Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks Lingxuan HuDavid Evans Department of Computer...
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Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks
Lingxuan Hu David EvansDepartment of Computer Science
University of Virginia
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OutlineProblem Statement BackgroundProtocolExperiment
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Scenario
Thousands of small, low-powered devices with sensors and actuators, communicating wirelessly
High-power base station
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Routing Tree
Adapted from Chris Karlof and David Wagner's WSNPA slides
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Routing
Adapted from Chris Karlof and David Wagner's WSNPA slides
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Wormhole Attack
• Tunnel packets received in one place of the network and replay them in another place
• The attacker can have no key material. All it requires is two transceivers and one high quality out-of-band channel
Adapted from Chris Karlof and David Wagner's WSNPA slides
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Disrupted Routing
• Most packets will be routed to the wormhole
• The wormhole can drop packets or more subtly, selectively forward packets to avoid detection
Adapted from Chris Karlof and David Wagner's WSNPA slides
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Impact of Wormhole — Experiment
Base Station at Corner Base Station at Center
How many routing paths are disrupted by a single wormhole?
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Impact of Wormhole — Result
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Base Station at CornerBase Station at Center
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Possible Solutions
• Time – Signal is transmitted at speed of light
• Location– Location awareness
• Direction– Directional Antennas
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Directional Antennas
Operation Modes: Omni and Directional
In Omni Mode:Nodes send signals with gain Go
In Directional Mode:Capable of sending in specified directionDirectional Gain Gd (Gd > Go)
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Antenna Model
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The model is comprised of N antenna zones. The N zones may collectively cover the entire plane
The zones are numbered 1 to N oriented clockwise starting with zone 1 facing east
The channel is bidirectional. For, example, if A hears B from zone 1, then B will hear A in zone 4, which is the opposite zone
East
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Simple Neighbor Discovery
A Region Announcement, done through sequential sweepingN A Include nonce and zone information in the messageA N Check zone information and send back the nonce
HELLO | IDA
IDN | EKNA (IDA | R | zone (N, A))R
A N
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Detecting Wormhole
A B
Hello
zone (A, B) = 4
zone (A, B) = 1 Wrong!
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Sophisticated Wormhole
A B
Hello
zone (A, B) = 1
zone (A, B) = 1 Yes!
Simple Neighbor Discovery can reduce the chance of successful wormhole attack to 1/6, but it is still unacceptable since a single wormhole can disrupt most routing paths.
Possible Solution: Neighborhood coordination
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V
Verified Neighbor Discovery
A Region Announcement, done through sequential sweepingN A Include nonce and zone information in the messageA N Check zone information and send back the nonceN Region Inquire the validity of neighbor A through verifiersV N Send confirmation to N if all zone information is correctN A Accept A as its neighbor and notify A
HELLO | IDA
IDN | EKNA (IDA | R | zone (N, A))R
A N
INQUIRY | IDN | IDA | zone (N, A)
IDV | EKNV (IDA | zone (V, N))
IDN | EKAN (IDA | ACCEPT)
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Verification Region
1. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V)2. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A)
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zone (B, A) = 4zone (B, V) = 5
zone (B, A) = 4zone (V, A) = 3
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Verifier Analysis
1. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V)2. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A)
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Region I Region II
X Y
vv
zone (B, A) = zone (B, V)zone (B, A) = zone (V, A)
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Worawannotai attack
A and B are just beyond the transmission range of each other There does have a valid verifier V in this case X simply retransmits messages between A and B, X doesn’t
need to retransmit the message of V.
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Strict Neighbor Discovery
1. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V)2. zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A)3. zone (B, V) can not be both adjacent to
zone (B, A) and adjacent to zone (V, A)
Theorem: In strict neighbor discovery, if distance (A, B) > r, the verification region is empty
Strict verification region
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Cost AnalysisCommunication Overhead
The typical secure link establishment includes announcement, challenge and responseThis protocol adds inquiry, verification and acceptance
Connectivity Only accept a node as neighbor if it can be
verified by at least one verifier, so may prevent some legitimate links from being established
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Impact on Connectivity
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For a more typical network with omni density = 10. In verified protocol, 0.5% links are lost and no nodes are disconnected. In strict protocol, 40% links are lost and 0.03% nodes are disconnected.
Verified Protocol, Omni density = 3 Strict Protocol, Omni density = 3
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Node Distance vs Connectivity
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Strict Protocol Verified Protocol
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Impact on Routing
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Omnidirectional Node Density
Directional TransmissionVerified Protocol
Strict Protocol
For verified protocol, the routing path length is nearly the same
For strict protocol, the routing path length increases around 20%
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Directional Errors
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Maximum Directional Error Degree
Lost Links, Strict ProtocolLost Links, Verified Protocol
Disconnected Nodes, Strict ProtocolDisconnected Nodes, Verified Protocol
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Lost Links, Strict ProtocolLost Links, Verified Protocol
Disconnected Nodes, Strict ProtocolDisconnected Nodes, Verified Protocol
Omni density = 3 Omni density = 10
The error is modeled by disorienting nodes by a random angle in [-max, max]
The disconnected nodes is little affected
The lost links will increases as maximum directional error degree increases
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Conclusion
Wormhole attack is a powerful attack that can be conducted without any cryptographic breaks Directional antennas offers a promising approach to preventing wormhole attacks through neighborhood coordination
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Discussion
Design protocols to prevent more powerful wormhole attacksOr try to prove that some powerful wormhole is unpreventable if no assumption on time synchronization or location awareness is made. Mitigate replay attacks in other layers (routing, application)
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References
[1] L. Hu and D. Evans. Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, San Diego, 5-6 February 2004.
[2] R. Ramanathan. On the Performance of Beamforming Antennas in Ad Hoc Network. MobiHoc 2001, October 2001.
[3] Y. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson. Packet Leashes: A Defense against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. INFOCOM 2003, April 2003.
[4] C. Karlof and D. Wagner. Secure Routing in Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures. First IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, May, 2003.