good known by intellect and hence the intellect is the

superior faculty. The relationship between intellect and will was a very complicated

matter with much ‘dialogue’ between two faculties. We can keep these points in the

background but our task is to return to the activity of deciding, return to intentionality

analysis and do some empirical investigation on the relationship between the activities

of knowing values, deciding about action, and implementing the decisions. We find that

complications remain but at least we can establish the relationship on the basis of

observable fact – the facts of psychological experience.

Lonergan puts 'deciding' on the fourth level of consciousness, along with

questions for deliberation and judgments of value, along with all that is involved in

religious belief and love. It may be more helpful to think of the four levels of

cognitional activity as in our diagram, with deciding as a distinct volitional activity. The

four levels of cognitional structure culminating in the knowledge of the judgment of

value have a certain parallel and commonality. There are clear parallels between the

questions, the insights, and the products of the insights. The levels can easily be related

to one another by way of sublation and dependence.

Volitional activity seems to be quite different from cognitional. There is a

question but it is simply a matter of 'yes' or 'no', assent or [329] dissent. The question is,

will I do it or will I not do it? It is not a question as, What is the best thing to do? as that

is a question for deliberation. Hamlet's question, to be or not to be? to commit suicide or

not to commit suicide? presents simple alternatives for decision. There is an activity of

deciding but it is in no way like having an insight, it is the person simply assenting or

dissenting; there is no assembly of evidence, no hypothetical syllogism, no arguing for

or against as all that by definition has been done in the process of deliberation. There is

Value Ethics 355

a product of deciding in action but action proceeds from decision not in the way that a

concept proceeds from an insight or a judgment proceeds from reflective insight.

One might think that deciding enters into the picture only after the judgment of

value in terms of implementing the value in action: this is the best thing to do, then, go

and do it. In that way of looking at it, deciding comes after the knowledge of value. But

Lonergan points out in the citation at the beginning of this chapter that the fourth level

is responsible for the proper unfolding of the first three levels. Deciding is involved

from the very beginning of the unfolding of cognitional process – in choosing the proper

unfolding of the pure detached unrestricted desire to know and in eliminating bias,

illegitimate short cuts, hasty judgments, self-interested opinions, the interference of

prejudice and fear. Having insights is an aspect of cognitional activity; but we decide to

establish the conditions in which these insights are likely to occur. We pass judgment

when a sufficiency of evidence has been grasped; but the indecisive person may still

hesitate; the rash person may have already acted before the evidence was complete.

Cognitional process unfolds properly if we decide for understanding, decide for the

truth, and decide against self-interest and distortion. The proper unfolding of the process

of knowing is simultaneously the implementation of the decision for truth.

Let us be clear about terminology. Deciding covers a wide range of general

decisions, specific decisions, decisions for or against any kinds of actions. We use the

term 'choice', when there is a clear decision to be made between alternatives: you

choose A instead of B. So it is clear that choice is also a decision. We also use the term

'to will' in [330] the sense of ‘to decide.’ As well as using the terminology of deciding

and choosing, we can continue to use the terms to will, willingness, even the will. We

do not want to fall back into a metaphysical connotation of the term 'will'; by it we

simply mean that, if a person actually wills something, then he has the power to do

so. Hence for us 'to will' is to decide; willingness is a inclination or readiness to decide;


356

the activity of willing is the same a deciding. We can continue to refer to the 'will'

without any connotation of a faculty psychology meaning simply the potentiality to

decide. Our task now is to identify in our own consciousness these acts of deciding,

choosing, willing, in a very concrete personal way.

2.1 What Deciding is Not

We will make a series of points all aimed at identifying the activity of deciding

and distinguishing it from other mental activities. Let us distinguish deciding from the

judgment of value; from the execution; from desires; from imaginings or wishes; and

from animal 'deciding'.

(1) It is clear that the act of deciding is different from the judgment of value. The

judgment of value is cognitional, knowing values; the deciding is volitional, willing the

values. You can make a judgment of value and then decide (a) to implement the

judgment, (b) to ignore the judgment, or (c) to go quite contrary to the judgment.

Decision is not necessitated by the judgment of value. St Augustine identified a time in

his life, when he had made the value judgment that his life was a moral shambles, but he

could not bring himself to decide to change it. Judgment of value is cognitive; the

decision is volitional, it moves us to action. Judgment of value is not the cause of

deciding, it does not necessitate a particular decision: the decision is free. As we will see

from Aristotle, there are many ways in which we can make the right judgment and still

make a wrong decision. This surely helps to show that they are different activities.

Perhaps the key difference is manifested in the question of value, as distinct from

to the question for decision. The question of value asks, Is this the right thing to do? Is

this the best thing to do? What are the alternatives? What are the advantages and

disadvantages? They are questions for deliberative insight and judgment, Yes or No

[331] to a proposition. The question for decision is quite different, Am I going to do it or

not? Am I going to assent of dissent? To be or not to be? Am I going to commit suicide

Value Ethics 357

or not? The question for decision may very well in the concrete initiate a review of the

judgment of value and the recurrence of questions for deliberation, but this simply means

that deliberation is continuing; in principle the two kinds of questioning are quite

different.

(2) The activity of deciding is distinct from the execution. You can decide to do

something, but the execution may not be for months. You book a holiday and pay for it,

but it does not happen for three months. You decide to propose marriage, but it might

take weeks or longer to share this with the Beloved. You decide to steal, but the

opportunity only presents itself once a month.

If some time intervenes, you can change your decision! The gospel story tells of

two sons. One says, Yes, he will go to work in the farm – but in the end he does not go.

The others say, No, I will not go – but in the end he does go. Both made decisions and

both changed their decisions. But that does not alter the reality that they first made a

decision, then changed it. Decision is a mental act which is distinct from judgment of

value and also from execution.

(3) We must distinguish deciding from desiring. We have already identified in

detail the various desires of the human heart – the deep desires for wholeness and

goodness and the more superficial desires for sensitive satisfaction. Aristotle defined

choice as intellectual appetite and the Medievals defined will as spiritual appetite. This

may have led to some confusion, as such phrases are conflating two very different

realities of desiring and deciding. We are clearly distinguishing between desire for value

and the deciding for value; the sensible desire for pleasure and the decision for pleasure.

For desiring, no matter how noble, is not deciding. Desiring requires deciding to move to

action. A strong desire for truth and goodness makes it easier to decide for truth and

goodness. A strong desire for sensitive satisfaction makes it more difficult to decide

against such satisfactions. To decide to go along with desire is easy as we are carried


358

along by desire. To go against desire is difficult; it is an uphill struggle; we have to [332]

grit our teeth and get it done; but sometimes that is the way it has to be.

(4) We must distinguish free decisions from idle thoughts, spontaneous

imaginings and various wishes. Imaginings, feelings, and thoughts can come into our

minds spontaneously, without our will or consent. We can imagine ourselves

volunteering to go on the Peace Corps, or giving to charity, or visiting a sick neighbour,

but that is not, as yet, a decision to do so. We can imagine evil things happening to our

enemy, but as long as they are idle wishful-thinking, we have not yet decided to inflict

evil. It is quite a different thing to plan intentionally to do some evil deed to our enemy.

Sexual fantasies can arise spontaneously; as such we are not responsible. At a certain

stage, when we become aware of such imaginings, we become responsible either for

continuing or not continuing that line of thinking. Idly discussing the possibility of

stealing is not the same as the decision to steal. So we must distinguish between feelings,

imaginings, thinking, deliberating and deciding. Deciding is a distinct activity by which

we deliberately, consciously, willingly decide to do good or evil. Wishes, desires, hopes

and fears are distinct from decisions.

(5) Animals eat some foods and refuse others; they cooperate with a shepherd or

resist; they move in this direction or that. Are they choosing? A parallel with cognitional

activities might help. It takes a long time to sort out the question, are animals intelligent?

To do that you have to distinguish what animals are capable of doing, and what they are

not capable of doing. They do have five external senses and three internal senses; they

have emotions, they can remember they have an imagination. They can learn within the

limits of memory and imagination. They can communicate feelings and warnings and

desires and needs. But they cannot ask questions, know universals, formulate correct

definitions, consider evidence and affirm the truth of judgments. By way of metaphor we

Value Ethics 359

can perhaps speak of animal 'intelligence' but only in the sense that their memory or

sense learning is faster than we expected.

There is no need to appeal to a free act of decision to account for animal

behaviour. They do act, they move, you can say that they [333] choose this food rather

than that food, but you do not need to appeal to a spiritual faculty for this. Animals are

moved by instinct, by natural appetites and desires and needs, by biological responses, by

their sense knowing, memory and imagination. Animals are simply responding to

external stimuli as creatures living in the biological pattern of experience and the drives,

needs, impulses, appetites, feelings, reactions, laws characteristic of that level of

existence. Hence we do not need to invoke a spiritual faculty of deciding to account for

the random wanderings of a cow around a field. We should not project what goes on in

our minds into the brain of the animal. Just as animals do not have epistemological

problems, so also they do not have moral problems. We recognize the comedy of

accusing a goat in a court of law for eating a neighbour’s maize.

Humans are also animals and we feel the same reflexes, feelings, appetites, and

instincts – sometimes we act on such impulses. But the more we identify the activities of

judgments of value and human deliberate decision-making, the more we see how

ridiculous it is to talk about animal deciding. All of animal activity can be explained in

terms of biology, instincts, desires, needs, self-preservation, etc. Humans can go in the

opposite direction to biological needs and desires by an act of free deciding. They can

choose to fast, choose to feel pain rather than pleasure, take responsibility for their

actions, exercise self-control and self-determination, and choose moral values rather than

satisfactions.

(6) The decision is a mental act that seems to follow the judgment of value and

issues in action. Hence it is an activity which is proportionate to a judgment of value.

Just as judging and intending values are spiritual activities, so willing seems to be a


360

spiritual activity. Deciding is an activity that is invisible and sometimes hard to isolate

and identify. Judgment is a cognitional activity which is usually expressed in a statement

or proposition; but the actual affirmation or denial is an invisible mental act. By self-

appropriation you can learn to identify this act. Now we are working on decisions;

mental actions which we can distinguish and identify by careful self-appropriation. In

our daily lives we are making decisions all the time. Mostly it is without effort or drama

or excitement. Often in practice the decisions are [334] hard to distinguish from

judgments of value and execution; they happen so quickly and are so intimately

connected. But when faced with a long drawn out process of deciding, we may be able to

recognize (a) the various inputs into the deliberative insight and judgment of value, (b)

desires pulling us in opposing directions, (c) the responsibility of making the right

decision and (d) the carrying out of the decision, as distinct stages in the process.

2.2 What Deciding is

(1) Just as a judgment says yes or no to a hypothesis, so deciding says yes or no

to a possible course of action. In the context of judgment we use the terminology of

affirming or denying, so in the context of deciding we use the terminology of consent,

assent or its opposite dissent. Decision is saying yes or no to a possible course of action.

Consent and dissent are commonly used terminology's and indicate the common

acceptance that consent/dissent is different from affirmation/denial. The essential

definition of freedom is the will's ability to move itself or not to move itself, to decide or

not to decide, to assent or dissent.3

(2) There is no human life without decisions. Just as there is no avoiding values,

so also there is no avoiding decisions. All human voluntary action involves some kind of

habitual willingness or specific willingness to act. If actions are not voluntary, then they

are not human acts; they result from reflexes, instincts, involuntary reactions: we are not

responsible for such. To try to avoid decisions is already a decision. You decide, to

Value Ethics 361

decide or not to decide. A bureaucrat was being pestered by a subordinate to make a

decision. The bureaucrat replied, ‘The decision is that there will be no decision.’

(3) We normally associate decisions with actions: we decide to go to the cinema,

to eat a meal, to meet friends. But decision is also efficient cause of the judgment of

value. We decide to deliberate, we decide to consider alternatives, we decide to be

responsible and in the end we are willing to pass a judgment of value. We could consider

deciding as the efficient cause of the judgment of value – the efficient cause being what

makes it to be or to happen. Hence, it is an extrinsic [335] element, but also a necessary

condition for the occurrence of the judgment of value.

(4) Decisions are free. A sufficient and correct definition of freedom is simply the

ability to assent or dissent, to say Yes or No to a course of action. We will discuss this in

more detail later. Reason is bound by the evidence: if there is sufficient evidence and you

want to be reasonable, you are obliged to pass the judgment. The sufficiency of the

evidence requires the judgment, if we want to judge reasonably. You might say that the

sufficiency of the evidence is the formal cause of the judgment.

But the judgment of value is not the sufficient cause of the act of deciding. You

can know and not decide. The connection is contingent, not necessary. The will can go

against the judgment of value. It is possible to know what is the right thing to do, and

still not do it. Plato and Socrates presumed that if we know the right thing to do, we

would do it. Aristotle was more realistic. He visualizes about four ways in which we can

know the good and not do it.4 (a) He sees the possibility of having knowledge but not

using it; he seems to be distinguishing between deliberate conscious acts and those done

without reflection even though habitual knowledge is already there. We know that

cigarettes are bad for our health but put that at the back of our minds when we smoke. (b)

Errors may arise in the practical syllogism. We may admit that stealing is wrong but not

recognize that this particular act is a case of stealing. (c) Circumstances may prevent the


362

normal use of knowledge. We may have habitual knowledge but this is impaired if we

are asleep or mentally disturbed or in the grip of strong emotion. (d) We may know the

right thing to do but our desires are contrary and we do the opposite. So there are many

things that can happen between the correct judgment of values and its implementation in

appropriate decision and action.

(5) The originating cause of the decision is the person; the decision emerges from

the person and may conform to the judgment of value or may go against it. The decision

may follow conviction or it may follow desires for satisfaction. We can go against our

conscience, against our reason, against our feeling. We can choose to do evil [336] rather

than to do good. The originating cause of a voluntary action lies in the agent himself,

says Aristotle.5 We are responsible for our decisions. We make ourselves to be what we

are by our decisions. This is why moral values are so closely identified with personal

values, the value of the person as originating value.

(6) Just as there are many values and many contexts where values operate and

conflict, so there are many kinds of decisions to be made. We decide on what clothes to

wear, what to eat for breakfast, which transport to use to work, how to spend our leisure

time, what to study, what to do with our salary, and the like. All of these are decisions,

whether about social values, cultural values or economic or intellectual values. Our

special interest is in moral decision-making.

(7) The decision is of moral importance in its own right. Often we have

overemphasized the morality of actions, but it is in the decision that the real good or evil

seems to lie. Decision itself has moral import regardless of whether the action is carried

out or not. It is something which carries weight, is a step in the direction of self-

transcendence or a step in the opposite direction. To decide is itself an action which

carries enormous moral weight or value. It is often asserted that real evil or good comes

from the heart, from the inside, from one’s intentions, motivations and decisions.

Value Ethics 363

If a husband decides that he will be unfaithful to his wife, plans to meet a

girlfriend at a certain place, has everything all set up; but unfortunately falls off his

bicycle, breaks his wrist and ends up in hospital, has he been unfaithful, has he

committed a moral fault? The answer must be Yes, even though it did not come to the

full extent of implementation. He decided; he was fully committed to his decision; it was

a serious, deliberate, premeditated decision. By that decision he diminished himself and

sets himself on the way to being actually and fully unfaithful.

You can be put in jail for deciding, even though you never committed the crime.

Conspiracy means meeting with others with the deliberate intention of committing a

crime. Even if the crime is never committed you can be found guilty of conspiracy and

put in jail. Our society recognizes that the decision to commit a crime expressed in [337]

conversation with others is already a crime. The law also recognizes assault with intent

to cause bodily injury as a crime. Whether you succeeded in causing bodily harm or not

is something extra. ‘Loitering with intent’ also clearly recognizes that this person has

already decided to commit a crime and is just waiting for the appropriate time.

(8) We normally think of decisions in terms of specific actions or outcomes; we

decide to do something or not to do it. This is when we are in the mode of concern: we

are action oriented, something needs to be done, the decision leads to a specific

implementation. But we can distinguish complacency from concern.6 We can distinguish

acts of will which do not have immediate, direct, specific actions in mind – this would

seem to be the mode of complacency. We can think of complacency as simply accepting

goodness, rejoicing in beauty or success or development or peace. It is a deciding, but

issues in no specific action; it is an act of the will; it seems to change attitudes rather than

producing an action. We can think of this as accepting – who you are and what you are;

accepting both success and failure; accepting our lot in life, whether it be for better or for

worse. We can think of the attitude of acceptance in face of a diagnosis of terminal


364

illness, acceptance of the limitations of growing old, accepting the passivities of

diminishment, about which we can do little or nothing. In the end there is the acceptance

of inevitable death.

Contrary to acceptance, we can think of persons who resist, reject, resent, deny

their lot in life; persons who refuse to accept the diagnosis of their doctor and seek for a

doctor who will give the diagnosis they want; persons who resist and struggle against

death even to the last moment; persons who live their entire lives resentful and angry that

they are of limited intelligence or talent: persons who deny the aging process and pretend

to be eternally young; persons who are resentful or jealous or envious when they see

success and goodness in others and not in themselves. These too are acts of the will, a

mode of deciding, that does not issue in a specific action but rather in an attitude to life, a

stance taken in relation to something.

Complacency is an act of assent to goodness in general, a rejoicing in goodness,

an acceptance of limitation. It is a deciding but a [338] special kind of deciding. It is of

great importance as an attitude to life.

2.3 Emergence and Differentiation

(1) Intelligence emerges in the behaviour of the child, slowly and fitfully, in

reactions, recognition, gestures and finally language. Similarly and simultaneously we

can see the emergence of will and decision in the behaviour of the child. We can note the

acceptance of food or the refusal of food, consent with the will of the mother or dissent.

It is a tug of wills with the child testing the limits of tolerance of the parent. Children can

be described as wilful, stubborn, bold, disobedient, cooperative, good or bad. Just as

cognitive psychologists have traced the emergence of intelligence in the child, so other

psychologists have traced the moral development of the child from the earliest age. Pre-

eminent in this field as we have seen are Piaget, Erikson and Kohlberg. What we want to

stress is that deciding emerges concomitantly with knowing. It is not as if the first three

Value Ethics 365

levels of consciousness develop first and then the fourth. They emerge as an

undifferentiated bundle of actions and reactions. It is only later that they can be

differentiated and identified as distinct.

(2) Decisions are operative from the beginning of cognitional structure. Just

because we put deciding at the fourth level, does not mean that we cannot make a

decision until we have already performed all the other preceding activities. We are

already deciding to ask questions at the level of intelligence: to be intelligent. We decide

to operate in the intellectual pattern of experience, we decide to formulate correctly; we

decide to ask the question for reflection, attempt reflective understanding and judgment.

Performing all these activities presupposes the activity of deciding.

In our previous text we considered cognitional theory and epistemology

identifying the activities of questioning, understanding, formulating, and judging truth.7

We prescinded from decisions in the interests of doing one thing at a time. But decisions

are the necessary and sufficient cause of these cognitional activities. They are voluntary

activities for which we are responsible. We decide to judge in the sense that we decide to

be reasonable, to exclude bias, to face the evi-[339]dence, to speak the truth. The proper

unfolding of this list of cognitional activities presupposes a habitual willingness to be

attentive, intelligent, reasonable and, finally, responsible.

(3) Deciding can be habitually operative. If you make a decision to join an

academic program, then you do not have to renew this decision every time you wake up

in the morning, go to lectures, read a book, do the exams. The decision has passed into

the habitual texture of your mind. Many of our broad decisions become habitual in this

sense. Marriage or a career choice is a major decision in our life which passes into the

habitual texture of our lives. We do not have to think about them until there is a clash or

a crisis. Many decisions become routine. Habits are voluntary and make it easier for us to

concentrate on more important things; we can consign many aspects of our life to habit


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and routine in order to be able to concentrate on the challenging bits. In a good person

there is a habitual willingness to seek true values, to implement true values, to become a

true originating value.

(4) Decisions can be general or specific. General decisions will affirm the

goodness of being healthy, being kind, becoming responsible, fulfilling one’s work

duties. Then there are specific decisions to do this now, to react to this person in this

way, to be in time for work or to be late. General decisions are operating in the

background, motivating specific decisions. General decisions can effect many specific

decisions. We decide as to our goals in life, and also the means to attain them. We decide

about long-term strategy, as well as short-term tactics; we decide on vision statements,

goals and targets.

(5) The depth of commitment involved in a decision can vary. You can make

very superficial decisions which can be changed easily. The two sons in the gospel said,

Yes I will go, and No I will not go; but both changed their minds. It seems to indicate

that their decisions were taken on impulse and were not very deep. Similarly, a decision

to marry can be serious, deep, a real commitment of will, a determination to be truly

faithful regardless of what happens. In our modern time we sometimes have a very

superficial commitment, which really amounts to saying, ‘I will be faithful to you for as

long as [340] it suits me: if we have problems we will divorce and each will go his or her

own way; we will stay together as long as we are happy together’. Much the same can be

said about any decision how deep is it, how serious, how determined. Is it just a whim,

an impulse, based on feeling or based on conviction?

(6) Some have spoken of a fundamental option. This refers to a deep permanent

orientation of moral decision-making to the good and the true. Normally, particular

decisions are simply implementations of this fundamental decision. It is possible to make

Value Ethics 367

an occasional specific bad decision without altering the fundamental deep commitment

of a fundamental option.

(7) Judgments of fact usually refer to the present actual state of affairs, to things

already existing. Decisions usually regard actions which do not yet exist; they are

alternatives, possibilities, actions which can come into existence by implementing

decisions. Thus a certain amount of risk is always involved in decisions. We cannot

predict the future, we cannot be certain how things will turn out. Existentialists like

Kierkegaard emphasize this aspect of decisions. Some speak of anxiety as the feeling

most characteristic of the activity of deciding. 8

(8) Decisions are irrevocable. Once you have decided, it can never be true that

you did not decide. Even if you change your mind, the fact remains that at this point in

time you decided to do something. It is easy to see that if you verbally abuse somebody

today, there is nothing we can ever do to change the fact that today you abused this

person. You can apologize, you can take back your words, you can compensate, you can

ask for forgiveness, you can affirm the opposite of what you said. But words once said

can never be unsaid.

Similarly with a decision. Even though it is a mental act, inaccessible to all but

yourself, it is still an act which is posited and once posited can never be said not to have

been posited. Once we have decided, we have performed an activity which has moral

weight and importance. We can change our minds, many things may interfere before the

decision is implemented, but still an act of deciding is an action like every other. If you

decide to kill someone and change your [341] mind a day later, you can never deny that

for that day you had decided to kill a person.

2.4 Levels of Decision-making


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Let us look at the relation between knowing and deciding in terms of levels of

decision-making, culminating in the pure decision to produce the one and only edition

of oneself. At each level of the scale of values we decide for value or for satisfaction.

The vital value of health is often in conflict with satisfaction. Certain foods are

very pleasant to eat, but they are bad for your health. Exercise is healthy, but it is easier

to snooze. Smoking is bad for your health, everybody knows this, it is written on each

packet of cigarettes, but millions continue to smoke. Medicine is good for you, but it

often tastes bitter. It is we who decide on these issues; or else drift along in search of

satisfaction.

We recognize the social values of the good of order; how we are all better off by

cooperation, specialization, organization of society, the give and take of community. We

can decide to share or, on the contrary, we can wrap ourselves in self-interest. Instead of

giving to our country or community, we can focus on what we can get out of it. We can

choose the satisfactions of self-interest and selfish egoism, over against the good of

cooperation and order.

Each of us participates in the creation, and propagation of the cultural values of a

society. We receive these values through education, socialization and inculturation. We

then take our turn internalizing these values, improving their definition and

implementation, making the culture more authentic or less. We become the educators of

the next generation, the leaders, the innovators, the instruments of socialization. We can

choose the value of truth, or let it be swallowed up by expediency or conformity. We

can choose transparency and accountability, or dishonest practices and dubious

accounting. We can allow our politicians to mislead or be corrupt, or call them to

account by protest and demands. We can choose to be part of the problem rather than

part of the solution by our own corruption, in-[342]difference, dishonesty or

inauthenticity. We are responsible for our decisions for or against cultural values.

Value Ethics 369

Finally, we decide for or against moral values. It is an existential decision; a

decision not only to produce terminal values, but to produce the one and only edition of

oneself. By our moral value we make ourselves to be what we are as free and

responsible persons. “One has to have found out for oneself that one has to decide for

oneself what one is to make of oneself; one has to have proved oneself equal to that

moment of existential decision;”9

Thus, we can see that there is a deciding proper to the end and activity of each

level of consciousness. We can see that decisions increase in responsibility and depth as

we move to the higher levels of consciousness. I labour the point in order to bring out

the importance of the activity of deciding in all facets of human life and particularly at

the point of deciding what kind of life we are going to live, what kind of persons we

would like to become and how we are going to implement our judgments of value in a

life of value. This includes all values but especially moral values, by which we mean the

value of the person, as free and responsible, living in relationship with others, and

promoting the integral flourishing of both person and society.

In some sense the activity of deciding represents an apex in terms of the levels

of consciousness. Knowing represents a part of the human person; willing somehow

encompasses the whole. There is a sense in which metaphysics is the most

comprehensive view reached in philosophy; but that is only from the viewpoint of

knowing. There is a sense in which ethics is the most comprehensive view because it

includes human deciding and acting as well as knowing. Ethics differs from

metaphysics in that it is a practical science. The centre of the study of practical science

must be the activity of deciding. This is what all knowing leads to; this is where all

human action originates. This is where we touch the person as moral person; not the

person as a good footballer, not the person as a medical specialist; not the person as

professional teacher; but simply the person in so far as they are responsible for what


370

they value, what they have become, and how they act in relation to others. Cognitional

integration is limited to [343] truth. Volitional integration includes everything;

philosophy becomes a philosophy of life.

3 Priority: Values and Decisions

We have been at pains to identify and distinguish clearly between the cognitional

activity of knowing value and the volitional activity of deciding, yes or no, to various

courses of action. Let us not make the mistake of separating these activities as if one

could unfold quite happily without the other. The Medievals argued about the relation

and priority between the faculties of intellect and will. We revert to the empirical basis in

intentionality analysis and make no assertions, which cannot be verified in our own

experience. If we can get this relationship between values and decisions right, we will be

able to answer the question, To what extent do we choose our values? Two extremes

have to be eliminated first, the illusion of isolated reason and the fantasy of arbitrary

will.

3.1 Myth of Isolated Reason

In our citation at the beginning of the Chapter, Lonergan notes the end of, "the

notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or

control from reasonable decision."10 Why is this so? In doing cognitional theory and

epistemology one naturally focuses on the activities of questioning, understanding,

formulating, reflecting, judging truth, deliberating, and judging value. One can recognize

these activities in your own experience, you can see how they build up in an integrated

cognitional structure and one can grasp that this structure is not open to basic revision.

But if the unfolding of pure understanding leads so directly and inevitably to that

conclusion, why do so many philosophers disagree on cognitional theory and

epistemology. Why do some students agree and accept and others resist and refuse? Why

do individuals with the same information and education, come to different conclusions?

Value Ethics 371

Belatedly we are led to the recognition of the role of deciding, not only in

implementing our value judgments in external actions, but also in the processes of

reaching our value judgments. We put 'decid-[344]ing' as a fourth level activity but this

not quite accurate as it is already operating in the activities of knowing. The proper

unfolding of the desire to know requires 'reasonable decisions' at each step of the Way

Up. We decide what data we are going to attend to, which research projects to follow,

which books to read, which topics to concentrate on. We push ourselves when data are

accumulating but understanding will not come. We are tempted by short-cuts, deceits,

borrowing from others, complacency in accepted opinions. We decide to follow certain

clues, to assemble sufficient evidence, to posit the judgment. We relentlessly question

the implications of our conclusions, the actions that should follow, what is worthwhile?

It is clear that if you wish to understand correctly you must decide to establish the

conditions for the occurrence of insight. We cannot command the flow of insights; we

cannot fully control the unfolding of cognitional activities, but we can decide to set the

conditions for the occurrence of insights and we can decide to block interferences,

biases, distractions or distortions. The activities of knowing are in the same need of

decisions as external activities like buying a car or cooking lunch.

The proper unfolding of the desire to know supposes the presence of willingness

and good decisions. But what if deciding is skewed or weak, or overcome by other

desires? If you allow arguments that are unsound to enter into your reasoning, if you do

not make the effort to gather all the relevant data, if your definitions are fuzzy and

incoherent, can you expect to reach a correct conclusion? If you allow feelings of self-

interest, a touch of ethnic bias, feelings of resentment, processes of denial, repression,

rationalization, etc, to interfere, then again you cannot expect to reach the truth. If instead

of the path of intellectual development and conversion you choose the path of decline


372

and remain happily unconverted, then, again you cannot expect to reach correct

judgments of value.

There is a normativity immanent in the unfolding of the activities of knowing.

There is a right way of doing it and many wrong ways. The right way is to allow the pure

desire to know free reign, to raise further questions, to challenge every hypothesis, to

eliminate every bias, to criticize every proposed judgment, to evaluate each proposed

course of action. Lonergan later expressed this normativity in terms [345]of the

transcendental precepts, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. This

formulation is in the imperative mood; this is the way it should be done.

The normativity is operative, but it still requires a free decision to be

implemented. The implementation of these imperatives supposes a habitual willingness,

a continuous deciding to follow these imperatives. Precepts are there to be followed

freely and responsibly; which allows also for the possibility that they will not be

followed responsibly. No matter how you look at it, decisions are part of the process of

knowing and without good decisions knowledge of truth and value will not be attained.

3.2 Myth of Arbitrary Will

The second myth that Lonergan explodes is "the notion of will as arbitrary power

indifferently choosing between good and evil"11 In other words, can we decide arbitrarily

between good and evil, right and wrong, between any alternative courses of action? Can

we decide independently and apart from knowing? Can we choose the good without

previously knowing the good? How does our will or deciding operate anyway? It is

evident that we do not normally choose arbitrarily, that is, at random, without thinking,

without judging, without evaluation. A little self-appropriation reveals this.

This is evident for economic values. Do you go into a department store and

choose clothes at random, without thinking, arbitrarily? Not usually. Why does it take so

long to decide on a purchase? Normally there are criteria operating in terms of your size,

Value Ethics 373

your needs, your available finance, current fashion, your likes and dislikes. If you choose

badly, you will probably find yourself back at Customer Service to return the items.

This is evident also in cultural values. When you choose a college, you do

research, you seek advice, you visit the place, you line up what you see with what you

are seeking. You choose the courses carefully or you might find yourself out of your

depth, or of no relevance to your interests. You choose the topics to study, you choose to

research in this particular area. These are not random choices, they are guided [346] by

your needs, your priorities, your values, your criteria, your likes and dislikes. There are

good choices and bad choices.

What about our moral values? Do we choose them arbitrarily or are we in some

way constrained towards certain values and against certain disvalues? Most persons

aspire to develop, to become good persons, to be authentic, true to their nature. In

making good decisions we automatically ask what is the right thing to do, the way to

become a good person. A judgment of value emerges from a process of deliberation,

assembling evidence, learning from past mistakes, moving towards sufficiency of

evidence for the good of something. That process is guided by a deep desire to know

what is true and good. To flout these aspirations, desires and ideas is to make bad

decisions, to become unauthentic, to choose blindly instead of reasonably. It is to choose

inattentiveness, unintelligence, unreasonableness and irresponsibility.

In trivial matters, where not much is at stake, we can and do choose arbitrarily,

between coffee and tea, a red dress or a blue dress, Pepsi or Coke. If matters are very

balanced and we find it hard to decide, we can have recourse to tossing a coin for it; you

might have two Universities which are offering attractive courses and the advantages and

disadvantages seem to balance out after all of your deliberation. You cannot decide. You

toss a coin. But this is rather exceptional. Where it is a matter of indifference, we do not


374

care one way or the other. But the normal procedure for human decision-making is to

follow deliberation that produces true judgments of value.

There are occasions when there is little time available for deliberation, when you

have to act quickly or immediately. Certain sporting activities, football, basketball, etc

often require immediate reflex decisions to pass or not to pass, to go left or go right, to

tackle or to hold off, etc. Police and soldiers are sometimes in life threatening situations

where they have to decide in a split second to shoot or not to shoot. The training that

such persons undergo is precisely to train their reflexes, to see quickly, to think quickly

and to evaluate and decide immediately. [347]

Decisions then are normally not made arbitrarily, that is, at random. Good

decisions follow good judgments of value in implementing and becoming. However, we

can choose arbitrarily, we are free to make bad choices, we are open to go against our

better judgment. We might baulk at this serious deliberation and simply follow our

feeling, seek satisfaction, become a drifting aesthete. But to act arbitrarily is to be

inauthentic. It is to go against the precept to be responsible.

3.3 Some Priorities

Is there a priority between judgment and deciding? The Medievals argued

fiercely about the priority of Intellect or Will; the Voluntarists praising the will, the

Intellectualists extolling the role of intellect. Is there any meaning or utility in this

argument transposed into our modern context?

(1) In terms of chronology, I do not see any sense in saying that understanding

emerges before deciding or vice versa. The child is an undifferentiated blob of sensing,

feeling, desiring, deciding, understanding, wanting. All are emerging, all are active, all

are mixed up together and so interrelated that it makes no sense of trying to claim one or

the other emerges first. The process of maturation moves us from undifferentiated to

differentiated consciousness. It is a long, difficult, unfinished, business of untangling the

Value Ethics 375

multiple interrelationships between knowing, deciding, feeling, loving, learning,

believing, trusting. Our efforts in self-appropriation try to identify some lines of

causality, some structure of the activities, some priorities or dependencies. In the

concrete everything is interrelated in a manner too difficult to comprehend. In the

abstract we can identify some priorities and causes.

(2) Conscious operations of the five levels can be related to one another in terms

of sublation. The higher activity is a going beyond the previous activities to something

new, the operations of previous levels are still respected in their integrity and

independence, the products of previous levels are enhanced and of increasing importance

for the higher level operations. In this sense there is a structural dependence of

understanding on sensing, of knowing truth on understanding and sensing, of knowing

values on knowing truths, [348] understanding and sensing, and finally the activity of

deciding, which normally depends on values, truths, understanding and sensing.

Putting it another way, you can have experiencing which remains as such;

without understanding. You can have understanding and sensing, without going beyond

to judgment of truth; you can have knowledge of truths which do not go beyond to

judgments of value, and you can have judgments of value which are not implemented,

not decided upon. You have an order of dependence of the higher on the lower.

On the other hand, we have to note the circularity of deciding, in the sense that

good attentiveness, acts of intelligence and judging are concomitantly the result of good

decisions. You cannot pass a good judgment of value without making good decisions.

On the other hand you need judgments of value to make good decisions. Two Latin tags

illustrate this mutual relationship. On the one hand, Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum

(nothing is loved unless it is first known), illustrates the dependence of loving on

knowing. On the other hand, Nihil vere cognitum nisi prius amatum (nothing is truly

known unless it is first loved), illustrates a certain priority of loving to knowing.


376

(3) In the end, we have to note that deciding is at the top of the scale and sublates

all the other levels and so is in some sense pre-eminent. It is pre-eminent in extending

knowing to doing. The doing is two-fold; it refers to the proper execution of the internal

acts of experiencing, understanding, knowing truths and values; and also to the external

acts of implementation of judgments of value in life’s activities. Knowing is a specific,

limited part of what we can do as human beings. But there is more to life than knowing.

The point of knowing is usually with a view to implementation. It is in deciding that our

knowledge is applied to our careers, our relationships, our moral conduct, our financial

transactions. It is our decisions, which are at the core of what we stand for as human

beings and how we become authentic human beings. Moral values are higher values than

cultural values because of the freedom and responsibility embodied in our decisions. We

may be limited in our intelligence and our education, but we are fully responsible for

what we decide to make of our-[349]selves as free and responsible persons. It is in ethics

that deciding becomes thematic, central, and explicit. In considering moral values we

move from the speculative to the practical, from the part to the whole. We move from the

knowing subject to the existential subject, the living, deciding, feeling, acting, becoming,

and being.

(4) Aquinas treated of the intimate relation of intellect and will, in great detail

and with acute perception.12 Most of what he says conforms to what we learn by way of

self-appropriation. He distinguishes twelve steps on the road to the execution of a good

decision – six activities of the intellect, intertwined with six activities of the will. Let me

give a rather crude summary of this process. In order to be moved to action a person

must perceive some good (1). If he sees that this is really desirable it becomes a wish (2).

If the intellect sees this good as attainable (3), the will can form the intention (4) or

tendency towards the good. Now the intellect starts the process of deliberating (5) on the

reasons for or against carrying out this intention. Once we consent (6) to the process of

Value Ethics 377

deliberation, we become responsible for our thinking; all the previous activities can

happen spontaneously without our consent. Deliberation issues a last practical judgment

(7), that this specific action is the best course of action. Choice (8) follows as the will

decides in favour of the action. The intellect issues a command (9) to direct the will in

the use (10) of the means to carry the decision into execution. Finally, there is the

perception of the end that is attained (11) and its enjoyment (12).

This might sound somewhat abstruse and abstract, but it seems to conform to the

process of making simple decisions. Let us consider an example of going to the cinema.

We are reading the morning newspaper and a movie catches our eye; we read about it (1)

and are attracted by the thought of seeing the movie (2). We could forget about the whole

thing at this stage or we might continue to consider possibilities of when where and how

it might be possible (3). We form an intention (4) of putting aside time, arranging

transport, inviting a friend. We deliberate (5) about whether it is the right thing to do,

whether other priorities are being sacrificed, what is the best time to go. We consent (6)

to the idea, we approve of it, we take responsibility for it. We judge, when is the best

time, what is the best form of trans-[350]port, who is the most pleasant company to share

this experience, we issue a last practical judgment (7) that this is a good thing to do. We

decide that it is a good idea and a good thing to do (8). We take practical steps to procure

transport, invite a friend, make arrangements, as it moves towards the time of execution;

this is the intellect issuing a command (9), that it is to be done and the will using the

means to achieve the end (10). Finally, there is the knowledge that the end has been

attained (11), and the enjoyment of the movie (12).

It is true that we can make quick and good decisions without explicitly following

each of these steps. The whole process can be compressed into seconds or minutes,

where the various steps cannot be identified. On the other hand, a career decision can be

quite protracted and could be analysed in even greater detail than the twelve steps. You


378

could usefully try to identify these steps in your own decision-making procedures. The

analysis of Aquinas highlights certain aspects of the relationship between intellect and

will, which are of permanent importance.

(a) He shows clearly the intimate interconnection and intertwining between the

activities of knowing and deciding. There is a discursive process in the emergence of

knowing: from the general idea of going to the movie, to knowledge of when where and

how, to knowledge and appreciation of the value of the movie, to knowledge of the

alternatives and possibilities, down to the specific details of driving, paying, sitting and

enjoying. There is a discursive process in the deciding: from a general approval of the

idea in the beginning, to a specific approval to the particular time and place and movie,

to the means to achieve the end, to carrying out the decision. The two process are

intertwined, reinforce one another, need one another and complement one another.

(b) The two activities of evaluating and deciding have an integrity proper to their

own nature. The activities involved in evaluating must be performed in sequence, must

be performed correctly, must be allowed to unfold properly, and to reach its proper term

securely. If some data is pushed aside, if relevant ideas are not correctly understood, if

there is a hasty jump to judgment, if the process is not al- [351]lowed to reach a term,

then the evaluation will be faulty. Decisions based on mistaken evaluating will

themselves be faulty. The activities of deciding also have an integrity of their own. We

approve of the general idea of going to the movies; we assent to investigate further; we

decide to drive rather than walk; we agree that it is a good idea; we decide to implement

in certain specific ways. Just as we have to learn to evaluate well, also we have to learn

to decide well.

(c) Aquinas includes feelings in his analysis. Wishing and enjoying, as the first

and last acts of the will, seem to be explicitly and totally feelings – though feeling

elements surely pervade the process. Aquinas attributes these feelings to acts of the will,

Value Ethics 379

as acts of deciding. Our analysis has moved in the direction of distinguishing the feeling

element – the desire to know – as a distinct reality in itself, not to be confused with

deciding. We established clearly the characteristics of sensitive and spiritual desires.

They are quite different from deciding. It is true, of course, that desiring enters into the

process of evaluating and deciding. But it is inviting utter confusion not to distinguish

between desiring and deciding. Evaluating is evaluating; deciding is deciding; desiring is

desiring. There are three distinct realities that are interconnected in many ways. Our

policy has been to differentiate in order to integrate, to distinguish in order to unite.

Perhaps we begin to see how the cognitive, affective, and volitional elements are distinct

realities, which combine into one developing triune consciousness.13

(d) Perhaps, we can now appreciate how these three components are

interdependent, complement one another, but are distinct from one another. The activities

of knowing cannot unfold without the desire to know and the free cooperation of will.

The desire to know goes nowhere of itself, without the ability to know, and the deciding

to act. Deciding is blind without intellect to present possibilities of the good to be done;

if desiring is in harmony it makes deciding easier; if it is contrary, deciding becomes

more difficult.

(e) The malfunctioning of any one element can disrupt the whole process. If we

have wrong information, ill-formed opinions, mistaken judgments, then, not only our

judgments but also our feelings [352] and deciding will be out of tune with reality. If we

have judged wrongly that certain leaders are tyrants, we will have negative feelings about

them, not support them, even though they are in reality good leaders deserving support.

If we allow the desire for satisfaction to dominate our minds and hearts then we will be

biased, our judgments distorted, our feelings soured. Despite our best evaluations and

feelings we can decide badly and choose evil rather than good. The good of the whole

requires the good of each of the components.


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(f) We have already touched on the question of whether deciding beings

deliberation to an end.14 I would continue to insist that deliberating is purposive, and

comes to a term in a judgment of value. The judgment might be tentative, it might be

provisional, it might be only probable rather than certain. There may well be

circumstances where we do not have time to consider all the evidence, or the required

evidence is unattainable, yet we have to make a decision. In such cases we make a

provisional judgment as to the best thing to do. We judge that further research is a waste

of time; we judge that we have reached the point of decreasing marginal returns; we

judge that there are other matters more worthy of our attention. We do not sacrifice

knowing to an arbitrary, blind choice of what to do.

3.4 Good Will

Will is good by its conformity to intelligence. It is good in the measure that antecedently and without persuasion it matches the pure desire both in its detachment from the sensitive subject and in its incessant dedication to complete intelligibility. A will less good than that is less than genuine; it is ready for the obnubilation that takes flight from self-knowledge; it is inclined to the rationalization that makes out wrong to be right; it is infected with the renunciation that approved the good yet knows itself to be evil. In brief, as man's intelligence has to be developed, so also must his will.15 Just as we have to learn to actualize the potentiality of our power to understand

and to know, so also we have to learn to actualize our power to make good decisions.

Just as our intellects develop by being put to good use, so our will becomes a habitual

willingness for real good only by being exercised in that way. There is a real difference

[353] between a good will and a bad will, a habit of good decisions and a habit of bad

decisions. Aristotle made a distinction between the intellectual virtues and the moral

virtues. Intellectual virtues were perfections of knowing: science, understanding,

wisdom, art, prudence, etc. Moral virtues are attributed to perfections of character, of

behaviour, that involve choice and deliberation, the whole person.

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Kant was on to something when he insisted that there is nothing morally good in

the universe of human behaviour except the good will. The only real moral goodness

belongs to the good will; all other goods can only be good in a qualified sense. He is

right in that deciding is the key moral act. There is the goodness of the cognitive

component to be found in a good judgment of value. There is the goodness of the

affective component to be found in intentional responses to value. But there is the

goodness of deciding for the good, which goes to the heart of the matter. The cognitive

component is a perfection of knowing. The affective component is a perfection of

feeling. The volitional component is a perfection of the whole, of deciding, of freely

taking responsibility as human persons for what we do and what we become. It is the

goodness of self-control, self-direction, self-determination, of self-transcendence. Our

feelings may have been distorted by psychological trauma, by abuse, or by neglect; we

may not be fully responsible for our feeling orientation to the world; we can make

excuses for our distorted feelings. Our judgments of value may be distorted by a poor

education, limited intelligence, lack of experience; we can think of excuses for our poor

judgments. But deciding is by definition our own. In deciding we become responsible for

what we do with our limited understanding and perhaps soured feelings.

What then are the qualities of good deciding, over and above the goodness of

knowing and feeling. It seems to be a habitual willingness to choose in favour of value as

opposed to satisfaction. Such willingness should be strong and energetic, rather than

weak and slothful. It is told that Aquinas’ parents were not too pleased that their son was

to become a celibate monk, so they introduced a girl to his quarters to tempt him.

Aquinas snatched a burning branch from the fire and chased her from the building. It was

a firm and energetic [354] reaction, a sign of a strong will. There was no hesitation, no

weakness, so shilly-shallying. He never wavered in his vocation. Deciding for value

should be permanent, consistent and deep. It is not a great moral virtue to decide to be


382

honest today, if you decide to be dishonest tomorrow; decisions can be superficial and

fickle, blown about by the winds of change. Decisions should be comprehensive, for all

values at each level of consciousness. Not all values can be realized in a human lifetime

but in principle universal willingness includes all values. It is not a great moral

achievement to keep eight of the ten commandments; to choose certain virtues, with the

spice of a few vices thrown in for good measure. It should be a habitual willingness,

meaning a habit of deciding well, a disposition ingrained in the will.

Can you train persons to this universal willingness? Can you educate people to

choose values as opposed to satisfactions? You can, if the person has the initial

willingness to cooperate, if the person is willing to make the effort, if the person already

values universal willingness. We educate our children to discipline, to sharing, to virtue,

to willingness, to moral goodness. But we have no guarantees of success, unless the

willingness comes from within. No training course can put that there if it is not already

there in some inchoate form. Psychologists have produced exercises and techniques for

training the will, but they all presuppose that there is an initial willingness to do the

exercises and profit from the exercises in the participants.

One author speaks of a strong will, a skilful will, a good will and a transpersonal

will.16 By strong will he means will-power, determination, perseverance through

difficulty. Such will-power, he claims, can be reinforced by exercises, by focussing on

goals and targets, by various psychological techniques. The skilful will recognizes the

need for the reinforcement of feelings, the need for convincing arguments, for seeing the

worthwhileness of it all. The good will is the moral will; it is not only the good for

oneself but for the group, the society, the common good of society. It recognizes that we

are social beings in relationship with others. The transpersonal will recognizes a

hierarchy of needs as enunciated by Maslow.17 After the basic needs are satisfied, there

Value Ethics 383

remains a need for meaning in life, for a cause to devote oneself to, for ultimate meaning,

for a kind of self-transcendence. [355]

3.5 Good Decision-Making

In the context of an individual, good decisions presuppose (1) a correct process of

deliberation, deliberative insight and all that that entails, proceeding towards the

judgment of value. (2) Intentional desire for value as a feeling orientation towards the

good and the noble, allowed to motivate, animate, and drive the process of deliberation.

(3) An understanding of what it is to be truly human in the sense of self-transcendence,

development and conversion. Combine these with a good will and you have a good

person making good decisions.

However, decision-making often takes place in the context of a group, a parish, a

company, a school, a government, a local council, an executive committee, a board of

trustees, etc. But the same principles apply. It is a question of setting up the group

structures for all the components to be represented, cognitive, affective and volitional.

Usually the experts will provide full information on all feasible options. One has to

presume that there is a desire for the good in all the participating individuals. One hopes

that there is a shared vision of the values to be pursued in the decisions. Finally, someone

or some group have to make the right decision.

Often, the topic of decision-making does not distinguish between the judgment of

value and the decision. So much of decision-making literature is usually on the judgment

of value, rather than the decision. But there is a clear distinction between information and

decision. Typically, committees are set up to study an area and to make

recommendations. They are responsible for gathering the information, studying the

alternatives, assessing alternatives and consequences, presenting proposals and

recommendations. Some individual or group has to make the decision. It is the executive

that now takes over and implements the decision. There is the gathering of information,


384

studying proposals, making feasibility studies and the like. But there is in the end the

decision. They are two quite different activities and need to be clearly differentiated. 18

The goodness of the judgment of value depends on the information being

complete and correct. It depends on the authenticity of those collecting the information to

sort it correctly, to evaluate it [356] honestly, to order it correctly, to devise alternatives

responsibly, to present it objectively.

The goodness of affectivity is whether the individuals or group are spontaneously

oriented to value or satisfaction. Are they habitually desiring the good of the task in

hand, for the success of the project, for making the world a better place to live in? Or are

they pursuing selfish desires, out for themselves, seeking career advantage, operating out

of hidden agendas, looking for the easy fix rather than the true solution?

The goodness of deciding lies in the willingness to do the right thing. The

decision comes at the end of the process of feasibility studies, policy reports,

recommendations. The good qualities you look for in a decision are its depth, its

firmness, its resoluteness, its permanence, its commitment. Bad decisions are usually

fickle, frivolous, superficial, revisable, transitory, arbitrary, blind, and irresponsible.

4 Responsible Freedom

Perhaps the difficulty here is that everybody thinks they know the meaning of

the word freedom. Everybody uses the term often, argues passionately about it, defends

it vigorously, is prepared to shed their blood for it, and to take to the streets in protest at

infringements of their freedom. We all presume that we know the meaning of freedom

until we attempt to define it, to isolate its various shades of meaning and to evaluate

which is the correct meaning. The essence of deciding is this element of freedom and

responsibility. What precisely is this notion of freedom?

4.1 Towards a Definition of Freedom

Value Ethics 385

There are many nuances of meaning given to the word freedom. In a socialist

ideology freedom means free as a member of a group; in a liberal capitalist system it

means free as an individual pursuing personal goals. Parents believe in one kind of

responsible freedom; their teenage children mean something else. Some consider

censorship an infringement of their liberty; others consider it a defence of [357] people's

freedom to live in a decent environment. In what sense are prisoners free? In what sense

is an animal free? Is God free? Is the rich person more free that the poor person? Is the

temperate person more free than the alcoholic? These questions cannot be answered

without a very careful reflection on the meaning of freedom, which in turn can only be

done in the end by a process of self-appropriation.

Just as it was difficult to catch the mental act of deciding, so it is also difficult to

pin down the freedom of the act of decision. Plato thought that the person who knows

what is good will automatically do it; he did not seem to have much room for freedom

of choice. Aristotle recognized the difference between voluntary and involuntary actions

but freedom was not a great value for him. Throughout history many different theories

have been proposed to explain or to deny our freedom. In theological circles it has been

notoriously difficult to reconcile continued human freedom and a grace, which is really

efficacious, which produces its effect regardless of the dispositions of the subject. Our

modern notion is coloured by the French and American revolutions, which pioneered

individual freedom of all citizens over against authoritarian political or religious

regimes. So the predominant meaning of freedom even today is freedom from

oppression, from any constraint, freedom to do as one wishes, freedom from restrictions

of any kind.

So it is clear that there are many analogous meanings of the word freedom, and

that the shades of meaning are subtle – but of great importance. We can learn from the

theories and the history but in the end only in our immediate experience of our own


386

freedom will we be able to identify these nuances, the limits of freedom, its

development or decline. If there is no personal freedom than all talk of morality is void.

If we are vague and ambiguous about freedom then our understanding of moral

obligation will be vague and ambiguous. So we go to some pains to be precise and

correct about our notion of freedom.

Freedom is such a basic notion that it is hard to find a synonym, or to express

what it is in other terms. However we must make some attempt to pin down some of the

characteristics of a free human deci-[358]sion. What we have said so far at least clears

the way. The free human decision is not determined by the laws of nature as formulated

in the sciences; you cannot explain freedom in terms of genes, reflexes, unconscious

motivation, inhibitions, compulsions, etc. Nor is the free human act to be explained in

terms of knowledge. To know the good does not necessarily entail choosing the right

action. Nor is freedom to be thought of as simply the absence of determination, a

random, chance, irrational, swinging from one thing to another.

Human freedom, then, is the human person as the free cause or determinant of

his own decisions and actions. Every event must have a cause or an explanation. We

have ruled out laws of nature as sufficient explanations of free choice. The

indeterminists claim that there is no cause– that it is chance, random, behaviour. For us

the cause is to be found in the person, the self, the subject. It is the person who freely

chooses. Free choice is only possible when you have a human person. Human action

does have a cause or explanation; it is the self, self-determination. Within the constraints

of our human condition, it is the self that decides whether to seek the good or evil, to

choose satisfaction or value, to promote progress or decline, to be selfish or altruistic, to

act or not to act.

The essence of freedom is that the will may or may not move itself to its free act.

This is the necessary and sufficient definition of freedom.19 We can choose not only

Value Ethics 387

between alternatives but we can accept or reject the lot. In any free act there is always

the alternative of not acting. In any concrete action there is the possibility of choosing

alternatives or of not choosing at all. We are free to decide or not to decide; to will or

not to will.

Freedom is a quality of the act of deciding. Albert the Great though of Free Will

as a separate faculty from the intellect and the will. Aquinas rejected that. Freedom is an

attribute of will, an accident not a substance. There are some actions, which spring from

a free will; there are some actions, which spring entirely from instinct, from passion,

from chemistry, from mental illness. And there are some human actions, which spring

from a mixture of influences; there are degrees of freedom. [359]

Freedom is a directed dynamism: it is aimed towards self-realization or self-

actualization. To realize freedom, to actualize freedom, to enhance freedom, that is the

direction we must choose. This might seem to be a contradiction in terms, that to be free

we must choose the good. But the position has a respectable pedigree. Aristotle

explained that the final end of all human actions is happiness. No matter what proximate

goals or intentions we might have, the final aim of everything that we seek is our

happiness. By happiness Aristotle certainly did not mean pleasure and says so explicitly.

He struggles with certain notions like final end, self-sufficiency, function of man,

perfection of man. He admits that pleasure and wealth and a good family contribute to

happiness. The person of highest happiness seems to be the person of contemplation.

Happiness seems to have been a kind of heuristic term, which Aristotle lays down as a

basic definition at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics and then strives to give it

specific content throughout the text. At least one commentator has suggested that

Aristotle meant by happiness a kind of self-actualization; the happy man "is the man

who makes a success of his life and actions, who realizes his aims and ambitions as a

man, who fulfils himself."20 Aquinas also held that humans necessarily will supreme


388

beatitude. But supreme beatitude is the final end; we are not free as regards the final end

but only as regards the means to attain the end. We deliberate not about happiness or

beatitude but about the means to attain them. Hence to be free does not mean freedom to

go against your nature. We are human beings; we start in a state of potentiality; but

there is dynamism towards growth, development, differentiation, self-transcendence.

We can choose the means to achieve that aim. We are not free to change our nature, to

be other than human.

To say that an act is free does not mean that you spin a dice and each alternative

has an equal possibility of being realized. In the moral sphere freedom realizes itself

through self-transcendence. Rousseau and others considered that humans are born good

but are corrupted by society. Calvinists and Jansenists seemed to consider that we are

born evil and only the grace of God can save us. Aristotle took a middle position – we

are born potentially virtuous but not ac-[360]tually virtuous. But the dice seems to be

weighted in favour of becoming virtuous rather than vicious. The choice between good

and evil does not stack up at fifty-fifty. Our normal basic orientation is towards the

good, towards virtue, towards self-transcendence. We enhance our freedom in choosing

self-transcendence; we destroy our freedom by choosing evil, vice and decline. Thus

effective freedom, as we shall see, is not a given but a personal achievement.

By our free choices we define what kind of persons we shall become, what we

are worth as human persons. We easily complain about our failing memories, but we

take responsibility for our judgments of fact. How much more do we take responsibility

for our judgments of value, our moral decisions and actions! You often hear a person

praised for his football skills or whatever and the commentator adds that he is a good

person as well! We can praise a person's intelligence, his musical talent, efficiency,

business acumen, rhetoric or skill but when we say he is a really good person we are

talking about a different category altogether. Primarily in the end it is our moral

Value Ethics 389

goodness that defines what we are as persons. Personhood seems to be closely linked

with the activity of choosing, deciding and acting. This counts for more than

intelligence or skill. Moral goodness can exist in the uneducated, the unintelligent, the

unskilled, the poor, the socially deprived. It is a human person's free choices that make

him to be a good person.

Freedom and responsibility are two sides of the one coin. Positively freedom

means to be responsible. It means choosing good and avoiding evil; it means choosing

moral values and rejecting disvalues; it means promoting progress and reversing

decline; it means choosing the path of self-transcendence in all its phases, stages,

implications and detail. This is what a human person is meant to be; the perfection of

our potential, the fulfilment of our nature. We make ourselves by our responsible

choices to be responsible persons. We distinguish our position from that of Sartre

because of the notion of potential and actual. For Sartre we define our nature by our

choice; essence precedes existence. We would rather think that our nature is not static,

fixed, determined, rather it is a dynamic potential. As children we are in potentiality to

be educated, skilled, cooperative, virtu-[361]ous, good. Which path we choose is what

defines us as persons, we become as persons.

Negatively, freedom means the possibility of choosing evil, the possibility of not

following through on our judgments of value, the possibility of perverting the hierarchy

of values in our choices, the possibility of decline. In this case we constitute ourselves

as selfish, licentious, evil persons. It means choosing the incoherence of

rationalizations, the escapism of avoiding self-consciousness. It may mean capitulating

to moral renunciation: 'I know what I should do but it is too much to ask'. It might entail

moral indifference, a perverted conscience, a distorted set of priorities.

4.2 Limitations to Human Freedom


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We are free as human beings, not as animals are free, not as angels are free, not

as God is free. As human persons we represent a higher integration of physical,

chemical, biological, botanical, zoological, intellectual, moral and religious elements.

We are not a mixture but an integration, a whole, a unity. That is the context of our

freedom and it defines the limits of our freedom. We are not totally free in the sense that

we can do anything; we are not free in all our actions; there are degrees of freedom and

responsibility depending on the our deliberation, our intention, our knowledge or

consent. Just as human knowing is different from the knowing of animals and inferior to

the knowing of angels or God, so as a parallel our freedom is to be understood as a

human quality different from that of other beings.

(1) Limitations as physical, chemical, living. It is fairly obvious that we are

bound by the laws of physics and chemistry. The lens of the eye refracts light in exactly

the same way as the lens of a camera, according to the same rules of concave/convex,

focal length, etc. Our digestion depends on a balance of acid and alkali; if there is too

much acid you neutralize with a bicarbonate. We operate within the laws of physics and

chemistry that apply to all material bodies in our movements, range of tolerance of

temperature, need for oxygen, emitting carbon dioxide, etc. To live and survive we have

to accept these laws, live with them, use them for our benefit. If we want to fly we have

to invent and construct airplanes. To survive in cold climates we have to [362] wear

warm clothes and build solid houses. If our eyes are defective we can correct them with

spectacles. As living beings we are subject to the constraints of all living things, birth,

growth, aging, death; the necessity of reproduction, satisfaction of basic needs; search

for food; specialization of senses; development of skills; protection from disease,

danger, predators. There aspects are relatively obvious and taken for granted.

(2) Psychological limitations. More difficult to assess are psychological factors

setting the context for our exercise of freedom and responsibility. Developmental

Value Ethics 391

psychology traces the elements operating in us through the life cycle of birth, childhood,

adolescence, independence, marriage, child rearing, aging and dying. They emphasize

the importance of the early family environment, which seems to determine the basic

outline of our personality, character and temperament. Personality as used in

psychology seems to refer to the totality of an individual's behaviour and emotional

characteristics. The structure of the personality whether we are reflective, or emotional,

or talkative will be laid down early in life. As we are not responsible for choosing our

parents, we are not responsible for these basic aspects of our personality structure,

character and temperament. We can later adjust and adapt and use that for good or evil

and for that we are free and responsible.

Willing and freedom emerges along with the understanding of the child and is

recognized in accepting and refusing, responding and not responding, obeying and

disobeying. Perhaps at first the child is largely determined by instinct, emotion,

appetites and desire, by the sensible. We do not normally consider a child legally

responsible for his/her actions; but parents can recognize good behaviour and bad

behaviour and administer appropriate rewards and punishments. Normal psychological

development to maturity involves negotiating the stages of development; it involves

balancing the areas of physical growth, emotional changes, sexual developments,

intellectual desires and moral values. The exercise of responsible freedom presupposes

such balanced growth. [363]

There is a parallel development of moral understanding, deciding and action. In

another place we will outline Kohlberg's stages of moral development. It is not normal,

morally or psychologically, for a thirty-year-old to be relying on instructions of their

parents. It is easy to see that serious psychological maladjustment makes the exercise of

responsible freedom almost impossible. Mental retardation, serious neurosis or

psychosis, schizophrenia, compulsions, fixations and so forth, can be so severe that the


392

question of real freedom and responsibility does not arise. We do not punish the insane

for their misdeeds; we sent them to a hospital or psychiatrist.

More difficult to assess are the in-between cases. To what extent do mild

compulsions, projections, regressions, repressions, denials, anxieties, phobias interfere

with the responsible exercise of our freedom. Is a kleptomaniac responsible for his

stealing? To what extend does unconscious motivation influence our actions and desires

and so undermine our freedom? It is clear that there is a large area of diminished

responsibility. The exact extent of the diminishment can only be assessed in individual

cases by a competent psychiatrist.

(3) Habits and Addictions. More normally we have the question of habits and

addictions; do they enhance our freedom or obstruct it? We have already explained

Aristotle's understanding of habits of virtue and vice and their function in the moral life.

Habits so understood are states of willingness to act in a certain way. Individual acts

motivated by individual decisions establish a pattern of response, where willingness

becomes easier, more spontaneous and pleasurable. Good habits enhance our free

decisions. Willingness becomes routine, spontaneous, we do not have to think about it

or make a big effort to decide. Just as insights pass into the habitual texture of the mind,

so decisions or choices become habitual; freedom is operating but it is on automatic, we

have habitual disposition to do good, we can turn our attention and effort to more

productive issues. Because we are human, our decisions become embodied in our

emotions, or spontaneous reactions and even in our chemical makeup.

Unfortunately, the same is true for bad habits. Individual evil choices when

repeated become habitual. There is an inbuilt disposi-[364]tion to continue with that

kind of behaviour. It becomes more difficult to change and alter the behaviour. Yet we

are still responsible for our actions, our freedom is operative even if it is not explicitly

invoked. A football player who loses his temper cannot plead in mitigation that he has a

Value Ethics 393

habit of losing his temper. A person who has the habit of telling lies, is still free to tell

the truth even though it will be more difficult for him than for an honest person. Vicious

habits leave freedom intact.

Addictions are somewhat different. They are not just strong habits; something

different is in play. Even with a strong bad habit, freedom is intact and we can change

our behaviour. Whereas habits enhance and embody free decisions, addictions take

away our freedom and muzzle it. An addiction is where the physical, or chemical, or

psychological compulsive aspect of behaviour has taken over. Our freedom is impaired,

limited, no longer in control. For a smoker nicotine becomes an accepted part of the

chemical balance in the blood and the body has a need for a continued supply of

nicotine. If there is no re-supply, the chemical balance of the body is upset and all sorts

of cravings, headaches, aches and pains can be experienced. Smoking can be an

addiction. As an addiction it is difficult to change by will power alone. Very often a

substitute will have to be provided or nicotine supplied through another channel, and the

individual helped by the support of a group or even by hypnosis.

There is a wide range of substances and patterns of behaviour, which can be

addictive. We think immediately of smoking, alcohol and drugs; but one can also be

addicted to sleeping pills, nose drops, tranquilizers, chocolates, etc. One can be addicted

to betting, to working, to certain forms of sexual behaviour; to fasting (anorexia), to

feasting (bulimia). A workaholic is addicted to work; it is not that he works hard or has

a habit of work, or is generous with doing overtime; he must work, is not free not to

work, it has become compulsive addictive behaviour.

(4) Sociological Context. Let us now consider from our own experience to what

extent we are influenced by our social environment. What is certainly true is that the

process of socialization gives us a [365] language, a common way of living, makes us

part of a group, and teaches us a view of the world. The child born in a Kikuyu village


394

will learn to speak Kikuyu, will eat and enjoy local foods and drink, will learn about the

traditions of the Kikuyu, will be taught to respect the elders, will learn to work hard, to

herd and to cultivate at the right time. A child born in an urban American setting will

learn to speak English, will dress in the current fashion, will watch television for an

average of two hours a day, will identify with America, will speak with a local

Bostonian or Texan or whatever accent. The social environment sets the context for

moral development and certainly influences considerably the setting, the limits , the

possibilities in which freedom will be realized.

It is also true that a bad social environment will influence the context of the

moral development of the child. A child growing up in a slum area will be exposed to

theft, to violence, to social tension, to prostitution, etc. early on in life. This increases

the probability that he/she will follow the example of those around and become like

them. Similarly a child growing up in a family where the parents are always fighting,

drinking, abusing the children, will be left with scars and traumas, which will influence

later behaviour. On the other hand a person growing up in a model home, with loving

parents, psychological and financial security, good example and good schooling has a

probability of turning our as a good citizen.

So while we admit the influence of social environment on the moral

development of the person we do not admit that such influence is inevitable or

determining. A person born in a slum does not inevitably become a thief or a prostitute;

there are many examples of people born in a deprived environment but managing to

react against such influence to escape from the environment and become heroically

moral citizens. A person can be reared in a disturbed family and have a propensity to

abuse or alcoholism but that does not mean that they will inevitably turn out as abusers

or alcoholics. Nor does it follow that the person from the ideal family, school, and

neighbourhood will turn out as a model citizen. [366]

Value Ethics 395

It is fairly clear from experience that parents cannot determine the future moral

behaviour of their children; if determinism were true then they would have control over

the behaviour of their children. But it just does not work like that. A parent may deeply

desire that their child follow their footsteps to become a doctor, or a farmer, or a pianist;

they can force them to go to piano lessons, force them to go to certain schools, force

them into certain leisure time activities, but in the end the child becomes an adolescent

and either accepts or rejects for himself. A parent can inculcate good moral habits, give

good example, set standards and expectations, but to the chagrin of the parents the child

can turn out to be a criminal.

Governments have tried to determine the behaviour of their citizens in

Communist and Utopian schemes. The State controls the education, the media, and the

political and financial institutions. They can fill the minds of the citizens with their

ideology, their ideals, their politics. They can censor contact with the outside world,

other ideologies, alternative life styles. But where has such a system ever worked for

long? In the end people make up their own minds and say this is rubbish. Cults and

some religious institutions have tried to determine the behaviour of their members by

strict rules, total indoctrination, and withdrawal from the wider society. But again it

only works for a limited time with a limited number of individuals.

There is nothing that can stop the emergence of true human freedom and

responsibility. The task of education is not to prevent that emergence but to prepare for

it, equip the individual to deal with it and then allow the mature adult to take

responsibility for his own choices in life, to stand on his own two feet as a moral person.

In the end there is the mystery of human freedom. Where does the willingness to

change come from? Where does the willingness to be persuaded that this is something of

value come from? The alcoholic has to really want to change in order to change. Where

does that wanting come from? Where does that openness to be persuaded come from?


396

You can bring a horse to the water but you can't make him drink. Where does this basic

willingness come from? It can only [367] come from the person and if it is not there it

cannot be forced from the outside.

4.3 Freedom as Achievement

Lonergan distinguishes between essential and effective freedom. Essential

freedom is defined thus: "Man is free essentially inasmuch as possible courses of action

are grasped by practical insight, motivated by reflection, and executed by decision."21

To be free essentially is to be free in principle, by definition as a human person you are

free; not with the freedom of an animal but with the freedom of a rational, responsible

human person.

But the effective exercise of that freedom may be narrow or broad: "But man is

free effectively to a greater or less extent inasmuch as this dynamic structure is open to

grasping, motivating, and executing a broad or a narrow range of otherwise possible

courses of action. Thus, one may be essentially but not effectively free to give up

smoking."22 So the actual range of possible alternative courses of action varies from

person to person. Our actual freedom is limited by our financial, social and cultural

situation. But it is also limited by the use or misuse that we have made of our freedom.

If we have allowed ourselves to become addicted to cigarettes then we are not free

effectively to give up smoking; we cannot just decide to give up smoking now and carry

out the resolution successfully. So the exercise of freedom expands and enhances our

effective freedom; the non-use or abuse of our freedom constricts and destroys the range

of our effective freedom.

We have already identified the physical, sociological and psychological limits

and context of human freedom. Now we are talking of the actual exercise of free choice

itself. In some ways freedom is analogous to a habit – the more it is properly exercised

Value Ethics 397

the easier and more spontaneous it becomes; the less it is used and the more it is abused,

the more difficult it becomes to exercise it properly.

Our human life is a progress through dialectical tension between seeking

satisfactions and following true values. The gospel says that the truth will set you free:

if we choose to follow true values and im-[368]plement them, we are making good free

choices and we enhance our freedom. We extend its range. We are learning to live by

our free choices and not following appetites, physical desires which might be in conflict

with true values. It is the good person who is truly free; the good person has made good

choices, constituted himself as a good person, habitually seeks the good in freedom and

responsibility. Nelson Mandela, who was imprisoned for twenty-seven years by the

apartheid regime of South Africa, did not allow resentment, anger, or revenge to destroy

his goodness as a person; he remained free to forgive and to reconcile. In the inner

struggle of satisfactions against values, true values won out: he remained free, he was

not determined by what was done to him.

Freedom is to be realized in the harmony of desires, a balance in the dialectical

tension and not in the elimination of one of its terms. Human freedom is not the

freedom of an angel, but of an incarnated spirit; it has a physical, chemical, biological,

zoological, intellectual component. The aim is not to eliminate sensitive desires and

physical needs but to integrate these in the final volitional integration of the good moral

person. That is when the range of effective freedom is widest and we become truly free.

If however we follow the opposite path of following satisfactions as opposed to

true values, then the will is not being exercised and so it loses control. Bad habits make

us vicious persons and it is very difficult to change; will power is debilitated; vicious

forms of behaviour are ingrained; it is difficult to reverse direction. The gospel says that

the sinner is a slave of sin. The slave is not free; the sinner is not free in the sense that


398

his effective freedom is limited. Abuse and neglect destroy freedom; the proper exercise

of responsible freedom enhances and strengthens our real freedom.

4.4 Are we Really Free?

But is it still possible that freedom is an illusion? The determinists of various

stripes would grant that we think we are free, but they would appeal to hidden

motivation, unseen determinants, unconscious forces which undermine the reality of

that freedom. 'We feel [369] we are free but all the time we are enslaved' would be their

argument. How do we reply?

From the beginning of the text we have been trying to develop an ethics based

on self-appropriation, namely, based on adverting to the experience of moral living,

understanding the elements involved in choice, decision and action and affirming the

truth or falsity of these elements. We have been using an empirical method simply

expressed as, theory verified in instances. We have noted how knowledge based on data

of consciousness differs from knowledge based on data of sense; in other words how

interiority differs from normal theory. Here specifically we are concerned with a correct

grasp of the real meaning of freedom. Is it real or is it an illusion? How do we find the

answer except (1) by adverting to our own experience, (2) thinking our notion through

to the end, and (3) then verifying this by a return to the data.

(1) Each one of us has privileged access to the data of our own consciousness.

Allow me to advert to my own experience of freedom and limitation. I know that I am

free to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to make good choices or to make bad

choices, to get drunk or to remain sober, to resist temptation or to accede. I know I am

faced with a range of choices and I am free and responsible in my decisions. I know that

my choices are limited by age, by finances, by the group I belong to, by the

commitments I have made. I experience these limitations, I can identify and name them,

and my freedom is exercised in a context of which I am aware.

Value Ethics 399

I can look at my past and review the choices that I have made; some were hasty

and ill-judged; some were selfish and destructive; some were brave and liberating; some

were cowardly and enslaving; at times I followed desire for satisfaction as opposed to

true values; there were times when I followed the crowd, times when I took a stand for

better or for worse; times when I followed authority and other times when I defied

authority and tradition. I can recognize the unfolding of my human freedom with its

limitations and failings.

(2) My freedom is reasonable and responsible, not simply indeterminate,

uncontrolled, arbitrary. I have made some capricious, arbi-[370]trary decisions; I have

made such random, hasty, unreflective decisions and actions. But I now know that they

were poor decisions and I should have thought out the implications. There are criteria

that one sets for buying a new car or a new house; you want to find one that suits your

needs and can afford; you think it through, sleep on it, view the alternatives, which best

satisfies the criteria. Similarly our lives have a consistency and continuity in our moral

choices. If lying is wrong for me today then it is difficult to hold the opposite tomorrow.

I recognize arbitrary choice as a wrong way of thinking about freedom, that it does not

cohere with the felt moral obligations of the human person.

(3) That is my experience; one might claim that is all right for you but I have a different

experience. But how can it be different? Either you have not adverted to the data, or

you have not thought the notion of freedom through to the end or you have not verified

by adverting to the data of consciousness. Can a person coherently assert that he is

totally determined in all his actions and at the same time punish his child for disobeying,

or criticize a politician for lying, or praise a friend for being generous?

The notion of freedom I have outlined is actually presupposed by so much of our

social life, by the universality of praise and blame, by punishment and reward. I do not

think that my personal experience of freedom is so different from that presupposed by


400

the legal system, by our regular judgments on other peoples' behaviour, by our

educational system. We recognize degrees of freedom, we recognize extenuating

circumstances, we distinguish the freedom of children from that of drug addict, from

that of the mentally ill, from that of mature adults.

There is a parallel between the self-affirmation of the knower and the self-

affirmation of the free human person. Self-affirmation of the knower as a knower,23 is

based on self-appropriation of the activities of knowing. We identify the experience of

sensing, understanding and judging in our own lives. We define this as knowledge. If

these activities occur in proper sequence and following the intrinsic [371] norms of the

process, then I am a knower. But these activities occur in me. Therefore I am a knower.

Similarly, our affirmation that the human person is free and responsible is based

on the same way of arguing. I examine my own experience of freedom and limitation,

thought, decision and action; the factors, which diminish, and those which enhance

freedom. We define freedom in the light of this experience. If these decisions and

actions occur, then we are free. But such decisions and action do occur in the way

defined. Therefore, we are free.

We can distinguish between real freedom and illusion. We can distinguish

between dreams and reality. We enjoy fantasies about what great things we might do,

but know that they are not realistic. We might suffer from the illusion that we are

heroically good morally and then fall on our faces when reality hits us. We might have

illusions about how good other people are only to be disillusioned by their selfishness

and betrayal. There is a self-correcting process operating in our knowledge of our own

freedom just as in our knowledge of science or common sense. To claim that all our

experience of freedom is an 'illusion' is to void the word of any meaning whatsoever.

5 Choice of Evil

Value Ethics 401

We explained earlier the principle that we always decide for our own happiness.

It is a metaphysical principle, a definition, but also is translatable into common

experience. You might conclude from that that it is impossible to choose evil. In a sense

it is. It is impossible to choose evil as evil, pure evil, as such. We can only choose evil

under the appearance of some good to us. We make it appear good and then we can

choose it.

We use various tactics in this process but the strategy is the same. We will

outline the broad lines of this strategy in this section and indicate some of the tactics we

use.

5.1 What is Evil?

The notion of evil is a very difficult notion to grasp, even though we are very

familiar with it in our every day lives. Lonergan makes a [372] basic and correct

distinction between physical evil, moral evil and basic sin.24 So let us use this as our

framework for talking about evil. Without simple basic distinctions such as these, we

have nothing but confusion.25

First, physical evil are the shortcomings of a universe that seems to work

according to the principles of an emergent probability. The universe seems to be

developing, moving towards higher forms, orders, regularities, but doing so in terms of

probabilities not in terms of necessary determinism. So physical evils are the

extinctions, the droughts, the earthquakes, the diseases, the imperfections of a universe

that is moving from undeveloped to developed; which admits of breakdowns, false

starts, failures. These are physical evils over which we have some control, but not a lot.

It is the nature of the universe we live in to be undeveloped and to be working according

to schedules of probabilities, rather than a rigid, clockwork determinism.

By moral evil Lonergan means the consequences of basic sin. The consequences

are both personal and social. In the person that is a corruption of intellect, a distortion of


402

feelings, a weakening of the will, and a cycle of decline sets in. In society there is the

irrationality of the social surd, the irrelevance of detached understanding, competing

egoisms, the emergence of force, breakdown of social order, etc.

We get to the heart of the matter in the definition of basic sin, which we can

translate as basic evil. "By basic sin I shall mean the failure of free will to choose a

morally obligatory course of action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course

of action." 26 Basic moral evil lies in our failure to affirm and decide for the appropriate

moral value or course of action. It is our failure to reach a correct judgment of value and

a failure to decide for the good and the true with sufficient firmness, depth,

perseverance, clarity. The failure to affirm the good leaves us open to alternative

courses of action, which begin to seem quite attractive, and which we eventually

choose. The spiral of moral decline has begun. As Lonergan puts it: "if he fails to will,

then the obligatory course of action is not exe-[373]cuted; again, if he fails to will, his

attention remains on illicit proposals; the incompleteness of their intelligibility and the

incoherence of their apparent reasonableness are disregarded; and in this contraction of

consciousness, which is the basic sin, there occurs the wrong action, which is more

conspicuous but really derivative."27 There are many factors mentioned here and I

would like to build on this in outlining the stages of moral decline.

5.2 Stages of Moral Decline

Stage one. The beginning of evil lies in not choosing strongly enough the option

for the good. Deliberation should normally present the good in a true value judgment;

intentional response drives that process towards value rather than satisfaction. But it is

deciding which says Yes or No to these processes, to their unfolding in the correct way,

and to how firmly they are affirmed. The beginning of infidelity is a lack of firmness in

fidelity. The beginning of lying is in lack of firmness in our affirmation of the value of

Value Ethics 403

honesty. The beginning of our manipulation of people is our lack of respect for the

dignity of the human person.

So the source of human moral evil, in you and me, is an absence, a negative, a

lack. To grasp the meaning of human evil, you have to have an inverse insight, an

insight into the absence of an expected intelligibility. What should be there is not there.

Human evil is irrational; you can only grasp the irrational by the roundabout procedure

of an inverse insight. In not choosing strongly to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and

responsible we are leaving ourselves open to choose to be inattentive, unintelligent,

unreasonable and irresponsible. There is no reason why we should do that.

I think this conforms to common experience. The paradigm case of Eve in the

garden is an illustration. She was not sufficiently convinced of the cogency or

legitimacy or reason for the command not to eat the fruit of the tree. She left herself

open to temptation. She did not exclude other alternatives.

Stage two. This absence of a strong affirmation of the right value or

alternative, leaves open many other possibilities. They are [374] not excluded. They

present themselves as possibilities. In fact they begin to be attractive. Eve continued to

gaze at the fruit and savour how delicious it might taste. Now we are shifting from the

real good, which we have not affirmed sufficiently, to the apparent good which is now a

possibility. We substitute lower values for the higher values that we should have

chosen. We begin to substitute satisfactions for values.

The processes that now take place are twisted reasoning, soured feelings and the

dynamic of decline.

Stage three. Corruption of Intellect. We have not affirmed sufficiently strongly

what we should have chosen; we have substituted a lesser good or a satisfaction. Now

we have to justify that in our own minds. We have to bring our judgment of value into

line with our weak will. We have to bring our knowing into conformity with our


404

willing. We do this through rationalization, avoidance of self-consciousness, moral

renunciation and various other excuses.

Rationalization. Instead of reforming our behaviour in response to a guilty

conscience, we attempt to change our value judgments and our conscience to bring it

into line with our behaviour. Usually, this takes the form of focusing on the apparent

good and forgetting about the real good. There are few things that are totally bad and

that bring no good, of any kind, to anybody – it is an ill wind that does not blow

somebody good. So we focus on the good of vital values; or we focus on the pleasure

that will be experienced; or we bracket moral obligations, consequences, laws,

punishments, etc. It is difficult to choose evil as evil; so we dress it up as the apparent

good, what seems good to us, now, at this moment.

We rationalize stealing by pretending that we are just borrowing without

permission; that this is community property so I really own it anyway; he is so rich that

he will be able to replace it in a week; I am just redistributing the goods of the society in

a more equitable manner; I need it for my family, and the like. Or we might argue to

ourselves that, Okay, there is a rule that this is wrong, but this particular case is an

exception, the rule does not apply here and now for me. Or we appeal to a situation

ethics where we are completely free to say [375] that this situation is unique, no laws

apply, I have to do the loving thing and this is what I am doing. Loving in this case can

easily mean, what is convenient, what I like to do, what I get pleasure out of doing. Or

one can argue that, Everybody is doing it, so why shouldn't I. Or we might argue, Well

I will just do it this once and then never again. Eve in the garden began to think, Maybe

God has a hidden agenda in forbidding us to eat this fruit; maybe we will become like

God if we eat!

We avoid self-consciousness by not thinking about it; "just do it" as the T-shirt

slogan puts it. Engage in a ceaseless round of activities, an activism, that does not allow

Value Ethics 405

time for reflection, evaluation, self-awareness. If we always act on the spur of the

moment, or in anger or on impulse then we are avoiding awareness and the struggle

inside us is suppressed.

Moral renunciation is surrender. We admit that it is wrong, but it is beyond our

human capacity to resist the temptation. I am too fixed in my ways to change. I know I

should give up cigarettes, but I just can't. Once we have admitted that to ourselves it

becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and truly we will not be able to give them up.

This kind of mental activity introduces more and more incoherence into our

judgments, our conscience and our actual behaviour. We are living in a state of tension

with ourselves. We usually find that we are caught in a situation of covering up our bad

habits, we are involved in lying, deception, self-delusion, denial; this is the path of

disintegration and self-destruction.

Stage Four Deformed Feelings. We have already distinguished between the

intentional response to value that are feelings leading to true value; and intentional

response to satisfying and dissatisfying that are morally ambiguous. Now that our weak

will has chosen satisfaction over against value, our feelings tend to fall in line. The

feeling for value is smothered, choked, neglected, ignored. We substitute short-term,

sensible, selfish, pleasures which are not true values. Our body, our psyche, our

imagination, our habits, tend to fall in line with this behaviour and to expect it. The

pleasure/pain criterion substi-[376]tutes itself for the value/disvalue criterion. We become

insensitive to values and sensitive only to our own sensitive desires.

All the biases flourish in this context. We feel only for ourselves, we are

sensitive only to the good of our own little group. The disinterestedness of intelligence

has little hold when you are oriented only to personal preference, satisfying sensible

likes and dislikes, seeking advantage for yourself and your group over against others


406

and other groups. You begin to feel quite happy in a situation of competing egoisms and

conflicting groups.

One is now open to all sorts of deformations of feelings. Ressentiment,

inferiority complex, raw selfishness, lack of self-esteem, denial, hatred, depression,

shame, revenge, superiority complex, enjoyment of power, of wealth, of fame, despair,

sensuality, etc. As Aristotle pointed out, you are truly virtuous when you take pleasure

in doing virtuous acts. But when we allow ourselves to be attracted by sensible

pleasures like the masses then pleasure becomes the end. Then we begin to do the

apparent good rather than the real good. We learn to take pleasure in evil, rather than in

good. The intentional response to value is smothered, twisted, diverted, ignored. We

become insensitive to true values. We end up loving evil and hating the good.

Stage Five Cycle of Decline. We will examine in the next chapter the dynamic

of horizontal finality in development and of vertical finality in conversion, a process we

name self-transcendence. For the moment we consider the opposite, the possibility of

decline and refusal of conversion. It starts in the will – we make weak decisions for the

good and hence leave ourselves open to lesser goods, or substitutes. Our rationalization

follows in an attempt to maintain some kind of coherence between our knowing and

doing. Our feelings fall into line as we manage to stifle our conscience and learn to take

pleasure in evil. The feeling aspect, the cognitive aspect, the weak will aspect, each

feeds into the other in a cumulative process of decline and disintegration. There is a

dynamic about the process of decline, a momentum with each aspect feeding the others.

Vices become ingrained habits. They are deep dispositions to evil rather than to the

good. We become divided against ourselves. Conscience occasionally [377] asserts

itself. But it is no longer a trusted judge between good and evil. Self-transcendence

becomes immanence; we are locked in our little world of short-term satisfaction,

selfishness and egoism.

Value Ethics 407

Stage Six Personal consequences. There is a contraction of freedom and weak

will tends to become bad will. In this context the power of deciding well is considerably

diminished. Judgments of value are twisted into presenting the apparent good rather

than the real good. Desires are a chaos seeking more of satisfaction than of value. The

dynamic of decline has taken hold. Deciding to reverse the process requires a

tremendous effort; but the motivation, the desires, the aspirations that would favour that

effort are absent. Deciding become weak, superficial, fickle, irresolute. Addictions and

other psychic illness can lead to complete breakdown of the power of deciding.

Stage Seven Social consequences. No man is an island, and so the decline of

one person vitally effects the family, the friends, the relatives, the work mates, the local

community, all the groups to which the person belongs. The good of order is distorted to

deal with the behaviour of persons in moral decline. The person in moral decline tends

to seek out those of a like mind, and similarly tends to corrupt those who still believe in

moral values. Irrational structures, laws, procedures, patterns are put in place. The

process of rationalization becomes social, they are taught in the schools, they are

propagated in the media, they are pandered to by politicians. The process of individual

decline becomes social decline and the social institutions follow suit.

The cycle of decline becomes rooted in the society. Decisions are made for

pleasure not for value. Sensitivity to true values is smothered in the rush for sensible

pleasures. The ideology of rationalization takes hold on the public imagination. It

becomes more and more difficult to initiate a reversal.

Conclusion. Deciding is the efficient cause of our judgments of value, and of

our actions. It is an important though extrinsic component in the judgment of value. It is

one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of a good judgment of value. In this

chapter we [378] have distinguished the act of deciding from sensible and spiritual

desire, from cognition, from wishes. We have seen that deciding requires training; we


408

need to learn to have a habitual strong willingness to seek values rather than

satisfactions. Weak will can become strong; fickle will can become deep and

permanent. Just as we need to learn to know well, we have to learn to decide well, to

make good choices.

Suggestions on Questions for Deliberation:

(1) I am sure you would normally look for information booklets, check on the courses,

professors, procedures, faculties, expenses, the sports program, ask advice from family

friends and alumni; visit the place and do a tour; look over application form; talk to the

registrar. Good decisions suppose comprehensive and correct judgments of value, which

presuppose relevant factual information.

(2) Just to point out that choice is not usually an arbitrary, random activity. If you do not

choose your clothes or books at random, why should you choose your moral values in

such an irrational manner. What kind of persons do we want to become; how do we

understand the authenticity of the human person; do we desire values; do we aspire to

autonomy; do you want to grow up or not?

(3) The point is self-appropriation. The point is to identify the words value, decide,

desire, aspire, guilt, conscience, deliberation, etc. in your own experience.

(4) Prisoners, as human persons, are free. They may not have exercised their freedom

responsibly. As such they may have ingrained habits of criminality and in that internal

sense will find it hard to go straight. They are constrained externally in their movements

but remain essentially free.

(5) The range of alternatives in possessions, education, medical care, travel, etc. is wider

for a rich person than for a poor person. It is detachment from these things that free us

spiritually. The poor man is not necessarily detached in his mind from possessions. [379]

(6) The good moral person has committed himself to true values and lived according to

these and has learned to take pleasure in such a life; hence it is easier for him to

Value Ethics 409

continue in the same line. He has become what he has become freely and responsibly;

he has enhanced his freedom and responsibility. The depraved person has chosen

satisfaction rather than true values; he has developed habits of vice; he takes pleasure in

such behaviour; his thinking has fallen into line with his acting. His conscience is

deformed even as it continues to invite to change. It is very difficult for this person to

change morally. His freedom has become narrowed and weakened.

(7) We are oriented in some fundamental sense towards the good. The transcendental

precepts, as well as being imperatives, are also immanent and operative in human

activities. We are oriented to the good in that fundamental sense. We can decide not to

choose that path, leave ourselves open to alternatives, admire their seeming

attractiveness, choose the apparent good for us and in this convoluted way we can

choose evil.

(8) Habitual knowledge can be temporarily and conveniently forgotten. Sensible

passions can overcome our moral convictions. Knowledge of what is right can be

mistaken. One’s knowledge might be obstructed by drink or drugs. Our power of

deciding might simply be too weak to carry out the right action. [380]

Endnotes

1Method in Theology, 121. 2Method in Theology, 38. 3Grace and Freedom, 320-21. 4Nicomachean Ethics, 1046b10 – 1047b15. 5Nicomachean Ethics, 1111a20. 6See Frederick E. Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, Supplementary issue of Lonergan Workshop, Volume 16, ed. Fred Lawrence, 2000. “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas”, 71-204. 7B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy.


410

8Elizabeth Morelli, “The Feeling of Freedom,” in Timothy Fallon and Philip Boo Riley, Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) 85-106. 9Method in Theology, 121. 10Method in Theology, 121. 11Method in Theology,121. 12Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q 7-17. See also Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, (Saint Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1953, 1967), Especially 12-13 for a summary and interpretation of Aquinas, to which I am indebted. 13See Andrew Tallor, Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997). Presents many Lonerganian themes in common with this text, but from the point of scholarship rather than self-appropriation. 14Chapter Four, Section 3.1. 15Insight, 714. 16Roberto Assagioli, The Act of Will: A Guide to Self-Actualization and Self-Realization, (Northamptonshire: Turnstone press, 1974, 1985), 17A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, (New York, 1970). 18Michael Shute, and William Zanardi, Improving Moral Decision-Making, (Axial Press, Halifax, 2003) An example of decision-making following a Lonergan background. 19Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 320-21. 20Jonathan Barnes in his Introduction to The Ethics of Aristotle, (London: Penguin Books, 1953), 34. 21Insight, 643. 22Insight, 643. [381] 23Insight, Chapter eleven. 24Insight, 689-90. 25I found the following reasonably helpful but not free of confusion: Peter Vardy, The Puzzle of Evil (Great Britain: Fount, 1992). Mary Midgley, Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay, (London, Routledge, 1984). Martin Buber, Good and Evil: Two Interpretations, I Right and Wrong II Images of Good and Evil, (New Jersey: Prentice

Value Ethics 411

hall, 1952). Harold Kushner, Why Bad Things Happen to Good People (New York: Pan Books, 1981). 26Insight, 689. 27Insight, 689.

8

Moral Self-Transcendence

For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence.1


(1) Think of one way in which you have grown and one way in which you have declined in moral sensitivity since adolescence. (2) Are you attracted by the notions of self-fulfilment, self-actualization, human flourishing, self-development? (3) Is ‘to become a better moral person’ part of your aspirations in life? (4) Would you prefer to suffer an injustice or to do an injustice? (5) Would you prefer to have a good daughter, or a clever daughter? (6) Four thieves rob a bank. Do you expect them to share the money fairly between them? [384] (7) Why are we so different from Albert Schweitzer, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King? (8) To whom would you go for advice on a personal moral dilemma: (a) a close friend? (b) a competent professional? (c) a clever lawyer? (d) a moral, wise person?

1 Introduction

Let us keep in mind where we are. We have already identified three components

of the judgment of value, the cognitive, the affective and the volitional. We have

identified each of these, painstakingly, precisely, in explanatory mode. We have seen

how the first two components, the cognitive and the affective are intrinsic constitutive

elements of the judgment of value. We have seen the element of free and responsible

deciding as the necessary condition for the possibility of a judgment of value even

Value Ethics 413

though it is an extrinsic element. We now consider the total context of the developing

person, who posits the judgment of value and thereby constitutes himself or herself as

morally self-transcending, an originating value. This is clearly stated by Lonergan as

one of the components of the judgment of value2 and so we must examine it very

closely.

This chapter will be devoted to elaborating the notion of moral self-

transcendence as the context in which correct judgments of value are posited. To make

good judgments of value, you need to be the kind of person who makes good judgments

of value. To become the kind of person who makes good judgments of value, you need

to make good judgments of value! To posit a correct judgment of moral value is to

change yourself morally for the better. To affirm an incorrect judgment of value is

usually to become a lesser moral person. There is a ‘becoming’ involved in moral

development and affirming true moral values is part of the process. Just as in Aristotle

we become virtuous by doing virtuous acts, so in affirming true moral values we

constitute ourselves as good moral valuers. When we take a stand on judgments of truth

we are responsible for those judgments; they become part of us, what we believe, what

we stand for as persons. Much more so when we affirm our moral values; it is not [385]

just an act of the intellectual faculty, but an act of the person, taking a stand on what is

important, what has priority regarding persons, interpersonal relations, how he plans to

interact with others – an affirmation of personal priorities in life. As we pointed out

earlier, when we achieve terminal values, we at the same time constitute ourselves as

originating value.3

This might sound like a vicious circle. But vicious circles belong to logic, and

we are talking of the realities of life. The reality is that the three components of the

judgment of value that we have already examined interrelate in a context of becoming

or of declining. We are calling this becoming ‘self-transcendence’. To understand fully


414

the authentic judgment of value, we must have a clear understanding of this developing

context. We are thinking of it in terms of final cause, or general finality.

2 Self-Transcendence

The term itself is open to misinterpretation from the beginning. ‘Transcendence’

in this context does not refer to God or to the transcendent, or to the spiritual. Similarly,

the term self-transcendence does not refer to leaving the self behind, as if it were of no

importance. Equally, the term is not used to create an aura of mystery or obscurantism.

Transcendence for Lonergan is the simple process of going beyond by asking further

questions and attaining correct answers.

I think there are two counterpositions in mind here. The first is Kantian

immanentism. Immanence is the problem of being confined in the subject. For Kant we

cannot be sure that we know the thing-in-itself, because we have no way of comparing

what is in here and out there to be sure that they correspond. So for him our knowledge

is immanentist, knowledge of concepts rather than of reality. The post-Kantians inherit

the same problematic and are also unable to solve it. Immanentism is a common

opinion among contemporary philosophers and when you think in terms of images of

‘in here’ and ‘out there’ you will never be able to solve it. It is also a common opin-

[386]ion among non-philosophers. Solving this problem is central to establishing a

notion of truth and of value.

I think the second counterposition Lonergan has in mind are the incomplete and

inadequate notions of self-development, self-fulfilment and self-actualization current in

psychology. Some of these are based on a truncated notion of the human subject; they

often ignore the dimension of religious or moral development. They often advocate the

elimination of guilt rather than accepting that it might indicate wrongdoing. They often

espouse a self-serving notion of human success, which eliminates notions of right and

wrong, true and false, true and false values. Sacrifice, genuine love, suffering, service

Value Ethics 415

of others have no place in such counselling.4 So Lonergan escapes from this verbal

tangle by using a term of his own and intending an authentic notion of self-realization.

2.1 Immanence to Self-Transcendence

‘To transcend’ for Lonergan usually means simply, ‘to go beyond’. It usually

refers to the process of questioning, which no sooner has it come to a term in a

judgment, that it goes beyond to further questions, in an endless sequence of further

questions, opening out, going beyond all limited horizons.

There is an elementary transcending already operating at the level of sensing.

Sensing intends the sensible; seeing goes beyond itself as an activity, to what is seen;

there is a distinction between the seeing and the seen. We attend to what is there, not to

what we want to be there. We attend to the whole of the relevant data and resist

screening, censoring, denying, distorting by ulterior motives or hidden agendas.

In the activities of questioning, understanding and formulating we intend the

intelligible; we go beyond the activity of insight to intelligible relations, causal

connections, concepts, hypotheses, definitions. The activities are one thing, the contents

of these activities are another – they are distinct. We go beyond ourselves to the

intelligible. Questions for intelligence intend the intelligible; the activity of un-

[387]derstanding grasps the intelligible in the sensible; this intelligibility is expressed

and formulated clearly in a concept or a definition.

In questions for reflection, reflective insight and the judgment of truth, we

intend and attain the real; we do not constitute the real by our knowing it. The real is

known as independent of our knowing it. When we attain the truth, we have gone

beyond the subject knowing, to what is known. Cognitional self-transcendence means

that we attain the real, the true, the actual, what is the fact. We are not locked in

ourselves as in a prison but can go beyond, to all that is intended in questioning and can

be affirmed correctly in judgments.


416

We have dealt with this question in detail in Foundations,5 where we considered

the themes of cognitional theory, epistemology and intellectual conversion. Questioning

intends answers; they lead beyond the subject and ask about reality. If the questions can

be answered truthfully we have attained the real. The criterion of the real is what can be

affirmed in a correct judgment. The real is attained in a correct judgment and not in an

imaginative jump from the ‘in here’ to the ‘out there’. The image of ‘going beyond’

that Lonergan uses in relation to self-transcendence should not be taken too literally: it

is not the going beyond from the ‘in here’ to the ‘out there’ of imagination, but the

going beyond of questioning to correct answers.

In this text we are applying the same process to the notion of true value. We can

only attain true value by a process of questioning, deliberating and judging and so a

process of moral self-transcendence. In questions for deliberation we intend values. In

deliberative insight we assemble the cognitional arguments and evidence for the truth

of values. In correct judgments of value we attain knowledge of value. We go beyond

sensible satisfactions to the truly good, the good independent of the affirming subject.

We go beyond the apparent good to the real good. It is still cognitional in the sense that

it is only knowledge of value; it becomes complete moral self-transcendence when we

decide and act in accordance with this knowledge.

One could also talk of religious self-transcendence, going beyond a worldly to

an other-worldly perspective, going beyond creation to the creator, going beyond

human possibilities and achievements, to [388] the perspective of sin, salvation,

redemption, holiness, grace, unconditional love, and religious experience.

Self-transcendence, then, is a process of growth, of continuously expanding

horizons, of going beyond limits to the unlimited. It is not just an intellectual

development in the head, but a development of the whole person, an expansion in many

directions, an achievement of our finality and potentiality.

Value Ethics 417

2.2 Self-Development to Self-Transcendence

Lonergan does use the term self-transcendence is the clearly defined sense of

the previous section. In that sense it is closely associated with the process of

intellectual, moral and religious conversion. But I think he uses it also in a broader

context, with a broader meaning, referring to the whole human person, becoming as a

whole, and in each of his different aspects. In this sense self-transcendence refers to the

whole process of human development and conversion. It is a global term encompassing

all aspects of human fulfilment of potencies, authentic human flourishing. It helps to

appreciate this wider view if we consider some of the counterpositions which are

extremely prevalent in our contemporary culture.

There are many incomplete and inadequate notions of human self-development,

self-fulfilment, self-realization, and self-actualization current in psychology and in

everyday attitudes to life. The general notion of self-fulfilment is a very attractive one,

as it does respond to a deep human aspiration to become more fully human, more

authentic, and to develop one’s potential to the full. However, this presupposes a

correct notion of what is human nature, what is its proper flourishing, what are its

intrinsic limits. We will just pick out three of the more obvious distortions for the

purpose of clarification by contrast, namely, the truncated subject, the alienated subject,

and the self-creating subject.

The Truncated Subject. To what do we as human persons aspire? What is the

most we can hope for? What are our deepest and best aspirations? Many popular

notions of self-development aim at the development of social skills, emotional

development, successful [389] adjustment to situations, but explicitly exclude moral

and religious aspirations. The implicit notion of a human person is of one who is

skilful, intelligent, successful, happy in relationships and climbing the economic ladder.

Notions of altruism, philanthropy, self-sacrifice, are either excluded entirely or are


418

perversely distorted towards a self-serving view of human development. If the moral

dimension of the person is excluded, then guilt, remorse, and conscience become

inconveniences on the way to ‘self-development’. The aim of the therapist becomes

eliminating remorse, repressing guilt, suppression of genuine conscience and the

substitution of some goal of ‘success’ or ‘happiness’. There are many theories of self-

development based on truncated notions of the human person and human aspirations.

The Alienated Subject. To be authentic is to be true to oneself. But what

happens if you have a totally false notion of what it is to be a human person? The

alienated subject has a false notion of what it is to be a human person, is trying to

conform to that notion, and is alienated from his true nature. There are those who think

of the human person as intrinsically self-interested and society as simply a battleground

for competing egoisms. This is accepting a Hobbesian notion of human person and

society: homo homini lupus, man as a wolf to man. But is this the true notion? Are these

the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart? Some view the universe as a

meaningless accident in the history of the cosmos and human persons as biological

realities suffering from the illusion that they can know, that they can decide, that they

have moral principles. Self-transcendence does not have much chance in this

philosophy of life. If you have a false notion of the self, and try to be true to this false

notion, then you become an alienated subject, a subject in basic tension, alienated from

your true self.

The Self-Creating Subject. Finally, there are the exaggerated notions of self-

constitution, which do not recognize any limits to the process of human development.

Nietzsche looked to the ideal of the Superman; the one who has overcome all illusions

and taken responsibility for his life; the one who is strong, courageous, powerful; who

has a super intellect seeing through the masks, the resentments, the ideologies of the

masses; the one who is true to the will to power. [390] Nietzsche popularized the notion

Value Ethics 419

that we create our values, we are responsible for what we become, and that there are no

limits to that becoming. Sartre is also credited with the notion that existence comes

before essence; that our freedom is unlimited and that we can make of ourselves what

we choose; we can make our own essence to our own image. There are many

exaggerated notions, which stress that we are totally free to choose our values, that we

are totally responsible for our becoming, that we are arbitrarily free to become what we

will. We will try to be very clear as to what extent we constitute ourselves as authentic

persons. In elaborating our notion of self-transcendence we must be careful to base

ourselves on an adequate notion of the human person and to pin down clearly the limits

of self-transcendence.

2.3 Development and Conversion

In presenting a comprehensive notion of human becoming, we have to

distinguish the process of development from the related notion of conversion. These are

distinct processes and must each be clearly identified and appropriated.

Development we will deal with in terms of genetic method, which grasps

continuity through stages of becoming. We deal with notions of sequences of stages,

emergence of new realities, principles limiting this becoming. Development seems to

deal with horizontal finality. We expect the physical development of a growing person

to go through invariant stages, which unfold outside the control of our will; they just

emerge, happen, we adjust as well as we can. Moral development seems to unfold also

in a series of stages and levels which to some extent are also transcultural, universal,

invariant and beyond our control. Again it is a question of adjusting as well as we can

to different ways of thinking, feeling, deciding and doing characteristic of each level

and stage.

Conversion is a process of becoming which we deal with in terms of a

dialectical method. Here we will deal with linked but opposed principles of moral


420

deciding – the choice between satisfaction and value. At each stage of moral

development there is the possibility of conversion or lack of conversion. At each stage,

within the limits of [391] that stage, there is the possibility of good response or bad

response, choosing to become a good person or choosing to become bad person,

choosing value or satisfaction. At each stage we are free, and at each stage we make a

choice. Conversion is different from development; so first we treat of the stages of

moral development and later the possibility of moral conversion.

3 Understanding Moral Development

Do one's moral judgments change over a lifetime? Does this make moral

judgments merely subjective opinions subject to random changes? Does the moral

reasoning of the child, the adolescent and the adult differ structurally? If the notion of

development applies to the moral person, then, we should be able to identify a

beginning, a middle and an end to the process. Development seems to imply a

teleology, an end that the process is aiming at, a target as Aristotle would say. Surely no

study of ethics, which takes people as they are, can ignore this process. Surely, an

understanding of our own behaviour and of others will be considerably enhanced by

such a study.

Aristotle had a simple but clear notion of moral development. He often asserts

that young people are led by their passions and are not fit students for moral

philosophy. So he imagines the starting point of moral development as being a situation

where emotions dominate and reason is weak. The actual learning of virtue is difficult

and arduous at first. It is necessary to follow discipline, good laws, and go against

emotional impulses. The first acts of virtue are done with gritted teeth, opposing natural

tendencies to follow emotions. But, as individual acts of virtue are performed, the

subject realizes that it is possible and not so unpleasant, and it becomes easier to

perform further acts of bravery, temperance, justice, and the like. Eventually, the

Value Ethics 421

practice becomes habitual; it becomes a habit, a virtue, a spontaneous disposition to act

in a virtuous way and to take pleasure in such practice. The mature moral person

exercises a balance between reason and emotion, takes pleasure in goodness, practices

both intellectual and moral virtues and is happy to boot. This Aristotelian sketch of

moral development would seem to be accurate so far as he goes but [392] we would

hope for a more precise and differentiated treatment of the process of moral

development.

Moral development is a whole of which the parts are also developing. It is clear

that there is a physical, bodily, biological development going on through life, setting

the context for other developments. Intellect and skills are developing through learning,

higher viewpoints, clearer perceptions, surer judgments, more complicated operations.

Emotional development is proceeding apace where the chaotic emotional outbursts of

the child are channelled, directed, purified and brought into line with adult demands.

We develop psychologically in dealing with relationships, learning from experience,

acquiring a philosophy of life, a settled personality and temperament. Moral

development is a supervening integration of all these developments in terms of free and

responsible deciding, recognition of the superiority of moral values, recognizing the

struggle for moral authenticity, judging, deciding and acting in accord with a true scale

of values and thereby producing an integrated mature good human person.

3.1 Understanding Development

Let us now consider the kind of becoming that we call development. Obviously

there is something that changes and something that remains the same. If there were

nothing that stayed the same, it would not be change but annihilation or creation or

chaos. Heraclitus claimed that everything is changing, therefore, you cannot step into

the same river twice – it will have changed in the meantime. If he thought his position

through, he might have realized that on these principles you cannot step into the same


422

river once – because it is continually becoming and never the same. Process philosophy

would seem to face the same problem. There has to be something that remains the same

to be able to identify what has changed. Equally, if nothing changed there would be no

development, merely static immobility. Hence, our task would seem to be to identify the

elements that change and those that do not change and the relation between them; we

have to identify being and becoming. [393]

Development is a special kind of change. It is orderly, predictable within certain

limits, continuous, and intelligible. It is not physical change, as in changes of the

weather from one day to the next, or the changes in the positions of the stars, or

fluctuations of the stock market. It is not chemical changes as in iron rusting, ozone

layer depleting, a battery discharging or being charged. It is only in living things that we

get the full reality of development in the sense that we are using it. Hence it is in the

laws of biology that we look for the first understanding of life and how it develops. It is

only by extension or analogy that we apply development to the non-living world. The

characteristic of living things is that they possess their being, not in a static immobility,

but by development, generation and corruption, a beginning, a middle and an end: living

things possess their being by becoming over time.

Aristotle asked about the intelligibility of living things and coined the notion of

soul as the first principle of a living organic body. There is an identity between the

living thing that is generated, the living thing growing through its various stages of

development and finally dying or corrupting, ceasing to exist as a living thing,

degenerating. He applied this notion to the smallest of living creatures, to plants, to

animals and to human beings. The essential characteristic of living things is their ability

to move of themselves, a principle of self-movement or self-organization; orderly

changes emerge from within, unfold in a fixed sequence of stages and then cease.

Nowadays, if you ask, What is Life? You are apt to get the answer, the DNA. Aristotle

Value Ethics 423

had a more satisfactory answer. Life is not the material or biological substrate –

however indispensable that might be. Life is the totality of the stages of generation,

growth and decay, the organizing principle that operates through the stages, the total

intelligibility of being and becoming of the living thing. ‘Soul’ is a term, which has

unfortunately lost its original meaning and is now unusable. But Aristotle was certainly

closer to understanding life than contemporary reductionist biologists.

Aristotle was working on an empirical principle – observe the movements of the

living things. It was not hard to distinguish between the movements characteristic of

plants, or animals and of hu-[394]mans, respectively. Plants grow, take in nutrients and

give out residues, increase in size, reproduce by various ways, respond to sunlight,

water, soil, but do not walk about, do not have a developed sensitivity and are not very

flexible in adapting to environment. Animals develop sensitivity, mobility, superior

organization and differentiation, more control over the environment and consciousness

at the level of sensitivity; but they do not show any propensity to talk, discuss politics,

write books or invent motor cars. Humans incorporate all the achievements of plants

and animals to go beyond, to ask questions, enunciate truths, judge values, decide about

their becoming and submit to an all-powerful God. Aristotle differentiated three kinds

of soul, vegetative, sensitive and rational according to the activities observed and

verified. Similarly he recognized an obvious hierarchy of powers in these living beings.

Lonergan abandons much of the Aristotle’s terminology of body and soul,

substance and accident, but retrieves the original insight now expressed in his own

terminology, in the context of modern science and his own cognitional theory. He coins

a terminology of central and conjugate forms corresponding roughly to Aristotle’s

substance and accident. He uses the terms potency, form and act, as the content of acts

of experiencing, understanding and judging, respectively. He has a metaphysical

framework by which we can recognize what stays the same and what changes in the


424

process of development.6 Lonergan deals with development in the context of a genetic

method.7 This technical background is there, if you wish to investigate further; it is

presupposed in our consideration of development.

What then is development in the strict sense? If you are trying to understand a

stone, you gather the empirical evidence, you formulate your hypotheses about chemical

elements, identify the elements, research the origins, confirm the conclusions and now

you understand the stone, which has remained conveniently static during the research.

Understanding 'development' presents a new challenge in that the subject is changing,

there is a unity in becoming, a beginning a middle and an end, all of which have to be

included in the development. Lonergan gives a useful definition of development, which

will [395] help us to draw out some of the implications of this notion for making

judgments of value.

The first part of Lonergan's definition states that development is "a flexible

linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations."8

Development in flexible in that there are a number of ways to reach the same

goal; the same aim can be achieved by different means; development is not the same as

the functioning of a clock. Food is needed but there is a wide range of acceptable form

of fruits, vegetables, meats, fish, crabs, and the like, which can be cooked in various

ways. Humans always use language but there is no fixed, universal and necessary

language, other than invented by human intelligence. There are hundreds of thousand of

languages constructed according to varying rules of grammar, agreement, phonetics,

semantics, and linguistics. Some social organization is necessary, but each culture, time

and place can have a variety of structures of organization.

Development is a linked sequence of stages. The stages are easy to identify,

fetus, baby, child, infant, adolescent, youth, adult, maturity, parenthood, aging. Freud

identified the stages of sexual development as oral, anal and genital. Kohlberg

Value Ethics 425

recognized seven stages of moral development. Piaget recognized stages of cognitive

development. But the stages are linked, related to what went before, related to what

happens afterwards, part of a sequence. There is a sequence or order by which one thing

develops from another; later developments depend on earlier developments. Intellectual

developments depend on psychological developments, which depend on neurological,

which depend on biological, which depend on physical and chemical. The sequence is

what links the stages – the stages understood as linked together.

The key is to grasp the sequence, understand what is going forward. Later in

this chapter we will see how Kohlberg defines the levels and stages, which one

normally goes through to reach moral maturity. Each of these individual stages is worth

further study; each study contributes to our understanding of an aspect of moral

development. Kohlberg has also helped us to understand the links be-[396]tween the

stages in his stated principles of stage development – how and why one moves from

one stage to the next. Grasping the sequence is precisely grasping the stages and the

links between the stages, and now you have an understanding of development. All the

data on each of the stages is relevant; all the data on the links between the stages is

relevant. The insight into development is an insight into the totality of empirical data on

both the stages and the links between the stages.

Higher integrations are the central forms, the unity identity whole, which

perdures through the process of development of the whole and of the parts. The

direction of development is towards further differentiation and specialization. But these

new emergent realities have to be integrated into the whole, adjustments have to be

made and unity preserved. Emergence of the genital stage of sexuality calls for

adjustments, reorientations, redirection, integration; this biological development has

moral implications, decisions have to be made, feelings brought into line, behaviour

adapted, relationships readjusted.


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The direction of development is towards further differentiations and

integrations. The child is an undifferentiated mess of feelings, ideas, images, impulses,

decisions, desires, and fears. Intelligence is operating in naming, understanding,

relating cause to effect, but imagination is dominant; if a child asks why?, don't give an

explanation, tell a story. The child's moral behaviour is confused with desire to please,

fear of punishment, some sense of fairness and unfairness, respect for the authority of

parent figures, respect for the rules that are laid down.

The process of differentiation of all these elements is long and arduous and

takes place in successive stages. Kohlberg, as we shall see, traces this development

fairly well. The child learns to distinguish between accidentally knocking over a pot of

tea and deliberately writing on the wallpaper. He distinguishes moral laws such as don’t

lie, from practical advice, don’t go near the fire. He discovers that there are exceptions

to the rules. That there are conflicts of rules: Mommy says one thing and Daddy says

another. He discovers that some rules are [397] unjust. Some situations don't seem to

have any rules. So they move to a higher viewpoint, a higher integration, a different

way of structuring moral responsibility in the stage of conventional morality, seeking

approval and disapproval. But that itself is not a final resting place. The young person

discovers that you can't please everyone; approval from certain types of person is

neither desirable nor possible; what is approved may be felt to be wrong. Some people

might approve and others disapprove. Why should one rely on others for your moral

life and values anyway? And so the young adult moves to conscience, value, autonomy,

personal moral value judgments as a yet higher integration of a moral position.

The final part of Lonergan’s definition of development specifies that, "the

higher integrations meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds

through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence."9

The tension is between what the thing is at the present stage and what it is to become in

Value Ethics 427

the next stage. The underlying manifolds of physical, chemical, biological and

psychological elements are to be transformed successively by the new integrations that

emerge. The principle of emergence is the expectation of new realities that will develop

and emerge in due course. The principle of correspondence is the necessity that these

new developments do not disrupt the equilibrium of the whole; new elements have to

be integrated into the whole. Growth involves a constant tension between present habits

and future possibilities.

There is an operator pushing for change; there is an integrator holding things

together. What is this operator? Lonergan coins this notion of the operator as what

drives the process forward and upward. What is the common thread driving the process

from stage to stage? In the case of cognitional development it is the desire to know. In

the case of moral development, it is the desire to know the good, to do the good and to

become good. This is what keeps us going from stage to stage. Our deepest aspiration is

to become authentic persons; not just persons of skills, of success, of money, of

achievement, but of persons as authentic persons – deciding and becoming true persons

of moral value. [398]

What is the integrator? What is it that pulls everything together into one? What

is it that calls for adjustments, when things are out of line. I think it is the person, the

subject, the one, who cannot tolerate blatant contradictions between belief and action,

or between one aspect of behaviour and another. We are probably familiar with the

phrase ‘getting it together’. There are times in life, when we are simply overwhelmed

by the rate of change and need to take time out to adjust, to take stock, to reorient

ourselves. The first year away from home, the first month in a new job, the death of a

parent or sibling, diagnosis of terminal disease, are crisis points requiring

readjustments, adaptation, learning, and above all integration.

3.2 Lonergan on Moral Development


428

Lonergan rarely speaks of moral development as distinct from moral conversion,

and then only briefly.10 He admits that moral development is extremely complex.11 The

complexity comes from the fact that moral development is one component of a process

of total development, where all the other components are also dynamic and developing.

A person’s orientation in life can be basically religious, ethical, aesthetic or practical. A

person can be oriented towards self-satisfaction or towards values. It is difficult to draw

sharp distinctions. Besides the complex reality of moral development, there are the

complexities and confusions of the various theories of moral development.

However, he does appeal to Piaget to throw some light on the subject. He has

appealed to Piaget in reference to cognitive development; now he appeals to him to

understand moral development. Piaget studied the moral development of children by

observing how they play games of marbles and how their attitudes to the rules of the

game develop in distinct stages.12 Piaget noted that young children (5-7 years of age)

regard the rules of the game as immutable and absolute. They are an extension of the

authority figure and cannot be changed or infringed. In a second stage the children (8-11

years of age) agree that [399] the rules can be changed if everybody agrees but

somehow an injustice is being done to the game – they feel guilty about it. In a third

stage the children (12-13 years of age) agree that the rules can be changed if all agree

and no injustice is being done to the game and everybody is happy.

Piaget with the help of collaborators also studied children’s attitudes to

punishment and the development of a sense of justice. He generalized from these studies

to the conclusion that moral development as a whole moves from a stage based on

respect for the law, to a stage based on mutual agreement. The first stage emphasizes

the immutability and absoluteness of the law; that it is backed by authority; that it

comes from outside and from above. Morality at this stage is clearly and simply

obedience to this law. In the second stage morality is based on mutual agreement among

Value Ethics 429

equals; each participant is free and autonomous; what is good is good for the group and

not just for the individual. It is based on mutual respect and recognizes the autonomy of

each person as free and responsible. This is quite different from a law imposed from

above to which we owe absolute obedience.

Lonergan seems to accept this model of moral development as a movement from

obeying an external law, to increasing autonomy and the subject taking responsibility

for his own becoming. In the first stage the person is responsible for his own judgments,

decisions and actions and hence for his becoming as a moral subject but is not aware of

this fact. Later the person through self-control and self-determination, realizes that he is

responsible for his own becoming. The critical point is reached when autonomy decides

what autonomy is to be. “The subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to

decide what he is to make of himself.”13 He becomes a self-starter rather than a drifter.

Lonergan then sees moral development as always moving in the direction of autonomy,

the subject taking more and more responsibility for his own life and his own becoming.

In the end the subject is responsible, “for producing the first and only edition of

himself.”14

3.3 Kohlberg on Moral Development

I would like to outline Kohlberg’s stages of moral development. He is more

detailed, differentiated and complete in his treatment of moral development. He also

studied children and their responses to [400] questions about moral dilemmas,

punishment, and the reasoning behind moral behaviour. Understanding the invariant

stages of the development of the structure of moral reasoning should help us to

understand our notion of the moral judgment of value. Kohlberg has never written a

standard textbook of his theories but there are many others who have summarized and

applied his theories.15


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Our professed aim from the beginning has been self-appropriation of ourselves

as moral thinkers, knowers, deciders and doers. Awareness of the process of

development should help to understand our own coping with moral dimension of life.

An appreciation of the normal stages of moral development will help us to realize that

there are different ways of thinking about moral issues and that some are more mature

than others. One of the reasons for the variety of theories of morality is that people are

at different levels of moral reasoning. The higher forms of moral reasoning are

incomprehensible to those who are still at a lower level.

Levels and Stages. This is a simple summary of the stages and levels of moral

development as expounded by Lawrence Kohlberg. He seems to me to be more

comprehensive and accessible than the theories of Piaget or Erikson.16 There are three

levels, the pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. Conventional here

means much the same as social or socialized. The pre-conventional level is the level of

egoism when the individual is not even conscious of belonging to a group; principles of

moral reasoning at this stage do not include the group. Conventional morality is

strongly, if not entirely, determined by the group, belonging to the group, and wanting

to be approved of by the group. The post-conventional is when one goes beyond

conformity to find the basis of moral principles in one’s autonomy as a thinking human

being.

Level One. Preconventional level. This refers mostly to children in the seven

to thirteen age group. It is rare that an adult would be fixated at this level but it does

sometimes happen. Here the child is responsive to labels of good and bad, but interprets

these in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action. Good and

bad at this level mean leading to punishment or leading to satisfac-[401]tion. Results of

action are viewed in very physical terms. There is a sense that the rules are absolute,

because they come from adults who are big and strong and always right. There is little

Value Ethics 431

understanding of intention as a factor and no understanding of the reason for the rules;

they are viewed as quite arbitrary and the child has difficulty distinguishing moral rules

from physical rules, e.g. between don't tell lies and don't play with the scissors.

Behaviour is regulated by fear of punishment and desire for reward. This is all quite

egoistic.

Stage One. Punishment and Obedience Orientation. The dominant motive

here is fear of punishment. Parents are obeyed because, if not, you will be punished.

The degree of punishment determines the gravity of the fault. Children are very

responsive to this approach. It is a very basic level of moral behaviour. There is a

strong temptation for parents to use this, because it is so effective in producing

conformity. Many childhood stories work on this fear of punishment; the evil person in

the story is killed or eaten. Parents invent stories of monsters, or devils or witches to

frighten the children to be good. Even religious groups can use stories of devils, hell

and punishment, God as a terrifying Judge, to cower people into conformity.

Stage two. Instrumental Relativist Orientation. Here an element of fairness,

reciprocity and equal sharing are present. The child responds better to hope for a

reward. This is more positive and optimistic. This stage represents a more positive view

of what is good rather than a simple avoidance of what is prohibited. There is the

beginning of the awareness of being part of a group or family and that other people have

to be taken into consideration. Rewards are still interpreted in a physical sense. There

is no self-sacrifice; even participation in a group is for egoistic purposes. At this level it

is better to talk about heaven rather than hell, reward rather than punishment. Ideals of

the lives of good people can be put before the children to great effect.

Level Two. Conventional level. Maintaining the expectations of the

individual's family or group is perceived as valuable in its own right. This involves

conformity and loyalty, supporting and justifying the order and of identifying with the


432

persons and groups involved. [402] The society or group is dominant. The process of

socialization has taken place. Living in harmony with the group and being approved of

by the group are very important. One's self-worth is measured by the approval of the

group. Group roles are determinants of right and wrong.

Stage three. Good boy – nice girl orientation. Good behaviour is what

pleases or helps others and is approved of by them. One's behaviour is governed by the

search for approval. Self-sacrifice is accepted if it is necessary to get approval. The

psychological pleasure of belonging and being respected is substituted for the cruder

physical criterion of pleasure in earlier stages. There is the beginning of awareness that

intention plays a part in moral evaluation. ‘He means well!’ is important. Problems arise

when people do not conform to their roles, when roles conflict, when some people

approve and others disapprove of a certain behaviour.

Stage Four. Law and Order Orientation. Here there is an orientation towards

authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of social order. Right conduct consists in

doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the social order for its

own sake. Here there is an abstract concern for law. Law is seen as the ultimate

guarantee of peace, order and the individual's rights. Any deviation from the rules is

feared as possibly leading to social chaos. The rules are viewed as unchangeable,

because they maintain social order. The reason for the rules may not be appreciated.

This is the basis for a legalistic attitude and is very common in society and in the

church. According to Kohlberg, the majority of adults are around stage four. The hero

of stage four is the student who reports his fellow students for breaking the rules;

keeping the rules is more important than loyalty.

Stage Four and a half. The cognitive disequilibrium leading to stage five is so

important that Kohlberg came to call it stage four and a half. This is characterized by

scepticism, egoism and relativism. It is a stage often reached at university or college or

Value Ethics 433

a bit beyond. It is a tendency to rebellion and independence from family and social

norms and even from church regulations. It is a stage of questioning the basis for the

rules of the society and the church. [403]

This stage tends to be sceptical because it sees that rules are inadequate, but does

not know what is to take the place of rules. It tends to be egoistic because it is

questioning the values of stage four and so is being alienated from the society, and is

thrown back on oneself. This stage tends to be relativistic, because of the awareness of

varying rules in different families and societies. It is a transitional stage from

heteronomy to autonomy. It is questioning the authority that makes the rules,

questioning the basis for the rules, and aware that the rules are sometimes wrong.

Conscience may be in conflict with some of the rules.

Post-Conventional level. This is the level of autonomy, when a person

decides for himself on the basis of principle or conscience, as to his choices. It is going

beyond the society in its actual reality, to formulate a moral theory or philosophy from

which you can criticize society. It is a search for the best kind of society. One author

sums up the final position well when he says: "If a person spends his whole life doing

what he has been told to do by authority, merely because of fear of authority (stage

one), or because it will bring him pleasure (stage two), or because it is expected by the

group (stage three), or because that is the law (stage four), he has never really made

moral decisions which are his own moral decisions." 17 This is a stage where you make

up your own mind for yourself, and it may well conflict with accepted wisdom.

Stage Five. Social-Contract legalistic orientation. This is a kind of moral

philosophy of rights and duties which came in with Locke and then the American and

French revolutions. Law is not respected for itself but is seen to function for the society

and can be changed. Law is an invention of man and can be continually improved. Law

is there to protect the rights of individuals. There is usually a touch of utilitarianism


434

about this. Here a person has to decide whether a law is just or not before obeying it.

There is an appeal to rights that are inalienable and so not given by the society but

which society has a duty to respect.

Stage Six. Universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the

decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical [404] principles appealing to

logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency. They are universal principles

of justice that are abstract. They are not concrete rules of do this or don't do that, but

universal moral principles. Kohlberg cites Martin Luther King, J.S. Mill and Emmanuel

Kant as examples of this stage. He also seems to include religious heroes such as

Ghandi, Christ, Buddha, St. Francis of Assisi in stage six. Apparently Kohlberg was

thinking of creating a special stage seven for such religious persons.

Principles of Stage Development. Kohlberg's thesis claims that there is an

invariant sequence of stages that every person must go through. These stages have been

empirically identified. He followed a group of respondents over a period of thirty years

doing continuous interviews and research. He developed a technique of telling a story

and then asking for a moral evaluation of the actions and actors in the story and the

reasons for these evaluations. His interest was the structure of moral reasoning revealed

by the answers. He was not so much interested in good and bad behaviour but the

reasons for evaluating behaviour as good and bad. In this way he discovered the

sequence of stages and that they unfolded according to the following principles:

(1) Stage development is invariant. The order in which the stages occur never

changes. Just as in sexual or motor development there is a sequence of stages and you

cannot jump or skip or go backwards. You have to crawl before you walk, walk before

you can run, grasp before you can throw, etc. Similarly in moral development there is a

predetermined sequence which does not depend on the individual or family or culture.

Value Ethics 435

(2) Subjects cannot comprehend moral reasoning at a stage more than one stage

beyond their own. They can understand the next stage but not beyond that; it is beyond

their horizon. It is no use putting moral ideals like 'it is better to give than receive'

before a child of ten years old. It is no use at this stage explaining the transcendental

imperatives of Lonergan; you have to appeal to punishment or reward.

(3) Subjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning that is one stage above their

own predominant stage. They can understand and appre-[405]ciate the way of thinking

of one stage beyond even though they have not arrived there yet. They are attracted to it

because it resolves difficulties that they are experiencing and makes more sense.

(4) Movement though the stages is effected when cognitive disequilibrium is

created. A person becomes dissatisfied with his stage because it does not answer certain

questions or personal problems. There is an incompleteness, an inconsistency, a

contradiction, a confusion, which cannot be solved at that stage. This moves the subject

to the higher stage.

(5) Up to stage four, each stage represents a more adequate perception of the

social system and ability to think more abstractly. Moral development follows the steps

of socialization. At first moral thinking is purely individualistic. At stage four it is very

much influence by the society and social conformity.

(6) A subject can become fixated at any particular level. Just as in emotional or

motor or sexual development a person can become fixated at a particular stage so also in

moral development you can have adults who still behave like children. It is normal for a

child to pass through a stage of thumb sucking but you expect that by adolescence that

is finished; so a subject whose behaviour is still oriented to egoistic pleasure in

adulthood has become fixated at an infantile level.

3.4 Critique of Kohlberg


436

We have turned to the psychologists to help fill out the details of the process of

moral development. Kohlberg has done us a favour in outlining the levels and stages in

such detail and with such precision – even if we have to disagree with certain points.

We can use Kohlberg as a kind of mirror in which to see ourselves and ask if what he

has said is true in our own experience.

These psychologists are telling us that there is enough empirical data to assert

the reality of moral levels and stages. Kohlberg claims that these stages of moral

development are universal and cross-cultural; that moral obligation is a universal fact of

human existence. The move towards moral autonomy takes place through distinct stages

which are identifiable, empirically verifiable, can be identified [406] in our own

experience and in the expressed opinions of others. It is transcultural, universal,

pertaining to human nature.

Kohlberg and his stages have had an enormous impact on American education

and Christian catechetics. He came at a time when values were being discussed but

there was little control over which values were really important. The 'value clarification'

approach simply brought out into the open the actual values of the group, but had no

way of rectifying a situation where a group might value stealing or violence. The bag of

virtues approach where each ethnic group or state or community chose the virtues to be

inculcated in schools seemed very arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Along comes the

saviour, Kohlberg, to introduce a bit of reason, empirical evidence, universal

developmental stages and so a foundation for an educational system that wanted to

encourage moral values. It was not relativist and not emotivist; it was both philosophical

and empirical. He immediately became a kind of guru. Unfortunately, even he was

unable to establish the truth of moral judgments, or to answer the question of where

values came from, and how they could be critiqued, or how you could establish a scale

of objective values.

Value Ethics 437

In favour of his approach, I would make the following points. (1) He has

identified different structures of moral reasoning at different stages and his observations

are very acute, perceptive, illuminating and basically true. The over all reality of

developmental stages is there for any parent or educator to see. (2) His concentration on

the form of moral reasoning and not the content of moral codes is of great interest to us

because we have followed the same path. He bolsters our position in giving

respectability from the point of view of empirical psychology. There are invariant

patterns of moral reasoning. (3) His claim to be intercultural, invariant, universal is also

important. If this reasoning and stages are really intercultural then he has found

something that belongs to human nature as such. (4) In this way he preserves the

objectivity of moral reasoning in a form of justice for all. (5) His outline of levels and

stages of moral development is an excellent example of Lonergan’s definition of

development. First, study the levels and stages; second, study how the stages form a

sequence; third, study the principles that make the sequence [407] move forward

(principles of stage development); fourth, study the principles of integration of new

developments.

This schema is important for teaching values. You have to make some effort to

speak to the stage at which the majority of your students are. If you are teaching young

children, then you will have to stick to stories, an appeal to fairness, insist on keeping

the rules, threaten with punishment, and cajole with promises of rewards. But if you are

teaching in a university you are dealing with students on the verge of autonomy, in the

transition from conventional to post-conventional moral reasoning. Now you can begin

to appeal to responsibility, standing on your own two feet, making good moral decisions

for your self, developing your own conscience, giving theoretical ways of analyzing

right and wrong.

However, Kohlberg is open to criticism and I would make the following points.


438

(1) Because of his methodology of discussing stories and eliciting the reasons

for evaluations, Kohlberg focused exclusively on the moral reasoning of the subjects.

He did not consider their feelings, or their decisions, or their implementation. Many

psychologists have detected a divergence between what people say verbally about moral

reasoning and how they actually behave themselves when it comes to the crunch.

Relying exclusively on discussion, Kohlberg might have missed important aspects of

moral behaviour, as it actually occurs in real life.

(2) Many have argued that feelings play an important part in moral judgments

and decisions. It is surely a defect in an account of morality, if it entirely ignores this

perspective. Similarly, an educational system based entirely on moral reasoning will not

be comprehensive as it is leaving out a vital perspective. Many of the educational

strategies based on Kohlberg's theories were a complete failure. Perhaps it is because it

is so narrowly focused on reasoning. A feminist critique has also challenged this

focusing on reasons rather than feelings in stage development.18

(3) Kohlberg does not identify and analyze the activities of deciding and

implementing. The situations he discussed were purely hypo-[408]thetical stories. It is

evident that judgments in the context of a classroom discussion might be different from

the judgments made in the heat of a real life dilemma. Kohlberg fails to distinguish

between judgments of right and wrong and the free decisions and implementation which

follows on after them in real life. He asks the question, what would you do in such a

situation? But an answer given in a discussion might differ from one given in a real

situation.

(4) I suspect that the neat schema of three levels and six stages do not work out

so neatly in real life. It is nice to divide moral development into three levels and six

stages and to line them up one after the other. I suspect that real people are a bit more

complicated and prone to mess up this neat schema. Some people's reasoning is hard to

Value Ethics 439

classify. Some advance in one area but regress in others. Perhaps there is more

overlapping of the various stages. I suspect that even though we advance from one

stage to another, vestiges of the previous stages continue to operate in us. It is not

completely unknown for morally mature adults to put on their safety belts solely out of

fear of being fined rather than because it is the right thing to do. There is a certain

inflexibility about Kohlberg's stages, which makes me uncomfortable. I am not sure

that the child is always totally egotistical; I suspect that they are capable of quite

altruistic actions even though this may not be the norm. I am not sure that in some cases

stages can be skipped and the end point of autonomous conscience reached by other

routes.

(5) There seems to be no analysis of rationalization, of how we reason ourselves

into doing what is wrong and the twisted kind of justifications we give for doing things

we know to be wrong. It would be very interesting to examine the ways by which we

make excuses for our moral failures, how we cover up, deny obvious facts, rebut correct

arguments, persuade ourselves that white is really black. If we are to fully understand

the process of moral development, surely we should learn by contrast with moral

decline.

Conclusion. We have studied the reality of moral development. We have seen that the

person develops as a whole, through distinct levels and stages. We can see that

reasoning develops, that affectivity [409] develops, that deciding becomes more

responsible, that relationships with society develop. In this context it is difficult to think

of a static ethical system, equally applicable to all levels and stages of development. It

would seem that any attempt to systematize the data on moral development will have to

adopt a dynamic point of view, a view that promotes moral development and reverses

moral decline.


440

Moral development is a limited affair; there are clear limits to what we can make

of ourselves. The levels and stages are there for all to see. There are some exceptionally

heroic moral persons, but they remain human persons, just like you and me. Dreams of

self-creation inspired by Nietzsche and Sartre are simple fantasies worthy of cinema but

not of empirical reality. Development is not a process of endless limitless becoming or

self-creation – it is a distinct process with clear stages and definite limits.

There is a rough parallel between Kohlberg’s levels and our own outline of

moral systems in our first chapter. You could simplify Kohlberg’s levels as first,

obedience to the law, second, be as virtuous as you can, and third, adopt a universal

moral principle position. We outlined a rough transition from an ethic of law, to an ethic

of virtue, and finally to an ethic of values – claiming that the ethic of value incorporates

and goes beyond and is better than the previous systems. A moral system must start with

people as they are; the permanence of morality is the permanence of the set of activities

performed by persons in making moral judgments, decisions and actions.

4 Understanding Moral Conversion

4.1 General Notion of Conversion

1. From horizontal to vertical. Conversion has to be distinguished from

development. Development implies continuity along one direction or orientation, even

though it presumes some change within that overall orientation. Conversion involves

something new and different in the very orientation. Lonergan has recourse to the notion

of horizon. A horizon is, "the limit of one's field of vision."19 From different standpoints

there will be different horizons. Every-[410]one has limits to his world. There are the

things with which we are familiar and at home. There are things of which we know

something and can ask questions about it. But, then, there are things which are so

outside the horizon of our minds, that we cannot yet even ask intelligent questions about

it. "Horizons then are the sweep of our interests and of our knowledge; they are the

Value Ethics 441

fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also are the boundaries that limit

our capacities for assimilating more than we already have attained."20

Lonergan distinguishes a horizontal exercise of freedom, which leaves the basic

horizon intact; and a vertical exercise of freedom, which involves a change in the

horizon itself. For example, there are many forms of empiricism. There are

developments that can take place within the tradition of empiricism. Empiricist

principles can be applied to new areas of human knowing. The principles can be

formulated in different terminologies. It can be applied to language and become a kind

of linguistic analysis. These are horizontal changes; the basic horizon of empiricist

principles remains intact. By contrast, conversion involves a vertical exercise of

freedom that changes the horizon itself. A shift from empiricism to critical realism

would be a change in the basic horizon; it would be a vertical exercise of liberty. It

would be a move into a new horizon. The movement into a new horizon involves an

about-face; it comes out of the old, by way of repudiating characteristic features; it

begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever-greater depth and breadth and

wealth. Such an about-face is what is meant by a conversion.21

2. From genetic to dialectic. Genetic method deals with development in terms

of continuity of a sequence of stages. Kohlberg's exposition of levels and stages is a

consideration of the development of moral reasoning, how one stage leads to another,

the continuities and the discontinuities. Any living organism will go through stages of

growth, development, changes of various kinds, which are understood using genetic

method. Conversion is more appropriately studied in the context of a dialectic method.

Here there is a conflict of linked but opposed principles of change.22 Dealing with

conversion we have to identify the forces leading us to moral goodness, the drives

obstructing the move to virtue, and how the conflict works its [411] way out in the

normal person. The dialectic is present at all stages of moral development. It is a free


442

choice of the individual at each stage. Although the tension is partly resolved in the

mature good person in principle it never goes away; we never eliminate either of the two

terms.

3. New beginning. Conversion is an about-face that involves a repudiation of the

old and an embracing of something new. It is a change of orientation. It involves a

choice and a decision. Conversion involves rejecting the old way and accepting the

new. There is both a negative and a positive aspect to every conversion.

It is clear that conversion is not just a higher viewpoint, a minor change of

horizon or a development in one particular direction. It involves a decision which is a

vertical exercise of liberty that is so basic that the subject himself is transformed.

Conversion is a transformation of the subject. Nor is it a minor transformation. "Rather,

it is a radical transformation on which follows, on all levels of living, an interlocked

series of changes and developments."23 It is a new beginning because it brings about a

new self to be understood. It is a transformation of the subject and becomes the basis for

a whole new series of developments. By conversion is understood a transformation of

the subject and his world. Still it is not just a development or even a series of

developments. Rather, it is a resultant change of course and direction. There emerges

something new that fructifies in inter-locking, cumulative sequences of developments on

all levels and in all departments of human living.24

4. Three conversions. Lonergan identifies three basic conversions, intellectual,

moral and religious. The order of exposition that Lonergan favours is first, intellectual

conversion, then moral conversion, then religious conversion. There is a certain logical

progression from intellectual, to moral, to religious conversion. It should not be assumed

because of this that this is the order of occurrence in reality or that this is the order of

dependence. It does not follow that intellectual conversion precedes moral conversion,

nor that moral conversion precedes religious conversion. Nor does it follow that moral

Value Ethics 443

conversion is dependent on intellectual conversion or that religious [412] conversion is

dependent on moral conversion. "Conversion has many dimensions. But there is no

fixed rule of antecedence and consequence, no necessity of simultaneity, no prescribed

magnitudes of change."25

Moreover, there can occur any combination of presence or absence of the three

conversions; it is possible to be converted morally and not converted intellectually.

However, normally a conversion in one dimension will naturally create a tendency to

conversion in the other dimensions, but this need not necessarily occur. Human persons

are very flexible and inventive in combining elements of conversion with elements of

decline.

5. Sudden/gradual. Nor should we think that conversion must of necessity be

such a sudden and once and for all experience as that of Paul on the road to Damascus.

Conversion is often a slow and tortuous process. "Conversion may be compacted into a

moment of a blinded Saul falling from his horse on the way to Damascus. It may be

extended over the slow maturing process of a lifetime. It may satisfy an intermediate

measure."26 Since conversion may be a slow maturing process, then, there is an infinite

variety of degrees in the achievement of conversion.

6. Willingness. Conversion is above all a change in willingness. Development

focused on reasoning and affectivity, without excluding deciding. Conversion is

centrally about saying Yes, or No. It is about deciding for satisfaction or value. It is

choice, will, the exercise of will, the acquiring of universal willingness, deciding always

for value. Within each stage of moral development there is the possibility of deciding

well, or deciding badly; the possibility of good will operating or bad will; the possibility

of conversion or lack of conversion.

7. Intellectual and Religious Conversion. Intellectual conversion27 is accepting

judgment as the criterion of the real, rather then the unquestioned imaginative


444

assumptions of the out there now real; it is accepting that knowing is not looking, but a

series of interrelated cognitional activities; it is moving from the world of immediacy

into the world mediated by meaning. Religious conversion is “being [413] grasped by

ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-

surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations.”28 This is the context in which

moral conversion might or might not occur.

4.2 Moral Conversion

The meaning of moral conversion can be stated quite simply: "Moral conversion

changes the criterion of one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values."29 It

involves a turning away from satisfactions and a turning to values and involves a radical

transformation of the self because it is in moral decisions that the subject constitutes

himself as a free and responsible subject. It is when satisfaction and value conflict that

we have to make a moral choice. Now we have to consider what is meant by these two

key terms ‘value’ and ‘satisfaction’. We have to give meaning to these terms by appeal

to further clarifications, illustrations and examples, not only from texts but also from our

own experience. We have already (Chapter Six) discussed the difference between the

intentional response to value and the intentional response to the agreeable or

disagreeable, in the context of the judgment of value. It runs parallel to the distinction

Lonergan draws here between value and satisfaction in the context of moral conversion.

1. Satisfactions. Lonergan gives very little help in identifying what precisely is intended

here. He rarely elaborates on what is meant and continues just to refer to satisfactions, as

if everybody knows what he was referring to. The intentional response to the agreeable

or disagreeable is in itself morally neutral or ambiguous. Presumably, satisfactions

simply as such are also neither morally good nor bad. Further, we have to remember that

the desire to know can be satisfied; such satisfaction is actually a criterion that you have

reached an invulnerable insight. Moral conscience can also be satisfied, a happy

Value Ethics 445

conscience. Satisfaction itself can be a value. Hence, we presume that by satisfaction

Lonergan is referring to sensitive satisfaction that is in some way is in conflict or

opposed to value.

Sensitive satisfactions simply stated are pleasures. They result at the level of

feeling and experience when sensitive needs, wants and [414] desires are met. Animals

in the biological pattern of experience have appetites, drives, desires, instincts, reflexes,

senses, memory and imagination. They act exclusively in terms of satisfying appetites

here and now; seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. If they are hungry and there is food,

they eat, if they feel like mating and there is a mate, they mate. If they are tired they go

to sleep. Hence they seek immediate, selfish, gratification of physical appetites, seeking

the pleasurable and avoiding the painful.

Children are spontaneously orientated towards sensible pleasure and satisfaction.

As animals we inherit all the instincts, impulses, appetites and senses of the animals.

Our orientation is towards the immediate egotistical gratification of all desires and

needs. Small children operate on this criterion of behaviour. The child learns only

gradually that pleasures can be postponed, cancelled or disciplined. From pleasing

himself, the child may learn the value of pleasing the parents. The child is taught

obedience by way of reward and punishment. Now a different kind of pleasure and pain

is introduced into the equation. The child learns the value of obedience and gradually

learns to distinguish what is pleasing to the parents and what is not pleasing. Later that

will develop into the notion of what is right behaviour and what is wrong. Normally,

some sense of orientation to what is valuable – beyond simple pleasure and pain – will

be present by the time the child reaches the age of reason.

But sensitive satisfaction continues to play an important part in the life of the

adult. If it is the dominant motivation, then, the adult remains in what Kierkegaard

called the aesthetic stage and what Lonergan would call morally unconverted. It is a


446

phase dominated by sense, pleasure and impulse. The self is dispersed in the pursuit of

pleasure and sense enjoyment. One drifts from one thing to another; this person is most

aptly called a drifter; he has no other principle guiding his life than the search for

pleasure. Pleasure can be found in all sorts of ways, on different occasions, in different

places. There is no cure for such a drifter unless he breaks into a new horizon. The

person simply has to make a choice, Either-Or; either to remain at that level or to make

the transition to the ethical level by an act of choice, by self-commitment. Lonergan

would call this a moral con-[415]version, a transition from satisfaction to value.

Lonergan does not invoke Kierkegaard in this context, but it seems that the transition

from the aesthetic to the ethical stage is remarkably similar to Lonergan's moral

conversion.

Satisfactions are not evil but they are ambiguous; they may coincide with what is

truly valuable and they may be in conflict with what is truly valuable. In themselves

sensitive feelings as sensitive are amoral: the category of morality does not apply. It is

only in the human person, when sensitive feeling is integrated as human sensitivity, that

the moral question arises. Moral education as Aristotle pointed out is to teach children to

take pleasure in good and noble works; it is an education of the emotions. Aristotle also

insists that the criterion of virtue is when you take pleasure in the exercise of the virtue.

He is also clear that contemplation as well as being the highest form of activity proper to

human beings is also the most pleasant of all activities. Hence we are in no way trying to

eliminate satisfaction from the moral life but to grasp the difference between the

satisfactions, which are in conflict with moral values and the satisfactions, which

accompany and reward moral living.

Satisfactions that oppose true values are usually selfish, physical, immediate and

an end in themselves. The child at first is thoroughly egotistical; it is concerned only

with its own private hunger, thirst, desires and needs. This cannot be called a moral fault

Value Ethics 447

because the intentional response to value has not yet emerged. Similarly, animals are not

renowned for their altruistic behaviour. The unconverted or the aesthete in Kierkegaard's

sense is also looking for selfish pleasure; a situation is viewed only from the point of

view of the possibility of pleasure for the drifter. The point of view of other participants

in the situation is not considered. The drunkard, the thief and the drug addict are

thinking only of their own satisfaction.

The pleasures that conflict with true values also tend to be strong, physical

pleasures, predominantly of touch; cravings and passions that tend to carry us away and

take control. The sexual impulse is enormously strong; if allowed free reign it would

almost certainly conflict with values such as respect, love, temperance, justice and the

[416] like. To a lesser extent hunger and thirst are very demanding physical desires,

which can lead easily to excess. Such strong sensitive feelings tend to take control, to

overcome the desire for value, to determine our decisions.

The child cannot postpone gratification; it must have a drink here and now

immediately. It is a short-term view. The drifter thinks only of the immediate future and

the possibility of imminent pleasure; the long-term consequences of behaviour are not

considered. It is only with difficulty that the child learns that sometimes you have to

work now and rest later, eat your vegetables now and the desert later, that gratification

can be postponed.

The child and the drifter are motivated by the search for pleasure and the

avoidance of pain. Pleasure is an end in itself. The pleasures of drink, of sex, of drugs

are sought for their own sake regardless of consequences. The higher pleasures that

Aristotle talks about accompanying virtuous activity and contemplation are not sought

for their own sake. We seek contemplation because it is the fulfilment of human

aspirations; and as a by-product we get the greatest satisfaction. But we do not practice

contemplation for the sake of the pleasure that it gives.


448

2. True values. The pleasure principle of the young child is gradually modified

by the inculcation of values, vital, social, cultural, moral and religious. The child has to

learn that there are other people in the universe who also have needs and desires. So the

child is taught to dress properly, to keep clean, to respect the elders, not to fight with the

other children, to help in the housework. Here values are conflicting with the pleasure

principle. As the child learns to read, goes to school, appropriates the cultural and

language values of the society, the horizon is widened, further values are introduced in

to the equation. Moral values also emerge; the child is taught to obey its parents, to share

with the other children, not to tell lies, not to use bad language. The orientation of

behaviour shifts from selfish satisfactions to the realization of true values. The process

continues throughout life. [417]

True value is what is intended in the question for deliberation, what is responded

to in the intentional response to value, what is grasped in deliberative insight, what is

affirmed in a judgment of value, what is decided for and implemented by an authentic

person. Values are known, not by looking, but by a series of interrelated activities,

respecting the cognitive, affective, volitional components. Our intellectual knowledge of

truth differs from sense knowing; similarly, our knowledge of values differs

fundamentally from sensitive response to pleasure. The authentic person is the one who

lives according to these values and not according to the criterion of sensitive

satisfaction. Values tend to be long-term, spiritual, moral or intellectual, altruistic; they

line up in terms of a scale of values; they tend not to eliminate pleasure but to redirect,

sublimate, displace it, so that we learn to take pleasure in goodness.

A new criterion of value judgments, decision and action emerges in the human

being. It emerges first in terms of responding to rewards and punishments, seeking the

approval of parents and society and avoiding their disapproval. In a good family morally

right behaviour will be approved and morally wrong behaviour will be disapproved of.

Value Ethics 449

In adolescence the teenager will attempt to move from dependence to autonomy, to

express the criterion of behaviour in terms of personally grasped ideas of justice, social

contract, equality, what is right or wrong independently of approval or disapproval of

parents, society, or church. Moral behaviour will then develop according to this criterion

of true values. These are grasped by asking questions of value, deliberative insights,

judgments of value, good decisions and execution.

3. Dialectic. Moral conversion is a dialectic by which we mean ‘linked but

opposed principles of change’.30 The principles of behaviour are linked because they are

operating in the same human person. They are opposed because one is urging to

immediate, short-term, selfish gratification of physical appetites and impulses. The

other is urging the choice of true values, the postponement or sublimation of sense

gratification; a life lived according to moral values. By dialectic we mean that these are

in conflict. The conflict is not resolved by eliminating one of the criteria. Nor is it

resolved by a [418] complete victory of one of the criteria over the other. It is resolved

by a balance, a harmony in the tension of opposites. Moral conversion is precisely

finding that balance of tension. It is not the exclusion of pleasure; not the unremitting

search for pleasure; but the good life of the virtuous, happy man.

To identify this dialectical tension between satisfaction and value it might be a

help to go back to intellectual conversion and note a parallel dialectic at work.31 We

defined intellectual conversion as the transition from 'body' to thing, from animal

knowing to intellectual knowing, from 'looking' to cognitional structure, from the out

there now real to the real as the verified, from imagination to judgment, from the world

of immediacy to the world mediated by meaning. Intellectual conversion is not a matter

of eliminating either of these two powers but of critical distinction and harmony.

Elementary knowing is operative from birth but critical intelligence slowly emerges; but

it rarely takes complete control; many unquestioned imaginative assumptions survive the


450

most critical of intellectual lives. And so we find ourselves operating at one time from

the pure desire to know and at other times according to the criteria of the out there now

real.

Similarly, in moral conversion there are two criteria operating, satisfaction and

true values. Satisfaction is operative from birth; it holds the stage, it is dominant. As we

grow up it is a matter of notions of right and wrong asserting their influence slowly and

gradually. Self-appropriation helps us to recognize these two principles operating; they

pull us in opposite directions. They suggest two criteria of what is good, the good of

physical satisfaction and the good of true values. There is a constant tug of war between

the two drives. To be morally converted is to operate easily and regularly according to

the principle of true values. Rarely does a person achieve complete ascendancy of true

values over satisfactions. It is a matter for most of us of a constant struggle, a dialectic

of progress and decline, two steps forward and one backwards.

It is important to recognize these two principles operating in oneself. The story

of the temptation in the Garden of Eden is a place [419] where we can recognize this

dialectic at work. On the one hand is the commandment of God, not to eat the fruit of

the tree in the middle of the garden. On the other hand is the fruit that "was good to eat

and pleasing to the eye, and that it was desirable for the knowledge that it could give".

(Gen 3,6) You can almost see Eve concentrating on the anticipated pleasure of eating the

apple, the delusion she entertains from the lies of the serpent and the putting away into

the back of her mind the commandment not to eat the fruit and any rational

consideration of the choice she was about to make.

A similarly instructive story is to be found in the Book of Daniel chapter

thirteen. It is a story of two old men who are attracted by the sight of a young lady

bathing in a garden. Far from averting their eyes, or avoiding that place again, they make

a habit of coming to the same place and indulging their desire. "They threw reason

Value Ethics 451

aside, making no effort to turn their eyes to heaven, and forgetting its demands of

virtue." (Dan 13,9). This is deliberately putting aside the criterion of true values and

adopting the criterion of the pleasure principle. Something like this always happen when

we choose to do evil. We ignore our conscience, we do not listen to reason, we do not

think of the consequences, we do not think of the harm we are doing; we surrender to the

search for immediate, short-term selfish pleasure.

5 Moral Self-Transcendence

Our concern in this chapter has been, how the process of moral self-

transcendence enters into the judgment of value. Self-transcendence involves a process

of becoming. By making good judgments of value, we become good judgers of value. In

order to become good judgers of value, we have to make good judgments of value. This

is not a vicious circle but a statement of the reality of how we develop intellectually and

morally. We do so through various incremental processes, particularly, development and

conversion. Such becoming is not a single, enormous leap into moral rectitude, but a

discursive, incremental, slow, and precarious entry into the world of value. Let us

summarize these processes by way of conclusion. [420]

(1) Genetic development. The psychologists have elaborated in detail on the

development of moral reasoning through levels and stages. How does that fit in with our

notion of moral conversion? Significantly absent from Kohlberg, particularly, is any

consideration of how the interviewees actually behave in their own lives. It is one thing

to give a moral judgment on a hypothetical situation; it is quite another as to how you

will actually behave in that situation yourself. We are not only interested in moral

reasoning, but in moral feeling, valuing and behaving. Our notion of moral conversion is

wider that the categories of the psychologists and is sufficiently broad to apply to each

stage of moral development. The child begins the process of moral conversion when he

chooses not to do something forbidden out of fear of punishment; the motive later


452

changes perhaps to behaving in order to gain parental approval; later it is a case of social

conformity, later autonomy, later still the realization of universal values, right and

wrong.

(2) Dialectical struggle. This, as we have explained, is the struggle between the

search for pleasure and the inclination to true values. But the dialectic of opposites

operates at each stage of the developmental levels and stages, as outlined by Kohlberg.

At each stage you can choose physical, short-term, immediate, gratification of sense

rather than the right, valuable, virtuous course of action. At first, the child learns through

punishment and reward; it learns to do the right thing, perhaps, for a dubious motive out

of fear of punishment or desire for a reward. But at least it is learning to do the right

thing. But not every child will respond positively and you will have bold children who

will misbehave despite the punishment they know is coming; and good children who

will do the right thing. Later the approval of the group will be valued and later the idea

of fairness, justice, sharing. But at each stage there is an emerging choice of the child to

be good or to be bold, an emerging freedom and self-determination, an emerging

responsibility for its own life and what to make of it.

(3) Satisfactions and pleasures are not evil and are not to be negated. When we

do virtuous acts for the first time it is rather difficult because we are usually denying

some physical satisfaction and at first that is difficult. Yet it becomes easier the next

time and easier the next [421] time until pleasure is displaced and we have learned to

take pleasure in the virtue. The sign of having a virtue is that we do the virtuous activity

spontaneously and with pleasure. Ironically, if we seek satisfaction for its own sake, we

often do not find it; if we seek true values in virtuous activity, we often find satisfaction

as well.

(4) Fidelity to the transcendental precepts. There are different kinds of

satisfactions. The pleasures of immediate sense gratification are one kind. Peace of soul,

Value Ethics 453

harmony of spirit, being at peace with oneself and one’s conscience is a higher kind of

satisfaction. If we are morally converted and are faithful to the transcendental precepts

the one criterion of true value is in control and we are at peace with ourselves. The

pleasure principle has been displaced or sublimated or suppressed. We are a whole, a

unity, an integrated being, not at war with ourselves and our conscience. We can be

totally honest, totally open, have nothing to fear.

(5) Moral progress is marked by the achievement of real freedom. Freedom as

we have seen is self-determination and not arbitrary choice. It is the good man who is

free to choose. It is the good person who has chosen well and is constituted as a free

person. He is free from attachments, constraints, fears, compulsions and addictions. The

good person is truly free because his good habits mean that he is acting not out of an

animal pleasure principle but out of conscious, knowing, free choice. He has extended

the range of his effective freedom. The person of bad habits contracts and slowly

destroys his freedom.

(6) The result of moral self-transcendence is wholeness, integration, balance,

transformation of the person, where all desires are as one. The dialectical tension will

never completely disappear but one can establish a harmony, a triumph of progress over

decline, of self-transcendence as opposed to decline. This wholeness is much talked

about in modern spirituality and psychology. It is a kind of peace of mind, peace with

yourself and your conscience, where habits have made it easier to be virtuous, in fact, it

is pleasurable to be virtuous. The harmony is between conflicting desires, those

characteristic of the biological pattern of experience and those of [422] the pure desire to

know and love. But the harmony includes felt obligations, intentional responses to

values, one’s conscience, one’s intellectual development, one’s spiritual development. It

is a process of self-realization, actualizing potential; as opposed to its opposite which is

self-destruction and disintegration that we encounter in moral decline.


454

(7) It should be noted that moral conversion is always partial, always fragile and

always free. There are real limits to moral conversion. It is partial because usually we

are very virtuous in some areas but retarded in others. It is rare that you find a human

being who is completely and fully and perfectly morally converted. It is fragile because

it is easily broken, we easily backslide or regress, the temptation of decline is always

there. We never eliminate the two poles of the dialectic. The most we can hope to do is

achieve a fragile triumph of true values over satisfaction. Lonergan refers to the human

incapacity for sustained development. It seems from one’s own experience and from

accounts of the experience of others, that we have spurts of development followed by

fits of decline, areas in which we are progressing and areas in which we are declining. It

seems to be humanly difficult to achieve continuous moral progress, in all areas, and at

all times. Moral conversion is always free; even if reinforced by habits, spontaneous

inclinations, feelings and pleasure, we are always free to reverse the process, to choose

satisfactions over true values.

Conclusion. Our primary focus in this text is where do moral values come from. Our

general answer is that they come from judgments of value. We have identified four

distinct components of the judgment of value. In this chapter we have examined the

notion of moral self-transcendence in so far as this impinges on judgments of value.

Why then is this element of self-transcendence, both development and conversion,

important for reaching correct judgments of value?

Aristotle states clearly and repeatedly that the standard and criterion of

goodness is the good person. He does not develop an ethic without taking people as

they are into account. It is the good person who knows about goodness, recognizes it

when he sees it, is sensitive [423] to values, responds positively to values, implements

terminal values and becomes an originating value in the process.

Value Ethics 455

It is precisely this process of becoming a good person that we have been

analyzing in this chapter. We do so by developing morally and by a process of moral

conversion. In developing we pass through specific clear stages and levels of moral

reasoning and feeling; we can become fixated at any level; various distortions of

reasoning and feeling can occur; there are clear limits to the stages of development; we

constitute ourselves as reasoning and feeling persons appropriate to our stage of

development. By a process of conversion we cultivate a universal, habitual, willingness

to respond to values rather than satisfactions; we learn to make good decisions, by good

decision-making; we recognize the attractions of the apparent good but learn to opt for

the real good. We nurture habits of willingness, moral virtues, spontaneously we seek

the good, rather than pleasure. We constitute ourselves as good persons.

The moral judgments of the converted, mature person will normally be correct.

The moral judgments of the unconverted, the immature, the seekers after pleasure, the

drifters, will tend to be unreliable, distorted, biased. By the dual processes of

development and conversion we constitute ourselves as the standard and criterion of

moral goodness.


(1) The point of this question is to call attention to your own experience of moral

development or decline. You might have become more sensitive to gender issues, to

social justice issues, to practical business ethics, to racial discrimination. You might

have become less sensitive to issues of truth telling, driving under the influence, filling

out tax returns honestly, and the like.

(2) Self-improvement psychology presents many ideals of how to be successful,

happy, well-adjusted, and mature. Sadly, they often work out of a truncated, or

alienated, or unrealistic [424] notion of the human subject and often ignore true moral

and religious values.


456

(3) We have many aspirations in life. One of them should be to become an authentic

moral person knowing true values, deciding for and implementing these values. Other

than religious values, moral values should be the most important values in our life.

(4) This question dates from the time of Socrates who opted for suffering an injustice

rather than doing an injustice. If we do an injustice we become unjust; we do a serious

injury to ourselves as moral persons. If we suffer an injustice, it only touches us on the

outside; we do not compromise our integrity.

(5) You can almost guarantee your child will acquire job skills, if you pay for a good

education. But you have no guarantee that your child will opt for values rather than

satisfactions. If you wish the best for your child, you would wish them to be good,

rather than clever.

(6) There is honour among thieves. If they have agreed beforehand, they expect the

agreement will be followed. One presumes a basic sense of fairness, even among

thieves – but be prepared for exceptions.

(7) These are some of those who might be considered morally converted to a heroic

degree. Most of us just stumble along the road of moral compromise and mediocrity.

(8) Ideally, the best adviser would be one who is wise, experienced, competent in the

matter in hand, morally mature, and also a friend. The worst advice would come from

the foolish, the inexperienced, the incompetent, the immature, the person who does not

care about you. [425]

Endnotes

1 Method in Theology, 38. 2 Method in Theology, 38. 3 Chapter Three, Section 5.8. 4 See Walter Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Direction in Self-Transcendence, (New York: Paulist Press, 1998). See especially Chapter two on the history of the notion of self-realization.

Value Ethics 457

5 B. Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter ten “From Authentic Subjectivity to Genuine Objectivity.” 6 See Insight. Chapter Eight on Things is a pre-metaphysical treatment of substance. Chapter Fifteen on the Metaphysical Elements deals with central and conjugate potency, form and act. 7 Insight, 484-507. 8 Insight, 479. 9 Insight, 479. 10 B. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 96-102. Also B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol 17 of Collected Works, 322-5. Also B. Lonergan, Insight, Human Development, 494-504. 11 B. Lonergan, Topics In Education, 96-8. 12 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1997). 13 B. Lonergan, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, vol 17 of Collected works, 315. Also Method in Theology, 240. 14 B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 83. 15 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice vol I, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of the Moral Stages vol 2 (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984). A simple text which I follow is Ronald Duska and Mariellen Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paulist Press, 1975). See also Walter Conn, Conscience: Development and Self:Transcendence (Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1981), especially 91-103 which give a convenient summary of Kohlberg's stages. See also Walter Conn, The Desiring Self: Rooting Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Direction in Self-Transcendence (New York: Paulist Press, 1998). 16 Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton,l 1963). Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York, Norton, 1963). Erikson approaches moral development from the point of view of trust; he deals more with the affective aspect of moral development. [426] 17 Duska and Whelan, Moral Development, 69. 18 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 19 Method in Theology, 235.


458

20 Method in Theology, 237. 21 Method in Theology, 238. 22 Insight, 242. 23 B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 66. 24 Method in Theology, 130. 25 B. Lonergan, Second Collection, 66. 26 Method in Theology, 238. 27 Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Nine. 28 Method in Theology, 240. 29 Method in Theology, 240. 30 Insight, 242-3. 31 Cronin, Foundations of Philosophy, Chapter Nine on Intellectual Conversion.

9

Judgments of Value

Such judgments (of value) are objective or merely subjective inasmuch as they proceed or do not proceed from a self-transcending subject. Their truth or falsity, accordingly, has its criterion in the authenticity or the lack of authenticity of the subject's being.1


(1) It is morally wrong to kill another human being. Is this a true statement? Are there exceptions? (2) Does expertise in making correct judgments of value make you a better person? In what way? (3) Is it wrong for one person to use another as an instrument of sexual pleasure? Why? (4) It is sometimes asserted that what consenting adults do in private has nothing to do with the State or anybody else, as long as they do not harm anyone. How do you evaluate that position? (5) What qualities would you look for in a tutor for your own children? [428] (6) What do you mean by conscience? In what sense is it a feeling? Can it be mistaken? (7) "This is my culture. You do not belong to my culture. Hence you cannot pass judgments on my values or behaviour." Do you agree with this position? (8) Imagine that you are a teacher of moral values, either as a parent or professor. Should you,

(a) be neutral and simply provide information for children or students to make

their own choices; (b) help the students to clarify their own values, without you passing judgment

on their choices; (c) teach a scale of values, which you have reasoned out, feel are true, which

enhance decision-making, and aim at self-transcendence?

Judgments of Value

460

Aspects Symbols Components Causes Analogy

Cognitive Aspect Mind Deliberative Insight Formal Cause Structure

Affective Aspect Heart Int. Response to Value Material Cause Content

Volitional Will Free Deciding Efficient Cause

Integrative Spirit Self-Transcendence Final Cause

Diagram Two. Four Components of the Judgment of value. [429]

1 Four Components

This would seem to be a convenient place to summarize what we have said of

the four components before we proceed to show how they unite in a judgment of value.

Please refer to diagram 2. You may have felt that we were wandering from the point in

some of the previous chapters, but we hope to show how everything now comes

together. A judgment of value is necessarily a complicated activity, but I think we can

show how, where and when it emerges. If we can succeed in doing that, we will have

uncovered the source of values and be able to mount a critique of values.

1.1 Four Components – Summary

Central to the diagram are the four components, which we have named, the

deliberative insight, the intentional response to value, free deciding, and the process of

self-transcendence.

The deliberative insight is the culminating point in reasoning towards what is

right and good. Judgments of value presuppose adequate understanding and information

about the matter in question. It presumes a grasp of possibilities, of alternatives, of

consequences, of motivations. It presumes correct definitions of terms, correct process

Value Ethics 461

of reasoning and inference, correct formal arguments from evidence to conclusions. It

presumes a grasp of principles and of concrete situations, and the insight that grasps the

relevance of the former to the latter. One should be able to give a reasoned explanation

of the moral positions that we take. One should be able to refute counter arguments. All

the activities encompassed in the activities of experiencing, questioning, understanding,

formulating, reflecting, judging truths, questioning value and the process of

deliberating, are relevant and presupposed by the deliberative insight. The deliberative

insight itself is a grasp in this totality of the sufficiency of the evidence for the

prospective judgment of value. This is the cognitive aspect.

We have closely associated the intentional response to value to the pure,

detached, disinterested, unrestricted, desire to know the truth, to know what is

worthwhile, to do what is right and become a person [430] of value. This is an innate,

spiritual orientation to what is good. It is an intention of value in the sense that, at first,

we ask questions about what is right, without knowing the answer; but we can work our

way to the answer, and when we find it recognize it as correct. It is response in the sense

of being sensitive to values, recognizing values, pointing in the direction of value, being

attracted to value. Value itself is a transcendental notion; it can be defined only in the

indirect manner of what is questioned, what is grasped and what is affirmed in a

judgment of value. We feel responsible; we feel obliged; we feel that there is a right

way to behave and a wrong way; we praise those whom we consider good; we blame

those we deem to have failed in their responsibilities. We feel our own conscience as

happy or uneasy. This is the affective aspect.

Thirdly, the motor force of this process is the person deciding freely and

responsibly. We have the power to say yes or no to the process of moral knowing,

feeling and becoming. Deciding is motivated by the good as known by correct

understanding. It is helped by the desire for the good, which makes it easier to say yes.

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462

Deciding comes in before the judgment of value, in the sense of assenting to the

processes of reflecting, deliberating and feeling. Deciding also follows the judgment of

value, in the sense of implementing courses of action that are judged to be right and

obligatory and good. We have to learn how to decide well – to decide firmly,

consistently, deeply, comprehensively, habitually, responsibly, in favour of what is

good. This is the volitional aspect.

Each of these components presuppose a context of the human person in via,

becoming, developing, moving towards moral development and conversion. It is in this

context of teleology that the judgment of value has a place; it is part of the being on the

way, a partial achievement of self-transcendence. The human person as a developing

subject is the proper context for the judgment of value. Animals do not make judgments

of value. Angels do not make judgments of value. We humans make judgments because

we are on the way to knowing the good, on the way to realizing the good in society, on

the way to becoming good person. This includes a horizontal finality as well as a

vertical finality, a development and a conversion, a [431] genetic development and a

dialectical struggle. To become good persons we need to make good judgments of

value; to make good judgments of value we need to be good persons. This might be

called the integrative aspect as it relates the parts to the whole in the context of self-

constitution.

To become a good person requires that each of these components be present. If

one is absent or deformed or defective, the whole action or person is defective. It might

be helpful to show how each of these components can be defective or deformed as a

contrast to the ideal that we have sketched above.

The processes of reasoning can be defective: fallacious arguments, irrelevant

distractions, not thinking things through to the end. Information can be inadequate,

inconclusive, mistaken or plain wrong. We might not attend to all the evidence, be

Value Ethics 463

aware of all the possibilities, think about the possible consequences of the action. We

may allow processes of rationalization, thinking up excuses, justifying our evil deeds, to

hold sway – even though deep down we know it is indefensible. Thinking, reflecting

and deliberating are complicated procedures and can be short-circuited, distorted,

conflated, confused, in a variety of ways.

On the flip side of the intentional response to value is the love of darkness, the

selfish desire for satisfaction, the hard-heartedness of the person who is closed to love

and value. An immoral life can lead to insensitivity to value, a sympathy for criminals, a

jealousy of good people. A life of seeking selfish pleasure establishes habits in our

psyche. We are prone to the bias of individual self-interest, the selfishness of the in-

group, the long-range defect of practical common sense. Feelings as well as developing

can also be declining and distorted. Resentment, pride, ambition, greed, egoism,

revenge, envy, as feeling orientations can take control. Or feelings can be dulled into

indifference, an ‘I don't care attitude’, a form of moral insensitivity. In many ways, then,

distorted feelings can become a powerful obstacle in the way of moral growth.

Deciding can be weak, the weak-willed person. We can allow ourselves to be

diverted from truth and goodness. We allow the process [432] of moral decline to

become habitual. We make resolutions, but break them as soon as opportunity arises.

We do not decide for the good sufficiently strongly and then all sorts of alternatives rear

their ugly head. Weak-will gives way to bad will, when we decide for distortion of

rationalization, distortion of feelings, satisfaction of our own sensible desires at the

expense of others. We can refuse to be fully human. Deciding can be irresponsible,

haphazard, self-interested, rash, superficial, or unreliable.

As well as the authentic notion of self-transcendence that we have outlined, there

are many notions of self-fulfilment based on a truncated idea of the human person. The

goal of human life is presumed to be pleasure, or success, or wealth, or fame, or power.

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464

The dimension of truth and value is submerged under these more palpable goals. Instead

of self-transcendence we have immanence; persons caught in their own circle of selfish

ambitions, sensible pleasures, narrow goals. The drifter is the aesthete seeking always

for pleasure, going nowhere in life, not achieving, not becoming, indifferent to truth and

value. Instead of development, we have decline; instead of conversion, we have

stagnation.

These components tend to be solidary; if one goes wrong, the others tend to go

wrong also. These components are intertwined in many ways. We are particularly

interested in how they form a unity in the subject, the person, and in the judgment of

value. Hence we will try to indicate how these components form a unity on the part of

the subject and a unity on the part of the product, the judgment of value.

1.2 Unity on the Part of the Subject.

The principle of integration is the conscious subject: the one who performs all

these activities, who is the subject of these feelings, who is responsible for the control of

the whole process. The various activities, some sensible, some intellectual, are united in

the same subject. The levels of conscious activities are levels of the same subject. So

the cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects of the process of making a judgment of

value are united in the one person, who is the subject of all these aspects. They are

interrelated activities because it is the same person who is responsible, coordinating and

directing. [433]

The symbols of Mind, Heart, Will, and Spirit correspond roughly to these four

components. These are descriptive terms, overall symbols of aspects of our humanity,

familiar from popular culture. We need to show that our analysis can be translated into

down-to-earth descriptive language, which anybody can understand. There are these

distinct aspects. We have been at pains to identify and define them in an explanatory

framework. But they are not separate, cannot be separated; they are interrelated in a

Value Ethics 465

multitude of ways. They all play a part in the emergence of a judgment of value and so

they all play a part in the unfolding moral drama of our lives.

We are talking about an existential ethics, one in which the subject is

transformed in the process. We are not just talking about passing individual judgments

of value, but the elements of the person by which he develops or declines, moves to

conversion or away from conversion. The whole person and all the essential elements of

human being are involved. We are not talking about a peripheral activity but how the

knowing, desiring, deciding, developing person becomes an integrated, mature, good

human person.

1.3 Structure and Content

The question remains to show how these four components unite in a single

judgment of value. We will use the notion of structure and content and then the analogy

of the four causes. We dealt with this briefly in terms of the unity of the cognitive and

affective elements (Chapter Six, Section Seven). Let us now show how four components

unite in a single judgment of value.

Lonergan himself asserts that the structure of the judgment of fact and the

judgment of value is similar; whereas they differ in content, one intending truth, the

other intending value.2 Let us see how this can be used to show how the deliberative

insight and intentional response to value fit together to form a judgment of value.

The structure of a deliberative insight, as of reflective insight, is the hypothetical

syllogism. We are looking for the universal structure of all deliberative insights and

there are four steps. [434]

(1) All deliberation starts with a question of value, What is this worth? What is

the right thing to do? Is this person, policy, action, thing, event, good or bad? This

represents the conditioned. Only God is necessarily good; for everything else we have to

Judgments of Value

466

ask, to check, to find out, to confirm and that starts in a specific, precise question, Is B

good?

(2) The goodness of things in this world is contingent. It is partial, it is fleeting,

it is conditioned. But there are values, some things are better than others, we are always

making value judgments. To specify how to answer the question of worth, you have to

specify what conditions need to be fulfilled to make this good in this or that respect. If

this is a reliable, inexpensive, comfortable car, then, it is good. So the next part in the

structure is to establish a link between the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions. You

can symbolize this by saying, If A, then B, where A represents as many conditions as

you wish. But if they are present, then B is. This is the hypothetical element. It

establishes a connection between the conditioned and its possible conditions. What

evidence do you need? Is the evidence sufficient? Is the evidence linked to the

conclusion?

(3) Then your problem is establishing, if these conditions are fulfilled or not.

Here you go to the evidence, the information, the reasoning, the justification, the

arguments for and against. You go back to the data, the definitions, the facts, the

previous judgments of values, the whole context. In the end you are compelled, the

evidence is sufficient, the conditions are met. You posit the antecedent: but A.

(4) The conclusion follows of necessity, the question is answered and affirmed,

the judgment of value is true. Therefore B. B, which started out as a conditioned, is

now affirmed as virtually unconditioned; for the moment, in this time and place, this is a

true value.

The structure of deliberative insight is the hypothetical syllogism. You want to

find out if B is good. You proceed, if A then B. But A. Therefore B. Which car is good

for you? Establish what you want in a car, comfort, affordability, speed, etc. Does this

car fulfil these conditions? If yes, go ahead and buy it. If not, then keep looking. The

Value Ethics 467

same procedure can be followed in judging which is the best school [435] for your

children, who is a good person to baby-sit the infants, what is the right thing to do in

moral affairs. This is a basic heuristic structure; it is how the mind works in finding out

about values.

But have we left out something? A structure, without a content, is like a skeleton

without flesh and blood. We have the universal structure or form, but where is the

dynamic, what is being aimed at, why should we follow this procedure anyway? What

drives us so naturally and inexorably through these steps? What is animating the process

is the desire for value, the intention of value, the transcendental notion of value, the

precept to be responsible. The dynamic is the questioning, the intending, which is

operative in all the steps and which inevitably unfolds according to the above structure.

We want what is best for ourselves and our kids and our country. It is not always

clear what is best; we need to find out; we have to work at it; we want to work at it. We

are not usually satisfied with half answers or guesses, or random choices. We want to be

sure we are right on questions of value. We feel our way through a maze of evidence,

we sort out the truth from the falsehoods and distortions, we are sensitive to issues and

values as the process continues, we feel convinced, we are convinced. Without the

content of this dynamic towards value, the structure would remain static and empty.

Deliberative insight unites with intentional response to value, in the same way

that a structure unites with a content. These are the intrinsic constituent parts of the

judgment of value. Both are needed. If you have only formal reasoning, you have logic,

you have formal inference, you have concepts, but it is all up in the air, conceptualist,

static, deductive, abstract. If you have only feeling, then you have a dynamic, you touch

the heart, but you are in danger of becoming the idealist doing more harm than good;

you have no control, no criterion operating, no way of ensuring that you are right.

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468

There is also an analogy to be found in the notion of passive and active intellect

of Aristotle, which we mentioned earlier. In analyzing the activity or understanding

Aristotle correctly perceived that it involves activities and passivities. The active part he

identified with throwing light on the phantasm so that what is potentially visible [436]

would become actually visible, so that the potentially intelligible would become actually

intelligible. We translate that in intentionally analysis as the desire to know, the wonder

that is the beginning of all philosophy, the activity of questioning. Questioning intends

knowledge, feels its way to knowledge, knows that knowledge is achieved when no

further pertinent questions arise. But there is the other aspect of passivity, receiving,

becoming, the tabula rasa being informed immaterially by the form in a process of

abstraction. Correct understanding requires the abstraction of ideas from images and the

receiving and storing of these ideas in the mind. Aristotle did not elaborate much on the

structure of the judgment, but I think we can see some rough parallel between the active

intellect and the intention of value, and the passive intellect as the activities of

deliberating and judging value.

1.4 The Four Causes

A further way of seeing how these elements unite in a judgment of value is to

consider them on the analogy of the four causes. Aristotle used this schema of causes to

great effect and it seems to apply helpfully to the judgment of value. The four causes are

the four answers to the questions, What is it? What is it made of? What is moving it?

And What is it for? These give the formal, material, efficient and final causes,

respectively. Lonergan gives the example of a bridge; where the formal cause is the

design, the plan, the architecture; the material cause is the steel, bricks and cement; the

efficient cause is the builders who construct it; the final cause is the purpose of

communication.3

Value Ethics 469

On this scheme, if you ask, What is a judgment of value? you would have to

answer that it is an affirmation emerging from a deliberative insight – it is a judgment.

This is the formal cause. It is different from a grasp of possibilities; it is different from

concepts or definitions; it is different from fantasy or imagination; it is different from

the decision; it is different from execution. The unity, identity, whole of the judgment of

value is its form – the single intelligibility that makes it what it is, and distinguishes it

from everything else. [437]

The intentional response to value would be the material cause. What is it made

out of? It is made out of value: it intends value in the question, grasps value in the

deliberative insight and affirms value in the judgment. Without value you cannot have a

judgment of value. The specific judgment gives determinate form to indeterminate

value. In this way the judgment of truth differs from the judgment of value; they are

made out of different things, they intend, grasp and affirm different contents, namely,

truth and value, respectively. The cognitive and the affective components are the

intrinsic constituent causes of the judgment of value, just as the formal and material

causes are the two intrinsic constituents of a sensible substance. The two further

components are extrinsic causes.

The efficient cause is the motor cause, what makes it move, what makes it

happen. It is free responsible deciding which controls the process, moves it in one

direction rather than another, allows it to proceed or not. This is a sine qua non, a

necessary condition for the occurrence of judgment, but is extrinsic to the process rather

than intrinsic. It is the volitional aspect.

The final cause asks the question, What is it for? What is the purpose? Where is

this process going? The single judgment of value is a part within a whole. But the whole

is a developing unity; there is a teleology operating in the questioning, deliberating and

reaching a judgment of value. But there is a total teleology in which the human person

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is on the way in terms of knowing what is the right thing to do, on the way to becoming

a good person, on the way to self-transcendence and happiness. It is only in the context

of this developing subject that the judgment of value makes sense. Each judgment

represents one incremental step on the way to self-transcendence, on the way to

becoming authentic human persons. Only human beings make judgments of value and

so the context is set by the developing, transforming, becoming of the human person,

moving from potentialities to actualities.

We are appealing to Aristotle's four causes to indicate how the four components,

identified at length and in detail in this text, finally coalesce into one judgment of value.

Hopefully, we have said enough [438] on this topic to be able to continue to the

judgment of value itself and its own characteristics.

2 Characteristics of Judgments of Value

Just as there are four characteristics of a judgment of fact, so there are four

characteristics of the judgment of value.

1 No Further Content other than Yes or No. The judgment of fact is intended

in the question for reflection, which asks simply, Is it true? and expects a simple Yes or

No answer. The judgment of value, then, will similarly be a simple Yes or No answer to

the question for deliberation. The judgment of fact expresses the truth, the existence, the

reality of what is affirmed. The judgment of value expresses the goodness, the

worthwhileness, the value of what is affirmed.

Judgment is a simple yes or no or anything in-between. You may have to be

content with a probability; you may have to admit ignorance and refrain from giving an

answer. Between the Yes of complete certainty and the No of absolute denial, there is

an infinite variety of probabilities, possibilities, uncertainties, degrees of clarity and

certainty. We cannot always expect unambiguous, certain, affirmations or denials.

Value Ethics 471

Aristotle pointed out that we cannot expect mathematical precision in ethics and

politics.

The judgment of value adds no further content to the deliberative insight, except

the yes or no uttered in answer to the question. If further clarification is needed it means

that we are retracing our steps and asking further questions for understanding, looking

for more information, defining our terms more clearly, formulating more satisfactory

hypotheses. You cannot very well affirm that something is really good, if you do not

understand fully what that something is.

2 Affirmation or Denial. Just as judgments of fact affirm or deny a matter of

fact, so a judgment of value affirms or denies a matter of value. The act of affirming or

denying is an activity of mind. It is not just a synthesis of words as 'it is wrong to steal',

but an affirmation that 'it is true that it is wrong to steal.' One can give lip service to

judgments of value, utter the words but not affirm the meaning. One [439] can spend a

semester teaching about Rawls on Justice and surprise the class by announcing on the

last day that you think it is totally wrong. There is indirect speech where you are

explaining the positions of other thinkers; and there is direct speech where you are

explaining and defending your own moral stance. Most courses on ethics are historical,

in the sense of teaching Kant's ethical system, natural law in Aquinas, Aristotle on the

virtues, and the like. But the real task of ethics is to take a stand for oneself, to affirm or

deny for oneself.

There is a deliberative process, a struggle to assemble evidence and link the

evidence to the conclusion. But the judgment of value is distinct from that process

because it posits, assents to, affirms the content of; it goes a step further than

deliberation. You could conceivably deliberate forever; a fearful, timid, temperament

will hesitate to judge. But normally there comes a time, when the relevant facts become

clear, the values involved become clearer, the suggested course of action and the

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consequences become clear; it is just foolish not to judge. On the other hand, it is rash

to judge without sufficient deliberating.

The act of judging happens in the mind. It can be expressed in words or in deeds

but the reality is a mental act of judging the value. Because it is inaccessible and

invisible, people can lie about their judgments of value, people can be hypocrites,

people can be traitors, moles, spies; the external does not always conform to the

internal.

Even though the judgment of value adds only affirmation or denial, that is an

enormous step forward, a commitment, a preparation for decision and action.

Affirmation or denial is no small thing. Assent to or dissent from a moral stance is a

serious matter. To affirm a moral rule as true is to assert that it is not just true for you,

but true and binding for any human person in the same situation. It is to affirm that this

is the truly virtuous thing to do not just for you, but for any human being.

3 Taking a Personal Stand. We take a personal stand. We take a personal

stand in judgments of fact because nobody is forcing us to the judgment; we can

continue to reflect, we can qualify our judg-[440]ment, we can make probable

judgments, we can admit ignorance. These are factual judgments concerning our

beliefs, our opinions and our commonsense knowledge. We defend our view of the

truth; we have attained truth. Some easily complain of their memory; few complain of

their judgments. We are responsible for our judgments of fact.

Much more so are we responsible for our moral judgments. Our moral

judgments constitute us as moral persons. We are coming very near to the centre of the

person, what he is worth, what he stands for in terms of values. This is originating

value: by our good acts not only do we produce good products, but we also thereby

constitute ourselves as good persons.

Value Ethics 473

We have no excuses for our value judgments; we posit them freely and

knowingly. We could do more research, we could be more discriminating, we could be

better morally; but we are what we are because of our previous judgments and, of

course, decisions and actions that follow. You sometimes hear excuses like, 'the devil

tempted me', or 'I lost my temper', or 'everyone is doing it'; but such excuses don't

excuse; we are responsible for our judgments of value. Admittedly, we inherit many

values from our family or culture, but as an adult one is expected to make up one’s own

mind. That is what it is to be a responsible adult.

What is the real worth of a person? Is it his intelligence? Is it his wealth? Is it his

power? Is it his race? Is it his socio-economic class? The real worth of a person is his

moral worth, the values he stands for, the kind of person he is, and from that follows the

appropriate decisions and actions. You can have a youth with all the advantages of a

rich technological society, computers, internet, access to the best schools, all the

clothes, toys, facilities you can dream of; yet when you talk to him you find that he

stands for nothing; self-absorbed, following the crowd, no mind of his own, a

materialistic scale of values, morally warped. On the other hand, you can have a person

emerging from a deprived background, struggled for a minimal education, surrounded

by thieves, corruption, degradation, exploitation and violence; and yet they emerge as

persons of worth, with a healthy scale [441] of values operating, caring for their

families and community; people who have something to teach us all.

'Mind' we use with reference to intelligence; 'heart' we use with reference to

values, love, goodness, moral worth, feeling. We respect intelligence, but much more

we respect a healthy scale of values, a good person, a good heart. That is the moral

worth of the person. It does not come from the family or education, it does not come

from socio-economic status, it does not come from ethnicity or culture; it comes from

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the person, the responsible individual person, judging, deciding and acting and thereby

constituting himself as a worthwhile person, a person of value.

4 Knowing Value Comes to a Term. Judgment of fact brings the process of

knowing to a term. Judgments of value bring the process of knowing values to a term.

Deliberating is purposive; it does not just go round in endless circles; it is the judgment

that brings the process to an end. We judge that we have a sufficient understanding of

the relevant facts, that the relevant values have been appreciated and apprehended, the

alternatives and consequences assessed; no further pertinent questions arise; the

judgment emerges. We decide and act on the basis of the judgment. We move on to

other matters. Knowledge accumulates by way of increments. We proceed step by step,

one thing at a time. We finish one area and we move on to another. Judgments of value,

just as judgments of fact, pass into the habitual texture of the mind. We establish our

lives on a set of basic values, which provide the background to our particular specific

judgments and actions.

5 Context of Judgments of Value. We reach a value judgment about one

matter, but other matters arise. Judgments of value, just as judgments of fact, take place

in a context. That context is ourselves as self-transcending persons. We continuously

constitute ourselves as valuable persons by our good judgments, decisions and actions.

We constitute ourselves as worthless persons by bad judgments of values, wrong

decisions and evil actions.

There is the context of history and the growing awareness of certain values like

human rights, freedom, gender equality, the environ-[442]ment, the sacredness of human

life. Perhaps, also there is a growing insensitivity in other areas. We are all part of our

society and culture and are to some extend limited by the horizon of our place and time.

It is hard to blame Aristotle or St. Paul for accepting the institution of slavery; it was so

much part and parcel of their way of life.

Value Ethics 475

There is the context of the developing subject. There are stages of moral

development; the later stages depend on how we have negotiated the earlier. There is

the possibility and actuality of moral conversion within each of these stages. We do not

expect the moral reasoning of the child, the adolescent, the young adult and the mature

adult to be the same. You do not use the same pedagogy in teaching values at these

stages; you do not apply the law in the same way to persons in various stages; you do

not have the same moral expectations of persons at different stages.

There is the context of growing knowledge about the world, health, resources

and the ecosystem, where the discovery of new realities requires a reappraisal of our

moral position. In the context of knowing the harm caused by cigarette smoking, then,

there are moral implications to producing and consuming such products. Promiscuous

sexual activity takes on a new dimension in the context of Aids pandemic. The

discovery of greenhouse gasses requires a revision of how we consume fossil fuels.

6 Self-correcting process of Knowing Moral Values. We learn from our

mistakes. We do not always get it right the first time. We are obliged to live, before we

have learned to live properly. In moral matters experience is a great teacher. But that

process of realizing that we have made a mistake, admitting it, understanding why we

erred, correcting the judgment and behaviour in the future, is part of the human

condition. The process of self-correction is continuous. It is immanent and operative in

the dynamism of the intention of values and the realization that we are continually

falling short of getting it just right. The fact that we make mistakes in moral matters

does not prove that we can never have certain moral knowledge. The extraordinary

thing about our moral knowing is that we can recognize a mistake and work to correct

it. Science works on the principle of the [443] self-correcting process of human

knowing. Moral knowledge works on the same principle; we are getting nearer and

nearer to moral truths. The absolutes are not in the propositions, or statements, or

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formulations but in the activities of persons deliberating, judging, deciding and doing,

on the path to self-transcendence.

3 Various Kinds of Judgments of Value.

Lonergan seems to have framed his discussion of value around the question,

What is the right thing to do, here and now? But there are many other forms of

evaluation; moral values have a wide range of application; values judgments occur

within each level of the scale of values.

(1) In the context of a rule based moral philosophy, the judgments of value will

be expressed in the form of commandments, norms, regulations, prescriptions, such as:

it is wrong to kill, it is wrong to steal, it is wrong to commit adultery, it is wrong to tell

lies, etc. Or you can put it more positively as: respect life, respect the property of others,

be faithful to your marriage partner, tell the truth at all times, etc. These laws can be

very general as in the above, or very specific as applied to particular places and times.

The primary principles of natural law are value judgments, the secondary principles of

natural law are similarly specific judgments of value. Judgments of value are operative

in the context of vital, social, cultural, personal or religious values.

(2) In the context of a virtue/vice approach to ethics, judgments of value would

be expressed in terms of: it is good to be brave, it is good to be honest, it is good to be

patient, it is good to be kind. On the other hand, it is bad to be cowardly, to be

dishonest, to be impatient, to be unkind. In virtue ethics we ask the question, What is

the best kind of life for a human person? When we list the virtues to be praised and the

vices to be avoided, we are making comparative value judgments. We also make

particular judgments on the virtues or vices of individuals; John is a liar, Michael is a

thug, Mary is a flirt, and the like, express moral judgments on persons. They are

judgments be-[444]cause they are affirmations, which are either true or false. They are

items of moral knowledge, true or false judgments of value.

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(3) "Ought” statements are moral judgments of what we ought to do or what we

ought to hold. There is no logical transition from 'is' statements to 'ought' statements. In

our terms, the intentionality of the truth in third level operations is one thing and the

intentionality of the good in fourth level operations is another distinct reality. Third

level operations result in 'is' judgments; fourth level operations result in 'ought'

judgments. It is not a question of logic but of what it is to be a knowing and valuing

human person. Statements of fact are either true or false. Similarly, statements of value

are either true or false.

(4) General/Specific. General judgments of value are usually universal of the

kind, stealing is wrong, education is good, a high standard of living is better than a low

standard of living, classical music is better than jungle music, the young should respect

their elders. We have made a multitude of such judgments and they have passed into the

habitual texture of our minds. They constitute the context from which we make

particular or specific judgments of value at particular times and places. They are true or

false as the case may be, as general statements.

Specific judgments of value focus on the concrete and the particular. This

specific proposed action is morally right or wrong; I ought to spend this afternoon

studying rather than going for a walk; I must tell the truth even though I might be

punished; I should buy books with my allowance and not beer.

In the end every rule has to be applied to a particular specific instance. How

general principles are applied to the particular involves a further insight into the

connection between the two.4 One of the difficulties we have already mentioned for an

ethic of rules is precisely how universal rules are applied to particular cases; the

exception proves the rule; circumstances alter cases.

(5) Simple and Comparative Judgments. When we assert the value judgment, ‘it

is wrong to kill,’ we can call this a simple judgment. When we are judging between

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alternatives, we are often involved in [445] comparative judgments of value. What is

the best thing to do? How does this alternative compare to that? There are many

alternative ways of spending one’s afternoon; which is the best? We judge that it is best

to study in the library and that is a comparative judgment.

Different moral values may be in conflict; loyalty to the peer group may demand

that we keep quiet, but honesty to authority may demand that we give evidence against

one of the group. There can be conflicts between different moral rules and you have to

compare and prioritize. There can be conflicts between different virtues or vices. Such

situations require us to compare what is at stake and to judge appropriately. Different

kinds of value may be involved in a single course of action; for instance economic and

moral values may clash and again a comparative judgment is necessary. Is it wrong to

pay a bribe for permission to distribute food to the poor? There are endless possibilities

of conflict between various values in a situation.

(6) Non-moral judgments of value. There are many kinds of value, as we have

already seen, and in each case we can identify the judgment of value. Although we

concentrate on moral judgments as our focus of interest, it is important to distinguish

them from other judgments of value. Aesthetic values, practical values, intellectual,

social, cultural, and religious, all provide a context in which we make judgments of

value.

Aesthetic judgments: this is horrible music, this is a good painting, this is a well-

designed building, I enjoyed that film, it is a beautiful day, that was an exciting game.

Aesthetic judgments will vary greatly depending on the background of the person –

beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But certain criteria can be applied, such as

harmony, balance, form, content, story, flow, etc. Aesthetic judgments are not totally

arbitrary or subjective.

Value Ethics 479

We make many practical value judgment every day. What is the best way to

invest your money? What is the best design of a building? Where should the water be

connected? Is it worth buying this computer? What crop should we plant in this field?

Which car should I buy? Do we need more workers or less? [446]

We are continuously making judgments about persons. We judge a person by

his or her appearance, how they dress, how they speak, how they present themselves.

We make friends with those we trust and like and seek their company. We shun those

we do not like, those we disapprove of – we judge them poor company. We judge

political figures, we judge film actors, we judge professors, authors, teachers, and

associates. The gospel injunction not to judge your neighbour is asking the impossible;

the intent seems to be, not to judge your neighbour too harshly.

We pass judgments on people’s intellectual capacities. We evaluate quickly who

are the good professors, what are the best books to read, whose advice is trustworthy

and whose advice is useless. We describe people we know as, smart, sharp, brilliant,

brainy, or alternatively as slow, dull, stupid, and other pejorative terms. In our own

intellectual pursuits, we judge which subjects to concentrate on, what topics are the

most important, what study methods to follow, how to allocate your study time.

People will often differ in their evaluations because they are applying different

criteria. One car suits one person who is rich and old; another suits a young student who

has limited financial resources. One kind of food suits one person but not another.

Tastes differ. Many of our value judgments are probable rather than certain. We do not

have complete information; we do not have endless time to deliberate; we might be

quite inexperienced in the field; we may have mixed motives operating; we do not

know how the future is going to work out. Often our judgments have to be provisional.

For the moment it seems that this is the case, but if I find out more about it I might

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change my mind. Judgments can be mistaken for various reasons and so the self-

correcting process of human knowing is called into play

We are actually involved in multiple processes of evaluation most of our

conscious life. These involve moral evaluations as well as the integral scale of values.

The four components, cognitive, affective, constitutive and volitional will be present in

all judgments of value, in varying degrees. To evaluate well, we have to be competent

and [447] knowledgeable, intending true value rather than selfish satisfaction, willing

the world a better place with better persons and social organization, and moving

towards growth and conversion.

It is an illusion to think that an ethic of natural law or a virtue ethic or any other

kind of ethic can avoid judgments of value. There might be a temptation for some to

think of natural law ethic as ‘objective’ because it lays down the law, clearly and

precisely, for all people, equally. But this is glossing over the fact that each of these

laws is also a general judgment of value and requires a further specific judgment to be

applied to the concrete. Similarly, in a virtue ethic the list of recommended virtues is a

result of many judgments of value. There is no avoiding the process of evaluation. That

is why it seems that a value ethic is foundational; it identifies the foundational set of

activities by which we know values; it gives us a transcendental method which is

applicable at all times and in all circumstances.

4 Criterion operating in Moral Judgments: Conscience

It might be helpful here to draw a parallel with the proximate and remote

criterion of truth.5 The proximate criterion of truth is the sufficiency of the evidence for

a particular judgment. Is this fellow a thief or is he not? Well, what is the evidence, is it

linked to the accused, is it direct or circumstantial, is it possible that the witnesses are

lying, or the evidence was planted, or the police were corrupt, and so forth. In each

individual case of a judgment of truth there must be sufficient evidence and the

Value Ethics 481

evidence must be linked to the conclusion. Lonergan regularly referred to the proximate

criterion of truth as the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned.

The remote criterion of truth is the proper unfolding of the pure, detached,

unrestricted desire to know. It sets the overall context in which particular judgments of

truth will be made. Are we normally intellectually honest, open and sincere, are we

biased, prejudiced, twisted, closed, emotionally driven, etc? Do we allow further

questions to arise? The remote criterion is that no further pertinent questions arise – the

desire to know is satisfied. [448]

It would seem helpful to make a similar distinction, when we talk about the

proximate and remote criterion of true moral judgments. The proximate criterion of a

value judgment is the virtually unconditioned of the judgment. The deliberative insight

grasps the sufficiency of the evidence for the conclusion and the judgment follows. In

each particular case we need to understand the details, the particulars, the

circumstances, the motivations, the consequences, the possibilities, the exceptions, the

means for the end, the alternatives, etc. We should be able to show proximately that this

course of action is better than that, that this value is more important that that, that this is

wrong for the following reasons, that this is right for the following reasons. The

proximate criterion is the correctness of the relevant judgment of value. It is the

virtually unconditioned of a value judgment. We have referred to this component as the

cognitive component.

The remote criterion of moral goodness is the proper unfolding of the desire to

know and do the good. It is the exclusion of bias, the honesty and openness to face all

questions, the perseverance to ask all relevant questions, the brushing aside of any

tendency to obscurantism, the determination to think things through to the end. This

criterion is satisfied when no further relevant questions arise. The desire to know the

good is satisfied.

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But there is a further aspect to the matter. Judgments of truth arrive at the

perfection of the intellect, fulfilling the potential of a part. But judgments of value

pertain not just to the perfection of the intellect, but to the whole person. All our actions

are incorporated in moral judgments, decisions and actions. The desire to know

becomes the desire to be, the desire to become, the desire to achieve the good, the desire

to decide rightly, to extend knowing into doing. Hence, it becomes the pure desire to

know and love and do the good and become the good. Moral values move us to consider

the whole person, as is and as becoming. In this sense we accept Aristotle’s principle,

that the good, wise person is the standard and criterion of goodness.

The total criterion of moral value is the happy conscience of the truly good and

competent person: what the good and wise person [449] would do in that set of

circumstances. It is the fully moral, mature person who is the criterion of true moral

value. It is the good person who knows about goodness. It is the virtuous person who

knows about virtue. It is the habitually good and wise person with a happy conscience

who is the total criterion of moral goodness. The total criterion is "the authenticity or

lack of authenticity of the subject's being."6 It is only in the context of total intellectual

and moral openness and integrity that we can be sure that our moral judgments are true.

In our terminology the total criterion of moral goodness is conscience.

4.1 What is Conscience?

This notion has a long history, emerging very vaguely in Greek thought but

clearly understood and pivotal in the thought of St. Paul. In Aquinas we have a

distinction between synderesis and conscientia. For him synderesis was a habitual

knowledge of basic moral principles situated in the intellect. Conscientia, on the other

hand, is not a habit or a power but an act; it is the action of applying habitual knowledge

to specific, particular situations.7 In more modern times, the moral sense philosophers

held that conscience is a superior faculty that intuits what is right and wrong; it is a

Value Ethics 483

faculty distinct from the intellect. Freud for his part identifies conscience with, what he

calls, the Superego – the conventions and demands of conformity with the society writ

large for us and internalized. Nietzsche defined the good conscience as “that venerable

long pigtail of a concept which our grandfathers fastened to the backs of their heads and

often enough also to the backside of their understanding.”8!

We tend to think descriptively of conscience as a voice whispering in our ear

and telling us what is right or wrong. We tend to think of it as a special faculty or

ability. Many think of conscience as sensitive feeling and identified with feelings of

guilt or approval. Everybody has a conscience and seems to know what it is, but when

you try to define it, you find it is not so easy to pin down.

Lonergan as usual gives a very simple and accurate definition of conscience; he

simply defines conscience as consciousness at the fourth level of intentional

consciousness. “But to speak of the [450] fourth level of human consciousness, the level

on which consciousness becomes conscience, is to suppose the context of intentionality

analysis.”9 Conscience then is an awareness proper to the activities of the question for

deliberation, the deliberative insight, the judgment of value, the consequent decision and

action. It is an awareness of the normativity of the precept to ‘be responsible’ as it

operates in human persons.

Let us now explore in detail the notion of conscience as 'consciousness at the

level of moral judgments, decisions and actions'. We should be familiar now with the

idea that as well as being directly aware of objects, we are concomitantly aware of

ourselves as subjects. We have systematically explored the possibilities of a heightened

awareness of our experience, understanding and judging. Conscience is this awareness

at the level of deliberating, judging value, choice and decision and action. When we

make choices we are conscious of whether we are doing right or wrong. It is

spontaneous. We cannot avoid it. The awareness may be subtle and deep, rather than

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sensible and strong. But along with making our judgments and choices, there is the

awareness that we are making good judgments and choices or the awareness that we are

making bad judgments and choices.

A heightened awareness of the obligation to choose the good and reject evil is

the basis of moral behaviour. What we have been doing in ethics is appealing to

yourselves as moral subjects to discover the source of moral obligation. We have been

trying to discover the upwardly directed dynamism of human intentionality. You,

hopefully, have been trying to discover in yourself the precept to ‘be responsible’, the

intention of value, the urge to self-transcendence. We have been trying to identify the

stages of moral development and trying to move forward and upward in those stages.

We can develop our sensitivity to moral values; we can strengthen our intentional

response to values; we can become better moral subjects and that is the aim of teaching

moral philosophy.

This is a very broad understanding of conscience. Yet I think that it is correct,

because conscience is an awareness, which pervades ev-[451]erything that we do.

Because we divide consciousness into four levels that are structurally distinct, we

perhaps think of the fourth level as the one that is reached last; but in fact it is there

from the very beginning. Even though Insight is explicitly about understanding and

judgments of truth, you can see that judgments of value and decisions are being made

from the beginning about what is worth studying, what authors are worth reading, what

method is best, and the like. The distinction between the four levels is not necessarily a

chronological distinction; that is, they do not necessarily follow in a time sequence one

after the other. It is more a question of a kind of spiral which continues to circle around

and upwards. Moral judgments and choices are not confined to specific moments but are

involved in everything that we do. How we spend our time, our career choices, our

relations with others, out leisure activities, are permeated with judgments and choices

Value Ethics 485

that have moral implications. We should not think of morality as operative only when

we are faced with temptation and sin. It is rather, what are we to do with our lives; what

are we to make of ourselves; what kind of people do we want to become.

Walter Conn in Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence basically

follows Lonergan's interpretation of conscience. He says that it is more correct to say

that a person is a conscience, than that a person has a conscience:

Conscience, then, in a few words, should be understood as the fundamental, dynamic reality of the personal subject who has committed, dedicated, indeed, surrendered her or himself to the radical demands of the human spirit: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, love.10 The point at which these lines intersect, the radical meaning of human conscience, I am suggesting, is the reality of the authentic personal subject, intellectually, morally, affectively, and religiously converted, operating on the fourth and highest level of moral, responsible, existential consciousness.11 Conn has a deep knowledge of the developmental psychologists Erikson, Piaget

and Kohlberg, as well as comprehensive understanding of Lonergan and he elaborates

this broad notion of conscience and how it works. [452]

Conscience is not an activity in itself, but an awareness that accompanies the

activities characteristic of moral judging and deciding. Conscience is not a faculty in

itself, it is not a sensitive feeling in itself, and it is not in the intellect or in the will. It is

simply the awareness accompanying the evaluating, deciding, acting dimension of life

as free and responsible. A correct grasp of the role of conscience presupposes a correct

grasp of the meaning of consciousness. Because it is difficult to grasp the notion of

consciousness correctly, so it is more difficult to grasp a correct understanding of

conscience.

In Insight Lonergan distinguishes between rational consciousness and rational

self-consciousness. Rational consciousness is the awareness of making a correct

judgment of fact based on sufficiency of the evidence, the assurance that one in not

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biased and the fact that further relevant questions do not arise. Rational self-

consciousness is the awareness of the necessity for consistency between knowing and

doing; it is the extension of rationality from knowing to doing. This moral self-

consciousness would be equivalent to conscience. He does not, for a moment, entertain

the idea of conscience as a separate faculty.

4.2 How does Conscience work?

PERSON

AWARE OF :-

Moral Obligation Questions of Deliberative Judgments of Decisions Human

Be Responsible Value Insights Value Actions

Diagram Three. How Conscience Works. [453]

Let us explore further this notion of awareness immanent in the activities of

moral judging and deciding. This awareness is a consciousness of the self, which is

immanent in all the activities of deliberating and deciding. What is conscience aware

of? Please refer to Diagram Three.

(1) We are aware of the drive of moral obligation. The precept here is to be

responsible. Spontaneously in every normal human person, there arises the distinction

between good and evil, and the obligation to seek the good and avoid the evil. It can be

called innate in the sense that it is part of the spontaneous unfolding of the human spirit.

It is found in every culture, in every age, in every normal person. A person without this

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drive is defined correctly as a psychopath and in need of psychiatric help. This is the

beginning and foundation of all moral judgments, decisions and actions.

(2) We are aware of the activities of questioning value, deliberating about value,

judging value, deciding freely and responsible, and finally living up to our convictions.

The process may take weeks or it may take a few seconds. We are aware of our

obligation to perform these activities properly. We are aware of the dynamic underlying

these activities.

We distinguish firstly the question, where we ask what moral values are

involved, what are the alternative courses of action, what are the likely consequences,

what are the social, political, economic implications and so forth. We are obliged to ask

all the relevant questions, to face all the issues, not to cover up or deny or sweep under

the carpet.

Next is the deliberative process, where we study the situation, ask advice, do

research, consult our feelings, discriminate and sensitize ourselves, work out the means

and the ends, consult experts, and the like. The quality of our moral judgments will

depend on correct deliberation. We are obliged to examine the relevance of arguments,

the process of inference, the alternatives available, the rights of all involved.

Then, we make a judgment of value, that this course of action would be better

than that, that such a value is more important than [454] another, that in these

circumstances this should be done. Rash moral judgments lead to rash moral behaviour.

We are responsible for our judgments; we can be called to account for the behaviour

that follows.

Distinct from the judgment, but close to it, is the decision, the act of deciding,

which although it is a pure mental act has huge moral implications and is itself a moral

act. In a sense, once you have firmly decided to commit adultery in your mind, you are

already guilty of adultery. Once you have decided with others to rob a bank, you are

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guilty of conspiracy. Once you repent in your heart, your sins are forgiven. We are

aware of our obligation to freely and responsibly decide on our actions, our values, what

kind of a person we want to become.

But the execution of the decision is another step towards good or evil and

completes the process. Circumstances may intervene to prevent the implementation of

the decision. The final morally good or evil act is posited and can never be recalled or

changed.

Conscience is operative throughout the whole process. The dynamic is to be

responsible, to intend values, to desire the good. The dynamic operates through all these

activities. But the contrary affect is also present; the attraction of satisfaction, the lure of

pleasure, the comfort of the agreeable. The real evil very often is not to be found in the

action but in the processes of rationalisation, avoidance of self-consciousness, moral

renunciation, prejudice and bias, or sheer bad will, which intervene in the deliberation,

the judgment of value, and the decision.

(3) Our consciences urge us to good actions. We are endowed with this moral

urge to do our duty, to love our family and country, to know good and evil, to become

good persons. Our conscience blames us when we fail. We feel guilt, remorse, unease.

We cannot sleep, we seek to make amends, we regret our failures, we repent of our sins.

Our conscience rewards us when we succeed. We feel real satisfaction at fulfilling our

duty. We are rewarded with a happy conscience, we are at peace with the world. This

would seem to be the happiness Aristotle envisaged for the moral, contemplative

person. [455]

Our consciences can be aroused over actions, past, present or future. Conscience

is a pervasive awareness, before, during and after evaluating, deciding and acting. We

can feel guilty of a transgression committed decades ago, or feel happy about a decision,

which will only be implemented in the years to come.

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(4) We are responsible for what we do to our conscience. These are all free acts

from the beginning to the end. It is we who develop our conscience by responding to

true values, or destroy our conscience by rejecting the good and choosing the evil

course of action. The hardened habitual thief has become what he is, not because of his

environment, not because of his parents, not because of the company he keeps, but

because of his own free decisions, which, slowly but surely, made him to be what he is.

(5) Consistency or inconsistency. In Insight Lonergan used the criterion of

consistency between knowing and doing as the basis of moral obligation. He seemed to

consider this an extension of rationality from knowing to doing. He was thinking in

terms of three levels of cognitional structure and this was the only way he could fit in

moral obligation. Later, in Method he identifies moral obligation with the transcendental

precept to ‘be responsible’ which is a given of human nature, an operative principle in

the activities of moral discernment. I think we can maintain the usefulness of the idea of

consistency but it needs to be broadened. The criterion of a happy conscience can be

broadened to mean consistency between our awareness of moral obligation and our

fulfilment of these obligations in correct judgments of value, good decisions and prompt

implementation. Conscience is the self as aware that we have moral obligations, are

driven by the transcendental precept to be responsible, and our implementation of this

drive. Are we faithful or do we fall short? To what extent are we faithful and to what

extent do we fall short?

(6) Is conscience a feeling? We often remark that we feel guilty, we feel

responsible, we feel obliged, we feel remorse, we feel shameful. There is certainly an

affective component to conscience. In our analysis of the affective component of the

judgment of value, we drew a [456] detailed distinction between sensitive feelings and

spiritual feelings. Conscience is a crucial test case where this distinction applies and has

deep ramifications.

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Sensitive feelings have an intrinsic material aspect; they are conditioned by

space and time; higher animals experience many sensitive feelings such as joy,

excitement, anger, aggression, anxiety, affection, guilt, sorrow. We too use the terms,

feeling guilty, feeling shame, feeling remorse, feeling regret, or alternatively, feeling

happy, at ease with our judgments and decisions. Conscience, however, is not to be

identified with sensitive feelings. Sensitive feelings can be disproportionate to real guilt.

Children feel very guilty at accidentally breaking dishes, where there might be no blame

attached whatsoever. A habitual thief may claim that he feels no guilt at stealing and

hence is not guilty. We can feel guilty at breaking a taboo, but no real guilt might be

involved. A scrupulous person may be overcome by guilt feelings at a trivial fault,

which a normal person would brush off as a minor infringement. Our feeling stance can

be deformed or developed, adolescent or mature, formed by a good education or

deformed by a sensate culture. Sensitive feelings alone are no sure guide to moral guilt

or innocence.

On the other hand, there are what we called spiritual feelings, the desire to know

and do the good, the intentional response to value, the precept to be responsible. These

are deeper, more permanent, inclinations of the human heart and they always lead to

self- transcendence. These we also feel, we feel responsible, we feel obliged, we feel

that we have neglected our duty. We have examined the many ways in which sensitive

and spiritual feelings interrelate with one another, either on the way to development or

on the road to moral decline.

We are faced with a dialectic of feelings that calls for discernment. Are we

really guilty? On the surface we might have no guilt feelings at all; but is that because

we are not really guilty, or because we have become habituated to guilt and rationalized

away our guilt feelings? We may have strong guilt feelings, but it may be because we

are scrupulous or have broken some long held taboo, or because we are neurotic. We

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may have no strong surface feelings of guilt, but we may [457] have a deep-down

unease about what we are doing. On the surface our conscience may be quite happy, but

this may be a contrivance covering up a deep long felt unease. In the truly good person,

feelings will be sensitive to values; a happy conscience will indicate true goodness; an

unhappy conscience will indicate real failures and vices. In evil persons conscience will

be deformed and perverted by a habitual life of dishonesty or selfishness. For most of us

who follow the middle way we have to be continually struggling to find true happiness

in doing good, to bring our actions into line with the deepest and best inclinations of our

heart, to resist the rationalizations, excuses and distortions. We have to discriminate

between sensitive and spiritual feelings. We have to deal with mixed feelings, confused

feelings, conflicts of feelings, ambiguous feelings.

(7) Can conscience be totally corrupted? Aquinas posed this question and

answered No. The process of moral decline corrupts the understanding, deforms the

feelings, limits freedom and sets us on a spiral of decline. But this still leaves basic

freedom and responsibility intact. The person is still deemed to be responsible for his

actions. If he is responsible, then he is not determined, and so the possibility of

changing his ways is there. It is only when mental illness, insanity, compulsive

addiction takes over, that a person is no longer responsible for his actions and

conscience is no longer operative.

(8) Conscience is the awareness of the feeling and passes judgment on the

feeling. Conscience is aware of the obligation, the feelings, the judgment, the decision,

the actions. By conscience we are able to distinguish whether guilty feelings are really

indicative of the real guilt of the transgression. Conscience hence is wider than feeling,

it passes judgment on feeling, it distinguishes sensitive from spiritual feelings, it

discerns between conflicting feelings. There is obviously a feeling component here, but

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conscience is aware of the source of that feeling, the reason for that feeling, the decision

and actions which gave rise to the feeling.

The judgment of conscience on our own actions is the final judgment of value.

We are passing judgment on ourselves and our actions, our motives and our intentions.

To pass an adequate judgment [458] the four components must be present, cognitive,

affective, volitional and self-transcendence. It is the good person who is the standard

and criterion of goodness.

4.3 Development and decline of conscience

The psychologists Piaget, Kohlberg and Erickson have traced the development

of moral reasoning from their perspective of psychology. We too can trace the

development of conscience through the various stages. For the child the dominant

figures are the parents who are to be pleased or displeased, obeyed or disobeyed, they

are the authority figures; they judge what is right or wrong by rewards and punishments,

approval or disapproval. This seems to be followed by a social orientation where justice,

equality, law and order are the dominant theme. Here obeying the law predominates,

whether it is the law of the society, or community, or church, or international

community or political correctness. Morality is defined in terms of obedience to law, or

breaking of laws. This is followed by a more internalized value system, which allows

for more flexibility, exceptions, for situations not covered by law.

But within any of these stages we note that the good person does the good thing

and further confirms himself as a good person. Doing the good thing becomes a habit.

Feelings are brought into line with moral values. Conscience is operating, being

educated and informed, being sensitized as to what we are and what we can become. We

learn from mistakes. We have first to live before learning how to live properly. Open to

others, to true values, to self-transcendence. Kohlberg looks at moral development as a

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progress from heteronomy to autonomy, from dependence on others to dependence on

yourself and your own moral principles.

The problem with extolling conscience and moral autonomy is that these terms

are so often misunderstood. Conscience is often interpreted as an excuse for doing what

you like, following your attraction to pleasure, rather than the intention of the good. It is

often appealed to when some authority, secular or religious, makes demands on us,

which we find unpleasant and not to our liking. It is often used as an excuse to bypass

the difficult process of moral [459] deliberation, research, argumentation, and judgment.

Adolescents appeal to conscience to justify any kind of sexual behaviour that attracts

them.

A mature conscience will always value the heritage of social, cultural, moral and

religious values into which we are born and in which we are educated, socialized and

inculturated. An informed conscience will be serious about deliberation, research,

listening to the opinions of others and learning from specialists in the field. A good

conscience will be laced with an appropriate humility. Conscience is not a panacea; it is

not a magic formula for the knowing of good and evil. A judgment of conscience

requires complete understanding of the facts, a genuine desire for the good of value, free

and responsible exercise of decision-making, in a person who is on the way to self-

transcendence.

But conscience can also decline. The bad person disobeys the law, cares less

about other people, is insensitive to values, and becomes oriented to pleasure as an end

in itself. Conscience is blunted, hardened, ignored, stamped upon, kept in ignorance.

Eventually, we end up with a depraved person, dedicated to evil, whose conscience has

for the moment been silenced but is still operating deep down, as a possible call to

conversion.

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5 Objectivity of moral value judgments.

5.1 Critical Realist Position.

The debate on the objectivity or subjectivity of moral values usually takes place

in the context of naive realist presuppositions. In this context objectivity is conceived as

the out there now, already existing, already constituted, independent of the subject.

Subjectivity in this context is understood negatively as the private interests, feelings,

biases, preferences of the subject, which are all to be excluded if we want to gain

objectivity.

The naive realist position holds that values are somehow out there now real.

They are objective in that sense and do not change. There is an objective order of values

in the things themselves. Plato asserted [460] that the virtues and values are Forms in

the supersensible World of Forms. How then do we know these values? It is usually by

some form of intuition, by which we directly perceive them either through intellect, or

emotion or perception. Intuitionism seems to imply that values are out there now to be

apprehended by intuition. It is thought that this is the only way to preserve values that

are ultimate, stable, unchanging.

Another extreme, the subjectivist position, would hold that we create our values,

we invent them, we construct them, we choose them for ourselves on the basis of

subjective preference. It is our acts, which bring values into existence. Each one does it

for himself. I cannot impose my values on you and vice versa.

The critical realist position asserts that true values are what are affirmed in true

judgments of value. Our principle when considering knowing was that 'genuine

objectivity can only be gained through authentic subjectivity.' This principle we apply

also to moral value judgments. Authentic subjectivity is self-appropriation of the proper

activities involved in making moral decisions. Authentic subjectivity is to recognize

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what is bias and to exclude it; to recognize the pure detached desire to know the true

and the good and to implement such precepts in our lives; the courage and the honesty

to carry out the programme. Authentic subjectivity is to be faithful to the transcendental

precepts, to be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and be responsible. Authentic

subjectivity is to recognize the normativity operating at each of the levels of

consciousness. It is only through attention, intelligence, reason and responsibility that

we can attain the objective truth of fact or value. That is the only way to objectivity.

Value judgments are true, if they reward the self-transcending subject with a happy

conscience; they are false if they result in an uneasy conscience.

5.2 Absolute Notion of Objectivity of Moral Values

The principle of non-contradiction states that a judgment cannot be true and

untrue at the same time and in the same respect. It is easy to explore this in

epistemology in judgments of fact, but the same holds true in judgments of value. To

the extent that it is true, that this [461] is the right thing to do for me here and now, it

cannot at the same time be untrue that this is the right thing to do. It is true for anybody,

in the same time, in the same situation, in the same respect. Times do change, cultures,

meanings, language change and that changes the perspective. The ultimate permanence

and continuity in moral values is not to be found in the content, which is subject to

particular times and cultures, but in the invariant structure of activities which produce

moral judgments, decisions and actions.

Many seek the absoluteness of moral values in the wrong places. They oppose

relativism and think that the only defence is the absoluteness of moral rules, or

formulations, or categorical imperatives, or natural laws. But the absolutes are not to be

found in particular formulations, in one time or place. They are not to be found in the

formulated content of laws or virtues or ways of behaving. Meaning changes, languages

change, human mores change, symbols change, doctrines change, cultures change. Is

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there anything that does not change? For a human person it is only the invariant

structure of human activities of experiencing, understanding, judging the facts and

judging the values that does not change. This is what Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant,

Hume, have in common; they perform the same activities, some more adequately than

others. The value of this study is to find and identify this series of invariant, unrevisable

activities, which define what it is to be a good human person. Garett Barden argues this

point at length and asserts, "I have consistently argued throughout this work that

propositions are not ultimate but that they have an intelligent, reasonable, and

responsible source that, for the propositions we make, is ourselves." 12

The notion of normative objectivity is also relevant to moral objectivity. If you

wish to be objective, it is true that you have to eliminate bias, self-interest, prejudice,

and other interferences with the proper unfolding of the pure desire to know. To guard

against such bias methodologies and procedures must be set up and followed. Social

research methods embody many of these procedures. Total honesty, total openness, total

genuineness is called for especially when it comes to moral values. [462]

5.3 Do we create moral values?

What is the difference between Lonergan's position on the self-constitution of

the moral person by his choices, producing the first and only edition of himself, and

Sartre's position that existence comes before essence – that we make our essence by our

choices?

We would hold that to perform the activities of experiencing, understanding

judging fact and value, deciding and acting we are performing the activities, which

make us to be human persons. Immanent and operative in those activities there are

norms, which oblige us to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. It is in

implementing these that we develop as persons and achieve human self-actualization

and produce the one and only edition of ourselves. We become authentic by being

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faithful to the deepest and best inclinations of our nature. It is a process of moving from

potentiality to actuality. We become moral or immoral persons by actualizing or not

actualizing these potentialities. We bring ourselves into being as originating values. We

do not create ourselves out of nothingness; we actualize potentialities we find in our

nature.

Sartre seems to be claiming something more; that we produce essence out of

existence. He does not recognize the notion of potentiality to actuality; he does not

recognize the limits that are there in human nature. He seems to think that values can be

plucked out of the air, arbitrarily, at random, existentially.

There is a sphere in which human persons confer meaning and that meaning is

constitutive. We give meaning to sounds and we constitute language; that is the work of

human intelligence and ingenuity. We constitute countries by agreeing on boundaries,

names, constitutions, legal systems, and international recognition. The good of order,

cultural values, knowledge, education, are achievements of centuries. We bring

goodness into being in ourselves, our values, our forms of social organization, our

constitutions, our laws, and our common way of life.

But this is not an arbitrary creating out of nothing: it is more in the line of

bringing potentialities into actualization. We are discovering the laws of physics and

chemistry, rather than creating them. Cre-[463]ation out of nothing seems to be a divine

prerogative. We are pointed towards truth and goodness and can bring them into being.

Our creating of ourselves is only being faithful to our nature, being true to ourselves,

responding to he deepest and best inclinations of our hearts. The inventiveness of

intelligence is not an arbitrary pulling rabbits out of hats, but of realizing potentialities

of nature.

Is there an objective order of values? Not in the sense that the order of values

pre-exists human persons, as already constituted, hierarchically organized, named, out

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there now real. There is an objective order of values in the sense that to be a human

person is to perform activities at five levels of human consciousness; that each level has

its own intentionality; that this hierarchy of activities is normative, interrelated, self-

assembling and self-constitutive; that corresponding to this hierarchy there is a

hierarchy of vital, social, cultural, moral and religious values, to be realized in our

common life together.

6 Clarification by Contrast

Our task has been to trace the source of our knowledge of values, our knowing

of good and evil. Our answer has unfolded in the previous chapters and we have

identified the role of understanding, the place of feelings, the influence of deciding in

the context of a self-transcending subject. We have identified these individual elements

and we have seen how they unify into a single judgment of value, a single act of

knowing good or evil. We have seen that the only guarantee of the objective validity of

our knowledge of values lies in the integrity of the acts of understanding, desiring, and

deciding, of a self-transcending subject.

Some might complain that this is a complicated position. Can you not give us

something simpler? Surely it can’t be as complex as that? But the reality is that

knowledge of good and evil is a complex business. Attempts at simplification might

satisfy for a time but ultimately will be seen to be inadequate. It seems that this

temptation to simplification is the bane of contemporary attempts to deal with

knowledge of values. It might help bolster our position, if we pin-[464]point the lacunae

in certain contemporary accounts of values – intuitionism, emotivism and rationalism.

There is a school of thought that claims that we know values by an intuition; that

this intuition is a single, simple, direct, immediate knowledge of value. Sometimes it is

said to be an emotional intuition, sometimes an intellectual intuition. This is a

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characteristic of the phenomenological approach to values, as in Max Scheler or Nicolai

Hartmann, and the English empiricists, such as Henry Sidgwick or G. E. Moore.

All my own experience of struggling with values and my experience of teaching

values, indicates that out knowing of values is discursive, complicated, involves many

factors, is a struggle, and usually attained only after overcoming mistakes and

inadequacies. I have no experience of direct, immediate, perception of values. Our

knowing values is discursive in the sense that it is worked out over time, it is worked

out through conversation between different alternatives; that our knowledge of values is

always, provisional rather than final, probable rather than certain, virtually

unconditioned rather than formally unconditioned. It is complicated in that it involves

many activities of questioning, understanding, defining, reflecting, deliberating and

judging; that it involves many components such as thinking, desiring and deciding; it is

a judgment not of the intellect but of the whole person as standard and criterion of

goodness. A characteristic of the intuitionists’ writing on ethical knowledge is the

absence of the notion of deliberation. If we know values by a simple, direct perception,

then, clearly we do not need this complicated struggle to line up means and ends, direct

and indirect, evidence and counterevidence, arguments with counter arguments, that

characterizes the process of deliberating. But it seems to be that our knowledge of good

and evil is a struggle; it is not given in a simple intuition; that we go through the

difficult process of deliberating in order to come to a conclusion in the judgment of

value. In the end, it is a question of psychological fact: do we know values by intuitions

or by deliberating and judging? In my experience we do so by the latter and not the

former. Intuitions seems to be an attempt to simplify our account of knowing values to

[465] one factor alone, but in the end it is found wanting as a total account of knowing

values.

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An alternative contemporary account, emotivism, emphasizes the role of feeling,

emotions, personal preference, as the sole source and explanation of values. This

attitude is very much part and parcel of our contemporary sensate culture. It gets

philosophical backing in the empiricist philosophy of A.J. Ayer or the situation ethics of

John Fletcher. This attitude claims that values are a personal preference based on

feelings of likes and dislikes, feelings of approval or disapproval, feelings of love or

hate; that these choices are private and emotional; that no one else can tell us what to

value. Sometimes these theories are based on self-interest, personal preference;

sometimes on love, sympathy, compassion, empathy, and the like. Common to all of

them is the exclusion of reasoning, deliberating, judging and the notion of true or false

values. This position is, of course, relativistic to varying degrees.

Again, it is unfortunate that one element in the process of valuing has been

glorified to the exclusion of all other components in the interest of simplification. But

does it work? Is that how we reach knowledge of values? What are the psychological

facts? Feelings obviously play a part in moral judgments and decisions. We

distinguished two kinds of feeling orientation, a deep permanent spiritual intention of

true value and a sensitive feeling dimension which is morally neutral. Identifying the

proper role of feeling, then, requires discrimination and discernment. Feelings are very

complex, multilayered, subtle and ambivalent and are really difficult to identify and pin

down. But do desires or feelings by themselves ever give knowledge of true values?

Even at their very best, purest, most spiritual, do feelings know values? Feelings intend

values, desire values, recognize values, are sensitive to values rejoice in true values, but

by themselves are only inclinations and not knowledge. If we know values it is by

activities of experiencing, understanding, defining, reflecting, deliberating and judging.

These are cognitional activities. They operate in tandem with the desire to know good

and evil. In our analysis the desire to know value is the dynamic driving the activities

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from questions of [466] value to judgments of value. Our analysis seems to conform to

the facts of experience and that has been our recurrent argument.

Feelings, then, are indispensable to knowing values, but do not constitute a total

explanation of the source of values. Feelings combine with the cognitive and volitional

components in the context of a self-transcending subject to form a comprehensive,

complete account of the source of our true values. Simplification seems plausible in the

short-run, but is found wanting in the long-term. Even the most well-intentioned moral

philosophies of love, compassion, sympathy, and empathy require a cognitive and

volitional component to be complete.

Perhaps, a last group we could consider by way of contrast would be the

rationalists. This group of thinkers accounts for our knowledge of value by way of

reason alone, understood often as formal, deductive reasoning from premises to

conclusions. Kant claimed to derive knowledge of values from practical reason;

Lonergan in Insight claimed to derive obligation from speculative reason; conceptualists

work out systems of first principles, secondary principles and practical applications,

appealing to definitions, divisions and deductions. Natural law theorists were often in

this rationalist, conceptualist mode. Rawl’s theory of justice would seem to be in the

same kind of position, which excludes any recourse of input from feelings.13

What do we say about this? In what way do we differ? Our appeal is again to the

data of our own consciousness. There is clearly a cognitive element in our knowledge of

values: we question, we argue, we appeal to facts, we point to consequences, we

consider alternatives, eventually we reach a judgment of the right course of action in

this situation. There may be an element of deduction by which we apply universal

principles to the concrete situation, but this presupposes an understanding of the

concrete situation, which is attained not by a deduction, but by induction, by

observation, understanding and judging. Universal imperatives still require an additional

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insight into the concrete situation to which they apply. Some very clear thinking is

required to distinguish direct and indirect causes, immediate and remote consequences,

normal and abnormal cases, natural and un- [467] natural means, culpable and

inculpable ignorance, means and ends, and the like. Very clear thinking is called for in

difficult cases. But the casuist with all his clear thinking is not necessarily the good

person who is the standard and criterion of goodness. If casuistry relies solely on

definitions, deductions, inferences, logic and clear thinking, something important is

lacking. To know values we need to care about values, feel responsible for values,

desire them passionately. The good person, sensitive to values, aware of the concrete

situation, has a better chance of finding the right course of action, than the aloof casuist

thinking through his abstract deductions. Again it is not a question of opting for either

clear thinking or sensitive feeling. Both are needed to feel and to think our way to the

correct course of action. The rationalist seems to err on the side of excluding care,

passion, feeling and responsibility from the search for goodness. [468]


(1) This is a true statement in the context of a moral law ethic; the opposite would be a

false judgment of value. It is stating that normally it is wrong to kill. Because it is a

general statement it allows for specific exceptions as in a just war, or self-defence and

perhaps other exceptional situations.

(2) To make a correct judgment of value you must have a deliberative insight,

intentional response to value, display a habitual willingness to seek goodness, to be on

the way to self-transcendence, and all that these components entail. By true judgments

of value you are cognitionally self-transcendent. By implementing and living it you are

really morally self-transcending.

(3) What is the value of a human person? What is the purpose of sex in the total context

of personal and social development? Can you distinguish developing and declining in

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sexual growth? Can you use a person as an instrument, a means rather than an end?

What personal values are being expressed in casual sex for pleasure?

(4) The guiding principle of what is right and wrong comes from within rather than

from without; from conscience rather than the State or any Authority. But conscience

must be informed; formed rather than deformed. Your first obligation is not to harm

yourself; namely, to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Immoral

behaviour harms those who engage in it; makes them to be immoral persons; and will

inevitably effect their family, school, community, society.

(5) We would normally look for somebody who is competent, a good teacher, a good

person, a good model, a likeable and happy person, one who will be a good influence on

our kids. These are all value judgments.

(6) Answered in the text.

(7) Implicitly, this is cultural relativism. But cultures are not absolutes. What is basic is

human persons who are attentive, [469] intelligent, reasonable and responsible; for these

imperatives are transcultural. One person can criticize the values of another culture, not

on the basis of cultural superiority, but on the basis of transcendental method.

(8) The first position is the value-free attitude. But this itself is a value position; it

involves valuing neutrality and implying that we choose our values at random; that we

have no values to teach. But can values be excluded? What is the value of what is left?

There are many contradictions involved in this position.

The value clarification movement designed projects to help participants become

explicitly aware of the values they aspired to. But it has no critique of values, and no

guarantee that values would be implemented just because they were aspired to.

Teaching true values involves instruction, aspiration, inspiration and encouragement in

good decision-making. The teacher can do so much, the pupil has to respond. Without

that response the teacher or parent can do little. [470]

Judgments of Value

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Endnotes

1 Method in Theology, 37. 2 Method in Theology, 37. 3 Insight, 674-5. 4 See Gula, What are they saying about Moral Norms. Also F. Crowe, Three Thomist Studies, "Universal Norms and the Concrete Operabile in St. Thomas Aquinas". 5 Insight, 573-5. 6 Method in Theology, 37. 7 Summa Theologiae, Pars Prima, Q 79, Arts 12 and 13. 8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, (London: Penguin, 1970), 145. 9 Method in Theology, 268. 10 Walter Conn, Conscience: Development and Self-Transcendence (Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1981) 208. 11 Conn, Conscience, 203. 12 See Garrett Barden, After Principles, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 124. Conceived as a reply to MacIntyre's After Virtue, this book is an extended discussion of where the absolutes in moral values are to be found. 13 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999).

10

Promoting Moral Values

Finally, morality reached by mutual agreement and based upon mutual respect is an important part of human morality, the part of morality that arises when the subject moves to the level of ethical value, autonomy of spirit, realization of his own freedom and responsibility and respect for the freedom and responsibility of others. It flowers in human cooperation, in concrete enterprises and in civic virtue.1

1 Foundations

We have now completed a long, and sometimes tedious, journey of self-

discovery. We started out wondering about values and where they come from and now

we have discovered the answer. We have identified the components, how they work,

how they combine together, how we make good or bad judgments of value. We have

cracked the code, discovered the knowledge of good and evil. This is no small claim,

not just a footnote in the history of philosophy, but a major breakthrough, the end of an

era and the beginning of another. Our major debt is to Bernard Lonergan; even though

he did leave a few false clues, the main points of our discovery of the integral

cognitional structure of facts and values are already present in his writings. What

remains to be done? The implications of our discovery point in every direction. Our

intention is this last chapter is to give a [472] précis of where values come from (section

one); to give some indications of how this discovery can be make more practical

(section two); to answer the question of how to teach values (section three); and to

conclude with some hopes of the recognition of the value of the human person in the

context of a global ethic (section four).

1.1 Where do Values Come from?

We started our text wondering why people so easily appeal to values and yet

how difficult it is to find a rationale for the process of valuing. We set out to find that


506

rationale, not on the basis of theories of axiology, but on the basis of personal self-

appropriation. We wondered what was lacking in previous systems of ethics and why

we should now have recourse to a value ethics and so we considered the role of method

in ethics as a pivotal issue. We considered the alternative traditions and methods in the

appeal to feelings, reason, intuition, and free choice. We looked at the noble traditions

of natural law ethics and virtue ethics. We set out with the hypothesis that the method

of self-appropriation might help us to find a foundation, which underlies all these partial

and limited attempts to formulate a philosophy of moral conduct. We were able to start

with people as they are; we embraced the empirical principle but insisting on including

data of consciousness as well as data of sense observation. We eschewed exclusive

appeals to the authority of sentiments alone, or reason alone, or intuition alone. We did

not see much point in working out abstract systems of concepts, which can only be

related to concrete situations with great difficulty. We were aware that relativism is

somehow incoherent, that there must be some absolutes somewhere; but one has to be

very careful in identifying that absolute; it is not in propositions, not in formulations,

not in laws, not in lists of virtues, not in an authority telling us what to do. It is internal:

it is to be found in the norms which are immanent and operative in the activities of

asking and answering questions about the value of persons and behaviour.

Starting with people as they are we set out to identify the activities we perform

when we are facing a moral dilemma. If we are facing a problem, then we are

questioning which way to go, which to choose, [473] which is right, which course is

better than the other, what values are at stake here. The questioning is the dynamic

operative throughout the process from the initial question to the final judgment of value,

usually followed by decision and action. We identified the activity of deliberating by

which we meant assembling evidence for or against, learning from previous judgments,

appealing to examples, examining hypotheses, considering alternative courses of action,

Value Ethics 507

envisaging various immediate and remote consequences of action. We noted the four

components operative here, the cognitive, the affective, the volitional, within the total

context of a process of self-transcendence. Deliberative insight incorporates all four

components into a unity and issues in a judgment of value. The judgment affirms the

truth of the value statement, adds no content of its own, we take a stand and become

responsible thereby. With good will and resolution, we freely and responsible decide to

follow the right course of action and become actually self-transcendent when we

implement the decision. So we examined and identified five specific, distinct, personal,

activities involved in moral consciousness: questioning, deliberating, judging, deciding

and implementing.

Like most things, there is a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it.

Sometimes we have to read the instructions to find the right way of assembling a table,

or cooking a new dish. In the case of the activities of knowing values, the norms are

immanent and operative in the doing. To start asking, What is the right thing to do?

already implies that we at present do not know, but that we can find out, and the

procedure for finding out unfolds in terms of assembling data, arguing to conclusions,

combining the known and the unknown, and pushing relentlessly until we find the

answer and know that the answer is correct. There is a right way to question the worth

of something, to deliberate about the matter, to reach a deliberative insight, to pass a

judgment of value, to decide and to implement. The dynamic is the question of value;

we can call it the transcendental imperative, to be responsible. Very few people espouse

the ideal of being irresponsible. There is something fairly basic and incontrovertible in

affirming the norm of responsibility. It is true, of course, that we sometimes behave

irresponsibly, but it is a rare person who sets this [474] out as the ideal for all human

beings to follow. We recognize this dynamic operating in ourselves; we intend values,

we respond to values, we work our way painfully to the knowing and implementation of


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a scale of values, we become more or less sensitive to values, as we progress or regress

in moral development – we learn to recognize values when we see them.

We identified the components involved in the judgment of value. The cognitive

component involving reasoning, arguing, inferring, comparing, weighing evidence, a

heuristic structure we follow as we move to a conclusion. The affective component by

which we intend value, we seek value, we want to do the right thing, we want the best

for our kids, we would like to leave the world a better place by our passing contribution.

At the same time we are suspicious of glib arguments, of persons whose motives are

self-interested, where evidence is not convincing, we feel uneasy about the course of

action. The volitional element recognizes free and responsible decisions operating all

through the process, before the process and after the process; it is in virtue of this free

deciding that we are responsible or not responsible for our action. The element of self-

transcendence recognizes the human condition as a being on the way; it is the total

human context understood from a moral point of view; for deliberation is purposive, it

is heading to a goal, to a final end, to happiness, to self-transcendence. We showed how

these components unite in a judgment of value, either on the analogy of structure and

content, or on the analogy of the four causes.

Although we focused on the role of these components in the deliberative insight

and judgment, they can be generalized into the totality of the moral life – our life as

persons in relation to others, the life of action, the drama of living and dying,

developing and declining. They encapsulate a notion of the human person as feeling,

thinking, knowing, deciding and doing; a notion of the human person as psyche, as

intellectual, as volitional, as an acting human being; a notion of a human person who

operates at five levels of intentional consciousness, experiencing, understanding,

judging truth, judging value, and loving; a human person who is free and responsible at

all levels of activity; a human person who is obliged, to be attentive, to [475] be

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intelligent, to be reasonable, to be responsible, to be in love; a human person who

operates in terms of a scale of values which line up as vital, social, cultural, personal

and religious.

As well as the immanent and operative norms pushing the process of moral

development, there is also a criterion operating to judge, whether we have reached the

goal or not. Proximately, we look to the evidence, the arguments, the justification for

the goodness of the course of action; we look to the good of the consequences, the

motivation of the action, our gut feelings about the proposal. More remotely, we look to

our own openness to ask further questions, to our sensitivity to the values involved, to

our habitual willingness to do the right thing for the right reason, at the right time and in

the right manner. We similarly acknowledge our inclination to bias, our weakness in

willing, our deficient intellects, our learning by mistakes, our unruly feelings, our

readiness to substitute pleasure for the good. Finally, we recognize the total context

where all the parts come together and we are guided by conscience: the standard and

criterion of goodness is the authentic, competent person endowed with a happy

conscience. The authentic person is the one who knows about authenticity.

Finally, we recognized that the struggle involved in the process of moral

conversion will always be with us. Our desires are in need of discernment. As well as

those sensitive desires for satisfaction, there are the desires for knowledge, for truth, for

goodness, for development, for infinite goodness, goodness without qualification. But

we are involved in a dialectical struggle between the more palpable, sensitive desires

and deeper, more spiritual aspirations. We are free to choose either path.

Surely, we have now answered the question, where do values come from? We

can answer that values are the goods we desire in questions for deliberation, grasp in

deliberative insight, affirm to be true in judgments of value, decide in favour of and

implement in our lives. We are the source of value. We do not choose values out of the


510

sky, but recognize the imperatives of, who we are, and what we are, and what we are to

become. We recognize a scale of values, which can be [476] affirmed in comparative

judgments of value. We recognize our struggle for authentic values and our frequently

falling short of the ideal. We can see through the naivety of the theory that claims that

we know values by some simple, direct, immediate, intuition or perception of a value

out there now real. We recognize the one-sidedness of saying that we know values by

feeling or sentiments of approval or disapproval. We can recognize the abstractness of

claiming that knowledge of values is attained by reason alone, by some natural law

syllogism, by come conceptualist definition, by some a priori categorical imperative, or

by some new theory of justice.

Above all we recognize where the absoluteness of moral value comes from. The

absolute lies in the activities, the norms, the components, the criteria, the products of

these, in the good life of the authentic person. This is the transcultural, ahistorical

source of moral absolutes. The absolute is not to be found in the law; it is not to be

found in a list of virtues; it is not to be found in authority; it is not to be found in a

proposition, or in a formulation, or in a philosophical theory, or in commandments

carved on stone tablets.

I think we can now claim to have found the kind of ethics we were looking for in

our discussion of method in ethics. We have found an ethics that is transcultural,

universal, invariant; that is based on the invariant structures of personal intentionality.

We have found a personalist ethic, centred on the supreme value of the person,

recognizing the richness of the many-sided reality of being a human growing person.

We have found an ethics that is verifiable; everything we have said is verifiable in

relation to our own experience of moral behaviour. We now have an ethics that is

maximalist, that looks to the infinite possibilities of growth and conversion, appeals to

the deepest and best inclinations of the heart. We have an ethics that is creative, able to

Value Ethics 511

tackle the challenges and possibilities of new technologies, new medicines, evolving

economies, to make the world a better place to live in. We have an ethics that is not only

personal, but also social and global; we become persons in relationship to others. We

have an ethics that can be taught, that identifies the elements needed in teaching, the

stages of appropriate pedagogies. We have an ethics that is foundational, goes to the

root of the problem, finds the [477] source of values and can mount a critique of

inadequate theories of value.

1.2 Self-Affirmation as a Responsible Subject

It might be possible to read all the foregoing and still remark, So what? What

has that got to do with me? I acknowledge the facts but intend to continue with my life

unchanged. We might acknowledge moral obligation as applying to humans in general,

but not to myself in particular. It might be helpful to note a parallel with the procedure

in terms of cognition. We noted that the first part of Insight, the first ten chapters,

concerned the activities of knowing, knowing considered simply as an activity of the

mind.2 The only question being considered in this first part was, What are these

activities and can I identify them in my own mind? It was a pure phenomenology of

knowing, in the sense of an accurate description of what actually takes place. It could be

called a psychology of knowing in the same sense. The question being asked was, what

am I doing when I am knowing?

But this first descriptive part was followed by a crucial transitional part where

the question shifted to, Why is doing that knowing? Here we have self-affirmation, then

the notion of being, and objectivity. This involved taking a fundamental, personal stance

on What is knowledge, being and the real? This we named epistemology. This was

followed by an elaboration of the content of the known, which we named metaphysics.

Our procedure in ethics has followed a similar pattern. We have first identified

the activities of deliberating, judging, deciding and acting from a moral perspective. Up


512

to now we have simply asked the questions, Do these activities occur? In what order?

Are we including all the relevant activities? We have been doing a psychology of

morals or even a phenomenology of moral activity. We have simply been attending to

the facts of moral experience. What are the activities we all perform? What are the

norms operating through these activities?

Now we come to a turning point. It is time to take a stand. It is time not just to

acknowledge the fact of moral obligation but accept [478] all that that implies. It is a

shift from neutral empirical psychology, to taking moral responsibility for our

behaviour. We accept the fact of moral responsibility as it applies to us, as we are

bound by it, as we are obliged to implement such obligations. We are to take a stand on

what we are as moral subjects with the fullness of responsibility that this involves. It is

not just accepting a fact but a commitment to a position.

The judgment will be a value judgment, which we can express as ‘I am a person

who judges, decides and acts according to the precept to be responsible.’ ‘I am a

responsible subject.’ This is a judgment each person has to make for himself. It is rather

fundamental; decision and action should normally follow. This expresses our

fundamental position. In epistemology it was the judgment, ‘I am a knower’. Now in

ethics it is, ‘I am a responsible person’.

What justifies us in taking this moral stance? Knowledge of human moral reality

that we have reached in identifying the activities of moral behaviour, indicate that this is

what it is to be human; there is an imperative; to be human we must freely follow that

imperative. We have not just ananlzed it, but we have identified it in our lives. We feel

obliged by it. That is sufficient ground for our basic value judgment that moral living is

the best way for a human person to live.

1.3 Not Open to Basic Revision

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Again we have recourse to a parallel from cognitional theory. There we clearly

distinguished between the facts of cognitional activities and the theories that were

invoked to explain human knowing. The facts about cognition are discovered by self-

appropriation. We attend to the data of consciousness, identify the activities involved in

knowing, line up the activities in the sequence in which they occur, identify the norms

that are immanent and operative in the activities. These activities as performed are the

same for everybody: this is how Aristotle’s mind worked, how Einstein’s mind worked,

how your mind works, how my mind works. We all perform the same basic activities, in

the same order, well or badly according to the same immanent and operative norms. All

human beings have a common starting point in performing the activities of knowing. It

is when we come to [479] theories of knowing that divergence begins to occur and we

need to distinguish position from counterpositions.3

Any theory of knowledge that is coherent with the performance of the basic set

of activities will be a position. Any expansion of such a theory of knowledge into a

metaphysics will also be a position, if it is coherent with the set of activities.

Cognitional structure and all that is implied in that, is coherent with the set of activities

and is a position and is correct and is not open to basic revision. Obviously, any theory

of knowledge it open to improvement, to minor adjustments, to additions, qualification,

further differentiation and sophistication. But cognitional structure is not open to basic

revision because any attempt at basic revision will simply invoke the same pattern of

activities, experience new data, understand new theory, and verify new theory in

judgment.

Contrariwise, any theory of knowledge that is not coherent with the performance

of the basic set of activities in knowing will be a counterposition – there will be an

incoherence between performance and content. It is not hard to show that Hume claimed

that all human knowing was a variation of sensation, but in writing his book he was


514

presumably understanding, and in rejecting contrary opinions he was judging about

truth and falsehood. It is not hard to show that Descartes’ account of human knowing

emphasized understanding, but in performance he was also experiencing and judging

truth and error. So there is a test that we can apply to any theory of knowledge, namely,

coherence between performance and content, to decide which is positional or

counterpositional, which is true, which is false.

We can use the same procedure to show that our account of the activities of

knowing value is coherent with our theory of values and that it is not open to basic

revision.

The activities as performed are what everybody has in common. If you are a

human person then you are one who questions the worth of ways of living; who

deliberates and feels in relation to values; who judges values as true or false; who

decides in accordance with true values and implements such decisions in human praxis.

This is true of human persons of all times, and all places, and all cultures, and all [480]

continents. This is what it is to be a human person. But, of course, we do not perform

these activities perfectly; we often fall short in some or all of these activities. But

strangely we can recognize our mistakes; we can rectify our defects. We can do so

because of the immanent and operative norm ‘to be responsible’ operating through all

these activities. Everybody can learn from their mistakes. Everyone is endowed with a

conscience. All these activities we share with everyone else at the level of performance.

But when it comes to objectifying these activities and formulating a theory of

moral behaviour, wide divergences occur. We can recognize the position in that it is

coherent with performance of the basic set of activities. The basic position is not open to

basic revision. There is much room for improvement in identifying the activities and

norms more accurately; there is room for additions, further differentiation and

sophistication, further elaboration and explanation; and all that needs to be done and

Value Ethics 515

hopefully will be done. But our position is not open to basic revision, because that

would involve an incoherence between the theory and the activities, between the content

and the performance.

As there is only one position, where there is coherence with performance, so

there are many theories that are incoherent with the basic position. The test of whether a

theory is true or not is to ask whether it is coherent with the basic set of activities, is

there coherence between content and performance. Freud claimed that conscience was

just the superego, the expectations of the society internalized; but was he acting as a

slave to such determinism when he debated with himself and finally decided to publish

his Interpretation of Dreams? A.J. Ayer claims that all moral imperatives are simply

expressions of emotional approval or disapproval; but is this what he taught his

children? Is this how he judged his own conduct? Is this how he judged, praised and

blamed others? G.E. Moore claimed that we know the good by a special, immediate,

direct intuition; but why did he deliberate at such length to refute naturalism, hedonism

and metaphysical ethics, and develop his own theory of intuition of the simple,

indefinable good? Relativists claim that all moral statements are relative; except this

privileged discovery of their own. So we do [481] have a criterion for the adequacy,

comprehensiveness, truth, of any moral theory and it lies in the coherence between

content and performance, between theory and the basic set of fundamental activities that

we perform.

We use this procedure, not to browbeat those who disagree with us, but to show

that we have reached something very basic, unrevisable and foundational in recognizing

the activities and norms of moral behaviour as the starting point for a moral philosophy.

Moral philosophy can be fully critical. There is an empirical principle by which you can

verify all moral laws, virtues and values. Just as metaphysics can be checked against the


516

facts of cognitional activities, so also an ethics can be checked against the facts of moral

activities.

2 Value Ethics in Practice

2.1 Making True Value Judgments

We have noted how we are constantly, unavoidable, making value judgments.

We may be passing judgment on the price of groceries in the store, on a new tax

regulation, on a new neighbour, on the behaviour of our children, even on the weather.

Our moral judgments are aroused when the subjects of discrimination, marriage,

abortion, war and peace, sexual abuse, and the like, are raised or we encounter them in

daily life. We don’t have much training in evaluation; we may not even be aware that

we are valuing. So it is no wonder that our value judgments are sometimes arbitrary,

emotionally biased, irresponsible and haphazard.

We have also noted that theories as to how to make good value judgments are so

diverse and contradictory. We have noted those who appeal only to emotions – you pass

judgments by venting your feelings. We noted the exclusive appeal to reason in terms of

deductions, applications, definitions and divisions. We noted the prevalence of those

who say that all judgments are relative, subjective, expressions of personal preference,

opinions having no cognitive status whatever. Our current high culture does not give us

much help in learning how to value well. [482]

What might things be like, if we could reverse the trend? What could happen if

persons were taught how to make good value judgments and the high culture of the

society defined and promoted a healthy, balanced, comprehensive value philosophy?

Our claim is that we now have an explicit, correct, comprehensive, foundational account

of where values come from and hence can launch a critique of false valuing and

incomplete philosophies of value. We are not so naïve as to expect this to happen

overnight and but surely an explicit recognition of the process of valuing is a significant

Value Ethics 517

contribution. Imagine if persons understood values, not just as opinions or preferences,

but as the true good sought in questions for deliberation, grasped in deliberative insight,

affirmed in true judgments, decided for freely and implemented responsible. Imagine if

we had a heightened awareness of the deepest and best inclinations of our hearts – the

transcendental imperatives – and make them the central thrust of our life. Imagine if

debates about public policy were conducted with respect for true values, the good for

all, equally, and not in terms of my constituency, my self-interest, my hidden agenda.

Imagine if the words conscience, autonomy, self-realization, freedom, tolerance,

happiness were understood, used and lived in their authentic meaning. Imagine if we

had a society of persons who knew how to make value judgments, truly and

responsibly! Imagine if our educational system knew how to teach moral values!

The first baby step towards this dream of transformation is surely the

foundational task of identifying the activities and norms, the components and the unity

of the process of knowing true values. This is what our text has achieved. It is not a

theory imposed from above but a map of the human mind as it strives to know good and

evil. It is a guide to reading yourself, to acknowledging your potential, to recognizing

the deepest and best inclinations of your heart. It is a guide to true happiness, the

happiness of authenticity, or realizing potential in the exercise of the activities of

knowing and deciding for the good of all. What we are promoting in this text can be

summed up in the clarion call, Develop the position, Reverse the counterposition:

Promote authenticity and Reverse inauthenticity. [483]

Aristotle discovered and elaborated ‘understanding form in images’, and

elaborated a metaphysics of matter and form, act and potency. Aquinas discovered and

elaborated the difference between direct insight and reflective insight, between simple

apprehension and judgment, between the first and second act of intellect. He elaborated

a metaphysics of matter and form, act and potency, essence and existence. The early


518

Lonergan combined all these in the three levels of cognitional structure, with a

consequent metaphysics of proportionate being, potency, form and act. The later

Lonergan realized that the good of value is a distinct intentionality, known through

deliberating and judging, deciding and acting and so he objectified a fourth level of

intentional consciousness. We have clarified the stages, the activities, the components

operative at this fourth level into a coherent, critical, foundational account. True

knowledge of good and evil is no small achievement. It is dreamed of in many cultures

and myths including the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the Garden of Eden. Now

we seem to have the structure of the activities of knowing good and evil in place. The

implications and possible applications of this discovery are vast; one becomes

speechless at the possible horizons opening up for education, politics, ethics, law,

institutions, community life, global ethics, economics, relationships and more. All we

can do here is pick out some pointers where value ethics might make a significant

difference and needs to be applied and implemented.

2.2 Generalists and Specialists: Foundations and Application

If you tell someone you are working on ethics, they often ask a specific question

about genetics or economics, and they are very surprised when I tell them I do not know

the right answer. There was a time when one person could be expected to know all the

answers, but those times have long passed. In the traditional method of teaching ethics

the aim was to give answers, to all questions of what is right or wrong, in every area of

life. In the natural law tradition you formulate the laws and then apply them to concrete

situations. In virtue ethics you define the virtues and with a little bit of prudence know

how to apply these virtues. In the twentieth century the distinction began to be made

between practical ethics and meta-ethics. We are working in [484] we do not and cannot

aim to give specific answers to all questions of ethics. So the question arises as to what

Value Ethics 519

contribution our foundational approach makes to actually providing answers to specific

questions. How can foundations be practical?

There is a parallel here, in the Lonergan context, between metaphysics and a

value ethics. Lonergan's metaphysics is conceived as “a whole in knowledge but not the

whole of knowledge.”4 Metaphysics is about method and the general structure of the

universe consequent on the very structure of knowing. So if knowing is constituted by

the activities of experiencing, understanding and judging, then reality is constituted by

the elements of potency, form and act. If there are two fundamentally different kinds of

insights one that grasps a unity identity whole in an aggregate of data, and one that

grasps a similarity between this data and that data, then there will be central forms and

conjugate forms (substances and accidents). If there is a process of successive higher

viewpoints, insights that build on one another, then there will be a hierarchy of genera

and species. If there is a finality operating in unfolding of intelligence, then, there will

be a finality operating in the world of proportionate being. Hence, you can define

metaphysics as the anticipation of the structure of the universe of proportionate being.

That is of course very empty; it does not give any specific answer to any

particular question about the universe. What is called for here is collaboration between

the metaphysician and the scientist. The metaphysician provides the method, the

framework, the critique, the knowledge of the whole; what the scientist supplies is

specific content on determinate aspects of reality. If you want to know about quasars ask

the scientist; if you want to know about the criterion of the real, ask the metaphysician.

The scientist needs the metaphysician to distinguish between the real as the correctly

affirmed and the real as the unquestioned imaginative assumption of out there now real.

The metaphysician needs the scientist to flesh out the empty structure of his view of the

whole.


520

Something similar occurs in a value ethics. We have not given answers to

specific moral questions, but we have outlined a method of [485] finding the correct

answer. We have specified the activities that must be performed, the dynamic operating

in the activities, the criteria operating throughout the process. We have clearly identified

the components in knowing values in general and the same components will be involved

in any specific answer to particular questions. We have formulated a general

anticipation of what an authentic human person might look like. This is a meta-ethics,

an outline of a method, a general heuristic structure of the universe of proportionate

value. We are generalists not specialists. So how is a value ethics to be fleshed out in

the concrete? Can we offer at least some guidelines?

To a certain extent everybody can do this for themselves. It is not very difficult

to appreciate the value of honesty, to realize that lying is being dishonest, and to know

that this particular statement is a lie. In many examples of daily life we have sufficient

knowledge of what is involved, sufficient awareness of the moral values at stake, a

vague realization that if I tell lies I make myself a dishonest person, and a realization

that we are free to decide for ourselves one way or the other. We perform the activities,

we do them well or badly according to our lights. In this sense nothing has changed

since the time of Aristotle.

However, we are now living in a highly differentiated world. There are areas

where commonsense knowledge is inadequate to the task of moral discernment. There

are many specialized areas of knowledge and application of knowledge where the

individual non-specialist is incompetent to judge. So ethics has spawned a slew of

specializations, business ethics, medical ethics, ethics of genetics and stem cell research,

justice and peace issues, terrorism and security, war and peace, distribution of wealth,

ecology and environment, endemic poverty, discrimination of race, gender, and the like.

Each of these could be further divided into sub-specialties. All this in a world of

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interconnectedness, a global world, where there are all sorts of unforeseen

interconnections and consequences. We have a proliferation of courses on ethics, ethics

committees, research on ethical questions; but if we do not have an explicit way of

proceeding, we have the blind leading the blind. [486]

It is here that there is need for collaboration between the generalists of value

ethics and the specialists of distinct disciplines. Each has a contribution to make. The

value ethics provides a framework, a set of activities, a list of components and

identification of criteria to use. The specialist provides the content, the information, the

specialized understanding of what is possible here, what is happening there, what are the

likely consequences, and so forth. The specialist might be working from an inadequate

notion of value, a confusion between satisfaction and value, an inability to distinguish

means from ends, a presumption that values are arbitrary, private preferences.

Certainty about foundations can be coupled with uncertainty about particular

applications. Because our approach to values is based on self-appropriation and is

basically unrevisable, one can be quite certain about the activities and components that

constitute knowledge of values. But particular applications, in specific circumstances

can be quite uncertain. We might be uncertain of the facts, have incomplete information

and understanding; we might have mixed feelings, be not sure of our motivation, be not

so resolute in our decision-making. No one can claim to be the perfect standard and

criterion of the self-transcending subject. Judgements of value can be tentative,

provisional, probable, ambiguous, or plain mistaken. This is nothing new. Aristotle

warns us that politics and ethics are not exact sciences; that he is aiming at clarifications

and a broad outline of topics, rather than a list of specific conclusions; that it is a sign of

a trained mind not to expect more precision than the nature of the subject allows.5

2.3 Laws, Virtues, Rights, Values


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A value ethics is not intended to replace all other terminologies, codifications,

priorities and expressions of other approaches to moral philosophy. It is intended to

make clear the foundations, the method and the criteria of all moral judgments and

actions. The specification of this framework in each situation must be undertaken by

responsible competent persons, individuals or groups, on the spot. We still need specific

rules, laws, norms, regulations, command-[487]ments, relating to concrete actions. A

foundational ethic of value does not make such specific rules redundant.

Is it enough to tell students to ‘be responsible’ and to presume that they know

what that means in the concrete? I made this mistake myself in setting up a new

computer laboratory for the use of the students. They were instructed in the use of

computers in a special course, I explained how much the computers cost, how fragile

they were, how difficult it was to get them fixed, and urged the student to be responsible

in the use of the computers. Fine. But after a week of use, there was chaos, students

complaining, computers broken, files lost, and that kind of thing. I realized that rules

have to be made, order has to be maintained, punishments have to be threatened; the

meaning of ‘being responsible’ has to be specified in such rules as, do not delete files

that do not belong to you, do not change default settings in programmes, do not execute

commands at random, close all programs properly before turning off the computer, do

not format C: drive. General exhortations need to be specified in relation to concrete

situations. The general exhortations remain in place; for sometimes the rules need to be

broken, sometimes they are not applicable, sometimes they conflict. In such a manner,

you can relate the general precept of the Bible to love God and your neighbour, to the

specification of the Ten Commandments and the elaboration of these in the Law.

The specification of what is right or wrong can be expressed in terms of

commands, rules, laws, regulations, moral laws, civil laws, traffic laws, tax laws, and so

forth. These usually specify what is the right thing to do in certain well-defined

Value Ethics 523

situations. It is very convenient to have these rules of thumb available. The intent is to

make it easier to behave morally and to teach the next generation what is expected of

them. Parents lay down the rules for the orderly running of the family. Schools specify

what is expected of students, rules regarding marks, discipline, clothing, attendance at

classes, respect for teachers, and so forth. An ethics of moral laws still has a valid role

to play in specifying behaviour that is right or wrong and to be clear as to what is

expected of children and students and citizens. The mistake commonly made is to

absolutize the laws, the propositions, the [488] formulation, the commandments

themselves. But moral laws can be unjust, contradictory, out-dated, overly general, and

always still require wisdom and goodness in their application to specific situations.

Moral laws are an expression of moral value judgments. The absolutes are to be found

not in the law itself but in the good and competent person, deliberating, judging,

deciding and action, responding to the transcendental imperatives and acting in accord

with a good conscience.

We can also specify moral behaviour in terms of virtues and vices. We exhort

our children to be brave, to be patient, to be kind. We define and divide our list of

favoured virtues and put them forward as the ideal way to live and to be. We specify the

kind of person we admire, the kind of person we would like to become. We advocate

character formation, discipline, and training in the virtues. We praise and blame; we

reward and punish; we approve and we disapprove. We put forward models to be

imitated, saints, heroes, incarnations of moral virtue. We choose a career because we

want to be like so and so. We imitate our parents, our admired teachers, our peers, our

leaders. All this is noble and good but again the absolutes are not in the lists or

definitions of the virtues, but in the activities and norms immanent and operative in each

person. No list of virtues is definitive. There is no human ideal that is not open to

change. The magnanimous man of Aristotle, the servant of the gospel, the virtues of


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Aquinas, the English Gentleman, the autonomous modern, are ideals of human

behaviour subject to cultural variations.

Nowadays, we speak of human rights, the inalienable rights of persons,

infringements of privacy. In so far as these are formulated with a view to defending the

freedom, dignity, and equality of all human persons, it is very noble and good. Such

protections are important. But again such statements about rights are value judgments.

The absolutes lie not in the formulation of the rights but in the intention to defend the

authentic, freedom and dignity of the human person. Rights are not out there now real.

Formulations of rights develop and vary; they are expressions of increasing sensitivity

to issues of justice and equality and freedom. Rights talk can be perverted for the benefit

of one group over against the rights of another. [489]

3 Teaching Moral Values

If you do not know the source of moral values, then indeed it will be difficult to

formulate an effective pedagogy for the teaching of correct values. If you have a skewed

notion of where values come from, then, you will probably have a similarly distorted

method of teaching them. For the emotivists, who hold that values are simply a matter

of emotional approval or disapproval, it is hard to think of any effective pedagogy other

than the manipulation of emotions to bring them into line with actions or vice versa. For

the rationalists, for whom values are simply a matter or rational argument, then

instruction, argumentation, reasoning, will be the only effective pedagogy. Plato seems

to have equated virtue and wisdom, so if wisdom could be imparted in lectures, so could

virtue. For those who say that values come from choices, then, the pedagogy will simply

present the alternatives for choice. For dogmatists, who say that values are imposed by

the authority of God, the State, or the Parent, then, their pedagogy will be to impose

their values on the students. For those who claim that all academic institutes should be

value-free, they will continue to foster the illusion that they are not teaching values,

Value Ethics 525

while they are in fact teaching the supposed value of a neutral factual value-free

secularism. How can we contribute to an authentic pedagogy of values?

3.1 Pedagogy of Four Components

We have been at pains to identify and distinguish the components operating in

the judgment of value and so we identified the cognitive, the affective, the volitional

and the context of self-transcendence, which coalesce in the judgment of value. We

have answered the question, where do values come from, in terms of these elements. We

have seen how the process of self-transcendence involves developmental stages and a

process of conversion. If we are correct, then, we have a firm foundation on which to

base our moral pedagogy. Obviously, a pedagogy will be adapted to the age and stage of

the student, but it seems that these four elements must always be present to some extent.

[490]

When we think of the cognitive component we realize that there must always be

some element of reasoning and inference present in moral teaching. The child might

ask, why is it wrong to tell a lie? and deserves an answer appropriate to his level and

stage. It is a question for understanding, and must be answered in terms of

understanding. 'Just do what I tell you and don't ask foolish questions' is not a positive

contribution to moral understanding and maturity. Laws and rules have a cognitive

content; definitions of virtue have a cognitive content. Working out which rule applies,

which has priority, how the rule applies to the concrete situation is a matter of

intelligence. Seeing through fallacies and rationalizations is, similarly, a task for

understanding. Later stages of moral reasoning can involve sophisticated reasoning

about ends and means, direct and indirect consequences, culpable and inculpable

ignorance, distinguishing between circumstances that alter or do not alter essential

cases. Values depend on facts; values are at least partly a matter of sufficient evidence:


526

instruction and understanding are an intrinsic constituent component of any true

pedagogy.

Aristotle states that moral education is wholly a matter of emotional training.

We would prefer to be more precise and state that all moral education will involve some

element of feeling. By feeling we are not necessarily referring to those emotions, which

come and go almost beyond our control, but those deep-seated feeling dispositions

towards what is good and true. We recognized a symphony of feelings, but the deepest

seems to be the pure, detached, unrestricted, desire to know the truth, to know what is of

value, to decide and realize the value and to become a valuable person. We saw this as

very close to the intentional response to value, which we held to be innate, a spiritual

disposition to seek the true and the good, something on the analogy of Aristotle's active

intellect. This intentional disposition is a component of our pedagogy, because young

people need to be taught to take pleasure in doing good; that immediate gratification can

be postponed and channelled into a deeper and more satisfying pleasure – the pleasure

of doing the right thing and becoming virtuous. Punishments and rewards, parental

approval and disapproval, [491] openness about feelings, expression and talking about

feelings, play a part in the education of the feeling life of the growing subject.

Training in decision-making is indeed a delicate task in moral education. You

can bring a horse to the water, but you can’t make him drink. You cannot force a person

to freely decide what you want him to do. So we allow children to make decisions about

clothes, food, leisure, in matters appropriate to their age and ability and discernment.

We encourage good decision-making; we point out consequences, give input on

possibilities, encourage being considerate of others. We point out mistakes, correct

aberrant behaviour, approve of success, and punish failures appropriately. We

encourage children not to act blindly out of feeling alone, to reflect on their choices, to

consider the good of others, to understand what they are doing and why. Training in

Value Ethics 527

decision-making and taking responsibility for our actions continues all through life. We

are perpetually faced with the choice between true value and satisfaction and few of us

have fully and completely negotiated this hurdle.

We acknowledge the component of self-transcendence present in the growing

pupil. We recognize the role of aspiration and inspiration in teaching moral values.

There is a desire to grow, to become, to develop, to pass on to the next stage, to be more

mature and autonomous; there is a desire to know the good, to do the good and to

become a good person. At a certain stage young people aspire to be like certain role

models, teachers, uncles, pop stars, football players, humanitarians, doctors, fire-

fighters, and the like. Stories of heroes and villains help to define the kind of person

they want to become. Biography and history present real live heroes and villains. Good

pedagogy works on these aspirations. This recognizes that there is a process of moral

development; we want to be like them, but we know we are not at present like them. We

aspire to moral authenticity but do not always succeed.

If we have a foundational grasp of where values come from, we can utilize this

knowledge to formulate appropriate pedagogies for all stages of moral development.

Values can be taught once we grasp the dynamics of where they come from. Four

components are in-[492]volved and none can be neglected. Pedagogy will be geared to

the infant, the child, the adolescent, the teenager, the youth, the adult, the mature adult,

the seniors. It should avoid the two extremes of laissez-faire liberalism, leaving the

pupil to choose their own values; or the extreme of indoctrination, imposing by force

your views and values.

None of the counterpositions that we noted on the question of values provide a

basis for a good pedagogy of moral values. Rationalists would claim that moral

education is just a matter of explanation, understanding the reason, logically working

out the principles and the application. Emotivists hold that values are an arbitrary


528

emotional preference and this hardly provides a basis for any moral pedagogy.

Intuitionists hold that values are intuited in single, simple direct intuitions: it is a puzzle

to me how you can produce these in others, when I have no evidence of their existence

in myself. Proponents of value-free education claim to eliminate values from the

curriculum; but in fact they are substituting their set of values for values that are

deliberated up, judged, decided and implemented by good people. Value clarification

methods and philosophy help us to be conscious of our actual values, are very effective

in promoting discussion and participation, but in the end have no critique of values and

no sound philosophy of where values come from or how they can be promoted.

3.2 Way up, Way down

From studies in epistemology, we might be familiar with the difference between

immanently generated knowledge and belief.6 Immanently generated knowledge is

knowledge which you have personally worked out for yourself, seen the evidence for

the hypothesis reflected on the sufficiency of the evidence and posited the judgment as

true. Belief is a short cut to knowledge based on accepting something on trust from

some authority, teacher, and author or media source. Much of our knowledge is based

on belief rather than immanently generated. We simply do not have time to repeat all

the experiments, see all the evidence, repeat all the insights and mistakes of history,

reconstruct the technology and the instruments. We have [493] trust and it is reasonable

to do so. We have a criterion to judge the truth of immanently generated knowledge. We

have also a criterion to judge what is reasonable to believe, what is credible or

incredible, what sources are trustworthy or not.

There is a parallel in the field of moral philosophy. We have to live before we

have an opportunity to learn how to live well. We have to distinguish good and bad

behaviour long before we can reflect about the difference between good and bad

behaviour. What we have been doing so far in identifying the activities of value

Value Ethics 529

judgments and decisions and actions has been analyzing the way up, the way of

immanently generated value judgments. But this activity is difficult, complicated,

requires a mature mind and careful analysis and distinctions. It is not option for those

who have no educational opportunities. But on what principles are we operating before

we indulge in this rational analysis? Uneducated people can distinguish good and evil,

without sophisticated rational analysis. How do they do it and is it legitimate?

So, as well as the way of immanently generated value judgments, there is also

the way from Above Downwards. It is also called the way of heritage, or of tradition, or

of receiving. We are socialized, educated and inculturated, before we develop our

immanently generated knowledge of values. For the most part as children we accept

our tradition, the values of the culture, the values accepted in the family, the values

expected of us. It is only slowly that we begin to question the foundation of such values,

we begin to assert our independence, we demand to understand the reason for moral

behaviour, we begin to move from heteronomy to autonomy.

We concentrated on the way of immanently generated knowledge of values in

the interests of doing one thing at a time and doing it well. But let us acknowledge this

prior context of values accepted through belief, through the culture, through heritage.

Let us look at (1) the judgments born of love, (2) the judgments accepted by belief,

which represent the way from above downwards. These we will discuss in turn. [494]

Lonergan regularly listed the transcendental precept “to be in love” as a fifth

precept, which we have been avoiding until now. We left it out in the interest of

focusing on the Way up as explicitly and exclusively as possible and concentrated on

how we attain immanently generated knowledge of values. The way of being in love

seems to me to represent one aspect of the Way Down. Lonergan defines faith as

knowledge born of religious love. Belief could be defined as knowledge based on trust


530

in some other person. Love seems to go beyond the bounds of immanently generated

knowledge of moral values in a religious sense and even in a human secular context.

‘Love’ in a text on Method in Theology is usually understood as referring to

divine charity, the love poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit: it is taken in a

religious sense. As such we discuss the relationship between charity and faith, God’s

love for us, our love for God, grace, forgiveness, God is love and so forth. Invoking the

transcendental precept ‘to be in love’ would seem to be invoking this religious meaning

and this seems to be what Lonergan intended. ‘Be in love’ would normally be

associated with religious conversion and the infused habit of charity. In a person who is

religiously converted and espouses authentic religious values, there is a very favourable

context for the affirmation of true moral values as well. This influence of religious

beliefs on moral values would represent on example of the Way Down

However, we cannot presume that context; we cannot take for granted that

beneficial influence. There are non-religious persons who are passionately interested in

moral values and the betterment of our human condition. We have tried to work out a

philosophy of moral values, exclusively from the Way Up, depending only on our

human capacities and not invoking religion in any way. So this religious context of the

meaning of love we leave aside for the moment as outside our scope.

But to be in love need not necessarily be interpreted in a religious context: it can

be understood and experienced as a purely human love. Secularist, humanists, moralists

can be, and often are, loving people. Philanthropy after all means a lover of mankind.

Love has a [495] role to play in human life as human. We are brought into existence in a

context of married love. It is the love and attention and care of parents that draws us out

to respond, to talk, to act, to relate, to become human persons. We start our lives

surrounded by affective love and trust. We learn to trust the world, to affirm and to

return love.7

Value Ethics 531

We do not reason ourselves into this love; we feel it, we accept it; we respond to

it; we return it. In this sense, love takes the initiative, it gives direction to our lives, it

inspires us to love our family, our friends, our countrymen, all of humanity. It is a

transcendental precept even in this human sense and so it will be an aspect of the

affectivity of spirit as inquiry; it will be spiritual like the other transcendental precepts, a

priori, permanent and deep desire of the human heart. It is an expansion from the desire

to know truth, goodness and value, to loving the good and becoming loving persons.

The presence of such a human love of family, friends and humanity provides a very

favourable context for knowing moral values, deciding in favour of values and

implementing them freely and responsibly. However, we cannot invoke this love

directly as a justification for immanently generated knowledge of values. It does

provide the context, it does influence out value judgments for better or for worse, it is an

aspect of moral conversion, but does not give us knowledge of values.

We associate love with the good and presume that loving is always a good thing.

However, there is a love of darkness, there is a love of evil, there is a love of destruction

and death. Love by itself, of itself, points to, normally indicates, recognizes goodness,

and rejoices in goodness. But that presumes a context of deliberation, judgments of

value, good and competent persons, wisdom and desire for the good. In the spiral of

decline, distortion of thought and perversion of feeling can bring about a love of

darkness rather than light, of evil rather than good. An ethics that is based on love as its

generating principle needs to be complemented with a way of knowing good and evil.

Another sense in which we can talk of the Way Down is by appropriating our

traditions in belief and trust. The first part of our lives is spent appropriating the heritage

of the past. We are socialized into [496] the common way of life of our family, our

country and society. We are inculturated into the beliefs and values of our society, by

learning the language, accepting the meaning, living the priorities, celebrating the


532

successes. We are educated into our tradition formally in schools and universities. We

learn from history about our roots, the struggles and successes from the stone age to the

present day. We appropriate the great achievements of the past in literature, science,

philosophy, art, technology. We live in an infrastructure that we did not build. We learn

from the past, so that we will not be condemned to repeat their mistakes and so that we

can build on their achievement to build a better future.

The first part of our lives is spent receiving, accepting, believing and

appropriating the achievements of the past, each in our own area of specialization. Not

to do this work of appropriating is to condemn ourselves to reinventing the wheel, to

struggle unnecessarily to discover what is already known, to condemn ourselves to

primitive barbarism.

But when we have appropriated and critiqued then it the time for criticism and

creativity, for going beyond, for new discoveries. Traditions are not dead but alive. A

tradition either develops or declines. The second part of our lives is for the Way Up of

immanently generated knowledge of values. We can no longer accept the past on the

basis of trust and belief; we must be able to understand, and judge for ourselves. We

become no longer receivers, but teachers, communicators, innovators, parents, and

philosophers. We shift our gaze from the past to the future. Our building of personal

foundations in ethics gives us a platform to launch into this noble task.

Lonergan divides his functional specialties into two phases, the first phase of

receiving the tradition in research, interpretation, history and dialectics; a second phase

of looking to the future, handing on the authentic message in foundations, doctrines,

systematics and communications. This is a mirror image of what we do in any discipline

and it is what we have tried to do in value ethics. In our first chapter we did a brief

dialectical analysis of the ethical tradition; what we inherit from the past is a mixed bag.

What are the genuine [497] achievements? What are the colossal blunders? In the main

Value Ethics 533

body of the work we have been laying the foundations of an approach to values based

on intentionality analysis. In this last chapter we are simply indicating what needs to be

done in terms of formulating a value philosophy, applying a value critique in practice

and communicating true moral values to future generations.

3.3 Teaching Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy presumes a context of a person of sufficiently cultured

consciousness making the transition from receiving laws and virtues from outside, to

discovering the values as immanent and operative in his own consciousness. It presumes

a context of a student questioning the basis of a moral life, asking what is the best kind

of life to live, seeking to make himself a better person and the world a better place to

live in.

The first task would seem to be learning from history. It would be rather

presumptuous to think that we have nothing to learn from our predecessors or that we

can do better than they without even evaluating their achievements or failures. Lonergan

used the phrase the permanence of genuine achievement. The phrase seems particularly

apt for a text such as the Nicomachean Ethics, which has hardly been surpassed to the

present day. One could think also of the writing of Plato, Aquinas, and Kant as in the

same category. But we learn not only from the successes but also from the failures, the

incomplete, the inadequate, the flawed attempts, that have been made to systematize

principles and data on ethics.

Study of history gives the broad background. It provides the material, the

concepts, the possibilities, the alternatives. The study of historical systems is relatively

easy. It is indirect speech. What did Kant say about obligation? What did the early

Kierkegaard say about choice? These are factual questions. Read the text, interpret the

text, summarize the text, and you have your answer. No personal commitment or

transformation is called for; whether you agree with Kant or Kierkegaard is another


534

question altogether. A vast amount of energy is poured into the study of the history of

ethics, sometimes under the illusion that this is ethics. There is no end to the material in

this [498] field to be studied. The printing presses continue to churn out texts, studies,

summaries, evaluations of all this historical data in an endless stream. This provides

knowledge about ethical systems. But the further question remains, as to taking a stand

on what is right and wrong for yourself.

Most professors of philosophy will embrace a particular system of ethics, accept

it as the best and endeavour to communicate this to students. The system may be natural

law, virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, or existentialist ethics, or any variation of

contemporary positions. This hopefully will be a coherent system of principles, leading

to practical conclusions as to what is right or wrong. This gives some coherence to the

questions, the principles and the conclusions. It provides a framework for discussion,

makes sense of most of the data on ethics, and generally helps to guide behaviour in the

concrete. If the students understand and accept the validity of the system, presumably it

can help them in their personal life. In these systems questions can be asked about

applications to the concrete and it might be called an applied ethics.

A foundational approach to ethics calls for a different pedagogical approach. It

would not be teaching theoretical systems but foundations. It starts with persons as they

are. It looks not to systems but to activities. It looks not to the authority of law, or

reason, or Church, or coherence, but to intentionality analysis. It proceeds pedagogically

in terms of solving moral dilemmas, identifying cognitional, affective volitional

components in personal experience. It recognizes the person in self-transcendence as the

standard and criterion of goodness. It recognizes that ethics is not just about the

coherence of systems but is about becoming an ethical person, responding to the

immanent and operative norms, becoming originating value at the same time as

producing terminal values. It recognizes that the absolutes in value ethics are to be

Value Ethics 535

found, not in the propositions or statements of laws, but in the set of interrelated

activities and the norms by which they unfold. A foundational approach is quite

difficult, as it does call for self-examination, taking a personal stand, being responsible,

and recognizing the implications of responsibility. It is difficult for the [499] professor

because he too is on the way; he too is still learning; he too is struggling with moral

development and conversion.

The purpose of teaching foundational ethics, is not to give answers to all

conceivable moral questions, but to empower students to find the answers responsibly.

It is to encourage the move from heteronomy to autonomy. It is to promote sensitivity to

moral values. It is to invoke the interior elements involved in intentions, motivations,

feelings, valuing, rationalizing, and so forth. It is to make moral development and

conversion a topic; ethics is not only about doing, but about becoming and being.

Foundational ethics is about training the generalists; those who provide the framework

and background for the work of the specialists and the application to concrete questions.

The foundationalist will be more sensitive to the inadequacies of particular systems and

the possibly mistaken assumptions of other systems and provide a critique of both.

4 What is at Stake?

Are we just involved in an academic exercise of professors quibbling over

minutiae of an arcane corner of an academic discipline? Or are we involved in an

argument of substance, an argument about the value of the human person, an argument

about how we think and value human persons? I think something very central is at

stake. It is not just for academics but for the whole of society. It is the foundation on

which human society is built. It concerns how we think of the value of the human

person, how the person relates to the universe and to society.

4.1 Value of the Human Person


536

We can assert that the human person is the most valuable being in the universe

that we know. The person emerges out of the processes of the universe, represents the

highest achievement of the universe, does things that no other being can do. The human

person integrates the levels of atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, senses, intelligence,

truth, value and openness to God into one unitary person. The person represents the

highest development of the finality of being, the [500] culmination of a process of

emergent probability. The person is distinct from all other beings in the ability to

understand, to know truth and value, to decide for truth and value, and to be open to

religious experience. We have concentrated on the person’s ability to know good and

evil, to decide for moral values, to become a person of value.

The value of the human person, over against other valuable things, is not just a

matter of degree. It is somehow incommensurable, non-negotiable, and inalienable. It is

not that we are slightly more valuable than animals – there is no comparison between

the value of an animal and of a human person. You cannot put a monetary value on

human life; there is just no proportion between the value of money and the value of a

human life. In principle, we have to assert the dignity of the human person, respect for

the human person, and the equality of all human persons as valuable.

Aristotle was probably the first to assert the equality of human persons as

substances; substances cannot be differentiated from one another by degree; if it is a

horse, it is a horse; and one horse is no more a horse than another.8 If this is a human

person, then this is equal in principle to all human persons. Persons differ in health, in

colour, in sex, in age, in culture, in education, in intelligence, in goodness; but in

principle every person is of equal value to every other person. You can legitimately say

that this person is more intelligent than that; they differ in intelligence, but they do not

differ in equally being human persons. You can say that this person is morally better

than that; but again they differ in acquired moral habits but remain equal as human

Value Ethics 537

persons. Such must be the principle underlying law, society, and the distribution of

goods and services in society.

If persons are equal, they are equal from beginning to end. We develop or

decline in terms of health, or education, or intelligence, but we do not develop in terms

of what we are as human beings. In the modern sense our personality develops; but in

the sense that we are human persons, by definition and in principle, we remain equally

valuable throughout our life. One can argue about when we become human persons,

about when does human life start – but I find no rea-[501]son not to accept that we start

at conception. One can argue about the definition of death, the death of the brain, the

stopping of the heart – but death would seem to be the death of the whole, not of a part

thereof. So in principle the fetus, the unborn, the child, the youth, the adult, the elderly,

the sick, the terminally ill, are all of equal value as human persons.

But this does not deny that human persons are developing persons and realize

their being over time and space. We develop physically, psychologically, intellectually,

morally and religiously. We become intelligent or stupid; we become either morally

responsible or irresponsible. We can become mature or remain in the immaturity of

adolescence. Moreover we are obliged to grow, to develop, to realize potential, to pass

through the stages of life’s passage. We are obliged to do so hierarchically, to be

attentive, to be intelligent, to be responsible and to be in love.

If we kept the value of the individual person in mind, we have a possibility of

organizing a human society whose purpose is the fostering of human life in all its

fullness. We could recognize that the economy is for the purpose of promoting human

life and not the other way round. We could build a society where the law is geared to the

promotion of human life as an end in itself. We could create institutions that are for the

people and not the people for the institutions.

4.2 Formulation of Laws, Virtues, Values


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We have seen how general moral principles need to be specified in order to

apply to the concrete situation. This specification can be in terms of laws, or in terms of

virtues or in terms of values.

In the context of cognitional theory we realized the importance of formulating

your hypothesis or definition or concept in a sufficiently differentiated and correct

manner. In order to be able to judge accurately the truth of the explanation, you have to

have a clear formulation of the hypothesis. Something similar occurs when it comes to

formulating concepts and definitions of values. There is a need for a precise,

sophisticated, correct formulation of what is intended in affirming a value. Much of the

confusion in our moral life comes [502] from vague and deformed notions of freedom,

equality, justice, tolerance, truth, self-fulfilment, desires, success, and the like. Being

clear and distinct is as important in ethics, as it is in cognitional theory.

Let us indicate very briefly how some core values should be formulated. Much

elaboration is called for, but we can at least indicate how some of these core values are

misunderstood in contemporary culture and how an authentic formulation is needed. It

is not a question of working out a calculus of values to be applied as a ruler, but a guide

to value judgments and their priority.

The prime value in a value ethics will be the human person, the dignity and

respect due to each and every human being, as the centre of moral value. The human

person represents the highest value in this universe, the peak of the universe, the most

valuable thing in the universe; it is only in the context of free and responsible human

persons that moral values have meaning. In the human person we recognize a scale of

values that can be affirmed both as originating value and as terminal values. It is a

hierarchy with the most important at the top and the least important at the bottom. So

we have identified vital values, social values, cultural values, personal values and

religious values. All are values; all in general are to be affirmed, but in comparative

Value Ethics 539

judgments of value the higher values are more valuable than the lower values. We

recognize the individual person as the centre of obligations, and rights. The obligations

emerge from the transcendental precepts, which are one aspect of what we are as human

persons. Rights spring from obligations; we have an obligation to live a moral life;

therefore, we have a right to live a moral human life.

(1) Happiness. Aristotle argued that we live for a purpose and the overriding,

supreme, single, purpose of human life is happiness. Everything else is chosen for the

sake of happiness and so happiness must be the supreme, single, final end of human life.

This is part of our nature and not a result of choice; we cannot avoid seeking happiness

as the supreme good. The main ingredients of this good are living well, according to the

intellectual and moral virtues, activity of the highest potentialities of the mind,

particularly, the contemplation [503] of eternal truths. Happiness is not to be found in

pleasure, nor in wealth, nor in politics, nor in honour. It is to be found in a complete life

– it is something long-term. By happiness he seems to have meant a genuine self-

fulfilment, or what we have called a process of self-transcendence. Nowadays, the word

‘happiness’ has come to mean, having fun, being joyful, achieving your own interests,

being successful, experiencing satisfaction or pleasure. But I think Aristotle was right in

his analysis and his understanding of human happiness. In our terminology, happiness is

to be found in the process of self-transcendence, in living according to an authentic

scale of values, in seeking the good of all and not just your own selfish, apparent good.

Happiness is the affective state reached through the activities of understanding, judging

truth and value, deciding for value and realizing value in a life well-lived.

(2) Freedom. Freedom is to be understood as self-determination, self-control,

taking responsibility for making good decisions. Freedom is not arbitrary choice; it is

not license to do as you please. Freedom is not to be understood as freedom from

constraint, freedom from laws, freedom from obligations; it is freedom to do the right


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thing, make true judgments of fact and value, decide well in terms of seeking objective

value, implementing values consistently, positively, habitually. Freedom is not to be

identified with the range of choices offered by a society, or economy. Freedom is the

achievement of a mature, authentic person seeking terminal values and becoming

originating value at the same time. Nowadays ‘freedom’ is usually used in the sense of

freedom from constraints, not being bound by obligations, freedom to do as you like.

Again unfortunately our culture suffers from a truncated view of the human person and

the great gift of freedom.

(3) Responsibility. This word is used in many senses with many nuances of

meaning. We use it in the sense of to be responsible, the transcendental imperative of

moral obligation, which is at the foundation of ethics. It calls us to responsible choice

and not arbitrary choice. Responsible choice means choice based on good value

judgments. It means choice based on a habitual willingness to do the good, the right

thing, to choose value and not satisfaction for its own [504] sake. Freedom and

responsibility go together like two sides of a coin. We are responsible for ourselves, to

be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and in love of the good. We are

responsible for our families, our work environment, the groups and communities to

which we belong. We are responsible for our governments, for our societies, for the

nations in which we live. We are responsible for our leaders in democratic societies, we

are responsible for the quality of public life, the decisions of governments taken in our

name. We are responsible for the laws passed by our governments, the wars fought in

our name, the policies implemented, the priorities that are in place.

(4) Equality. Aristotle stated that substances do not differ from one another in

degree. He did not realize the revolutionary implications of his statement. If this is a

horse and that is a horse, then they are equally horses. One may be young the other old,

one may be healthy the other sick, one may be worth a fortune the other worth a tub of

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soap, one may be male the other female. They differ in many respects but are equal in

simply being horses. One is not more of a horse than the other. So you have the

principle of human equality affirmed in principle. All human persons, as human

persons, are equal in substance, in principle, in essence. There may be differences in

colour, age, sex, education, status, roles, nationality goodness or badness, skills, ability,

and so forth but these all belong to the accidents and not the substance. Any legal or

political system has to recognize this as their starting point. Being a human person starts

from conception and ends with natural death.

(5) Justice. Justice is the implementation in practice of the principle of equality

of each and every human person. If every person is equal in principle then in principle

there should be equal availability of education, rewards for labour, medical services,

involvement in political process, involvement in economic institutions, involvement in

the making of the culture, the values and truths of the society. The legal system has to

be based on recognizing the obligation of each person to become a full human person

and hence his right to do so. Cooperation is the basis of human society and not

competing self-interests. [505]

(6) Tolerance. In a pluralist society we need to distinguish between legitimate

and illegitimate forms of pluralism. Legitimate sources of pluralism derive from

differentiations of consciousness, level of education, age of participants, specialization

of work, diversity of language and cultures, communications to different persons of

different times and places, varieties of common sense, and so forth. Unity in diversity is

surely the motto of most modern democratic societies. The richness and diversity of

cultures, languages, ways of living, ways of celebrating, cooking, dressing, need to be

embraced. Illegitimate forms of pluralism derive from the absence of intellectual, moral,

and religious conversion. Untruths, distortions of the truth, dishonesty, criminality, are

not a legitimate part of the richness of cultural pluralism. Moral deviance, moral


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decline, moral disvalues, are not part of the richness of culture; they are not to be valued

equally with moral development, moral values, moral self-transcendence. Personal

moral evils will inevitable effect the society in which the individual person lives.

Tolerance means respect for other opinions even though they may be considered

wrong. Tolerance does not mean that every opinion is of equal value. Tolerance is not

the same as indifference; to tolerate untruths is not to be indifferent to the truth. We

work to promote values and reverse disvalues. It is counterproductive to do this by

force, by compulsion, by the exercise of superior power. If our moral stance cannot be

made persuasive, then, there may be something wrong with it.

4.3 Global Ethics

It may seem that the approach taken in this text has been very individualistic.

We have constantly appealed to awareness of your own personal moral experience; our

method of self-appropriation might seem to leave out the social dimension; the process

of self-transcendence might seem to be an ideal of personal self-absorption little

different from navel gazing of other self-help psychologies of self-fulfilment. Some

might argue that we are putting the cart before the horse; that it is the social conditions

that determine the possibility of being a moral person and of doing a moral philosophy.

So let us [506] try to show that what we have been doing is simply a foundation for a

process leading to a global ethic.

Although we have relied mostly on a method of self-appropriation, we have

always presumed a context of the individual in the society, a person who becomes a

person because of social relations, a person who inherits from the past by socialization,

acculturation and education and at the same time makes a contribution to handing on

this legacy to future generations. The terms ‘moral’ and ‘personal’ are interchangeable.

To be moral means to be an authentic human person and to relate to others as a moral

human person. To decline morally the individual is not only personally on the road to

Value Ethics 543

becoming an immoral individual, but is also inevitably having a like influence on his

family, his relations, his friends, his groups, his community, his work place, his society.

The person who is developing morally is inevitably having a beneficial effect on his

family, friends, associates, students, community and society. This context we have taken

for granted. Man is a social or political animal, as Aristotle put it.

It is easy to see how the method of analysis suggested in this text can be

transposed and applied to a group context. Many decisions concerning our future are

taken by institutions, companies, government agencies, corporations, tribunals, Senates,

parliaments, and assemblies of various kinds. Many corporate groups set up ethics

committees to deal with their value priorities, relations between employees, service to

the customer, quality of service, and the like. What we looked for in terms of four

components of a good judgment of value, we can now look for in the deliberations of

groups, and the procedures of decision-making of institutions and companies. Very

often if there is a difficult decision to be made, a committee will be set up to investigate,

to report and to make recommendations. As experts in the decision-making process,

what would we look for in this committee that would favour it making good

recommendations?

We would surely look for a cognitive component. Are these people competent in

this area of specialization? Do they know the facts, are they experienced? Are they

taking all relevant material into ac-[507]count? Are they aware of the possible

consequences of certain recommendations, are they aware of environmental impact, are

they open to all possibilities, are they ready to learn from previous experience? One

looks for competent, knowledgeable, experienced persons to serve on such a committee.

But you also look for an affective component, in terms of what are these

individuals intending in participating in this process? You might have persons who are

only interested in furthering their careers, making a name for themselves, pushing their


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own ideas, belittling and ignoring the expertise of others. You might have persons who

are only interested in how this will impact on their own constituency, how their class or

ethnic group or geographical area will profit from decisions made by the group. Or you

might have persons who just do not care what decisions are reached; they are not

interested in the matter, are not prepared to do the work, are on the committee just

because of the salary and the perks. If these kinds of attitudes are predominant in the

group, it is hard to imagine the group reaching a good judgment and a responsible

decision. They will work out some mish-mash of a compromise and pass it on to higher

authorities.

What you are looking for in such a group is an intention of the good, not just for

one interest group but for all; not just in the short-run, but in the long-run. You are

looking for detachment from personal gain or career advantage and devotion to the

cause, the purpose, the aim of the committee. You are expecting some form of

commitment, a willingness to do the work, a readiness to listen to others, a

determination to finish the task assigned in a reasonable and responsible manner. Given

those kinds of intentions you can visualize the group working together with some kind

of cohesion, sorting through the possibilities with some kind of unanimity, and reaching

responsible recommendations together.

We are presuming that the participants are free and responsible; that they are not

just spokespersons for special interests; that they are free to speak their minds, to seek

the best solution, to be open to new possibilities. Are they willing to make good

decisions? Have they the [508] habitual willingness to seek true values and not personal

satisfaction? Knowledge and competence is one thing, but deciding is another. Are they

good deciders? Not too timid as to be afraid of trying new procedures. Not too rash as

to ignore the potential for disastrous consequences.

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We are presuming that the persons on the committee are developing and self-

transcending persons. We presume that in some partial way they constitute the criterion

and standard of goodness. Authentic individuals will make for an authentic well-

functioning group. Their shared competence, reasonableness and responsibility will

ensure that their vision of improving the human lot will be wholesome for themselves,

for all in the society. We want good people on such a committee and usually exclude

criminals, degenerates, drunkards and the like.

If we have a good grasp of how we reach knowledge of good and evil followed

by responsible decisions, this not only helps in our personal lives, but helps us to

understand group process, group judgments of value, group decisions. Not only do we

as individuals have to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible, but we can

see the same imperatives operating in a group context. Hence, although we worked

mainly in terms of self-appropriation, now we are in a good position to transpose this

from an individual perspective to that of a group, a society, or the whole of mankind.

Lonergan helps us again when we ask, what is community? Again he has a

simple but effective and accurate way of defining a community.9 Again it involves an

extension from the individual to the group. We understand the human person as

operating on five levels of intentional consciousness, with the transcendental precepts

operating at each level, with a consequent scale of values being objectified. By

extension, we can understand genuine community as common experience, shared

understanding, agreed truths and values permeating a common way of life.

Common experience is the prerequisite for community. Without some common

basis in experience nothing more can happen. An aggregate of people sharing a bus trip

from one city to the next will not form a community; but if the bus breaks down and

they are forced to [509] share their water and food, wait together for spare parts, help

one another, they slowly interact and begin to form community. If tribes are cut off


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from one another by oceans or mountains, they become strangers and often enemies.

Nowadays, global communications allows everybody on the planet to share in the same

common experiences, the United Nations, the Olympics, global economy, Internet,

World Cup, and the like. We are becoming a global village. We realize that we share the

same resources, we live in the same time and space, the actions of one impact on all.

Common understanding is a prerequisite of community. A common way of life,

a shared language, a set of customs, established ways of doing things, constant

interaction, ensure that members understand one another. A good of order presumes

that, although different tasks are assigned to different individuals, all share in the

benefits. Misunderstanding gives birth to mistrust and the breaking up of community.

The more persons understand one another, the stronger the basis for community.

Common truths and beliefs are a prerequisite for community. Each culture has

its traditional beliefs, its myths of origin, its common history, and its beliefs about itself.

It has its way of dealing with sickness, its mode of production, its system of justice, who

it praises and who it blames. Each community shares common truths about the human

person, rights, laws, marriage, politics, education and the like.

Each community has shared values, common values, accepted and implemented.

They may be traditional values such as respect for the elders, obedience to the law and

the tradition, punishments for breaking the law, respect for those who uphold the law

and preserve the traditions. They may be more modern values such as freedom of

initiative, upward mobility, individual rights, liberal capitalism, freedom of religious

belief, and the like. But a community has to have some common values, priorities, and

ways of making common decisions.

It is shared experience, common understanding, shared truths and values that

constitute the core of a community of persons relating to one another. Just as the

integral scale of values applies to the [510] individual, so it also applies to the local

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community, the ethnic community, the nation state, and the world community. Values

are not a matter for the individual but for the family, the community the society and the

global community.

Nowadays, we have to think in terms of a global community; such is emerging

from the common experience of living in the same time and place; the common

understanding of resources, rights, purpose of human life, the economy and it

functioning or non-functioning. The global community is emerging in shared beliefs and

values such as freedom, rights, justice, peace, rule of law, proper procedure,

international law, international criminal court, the United Nations, and other

international bodies regulating trade, health matters, climate, the environment, peace

and the like. Where do these values come from? Who is going to enforce the moral

values of such a global community? Or is it going to be a global community of Might is

Right?

Hans Kung has written eloquently on a global ethic for a global society.10 He

hopes that the world religions will have a positive impact in formulating and

propagating such an ethic. His work led to the Declaration toward a Global Ethic,

approved by the Parliament of the World Religions in 1993. But the ethic itself is not

based on the authority of religious systems but on human principles of morality. He

holds that there are universal principles of moral conduct, which should regulate

relations between peoples of different nations in the line of cooperation, basic principles

of justice and rights and freedoms.

The foundations for ethics that we have discovered in the context of individual

persons, are equally applicable to a global ethic. If our foundations are universal,

transcultural, based on what it is to be a human person, then, they are applicable, not

only in Europe and America, but all over the world. Not only is it valid in the context of

a Christian religion, but also in the context of Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and


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indigenous traditional religions. It does not invoke the authority of religion but the

authority of what it is to be a human person. Just as we can appeal to the transcendental

precepts [511] operating in each individual, so we can appeal to the precepts operating

in all persons, of all communities, societies, nations and international bodies. What can

we all agree on? On what basis do we make our international agreements? How do we

distinguish between development and decline? Surely on the basis of what it is to be a

good human person. We appeal again to Aristotle, who said that the good person is the

standard and criterion of goodness. If we have understood from this text what it is to be

a good human person, then, we have a basis for a global ethic, a community of

development, a world of self-transcending persons. [512]

Endnotes

1 B. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 100. 2 B. Cronin, Foundations, Chapter ten, sections one and two. 3 Insight, 411-4. On positions and counterpositions. 4 Insight, 416. 5 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b10 – 1094b30. 6 Insight, “The Notion of Belief”, 703-18(725-39). B. Cronin, Foundations, “Belief” 208-14; “The Way Up and the Way Down,” 263-67. 7 See Eric Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1963) and Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968). He emphasizes this aspect of trust and love as the beginning of moral development. 8 Aristotle, Categories, 3b33. 9 Method in Theology, 79. 10 Hans Kung, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, (New York: Continuum International, 1993); A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics, (London: SCM press, 1997).

Epilogue

Now that we have objectified the components, activities and processes in an

explicit, correct and comprehensive manner, we can only hope that this will lead to

better value judgments, better moral persons and healthier societies. This does not

happen automatically. Knowing how to make a good moral judgment, does not

automatically lead to making good moral judgments. It remains a struggle between

understanding and misunderstanding, true judgments and mistaken judgments, the will

for satisfaction or value, the tension of development and conversion. But hopefully, it

will be easier. Now that we have the map in place – and it seems to be accurate, precise

and clear – hopefully, we can find our way to following it.

In the introduction we raised the question of the relation between a moral

philosophy and religious system teaching moral behaviour. Our conviction was that we

can and should base our investigation of moral behaviour on philosophy and exclude

any explicit influence from theology. I hope this text has shown the value of such an

approach. We can know good and evil, simply as human persons experiencing,

understanding, judging truths and values. There is an integrity to the method, the

activities, the feelings, the deciding and the process of self-transcendence. At no point

did we need to appeal to religious justification or reinforcement. As Paul wrote about

the pagan Romans, they should have known that their corrupt practices were immoral;

they were culpable even though they had not the benefit of Christian Revelation; you do

not need Christian faith in order to condemn immoral practices.

However, that is not to deny the existence and value of a religious perspective.

We stepped very delicately around the questions of human suffering, sickness and

death; we did not ask any questions about the ultimate value of human life; we were

unable to deal with a person's deepest longing for union with God; we have to admit that

[514] the happiness achieved in any human life is somehow limited, conditioned and

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fragile. There is a wider perspective that these aspects of human life lead us into. The

religious dimension introduces notions of sin and redemption, faith, salvation, ultimate

destiny, ultimate happiness, worship, prayer, knowledge and love of God, grace, and

revelation. But all that is another story, another level of consciousness to be explored. It

is in that context that the deepest and best inclinations of the human heart find their

ultimate fulfilment.

Value in Ethics: Lonergan Perspective

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