USDCNDF ECF 9 State v Trussell - Trussell's Response to Yoho Motion to Quash Subpoena

8/16/2019 USDCNDF ECF 9 State v Trussell - Trussell's Response to Yoho Motion to Quash Subpoena

1/69

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

v.

TERRY G. TRUSSELL,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-188-MW-GRJ

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM

OF NON-PARTY THE HONORABLE TED S. YOHO

Pursuant to Rule 45(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant

Terry Trussell, files this Response to non-party the Honorable Ted S. Yoho, U.S.

Representative for the 3d congressional district of Florida, Motion to Quash

Subpoena Ad Testificandum (“Subpoena”) issued to him by defendant Terry G.

Trussell. A copy of the Subpoena was attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion to Quash

filed (DE 3).

A response to the memorandum of points and authorities in support of this

motion is submitted herewith. A proposed order is not attached, and oral argument is

requested ONLY if the court deems fit and proper.

1

Case 1:16-cv-00188-MW-GRJ Document 9 Filed 05/27/16 Page 1 of 31


2/69

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Inger Garcia, Esq.

Inger M. Garcia, Esq.

4839 Volunteer Road; #514

Davie, FL 33330

Florida Bar No. 0106917

Tel: (954) 894-9962

Fax: (954) 446-1635

[email protected]

Counsel for Defendant, Terry G. Trussell

May 27, 2016

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 27, 2016, I filed one copy of the foregoing

Response to Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad Testificandum of Non-Party the

Honorable Ted S. Yoho in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida

by CM/ECF. I further certify that I served one copy via electronic mail on:

WILLIAM PITTARD, D.C. Bar No. 482949

Acting General CounselTODD B. TATELMAN, VA Bar No. 66008

Senior Assistant CounselELENI M. ROUMEL, N.Y. Bar No. 3978863

Assistant Counsel

ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, D.C. Bar No. 998900Assistant Counsel KIMBERLY HAMM

Assistant Counsel, D.C. Bar No. 1020989 c/o

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSELU.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 219 Cannon House Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20515

(202) 225-9700 (telephone)(202) 226-1360 (facsimile) [email protected]

Counsel for the Honorable Ted S. Yoho, U.S. Representative for the 3d congressional

district of Florida

2


mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


3/69

/s/ Inger Garcia, Esq.



Davie, FL 33330

Florida Bar No. 0106917Tel: (954) 894-9962

Fax: (954) 446-1635

[email protected]


May 27, 2016

3



4/69

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

v.

TERRY G. TRUSSELL,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-188-MW-GRJ

RESPONSE TO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN

SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM



Davie, FL 33330


Tel: (954) 894-9962

Fax: (954) [email protected]

May 27, 2016

Counsel for Defendant Terry Trussell



5/69

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................... ii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 2

I.

The Subpoena Must Not Be Quashed on Sovereign Immunity

Grounds ....................................................................................................................... 4

II. The Subpoena Must Not Be Quashed Because It Does Seek“Material and Relevant” Testimony ............................................................................ 5

III.

The Subpoena Should Not Be Quashed Because Mr. Trussell Can Establish the

Extraordinary Circumstances Required to Compel Congressman Yoho’s Testimony

............................................................................................................ 12

CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................23

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

U.S. Constitution and Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1442 ......................................................................................................... 3

Cases

Bardoff v. United States,

628 A.2d 86 (D.C. 1993) ........................................................................................... 18

Bogan v. City of Boston,

489 F.3d 417 (1st Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................... 13

In re FDIC ,

58 F.3d 1055 (5th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................19

Marisol A. v. Giuliani,

No. 95-cv-10533 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1998) ........................................................... ..19

Matter of Sheeler v. Buffalo Wire Works, 50 Misc.2d 158, 269 N.Y.S.2d 897………4

i



6/69

Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537…………………3, 8

People v. Slochowsky,

116 Misc. 2d 1069, 1071, 456 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct.

1982)………………………………………………………….3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y of Labor ,

766 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1985)................................................................................... 16

Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, No. 89-0073 (D.D.C. May 18, 1989) ........................................................................ 18

United States v. Ballin,

144 U.S. 1 (1892) ........................................................................................................ 5

United States v. Molinares,

700 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983) ..................................................................................... 5

United States v. Morgan,313 U.S. 409 (1941) .................................................................................................. 12

United States v. Rostenkowski,59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995)....................................................................................21

United States v. Smith,

286 U.S. 6 (1932) ........................................................................................................ 5

Walker v. Jones,733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984)..................................................................................... 17

Wirtz v. Local 30, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs,

34 F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)………………………………………………………..17

Legislative Authorities

Rule VIII, Rules of the House of Representatives (114th Cong.) (2015) .................4, 5

ii



7/69

INTRODUCTION

Non-Party the Honorable Ted S. Yoho, U.S. Representative for the 3d

congressional district of Florida, moved this Court for an order quashing the

subpoena ad testificandum issued by the Circuit Court in and for Dixie

County, Florida, Criminal Division and served on him by the defendant, Terry

G. Trussell for a State Criminal Trial on June 6, 2016 through June 10, 2016.

BACKGROUND

The underlying action in this case involves a 14 criminal charges against Mr.

Trussell. State of Florida v. Trussell, Case No. 2014-201- CF (Fla. Cir. Ct.

2014), See Yoho Ex. 1. (DE 3-1). Mr. Trussell obtained a subpoena ad

testificandum (“Subpoena”) from the state court for a Trial date for the week

of June 6, 2016. See Subpoena, Yoho Ex. 2 (De 3-2).

On April 28, 2016, Congressman Yoho, through counsel, sent counsel for Mr.

Trussell a letter, via electronic and first-class mail, seeking clarification of the

subject matter(s) on which Mr. Trussell demands the Congressman’s

testimony. See Letter from Todd B. Tatelman, Sr. Ass’t Counsel, Office of

Gen. Counsel, to Inger M. Garcia, Esq. (April 28, 2016), Yoho Ex. 3. (DE 3-

3) Mr. Trussell’s counsel responded by forwarding portions of an email

written by Mr. Trussell, detailing the rationale for the subpoena. See E-mail

from Inger M. Garcia, Esq., to Todd B. Tatelman, Sr. Ass’t Counsel (May 11,

2016), (Yoho DE 3-4). There were 9 follow up e-mails and a telephone call

1



8/69

between counsels concerning this matter. The undersigned reviewed the file,

depositions and exhibits, and located the proof of the urgent need of having

Yoho testify at trial. In all fairness to Yoho’s counsel, the undersigned was

unable to continue negotiations prior to his having to file this motion and this

is the first time Yoho’s counsel may know the extent of Yoho’s importance

and knowledge of the Trussell matter.

The testimony initially outlines was a May 2014 conversation between

Congressman Yoho, Mr. Trussell, and a Colonel Harry Riley (Ret.) that

occurred in Washington. However, based upon evidence secured at the two

depositions of the purported victim SA Jeff Siegmeister, there are many other

issues that are key to this case that Yoho has personal knowledge of.

Composite Exhibit 1 are portions of Siegmeister’s two depositions taken

January 2016 and April, 2016, wherein there was testimony concerning Yoho.

Due to time and schedule constraints, Congressman Yoho removed to this

Court on May 25, 2016, see Notice of Removal, and now moves to quash.

ARGUMENT

Mr. Trussell’s subpoena to Congressman Yoho is enforceable and, therefore,

must not be quashed, for at least three, independent reasons: (1) The doctrine

of sovereign immunity does not bar enforcement of this Subpoena since it

does not seek the protected testimony; (2) the Subpoena does seek material

and relevant information; and (3) Mr. Trussell established the extraordinary

2



9/69

circumstances necessary to compel Congressman Yoho’s testimony. Further,

in summary, 28 USC section 1442, allows removal in regard to a subpoena,

but restricts it to questions relating to the performance of the official duties of

Congressman Yoho. Trussell and the undersigned certify that the examination

will not relate to the performance of any function as a congressman. It will be

prejudicial to the Defense’s ability to competently represent Trussell if the

undersigned is required to disclose to Congressman Yoho as a witness

beforehand and to the prosecutor the questions that the defense intends to ask

-- beyond the fact that the Defense will not question Yoho about his

congressional duties. To ask for a disclosure would be a denial of procedural

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. People v. Slochowsky, 116

Misc. 2d 1069, 1071, 456 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct. 1982) held: The

reason for the rule is that on a motion to quash a subpoena, the relevancy of

the purported testimony cannot be challenged was best stated by Mr. Justice

Cardoza in Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537.

The court in discussing the power to issue a subpoena ad testificandum stated,

“They (the power to subpoena) will be rendered to a large extent abortive if

his subpoenas are to be quashed in advance of any hearing at the instance of

unwilling witnesses upon forecasts of the testimony and nicely balanced

arguments as to its probable importance.” (pg. 381, 176 N.E. 537) (emphasis

3



10/69

supplied). The court thus felt that prophesying the probable importance of a

witness would in effect destroy the very power to subpoena. (See also Matter

of Sheeler v. Buffalo Wire Works, 50 Misc.2d 158, 269 N.Y.S.2d 897)

I.

The Subpoena Must Not Be Quashed on Sovereign Immunity Grounds.

The subpoena served on Congressman Yoho is directed to him for his

personal knowledge of facts, meetings, telephone calls and e-mails, at relate

to him personally, as well as under his authority to speak to his constituents,

in his official capacity. It does not relate to any official duties at all. The e-

mails at issue are from his personal e-mail and the meetings took place on his

personal time and location choice, outside his workplace. Congress has no

need to waive sovereign immunity in this case since there are no official

actions at issue in this case. The House Rule VIII.8, Rules of the House of

Representatives (114th Cong.) (2015), does not apply to this case as it does

not have a privilege in relation to Yoho’s personal knowledge, personal e-

mail and personal conversations. There is no action to be taken by the House

in relation to Yoho’s testimony in this matter. His designation as

Congressman was a professional courtesy and one letter at issue was

addressed to him as such. Accordingly, the Subpoena must not be quashed

based on sovereign immunity.

4



11/69

II.

The Subpoena Must Not Be Quashed Because It Does Seek “Material and

Relevant” Testimony.

House Rule VIII does not apply as the requested testimony of Yoho, as

it does not relate to the official functions of the House. House Rule VIII.1.

House Rule VIII. There is no challenge to the House or its official actions, as

distinguished from United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892); see also

United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932) cited by Yoho’s counsel.

House Rule VIII.3 authorizes congressional employees to respond to

properly issued subpoenas only if, among other things, the information sought

is “material and relevant.” Here the requesting testimony is material and

relevant. See United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir. 1983)

(“In this circuit, [t]he test for materiality is whether [the information at issue]

was capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it.”). The

testimony requested of Yoho here will clearly be relevant to the underlying

tribunal and jury deciding the matter. If it is determined, although it is not,

and the Subpoena relates to Congressman Yoho’s official functions,

Congressman Yoho is authorized by House Rules to comply with the

Subpoena if the testimony sought is “material and relevant.” House Rule

VIII.3. All testimony Congressman Yoho is relevant, and material, to the

criminal indictment against Mr. Trussell, as set forth below. The extent of

Yoho’s knowledge and involvement is much more than one conversation in

5



12/69

DC. It goes to the heart of the intent, credibility, injury, impeachment of

victim, the numerous defenses, including good-faith and immunity, and the

first amendment rights to assemble and express opinions, as well as potential

improper arrest and incarceration of Trussell.

Congressman Yoho has personal knowledge related to the ‘necessary’ conduct

of Trussell and Siegmeister.

The allegation that ‘since the criminal information has been filed, Yoho has not

had any significant contact with Mr. Trussell’ is in contradiction of the

documents produced by, and the deposition testimony of Siegmeister, as well

as the testimony of Dowdell and others who were present at meetings, and the

e-mails and letters. See Composite Exhibit 2 for the relevant E-mails and letter.

Yoho’s testimony will produce admissible evidence at trial.

Relevancy- Slochowsky Case

In Slochowsky, “the County district attorney brought a motion to quash a

subpoena served upon her by attorneys for defendants on grounds that the

testimony was irrelevant and privileged. The Supreme Court, Trial Term,

Kings County, Gerald Adler, J., held that: (1) privilege is not a proper issue

raised on a motion to quash a subpoena ad testificandum; (2) relevancy is not

an issue which may be raised by a motion to quash a subpoena ad

testificandum; and (3) defendants had a right to adduce the relevant and

6



13/69

material evidence that the district attorney might have.” People v.

Slochowsky, 116 Misc.2d 1069 (1982), 456 N.Y.S.2d 1018, Kings County,

New York, Trial Term, Part 24.

“Privilege is not a proper issue raised on a motion to quash a subpoena ad

testificandum since privilege may not be asserted in advance of question

actually propounded; rather, proper method of asserting privilege is upon

witness taking the witness stand and being asked questions regarding any

privileged matter.” Id. In Slochowsky, ‘the court further found that the proper

method of asserting privilege is upon the witness taking the witness stand and

being asked questions regarding any privileged matter.’ ( Matter of Pennock v.

Lane, 18 A.D.2d 1043, 1044, 238 N.Y.S.2d 588; Matter of Bonanno v. Ryan,

18 Misc.2d 711, 190 N.Y.S.2d 508, affd. 9 A.D.2d 605, 191 N.Y.S.2d 356).

Further, “relevancy is not an issue which may be raised by a motion to quash a

subpoena ad testificandum, since a motion to quash can only raise validity of

the subpoena or jurisdiction of the issuing authority.” Id. In Slochowsky, “the

County district attorney was not entitled to have quashed subpoena ad

testificandum served upon her by attorney for defendants on ground that

testimony was irrelevant where it could not be said that the subpoena was

issued for purposes of harassment, there was good-faith basis for issuance of the

subpoena, and affidavit of district attorney was insufficient to show that she

lacked relevant evidence, since defendants had a right to adduce relevant and

7


http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959117322&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959117322&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959207656&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959207656&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959207656&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959117322&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959117322&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1959117322&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1963120418&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)


14/69

material evidence which district attorney might have.” Id.

“With regard to relevancy the court in Santangello v. People, 38 N.Y.2d 536

stated at page 539, 381 N.Y.S.2d 472, 344 N.E.2d 404, “A motion to quash is

limited in scope, challenging only the validity of the subpoena or the

jurisdiction of the issuing authority...” (emphasis supplied) It would appear

that a motion to quash can only raise the validity of the subpoena or the

jurisdiction of the issuing authority.” Id.

“The reason for the rule that on a motion to quash a subpoena the relevancy of

the purported testimony cannot be challenged was best stated by Mr. Justice

Cardoza in Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 176 N.E. 537.

The court in discussing the power to issue a subpoena ad testificandum stated,

“They (the power to subpoena) will be rendered to a large extent abortive if

his subpoenas are to be quashed in advance of any hearing at the instance

of unwilling witnesses upon forecasts of the testimony and nicely balanced

arguments as to its probable importance.” (pg. 381, 176 N.E. 537)

(emphasis supplied). The court thus felt that prophesying the probable

importance of a witness would in effect destroy the very power to subpoena

(See also Matter of Sheeler v. Buffalo Wire Works, 50 Misc.2d 158, 269

N.Y.S.2d 897)’ Id.

8


http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1966127097&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1931101301&pubNum=577&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976110436&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)


15/69

““In this regard the court notes the cases of People v. McClinton, 75 A.D.2d

900, 428 N.Y.S.2d 61 leave to appeal denied, 51 N.Y.2d 882, and People v.

Forbes, 87 A.D.2d 829, 449 N.Y.S.2d 9. In both those cases the Appellate

Division stated that “The right to present evidence by witnesses of one's own

choosing is a fundamental ingredient of due process ( Jenkins v. McKeithan, 395

U.S. 411, 429, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 23 L.Ed.2d 404), and the testimony of a

defendant's witness should not be prospectively excluded unless it is offered in

palpably bad faith...” (People v. Forbes, 87 A.D.2d at page 829, 449 N.Y.S.2d

9 and People v. McClinton, 75 A.D.2d at page 900, 428 N.Y.S.2d 61). In effect

what the District Attorney is attempting to accomplish is to have this court

prospectively exclude testimony of a defendant's witness. This appears to be a

violation of the right of a defendant to present evidence by witnesses of his own

choosing. In both of the above cases the Appellate Court criticized the trial

court for requiring a showing of relevance regarding a defendant's witness. In

this case the District Attorney seeks to quash the subpoena on the grounds of

relevance. This court does not see any distinction between what the District

Attorney seeks to do and that which the Appellate Division, 2d Department has

criticized and found to be unacceptable. The court found that a claim of

irrelevancy cannot be used on a motion to quash a subpoena.” Id.

9


http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&pubNum=605&cite=51NY2D882&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&pubNum=605&cite=51NY2D882&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=155&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_155_829&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_155_829http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=155&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_155_829&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_155_829http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=155&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_155_829&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_155_829http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=155&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_155_829&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_155_829http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1969133009&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_1852&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)&co_pp_sp_708_1852http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982116287&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&pubNum=605&cite=51NY2D882&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&pubNum=605&cite=51NY2D882&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980113876&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)


16/69

“However, since there is apparently a legitimate reading of People v.

Fleschner, supra and dicta in Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d, 314, 383

N.Y.S.2d 590, 347 N.E.2d 915, supra that may indicate that relevancy is a

proper issue for a motion to quash, this court will address that issue. In

DelVecchio v. White Plains Unit, 64 A.D.2d 975, 408 N.Y.S.2d 802, the

Mayor and Council Members were subpoenaed to appear in an Administrative

proceeding. The Mayor and Council Members petitioned Special Term to

quash the subpoena, and the motion to quash was granted. The Appellate

Division, 2d Department in reversing Special Term, stated at page 976, 408

N.Y.S.2d 802, “We therefore do not agree with Special Term's conclusion that

there is ‘credence to the charge that [the union's purpose] was to harass the

busy men and women who are the Mayor and Council Members of the City of

White Plains'. But even if it could *1074 be plausibly argued that this were

so, that in itself would ‘not justify suppression of the subpoenas as a matter

of law at this time’ (See Matter of Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314,

318, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590, 347 N.E.2d 915). An attorney has a presumptive right

to issue a subpoena (CPLR 2302) and this applies to attendance in an

administrative as well as a judicial proceeding (citations omitted)”.” Id.

““To require the defendants under these conditions to accept the affidavit

without giving the court the opportunity to observe the witness and without

giving the opportunity to the attorneys to question the witness would appear to

10


http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000300&cite=NYCPS2302&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000300&cite=NYCPS2302&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000300&cite=NYCPS2302&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978125667&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1976111348&pubNum=605&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979117803&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)


17/69

this court, to be in violation of the defendants' right to confront witnesses

against them.” Id. “This court, from the outset, has also stated that it considers

the claim made in the moving papers in the first allegation of prosecutorial

misconduct to include a claim not only under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

but under both State and Federal due process. In this regard, the court has, on

several occasions early in the proceedings, stated that it considered this

proceeding in the nature of an Isaacson hearing, State v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d

511, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78. Isaacson is not limited to the particular

facts of the case as claimed by the District Attorney. In People v. Rao, 73

A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, the court extended the Isaacson doctrine to

impropriety by the special prosecutor. In People v. Mason, 97 Misc.2d 706, 411

N.Y.S.2d 970, the court extended the Isaacson doctrine to a situation whether

there was interference with a right to counsel.” Id. “The court notes that a written

motion has been submitted to amend the defendants' papers to reflect all

previous discussions in this area. The People have had notice for almost six

weeks of the very nature of this proceeding. In this regard it is relevant to an

Isaacson hearing whether there has been a pattern of misconduct on the part of

the District Attorney not only in this matter but in other similar matters. (People

v. Schwartz, App.Div., 1982, 455 N.Y.S.2d 650). Many authors have attributed

the leading case of Miranda to the fact that the court considered prior situations

where police abused the defendants' rights. The court, after considering other

11


http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1982149334&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1979144502&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1980103072&pubNum=602&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1978124937&pubNum=578&originatingDoc=Ib840ae4bd90911d983e7e9deff98dc6f&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.UserEnteredCitation)


18/69

cases, decided that corrective action was necessary. The policies both before

and after the plea herein are relevant in determining the sanctions to be imposed,

if in fact there is a violation of the defendants' rights. This court at this time,

has not determined whether there has been such a violation. The court further

finds, after seven weeks of hearings, that the District Attorney may have relevant

and material evidence which the defendants have a right to adduce at this

hearing. For all reasons herein, the motion to quash the subpoena is denied.””

Id.

Based on the relevancy argument as set forth above, Trussell has met his burden

of proof as to the relevancy.

III. The Subpoena Should Not Be Quashed Because Mr. Trussell Can

Establish the Extraordinary Circumstances Required to Compel

Congressman Yoho’s Testimony.

As cited by Yoho’s counsel, United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,

422 (1941) is distinguishable in that we are not seeking any testimony in

relation to any proceeding or administrative orders.

As cited by Yoho’s counsel, In re United States (Kessler), 985 F.2d

510, 513 (11th Cir. 1993) ordered district court to quash subpoena of high-

ranking government official called to testify as witness; “Because of the time

constraints and multiple responsibilities of high officials, courts discourage

parties from calling them as witnesses and require exigent circumstances to

justify a request for their testimony.”

12



19/69

In this matter the Defendant Trussell will absolutely agree to this Court

Staying the State case until Yoho is available and it does not interfere with his

duties as a ‘high official’. Further, to distinguish Bogan v. City of Boston, 489

F.3d 417, 423 (1st Cir. 2007), Trussell is not seeking the reasons for Yoho

taking official action, we are seeking the personal knowledge of Yoho in

relation to at least four known conversations, numerous e-mails, deposition

testimony of the victim, and a letter addressed to Yoho concerning Trussell.

The relevant conversations are summarized herein and in the Exhibits

attached, as Composite Exhibits 1 and 2.

There are extraordinary circumstances requiring the discovery sought

from Yoho in that he is the only one that can testify to the four conversations

he partook in with Trussell, Siegmeister, and Dowdell, can authenticate

documents, can express Trussell’s statements to him and his to others, can

explain the ‘sovereign citizen’ theory that he was told by Siegmeister, which

may have changed his position or ‘warned him off’, as well as other relevant

and necessary testimony. These witnesses cannot testify to hearsay comments

at a criminal trial and the only one who can testify to Yoho’s knowledge and

documents is Yoho.

Brief Summary of Conversations And Evidence

First conversation of May 2014 in D.C. is summarized in the Exhibit to

Yoho’s Motion which was addressed, which goes to the intent of Trussell.

13



20/69

The second relevant conversations was in a meeting with Ted Yoho,

around 7 P.M., October, 14 2014, between Rodger Dowdell, Marie Trussell,

Canetha Dodd, and Rodger Dowdell, an administrator for Florida’s Common

Law Grand Jury movement. They met with Yoho and presented him with the

circumstances of Trussell’s arrest for failure to appear in court, while standing

in court, five minutes before court was noticed to begin. More than 50 witness

affidavits (previously filed with a motion to recuse and otherwise with

administrative agencies) confirm the events of October 9, 2014, when Trussell

was effectively deprived of his constitutional rights by order of the judge,

forcing his absence from his noticed court appearance. Subsequent discovery

has revealed a possible concerted effort involving numerous persons to affect

the possible pre-planned arrest in the courtroom, in front of more than a

hundred witnesses. Ted Yoho at that meeting, emphatically committed to Mr.

Dowdell, that he would help Trussell.

A third meeting took place with Yoho at the Brass Monkey,

Gainesville, FL, on or about May 23, 2015, Trussell’s wife, Marie, and

Trussell met with Ted Yoho to bring him up to date on the progress of the

defense against State’s prosecution. During the discussion, many details of

how the defense were developing and how discovery was revealing State had

not conducted any substantive investigation of the case, or had any

understanding of the circumstances surrounding the charges were discussed,

14



21/69

since the grand jury information was hidden. Yoho was very attentive and

understood the points made. Again, Yoho expressed his sympathy to the

Trussell family plight and offered to consider anything he could do to help.

There were also two conversations with the purported victim

Siegmeister as testified by him in his two deposition excerpts attached, as well

as the documents (e-mails, letter, promises to assist) produced to the Defense

in this matter by Siegmeister. See Composite Exhibits 1 and 2 attached.

Siegmeister testified to Yoho’s involvements and knowledge, which is

extremely important to numerous defenses and negating elements of the the

criminal charges in the state case.

Further, Yoho is the only one that can confirm his e-mail agreeing to

assist Trussell, to the now deceased witness Roy Callahan. This e-mail was

produced to the Defense from the purported victim Jeffrey Siegmeister, who

is also the State Attorney of the 3rd Judicial Circuit in Florida. Callahan was

previously listed as a Defense Witness. Yoho is the only witness who can

verify and testify to the authenticity of this e-mails due to the death of the

recipient.

Further, in his deposition, Siegmeister testified to ‘warning off’

Yoho from helping Trussell, due in part to ‘philosophy’ and Siegmeister

provided e-mails and a letter to Yoho from now deceased Callahan. Attached

as Composite Exhibit 1 is the E-mail chain, and the letter to Yoho, including

15



22/69

Yoho’s assistance offer to Trussell. Apparently, Yoho was ‘warned off’

helping Trussell by the purported victim, Siegmeister, in this fourteen felony

count criminal case in which Trussell is looking at the potential of 70 years in

prison. This issue goes to intent and credibility and potential violations of

interference with the Defense. Also attached are excerpts from the two

deposition of Jeff Siegmeister (Composite Exhibit 1), in which Yoho and

(Composite Exhibit 2 the related documents) are discussed. The undersigned

apologizes for the darkness of the letter, but this is how the production, via

camera, was reproduced.

This case is distinguishable from Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y of

Labor , 766 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985), in that we are seeking Yoho’s

personal knowledge of relevant conversations with Trussell and Siegmeister,

as well as his resulting personal actions due to the ‘warning off’ by

Siegmeister, not any official actions of the Government.

Yoho is the local representative of Dixie County, where Trussell resides, and

he is up for re-election in a newly defined district, not including Dixie

County. However, at the time of the conversations, e-mails and potential

threats to, or ‘warning off’, Yoho was the representative of Dixie County.

The circumstances are extraordinary in that the knowledge is personal to

Yoho, and the ‘warning off’ may have significantly influenced Yoho’s

personal actions. Yoho also has personal knowledge of Trussell’s case, from

16



23/69

meeting with Trussell again, after Trussell was arrested in court at his

arraignment, for ‘failure to appear’, five minutes prior to the noticed hearing.

Yoho was shown the video of this ‘in-court arrest’ for ‘failure to appear’ and

Yoho’s testimony is crucial.

According to, Wirtz v. Local 30, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 34 F.R.D.

13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), a clear showing is made herein that Yoho’s

attendance at Trial is essential to prevent prejudice or injustice to Trussell.

Yoho’s testimony goes to the intent of Trussell, Trussell’s statements to

Yoho, authentication of Yoho’s statements and e-mails, to the potential

impeachment of the only purported victim who is attending the trial, and to

Yoho’s conversations with Siegmeister; all of which may exonerate Trussell.

For Trussell to be forced to continually disclose this much information, over

and over again, is a clear violation of Trussell’s due process rights. However,

to respond this this Motion, Trussell has once again disclosed relevant

Defense information to protect Trussell’s rights, although it violates Trussell’s

due process rights. Because this is a case involving mostly Public Officials,

Trussell is continually denied his due process rights by being forced to

disclose, in advance, his strategies and anticipated witness testimony and

areas of questioning. This is yet again, another example of Trussell being

deprived of his due process rights and proper trial preparation, by compelling

Trussell to address peripheral issues.

17



24/69

Members of Congress may be covered in a matter as to which he has

only a tangential association would unduly burden his ability to fulfill his

governmental responsibilities, however, the exceptional circumstances have

been presented herein.

As cited by Yoho’s attorney, Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. United

Transp. Union, No. 89- misc-0073, 1989 WL 225031, at *2 (D.D.C. May 18,

1989) is distinguishable as that related to a deposition or producing

documents because discovery would “disrupt [his] work as the ranking

Minority Member of the House Appropriations Committee”. However, this is

a major criminal Trial wherein Trussell will die in prison if he loses at trail

due to the deprivation of his due process and ability to subpoena witnesses,

and as a result is sentenced to 22 or 70 years, as Trussell is 72 years old. This

subpoena is not to inconvenience the work schedule of Yoho. Trussell again

states unequivocally that he requests that the Trial be stayed by this

Honorable Court until such time witness Yoho is available, and it does not

interfere with his important work schedule. Trussell needs Yoho at his trial.

Contrary to Yoho’s position, Bardoff v. United States, 628 A.2d 86, 90

(D.C. 1993) is not applicable as there are not others who were present at the

meetings, telephone call or e-mail, who did not hold such high office and who

could testify to Yoho’s knowledge. The policy reason that “the practice of

calling high officials as witnesses should be discouraged” is that “[h]igh

18



25/69

ranking government officials have greater duties and time constraints

than other witnesses.” In re United States (Kessler), 985 F.2d at 512 does not

apply to this circumstance of Yoho’s personal knowledge, meetings, e-mails

and involvement. There should be no greater duty than protecting the life and

liberty of his constituents.

Additionally, the e-mail used by Yoho is his personal e-mail address

[email protected], and his actions, meetings, and promises were of a more

personal nature and not involved with Government operations, decision-

making, or sovereignty. See Exhibit 1 page 3. The meetings all took place in

arenas outside of Yoho’s official scope of business as set forth above.

As to the Three factors in the case law set forth by Yoho’s Counsel, at

least three factors must be present before extraordinary circumstances can be

found: (i) the information sought must not be obtainable elsewhere; (ii) the

information sought must be essential (not merely relevant) to the party’s case;

and (iii) provision of the testimony must not interfere with the official’s

government responsibilities. See, e.g., In re FDIC, 58 F.3d at 1060-62;

Marisol A. v. Giuliani, No. 95-cv-10533, 1998 WL 132810, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 23, 1998)

Mr. Trussell has shown his special need or situation compelling Yoho’s

testimony is essential to Trussell’s case and that this evidence is not available

through any alternative source or less burdensome means.

19


mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


26/69

In response to Yoho’s attorneys’ first factor, Mr. Trussell has

demonstrated above that Congressman Yoho possesses material and relevant

information, not obtainable elsewhere. The representations that ‘Yoho has no

first-hand, personal knowledge that bears on the alleged conduct at issue is

incorrect. Yoho’s attorneys’ comments that ‘common sense dictates that any

such information more readily would be available from other individuals,

including, but not limited to, Mr. Trussell himself or Colonel Harry Riley

(Ret.),’ who Mr. Trussell indicated was a participant in the referenced

conversation’ is incorrect. Hearsay is not admissible in the criminal case

without proper exception or exemption and Yoho’s statements, e-mails,

conversations are exclusively his testimony. Mr. Trussell has met the burden

of making the necessary showing that the information is not available

elsewhere. Once again, in all fairness to Yoho’s counsel, this is the first time

he is receiving these documents in the Exhibit 1, due in part to time

constraints preparing for an imminent trial in order to save the life of Trussell,

and due in part to Trussell’s due process rights being violated by having to

disclose information in advance again and again and again in this criminal

matter.

With respect to the second factor, Yoho has personal knowledge of the

actions for which Mr. Trussell has been charged, he has had numerous

conversations, reviewed the video of previous court hearings, met with

20



27/69

Trussell and Dowdell for hours discussing this matter directly, has had

conversations with Siegmeister, sent an e-mail he was going to assist Trussell,

has received letters from others in relation to Trussell, etc. Mr. Trussell has

demonstrated why the testimony he seeks from Congressman Yoho is

“essential” (and not merely relevant) to his case.

With respect to the third factor, there is no dispute that compliance with

the Subpoena would interfere with the official responsibilities of

Congressman Yoho. The D.C. Circuit has noted that “service in the United

States Congress is not a job like any other.” United States v. Rostenkowski, 59

F.3d 1291, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “[T]he life of a congressman-as incumbent

legislator and perpetual candidate for office” is one in which the Member’s

“official day ends only after a round of nominally ‘social’ events at which he

is obliged to appear, and whose weekends and holidays are only an

opportunity to reconnect with his constituents.” Id . This aptly pertains to

Congressman Yoho. However, this does not excuse Yoho from testifying, it

only changes the potential time of the testimony. Trussell requests this

Honorable Court to Stay the State Case or to Remove the State Case in order

that Yoho can honor his obligations and Trussell can have a fair trial.

According to Yoho’s counsel, during the week of June 6, 2016, the date

for which Congressman Yoho is subpoenaed to testify, Congress is scheduled

to be in session, meaning that Congressman Yoho is required by House Rule

21



28/69

to be present to cast votes on the floor of the House. See House Rule III.1.

Again, Trussell reiterates that Yoho’s testimony is needed at trial and Trussell

requests that this Honorable Court stay the State Case to allow Yoho to

complete his duties and then when available, the trial can be either removed to

federal court or reset. The State Court has been quashing subpoenas

constantly without regard to Trussell’s constitutional rights, and without

regard to Trussell’s due process rights, mostly without properly noticed

hearing, without hearing, without an opportunity to be heard, and demanding

very specific factual nature and line of information against Trussell’s due

process rights. Trussell will never have a fair trial under the circumstances

given the political nature, the venue, the constant deprivation of his

constitutional and due process rights. All Trussell is seeking is the ability to

present a case, examine and cross examine relevant witnesses, effective

assistance of counsel, and his constitutional rights not being trampled as they

have been. Even in this response Trussell has been forced to disclosure

information he should never have been forced to disclose, as it violates his

due process rights. However, to aid this Court in understanding the extend and

necessity of Yoho’s testimony, it has been disclosed to Trussell’s detriment, if

the case remains in the State Court, where the prosecutor and purported victim

can prepare using this information that would have never been disclosed

except for this response.

22



29/69

For all these reasons, Mr. Trussell has demonstrated, that sufficiently

“extraordinary circumstances” are present here, and, therefore, the Subpoena

should not be quashed; however the state criminal trial should be stayed to

allow Yoho to perform his duties as required by law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Non-Party

Congressman Ted Yoho’s motion to quash in part and grant it in part. It

should be granted as to the timing, by ordering the trial court to stay the trial

until such time Yoho is available to testify, however the subpoena must not be

quashed in full.

23



30/69

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This memorandum complies with the type-volume limitations of Local

Rule 7.1(F) because it contains 6,652 words, excluding parts of the

memorandum exempted by Local Rule 7.1(F). This memorandum also has

been prepared in 14- point Times New Roman type and is double-spaced

between lines under Local Rule 5.1(C).

/s/ Inger Garcia,Esq.


4839 Volunteer Road; #514 Davie, FL 33330


Tel: (954) 894-9962

Fax: (954) 446-1635

[email protected]


May 27, 2016

24



31/69


32/69

Case 1:16-cv-00188-MW-GRJ Document 9-1 Filed 05/27/16 Page 1 of 27


33/69



34/69


USDCNDF ECF 9 State v Trussell - Trussell's Response to Yoho Motion to Quash Subpoena

Documents

Transcript of USDCNDF ECF 9 State v Trussell - Trussell's Response to Yoho Motion to Quash Subpoena