UUSNSW MINING ENGINEERING FACULTY€¦ · MASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCH The Upper...
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UNSWUNSWU SU SMINING ENGINEERING FACULTYMINING ENGINEERING FACULTY
PRESENTATIONPRESENTATIONPRESENTATIONPRESENTATION
MINING INDUSTRYMINING INDUSTRYMINING INDUSTRY MINING INDUSTRY BLINDNESS TO CATASTROPHIC RISKBLINDNESS TO CATASTROPHIC RISK
PEOPLE SAFETY Vs SYSTEMS SAFETY PEOPLE SAFETY Vs SYSTEMS SAFETY ©©
D i H ftDamien HawcroftOctober 2012
WELCOME TO COUNTRYWELCOME TO COUNTRYWELCOME TO COUNTRY WELCOME TO COUNTRY
MY STORYMY STORY
LLASTAST 20 YEARS20 YEARSLLAST AST 20 YEARS20 YEARSCarrying out Critical Risk Reviews since 1992
Critical Risk Reviews focused on property damage & business interruption
Company reviews over 170 mining, processing and port operations around the world, annually
S / C / C / /Sites include Australia / China / Canada / Europe / Indonesia / Mongolia / Namibia / South Africa / South America / USA / Other
All reviewers have extensive mining operational experience
MYMY STORY’S FINDINGSSTORY’S FINDINGSMY MY STORY S FINDINGSSTORY S FINDINGSThe word “boredom” should not be part of any vocabulary
Focus on the good bits of life
If you want to feel good do goodIf you want to feel good, do good
Seeking advice enables you to see things more clearly & rationally
Hope for positive outcomes and actively work towards them
Show compassion to workers at the “coal face”Show compassion to workers at the coal face
Humility is a strength
Ego is a weakness
RECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTS2008 - AUSTRALIA - Queensland mine floods > $2 B
2009 - AUSTRALIA - Olympic Dam shaft failure > $200 M
2009 - AUSTRALIA - Curragh dragline boom failure - $25 M
2009 – USA - Massey washery fire - $75 M
2010 – USA - Upper Big Branch – 29 Fatalities
2010 – NZ - Pike River – 29 Fatalities
2011 - AUSTRALIA - Queensland mine floods > $ 2 B (+)2011 AUSTRALIA Queensland mine floods > $ 2 B (+)
2011 – AUSTRALIA - Ulan mine water inrush ~ $68 M
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RECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTSRECENT MINING INCIDENTS2011 – AUSTRALIA - South Blakefield fire - $300 M (?)(?)
2011 – AUSTRALIA - Loy Yang conveyor / drive fire -$27 M
2011 – AUSTRALIA - derailment damage to 4km of rail. Cost 6 to 9 days at $30M / day, i.e. ~ $200M
2011 - AUSTRALIA - Moranbah North – Roof Fall –interruption of approx. 12 weeks.
2012 – AUSTRALIA – Yallourn Brown Coal Mine in Victoria – Mine flood ???
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INCIDENT SUMMARYINCIDENT SUMMARYINCIDENT SUMMARYINCIDENT SUMMARY
NEVER SAY NEVERIT WILL HAPPEN!
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Questions?Questions?Questions?Questions?
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BLINDNESS TO RISK
IF YOU ONLY HEAR GOOD NEWS START TO WORRY!
NEVER JUDGE A BOOK BY ITS COVER!COVER!
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Mine “X” Findings Mine “X” Findings –– People Safety Vs SystemsPeople Safety Vs Systems
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•Majority of accidents are related to Slip & Fall, Material Handling and Majority of accidents takes place during day shift on Tuesdays
50% Of accidents are sprains / strains d e to the slips and falls•50% Of accidents are sprains / strains due to the slips and falls.
•Suggestion: Focus Tuesdays on housekeeping and access to and from work areas this will ensure at least 40% reduction in accidents.
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Hydraulic coal shovel – operator’s cab = poor housekeeping5757Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Hydraulic coal shovel – poor housekeeping
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Hydraulic coal shovel’s undercarriage – oil / diesel / coal / dust build up
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Dragline’s LV Room – Poor Housekeeping6060Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Dragline swing shafts – excessive oil leaks6161Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
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Highwall toe – distance to pipes, park bay and foam fire suppression trailer
1st July - Monday – pit - poor mine design and conditions6363Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
3rd July Wednesday – pit stopped due to poor mining standards6464Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Reclaim tunnel – poor housekeeping6565Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Reclaim tunnel – poor housekeeping6666Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Reclaim tunnel – poor housekeeping – failed idler 6767Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Reclaim tunnel – poor housekeeping – failed idler6868Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Conveyor - gravity tower – poor housekeeping6969Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Tail – poor housekeeping7070Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Tail – poor housekeeping7171Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Conveyor tail / transfer - spillage7272Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Conveyor – poor housekeeping, fire risk & structural overload risk7373Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Conveyor – poor housekeeping and structural overload risk7474Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Train Load Out Silo – power pack room poor housekeeping7575Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
Missing hose – no water supply7676Hawcroft Consulting InternationalHawcroft Consulting International
BLINDNESS TO RISK
CATASTROPHIC EVENTFINDINGS
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TEXAS CITY REFINERY TEXAS CITY REFINERY DISASTERDISASTERDISASTERDISASTER
On March 23, 2005, a fire and explosion occurred at BP's, , pTexas City Refinery in Texas City, Texas, killing 15 workersand injuring more than 170 others.
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TEXAS CITY REFINERY TEXAS CITY REFINERY DISASTERDISASTERDISASTERDISASTER
THE PRINCIPAL FINDING :
Was that BP Management had not distinguishedbetween “occupational safety” (i.e. slips-trips-and-falls, driving safety etc ) Vs “process / systems safety” (i edriving safety, etc.) Vs process / systems safety (i.e. design for safety, hazard analysis, material verification, equipment maintenance, process upset reporting, etc.).
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DEEPWATER HORIZON DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTERDISASTERDISASTERDISASTER
The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosionp g g poccurred on April 20, 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. The explosion killed 11 workers and injured 17 others and resulted in one of the USA’s worst environmentalresulted in one of the USA s worst environmental disasters.
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DEEPWATER HORIZON DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTERDISASTERDISASTERDISASTER
BP boss Tony Hayward said:
“Safety is a core value of the oil and natural gas industry. We have a strong safety performance record, and we continue to improve upon it.
According to data from the Mineral Management Service (MMS), the overall safety and environmental performance on the U S Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) has shown steadythe U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) has shown steady improvement over the past decade. .......Recordable lost workday incident rates fell from 3.39 percent in 1996 to 0.64 percent in 2008 – a reduction of more than 80 percent.”
Westall noted in her letter that "all eight BP-operated Gulf of Mexico production facilities" received safety awards from MMS in 2009."
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DEEPWATER HORIZON DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTERDISASTERDISASTERDISASTER
Fortune's investigation shows ‘Perhaps the most crucialFortune's investigation shows ‘Perhaps the most crucial culprit: an emphasis on personal safety (such as reducing slips and falls) rather than process / systems safety (avoiding a deadly explosion)’.
C id thi BP h d t i t id li b iConsider this: BP had strict guidelines barring employees from carrying a cup of coffee without a lid --but no standard procedure for how to conduct a "negative-pressure test"
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MASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHThe Upper Big Branch Mine disaster occurred on A il 5 2010 b t 1 000 f t (300 ) d d tApril 5, 2010 about 1,000 feet (300 m) underground at Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch longwall operation at Montcoal in Raleigh County West Virginia. Twenty-nine out of thirty-one miners at the site were killed.
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MASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMassey CEO stated “Safety has always been of
t i t t M ” d it d iparamount importance at Massey” and cited various statistics the amount of time lost to accidents at Massey has bested the industry average for 17 of the last 19 years.
Massey’s “non fatal days lost” record has shown i t t i t d b tt th th i d tconsistent improvement and was better than the industry
average.
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MASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHMASSEY UPPER BIG BRANCHGovernor’s Independent Investigation Panel U Bi B h Mi Di t 19 M 2011Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster – 19 May 2011
Conclusion :Conclusion :“The April 5 2010 explosion was not something that happened out of the blue, an event that could have been anticipated or prevented. It was, to the contrary, a completely predictable result for a company that ignored basic safety standards andcompany that ignored basic safety standards and put too much faith in its own mythology”
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BLINDNESS TO RISKBLINDNESS TO RISKBLINDNESS TO RISK BLINDNESS TO RISK
“The presence of an effectiveppersonal safety managementsystem does not ensure thesystem does not ensure thepresence of an effective safetymanagement system”
Source : The Report of the BP U S Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel Jan 2007 of the Texas City Refinery Disaster - 2005Source : The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Jan 2007 of the Texas City Refinery Disaster - 2005
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BLINDNESS TO RISK - REASON
• MINES ACT
RISK MANAGEMENT•RISK MANAGEMENT
• OHSA
1970 to 2010 (+)• ENVIRONMENT
• LITIGATION
MINING INDUSTRY •CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
• FATAL RISK STANDARDS
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BLINDNESS TO RISK - REASON
People Safety
Systems Safety
FUTURE
MINING INDUSTRY
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BLINDNESS TO RISK - REASON
People Safety
Systems Safety
SUSTAINABLE SUSFUTURE
MINING INDUSTRY
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LESSONS TO LEARNLESSONS TO LEARNEmploy Systems Safety Officers
Define Critical Risks and complement these Risks with Principal Hazard Management Plans / Trigger Action Response Plans
Train employees thoroughly in these Plans and give “Challenge” Tests
More education in Change Management
Carry out practical Response Exercises / TrainingCarry out practical Response Exercises / Training
Register / track / review monthly - Reportable Incidents / investigation reports Actions (Prioritise / By / When)investigation reports – Actions (Prioritise / By / When)
REFERENCESREFERENCESREFERENCESREFERENCES
BP Texas City Refinery Disaster Andrew Hopkins CCH PressBP Texas City Refinery Disaster - Andrew Hopkins – CCH Press
BP Texas City Refinery Disaster - Investigation
Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel Upper Big Branch Mine Disaster – 19 May 2011
Fire in the Night The Piper Alpha Disaster – Stephen McGinty - Pan
Disastrous Decisions – The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico Blowout - Andrew Hopkins – CCH Press
THANK YOUTHANK YOUTHANK YOUTHANK YOU