Valerie Bunce - Should Transitologists Be Grounded

8/18/2019 Valerie Bunce - Should Transitologists Be Grounded

1/18

Should Transitologists Be Grounded?Author(s): Valerie BunceSource: Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 111-127Published by:Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2501122 .

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2/18

______________ _

COMMENT

Should

Transitologists

Be Grounded?

Valerie

Bunce

The

collapse

of state socialism

in

eastern

Europe'

has led to a

prolif-

eration

of studies

analyzing spects

of

democratization

hroughout

he

region. Central to many of these studies (particularly hose by non-

specialists) s an assumptionthatpostcommunismsbut a variationon

a

larger theme,

that

s,

recent transitions romauthoritarian o dem-

ocratic rule.

In

a recent ssue

of

SlavicReview, hilippe C. Schmitter nd Terry

Lynn Karl provide a spirited defense

of this

assumption by arguing

that democratization

n

eastern

Europe

can and should be

compared

with

democratization

n

southern

Europe

and Latin America.2Their

case

rests on three

points. First, hey

resurrect he

old debate about

comparative nalysis

versus area studies and

argue

in

support

of

the

former

nd

against

the atter.

This

is relevant o the

question

at

hand,

in theirview,because: 1) manyoftheobjections to comparingdemoc-

ratization

n

the east

with

democratization

n

the south are made on

traditional rea studies

grounds;

and

2) transitology,

s a

branch of

comparative politics,

features all the

methodological advantages

of

comparative nquiry.They

then turnto the difference ebate.

Here,

they rgue that,

while there are some differences etween south and

east,

the differences

o not

by any

means rule out a

comparison among

countries

n

Latin

America,

southern

Europe

and eastern

Europe.

Di-

versity

s

welcome, theycontend, especially when,

as

with these

cases,

it

involves

variation around a common and

unifying heme,

that

is,

recenttransitions rom uthoritarian ule.Finally, chmitternd Karl

argue

that

there s much to be learned from

comparing

democratiza-

tion in

Latin

America,

southern and eastern

Europe.

Such

compari-

sons, they contend, help

us define more

clearly

what is

similar

and

This

commentary

s

based

upon

a

larger

study nvestigatingmethodological

ssues in

the

comparative tudy

f democratization. would like to thank the National

Endow-

ment for the

Humanities for support of this

project. would also like to

thankBela

Greskovits orhis

commentson

this

paper.

1. In this

commentary, he term eastern

Europe

will

be used to refer o all

the

postcommunistountries hatduringthecold-war ra made up the SovietUnion and

easternEurope.

2. The

Conceptual

Travels of

Transitologists

nd

Consolidologists:

How Far

to

the East Should They

Attempt o Go? Slavic Review

3, no.

1

(Spring 1994):

173-85.

Their article s a response to criticisms

ot ust by

specialists n easternEurope, but

also

by specialists

n

southern

Europe

and

Latin America.

However, thiscommentary

will

focus primarily n eastern Europe.

Slavic

Review

54,

no.

1

(Spring

1995)


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3/18

112 Slavic

Review

what

s

different

n

recenttransitions

o

democracy,

ensitizeus

to

new

factors nd

new

relationships,

nd allow us to test a wide

range

of

hypotheses.As I shall argue below, theirfirst laim is wrongheaded

and irrelevant

o

the issue at

hand;

the second is

debatable;

and

the

third,while

valid

in

some

respects,

nevertheless

misrepresents

oth

the costs and

the

benefits

of

adding

eastern

Europe

to

comparative

studies of democratization.

Is the

debate

about

Is the debate about

the validity f comparing

1

the validity of

compar-

is

ng democratization,

democratization,

east and south, really a de- east and south, really a

debate between area

bate between area

specialists

and

compara-

e

specialists and compar-

tivists...

I

think not,

since those

who ques- ativists s Schmitter nd

R


4/18

Comment

113

parisons between

the two involve

at best apples and oranges

(which

would place important imits on comparison), and, at

worst, pples

and kangeroos whichwould call the entire enterprise f comparison

into question). Thus, Schmitter nd Karl (and other transitologists)

have a burden of proof. They cannot ustify heircomparisons

of east

and south by simply tating hatthese cases meet certain

definitional

requirements 178) or by arguing that we should compare

first nd

worry bout comparability econd.4

If issues

of

comparabilityre

a

common theme

n

critiquesof tran-

sitology,

hen so are

other

issues that ie at the heart of comparative

inquiry-in particular,problems involvingcase selection,

coding de-

cisions and concept-indicator inkages.For example, in their nvesti-

gations Schmitter nd Karl include-for unspecifiedreasons-some

postcommunist ases and exclude others.

This

is a problem.As every

social

scientist

knows, sample

selection determineswhichhypotheses

can be tested and

the kinds

(as

well as the

quality) of the

conclusions

that

can be drawn.To take another ssue:

on

what

grounds

do Schmit-

ter nd

Karl

distinguish

etween

pacted

versusmass

mobilization ran-

sitions

a

distinction rucial

to

their

nvestigations), iven

the consid-

erable

blurring

etween the two

n

the

eastern

European experience?5

Finally,

f the communists-now

ex-communists-continue to occupy

importantposts

in

eastern

Europe

and

if the

media

in

most of these

countries s stillsubjecttoundue controlbythegovernmentn office,

then

s it

accurate

to

argue,

s Schmitter nd Karl

do,

that hese

regimes

have moved

from

he

transition

eriod

to a

period

of democratic on-

solidation?6

All of

this

suggests,

chmitter nd

Karl to the

contrary,

hat

the

debate about

transitology

s

in

fact

a

debate

among

comparativists

about

comparativemethodology.

o

label

critics

rea

specialists,

hen,

is to

misrepresent

he

concerns

that have

been voiced about

compar-

ative studies

of

democratization,

ast and south.

t

is

also, perhaps

not

accidentally,

o

skirt

responsibility

or

answering

some

tough ques-

tions.

More generally,

one

can observe that it is a familiar rhetorical

technique

to reduce the ssue at hand

to

a choice between

positive

nd

4. This is the thrust f their

discussionof sample selection in Modes of Tran-

sition

in Latin

America, Southern

and Eastern Europe, Internationalocial Science

Journal 28 (May 1991): 269-84.

5. This problem also emerges

n some of the Latin American

cases, where pacts

were

a

consequence

of mass mobilization.My

thanks

to CynthiaMcLintock, Bela

Greskovits

nd

Hector Schamis

for

pointing

this out.

6. This is not to argue that tate socialismis stillfullyntact.Rather t is to argue

that what

we have seen in eastern

Europe

since 1989

is

the

end

of communistparty

hegemony.Whether hat

s

equal

to what has been understood n theory nd practice

as

a transition

o

democracy s, however,quite

another

question. See, forexample,

Lilia Shevtsova, Postkommunisticheskaia

ossiia: Muki

i

lobyshkoi

tiransformatsii,

unpublished ms., nstitute

or

nternationalEconomics and Politics,

Moscow, Septem-

ber 1993; and Gail Kligman

and

Katherine Verdery,

Romania

afterCeausescu: Post-

Communist

Communism?

Eastern

urope

n

Revolution,

d. Ivo Banac (Ithaca: Cornell

University ress, 1992).




5/18

114

Slavic Review

negative tereotypes.

his is

precisely

what

Schmitter nd Karl do by

juxtaposing comparative nalysis

to its

other,

that

s,

area studies. n

theirrendition, omparativists merge

as

the

good gals. They know

whatconstitutesmportant uestionsand thedata necessary o answer

them, hey

trike he

right

balance between

theory

nd

empirics,

nd

they

re

in

the

mainstream

f their ocial

science

disciplines.

Because

transitologys

a branch of

comparativepolitics,moreover, t is inno-

cent

by association,

that

s,

it features ll of the

positive traits

f com-

parative study.By contrast,

hose

who

object

to

transitology

re not

comparativists-by

definition.

nstead, they

are

area scholars. This is

a

category

which combines

a

number of

undesirable characteristics.

n

their iew,

for

example, area specialists ake refuge

n

empirie '(184);

they re allergicto theory; hey nlyknow one case and presume tto

be unique;7 they re isolated

from

their disciplines and clannish in

their behavior (177,

note

6);8

and

they automaticallyprivilege expla-

nations

that

are particularistic,

cultural and

ideational over ex-

planationsthat

are

generic

and structural.

Thus,

one

emerges

from

chmitter nd Karl's account with sense

that ne

can be no

more

for

area studies, against

comparative nd,

thus, against transitology

han be

for, say,crime, polio

and

war,

or

against

fatherhood

nd

apple pie.

In

drawing

sharp

and

value-

laden contrastbetween area studies and comparative

analysis, they

have tried to reduce thequestionat hand to a valence issue.However,

it is

not

a valence

issue.

Some comparative

tudies are

good

and some

are

bad.

Similarly,

work

by

area

specialists

can be

good

or bad.

The

quality

f the

specific study

n

question, then,

and

not the

genus

to

which

t

belongs,

s

what

matters.

It is

also important

o

recognize

that the distinction etween com-

parative

nd area

studies, specially

s

drawn n

sharp

relief

by

Schmit-

ter and

Karl,

s to

a

certainextent false

dichotomy.

n

practice,

om-

parativists

nd

area

specialists

often

work

hand

in hand.

For

example,

comparative

tudies can

only

be as

good

as their data

bases

and

area

specialists bymostdefinitions) re the ones thatprovidemuch of the

7. Schmitter nd

Karl

seem

to have

misunderstoodwhat theircriticsmean when

they laim that tate

socialism

and

post-state ocialism are unique. The argument s

not hateach eastern

European country s unique or thatthese unique characteristics

are derived from,

ay, distinctnational cultures.Ratherthe argument s a structural

one.

The focus s on the

distinctive olitical,

economic and

social characteristics hat

all

of these

countries hare as a

consequence

of state socialism.

8. The use of

the term clan is reminiscent f the

linguisticgames

the

western

imperial powers

played when theydecided in thenineteenth entury o draw a clear

line between the

civilized west-which

had

nations-and backwardAfrica-which

no longerhad nations,but, nstead,had tribes, lans and the ike see PhilipD. Curtin,

The mageofAfrica

Madison: University f WisconsinPress, 1964]). Similarlinguistic

games-which allocate

power,modernity

nd

responsibility-characterizemany

of

the

recent western nalyses

of the

former

Yugoslavia and,

more

generally,

he Balkans

(see

Maria

Todorova,

The Balkans: From

Discovery

to

Invention,

Slavic Review53

[Summer 1994]:

453-82).




6/18

Comment

115

data for comparative

work even forSchmitter nd Karl).9

n addition,

any list

of the most influential heories n the social sciences reveals

that a good number of them were authored by area specialists and

were based

forthe most

part

on extended fieldwork n theirparticular

countries,

f

not counties of

expertise.'0Here,

I

am thinking, or

in-

stance,

of workbyBenedict Anderson,JamesScott and Clifford

eertz,

as

well as

by

Guillermo O'Donnell,

Robert

Putnam and Philippe

Schmitter.11inally,

t is

by

now well established that

among

the

best

studies

n

political

science and

sociology

are those that

combine com-

parative methodology

with area studies

expertise.

ndeed, this is the

strength

f the recentvolumes

on

transitions rom uthoritarian ule,

edited by

Guillermo

O'Donnell,

Philippe

Schmitterand

Laurence

Whitehead. 2

A final oncern have withframing he debate as one

between rea

studies nd

comparative nalysis

s

the tone

adopted by

Schmitter nd

Karl. What

seems to be

implied

n

theirdefenseofcomparative nalysis

in general and transitology

n

particular,

s well as their

attack on

North

American

specialists

n

eastern

Europe,

is

that

eastern

Euro-

pean

studies

is

a

social science backwater

see 177).

That is

why,

n

9. This does not guarantee, however, that generalists will render an accurate

reading of the data. For example, James Fearon's recent formal

analysis explaining

the outbreakofwar n Croatia rests ntirely pon a particularreadingofthe political

beliefs of the Serbian minority

n

Croatia.

This is a

problem on two grounds: first,

such beliefs re extremely

ard

to decipher

in

the absence of survey

ata; second, his

rendition of these beliefs rests entirely

n a minimal and

quite

biased sampling of

journalistic not scholarly)

ccounts of these beliefs. See

his

Ethnic War as a Com-

mitment roblem, presented

t

theAnnualMeetingof theAmericanPolitical Science

Association,2-5 September 1994, New

York.

Moreover,

Schmitter

nd Karl

regularly

miscodeBulgaria

n

their

nvestigations. ee,

for

example,

Modes of

Transition ;

nd

What Kinds of

Democracy

are

Emerging

n Southern and Eastern

Europe,

South

and

Central America? unpublished ms). Finally,by my

calculation

(which

takes the for-

mer

Soviet Union into account

and

recent

developments

n

Bulgaria, Hungary and

Poland, as well as measures of influencewhich are less obvious than formalmember-

ship in a governingcoalition), the ex-communistsmerge as a farmore dominant

politicalforce

n

easternEurope

than Schmitter nd Karl seem to

recognize see

The

Conceptual Travels ).

10. My thanks o Michael Kennedy for making

this

point

in another context.

11. See Benedict Anderson, magined

ommunities

London:

Verso, 1991); James

Scott,Everyday

orms

f

PeasantResistancen Southeast sia

(London:

Frank

Cass, 1986);

CliffordGeertz,

The

nterpretationf

Cultures:

elected ssays New York: Basic Books,

1973); Guillermo O'Donnell,

Modernizationnd Bureaucratic uthoritarianismBerkeley:

University

f California

Press, 1973);

Robert

Putnam, MakingDemocracy

Work: ivic

Traditionsn Modern taly Princeton: Princeton University ress, 1993); Philippe C.

Schmitter,

Still

the

Century

f

Corporatism?

The

Review

f

Politics

6 (January1974).

12. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter nd Laurence Whitehead,

eds.,

Transitions romAuthoritarian ule: Southern

urope Baltimore:Johns Hopkins

University ress, 1986); idem.,

ransitionsromAuthoritarianule: Latin America

Balti-

more:

Johns Hopkins University ress, 1986); idem.,

ransitions

rom

uthoritarianule:

ComparativeerspectivesBaltimore:Johns Hopkins University

ress, 1986);

Guillermo

O'Donnell

and

Philippe

C.

Schmitter, ds.,

Transitions

rom

uthoritarianule: Tentative

Conclusions

boutUncertainemocracies

Baltimore:Johns opkins

University ress,1986).




7/18

116

Slavic

Review

their

view,specialists

n

the

region object

to

transitology nd, ust as

importantly, hy

Schmitter

nd Karl feel it

necessary

to

take on the

burden

of

propagating

the

comparative

message

to the

unconverted

readers of Slavic Review.Their arrogance in thisregardparallels the

attitudes ome

western

conomists have taken

when

holding

forth n

the transition o

capitalism

n

easternEurope.Just s

theyhave advo-

cated designer

capitalism, '

so Schmitter

nd

Karl,

and

other tran-

sitologists,

eem to be

advocating designer

democracy -if

not

de-

signer

ocial science.

4

What Schmitter

nd

Karl do not

seem to know

is thatthe wall separating astern

European studies from

omparative

politics

came down

long

before

the

collapse

of

the wall

separating

easternfrom

western urope15

-and, thus, onsiderablybefore the ar-

rival of democracy, et alone transitology nd consolidology, o the

region.16

Schmitter nd Karl

are

unaware of

thisbecause

they re

new

13.

David

Stark,

A

Sociologist's Perspective:Can Designer Capitalism Work in

Central nd Eastern

Europe?

Transition:

he

Newsletterbout

Reforming

conomies

(May

1992): 1-4.

14.

Is this

response

to

Schmitter nd

Karl

ust

a

matter f turf efense?There is

an elementof truth o their mplied pointthat ome easternEuropean area specialists

are quite resentful f the recentreduced-entry

osts

to claiming expertise n eastern

European studies.

These

feelings sometimes urface,for example, in discussions be-

hind closed doors with rakija on the table. Just s obscurityhad its costs, t appears,

so does notoriety.However, by designer social science I mean something quite

differentnd,

I

think,

ess

contentious.First, mpirical grounding

s

a necessary on-

dition

for

conducting sound research

and

for offering ound advice. Second, social

science

is

not

so

developed

that

t

can

predict

whatwill

happen

in

the

future,

et alone

dictate

what should

happen. Third, postcommunist

ransitions re withouthistorical

precedent yet social science theories are based

in

large measure on historicalprece-

dents.This, plus

their

multiple

nd

interactive

haracter, uggests hatthere are clear

limits

on

the abilityof

social

scientists

o

speak confidently bout these transitions.

Finally,

here s a

certain rony

n the notion

that,having rejected

scientific

ocialism

and thus the

orchestration

of

social, political

and

economic

developments

from

above,

the new

regimes

n the

region

are

now being told by some from he west that

there

s scientific

apitalism

and

scientificdemocracy, nd that they can be im-

posed from bove. This is despite thepurportedvirtuesofregulation through he

hidden hand

in

liberal

orders.

Humility,

n

short,

nd not

arrogance should be the

order of the

day.

15. It is

interesting

o note in this

regard that, rior

to

1989, comparative nalyses

were more common n

the

eastern

European

fieldthan

n, say,

Latin American tudies.

This

is

because of the

homogenizing

effects f

state

socialism

and, thus,

he extentto

which eastern

Europe-far

more than Latin

America-provided

a

natural aboratory

for

comparative tudy.

16.

This was less true for Soviet

studies,

where

single-case nalysis

was more the

norm,

where

comparative

theorieswere not

widely mployed

and where

the

assump-

tion of

studying unique

case

was

more

widespread.

This

seems to have reflected he

confluence

of

several factors: he sheer size and

thus

complexity

f

the former

oviet

Union (which, fter ll, occupied nearlyone fifth f the world's and mass); thediffi-

culties of

procuringdata;

the absence

of a

strong

ocial

science

traditionwithin

the

Soviet Union

(in

contrast

o, say, Poland, Hungary

and the former

Yugoslavia);

and

the academic politics

of

studying super power (which

ed

American studies

in

the

same

direction).

At

the same

time,

ome Soviet

specialists

dentifiedwiththe

country

they

tudied and

thereby

dismissed as irrelevant o their

research

all those littlecol-

onies

to

the westof the Soviet Union.

However,

these

generalizations re less relevant




8/18

Comment

117

to thisfield.Moreover, heir pproach to democratization-which con-

centrates

n

elites and

on

the liberalized present and ignores other

players, rocesses

and

the socialist past-automatically excludes from

theirpurviewmostof the literature n eastern European studies. All

of thistestifies,more generally if we may turn common observation

on its

head),

to the

long

and

unfortunate

solation of

many compara-

tivists rom he rich research traditionof eastern European studies.'7

Thus, by preachingthe comparativemessageto easternEuropean spe-

cialists, chmitter

nd Karl

appear

to be

generals fighting

he

ast war.

Is itaccidental, ne might sk,that he academicbattlethey re waging

happens

to

take place

in

a

bipolar

world?

Much more relevant to the question

of

democratization, ast and

south,is Schmitter nd Karl's response to the difference debate.

Here, theydo an excellent ob of reviewingmany of the differences

between democratization

n

eastern Europe versus southern Europe

and

Latin

America.

They

conclude that these differences o not rule

out

the

incorporation

of

eastern

Europe

into

comparative

studies of

recent democratizationbecause: 1)

the

temporal clustering

of

these

cases argues

for

cross-regional rocesses

at

work,which,

n

turn, ug-

gest

some commonalities across these

regions; 2) comparative study

benefits

rom

variance; 3)

the

differences

etween east

and

south

have

been exaggerated as have the similarities mong the southerncases)

and represent,n fact,variations on a commonprocess of transition

and

consolidation; and,

therefore

) comparison among

these coun-

tries

s

valid and valuable.

I

have

several

responses

to the

first

point.

Let us

accept

for the

moment the

assumption

that democratizations

n

the south and east

occupy roughly

he same

temporal space

and that this

speaks

to the

presence

of

similardynamics

of

change.

If

this s

so,

then

why hould

we

employ pproaches

to the

analysis

of

democratization

such

as

those

offered

y O'Donnell,

Schmitter nd

Whitehead,

s well as

by

Schmit-

ter and

Karl)

that

gnore

he

very xplanatory

factors

hat

would seem

to follow ogicallyfrom heseassumptions?Here, I refer o both inter-

national

and

economic variables

that would

appear

to

operate

in vir-

tually

all

these

cases-for

example,

the

development

from

the

early

to contemporary cholarshipon Russia

and

the successor states.

Comparative studies,

expressed either

s

comparison

of cases or utilizationof

comparative

heoryn single-

case analysis, re now becoming

the norm in

post-Soviet

tudies.

17.

This isolation was

expressed

in

many ways-some

of which were imperial.

Witness,

for

example,

the

pervasive

practice during

the cold-war

period

of western

European specialists using the term Europe in the titlesof their books, articles,

courses and even institutes,when

the

focus

in

virtually

very case was only

on

the

westernhalf

of

Europe.

To take another

example:

it has been common

practice

for

courses surveying omparative

politicstobe not ust Euro-centricwhich s enough of

a problem) but also western

Euro-centric. his reflected he widespread assumptions

withinthe discipline

of

political

science that:1)

the

onlyEurope that counted was

western urope

and

2)

westernEuropeanistswere more scientific nd more compar-

ative

n

their nalysesthan theircounterparts

n

other area studies.




9/18

118 SlavicReview

1970s onward of international

norms supporting human rights and

democracy,'8 he destabilizing

onsequences

of

the global debt crisis

and structuraldjustment olicies,'9 nd thepolitical fallout rom ong-

term pursuit

n

the second and

third worlds of import substitution

policies. What

I

am

suggesting,

hen,

s that

there

is

a contradiction

between he

rationale

of-

What

I

am

suggesting, then, is that there is a

fered for comparing de-

mocratization,

ast and

contradiction between the rationale offered south, and the ap-

for

comparing democratization,

east and

proaches transitologists

take when carrying ut

south, and the approaches transitologists theirstudies.

take when carrying out their studies. Second, did these

_ ____

transitions actually oc-

cur at

roughly

he same

time and thus

in

roughly

the

same context? t is

true

that

they are

closer

in

time to each other

than, say,

democratization

fter

Franco

and democratization

n

Great

Britain.

However,

t

is

also

true

that a

few

years

can make

a

big

difference

n

the

causes

and context of de-

mocratization. et

us take the

examples

of

Spain

and

Hungary,

two

countries

which

hare some similarities

n

the mode

of

transition.

he

transition

n

Spain

occurred

n

a

stable,bipolar

international nviron-

ment and Spain reaped enormous benefitsfrom this (as well as its

geographical ocation).

In

particular,

he

new

regime

had massive n-

fusions of

international conomic

aid,

which allowed

Spain

to

delay

by

ten

years painful

economic

reforms.

Moreover,Spain

was

assured

of

eventual

entry

nto the

European Community

nd

NATO;

the

only

question

was whether

Spanish political

leaders and

Spanish publics

would

support

uch actions.

By

contrast,Hungary

has

received

far

ess

international

conomic

support

and has

had

to deal

immediately

with

destabilizing

conomic reforms.

n

addition,

the end of the cold

war,

the Warsaw

Pact and

Comecon

have

created

for

Hungary (and

its

neighbors)a veryuncertain international nvironment. olutions to

this

problem,moreover,

re slow

n

coming,given

the

many

difficulties

involved

today

n

expandingmembership

f

NATO and the

European

Union

to include

Hungary

and other

members

of the former ocialist

world.

What

am

suggesting,

hen,

s that the decade or so

separating

these two transitionsmade

a

significant

ifference n their interna-

tional contexts.These

differences,moreover,

had

direct

domestic re-

percussions, creating very

different

rocesses

of

democratization

n

Spain

and

Hungary.

18.

See Dan

Thomas,

Norms,

Politicsand Human

Rights:

The Helsinki Process

and the

Decline

of

Communism

n Eastern

Europe,

Ph.D. dissertation

n

progress,

Cornell

University.

19. For an insightfulnalysis

of how international conomic pressures

prefigured

the outbreak

of war in the former ugoslavia,see Susan

L. Woodward,

Balkan Tragedy:

Chaos

nd Dissolution

fter

he

Cold War Washington:

Brookings nstitution,

995).




10/18

Comment

119

Schmitter

nd Karl's second point

is more compelling.They

are

quite

right n arguing

that

variety

s the

spice

of

comparative

nquiry.

Withoutvariation,we cannot develop robust concepts, identifykey

explanatory

actors r construct ood explanations.

However,there s

a catch.

Meaningfulcomparative

study requires that

differences

e

joined with

similarities; therwise,

oo much is

in

motion

to tracere-

lationships nd to

draw meaningful onclusions.

Moreover,

we can no

longer assume

in such circumstances hatwhat

we are analyzing

n one

context

s the same as

what we are

analyzing

n

another.The keyques-

tion,

then,

s whetherthe differences

onstitute ariations

on

a com-

mon

process-that

is,

transitions

rom

dictatorship

o

democracy-or

altogetherdifferent rocesses-that is, democratizationversuswhat

could

be termed

postcommunism.

chmitter

nd

Karl

take

the first

position

and their

critics he second.

It

is not

easy

to reach

a decision on thismatter. ocial

science acks

the

sophistication

needed

to

distinguish

etween differences

n

degree

and differences

n

kind. One

analyst's

democratization s another's

postcommunism-and

a third

might question

whetherpostcommu-

nism is so post.

How-

ever,

what can be

con-

However,

what

can be concluded is

that the

cluded

is

that the

differences between differencesbetween postcommunism and the

postcommunism

and

transitions

in the south

arefar more

substan-

the transitions

in

the

south are

far

more

sub-

tial than Schmitter and Karl's

discussion

stantial

than Schmitter

seems to

imply.

and Karl's

discussion

seemso mply.

etme

..,., .....

.

.

...

R R ..

.

...R

highlight

ust the most important

of them.

First is the nature

of authoritarian rule. What distinguished

state

socialism

from bureaucratic authoritarianism

and other

forms of

dic-

tatorship in Latin America and southern Europe were its social struc-

ture, its ideology

and ideological

spectrum, its political economy,

its

configuration

of

political

and

economnic

elites, its pattern

of civil-mil-

itary relations

and its position in the international

hierarchy of

power

and privilege.

Thus, state socialism

was different

long virtually

every

dimension

that economists, sociologists and

political scientists

recog-

nize as important.20 f we reach

furtherback in time, we find

two

more

important contrasts:

long-established states

in southern Europe

and

Latin America

versus ever-changing

states in eastern Europe,

and

a

20.

This

was

even

truefor

deviant

Yugoslavia.

See,

for

example,

Vesna Pusic,

Dictatorships

with

Democratic

Legitimacy:

Democracy

Versus

Nation,

East

European

Politics

nd Societies

(Fall

1994):

383-401.

Contrary

o Schmitter

nd

Karl,

the

dis-

tinctions

etween

state

socialism

and

other

forms

f

dictatorship

id not

wither

way

when

state

ocialism

softened

see,

for nstance,

Maria

Csanadi,

From

Where

o

Where?

The

Party-State

nd

the

Transformation

Budapest:

T-Twins

and

Institute

of

Economics,

Hungarian

Academy

of Sciences,

1995]).




11/18

120

Slavic Review

historical radition

f

democracy

n Latin America and southernEu-

rope

versus he absence

(save

for

Czechoslovakia)

of

any

suchtradition

in the east. Nor can we assume-as is thetendencyofmanytransitol-

ogists-that

these factors re ancient

history

nsofar as democrati-

zation

is

concerned.2' t

is not

ust

that

they

structure he

agenda

of

transition,

he interests nd

resources of

major

actors

and, thus,

the

balance

of forces

upporting

nd

opposing democratization,

he

tran-

sition

to

capitalism

nd the ike. t

is also that he

boundary eparating

the

authoritarian

past

from the liberalized

present

is

a

very porous

one

in eastern

Europe.

There are

also

significantifferences

n

the mode of transition. or

instance, there

is no

equivalent

in the southern cases either to the

diffusion rocesseswe saw in eastern Europe in 1989 or thus to the

role

of

international actors

n

ending the CommunistParty'spolitical

monopoly.22

It

is

crucial as well to

understand the end of state socialism

as a process

of national

liberation-whether that was

a

consequence

of

the

end of the Soviet bloc or the end of an internal

mpire as

with

the federal tates

of

the

Soviet

Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).

In this

sense, state,

nation and

identity

were-and are-at

the very

center

of

these

processes

of

change

in

easternEurope.

Another

differences

in

the

nternational ontextof transition. o

summarize

n earlier

point:

the eastern

European

transitions

re

tak-

ing place in an international ystemwhich s itself n transition.What

needs

to

be added

to this s

the verydifferent conomic and strategic

position

n

the

nternational

ystem

f

eastern

Europe versus outhern

Europe and Latin America.

At

the time

of

transition, asternEuropean

countries were

not

full members

by any

means

of

the

international

capitalist conomy,

nd

they

were

not

allied

in

any institutional

ense

withthe west.

The

most

striking ontrast,

nd the

one thatbears most

directly

n

the

question

of

democracy,

s in

the transitional

genda.

In

southern

Europe

and Latin

America,

the ssue was democratization; hat is, a

change in political regime.23ndeed, the circumscribed haracter of

21. See, especially, Csanadi,

From

Where

o

Where.

he

key

article

giving

rise

to

the proto-science

f

transitologyaside from

arlier

worksby Machiavelli, ccording

to Schmitter nd Karl) emphasized

the

importance

of historicalontextn

the process

of democratization.

ee

Dankwart Rustow, Transitions to Democracy, Comparative

Politics2 (1970): 337-63. However, transitologists uch as Schmitter nd Karl have

tended

to delete the

adjective

historical fromthis

argument

nd

concentrated,

s a

result, imply n current ontext.

22. This is not to reduce the events of 1989 to the Gorbachev effect. ather t

is to argue that the Gorbachev reformswere a necessarybut not sufficientondition

forthe

end

of state ocialism

n eastern

Europe.

For

an explanation-before the fact-

of both the Gorbachev reforms nd the

collapse

of

state socialism

in

eastern Europe,

see Valerie Bunce, The EmpireStrikesBack: The Evolution of the EasternBloc From

a Soviet

Asset

to

a

Soviet Liability,

nternational

rganization9 (Winter 1984/1985):

1-46.

23.

See, especially,

Robert

Fishman, Rethinking

State and

Regime:

Southern

Europe's

Transition to

Democracy, World olitics 2 (April 1990): 422-40.




12/18

Comment

121

political change

in

southernEurope

and

Latin America is one reason

why

tudents f

comparative

democratization ould reduce democratic

transitions

o a

process involving nteractions mong a handfulof po-

litical elites. By contrast,what s at stake n eastern Europe is nothing

less

than the

creation of the

verybuilding

blocks of

the

social

order.

What

is

open

for

negotiation

s not

ust

the character of the

regime

but

also the

very

nature of the state

itself,24

ot

ust citizenshipbut

also

identity,

ot

ust

economic liberalizationbut also the foundations

of

a

capitalist conomy.25

What

is

also at stake s not

ust amendment

of the

existing

class structure ut the creation of a new class

system;

not ust a shift

n

the balance

of

interests, herefore, ut something

much more fundamental:

he

very reation of

a

range

of

new interests.

Finally,what s involved n the easternEuropean transitions s not ust

modification f

the

state's

foreignpolicies,

but also a

profound

redefi-

nition of the role of the state n

the international ystem.

We

can draw two conclusions from hisbrief

ummary. irst,

f

we

are interested

n

balancing

similarities

nd

differences,

nd in

main-

taining t the same

time a

reasonable numberofcases,thenwe would

not

engage

in

comparisons

between east and south.

Rather,

we would

compare

all or some

of

the

27

eastern

European

cases with ach other.

Second,

we

must be

very

cautious when

comparing democratization,

east and south: at

best,

such

comparisons

would

produce

a limited

rangeofbenefits; t worst,we could be placingourselves n the unen-

viable and unviable

position

of

sampling simultaneously

n the

inde-

pendent

and

dependent

variables.

This

leads

us to

Schmitter

nd Karl's final set

of

arguments.

What

do we

gain

when we

compare democratization,

ast and

south? agree

with them

that such

comparisons

can enrich our

understanding

of

democracy.

n

particular, hey

emind us

of the

sheer

diversity

f

ways

young

democracies

come into

being

and

evolve,

and

theyhelp

us de-

fine the essential characteristics

f

democratizationby alertingus to

24.

The

centrality

f

state

building

in

postcommunism

eflects ot

ust

the inex-

tricability

f

state

and

regime

n

state socialism and thus the

powerful ffects

n

the

stateof the end of communist

artyhegemony,

ut also twoother

factors: he presence

in the region of so many new or newly iberatedstatesand the necessarilypowerful

consequences for the stateof a transition o

capitalism. On

the latter

point,

see Ivo

Bicanic, The Economic Causes

of

New State Formation

during Transition,

East Eu-

ropean olitics nd Societies (Winter

1995): 2-21.

25. It is true thateconomic-liberalization nd

structural-adjustmentolicies play

an important ole

in

the process of

democratization, outh

as well

as east. However,

one cannot very asilyequate economic reform n Latin

America and southern urope

with conomic transformationn theeast. This is, first, ecause the issue in the south

is amending capitalist conomy

lready

n

place, whereasthe ssue in the east though

Hungaryprovidesa valuable middle

case)

is

construction f

a

capitalist conomywith

state socialism-its virtual

opposite-serving

as

the

point

of

departure.

There

are,

moreover, therkeyeconomic

differences, ll of

which

place unusual economic bur-

dens

on

easternEurope-for example,thecollapse of theSoviet market, he primitive

character f eastern

European economies and the difficultiesmposed bytheprocess

ofbuildingnew national economies in so

many cases.




13/18

122

SlavicReview

differences,

as

well as

to similarities, among

democratic

orders.

Such

comparisons

also reveal

a number of factors

that were missing

from

prevailing theories of democratization.26

All of these

benefits

flowquite

naturally

from a comparative

project that is

rich in cases

and rich

in

diversity.

What Schmit-

What Schmitter

and Karl do

not

mention,

|ter and

Karl

do not

mention,

however,

is

a

however,

is

a

final

advantage

to such

cross- final advantage

to such

regional

comparisons. hey

can providea

RR2

cross-regional

compari-

sons.

They can provide

powerful

critique

of

prevailing

understand-

a

powerful

critique

of

ings

of democratization.

prevailing

understand-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

ings of democratization.

They may

not

simply

re-

fine the

common wisdom, they

may overturn

it.27

When

one

looks more

closely

at

transitology

from the vantage

point

of eastern Europe,

one is struck,

first, y the

fact that this is

a literature

rich

in

description

but relatively poor

in

testable

hypotheses.

An ex-

ample

of this

is constitutional design-an

issue of great

importance to

many

transitologists.28

How can we test

the relative

benefits

of parlia-

mentary

versus

presidential systems

if most

of the

systems in eastern

Europe

are

in fact a combination

of

both,

that

is,

a variation on

the

French FifthRepublic model? Moreover, how can we evaluate whether

constitutional design

matters

if

we

have no measure

of

impact

that

differentiates among

recent cases of democratization and if the

pur-

ported

consequences

of

constitutional

developments

could also

be

judged

to

be its causes?

For

instance,

is it correct

to

argue

that

Hun-

garian

democracy

is more

secure than

Russian

democracy

because

Hungary

opted

for

a

parliamentary

system

and Russia

did

not,

and

because

the rules

of the

political game

were formalized

more

clearly

and

earlier

in

Hungary

than in

Russia?29

Or does it make more

sense

26.

This is

evident,

for

instance,

n

some recent reflections n

democratization

by

transitologistssee,

for

instance,Guillermo

O'Donnell,

On the

State,

Democrati-

zation and

Some Conceptual Problems

[A

Latin American

View withGlances at Some

Post-Communist ountries], World evelopment1

[1993]: 1355-69; idem.,Delegative

Democracy? WorkingPaper No. 172, Helen

Kellogg nstitute f nternational tudies,

Notre

Dame,

March

1992;

Philippe Schmitter,

Dangers

and

Dilemmas of

Democracy,

Journalof Democracy

5

[April

1994]: 57-74).

27. Mythanksto theremarksmade by Gail

Lapidus,

Shari

Cohen,

Carol

Timko,

Karen Dawisha, David Ost,

Jan

Kubik and

Georgii

Derlugian at the panel, Shooting

Cannons

at the Canons at

the Annual

Meeting

of the

American Association for

the

Advancement f Slavic

Studies,

18

November 1994, Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania.

28. See, for example,JuanLinz, The Perils ofPresidentialism, ournal fDemoc-

racy

1

(Winter 1990):

51-69; Arend Lijphart,

Democratization and Constitutional

Choices

in

Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary,

and

Poland, 1989-1991

in

FlyingBlind, ed.

Gyorgy

zoboszlai

(Budapest:

Yearbook

of

the

Hungarian

Political

Science Associa-

tion,

1992): 99-113;

Alfred

tepan

and

CindySkach, Constitutional rameworks nd

Democratic Consolidation:

Parliamentarism ersusPresidentialism,

World olitics 6

(October 1993): 1-22.

29. If the latterfactorwere so

important,

hen how do we

explain,

for

nstance,

the

developmental trajectories f, say, Bulgaria

and Romania

(with

their

early

settle-




14/18

Comment

123

to argue

that the

problems surrounding

the

transition

in

Russia are

far greater than in Hungary and that it is this fact that has produced

both different

onstitutional

trajectories

and differences as well in the

seeming prospects for democratic consolidation?

A second problem is that what is offered in transitions literature

is not,

in

fact,

a

theory

of

democratization-a

series of

if, then claims

that can be tested-but rather

an

approach

to the

analysis

of democ-

ratization-that is,

a

statement about what should be

analyzed

and how.

All that this literature

gives

us is advice: we should look at

strategic

interactions among elites

and

treat democratization as a highly contin-

gent process that is fraughtwith considerable uncertainty. What it does

not give us

is

any explanation

of

why

some

authoritarian states

de-

mocratize and others do not, whythe process of democratization varies

across

cases,

or

why

some democracies take root and others do

not.

Since this

literature is a series of claims about how we

should

ap-

proach the study of democratization, can we then argue at least that

the approach offered

is

a sound one? Let me suggest one answer to

this

question by expanding

on a

point already

mentioned:

the

addition

of new variables

to the

equation. By oining

eastern

Europe

with south-

ern

Europe

and Latin

America,

we discover

a

number

of

crucial factors

that are

missing

in

the recent theories

of

transitologists-in particular,

the interaction between economic

and

political transformation,

the

importance of the media in the process of democratization, the pow-

erful

influence

of international

factors,

the

key

role of mass

publics

in

transitions

(as

well as

in

consolidation),30

the

centrality

of national

identity and nationalism

in

the process

of

democratization,

the im-

portance

of the left

as

well

as the

right

n

shaping

democratic

prospects

and, finally,

all those

thorny

issues

having

to do with

the

state,

its

boundaries,

its

strength

and its

place

within the international order.

This

is

a long list

of

missing variables,

which

focuses

our attention on

this

question:

at what

point

can

we

no

longer

tack

on

these factors to

the

prevailing approach

to the

study

of

democratization

and

should

we decide instead, given the desire forparsimony and the considerable

implications

these additions hold for our

very conception

of democ-

ratization, that

a

completely differentapproach

to

the study of dem-

ocratic transitions

is

required?

We

can

also

judge

the

soundness of the

prevailing approach by

concentrating

on what

it

includes rather

than on

what it lacks. Central

to the

approach

of

Schmitter, Karl,

O'Donnell

and their associates is

the

assertion

that elites are central and

publics peripheral. Thus,

tran-

sitions to

democracy

are understood

to

be elite

affairs and

the more

ment of

constitutionalssues)

versusPoland and

the Czech Republic

(given

their on-

tinuingproblems

with resolution of the

rules

of

the

politicalgame)?

30. See,

for

example,

Daniel V.

Friedheim,

Bringing SocietyBack

into Demo-

craticTransition

Theory:

Pact

Making

and

Regime

Collapse,

East

European olitics nd

Societies

(Fall

1993):

482-512;

and

SidneyTarrow, Social Movements

nd

Democratic

Development,

forthcoming

n

The Politics

f

Democratic

onsolidation,ol. 1, Richard

Gunther,

Nikiforos

Diamandous and

Hans-Jurgen

uhle,

eds.




15/18

124 Slavic Review

elitist, ransitologistsrgue,

the better.

However,

when we add eastern

Europe

to the

equation,

we

begin

to wonder about this

mphasis since:

1) publicswere mportant ctors

n

ending communist artyhegemony

in manyof these cases; 2) bargaining mong elites s-especially before

the fact-a very hard process to trace; 3) it is very difficult-again,

especially

before the fact-to determine elite interests

nd

elite re-

sources

and

4) pacted

versusmass mobilizationmodes of transition o

not explain patterns

of

success

in

democratic consolidation

in

the

postcommunist

world.

More

generally,

ne has

to wonder

whether,

n

focusing

o

heavily

on the machinationsof

elites, transitologists

ave

not committed he very ransgression heyhave lamented n the work

of area scholars: thepreferencefor a particularisticnd voluntaristic

understandingof social realityover one which is more general and

structural.

Just as elites and their interactions re central to the

approach

developed by Schmitter,

arl and

their ssociates,so are the

core

con-

cepts of democratictransition, emocratic consolidation and, finally,

uncertainty.

n

each of

these,

once we

add

eastern

Europe

to

the cal-

culus we find

a

number

of

problems.

Transition

implies change

that

is circumscribed

nd

directional,

n these

discussions,either towards

or

away from

democratic

governance.

The

first

spect

does not

fit

he

inherently evolutionary ature

of

postcommunism

nd

the second

leads to a misrepresentation f eastern European developments by

forcing

s:

1)

to

draw

too

sharp

a distinction etween

the

authoritarian

past

and

the

transitional

present, 2)

to

privilege

the democratic di-

mension over

all

other dimensions of

change, 3)

to

assume

that

polit-

ical

change

is

separate from, ay,

economic and social

change and 4)

to code any

and all

major developments

s factors

necessarily ffecting

movement

o or

away

from

democracy.31

onsolidation is also

a

prob-

lematic

concept. First,

t is

unclear

what consolidation means

in

an

empirical sense,

aside from

vague

notion that

consolidated de-

mocracies are those

that,following ransition,

eem to

promise lon-

gevity.s democraticconsolidation, then, ust a matterof time? How

do we factor n

capacity

to withstand rises? s

it the absence of dem-

ocratic collapse or the presence of certainfeatures, uch as a demo-

cratic

political

culture?32 oes consolidation entail

political stability

and,

if

so,

what does this mean? Is

it

the absence

of such factors s

significant nti-system rotest,

the

government's oss of its coercive

31. Symptomatic

f the

pervasiveness

f

these assumptions

has

been the tendency

of

scholars primarily n the Op-Ed page

of

TheNew York imes) o pronounce either

that Russia has turned the corner on democracyor that democracy is finished n

Russia.

32. A survey f longstandingdemocracies would seem to suggest hat: 1) there s

great variety n what constitutes democratic political culture; 2) it is very hard to

distinguish etween durable beliefs,values and behaviors and more short-termtti-

tudes and the like; 3) some democracies featureby some standards a less than dem-

ocraticallyminded public; and 4)

the

key

to

democracy mightbe mass culture but it

also

might e elite political culture. ee, forexample, Putnam,Making emocracy ork.




16/18

Comment 125

monopoly and sharp

divisions

among citizens and among political

leaders, or is

it

the presence of such factors

as

relatively durable gov-

erning coalitions

and

widespread public support

for

the institutions

and procedures

of

democracy? There is

a

final problem. If democracy

is a process, not

a

result,

and

if the democratic project can never be

completed,

then

how can

we understand the

term

consolidation

with

its

implication

of

democracy

as

an

end state?

The final member of the conceptual triumvirate in transitions lit-

erature

is

uncertainty. Here, again,

we encounter

a

certain

dissonance

between

concept

and

reality.

On the one

hand, transitologists

have

made a

great

deal of the

urfcertainties

surrounding

democratization.

Indeed,

this is the foundation for

much of

the

theorizing about tran-

sitions from authoritarian rule. On the other hand, we see a clear

pattern

in

the many

new democracies

that have

come

into

being

since

the 1970s:

an

extremely high

survival

rate. If

the democratic

enterprise

is so fraught

with

difficulties,

s

transitologists repeatedly assert,33 hen

how do we explain this?

It is not a

sufficientresponse

to

argue either

that

these new

democracies are still in the throes of consolidation

or

to presume

that the

durability

of new democracies

speaks

in

effect to

a

global bounty

of

heroic

princes.

Rather

the

response

should be to

question

whether

democracy (today

at

least) might

be

easier

than

many

have thought-or,

at

least,

whether the

imposition

of

authoritarian rule

mightbe more difficult han many seemed to have assumed.34

All

of these examples suggest

that

the

addition of eastern

Europe

to

comparative

studies of democratization

has one major

benefit,

aside

from those outlined by Schmitter

and Karl.

It

introduces serious

ques-

tions about the

reigning paradigm

of democratization.

This

leads us

to the

final

point

of

this

commentary.

If

Schmitter

and Karl

have been

in

some respects

too conservative in

estimating

the value of

comparing

east and south

(particularly

when

it

involves

samokritika ),

hen

they

have been

in other

respects

too liberal in their assessment of what can

be learned

from such

comparisons.

It

is here

that

we must switch our

discussion from the benefits of diversityto its costs.

The

striking

contrasts between transitions

to

democracy

in

the

south

and

postcommunism

in

the east

suggest

that certain kinds

of

comparative

exercises

are

highly suspect. First,

there is a

danger

in

presuming

fundamental

similarities when the similarities

posited

are

in

fact

superficial

and

highly misleading.

Ethnic

diversity

is a case in

point.

To

equate Peruvian, Spanish

and

Portuguese

ethnic

diversity

with

that of

the former

Yugoslavia

and the

former Soviet Union

(or

even

contemporary Russia,

for that

matter)

is to skim

over

a

number

33. See, especially, Philippe

C.

Schmitter, Dangers

and Dilemmas of Democ-

racy, ournal

fDemocracy (April 1994): 57-74.

34.

See,

especially,Guiseppe

Di Palma, Democratic Transitions:

Puzzles and Sur-

prises fromWest to East, Research

n Democracy

nd Society (New York: JAI Press,

1993): 27-50; Nancy Bermeo,

Democracy and the

Lessons of Dictatorship, Compar-

ative

Politics 4

(April 1992): 273-91.




17/18

126

Slavic

Review

of

distinctive features of

ethno-politics in eastern

Europe. Here, I refer,

for

instance, to the sheer

magnitude of diversity n the region

and its

correlation with

religious, political,

socio-economic and spatial mark-

ers; the powerful historical meanings attached to ethnicity,nation, re-

ligion and state; the

role played by state socialist

regimes in

developing

national

consciousness, as well as national elites,

national institutions

and

proto-states within states; the

central place

of ethnicity,national

identity and

national

movements in ending the communist

experi-

ment;

the role of

ethnicity

in

not

just

the

process of nation

and state

building

and

democratization, but

also in the transition to

capitalism;

the powerful impact of ethnicity on

definitions

and practices of citi-

zenship;

and

the

ways

in

which

ethnicity

n

eastern

Europe affectsnot

just domestic politics and economics, but also interstate relations

throughout

the

region. To be succinct: there is a

formerYugoslavia, a

former Czechoslovakia and a

former Soviet

Union, and there

could be

as well

in

the

future

a

former Russia. There is,

however, no

former

Peru

or

former

Spain.

Another danger

is to

transplant

onto eastern

European

soil

argu-

ments

developed

in

response

to the

very

differentconditions

existing

in Latin America and southern

Europe. Take,

for

instance,

the

argu-

ment

developed

in

the southern context that

publics

are

demobilized

during

transitions to

democracy

and that

this

contributes

in

positive

ways to the democratization process. This argument makes little sense

in

eastern Europe,

if

only

because of the

pronounced

role of

average

citizens as well as intellectuals

in

many

of these transitions.

Moreover,

an

argument

can

be

made

for

the

eastern

European

case,

at

least,

that

mobilized

publics

may very

well

be

assets,

not liabilities

in

the

process

of democratization.

They may

exert

needed

pressures

on elites to ad-

here to the democratic

rules of the

game

and

they may provide

the

necessary political

capital

for the transition to

capitalism.35

This

leaves us

with a

final

problem.

If

such

differentcontexts call

into

question

the transfer

of

concepts

and

arguments

from south to

east, then theymost assuredly challenge the validity ofusing the south-

ern

experience

to

predict evelopments

in

eastern

Europe.

For

instance,

Guillermo

O'Donnell,

as well as

Philippe

Schmitter

and

Terry

Karl,

have voiced

considerable

pessimism

about the future of

democracy

in

eastern

Europe.

In

particular,

they

have

argued

that

many

of the de-

mocracies

in the

region

are

incomplete

and

superficial,

that these new

democracies will take

a

long

time

to consolidate

and

that there are

grounds

for

expecting

at least

some

to

revert

back

to

authoritarian

rule.36

There are

ample reasons,

of

course,

to

wonder about democ-

35. See Valerie

Bunce,

Sequencing

Economic

and Political

Reforms,

ast-Central

European conomiesn

Transition

Washington: oint

Economic

Committee, 994);

Bela

Greskovits,Is the

East

Becoming theSouth?Where

May Threats to Reforms

Come

From?

paper

presented at

the XVI World

Congress of the

International

Political

Science

Association,

Berlin, 12-15 August

1994.

36. See Guillermo

O'Donnell,

On the

State ;

Schmitter

nd

Karl,

The

Concep-

tual Travels ;

Schmitter,

Dangers

and

Dilemmas ;

Schmitter nd Karl,

Modes of

Transition .




18/18

Comment 127

racy's future in eastern Europe. However, one must ask whether tran-

sitologists

are

engaged

in

a

careful

reading

of

trends

in

eastern Europe,

or whether their pessimistic conclusions

are an

artifactproduced by

measuring the east against the southern standard. Does eastern Europe

have a problem with democracy

or

is

it

simply that eastern Europe is

not Latin America or southern

Europe?37

Thus, my arguments are four: first, he debate over comparisons

between east

and

south cannot

be

reduced to

the

old debate between

area studies

and

comparative analysis. Second, Schmitter

and Karl are

wrong

when

they portray comparative

and area

studies

as

polar op-

posites. Third,

there

are

substantial differences between the east and

the south, and this creates far more problems for comparing the two

than Schmitter

and Karl

recognize. Finally,

there are

nonetheless

some

good reasons

to

engage

in such

comparisons.

The

most important rea-

son, however,

is not addressed

by

Schmitter and Karl:

the

ways

in

which

the addition of eastern Europe to comparative studies of democrati-

zation

alerts

us to fundamental

problems

in

how

transitologists

have

understood

and

analyzed

transitions from authoritarian rule-in the

east

and,

one

could

argue,

in

the

south

as

well.

37. To this must

be added one more point. A major problem

in theories of

democracy of older,as well as of more recentvintage) s that theyunder-predict he

incidence of

democraticgovernment.There are in effect oo many

democracies,

whether

ur theoretical erspective

s that

of,say,Seymour

Martin

Lipset;

Barrington

Moore;

Dietrich

Rueschemeyer, velyne Stephens

and

John Stephens;

or

Guillermo

O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitter

nd

Laurence

Whitehead. This suggests hat: 1) our

theories

of

democracy may be over-specified, ) there may

be

no single

path to a

democraticorder, 3) democratizationmay

be best understood in highly

voluntaristic

terms nd/or4) democracy may

not

be as difficult

project

as

has

been commonly

assumed.

Valerie Bunce - Should Transitologists Be Grounded

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