Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context

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Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context © 2011 Carnegie Mellon University Assurance Context Julia Allen SEPG NA 2011 24 March 2011

Transcript of Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context

Page 1: Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context

Using CERT-RMM in a Software and System Assurance Context

© 2011 Carnegie Mellon University

Assurance Context

Julia AllenSEPG NA 201124 March 2011

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Agenda

What is the CERT Resilience Management Model

(CERT-RMM)?

Model Building Blocks

CERT-RMM for Assurance

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What is CERT-RMM?

The CERT® Resilience Management Model is a maturity model for

managing and improving operational resilience.

• Process improvement for

operational resilience

• Converges key operational

risk management activities:

security, BC/DR, and IT

operations

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• Operations phase focus

• CMMI architecture

• Continuous representation

• 26 process areas

• Defines maturity through

capability levels

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CERT-RMM Building Blocks

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Foundational concepts of the model

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Operational resilience

Resilience: The physical

property of a material when it

can return to its original

shape or position after

deformation that does not

exceed its elastic limit

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exceed its elastic limit[wordnet.princeton.edu]

Operational resilience: An

emergent property

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Operational resilience and operational risk

Operational resilience emerges from effective operational risk management

Operational risk categories:

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Actions of

people

Systems

and

technology

failures

Failed

internal

processes

External

events

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CERT-RMM foundational elements

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Services in CERT-RMM

The resilience of high-value services ensures the

resilience of the mission.

Service resilience is a factor of asset resilience—if

an asset is disrupted or fails, the service may suffer.

Service resilience is the object of CERT-RMM

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Service resilience is the object of CERT-RMM

processes.

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Assets

CERT-RMM focuses on four types:

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Assets supporting the mission

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Operational resilience starts at the asset level

Protect assets from threats

Make them sustainable under adverse conditions

Optimal mix depends on the

value of the asset and the

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value of the asset and the cost of deploying and maintaining the strategy

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Organizational context for resilience activities

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CERT-RMM for AssuranceFocusing CERT-RMM on early life-cycle activities

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Focusing CERT-RMM on early life-cycle activities for building resilience in

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CERT-RMM focus in the life cycle

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For comparison: CERT-RMM and CMMI

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RTSE – Resilient Technical Solution Engineering

Ensure that software and

systems are developed to

satisfy their resilience

requirements

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RTSE specific goals

Goal Goal Title

RTSE:SG1 Establish guidelines for resilient

technical solution development

RTSE:SG2 Develop resilient technical solution

development plans

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development plans

RTSE:SG3 Execute the plan

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RTSE: Building in versus bolting on

Requires organizational intervention

Extends resilience requirements to assets that are to be developed

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Creates requirements for quality attributes

Attempts to reduce the level of operational risk

Extends across the life cycle

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RTSE: Design and test for resilience

• Perform resilience controls during planning and all life cycle phases

• Specify and maintain resilience requirements

• Design resilience-specific architectures

• Adopt secure coding practices

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• Adopt secure coding practices

• Minimize weaknesses and vulnerabilities (defects)

• Design test criteria to attest to asset resilience

• Test for resilience during assembly and integration

• Design and exercise service continuity plans during the development process

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RTSE influences

BSIMM2bsimm.com

Open Web Applications Security Project (OWASP)

Software Assurance Maturity Model www.owasp.org

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www.owasp.org

Microsoft Security Development Life Cyclewww.microsoft.com/security/sdl/

DHS Process Reference Model for Assurance Mapping to CMMI-DEV V1.2https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/swa/procresrc.html

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CERT-RMM for software assurance

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CERT-RMM assurance view

Engineering

ADM Asset Definition and Management

CTRL Controls Management

RRD Resilience Requirements Development

RRM Resilience Requirements Management

RTSE Resilient Technical Solution Engineering

SC Service Continuity

Operations Management

AM Access Management

EC Environmental Control

EXD External Dependencies Management

ID Identity Management

IMC Incident Management & Control

KIM Knowledge & Information Management

PM People Management

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Enterprise Management

COMM Communications

COMP Compliance

EF Enterprise Focus

FRM Financial Resource Management

HRM Human Resource Management

OTA Organizational Training & Awareness

RISK Risk Management

PM People Management

TM Technology Management

VAR Vulnerability Analysis & Resolution

Process Management

MA Measurement and Analysis

MON Monitoring

OPD Organizational Process Definition

OPF Organizational Process Focus

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The “what”

Framing process to practice

Process

Level

CERT-

RMM

Assurance for

CMMI

BSIMM2

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Moving from “what” to “how”Practice

LevelOpenSAMM

Microsoft SDL

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Example – Training and Awareness

Process

Level CERT-RMM Goal: Establish and maintain the strategic assurance training needs of the organization.

Process areas: OTA, RTSE, HRM

CERT-RMM Subpractices

Capability levels inform

practice maturity

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Practice

Level

BSIMM2

OpenSAMM

Microsoft SDL

Training related practices for creating the software security satellite, role-based training on demand . . .

Practices for technical security awareness training. . .

CERT-RMM Subpractices

Training guidelines on basic concepts, common baseline, training topics. . .

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Moving

The “what”

CERT-RMM links to codes of practice

Process

Area

Specific

Goals

Codes of Practice:

BS25999-1: 2011

CMMI v1.2

CMMI for Services

CobiT 4.1

COSO ERM

DRII GAP

FFIEC BCP Handbook

Codes of Practice:

BS25999-1: 2011

CMMI v1.2

CMMI for Services

CobiT 4.1

COSO ERM

DRII GAP

FFIEC BCP Handbook

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From “model

how” to “tactical

how”

Moving

from “what” to

“how”Specific

Practices

Sub-

practices

FFIEC BCP Handbook

ISO 20000-2:2005

ISO 24762:2008

ISO 27002:2005

NFPA 1600 (2007)

PCI DSS v1.1 (2006)

FFIEC BCP Handbook

ISO 20000-2:2005

ISO 24762:2008

ISO 27002:2005

NFPA 1600 (2007)

PCI DSS v1.1 (2006)

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Resources

Book

Includes full

model (v1.1)

plus adoption guidance and

perspectives of

real-world use of the model

Training

Introduction to the CERT Resilience Management Model (3-day course)

• Public courses (Pittsburgh and DC)

• Private onsite courses

Appraiser and instructor training in

development

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Website

www.cert.org/resilience

Support

Engage CERT-RMM team to lead

appraisals, provide implementation coaching, pilot CERT-RMM Compass, or deliver custom training

of the model

www.amazon.com/CERT-Resilience-

Management-Model-

RMM/dp/0321712439

development

CERT-RMM User Group Annual Series

• Quarterly 2-day workshops

• Focus on CERT-RMM implementation

• CERT-RMM Coach Certification option

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CERT-RMM contacts

Rich CaralliRMM Architect and Lead [email protected]

David WhiteRMM Transition Lead and Developer [email protected]

Lisa YoungRMM Appraisal Lead and [email protected]

Julia AllenRMM Developer/Measurement Team [email protected]

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[email protected]

Richard LynchPublic Relations — All Media [email protected]

SEI Customer [email protected]

Joe McLeodFor info on working with [email protected]

http://www.cert.org/resilience/

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NO WARRANTY

THIS MATERIAL OF CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND ITS SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE IS FURNISHED ON AN “AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT.

This presentation may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in

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This presentation may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or electronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for permission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at [email protected].

This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number FA8721-05-C-0003 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. The government of the United States has a royalty-free government-purpose license to use, duplicate, or disclose the work, in whole or in part and in any manner, and to have or permit others to do so, for government purposes pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at 252.227-7013.

CERT ® is a registered mark owned by Carnegie Mellon University.

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29© 2011 Carnegie Mellon University