Utility Pricing Death Spiral - Wits University

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Utility Pricing Death Spiral Mathematics in Industry Study Group 2016 Ashleigh Hutchinson, Emma Gibson, Thembani Phaweni, Dillon Snyman, Jeroen Schmidt, Despina Newman, Ramphabana Fhulufhelo, Shalotte Sam, Masilo Leope, Shireen Makobela, Edward Nonyane, Owoloko Enahoro Alfred, Popoola Peter, Viroshan Naicker, Lucy Motsieloa. January 15, 2016 (MISG 2016) January 15, 2016 1 / 27

Transcript of Utility Pricing Death Spiral - Wits University

Page 1: Utility Pricing Death Spiral - Wits University

Utility Pricing Death Spiral

Mathematics in Industry Study Group 2016

Ashleigh Hutchinson, Emma Gibson, Thembani Phaweni,Dillon Snyman, Jeroen Schmidt, Despina Newman,

Ramphabana Fhulufhelo, Shalotte Sam, Masilo Leope,Shireen Makobela, Edward Nonyane, Owoloko Enahoro Alfred,

Popoola Peter, Viroshan Naicker, Lucy Motsieloa.

January 15, 2016

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Problem statement

Utility companies bill customers based on their energy usage.

A portion of this income is used to maintain their infrastructure.

When customers reduce their energy usage, the utility loses a portionof this income, but their maintenance costs remain unchanged.

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South African context pt. 1

50% of households receive subsidized power.

Certain customers are charged higher tariffs in order to subsidise theprovision of electricity to low-income groups.

These high-tariff customers are increasingly likely to reduce theirenergy usage by using alternative energy sources.

This loss of income forces the utility to increase tariffs and creates afurther incentive to move to alternative energy sources.

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South African context pt. 2

The distributed network is fragmented.

There are 120 municipalities with less then 1000 customers.

More then 90 municipalities receive less than R1 million in revenue.

The utility runs the risk of being unable to maintain its infrastructure.

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A fair solution?

The national grid is an important resource regardless of how energy isgenerated.

Customers using alternative sources of energy still benefit from accessto the national grid.

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A fair solution?

Other options to cover the cost of grid infrastructure:

Tax funds.

Grid connection fees.

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General model

We consider a general model in which the utility’s customers are dividedinto n different tariff groups. We define the following variables:

Gi is the number of customers in tariff group i.

Gn+1 is the number of potential customers who do not have accessto the grid.

A is the number of customers who supplement their energy withalternative sources.

Ui is the energy usage for the ith group, where i ∈ {1, ..., n, A}.Ti is the electricity tariff per unit of electricity of group Gi.Here Tn < Tn−1 < · · · < T1

TA is the electricity tariff for group A.

Ci is the cost for the ith group per unit of electricity.

Hi is the fixed grid connection fee for the ith group Gi.

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Population dynamics

The number of customers in each tariff group changes due to a number ofdifferent factors.These groups are modelled by the following equations:

dA

dt=

n∑i=1

(χi(t) + riGiK(t)g(t) +miGiA),

dGi

dt= βi ·G− χi(t)− ri ·

(A

G

)K(t)g(t)−miGiA.

The βi coefficients are related to economic growth and specify how quicklycustomers are increasing their electricity usage and moving to higher tariffgroups.

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Supply shortage

The ri coefficients represent the possibility of a customer moving to adifferent tariff group (or alternative energy) when the utility is failing tokeep up with their current demand for energy.Here,

K(t) =

n∑i=1

GiUi + αAUA

k(t)− 1,

and

g(t) =

{1, K(t) > 0,

0, Otherwise.

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Tariff increases and interaction term

The χi(t) terms describe the rate at which customers switch to alternativeenergy due to tariff increases.Here,

χ(t) =

(G1 − g0

q

(1− a(t)

T1− γ),

and

σ(z) =1

1 + e−z.

The mi terms describe the rate at which customers switch to alternativeenergy as a result of increasing awareness and popularity.

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Death spiral conditions

The utility death spiral occurs when the rate of economic growth βi is toolow to compensate for the effects of higher tariffs, unreliable supply andincreased awareness of alternative energy sources.

dGi

dt= βi ·G− χi(t)− ri ·

(A

G

)K(t)g(t)−miGiA.

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Profit function

Using this information, we can calculate the utility’s revenue and expenses:

Profit =

ExternalFunding︷︸︸︷ε +

Revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷n∑

i=1

Gi (UiTi +Hi) + αATAUA +AHA

−[F (t) +

n∑i=1

(GiUiCi) + αACAUA

]︸ ︷︷ ︸

Total Cost

.

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Strategies

The utility needs to ensure that their profit never drops below 0 in order tomaintain their infrastructure.

Profit =

ExternalFunding︷︸︸︷ε +

Core Revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷n∑

i=1

Gi (UiTi +Hi)+

RA︷ ︸︸ ︷αATAUA +AHA

− Ctotal.

We can ensure that this condition is met by using the profit equation toadjust Ti, Hi and ε.

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External funding

One strategy is for the external funding to be defined as follows:

ε = −[ n∑

i=1

Gi (UiTi +Hi) +RA

]+ Ctotal.

If all tariffs are kept constant, any decrease in income must be covered byexternal funding.

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Tariff increase

We define the highest tariff price as follows:

T1 =

−ε−n∑

i=2Gi (UiTi)−

n∑i=1

GiHi −RA + Ctotal

U1G1.

The tariff for G1 is increased to cover the drop in income.

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Grid fee increase

We can alternatively define the grid fee:

H1 =

−ε−n∑

i=1Gi (UiTi)−

n∑i=2

GiHi −RA + Ctotal

G1.

The grid fee for G1 is increased to cover the drop in income.

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Distributed tariff increase

Tariffs are increased by µiY to cover the drop in income, where µi areweights that determine how much each group will be affected by theincrease.

0 = ε+

n∑i=1

GiUi (Ti + µiY ) +

n∑i=1

GiHi + αAUA(TA + µAY )

+AHA − Ctotal,

Y =

−ε−n∑

i=1Gi(UiTi +Hi)− αAUATA −AHA + Ctotal

n∑i=1

GiUiµi + αAUAµA

.

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Distributed grid fee increase

Grid fees are increased by ωiY to cover the drop in income, where ωi areweights that determine how much each group will be affected by theincrease.

0 = ε+

n∑i=1

GiUiTi +

n∑i=1

Gi (Hi + ωiY ) + αATAUA,

+A(HA + ωAY )− Ctotal,

Y =

−ε−n∑

i=1Gi(UiTi +Hi)− αATAUA −AHA + Ctotal

n∑i=1

Giωi +AωA

.

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Distributed tariff and grid fee increase

Grid fees are increased by µiY and Tariffs by ωiY . In this case, bothstrategies are implemented.

0 = ε+

n∑i=1

Gi(Ui (Ti + µiY ) +Hi + ωiY )

+ αAUA(TA + µAY ) +A(HA + ωAY )− Ctotal,

Y =

−ε−n∑

i=1Gi(UiTi +Hi)− αATAUA −AHA + Ctotal

n∑i=1

GiUiµi +n∑

i=1Giωi + αAUAµA +AωA

.

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Example

Our population dynamics are governed by:

dA

dt= χ(t) + r1(G1 −Gm)K(t)g(t) +m(G1 −Gm)A,

dG1

dt= β2G2 − χ(t)− r1(G1 −Gm)K(t)−m(G1 −Gm)A,

dG2

dt= −β2G2 + β3G3 − r2G2K(t),

dG3

dt= β4G4 − β3G3 − r3G3K(t) + r2G2K(t)g(t),

dG4

dt= −β4G4 + r3G3K(t)g(t) + r.

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Example

Here,

K(t) =

n∑i=1

GiUi + αAUA

k(t)− 1,

g(t) =

{1, K(t) > 0,

0, Otherwise,

χ(t) =

(G1 −Gm

q

(1− a(t)

T1− γ),

σ(z) =1

1 + e−z.

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Governing Equations

We define the tariff for the high-income group, T1, so that R = C. Thissimplifies to the following equation:

T1 =

F (t) + C1G1U1 +3∑

i=2(Ci − Ti)GiUi + αC1AUA

G1U1 + αAUA

−H1 (G1 +A) +

3∑i=2

HiGi

G1U1 + αAUA.

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Example results

Figure: Comparison of utility tariff against alternative tariff over time. Here,γ = 0.1, α = 0.05, Gm = 460000, r1 = 0.000086, r2 = 0.000112, r3 = 0.000134,β2 = 0.000021, β3 = 0.000067, β4 = 0.0007. A death spiral occurs for theseparameters.

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Example results

Figure: Comparison of utility high-tariff users against alternative energy users overtime. Here, γ = 0.1, α = 0.05, Gm = 460000, r1 = 0.000086, r2 = 0.000112,r3 = 0.000134, β2 = 0.000021, β3 = 0.000067, β4 = 0.0007. A death spiraloccurs for these parameters.

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Example results

Figure: Comparison of utility tariff against alternative tariff over time. Here,γ = 0.1, α = 0.5, Gm = 1500000, r1 = 0.000086, r2 = 0.000112, r3 = 0.000134,β2 = 0.000021, β3 = 0.000067, β4 = 0.0007. A death spiral is avoided for theseparameters.

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Example results

Figure: Comparison of utility high-tariff users against alternative energy users overtime. Here, γ = 0.1, α = 0.5, Gm = 1500000, r1 = 0.000086, r2 = 0.000112,r3 = 0.000134, β2 = 0.000021, β3 = 0.000067, β4 = 0.0007. A death spiral isavoided for these parameters.

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Conclusion

Economic growth is crucial.

Addressing short-term concerns such as load-shedding and grid accesscan help to mitigate the effect of cheaper alternative energy.

The usage-based tariff structure is problematic and unsustainable inthe long term.

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