Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system...

43
Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL © 2006 Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Peter H Feiler April 11, 2008

Transcript of Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system...

Page 1: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL

© 2006 Carnegie Mellon University

Software Engineering Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Peter H Feiler

April 11, 2008

Page 2: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Outline

Multiple aspects of system validation

System & software engineers working together

Multi-fidelity model-based analysis

Property preserving transformations

Conclusions

2Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Conclusions

Page 3: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Dimensions of System Validation

The system

System modelsModel-based vof

Validation of models against system

3Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

System models

System implementation

Model-based vofsystem

Validation of implementation against

system models

Page 4: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Single Source Annotated Architecture Model

Predictive Analysis Across Engineering Dimensions

SecurityIntrusion

Integrity

Confidentiality

Availability & Reliability

MTBF

FMEA

Hazard analysis

Architecture Model

4Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

4

Real-timePerformance

Execution time/Deadline

Deadlock/starvation

Latency

ResourceConsumption

Bandwidth

CPU time

Power consumption

Data precision/accuracy

Temporal correctness

Confidence

Data Quality

Low incremental cost for additional analyses &

simulations

Fewer independently developed models

reduces model validation

Page 5: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Architecture-Driven Modeling

Automatically derived

analytical models

5Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Annotated architecture

System generation

from validated models Validation of generators

Page 6: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

AADL and Safety-Criticality

Fault management

• Architecture patterns in AADL

— Redundancy, health monitoring, …

• Fault tolerant configurations & modes

Dependability

• Error Model Annex

• Specification of fault occurrence and fault propagation information

6Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

6

• Use for hazard and fault effect modeling

• Reliability & fault tree analysis

Behavior validation

• Behavior Annex

• Model checking

• Source code validation

Page 7: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Outline

Multiple aspects of system validation

System & software engineers working together

Multi-fidelity model-based analysis

Property preserving transformations

Conclusions

7Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Conclusions

Page 8: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Traditional Embedded System Engineering

System Engineer Control Engineer

System

Under

Control

Control

System

8Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Page 9: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Software-Intensive Embedded Systems

System Engineer Control Engineer

Ap

plic

atio

n D

eve

lop

er

Ha

rdw

are

En

gin

ee

r

System

Under

Control

Control

System

9Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Ap

plic

atio

n D

eve

lop

er

Ha

rdw

are

En

gin

ee

r

Compute

Platform

Runtime

Architecture

Application

Software

Embedded SW System Engineer

Page 10: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Mismatched Assumptions

System Engineer Control Engineer

Ap

plic

atio

n D

eve

lop

er

Ha

rdw

are

En

gin

ee

r

SystemUnder Control

ControlSystem

Physical Plant Characteristics

Data Stream Characteristics

Precision Units

10Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Ap

plic

atio

n D

eve

lop

er

Ha

rdw

are

En

gin

ee

r

ComputePlatform

RuntimeArchitecture

ApplicationSoftware

Embedded SW System Engineer

Characteristics

Concurrency Communication

Distribution Redundancy

Page 11: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Predictable Embedded System Engineering

Document the Runtime

ArchitectureNavigation

System

AirbagDeploymentParking

Assistance

EmissionManagement

CruiseControl

AntilockBrakingSystem

ElectronicFuel

Injection

System Analysis

• Schedulability

• Performance

• Reliability

• Fault Tolerance

• Dynamic Configurability

11Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Execution Platform

. . . . . . . . . .

Abstract, but Precise

Application Software

System Construction

• AADL Runtime System

• Application SoftwareIntegration

ExternalEnvironment

Page 12: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Working Together

Conceptual architecture

• UML-based component model

• Architecture views (DoDAF, IEEE1471)

• Platform independent model (PIM)

System engineering

• SysML as standardized UML profile

• Focus on system architecture and operational environment

12Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

12

Embedded software system engineering

• SAE AADL

• OMG MARTE profile based on AADL

• AADL as MARTE sub-profile

• Non-functional properties require deployment on platform

Data modeling

• UML, ASN,, …

Page 13: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Outline

Multiple aspects of system validation

System & software engineers working together

Multi-fidelity model-based analysis

Property preserving transformations

Conclusions

13Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Conclusions

Page 14: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Impact of Sampling Latency Jitter

Impact of Scheduler Choice on Controller Stability

• A. Cervin, Lund U., CCACSD 2006

Sampling jitter due execution time jitter and application-driven send/receive

14Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Page 15: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Latency Contributors

System Engineer Control Engineer

System

Under

Control

Control

System

Operational

Environment

15Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

• Processing latency

• Sampling latency

• Physical signal latency

Page 16: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

ARINC 653 Partitions & Communication

Frame-delayed inter-partition communication

Timing semantics are insensitive to partition order

Partition A Partition B

16Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

t0 t1 t2

T4

T1T2

T3

Partition APartition B

Partition APartition B

T1T2

T3T4

T1

T2

T3

T4

Page 17: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Latency Impact of Partitions

Display Manager

Sensor Request for new page

New page content

Latency contribution:

17Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

FlightManager

FlightDirector

Page ContentManager

Latency contribution:

Partition period per partition hop

Lower bound on worst-case latency

Page 18: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Intended Data Flow in Task Architecture

Navigation Sensor

Processing

Integrated Navigation

20Hz

10Hz

From other Partitions

Decre

asin

g P

rio

rity

Periodic I/O

20Hz

To otherPartitions

Shared data area

Pr 1

Pr 2

Pr 3

18Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Navigation

Guidance Processing

Flight PlanProcessing

Aircraft Performance Calculation

20Hz

5Hz

2Hz

Decre

asin

g P

rio

rity

Pr 4

Pr 6

Pr 9Priority assignment achieves desired data

flow

Preemption & concurrency affect read/write order

Page 19: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Frame-level Latency Jitter of Data Stream

Example: Non-deterministic downsampling

• Desired sampling pattern 2X: n, n+2, n+4 (2,2,2,…)

• Worst-case sampling pattern: n, n+1, n+4 (1,3,…)

NavSensor Processing

Integrated Navigation

20Hz 10Hz

19Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Timeline

Thread NavSensorProcessing

Thread IntegratedNavigation

Processing Navigation

Write

Read

Page 20: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Managed Latency Jitter through Deterministic Sampling

Navigation Sensor

Processing

Integrated Navigation Guidance

Processing

20Hz

10Hz 20Hz

From

Partitions

To

Partitions

Guidance

Nav

sensor

data

Nav signal

data

Nav

dataNav sensor

Periodic I/O

20Hz

20Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Processing

Flight PlanProcessing

Aircraft Performance Calculation

5Hz

2Hz

Fuel Flow

FP data

Performance

data

data

Nav data

FP data

Immediate and delayed data port connections for

deterministic sampling

Input-compute-outputAADL thread semantics

Page 21: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Rate Group Optimization

Logical threads to execute at a specific rate

Multiple logical threads to execute with the same rate

Placement of units with same rate in same operating

system thread

Reduced number of threads and context switches

21Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Reduced number of threads and context switches

Page 22: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Rate Group Order Can Affect Latency

Data flow from sensor Ts to control Tc to actuator Ta with mid-

frame communication

Effect of rate groups: Tc to Ta becomes delayed

Occurs when pairwise immediate connections in opposite

direction

22Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

t0 t50 t100

Ts Ta

Tc

OST 50ms

OST 100ms

Ts Ta

Ts

Ta

OS Thread 50ms

Tc

OS Thread 100ms

Page 23: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Software-Based Latency Contributors

Execution time variation: algorithm, use of cache

Processor speed

Resource contention

Preemption

Legacy & shared variable communication

23Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Legacy & shared variable communication

Rate group optimization

Protocol specific communication delay

Partitioned architecture

Migration of functionality

Fault tolerance strategy

Page 24: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Latency and Age of Data

Latency: the amount of time between a sensor reading and an output to an actuator based on the sensor reading

Age: amount of time that has passed since the sensor reading

Age Contributors

• Oversampling

24Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

• Missing sensor readings

• Failed processing

• Missed deadlines

Page 25: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Outline

Multiple aspects of system validation

System & software engineers working together

Multi-fidelity model-based analysis

Property preserving transformations

Conclusions

25Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Conclusions

Page 26: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Efficient Runtime System Generation

Navigation Sensor

Processing

Integrated Navigation Guidance

Processing

20Hz

10Hz 20Hz

From

Partitions

To

Partitions

Guidance

Nav

sensor

data

Nav signal

data

Nav

dataNav sensor

Periodic I/O

20Hz

Preserve timing semantics of execution

and communication

26Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Processing

Flight PlanProcessing

Aircraft Performance Calculation

5Hz

2Hz

Fuel Flow

FP data

Performance

data

data

Nav data

FP data

Immediate and delayed data port connections for

deterministic sampling

Input-compute-outputAADL thread semantics

Page 27: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Will This Implementation Work?

Navigation Sensor

Processing

Integrated Navigation

20Hz

10Hz

From other Partitions

Periodic I/O

20Hz

To otherPartitionsBuffer

Variable

Pr 1

Pr 2

Pr 3Buffer

VariableBuffer Variable

Buffer

27Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Navigation

Guidance Processing

Flight PlanProcessing

Aircraft Performance Calculation

20Hz

5Hz

2Hz

Pr 4

Pr 6

Pr 9

Buffer Variable

Buffer VariableSimulink: single variable

per connection

Page 28: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Overlapping Message Lifespan

Periodic thread MP and MC

MP ->> MC

Need for double buffering

MP MP

28Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MPi

MCi

MPi+1

MCi-1

Page 29: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Optimization of General Port Buffer Model

MPj

Producer

Send

Xfer

MPk

Consumer/Producer

MCj

Receive Send

Consumer

MCk

Xfer

Receive

29Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MSj MRj

Xfer

MSk MRk

Xfer

MP: producer copy

MS: send copy

MR: receive copy

MC: consumer copy

• Send/receive with or without copy

• Transfer with or without copy

• Processing with or without copy

Page 30: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Message Streaming Lifespan Framework

MSi

MPiProducer task

Send

Xfer

MPi+1

Send buffer MSi+1

TP, Mi+1DP, Mi+1

SMi

XMi

B E

30Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MRi

Xfer

MCi

Receive

Consumer task MCi+1

MRi+1Receive buffer

TC, MiDC, Mi

RMi

XMi

TX

Page 31: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Message Lifespan Properties

MC input-compute-output guarantee

TC, Mi≤ RMi

= BMCi≤ EMCi

≤≤≤≤ TC, Mi+1≤ Rmi+1

Message operation ordering condition

SMi< XMi

< RMi

MP bounded by producer dispatches

31Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MP bounded by producer dispatches

TP, Mi≤ BMPi

≤ EMPi= SMi

≤ TP, Mi+1

MS bounded by sends and transfer

SMi= BMSi

≤ X*Mi

≤ EMSi< SMi+1

MR bounded by transfers and receive

X**Mi

≤ BMRi≤ EMRi

= R***Mi

< XMi+1 * Completion of transfer

** Start of transfer

*** Latest of multiple receivers

Page 32: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Sequential Execution of Periodic Tasks

(τ P ; τ C )*

Collapse to single buffer

MPi MPi+1

32Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MS

MR

MCi

MS

MR

MCi-1

Page 33: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Application-based Send and Receive (ASR)

MP

MR

αP ΩPS&X

TP ≤ αP ≤ S ≤ ΩP ≤ DP

(ττττ P | ττττ C )*

3 buffers

33Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MR

MC

αC ΩCR

αP - ΩP ∩ αC - ΩC ≠ ∅ ⇒ non-deterministic S/R order

TC ≤ αC ≤ R ≤ ΩC≤ DC

α : actual execution start time

Ω : actual completion time

Page 34: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Dispatch-based Send and Receive (DSR)

MP

MR

αP ΩPS&XTP ≤ αP ≤ S ≤ ΩP ≤ DP

DP ≤ R ≤ TC

(ττττ P | ττττ C )*

2 buffersMP

34Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

MR

MC

R

αP - ΩP ∩ DP - TC = ∅ ⇒ deterministic S/R

α : actual execution start time

Ω : actual completion time

MC

Page 35: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Buffer Optimization Considerations

Send and receive execution

• As part of application (ASR)

• As part of task dispatch/completion (DSR)

Task execution order

• Concurrent: τ | τ

Periodic & aperiodic task dispatch

35Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

• Concurrent: τC | τP

• Atomic non-deterministic: τC ≠ τP

• Ordered: τC ; τP or τP ; τC

Message transfer

• Immediate to consumer (IMT)

• Direct to delayed consumer (DMT)

• Period-delayed to consumer (PMT)

Page 36: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Periodic Task Communication Summary

Periodic Same period

ASRIMT | PMT

DSRIMT | PMT

DMT

τP ; τCMF:1B PD:2B

S∨X∨R

PD:2B

R

PD:2B

S∨X/R

MF:1B

τC ; τPPD:1B PD:1B PD:1B PD:1B PD:1B

τ ≠ τ ND:1B PD:2B PD:2B PD:2B ND:1B

36Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

τP ≠ τCND:1B PD:2B

X

PD:2B

R

PD:2B

X/R

ND:1B

τP | τCND:3B

S/XC

RC

PD:2B

X

PD:2B

R

PD:2B

X/R

NDI:2B

S/X/RC

1B: Single buffer

2B: Two buffers

3B: Three buffers

4B: Four buffers

S, X, R : data copy

S/X : IMT combined send/xfer

S/X/R : DMT combined S, X, R

X/R: DSR/PMT combined X, R

o1∨∨∨∨o2 : One operation copy

MF: Mid-Frame

PD: Period Delay

ND: Non-Deterministic

NDI: No Data Integrity

Page 37: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Outline

Multiple aspects of system validation

System & software engineers working together

Multi-fidelity model-based analysis

Property preserving transformations

Conclusions

37Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Conclusions

Page 38: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Predictable Model-based Engineering

Reduce the risks

• Analyze system early and throughout life cycle

• Understand system wide impact

• Validate assumptions across system

Increase the confidence

• Validate models to complement integration testing

38Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

• Validate models to complement integration testing

• Validate model assumptions in operational system

• Evolve system models in increasing fidelity

Reduce the cost

• Fewer system integration problems

• Fewer validation steps through use of validated generators

Page 39: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Software

System

Design

System

Test

Acceptance

Test

Requirements

Engineering

Traditional Development Model

39Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Software

Architectural

Design

Component

Software

Design

Code

Development

Unit

Test

Integration

Test

Page 40: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Software

System

Design

System

Test

Acceptance

Test

Top-Level

Verification Items

High-level

AADL Model

Detailed

Low fidelity

Adequate confidence

High fidelity

Strong confidence

Requirements

Engineering

Virtual System Integration

Benefits of Predictive Architecting

40Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Software

Architectural

Design

Component

Software

Design

Code

Development

Unit

Test

Integration

Test

Detailed

AADL Model

Specify Model-

Code Interfaces

→ generation of test cases

← updating models with actual data

Page 41: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Industrial Embedded Systems Initiatives

SAE AADLStandardNov 2004

Automotive

OSATEToolset

SEIAADL Meta

Avionics

MBE

TOPCASEDOpen Source EmbeddedSystems Tool Framework

28 partners €20+M 2005-2008

ITEA SPICESModel-Driven Embedded

EAST ADLConsortium

AutoSAROpenGroup

Real-Time ForumEU + US partners

COTREAviation Systems

2002-2004

41Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

SEIAADL Meta Model & XMIJune 2006

AADL Error Annex Standard

June 2006

AADL UML Profile Std

2008

Aerospace

Model-Driven Embedded Systems Engineering

15 partners €16M 2006-2009

US AVSI Avionics ConsortiumAnalysis-based System Validation

12+ partners $40+M 2008-2011

EC ASSERTProof-based Satellite

Architectures ESA + 30 partners€15M 2004-2007

IST ARTIST2Embedded SystemsCenter of Excellence

2007-2011

IST ARTISTEmbedded Systems

2001-2006

ESA SatelliteArchitectures

2002-2004

Page 42: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

A Research Transition Platform

MetaHVestal

Honeywell

RMALehoczky

Klein

SimplexDependable

UpgradeSha

QRAMRajkumar

EDCS

INSERT/SimplexSha Lehoczky

Klein Feiler

EDCS

RTQTLehoczkyDASADA

TimeWeaverRajkumar

MoBIES

Sporadic serverRTQTKleinPACC

Dynamic QRAMRajkumar Feiler

DASADA

Predictable CachingIn Embedded SystemsFeiler Hansson DeNiz

AADL LatencyARINC653

Feiler Hansson

QRAM/RMAFeiler

ConfigurationConsistency

Krogh Feiler Li

EDCS

MetaH/AcmeFeiler

AMRDEC

Alloy-basedArchitecture Verification

DeNiz Garlan

SEI SCS

OSATEBinpacker RMA

ARINC653Feiler DeNiz

AlloyVerification

Jackson (MIT)

Model Validation

Resource Management

PartitionedArchitectures

MBE

42Safety-Critical Systems & AADLFeiler, April 2008

© 2008 Carnegie Mellon University

Formalized Execution SemanticsRolland

IRIT

Runtime SystemCode Verification

Verimag/IRIT

ReliabilityFault Tree

Vestal

Honeywell

Honeywell

Runtime SystemGeneration & Verification

AADL/PetriNetENST (Paris)

System Fault ImpactFeiler Sha

SEI UIUCRuntime System

VerificationHybrid Automata

Vestal

Honeywell

Process algebraACSR

Sokolsky (U.Penn)

ReliabilityAnalysis

GSPNLAAS

Reliability ModelingMobiusUIUC

ReliabilityAnalysisMarkov

Embry-Riddle

Sensornet Resources

ANDESStankovic Son

UVA

Fault PropagationFPTC

Wallace (York U.)

Formalized AADL Temporal

SemanticsIRIT (Toulouse)

ResourceScheduling

Singhoff (Brest)

NetworkCalculusVestal

Honeywell

ConfidentialityIn AADL

Feiler HanssonSEI IR&D

WirelessSecurity

ISIS Vanderbilt

Dependability

Security

Slack Stealer In MetaH

Vestal Binns

Honeywell Aging in AsynchronousArchitectures

Vestal Honeywell

SAE AADLStandardNov 2004

OSATEToolset

SEI

AADL Error Annex Standard

June 2006

Runtime SystemGeneration Verification

Page 43: Validation of Safety-Critical Systems with AADL€¦ · Dimensions of System Validation The system Model -based vof System models Validation of models against system 3 Safety-Critical

Peter H Feiler

[email protected]

at ENST until June 9, 2008