1

U.S. WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND ITS

IMPACT ON PAK-U.S. RELATIONS (2001-2008)

LUBNA SUNAWAR

Registration No: NDU-PCS-PH.D/S-09/006

A PHD DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES (PCS)

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD (NDU)

PAKISTAN

2016

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PhD SCHOLAR’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis submitted by me titled “U.S. War against Terrorism and its

Impact on Pak-U.S. Relations (2001-2008)” is based on my own original research work and has

not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Date: Lubna Sunawar

PhD Scholar

Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS)

National Defence University, Islamabad

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SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION

This is to certify that PhD dissertation submitted by LUBNA SUNAWAR to the Department of

Peace & Conflict Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad, Registration No: NDU-

PCS-PhD/S-09/006 titled, “U.S. War against Terrorism and its impact on Pak-U.S. Relations

(2001-2008) is supervised by me for fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in

Peace & Conflict Studies (PCS).

Date: Dr. Noman Sattar

Area Study Centre

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The endless thanks goes to Allah Almighty for all the blessings He has showered onto me, which has enabled me to complete this research work. I have been blessed by Almighty with some extraordinary people who have spun a web of support around me.

Words can never be enough in expressing how grateful I am to those incredible people in my life who made this dissertation possible.

First and foremost, I want to thank my Mummy and Daddy for their all time support,

love, and guidance. Thank you for letting me find my own way. Thank you for acknowledging for how hard I have worked, but also know that I would not be here without you. Thank you for always holding my hand through the things that make me

nervous. This PhD dissertation would not have been possible without the wholehearted support of my lovely parents whose kind encouragement have been a motivating factor and a source of strength for me from every perspective. I really appreciate and

acknowledge your patience and your valuable contribution in accomplishing this arduous task. You’re the best parents in the world and I owe my success to you. You have truly been the best support system I could have ever asked for. Each thing you do

for me is a stair I climb to reach the platform where I now stand. I would like to thank my sisters and brothers, Nabeela, Aneeqa, Bilal, and Talal for all their love and unending encouragement in making this PhD dissertation better than it started out; and a big thank you goes to my online families at Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland

and American Graduate School, Paris. I’m indebted to my research supervisor Dr. Noman Sattar for going through the

drafts and keeping me on the track. He has been so generous in dealing with my

queries and each meeting with him added invaluable aspects to the implementation and broadened my perspective.

I gratefully acknowledge the French Government initiative- a PhD Split Fellowship

which I obtained in 2013 for Paris. I was funded by the French Government and this generous funding made my PhD. research work invaluable in many ways. It was more than I had ever hoped for in my research life. I consider it a great honor to have been

part of School of Politics and International Relations at American Graduate School (AGS) in Paris as a visiting research scholar. During my stay at the host institution, Dr. Tatiana Coutto supervised my research work. I would like to pay my heartfelt thanks for

her untiring support and guidance throughout my research journey and for turning the most unlikely dreams into realities. Above all, she provided me with unflinching encouragement and support in various ways whilst allowing me the room to work in my

own way. Her drive for scientific excellence has pushed me to aspire for the same. She was the best choice I could have made for an advisor. Sometime we are just (or incredibly) lucky!!! One simply could not wish for a better or friendlier supervisor. I am

indebted to her more than she knows. We are working together on peer reviewed articles and I would love to work with her on many such projects in future too. My time at American Graduate School, Paris was made enjoyable in large part due to the many

friends and groups that became a part of my life and family; Ma’am Muriel (Registrar) at American Graduate School is one of them. I cannot forget her very friendly nature and administrative support she rendered throughout my research stay at AGS, Paris.

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I will be failing in my duty if I don’t acknowledge some of key diplomats, experts and research scholars I met in Paris. I shared my research experiences and got their

valuable perspectives on my research subject by conducting formal talks/interviews. I’m greatly indebted to: Ghalib Iqbal (Pakistani Ambassador in Paris), Muhaamd Ijaz (Minster Chief de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris), Air Commodore Syed

Nasir Raza Hamdani (Defense and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan), Mr. Camile Grand (Director of Foundation pour la Recherché Strategique Paris), Dr. Mariam Abou Zahab (an expert on politics and social issues related to Pakistan and Afghanistan), Mr.

Gerald Stang (Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute, Paris) serving and retired Pakistan Army officers for their valuable time, for their forthright narratives, and their hospitality.

I would also like to mention my deep gratitude towards Prof. Ishtiaq Chaudhry Head of Department, Peace & Conflict Studies, National Defence University for all his kind support provided to me while I was a student in the department.

I’m grateful to Mr. Tauqeer (Controller of Examination Branch, NDU) and Tasleem Kiani (Assistant Controller of Examination, NDU) for their co-operation throughout this research work. Lastly, I would like to extend special thanks to the

unknown reviewers of my thesis for accepting to read and review this thesis.

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Dedicated with Extreme Affection and Gratitude To the Loving Memory of My Beloved Brother and My Best Friend

CAPT (SHAHEED) MUHAMMAD BILAL SUNAWAR (TBt)

HERO OF OPERATION RAH-E-NIJAT 2009

"Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding

their sustenance in the presence of their Lord. They rejoice in the Bounty provided by Allah: And with regard to those left behind, who have not yet joined them (in their bliss), the (Martyrs) glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor

have they (cause to) grieve. They glory in the Grace and Bounty from Allah, and in the fact that Allah suffereth not the reward of the faithful to be lost (in the least). (The Noble Quran, 3:169-171)" A brave valiant officer of Pakistan Army, a fourth generation officer of the family, Capt (Shaheed) Bilal was a part of “Operation Rah-e-Nijaat,” who fought vigorously with the Taliban while performing his duties. He engaged the Taliban in a fierce battle at Pash

Ziarat (South Waziristan).He kept his cool, encircled the militants and boldly charged towards them with his troops while commanding his Platoon. The terrorists were completely taken aback by the bold counter-attack from Capt (Shaheed) Bilal and his

troops. He embraced Shahadat on 20th November, 2009 while fighting vigorously with terrorists. His professionalism under pressure and ability to remain calm in what was a chaotic situation is testament to his character. The troops narrate Capt (Shaheed) Bilal’s

performance as “Selfless, brave and courageous,….”Words like these do not come close to what Capt Bilal demonstrated that day.”

My brother is my best friend, my inspiration, my strength, a guiding star, and

above all, an Angel who has always shown me the way in the darkness around. He still gives me the strength to go on when I feel I cannot. He gives me encouragement , word of advice though it may be in his own little way- in a dream, in a song I hear,

through the perfect sunset, and blowing wind, my beloved brother is always with me. He has always given me so much in life and I do not believe just saying “thank you” is enough when it comes to paying a tribute to you. I always looked up to you for

guidance, protection and advice. You never failed me and was always by my side in everything I did. You were always there to offer me a word of encouragement when I needed it. You are always there to build me up when I felt down and give me the push I

needed to accomplish something. We miss you Bilal each and every day. There is not a minute that goes without

you when you are not in our thoughts. In everything that I do, you always stand by my

side! You will be remembered as a gentleman, as a good leader who has set a precedent of extreme valor and bravery for your followers, as a most loving and caring son and, the best brother in the world. The whole Pakistani nation is indebted to you for

what you have done for this motherland. MY VALIANT SOLDIER, MY HERO, I’M EXTREMELY PROUD OF YOU May Allah Almighty bless you with eternal Peace and Happiness in Jannat ul Firdos.

Ameen sum Ameen

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Contents

1. Introduction…………………………. …………………………………...1 1.1. The Statement of the Problem…………………………………………………………...4

1.2. Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………….5

1.3. Hypothesis………………………………………………………………………………11

1.4. Research Questions……………………………………………………………………..11

1.5. Research Methodology…………………………………………………………………11

1.6. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………….12

1.7. Structure of the Dissertation…………………………………………………………….22

2. Pakistan-U.S. Relations- An Historical Perspective…………………...25 2.1.The Cold War Era……………………………………………………………………….25

2.2. Socio-Economic Impacts of the Afghanistan War on Pakistan.......................................51

3. Changing Strategic Environment of the Region - The Taliban Factor..54 3.1. The Post Cold War Era……………………………………………………………….....58

4. Terrorism and Terrorist Threats before 9/11……………………………79 4.1. Terror Threats and Responses…………………………………………………………...81

4.2. 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attacks……………………………………………...84

4.3. Unsuccessful Diplomacy before 9/11…………………………………………………...85

4.4. U.S. National Security Strategy for Al-Qaeda before 9/11……………………………..87

4.5. Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Activities before 9/11…………………………………………….88

4.6. Attacks in Kenya and Tanzania…………………………………………………………90

4.7. The Attack on the USS Cole…………………………………………………………….92

5 September 11 and its Aftermath………………………………………….94 5.1 Growth of Talibanization……………………………………………………………… .116

6 Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism………….......135 6.1. U.S. War on Terror: Impact and Apprehensions for Pakistan…………………………..141

6.2. Legal Position: Are Drone Strikes justified?....................................................................159

6.3. Postscript……………………………………………………………………………….. 166

6.3.1. Af-Pak Strategy………………………………………………………………………..166

6.3.2. Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB)……………………………………………………………….168

6.3.3. The Raymond Davis Case……………………………………………………………..170

6.3.4. The Death of Osama bin Laden……………………………………………………….171

6.3.5. Salala Border Incident………………………………………………………………...173

6.3.6. Operation Zarb-e-Azb…………………………………………………………………174

6.3.7. 2014 U.S. Drawdown: Muddling through situation for Pakistan………………..........175

.

Conclusions and Recommendations………………………………………….. 179

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Findings ………………………………………………………………………192

Appendices

Appendix-I Text of the Speech of President General Pervez Musharraf on

(September 19, 2001)

Appendix-II George W. Bush: 9/11 Address to the Nation

Appendix-III Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009

Appendix-IV Text of Obama’s Speech on Osama’s bin Laden’s death

Appendix-V A New Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Appendix-VI Questionnaire

Bibliography………………………………………………………………….194

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Abstract

Pakistan has been facing security threats since its independence, and looking for security

assurances from external sources. Its alignment policy with the U.S. has been primarily based on

its heightened sense of insecurity at different times. This sense of insecurity and the U.S. need

for allies brought the two countries together during the Cold War. Military collaboration has

been an important component of this alliance. Since then, the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship

has been a roller coaster ride with periodic highs and lows at both ends. This relationship has

been based on periods of friendship as well as mutual distrust. Pakistan and the U.S. developed

new security strategies in the region to face the growing threat from Afghanistan in the 1980s

and after 2001.

American economic aid and the arms sales packages were meant to meet Pakistan’s

security needs during the Cold War and the Afghanistan Jihad. This was also meant to promote

U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. has enforced a reactive policy towards Pakistan by relating

aid to other requirements, such as nuclear nonproliferation, strengthening of democratic

institutions and to fight terrorism.

After September 11, 2001, Pakistan and the U.S. once again formed a security

partnership. Pakistan by virtue of its geopolitical environment became a natural and frontline ally

in the U.S led global War on Terror. However, Pakistan’s role in this war is a complex

phenomenon in terms of its implications. Though, Pakistan was an isolated country prior to 9/11

due to nuclear sanctions, military takeover by General Musharraf, and close ties with the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan once again became a U.S. ally to fight terrorism. This new

relationship brought new opportunities and challenges for the two allies. While the War on

Terrorism has made Pakistan to pay a heavy price, it has managed to build a sustainable

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relationship with the U.S. However, the future remains uncertain pertaining to the conclusions of

the War on Terror, and future developments in Afghanistan.

This dissertation analyzes the deciding factors in the Pakistan-U.S. relationship in the

post 9/11 era. While the main focus remains on the complex dynamics of the relations, and

Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror is highlighted.

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Abbreviations & Acronyms

ASSP Anjuman Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan

CARs Central Asian Republics

C3I Command, Control and Communication Intelligence

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COAS Chief of Army Staff

CSF Coalition Support Fund

FATA Federal Administered Tribal Areas

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

IMF International Monetary Fund

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

ILOAC International Law of Armed Conflict

ISI Inter Services Intelligence

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISAF International Assistance Security Force

JSOC Joint Special Operation Command

KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

KLB Kerry Lugar Bill

LOAC Law of Armed Conflict

LOC Line of Control

MCA Military Commission Act

MEDO Middle East Defense Organization

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MI Military intelligence

MSR Main Supply Route

MTCR Missile Technological Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NPT Nuclear Proliferation Treaty

NWFP North West Frontier Province

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

PML Pakistan Muslim League

PPP Pakistan People Party

PDPA People Democratic Party of Afghanistan

POWs Prisoners of War

RAW Research and Analysis Wing

RCD Regional Co-Operation for Development

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SAARC South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation

SCO Shanghai Co-operation Organization

SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization

TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

UAE United Arab Emirates

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UNMA United Nation Mission in Afghanistan

UNSC United Nation Security Council

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTC World Trade Center

List of Maps

Pakistan and it’s Immediate Neighbors…………………………………………………..28

District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa………………………………………..57

The Build-up of Kargil Conflict 1999……………………………………………………72

Map of Pakistan…………………………………………………………………………140

List of Tables

Pakistani Military Casualties 2001-2011……………………………………………………….118

List of Figures

U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan……………………………………………………………..….162

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Chapter -1

Introduction

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been moving from one crisis to another and even

after sixty nine years of existence, Pakistan is facing numerous problems and challenges. The

history of U.S.-Pakistan relations can be categorically divided into three different periods. Each

one of these periods contribute toward intense engagement with the U.S., subsequently followed

by a period of severance, even moving towards periods of sanctions and disengagements. In

total, U.S.-Pakistan relationship witnesses three major military engagements.

The first two engagements took place during the peak of the Cold War era (1950s and

1960s) and then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980s) when Pakistan fought a proxy

war in Afghanistan with Mujahedin to defeat the Red Army in the region. This war lasted for a

decade and finally concluded with the signing of the Geneva Accords. The third military

engagement started in the wake of September 11, 2001, which is directly related to the War on

Terrorism.

Cold War Engagement: When Pakistan emerged on the map of the world in 1947, the Cold

War had just started. That was the period when the U.S. was direly looking for allies in South

Asia to fight against Communism. Economic and military imbalances against India in the east

and unfriendly and hostile Afghanistan in the north-west made Pakistan deeply conscious of its

security and survival and it was looking for ways to redress it. Tensions with India in the form of

incessant confrontational attitude, and Kashmir issue brought Pakistan closer to the U.S to form

an alliance. On the north-west front, Afghanistan had cordial relations with the Indian Congress

who had never accepted the existence of Pakistan whole-heartedly. Moreover, Durand Line has

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been a bilateral issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kabul had not accepted Durand Line as

an international border and was the first Muslim country which opposed the entry of Pakistan in

the United Nations. These heightened security concerns from the neighboring countries and need

for economic development compelled Pakistan to look towards the U.S. for support. Pakistan’s

geo-strategic location proved to be a value added factor in the region and the U.S. offered

Pakistan military assistance. Pakistan signed South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in

1954, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 and Pakistan-U.S Co-operation Agreement

in 1959, thus making Pakistan the most allied ally in South Asia in the 1950s.

Fight against Communism: In the decade of 1980s, the resistance against the Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan offered a new opportunity to bring the two countries together to

minimize differences on the pretext of containing Communism. During this period, which lasted

till 1990, Pakistan acted as a frontline state to promote U.S. interests in containing Communism.

Pakistan became a recipient of economic and military aid packages amounting to $1.625 billion

spread over economic assistance and $1.5 billion in military assistance1 for six years for its role

in the Afghan Jihad. 2

But with the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and dismemberment of the

Soviet Union, Pakistan lost its importance for the U.S. as a frontline state. Pakistan was left alone

to deal with the outcome of the war-torn and politically unstable Afghanistan.

Post-Cold War Era can be termed as the era of disengagement and sanctions in the history

of Pak-U.S. relations. The U.S. imposed Pressler Amendment which was introduced in 1985 but

was finally implemented in the 1990s on the pretext of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Moreover,

many other major issues contributed to strain Pak-U.S. relations including Indian propagation of

1S.M.Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 451. 2 Raziullah Azmi, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994, p.29.

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labeling Pakistan as a terrorist state because of its alleged support to the Kashmiri Mujahedin.

Pakistan recognized the Taliban when they were in power in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s

until 2001. Throughout this period, Pak-U.S. relations were at the lowest ebb. Kargil crisis,

nuclear explosions of 1998 and finally bloodless military takeover by General Musharraf in 1999

brought democracy sanctions against Pakistan. During this period, Pakistan’s status of most

favored allied ally changed ultimately to most sanctioned ally by number of legislations made

against Pakistan from time to time.

Post 9/11 Relationship: After the shocking incidents of 9/11, Pakistan once again became a

frontline state in the U.S led war in Afghanistan. Thus the 9/11 incident provided a chance for

both countries to work under close military collaboration. Though Pakistan joined this war

reluctantly but has been the most active frontline state to contain Al-Qaeda and the Taliban

forces posing a continuing security threat for Pakistan. Pakistan has got involved in this War

against Terrorism to such an extent that its own internal security is badly endangered.

Pakistan’s co-operation with the U.S. included: granting logistics base facilities, sharing

military and human intelligence, and capturing and handing of Al-Qaeda suspects, sealing off

Pakistan’s western border and making its two naval bases, three air force bases, and its airspace

available to the U.S. military action in Afghanistan.3

The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. mainland created a difficult diplomatic ground for Pakistan

to negotiate with the U.S as it had been supporting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Basically,

Pakistan was left with only two options to go with: to stay as a supporter of the Taliban without

giving in to any international pressure; or to simply join the American-led international forces

3 The 9/11 Commission Report, London: Norton Company, 2003, p. 331.

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against terrorism (the War against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban) in Afghanistan without any

immediate delay.

However, without any doubt that was a difficult decision which President Musharraf had

to make in the better interest of the country under immense pressure which he had been facing

domestically and internationally on how to move forward vis-à-vis U.S. demands and

expectations in the coming days. President Musharraf admitted that he had taken the hard

decision of offering “open-handed support” to the U.S. under immense pressure, and dire

consequences and repercussions. He further added, in case of refusal to the U.S. demands, a

possibility of direct military action by a coalition of the U.S., India, and Israel against Pakistan

was inevitable.4

Pakistan has been going through a difficult phase as a frontline state against the War on

Terrorism. Today, Pakistan is involved in the U.S. led war to such an extent that its’ own

security and survival is endangered and has now become a victim of terrorism.

1.1 The Statement of the Problem

Pakistan and the U.S. have become allies when the situation in the region threatened the U.S.

interests as during the Cold War and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The post 9/11

shift in world politics brought Pakistan and the U.S. closer to face the post 9/11 challenges to the

U.S. security.

Pakistan joined the U.S. led War on Terrorism as a coalition partner. As in the past, the

two allies developed a closer partnership in military, economic and political fields. This had deep

implications for bilateral relations that has seen many ups and downs in its history. Pakistan

offered the U.S. its support in America’s war in Afghanistan, Pakistan also received economic

4 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism Allah, the Army & America’s War on Terror, New York: East

Gate, 2005, p. 221.

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and military assistance in this region. Despite this close collaboration, the relationship could not

be smooth in the long run. The U.S. policy of drone attacks in Pakistan’s Tribal areas,

differences over fighting terrorism and drawdown in Afghanistan led to differences between two

countries. While the two administrations try to overcome these differences, many issues

remained unresolved and leading to anti-Americanism and periodic strains.

A post 9/11 world offered challenges and opportunities for Pakistan and the U.S. and

brought serious implications for bilateral relations as well. This also had a bearing on both

countries relations with the regional countries (India and Afghanistan). The War on Terror thus

can be analyzed from the perspective of how a superpower manages an alliance relationship.

This will be addressed from Pakistan’s perspective in the light of Balance of Threat Theory

proposed by Stephen M. Walt and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s model of Complex

Interdependence.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

First is the Realists’ insight that there are no permanent friends or foes in international politics,

only permanent (national) interests. Every nation state in the international system pursues and

promotes its national interests. In the international system, some nation states are more powerful

than others. The powerful nation states have the capability to persuade weaker states to react in

certain predictable ways. They have the capability in terms of military and economic means to

exert influence on the weaker nations to promote their interests accordingly.

Kenneth Waltz believes that every nation state wants survival in the international political

system. The means for protecting and promoting one’s interest is power. According to Waltz,

“all states function in a similar manner in the international system; however, they are

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differentiated from one another in terms of power capability (i.e. power differentiation). Kenneth

Waltz makes a clear distinction between “strong” and ‘weak” states. Strong states or great

powers are in fact “power makers; they have the capability to change the behavior of other states.

Whereas, weak states are actually ‘power takers,’ having no choice but to follow the great

powers. Under anarchy, power differentiation ensures that all states must follow self-help or

decline and perish.”5

The Balance of Power theory is considered one of the basic mainstays of (neo) realist

theory of International Relations. This theory basically claims that states usually come together

and balance against the aggressive rising power for their security. In the international system,

which is an anarchical system and all states rely on self-help, in this way they can balance

against the rising state(s) having aggressive intentions. This balance of power theory has been a

norm of Realist theorists from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz and more recently, John

Mearsheimer. All emphasize that weaker nation balances the threat in the form of alliances

against stronger nations. Stephen Walt, however, has taken a different perspective. He says that

intentions cannot be ignored and threats are equally important and they really do matter as much

as raw power. Threats are related to power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and

perceived intentions of the enemy. Walt believes that threats have the ability to explain balancing

behavior better than power.

Neighboring states that are in close proximity are more dangerous than those that are far

away. States which do have large offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions have the ability

to threaten the sovereignty of other states with great ease; thus posing a serious danger to those

states which are economically and militarily weaker and smaller. Lastly, states with offensive

5 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.22.

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capabilities are tend to be more threatening and can create volatile situation then those states who

seek to preserve only the status quo. If balancing behavior is the norm in the international

system, then increase in any of these given factors like power, proximity, offensive capabilities,

or aggressive intentions usually encourage other states to ally against the most threatening

power.6

Thus Walt studies three types of state behavior:

Balancing is a kind of alignment against the threatening power (rather than the most

powerful one) to deter or contain the threat effectively.

Bandwagoning is an alignment with a dominant power, either to appease it or in the hope

of profiting from its victory in order to secure the interest of the state which is

comparatively weaker enough to defend itself.

Détente can be defined as the voluntary development of peaceful relations to reduce

tensions between nation states.

In historical perspective, Pakistan and the U.S. share have an unbalanced relationship primarily

based on mistrust, different perceptions and interests. Complex Interdependence and national

security are two different components which make this relationship difficult. But neither

Complex Interdependence nor national security gives a clear framework for many inter-related

problems of extensive engagement between states. International conflicts do not disappear when

interdependence prevails in a relationship but rather conflicts in place will take new forms and

6 Stephen Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization,

Cambridge MIT Press, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1988, pp. 275-316.

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may have the possibility to escalate. The traditional approaches fail to explain the

Interdependence conflict and this failure may lead to wrong analysis and bad policies.7

International politics can be defined as a struggle for power where all nation-states act like a

coherent unit to compete with each other. For political Realists, using or threatening force is the

most effective means to influence the behavior of other states. Violence which erupts between

states may take the form of war. The most important factor which dominates the international

system is the urge of a nation state to acquire strong defence by all means. The “high politics” of

important issues like military security dominates the “low politics” of economic and other social

affairs that with the passage of time become secondary issues of less importance to tackle.8

These real assumptions define an ideal type of world politics where every nation state has

a right to defend its territory and interests from real or perceived threats from the aggressive

state. In international politics, there are no permanent friends and foes and the interests of the

stronger nation prevail. Transnational actors either do not exist or are politically unimportant.

The only possible means of survival for states in international politics is to exercise force or the

threat of force. There is a clear hierarchy of issues for states in international politics which makes

it more difficult and challenging for nation states to determine fix rules pertaining to Complex

Interdependence and national security.9

In the post-Cold War era, the world has become more interdependent in economics,

communications and human aspirations. The main vital actors of this era are ‘non-territorial’

actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations and trans-national social

7 Robert J. Art & Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts & Contemporary Issues, New York:

Harper Collins College Publisher,1996, p.239. 8 Art & Jervis 239-241 9 Ibid.

22

movements which have the capability to exert great influence worldwide and have played an

effective role in bringing nation-states closer.10

Keohane and Nye are two influential theorists who have discussed interdependence in the

context of economics, communications, and human aspirations. Keohane and Nye intended to

come up with a coherent theoretical framework that could easily explicate the process of

continuity and change in order to exhibit the authenticity of Complex Interdependence in

modern-day world politics. Keohane and Nye basically explained Complex Interdependence on

the basis of three following characteristics:11

1. The main actors are states in the international system and they are closely interrelated

together via means of communication, interdependent economic structure,

multinational companies, non-intergovernmental organizations, and through process

of globalization.

2. The agenda of interstate relationships is mainly consisted of multiple issues that are

not arranged in order to form a regular pattern. In fact, there are numerous issues with

no hierarchical structure; and in this context, military security does not always

dominate the agenda.

3. The use of power in a form of military force becomes less significant when Complex

Interdependence prevails between the nation states.12

Keohane and Nye do not claim that military power is insignificant. They say that military actions

are always costly and deadly which could be avoided for a number of reasons. Keohane and Nye

emphasize the importance of transnational actors in the world politics that seek their own

10 Ibid 11Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power & Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1977, pp. 24-

26. 12 Hüseyin IŞIKSAL, “To What Extent Complex Interdependence Theorists Challenge to Structural Realist School

of International Relations?,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2004, pp. 139-142

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objectives rather than a state based desire. As a result, international organizations can play a vital

role on setting the security agendas of the weaker states because of the domestic influence these

organizations exert on the internal politics of that very state.13

In the post-Cold War era, Keohane argued that military security still plays a dominant role in

certain parts of the world where Complex Interdependence does not play influence role. On the

other hand, Complex Interdependence is a vital characteristic of democratic countries.

Eventually, the post-Cold War era can be described as a period which has witnessed the

expansion of international institutions and co-operation with gradual decline in military security

in the World Politics.14

Thus, accordingly, Complex Interdependence is a potent force which offers co-operation

between international regimes and institutions in order to prevent anarchical forces in the

international system. In addition to this, Keohane and Nye suggest that powerful institutions with

powerful norms could play a role that is similar to the powerful states both domestically and

internationally. This assumption is likely because Non-Governmental Organization’s (NGO’s)

and other networks are particularly strong enough to exert influence on states without regard to

boundaries. They use domestic public pressure to persuade political leaders to focus on their

preferred agendas.15

Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that Complex Interdependence has widened the

boundaries of the security concerns of the states much beyond the use of military security

13Ibid. 14 Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the information age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.5,

(Autumn, 1998) 81-94 15 IŞIKSAL, “To What Extent Complex Interdependence Theorists Challenge to Structural Realist School of

International Relations?,” pp. 139-142.

24

concerns including nongovernmental organizations, multinational companies, ethnic groups and

minorities.

Pakistan for the sake of its security, preservation of national interests and survival took a

U-turn and joined U.S. led coalition against terrorism. This was meant to secure its national

interests and balance the threat emanating from the U.S in the post 9/11 scenario.

1.3 Hypothesis

i. War on Terror put Pakistan’s security under severe strain and may not be able to

sustain Pak-U.S. relationship in the long run.

ii. Implications of the War on Terror have adversely affected Pak-U.S. relations and

undermined Pakistan’s security as well.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What were the external and internal security challenges related to terrorism for

Pakistan?

ii. What was the nature of the threat and what sort of implications has terrorism brought

for Pakistan?

iii. Has the nature of threat and Pakistan’s role and involvement in the War against

Terrorism changed over time?

iv. In what way does the current U.S.-Pakistan alliance differ from the earlier periods?

v. Is Pakistan a beneficiary in the War on Terror and what are Pakistan’s gains and

losses?

1.5 Research Methodology

This research is analytical based on qualitative approach to the research problem. Primary,

secondary, electronic, print media sources are used to gather data for research work, while

25

putting major emphasis on primary sources. This would be primarily based on observations and

telephonic talks/e-mails/Skype contacts; formal and informal interviews with diplomats and

scholars in France. It also includes interviews and on ground observations of Pakistani military

officers who have already served or are serving in the battle zone as a source for my research

work. I was a visiting research fellow at American Graduate School (AGS), Paris from April 1 to

September 30, 2013 under the Split PhD Program, an initiative of the French Embassy,

Islamabad. I worked under the guidance of Dr. Tatiana Coutto at AGS. This fellowship provided

me a wonderful opportunity to interact with diplomats, intellectuals, foreign research scholars in

order to collect primary data for my dissertation. Interviews with diplomats at Pakistan Embassy,

Paris, provided useful input.

1.6 Literature Review

The selected topic covers a period of eight years (2001-2008) of Pak-U.S. relations with

particular focus on post-9/11 era and its implications for Pakistan-U.S. relations. In order to

comprehend the present dynamics of Pak-U.S. relationship in the wake of 9/11, it is important to

understand the relationship during the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 era in the light of

relevant literature.

M.S. Venkataramani in The American Role in Pakistan deals with Pakistan – U.S.

Relations from 1947 – 1958. The author has given a very interesting account of Pakistan-U.S.

relations by arguing that the U.S. has always supported military regimes in Pakistan in order to

promote its own self-vested agenda in the region for which it has used Pakistan as a weight-pan.

This has never been liked by the people of Pakistan. He has primarily discussed the role of

President Ayub in promoting U.S. interests during his military tenure, i.e. 1958-1969.

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Another useful publication is the book by Robert J McMohan, titled Cold War on the

Periphery, which gives an excellent account of Pak-U.S. relations during the initial years of the

Cold War till the War with India in 1965.

G.W Choudhry’s Last Days of United Pakistan, and Rao Farman Ali’s How Pakistan Got

Divided, both publications give a very informative and balanced perspective on the 1971

dismemberment of Pakistan and discuss the factors in detail responsible for Pakistan’s break-up

from its Eastern wing.

In the U.S. – Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Power, edited by Leo E. Rose

and Noor A. Hussain, Stephen Cohen has identified few salient features of the Pakistan – U.S.

relationship during the Cold War era. In author’s opinion, U.S. – Pakistan security relations are

important for both nations. During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union had been the biggest

threat to contain. For Pakistan, on the other hand, India has been the vital security threat and this

factor overshadowed Pakistan’s relations with both the superpowers of the Cold War. He terms

the relations as unbalanced because in his opinion, the relationship has been, and may remain,

more important to Pakistan than to the U.S. itself. The U.S. has no permanent stake in the region

while Pakistan is a stake holder.

America – Pakistan Relations, Vol – I & II, edited by K. Arif, is a good collection of

official documents, speeches and other extracts related to Pak- U.S. Relations during 1947-1974.

These volumes provide an authentic resource base for research work, whereas thoughts and

opinions of different writers can be well compared with official extracts provided by the author

to arrive at meaningful conclusions.

Eagle Over Pakistan by Zubair Ahmed Firdousi is an overview of Pakistan-U.S.

relationship from independence in 1947 to the fall of Bhutto in 1977. The book gives a powerful

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account of dangers and pitfalls of a weaker nation like Pakistan with the superpower of the Cold

War, that is, the U.S.; and the obstacles which both nations faced due to divergence of their

interests and perceptions.

There is a wealth of literature available on the Pak – U.S. security relations during the

Afghan Civil War period. Two important publications by Shirin R. Tahir Kheli are significant in

this regard. These include: India, Pakistan and the U.S. breaking with the Past and the U.S. and

Pakistan – The Evolution of an Influence Relationship. The author has captured all the important

dynamics of relationship quite well. During the 1980s, Pakistan as a frontline state enjoyed the

influence and the benefits of being a partner of the U.S. in order to prevent Communism from

spreading in the region. Moreover, it discusses Pak – U.S. relations vis-a-vis India, including

future prospects, which have been covered in detail.

Robert G. Wirsings book Pakistan’s Security under Zia 1977 – 1988 gives a balanced

view of the various features and dynamics of security partnership during the critical period of

Afghan War.

Niloufer Mahdi in her book Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1971 – 1981: The Search for

Security, has described the nature of alliance of Pakistan with the U.S. The book gives a

thorough analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy compulsions from 1971 till 1981.

In Pakistan – U.S. Relations: The Recent Past, edited by Raziullah Azmi and Dr Maleeha

Lodhi analyzed the regional and global imperatives of the Pak – U.S. relationship with the

collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War. In the post Cold War period, Pakistan’s nuclear

program and the changing realities at regional and global levels made things really uncertain and

difficult for Pakistan. Its relations with Afghanistan in the early 1990s remained largely

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unsettled. In the author’s opinion, Pakistan had to redefine its foreign policy due to

rapprochement between India and China on one hand, and India and the U.S. on the other hand.

Disenchanted Allies – USA & Pakistan 1947-2001, by Dennis Kux provides deep insight

into the Pakistani and U.S. decision making process. This book presents the historic Pak-U.S.

relationship in an objective and very concise manner with highs and lows. Author’s conclusions

regarding the nature of relationship between both countries are quite interesting and thought

provoking which covers many critical phases during the Cold War and post-Cold War period.

This book, however, does not gives a clear picture of some important developments that occurred

in the wake of 9/11 attacks. However, the author has given the Pakistani perspective on the range

of bilateral issues which are of primary importance though covered in some detail, but need to be

analyzed further by utilizing primary and secondary sources.

Other books which provide a useful and deep insight into the dynamics of the Pak-U.S.

relationship are Abdul Sattar’s Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 2009, A Concise History and

S.M. Burke’s Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, An Historical Analysis. Both publications have covered

a wide range of aspects based on their convergence and divergence of interests between Pakistan

and the U.S. since the early days of Pakistan’s inception.

Ghost War: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet

Invasion to September 10, 2001 by Steve Coll highlights some of the difficulties after 9/11 due to

Pakistan’s continued support to the Taliban. In the author’s view, one of the greatest mistakes on

Pakistan’s part was its continuous meddling in Afghanistan’s political system after the Soviet

Union’s withdrawal from the region. At that time Islamabad considered it vital for its own

national interest. As Pakistan took U-turn in the wake of 9/11 which further exacerbated the

situation and gave Al-Qaeda and the Taliban opportunity to destabilize Pakistan.

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America’s Secret War - Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between the U.S. and its

Enemies by George Friedman, discusses Pakistan problems with the U.S. and major

developments in the wake of September 11. Lack of trust on Pakistan’s ability to contain

terrorism and the U.S.’ criticism of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence agencies for playing

double game pertaining to its role in dealing with terrorists discussed in detail. The author has

also highlighted the drone attacks and especially the U.S determination to prevent nuclear

weapons falling into Al-Qaeda’s hands.

The War on Terror and the Laws of War: A Military Perspective presents the work of six

American legal scholars who are considered an authority in their respective fields: Michael

Lewis, Eric Jensen, Geoffrey Corn, Victor Hansen, Richard Jackson and James Schoettler. This

book deals with the laws which are directly pertinent to the War on Terror including: targeting of

persons and property by using tactic of harassment, incarceration of combatants, interrogation

and treatment of prisoners, rules and norms regarding trial and punishment for battlefield

misconduct, command and responsibility, etc. Each chapter in the book actually addresses a

specific operational issue in a very comprehensive manner arising in the framework of the

Global War on Terror (GWOT); and demonstrates how a balance can be maintained between

authority and obligation under the laws of war. The book is based on the argument that the U.S.

has a traditional characteristic and has had a history of engagements in armed conflicts around

the globe. It would not be naïve to think that the U.S. has invoked and will continue to invoke the

Law of War against terrorist threats.

The Hunt for Khalid Sheikh Muhammad is an interesting account by Terry McDermott

and Josh Meyer who have given a comprehensive explanation of the search and capture of the

main executor of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. This gives the readers an informative

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description about the War on Terrorism at its best and worst. This is the story of determined

agents who meticulously carried out intelligence activities as they followed one of the world’s

most dangerous terrorists across the globe.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

reacted in a different manner to 9/11 incident. The authors explain “The FBI, looking at the

smoldering carcass in New York . . . instinctively asked, what happened and how? The CIA was

comparatively far better at looking past catastrophe that had occurred and asked the defining

question in that context…..What’s next?” This clearly shows the difference in tackling the same

problem but with different perspectives.

Seth Jones’s Hunting in the Shadows offers a detailing account on the War on Terror.

Seth Jones, who is a former senior adviser at the U.S. Special Operations Command has covered

every important event in such a way that it seems he has not left anything out. He has provided

terrorists profile in detail who have been involved in executing deadliest attacks since 9/11. The

author has narrated all the important terrorist acts by giving broader analysis in order to give a

clear picture to the readers. As Jones takes it, the history and brutal activities of Al-Qaeda’s war

against the Western world can be best identified as a series of “waves.” The first wave started

with the embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998, which hit the U.S. mainland in September

2001. This wave eventually ended with the U.S. led War against Terrorism and launching of

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Al-Qaeda’s leadership and Taliban in Afghanistan

and hit Pakistan with drone strikes. The second wave had begun in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq

by the U.S. and British led forces. The third wave gained momentum between 2009 and 2011

with the rise of the radical leader Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen and this third wave was concluded

with the killing of Osama bin Laden and several other Al-Qaeda leaders in 2011.

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Studying expansion of terrorism around the globe in a greater detail, and the counter

waves that deterred them gives a clear explanation to a layman about what works and what does

not when it comes to fighting terrorism. In the wake of 9/11, since the U.S. declaration of War

against Terrorism, the world has witnessed as there is no visible enemy to fight with. Terrorism

is an ideology and not a physical subject to tackle with force. If the U.S. attempts to defeat Al -

Qaeda and the Taliban forces by deploying large numbers of conventional soldiers to foreign

countries, they are only exporting backlash of radicalization and anti-Americanism.

Top Secret America by Dana Priest and William Arkin outlines how defence contracting

firms had made billions from the War on Terror with the erosion of civil rights in America and

the Pentagon’s heavy reliance on contractors. It features extensive research and investigation into

the murky world of intelligence collection, sharing and use, and detailing how multiple agencies

manipulating post-9/11. Within a span of ten years, many started producing the same intelligence

data – piles and piles of it that complicated the process instead of helping intelligence agencies.

The core argument presented in Top Secret America is whether the surveillance, the intense

working of intelligence agencies, the maintenance of secrecy, that have been used as trademarks

since the War against Terrorism has started have benefitted the U.S. or have helped make it

safer.

Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror by Richard A. Clarke is a thought

provoking memoir. After just a week of publication of Against All Enemies, Clarke before the

9/11 Commission pointed out some of the sensitive issues which later generated controversy

over how the Bush administration handled the threat of terrorism and the situation developed in

the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Richard Clarke, a National Security Expert, who has a deep insight

into Washington affairs had advised and informed Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush,

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Clinton, and George W. Bush on terrorism as a security threat to the U.S. He criticized President

Bush and his advisors most in a very forceful manner. Clarke firmly believed that Bush

administration failed to address terrorism which did not take Al-Qaeda seriously as a potent

threat to the U.S. national security. Clarke has given a wide-ranging account in the light of rising

intelligence of the danger posed by Al-Qaeda. He had been requesting in early days of Bush

administration to make terrorism a priority to fight with but his repeated requests were met with

lack of concern and interest. After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush and key figures such as

Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Dick Cheney turned their attention immediately to Iraq

which had nothing to do with the planning and execution of 9/11 attacks.

Just War against Terror impressively shows Elshtain's ability to address the U.S. military

action along with coalition partners against rogue states such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Other

writers have given their perspective of the U.S. military engagements in both secular and

religious journals as clear violation of the U.N.’ Charter and principles of International Law. In

"Taking Terrorists at Their Word," Elshtain mentions a September 18, 2001 Resolution passed

by then Congress gave President Bush exclusive right for the use of force under the Constitution

to take strict action to deter and prevent any further acts of International terrorism against the

U.S. mainland. She tries to justify the Resolution by stating that sovereign states of the world

such as the U.S., have every right to defend themselves and are acting under the rule of law. The

U.S. has sufficient legal authority to pass such laws which are vital for defence requirements

such as the September 18, 2001 Resolution and the Patriot Act. Just War Against Terror is an

important contribution to the ongoing discourse pertaining to the justification of U.S. led military

action against rogue states such as Iraq and Afghanistan. After years of political debate,

followed by the U.S. military action, both sides are trying to justify their positions.

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In the Line of Fire, which is a memoir written by President of Pakistan, General Pervez

Musharraf. This book has generated numerous controversies not only in Pakistan but across the

globe, but at the same time, this book is interesting and worth reading from every perspective.

President Pervez Musharraf detailed the U.S.’ threat to bomb Pakistan in the wake of 9/11, 2001,

and the serious repercussions due to which Pakistan had become the U.S ally against War on

Terrorism. The most interesting part of the book relates to 9/11 incident and Pakistan’s position

as a frontline ally, and the steps which Pakistan has taken in order to eradicate terrorism and

President Musharraf’s role in aligning Pakistan with the U.S. in the War against Terrorism.

The Age of Sacred Terror - Radical Islam’s War Against America by Daniel Benjamin

and Steven Simon provides a detailing, informative, and interesting perspective on the efforts of

the Bush administration to obtain Pakistan’s unconditional support in the wake of 9/11 against

the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This book is important from the perspective as this outlines the hard

choices which Pakistan had to make because of continuous U.S. pressure.

The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan by Bing West provides

a balanced and realistic way out of Afghanistan. Based on his own proficiency as both a combat-

hardened Marine officer and a former Assistant Secretary of Defence, Bing West has written a

very interesting, informative and compelling narrative which is quite rich with vivid characters

and rough warfare. The author narrates the consequences and the mix of strategic theory and

tactical reality. His conclusion is too good to provoke intense debate. He suggests: remove most

of the troops from Afghanistan without any further delay; stop spending billions of dollars on the

dream and hope of a modern but utopian democracy; and insist that Afghans fight their own

battles instead of looking towards foreign troops to provide them shelter. Bing West’s book is an

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account about brave men and cunning enemies that examines realistic choices to achieve win-

win situation.

In Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero, Rohan Gunaratna and Khurum Iqbal discuss the

facts that make Pakistan the headline of world media in recent years. Both authors claim many

fail to understand the gravity and complexity of the threat that emerges from within and

concurrently impacts regional and international security. For this reason, it has not only become

imperative to address the growing threat of terrorism, basic root causes of militancy in Pakistan;

but also there is a need to plan a long-term strategy to counter the menace of terrorism. Against

this backdrop, this book offers an interesting but compelling case of how Pakistan has become an

epicenter of Global War on Terrorism over the years. Ultimately, the authors have presented the

intensity of the threat which is a dominant factor in winning a crucial battle against the global

War on Terror. The authors introduce the readers to the backdrop of the problem currently faced

by Pakistan. For instance, the mishandling of the Cold War by the international community and

the policies carried by Islamabad against insurgents were strategic blunder in the region. This

could be dangerous for Pakistan in the long run. Starting with an explanation of Tribal areas of

Pakistan as the epicenter of global terrorism, Gunaratna and Iqbal show clearly how Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) emerged as a new headquarters and safe zones for Al-Qaeda

and the Taliban forces. The book then shifts the focus on mapping out numerous insurgent

groups that work actively under the umbrella of the Pakistani Taliban. The authors have given a

detailing generic profile of the sub-groups and their membership, leadership and organizational

structure, methods of finance, operational capabilities, and terrorists’ links with other local and

international groups all across the globe. The authors depict the complexity of the Pakistani

Taliban, which according to the authors is not a monolithic entity. The authors give much credit

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to Pakistan’s unparalleled effort in fighting the global War on Terrorism alongside the U.S.,

despite numerous accusations made against the country as a perpetrator of militancy and

terrorism in the region. As Islamabad became the frontline fighter and thus the frontline target of

terrorist groups, the Pakistani nation is now paying the price of countering this menace. The

writers encourage the readers to realize the severity and the complication of the anomaly that

haunts the country and call for the need to strengthen international co-operation as a way forward

in fighting this rigorous battle against Pakistan’s most fatal cancer.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

The study has been divided into five parts:

Chapter-1 Introduction begins by giving very brief preface about the Cold War period,

post-Cold War period and the post 9/11 period. This chapter includes: statement of problem,

theoretical framework, hypothesis, research questions, research methodology, and the Literature

review.

Chapter-2 U.S.-Pakistan Relations – An Historical Perspective examines the

history of U.S.-Pak relations to gain insights on the previous ups and downs and highs and lows

in the relationship and draws attention to the origin of alliances between the two partners.

Pakistan acted as a frontline state during the Cold War period and provided active support to the

U.S. to fight the Cold War against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the region. It

gives framework that analyzes consequences of USSR intervention in Afghanistan. When USSR

withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. also withdrew its support from Pakistan and

imposed economic and military sanctions on it. During this period, Pakistan was in a dire need of

financial support by the U.S. to help rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure and its institutions, and

36

above all, establishment of a favorable government in Kabul. In absence of the U.S. support,

Pakistan's economy was not that strong enough which could have afforded the rebuilding of

Afghanistan on its own. Ultimately, Pakistan also withdrew its support from Afghanistan which

led to civil war among the various factions of the Mujahedin who were seeking control of Kabul

through power. Pakistan, which was already supporting and hosting millions of the Afghan

refugees on its soil was further flooded with fresh wave of refugees due to civil war in

Afghanistan in the early 1990s. This influx of the refugees severely weakened Pakistan's

economy.

Chapter-3 Changing Strategic Environment of the Region- The Taliban

Factor gives a detailed picture of the 1990s when the Taliban had emerged as a dominant

source of power in Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the three countries which wasted no time in

extending diplomatic official recognition to the Taliban regime. By giving them diplomatic

recognition, Pakistan invited wrath of the U.S. in particular and the international community in

general. The Taliban paradox has badly impacted Pakistan-U.S. relations coupled with other

issues like: Kashmir struggle and Pakistan’s support for Jihadis, Pakistan’s noncompliance for

signing Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), imposition of sanctions, weak political and

economic structure, lack of democracy, Kargil conflict, and military takeover have been some of

the highlights of the 1990s.

Chapter-4 Terrorism and Terrorist Threat before 9/11 deals with the seismic

changes during the 1990s up to 9/11. This chapter highlights the growth of Al-Qaeda and the

Taliban forces in Afghanistan and its radical and subsequent effect on Pakistani society. This

chapter also analyses Pakistan’s security consideration in the region that led to the support of the

Taliban regime which eventually resulted in security predicament for Pakistan.

37

Chapter-5 September 11, 2001 deals with the incident on the U.S. mainland of which

brought serious external and internal repercussions for Pakistan being a neighboring country of

Afghanistan in the long run. Pakistan’s decision to change its Afghan policy and President

Musharraf’s decisive decision to align Pakistan with the U.S. led coalition in the aftermath of

9/11 is analyzed and discussed here.

Chapter-6 Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism deals with

the role of Pakistan as a “frontline ally” in on-going and unending War against Terrorism and its

implications for Pakistan in years to come. Once again, after the Cold War due to its important

geo-strategic location, Pakistan acquires huge importance for the U.S. as a neighboring country

of Afghanistan. Due to this geographical proximity, Pakistan has become highly vulnerable to

any volatility or militancy that has been occurring in Afghanistan for years due to foreign

invasions or domestic political strife. Pakistan has paid immensely for its commitment towards

fighting against terrorism, both domestically and internationally. In the War against Terrorism,

Pakistan has become not only the front line fighter to contain terrorism, but also has become the

frontline target of aggression and there are serious security threats for military forces and

civilians alike.

Conclusions & Policy Recommendations The last section of the dissertation will

critically examine the concerns of Pakistan vis-à-vis the U.S. and their past and contemporary

relationship. The dissertation will conclude with findings, some reflections on the policy

implications and recommends ways to enhance the relationship and improve co-operation

between both countries in their joint venture of fighting against terrorism.

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Chapter -2

Pakistan-U.S. Relations- An Historical Perspective

2.1 The Cold War Era

A leading theorist of International Politics, Hans J. Morgenthau, while referring to the most

essential determinant of a country’s foreign policy writes: “There is always one star to guide, one

set of thoughts, and one law for action to execute in a nation’s dealing with other nations of the

world, and that is, the national interest.”16

This above quote of Morgenthau is equally applicable to Pakistan’s foreign policy, i.e.

“National interest” which means “what is best for a national society in general” or “what is best

for a nation in foreign affairs in particular.”17 The concept of national interest and power

considerations are determined by various factors such as the geopolitical setting of a nation state,

historical legacies and traditions. It also includes other domestic factors including Pakistan’s

search for identity, conflicts between the two wings of Pakistan, i.e. East and West after partition

of the Subcontinent. The foreign policy of Pakistan can also be determined by military

16Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defence of National Interest, New York: Random House, 1951, p.242. 17 James N. Rosenau,“National Interest,” in David Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,

New York: Mac-. Millard Free Press,1968, p. 34.

39

establishment, the socio-economic and political conditions, and the breaking away of East

Pakistan in 1971. The aspirations, images as well as thinking and enthusiasm of the decision

makers to formulate policies in the best interest of the country, and the external environment

constitute the basic foundations of Pakistan’s foreign policy.18

The initial phase of Pakistan’s creation was full of hardships. The most severe of all were the

issues related to security, including a massive migration of refugees from India, weak economic

structure which Pakistan inherited from the British Raj in the Sub-continent, lack of managerial

skills and most important of all, threats from its eastern neighbor, India. In order to deal with

these internal problems successfully, Pakistan was in a dire need of external support, which was

required both in terms of economic and military assistance. First, Pakistan explored the prospect

of getting any relief from the British Commonwealth but due to its poor economic condition after

the Second World War, and because of its clear inclination towards India, Pakistan did not

receive any positive response.19 After World War II, the U.S. emerged as a superpower with

global responsibilities. The U.S. was constantly seeking new allies around the world because of

its competition with the Soviet Union. In a letter to then President Harry Truman, Secretary of

State George Marshall called for the President’s attention to the potential value of Pakistan as an

important Muslim country in the world and a country with a strategic position in South Asia.20

Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar narrates the initial period of Pakistan-

U.S. relationship as:

The U.S. was the only promising source of assistance for a country like Pakistan. Emerging from

the Second World War with its strong economy intact, it was the wealthiest nation in the world

18 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2005, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 125-129. 19 Mussarrat Sohail, Partition & Anglo Pakistan Relations, 1947-1951, Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1991, pp. 37-

55. 20 “Memorandum of Secretary of State George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman, 17 July 1947 (Extracts),”

Arif, ed., in U.S.-Pak Relations, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984, p. 3.

40

with huge resources, accounting for over 40 per cent of global production. Also, its democratic

system was quite congenial. It was, however, preoccupied by two factors (i) Soviet expansion in

Eastern Europe and (ii) the need to stabilize Western Europe through economic and military

assistance. At time, US interest in South Asia was rather minimal. However, Pakistan’s geo-

strategic location next to the Middle East, with its petroleum and other natural resources reserves,

provided strategic link and opportunity to benefit to Pakistan’s search for cooperation.21

The foreign policy of a country cannot be static, but adapts to change according to the internal

and external factors. As remarked by Lord Palmerston, there can be no eternal friends or eternal

enemies in the international politics. The only constant factor which creates difference is national

interest of a nation state which is supreme.22 Pakistan is located at the crossroads of various

civilizations and is located in such a region where it can play an important role and can exert its

influence effectively in economic and political developments involving the regional and extra-

regional powers.

The emergence of Central Asian Republics (CARs) with huge economic potential at the

end of the Cold War and collapse of USSR, China as an emerging superpower, Pakistan’s

closeness to Gulf due to its Gawadar seaport and above all, South Asia being a nuclear flash

point make Pakistan an important country not only in the region but also in the eyes of

international players.

21 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 37. 22 Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, p.114.

41

42

Pakistan and its Immediate Neighbors

Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbors have had significant and lasting effects on Pakistan’s

foreign policy. Pakistan suffered from instability soon after independence vis-à-vis India.

Because of border disputes, particularly due to Durand Line and ethnic rivalries, Afghanistan

remained another security threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union, the

superpower of the Cold War period, augmented Pakistan’s potential to be drawn into the Cold

War as would happen in 1979 when the U.S. used Pakistan to achieve its own strategic

objectives in the region. Its position on the crossroad between the Middle Eastern region and

South Asia gave it a huge potential as a geostrategic asset to the U.S.

Pakistan-U.S. relations in the past have been cooperative and conflictual at the same time.

With the beginning of the Cold War and the U.S.’ active participation in the world affairs after

the World War II, Pakistan assumed considerable importance for the U.S. Since 1947, “the

policy of Containment was deliberately designed to check the expansion of Communism

throughout the world,” and became the principal objective of the U.S. foreign policy.23 As an end

result of which, “for a decade and a half after the World War II, the U.S. identified and started

relying heavily for its security with alliances.”24And as the Cold War extended to Asia, the U.S.

had two broad objectives: first, the U.S. needed an ally so as to bridge the gap in its security

system versus the Communist system around the world, and second, to strengthen its alliance

system in the Middle East as well as South East Asia. SEATO was formed in 1954, under this

Treaty, the U.S. agreed to give armed equipment and offered training courses to Pakistan’s

armed forces. Pakistan was desperately looking for military assistance to strengthen its defence

23 Willaim G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1967, p. 163. 24 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969, p.69.

43

capabilities against mighty India. President Harry Truman’s Administration gave priority to the

defence of Western Europe which had become his Administration’s prime concern.

Pakistan needed diplomatic, military and economic assistance because of its poor socio-

economic and defence conditions. Despite Pakistan’s non-alignment policy stance, it was very

obvious from the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the U.S. that Pakistan

was inclined towards the West in order to get required diplomatic, economic and military

assistance.

When Pakistan emerged in 1947 after the partition of the Subcontinent, the Soviets tried

to bring Pakistan into their fold because they wanted to have uninterrupted access to warm

waters.25 Pakistan preferred to join the western bloc led by the U.S. which claimed itself a great

promoter of human rights and democratic values, and at that time was fighting against

Communism. The American Administration was against Communism because of its anti-

religious, undemocratic views and its’ restrictions on human liberties. Pakistan found the U.S.

closer to its ideological values than the Communist Soviet Union. Pakistan thus became

“America’s most trusted allied ally” in the decade of 1950s when the Cold War just started to

contain Soviet expansion across the world.26

The U.S. interest in Pakistan also arose out of its strategic location which is quite

significant regionally and it has been of importance to western powers as well. Pakistan could

serve as an ideal base for the U.S. from where it could keep a check on both the Communist

25 Op.cit. 26 Robert Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs, Summer,

2003, p.70.

44

powers of the Cold War period, i.e. China and the USSR and also safeguard its oil interests in the

Persian Gulf.27

Apart from the ideological, military and economic considerations, Pakistan has always

been a nation state where geopolitical factors have had a major influence on Pakistan’s foreign

policy. Pakistan had a very unique geography up till 1971 in the sense that it was comprised of

two wings, East and West, and both these wings were separated by one thousand miles of Indian

territory in between. The relations between India and Pakistan were never cordial since the

inception of Pakistan, so this rift in bilateral relations of the two states was of serious concern

from the security perspective of Pakistan. This security concern from the east led Pakistan to

spend more on defence than any other sector as compared to other developing countries.

Geographically, East Pakistan was surrounded by India from three sides and Pakistan as a whole

was surrounded by three big neighbors, namely, the Soviet Union, China, and India. There is no

other country in the world which has a geographical location akin to Pakistan, thus making it

vulnerable before external powers to extend their influence. As former President Ayub Khan

stated: “I know of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having

three such mighty neighbors.”28

Despite entering into two major alliances with the U.S., Pakistan's interests and

objectives did not coincide with the U.S. from the very beginning. Whereas the U.S. needed a

stable and strong partner in South Asia for the defence against Communist threat, Pakistan's most

important objective was to reinforce its defence capability against India. The U.S. also never

wanted to gain the displeasure of much larger and important country in the region, India.

27 H.C. Arya, A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations of the U.S. with Pakistan, PhD Dissertation, Indian School

of International Studies, New Delhi, 1966, p. 2 28 Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.114.

45

By the 1960s, Pakistan realized that it had lost more than it had gained from the military

alliance with the U.S. Therefore, it started moving towards the strategy of partial alliance with

the U.S. on the one hand, and started cultivating relationship with China on the other hand. This

move became more obvious with the coming of John F. Kennedy to power. The U.S. policy too

underwent a significant change with the change of Administration. President Kennedy, soon after

assuming office, adopted a friendly attitude towards Pakistan’s arch enemy, India29 which went

against the interest of Pakistan in the region.

Pakistan was seen by the American government as one of the countries that could

promote well the U.S. interests in the region in general and in the Middle East in particular, so it

deserved both types of aid, i.e. military and economic. According to the U.S. Administration, the

major objective of the U.S. assistance was to facilitate Pakistan in maintaining its autonomy and

strengthen its national unity, develop its institutions and sustain its major developmental effort.30

Thus, this aid factor in one way or the other opened the door to so called guidance and open

interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs. It has been observed, during times of arms sales,

interactions between Pakistan and the U.S. were warm and friendly; but during arms embargos

and restrictions, the relationship was precarious to a great extent.

Pakistan, no doubt, gained a lot from this alliance with the U.S., but had to pay heavily

for it. Due to this alliance, it began to be looked upon as an envoy of imperialist powers among

the Muslim world that had the ability to promote their self-vested interests.31 Its relations with

the Muslim countries particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan became tense because of

its alliance with the western camp. It also antagonized the two communist giants, i.e. USSR and

29 Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1960 , New York, 1961, pp.97-101. 30 Proposed Mutual Defence and Development Programmes F.Y. 1966, US Agency for International Development

and Ministry of Economic Affairs. 31 Selig Harrison, “India, Pakistan & U.S: Case History of a Mistake,” New Republic, 141, August 1959, pp.50-81.

46

China. This alignment did not even get much public support within Pakistan. Subsequent

governments faced severe pressure to withdraw Pakistan from the U.S. sponsored military pacts.

People feared that it would endanger the freedom and sovereignty of Pakistan in the years to

come, it also led to a stalemate on the Kashmir issue.32

President Ayub Khan, when assumed office, started thinking of strengthening military coalition

with the U.S. But in fact, Pakistan was ever prepared to do anything to qualify for the supply of

arms from any global source which was to be used against India to contain its aggression.33Other

forces which seemed very keen to draw Pakistan towards the West were the elite class in

Pakistan. They were heavily influenced by the Western democratic system and drawn mainly

from the feudal and military classes trained in the West.34

The heightened security concerns at the borders from the east and west, and necessity for

getting economic assistance for development required Pakistan to reach out to the U.S. During

the Cold War period, the U.S. reinforced Pakistan’s defence capabilities to a great extent and

potential for economic development as well. But in doing so, the U.S. also helped in promoting

despotic and radical elements within the country; the U.S. backing of the Pakistan armed forces

raised the military’s national profile. On and off, the Pakistan military came to lead the country’s

politics through a coalition of pro-Western elite, including Islamists who asserted and gained

firm ground during the Cold War. At this time, the U.S. did not show any apprehension for

Pakistan’s religious and extremist elements. In fact, it suited the U.S.’ interests in the region, as

religion itself became a powerful weapon which could be easily used for both purposes, to

32 Surendra Chopra, “U.S. Intervention in the Indo-Pakistan Dialogue 1953-1955,” Kurukshetra University Research

Journal, Vol. 4, Part 1-2, 1970, pp. 165-176. 33 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Preliminary Analysis of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in Verma & K.P. Misra, (ed.), Foreign

Policies in South Asia, Bombay, 1969, p. 73 and p.102. 34 Shaheen Irshad, Rejection Alliances: A Case Study of US-Pak Relations 1947-1967, Lahore: Ferozsons,1972,

p.28.

47

counter internal stability within a country and on the external front, it was used as a defence

shield against Communism.35

Pakistan’s alignment with the West, ill considered foreign policy and economic decisions

cost Pakistan dearly in the long run as it had troublesome relations with the Soviet Union. In

order to neutralize Pakistan, the Soviet Union joined hands with India. It openly supported India

for all disputed issues between India and Pakistan; particularly India got their strong backing on

Kashmir issue in the United Nations. The Soviets made sure to veto all resolutions on Kashmir in

favor of India and which they did to please India. This is one of the reasons the Kashmir dispute

remains unresolved till this day. Pakistan’s alignment with the West created an almost unending

enmity with both India and the Soviet Union.

India has always been a source of trouble for Pakistan since its inception. Pakistan was

refused its due share of assets of undivided India which were already allocated by the British at

the time of Partition. India deliberately stopped or severely restricted the flow of river waters to

the territory of Pakistan which emanated from Indian held Kashmir and this move badly affected

agriculture sector in Pakistan.36 Apart from these problems, Pakistan and India, two arch rivals,

fought three major wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1971 and one limited war, Kargil War, in 1999. In

sum, the Indian factor caused the greatest strain to the Pakistan-U.S. relationship.

The most important seal of Pakistan-U.S. relations was the 1959 Agreement of Co-

operation between Pakistan and the U.S. This coming together drew Pakistan and the U.S. closer,

but a lack of clarity on whether the agreement applied to aggression from India which later

became the main reason of Pakistani disenchantment with America. Under the Agreement of Co-

35 Touqir Hussain, “The U.S-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond,” U.S. Institute of Peace

(Autumn 2005), p. 2. 36 Pak-India Relations, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, 2003,

p.42

48

operation¸ the U.S. was required, under specific conditions, to help Pakistan if it becomes the

victim of belligerence from any country in general and regional country in particular.37 On the

other hand, India did not show any interest to contain Communism because of its so called non-

alignment policy and its growing friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

In return for this support offered to Pakistan via defence alliances by the U.S., Pakistan agreed to

provide bases at Badaber near Peshawar for the U-2 spy planes. The U-2 incident took place in

1960 when a spy plane took off from the American Air Force installation in Peshawar and was

shot down over the Soviet Union. Pakistan faced immense pressure from the USSR, including

the threat of dire consequences and complete annihilation.38

In 1962, Sino-Indian war broke out and the U.S. started pouring military and economic

aid to India. American arms to India came as a shock to Pakistanis who felt betrayed by the U.S.

being an ally of Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan began to question its relationship with the U.S.

Despite Pakistan's protest, the Kennedy Administration continued its military support to India

even after the war. Consequently, Pakistan sided itself with China and here started a new period

of growing relationship focused more on strengthening bilateral relations and areas of common

interests between the two countries.

In sum, over the period 1954-1962, U.S. financial assistance to Pakistan amounted to

$3.5 billion, which did not include $1.372 billion which was a reserved amount for defence

purpose and purchase of other military equipment,39 whereas India obtained $4 billion as

monetary aid during 1959-1963.40

37 “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” cited by Shahid Amin Dawn, 31 January, 1957. 38 Bashir Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, “Pak-U.S. Relations, A Chronology-1947 -1985,” Pakistan Journal of American

Studies, Area Study Centre, Quaid-i- Azam University, Islamabad, p.111. 39 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2009, p.59. 40 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, United States: Oxford University Press,1969, p.49.

49

There was a lot of resentment against these defence pacts, i.e. SEATO and CENTO

sponsored by the U.S. which Pakistan signed in the mid-1950s. The basic purpose of signing

these defence pacts was to get military assistance in case of Indian aggression. But these defence

pacts came into limelight after the war of 1965, as no significant help was provided to Pakistan

by the U.S. during the war despite alliances with the U.S. The then Government of Pakistan

faced severe criticism from Pakistani public regarding signing of these Mutual Defence

Assistance Agreements. Pakistan was committed to fight against Communism, but on the other

hand, members of these defence pacts were not obliged to defend Pakistan in case of foreign

aggression against its territory which was quite unfair and went against building a workable and

longstanding relationship with the U.S.41

The U.S. never liked Pakistan’s growing relations with China and the former USSR; it

always showed concern and resentment to this process. Pakistan tried to balance its relationship

with China and its Western ally but in spite of all these efforts, in 1962, the U.S. - Pakistan

relations were under great strain. This was the time period when a phase of deterioration in Pak -

U.S. relations began with massive U.S. defence aid to the Indians. The basic objective was to

strengthen them against China as India faced a humiliating defeat by the Chinese in Sino-Indian

War of 1962.42 The Government of Pakistan opposed this decision, many letters were written by

President Ayub of Pakistan to the Kennedy Administration but all these protests on official level

went unnoticed by the Kennedy Administration.43

Pakistan believed that the only guarantee that could deter India from committing

aggression against Pakistan was the pressure of the mightier and stronger China which would

41 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000,

p. 200 42 Ibid., p. 199 43 Op.cit.

50

never let India to take Pakistan as an easy prey.44 Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement and

an Aviation accord with China on August 29, 1963. The Kennedy Administration responded by

suspending a $4.3 million loan for Pakistan which was meant to build a new airport at Dacca,

from where Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) planned to fly to Beijing.45

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and later President of Pakistan,

criticized this drastic change in the U.S. Administration’s attitude towards Pakistan as

“unjustified policy of appeasing India in the region.” He stated, he saw no good reason why

Pakistan and China although ideologically apart could not draw closer to each other when the

U.S. and the USSR who were bitterly opposed to each other had forced themselves to ignore

their differences and develop some sort of understanding and reconciliation pertaining to their

outstanding problems.46

The most pleasant and surprising move in the aftermath of 1965 war with India was the

drastic and visible change in the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan. The President of the Soviet

Union would act as a mediator at Tashkent on January 4, 1966. A final declaration was signed by

the President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, and from Indian side, Indian Prime Minister, Mr.

Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the Ceasefire Agreement which is known as Tashkent Declaration.

President Ayub under severe pressure by the Soviet Union and India had lost on the negotiation

table whatever Pakistan had gained in the war.47

It is worth mentioning that Pakistan became a target of the U.S. sanctions throughout the

1965 War with India. The Johnson Administration immediately put sanctions on Pakistan and

stopped supplying all kind of military and economic aid, including the supply of spare parts to

44 Dawn, 25 August 1963. 45 Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Chronology-1947 – 1985.” p. 131 46 Ahmed, Tahir & Shabbir, Pak-U.S. Relations, Area Study Centre: Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p. 131. 47 Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Development 1947-1999, p. 213.

51

the Armed Forces. Pakistan considered this grossly unequal treatment because the U.S. was

Pakistan’s main and most significant supplier of war material while India had access to military

equipment from other countries. On the other side, USSR tried to strengthen India and kept

pumping military hardware and economic aid to ensure Indian supremacy over Pakistan.48

On April 12, 1967, the U.S. Department of State announced that the U.S. had no intention to

recommence defence assistance to Pakistan and India. This aid had been suspended by the U.S.

for both countries as a result of September War of 1965. Pakistan felt highly betrayed being an

ally and signatory of SEATO and CENTO pacts and was now highly worried about its security.

On April 17, 1967, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan issued a statement which read, in part, as

follows:

The current American decision to stop arms supply is loaded with serious repercussions

on Pakistan’s security and, therefore, has caused a great concern for the U.S as well. It is

a well acknowledged fact that most of the military equipment which Pakistan gets is of

American origin. While, on other hand, India is getting defense equipments from diverse

sources as well as focusing on increasing its own production is not hidden fact indeed. It

is very much apparent that the American decision to suspend military supplies to Pakistan

has encouraged India to become more inflexible in her attitude towards Pakistan.49

Pakistan got dissatisfied and eventually lost its immediate interest in SEATO and CENTO. But

President Ayub showed disagreement as he was wishing for the stability of close ties with the

U.S. and disproved the public reaction. In his speech to the Pakistani people, he said that “such

an emotional reaction is not inconsistent with our dignity as a nation.”50

Pakistan faced a major internal crisis in its eastern wing in 1970-1971, a reaction to the

policies of the central government, under control of the military regime. The U.S. did not want to

48 Ibid., p. 207. 49 Statement of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, April 17, 1967, Dawn, April 18, 1967. 50 President Ayub’s speech to the Pakistani Nation, May 1, 1967, The Pakistan Times, April 15, 1967.

52

be involved in the ongoing internal conflict of Pakistan which needed to be settled accordingly.

But in fact, the U.S. was concerned over the elections which were held in Pakistan in 1970. The

U.S. did not want Mujib ur Rehman, the leader of Awami League to emerge as the dominant

political force in Pakistan. The Awami League had promised in its election manifesto that it

would withdraw Pakistan from the U.S. defence pacts, SEATO and CENTO which would

ultimately reduce American influence in Pakistan. To make the situation worse for Pakistan,

India and the USSR came closer to each other and signed Indian-Soviet Union Treaty of

Friendship and Cooperation in 1971.51

Although the U.S never approved close Pak-China relations and had resented Pakistan’s

growing friendly relations with China. On the other hand, it had also requested Pakistan to bridge

the gap between Communist China and the U.S and asked it to arrange a meeting between

President Nixon and Chairman Mao. The Chinese relationship was extremely important for the

U.S. as it was trying to fix its growing differences regarding its Vietnam policy.52

Throughout the 1971 crisis, Congress had been hostile and showed indifferent attitude

towards Pakistan. The U.S. banned the supply of military spare parts to Pakistan in May 1971.53

India continued to get highly sophisticated weapons due to the 1971 Treaty which it signed with

the USSR. While Pakistan was a signatory of the defence pacts, it did not receive any military

equipment from the U.S during the crisis.

Pakistan eventually withdrew from SEATO in November 1972 and CENTO from 1979.54

After losing East Pakistan, there was an obvious change in the U.S. foreign policy towards South

Asia. It started tilting towards India acknowledging it as a major power. Therefore, it was

51 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 217 52 Ibid., p. 216 53 Ibid. 54 Op.cit.

53

presumed in the Indian circle, that the U.S. was not keen to consider Pakistan and India on equal

footing as far as military strength was considered.55

In the wake of Indian nuclear tests in 1974, Pakistan Government was compelled to

consider ways to meet this new threat in the region. Pakistan’s nuclear quest would develop into

a major stumbling block in the continuity of smooth and stable relations with the U.S. in the

coming years.56

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, visited the U.S. in February 1975 in an

effort to convince the U.S. Administration to recommence military aid to Pakistan. The Indian

nuclear explosions of 1974 and Pakistan’s legitimate sense of insecurity must have been the

reason which convinced the U.S. to re-evaluate its 1965 arms prohibition against Pakistan. After

Bhutto’s visit, the U.S. finally waived off the arms embargo which it imposed on Pakistan and

India. The U.S. arms embargo was lifted on the basis that Pakistan has been a “U.S. ally in the

region and is feeling insecure after its dismemberment in 1971.” This was further argued that the

U.S. aid would facilitate and “prevent Pakistan from going nuclear.”57

The Pakistan-U.S. relationship started deteriorating once again in 1976 when the Ford

Administration applied unprecedented pressure on Pakistan to abandon its deal for the purchase

of a nuclear reprocessing plant which it was eager to buy from France. In 1977, the U.S.

implemented the Symington Amendment against Pakistan, which allowed Congress to halt

economic and military assistance to any country that tried to acquire nuclear weapons

technology.58 The U.S. also tried to persuade France from providing the nuclear plant to Pakistan

but Pakistan retaliated by moving closer to the Soviet Union. Thus the period indicated the

55 D.C. Jha. “U.S. Policy Towards India,” Journal of Political Science 37, Jan-March, 1976, pp. 67-71. 56 Interview with ex-Army Officer, 17 June 2012. 57 National Herald, 12 March, 1975. 58 Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, New

York: Times Books, 1981, p. 168.

54

erosion in Pakistan’s ties with the U.S. because of its closeness with India. When Pakistan did

not concede, the U.S. started pressurizing France to cancel this nuclear deal which it did under

immense pressure from the U.S. in 1978.59

Tensions over Pakistan’s nuclear program had become evident with the passage of time. In a

meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that Pakistan should not

“insult the intelligence” of the U.S. by claiming the reprocessing plant was for peaceful, energy-

related purposes.60 Bhutto later stated that Kissinger threatened him by saying he must end

nuclear development or the U.S. “would make a horrible example of him.”61 Bhutto responded to

this threatening statement by stating that no country had in any capacity the right to tell Pakistan

what it could or could not do.62 This meeting highlighted the rapidly deteriorating relationship

between Pakistan and the U.S.

During 1977-81, Pakistan had become a low priority and less important country for the

U.S. because the U.S. was more interested in strengthening relations with India in South Asia.

The democratic government of Bhutto was overthrown in 1977, and General Zia took over as

Military Administrator.63

Such American attitude confirmed the old but factual dictum that friendship between

countries is not permanent but relies heavily on their own national and global interests. In 1979,

the Carter Administration immediately stopped all economic, technical and defence aid to

59 A.Q. Khan. Chairman, Khan Research Laboratories, “The Journey to our Tests.” The News, Islamabad, Special

Issue, 28 May, 1999. 60 Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, p. 163. 61 Ibid., p. 63 62 Rashimi Jain, U.S.-Pak Relations,1947-1983, Radiant Publishers: New Delhi, 1983, p. 61. 63 The Economist, 27 March-April 1982.

55

Pakistan on the pretext that it was secretly building an ‘Islamic bomb,’ which was based on

propaganda created by India.64

Change in U.S.-Pak relations came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which

ultimately gave rise to an increase in Soviet sphere of influence which endangered the strategic

interests of the U.S. in the region. Pakistan immediately got importance as a frontline state to

contain the Soviet Union’s expansion of Communism. As a consequence of this development in

the region, President Carter lifted the ban on aid to Pakistan which he had imposed earlier.

Pakistan could regain its influence on the pretext that he had decided to lift the ban so that

Pakistan could protect itself against the expansion of Communism. He further justified and

propagated this change in his policy towards Pakistan by saying “Pakistan was a frontline state

and would be USSR’s next target.”65 In keeping with this policy, President Carter, in January

1980, approved a package of $400 million worth of economic and defence aid to Pakistan.66

President Zia rejected this aid as peanuts as he regarded this aid package too small for the

purpose for which it was being provided to face immense threat from Afghanistan backed by the

Soviet Union. President Zia demanded $2 billion to rebuild the Pakistan armed forces.67 Pakistan

thus was in a position after the Soviet invasion to determine its own terms and conditions to the

U.S.

The Americans were now looking for a strong foothold in this region in order to promote

their strategic interests and to execute their influence in the region that was not possible without

the support and co-operation of Pakistan. Even during the election campaign of 1980, President

Ronald Reagan had openly claimed for establishing military bases in Pakistan. After getting

64 The Washington Post, 3 December 1981. 65 “U.S. Aid Package,” Dawn Overseas Weekly 5(19-25 January 1980), p. 5 66 The Tribune, 22 January, 1980. 67 “The Pakistan Puzzle,” The Tribune , 27 March, 1980.

56

bitter lessons from 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan was quite determined this time not to provide

any such facility to the U.S. at the cost of its own national interests.68

The military regime of General Zia had expressed its apprehension pertaining to increase

of Soviet activity in Kabul at the end of 1979 shortly before the Red Army’s invasion and had

called for prompt U.S. action. Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Advisor, Agha Shahi, in one of the

briefings to the American officials clearly highlighted the plight of Pakistan due to the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan. The historical significance of Afghanistan as a buffer zone disappeared

with the invasion and eventually Pakistan found itself economically and military weak. It was ill-

prepared and ill-equipped in the wake of sanctions which the Carter Administration imposed to

meet the military threat from the north-west. The Pakistani advisor clearly explained to the

Americans that the time to do something against Soviets advancement in Afghanistan was now. 69

But this word of warning was not taken in a serious manner by the U.S. Administration at the

time until the presence of Soviet tanks and soldiers in Afghanistan became a harsh reality which

posed a serious threat for Pakistan.

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a common border of approximately 1500 miles which

runs along the Durand Line in the north and northwest of Pakistan. Despite their common

religion and shared cultural values, relations between the two countries have always remained

tense.70

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved to be a decisive event

which brought Pakistan and the U.S. closer to each other. Pakistan was then under direct military

rule of General Zia. The Soviet action shook the world. Prior to the Soviet invasion, the U.S. and

68 The Washington Post, 3 December 1981. 69 Agha Shahi, Dawn, October 30, 1979. 70 Lubna Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” HILAL,

The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine. April, 2014. pp. 103-105.

57

other Western democracies were critical of the military regime in Pakistan. However, the

situation changed in favor of Pakistan. The U.S. found General Zia in Pakistan as a potential

military leader who could defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by confining Communism to

its borders. For this reason, President Zia was whole heartedly accepted by both the U.S. and the

Western world.71

“Strength, and not a little strength at that, is needed to defend socialist gains.”72

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan became a decisive event of the Cold War between two

mighty rivals of the time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The regional significance of Pakistan to

both superpowers had increased dramatically due to the presence of Red Army in neighboring

Afghanistan. This was the result of several factors: Firstly, Pakistan’s unique geographical

location made it extremely important in the region and secondly, Iran’s Islamic Revolution of

1979 made the situation critical for the U.S. Pakistan’s historical ties with Afghanistan and Iran

enhanced its importance manifold where Pakistan could play a vital role. Thirdly, Pakistan had a

prominent place in the Muslim world, especially its close ties with oil producing countries of the

Gulf region. Finally, Pakistan’s efforts to obtain a nuclear technology made it the first Muslim

country in the region which acquired nuclear capability. This created much difference not only

for the opponents but that became a matter of grave concern for the super powers as well.

The Soviet invasion brought Pakistan closer to the U.S. to support the Afghan Jihad.73

The U.S. chose Afghan religious leaders as its allies and extended full support who used to

71 Sundra Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan, New Delhi: South Asia Publishers,1993, pp.165-167. 72Leonid Brezhnev, “For Greater Unity Among Communists, Speech,” Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1969, p.15.

73 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam, London: Tauris Publishers, 2005, p.143.

58

receive training from Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) with the close

collaboration of CIA through military assistance.74

President Zia-ul-Huq and other high-ranking army officials in Pakistan perceived the

crisis in Afghanistan as a golden opportunity to advance the army’s own capabilities. A. Z. Hilali

says: “Zia and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in Afghanistan because they saw

it as militarily and economically profitable.”75The modernization of Pakistan’s outdated weapons

and defence systems would also serve as a deterrent to India; that factor too was of extreme

significance. Another reason Pakistan wanted to aid the Afghan rebels was Pakistan’s desire for

strategic depth which has been Pakistan’s top most priority against India.76General Zia perceived

that if the Soviet Union could be defeated in Afghanistan by using Mujahedin, and if a

government friendly to Pakistan could be installed in Afghanistan; Pakistan would definitely

gain influence in the region not only by solving decades-old border dispute of Durand Line with

Afghanistan but also by limiting chances of a pro-Indian neighbor.77

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically enhanced the U.S. economic and

military assistance to Pakistan in order to fight a war against the Red Army’s occupation. Large

amounts of cash and equipment were provided to the Mujahedin. They successfully engaged the

Red Army in Afghanistan through possible assistance which was given by Pakistan’s military

and its secret agencies, particularly the ISI. While this “aid” was primarily meant for the Afghan

Mujahedin, but there is sufficient evidence that funds allocated by the U.S. were misused on a

massive scale. Apart from this, Pakistan also received money for dual purposes: for the

74 Samina Ahmed, “The U.S. & Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond,” International Security,

Winter 2001-2, p.80. 75 A.Z. Hilali. U.S.-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, p. 11 76 Marvin G. Weinbaum. “Pakistan & Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship,” Asian Survey 31, June, 1991, p.498. 77 Ibid.

59

rehabilitation of Afghan refugees who left their homes; and for the construction of infrastructure

in war torn Afghanistan.78

Despite this aid flows, Pakistan remained suspicious of America’s intentions in the

region. It was largely assumed that the basic objective of the U.S. for pumping billions of dollars

to Pakistan’s was to contain the Soviet influence rather than helping and securing Pakistani

interests. The other factors which contributed anti-Americanism were the spread of Islamization

and radicalization of Pakistani society under President General Zia ul-Haq, and the gradual

expansion of militant Islam after the 1979 Revolution in Iran.

The U.S. disapproved the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and greatly disconcerted by the

developments under the cover of Islamic Revolution in Pakistan’s neighboring Iran. The U.S.

was committed to provide every possible support to Pakistan. On January 7, 1980, President

Carter made the following statement:

We have already assured President Zia, who is the leader of Pakistan, directly after the

invasion, and since then through emissaries that we are willing to join other nations in

giving necessary protection to Pakistan and meet their legitimate defensive military needs

whenever required by the government of Pakistan.79

Before 1979, the U.S. had strong reservations on Pakistan’s nuclear program, unstable

democratic system, India- Pakistan relations, narcotics, etc but Pakistan -U.S. alliance became

vital for the U.S. to defeat the Red Army in Afghanistan. In the post-Soviet invasion scenario,

the U.S. became less interested in the issues. Interestingly, President Reagan when assumed

office was not anxious about the after effects of radical Islamists in the region in the long run.

78 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.

79 President Carter’s Interview. Jan 7, 1980, Dawn, January 9, 1980.

60

They were seen and known as the best combatants in Afghanistan which the U.S. perceived as a

threat to the USSR but not to the U.S.80

The Afghan War caused great instability in the entire region and it caused a devastating

effect on Pakistan in particular. The Soviet Union also conveyed a number of direct and bluntly-

worded warnings to Pakistan from time to time during this period. The Soviet Union held

Pakistan responsible for the continuous trouble in Afghanistan. Radio Moscow carried anti-

Pakistan propaganda. Pakistan throughout this period strictly maintained a policy of restraint in

response to Soviet threats and its repeated air violations into Pakistani territory by the Soviet Air

Force.81

The influence of the ISI in the domestic and foreign policy of Pakistan increased during

the Afghan War. It played a dominating and vital role in formulating policies and strategies

during the War. The CIA and ISI co-operated with each other in the biggest covert operation at

the time in Afghanistan.82 ISI was directly involved in recruiting the Mujahedin across the border

and funneling the funds for the War. As a result of ISI’s close collaboration with Mujahedin,

direct contacts were established with the militants and religious forces at both national and

foreign level. Once the War was over and the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from

Afghanistan, both ISI and militant groups within Pakistan and Afghanistan continued their

collaboration.

The Afghanistan crisis was also taken up by the UN General Assembly in the 1980s

which passed resolutions with an overwhelming majority. It repeatedly called for a diplomatic

solution of the Afghanistan crisis, including the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and return of the

80 Lawrence Ziring, “South Asian Tangles and Triangles,” In Lawrence Ziring, ed., The Subcontinent in World

Politics: India, Its Neighbors and the Great Powers, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982, p.24 81 The Muslim, 21st February 1983. 82 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2007, pp.

13-15

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Afghan refugees to their homes from Pakistan and Iran. In the beginning, the Soviet attitude was

quite threatening and belligerent towards Pakistan because of its support to Mujahedin with

active involvement of CIA. This can be illustrated from an instance when Agha Shahi met Soviet

Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations in September 1980; Gromyko greeted his

Pakistani counterpart, saying you seem to fight a war with us.83

The Reagan Administration was more flexible than President Carter’s in granting military

and economic loans to Pakistan. It offered 3.2. billion dollars for economic assistance, apart from

that, the U.S. also agreed to sell 40 high performance F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. During the years

of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, both countries maintained high level of civil and military

interaction. The U.S. and Pakistan were agreed on one point agenda and that was a peaceful

settlement of the Afghanistan problem.84

The aid to the Mujahedin during President Carter’s time trickled into Pakistan with a

snail’s pace turned into a flood under President Ronald Reagan. The military sales and

diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. improved dramatically in later years.

During President Reagan’s term in office, the U.S.-Pak relations were going back to the

relationship of the fifties when arms merchants were roaming the continents in search of new

customers. It seemed Carter’s emphasis on human rights did not get any significant place in U.S.

foreign policy agenda. President Reagan while adopting a policy of deterrence, decided to fulfill

the demands of Pakistan for aid. There were clear indications from the White House that

Pakistan would get highly refined defence equipment from the U.S. as this aid would prevent the

Soviet Union from further exerting its influence and this would also refrain it from fulfilling its

expansionist ambitions. President Reagan went to the extent of exempting Pakistan from the

83 The Muslim, 15 September 1981. 84 Ziring. “South Asian Tangles and Triangles,” p. 24.

62

Symington Amendment on the pretext that politically strong, economically stable and

independent Pakistan with democratic institutions was in the interest of the U.S. It seemed that

the U.S. was no more interested in persuading Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program as it had

been doing earlier.

During 1985-86, Pakistan and the U.S. remained in close contact with each other

pertaining to regional security environment in the backdrop of the ongoing Jihad in Afghanistan.

The U.S. appreciated Pakistan’s close collaboration with CIA and steadfastness against the

Soviet threats. Pakistan received F-16 aircrafts from the U.S., twenty-five in 1985 and fifteen in

1986. The Congress and the CIA provided the Mujahedin with 250 launchers and 1,000 missiles

(costing approximately $200,000 each). The Mujahedin’s first success occurred in September

1986, when they used Stingers to take down three Soviet gunships near the Jalalabad airfield.85

Until the Soviet withdrawal, the Stingers wreaked devastating havoc on Soviet forces at the

hands of the Mujahedin.

Using Stingers, other advanced weapons and defence systems which was being provided

by the U.S. required proper training. The CIA sent several agents to assist the Mujahedin. During

the 1980s, over a million Mujahedin were trained in joint ISI and CIA established camps in

Pakistan.86 The U.S. and Pakistan co-operated closely throughout the crisis of the Afghan War.

In the early 1980s, Bill Casey, then Director of the CIA, and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman

Khan, Director General of the ISI, established a close relationship and they both kept in direct

communication. Money from the CIA went either to arms purchases from countries such as

China, Egypt, Israel, Britain, and America, or directly to ISI offices in Islamabad, Rawalpindi,

and Quetta. The weapons were then distributed to one of the seven groups of Mujahedin fighting

85 Hilali. U.S.-Pakistan Relationship. p.169. 86 Ibid., p. 121

63

the Soviet troops.87 The heavy influx of arms and aid to Pakistan from the U.S. during the 1980s,

led Pakistan to become a safe haven not only for the Mujahedin but facilitated other terrorist

groups, where they could train, resupply, and regroup themselves before continuing the fight in

Afghanistan. In one of his articles, Charles Cogan describes the Pakistan border during this

period as a “psychological Yalu River.” 88

When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in 1985, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and

Soviet Union started improving. Gorbachev openly admitted that Afghanistan was a bleeding

wound for the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet government showed its willingness to

disengage from Afghanistan and to work towards peaceful settlement of Afghan issue. Pakistan

took a sigh of relief with this drastic change in Soviet policy pertaining to Afghanistan.

After President General Zia’s mysterious death in a plane crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto

came to power. She had been critical of President Zia’s policy regarding the Afghan crisis during

these years. She was not happy the way President Zia made diplomatic gains during these years

from the U.S. economic and military assistance for Pakistan. When she came to power, she once

again faced an immense pressure from the U.S. regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. She tried

her best to remove misunderstandings about the nuclear program which were mainly created by

the Indian lobby.

During her visit to the U.S. in 1989, she successfully conveyed her government’s

message to the U.S. Administration that Pakistan neither had a bomb nor it had any intentions to

manufacture one. But apart from that, she also asserted that Pakistan being a sovereign nation

had every right to pursue its nuclear program for defence purposes. The U.S. showed interest in

87 Mohammed Yousaf & Mark Adkin, Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower, Pen & Sword

Books Ltd, 2002, p. 82. 88 Charles G. Cogan. “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” World Policy Journal, New York,

Summer 1993, p. 79.

64

maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan and offered to sell thirty eight F-16s to Pakistan. On

the other hand, the U.S. remained doubtful about Pakistan’s nuclear program which it considered

as a threat to the region’s stability.89

The Soviet interference in Afghanistan was an expensive and pointless venture and

ultimately Soviet Union failed to achieve its objectives. The Soviet Union had been condemned

all over the world, earned hatred and hostility of various factions within Afghanistan who were

deadly against any foreign intrusion on their territory and had been unable to establish a firm

control on the Afghan territory.

The final accomplishment of the U.S. and Pakistan at the end of the 1980s was the

withdrawal of the Soviet Union as outlined in the Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords, signed

in 1988 called for a return to normalized relations and “good-neighborliness” between

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. emerged as the watchdog and enforcer of the Soviet

timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the situation in Afghanistan was unresolved for

the Afghans, and as the U.S. decreased aid to the Mujahedin who were now fighting amongst

themselves to gain power, disagreements arose amongst various warring factions over the best

way to deal with the political turmoil in Kabul.

2.2 Socio-Economic Impacts of the Afghanistan War on Pakistan

After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan remained largely lawless society and under the direct

control of militant factions of former Mujahedin. Pakistan faced an unresolved situation in

Afghanistan, which caused many more Afghans to migrate to Pakistani border areas. The

crumbling of the Soviet Union and arrival of Afghan refugees created more problems for

89 Burke & Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd edition, Karachi: Oxford University Press,

1990, pp. 463-70.

65

Pakistan in many ways, such as social, political, and economic.90 In the long run, refugees not

only created just socio-economic rift and discrepancy in the Tribal areas but also added to

security problems, thus posing a direct threat to Pakistan’s security environment. Lethal weapons

were easily available in Pakistani society and this started when the U.S sent huge supply of arms

consisted of AK47 rifles and other military equipment for Afghan Mujahedin during the Soviet

invasion.

Weapons which Pakistan supplied to the Afghan Mujahedin groups to fight the Red Army were

again smuggled back to Pakistan’s Tribal areas and were directly sold by the Mujahedin in the

weapons market especially built for this purpose. These weapons were easily available in

markets of smuggled goods across the border where these weapons could be easily purchased at

very low prices by local citizens. For example, Darra market, Peshawar, which is considered to

be the world’s largest illegal arms market, consisted of just about 2600 arms shops with 3000

trained experts produced sophisticated weapons of all kinds on massive scale thus creating a

serious security concern for Pakistan.91It is true that the present wave of terrorism is a direct

outcome of this period which has radicalized Pakistan and further augmented militancy and

uprising in FATA and Baluchistan. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impacted Pakistan adversely,

including: the rise of ethnic and sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and

Balochistan, organized crime activities, weaponization and militarization of Pakistani society.

According to an estimate, about 90% of the world’s poppy farming is carried out in

Afghanistan. Out of this, 90% poppy, Afghanistan is capable to produce 70% of high grade

heroin. In order to create profits for provisions from war against USSR, political anarchy, and

90 Imrana Begum, The Impact of Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan,” Master Thesis, Area Study Centre: Karachi

University, 2010, pp. 115-116.

91Begum, The Impact of Afghan-Soviet War on Pakistan, pp. 193-195

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ongoing civil war within the country; the Afghan warring factions chose to restrict themselves to

this business of poppy farming and drug trafficking. Afghanistan had become a safe drug haven

for smugglers and drug merchants of the world which got the opportunity to smuggle their

products to all parts of the world with a great ease from this “golden crescent.” This business

eventually extended with the passage of time and resulted in the expansion of arms and drug

mafia in the adjoining Tribal areas of Pakistan. As time went by, heroin became easily accessible

everywhere in Pakistan making it a serious issue in Pakistani society. During the early 1980s,

drug were unknown in Pakistan and there were no cases reported as such but soon their number

rose to 45,0000, including five thousand heroin patients in 1986 which was highly alarming for

the government.92

Throughout the Cold War period, the U.S. followed a policy of friendship towards both

Pakistan and India. But the policy had suffered from some constraints in one way or the other,

primarily due to Pakistan-India hostility. The U.S. Pakistan alliance of the 1950s strained U.S.-

India relations to some extent. Throughout this period, India had been getting economic and

military assistance from the U.S. on one or the other pretext despite India’s non-aligned policy.

U.S. tried to build India as a barricade against China in the region which had defeated India in

the Sino-Indian war of October 1962. Pak-U.S. relations, on the other hand, were mostly

characterized by unfulfilled promises, lack of trust and mutual frustration mainly on Pakistan’s

side. Ironically, the U.S. efforts to improve relations with one country automatically strained its

relations with the other.93

92 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Afghan Refugees & Pakistan’s Internal Security Problems,” Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, 1994, p.18.

93U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs. Pakistan Military Academy

Kakul, 2003, pp.115-124.

67

The end of the Cold War saw a democratic setup in Pakistan. Both countries tried to

normalize relations, but Pakistan suffered aid cuts from Washington. The U.S. was no more

interested in this region after Soviet Union’s departure from the region and they left Pakistan on

its own to settle the mess. Pakistan, after Geneva Accords of 1988 lost a special frontline status

which it had been enjoying during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Thus, the close U.S.

alliance of 1980s with Pakistan quickly declined; it seemed as the Soviets were the only reason

which brought both the U.S. and Pakistan closer to each other in the first place.

Chapter – 3

Changing Strategic Environment of the Region: The Taliban Factor

After the end of the Cold War, the drastic transformation of Pakistan’s domestic politics had

indicated the signs of controlled democracy in the country. However, this change did not

fundamentally alter Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The post civilian leadership under

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto consequently tended to follow the general parameters on

Afghanistan which were already laid down by the military without any significant change. The

army retained the fundamental influence on the formulation of important domestic and foreign

policy agendas.94

Afghanistan is comprised of ethnic factions; a country representing a coalition of Islamist

groups within Afghanistan was granted the United Nation’s seat and recognized by much of the

international community in 1992. However, Afghanistan did not meet the necessary key criteria

for sovereignty in order to maintain existing frontiers, means to exercise its influence over its

94 Rauf Klasra, Shujaat says “(Gen) Baig offered him massive funds.” The News, 23 April, 2003.

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populace and territories, and the ability to regulate the management of its domestic economy.

Above mentioned are essential traits for a state in order to become eligible to get status in the

international community.95 States which do not exhibit these characteristics are termed as

‘quasi’, ‘pseudo,’ ‘disrupted’ or even ‘failed’ states.96 In this respect, Robert H. Jackson’s use of

the term ‘quasi state’ to explain the state behavior which lacks the recognition of the global

system by not fulfilling the criteria of International Law was applicable to the Afghanistan’s case

from any perspective.97

The UN’s Special Reporter for Afghanistan, Felix Ermacora, noted in his 1993 Report to the UN

Commission on Human Rights:

Whilst the Foreign office of Afghanistan may appear to demonstrate the features of a central government when viewed from abroad, this is misleading because there is still no effective government which truly represents all the country’s political forces and segments of the population. An armed struggle is still going on between government forces and militant groups headed by political leaders and field commanders, and even

struggle along ethnic and religious lines.98

The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave rise to a call for Jihad, which brought

foreign fighters, flood of refugees, and massive influx of foreign supplied weapons to Pakistan

and this further aggravated the situation. Following the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, many

Mujahedin who fought at the forefront in against the Soviet forces largely remained unsettled.

They began working independently outside the influence of clan elders who hired them earlier.

They acted as warlords and worked for criminal organized groups not only in Afghanistan but in

Pakistan as well.

95 Christopher Clapham, ‘Degrees of Statehood.’ Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998, pp.143-157. 96 Amin Saikal, “Dimensions of State disruption & International Responses,” 3rd World Quarterly, 21, No.1, 2000,

pp.39-49. 97 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations & the 3rd World, London: Cambridge

University Press, 1993, p.22. 98 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan by Mr. F. Ermacora, in accordance with the Commission

on Human Rights Resolution 1992/68, Geneva, 18 February 1993.

69

Pakistan remained the most influential external power in Afghanistan due to its prior

assistance for anti-Soviet Afghan Islamic groups in the 1980s. Most of the Afghan refugees who

came to Pakistan during this period of warfare were ethnic Pashtuns.99 Pashtuns are the single

dominating ethnic group in Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan FATA region.

The region of FATA is comprised of 450 Km long section situated along Pakistan’s

border with Afghanistan. This area is mostly inhabited by Pashtun majority and further

subdivided into dozens major ethnic groups and hundreds of clan and sub-tribes.100 The FATA is

a semi-autonomous area of Pakistan, dating back to British colonial rule of the Sub-continent.

The tribes live there have a rich history and are known for managing their resources, affairs, and

internal disputes without allowing any sort of external interference in their matters.101 By the end

of the Soviet invasion in the 1989, Pakistan was hosting approximately 3.5 million Afghan

refugees on its soil. These refugees had built strong networks with their Pakistani Pashtun

cousins and participated in almost every kind of economic activities particularly ranging from

involvement in the transport business of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan to

illicit drug trafficking.102Afghans, residing in Pakistan had assimilated themselves into Pakistani

traditions and thousands of them received their education in Urdu language.

99 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002. 100 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” pp. 103-105 101 Kirk H. Nilsson, Dealing with Terrorist Sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, US Army

War College, 2009, p. 2 102 Hilali, “The Costs & Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol.11, No.3, 2002,

pp.291-320.

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71

District Map of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

72

In the recent years, the semi-autonomous region of FATA has become a breeding ground of

terrorism. The U.S. intervention in this region has only resulted in the rise of anti-Americanism.

FATA is also considered to be the home of many Al-Qaeda fugitives and the Taliban forces. The

presence of a large number of “foreigners” from the Middle East, Central Asia, Muslim areas of

the Far East and even Europe to some extent go unnoticed by the government of Pakistan in the

past. This carefree attitude by the government of Pakistan encouraged the militants to use this

area as a safe zone to conduct terrorist activities.

3.1 The Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for the U.S. to restructure its relations with

South Asian countries. The U.S. foreign policy and security perspectives changed towards South

Asia in the post-Cold War era. The significance of the region declined for the US policy makers

after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pak-U.S. relations witnessed a downturn on major

issues including: cross border infiltration in India by Pakistani militant organizations, terrorism,

drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation were some of the highlights of the 1990s.

In the post-Cold War period, when the U.S. was left as the only global power, it changed

its policies and priorities too. The main focus would be on how to tackle the challenges of the

new unipolar world. During the Cold War period, the U.S. policy was based mainly on the notion

of power, influence, security issues and its strategic interests around the globe. In the South

Asian region, Pakistan was the only state which promoted the U.S. strategic interests during the

Cold War period and had been the most allied ally of the U.S. in the region. India, the

conventional ally of Moscow and arch rival of Pakistan, apparently welcomed Washington’s

73

changed policy towards Pakistan and had become the focus of the U.S. as the dominant power in

South Asia which has always been its desire.103

In the given situation, Pakistan not only lost the status of a frontline state but also attained

the reputation as an unfavorable nation and was alleged to have a tendency of harming U.S.’

regional interests in South Asia. It has often been said about Pak-U.S. relationship, that this

alliance between both countries is largely issue based; and whenever the “issue” lost its

significance for one of the countries, led to the loss of strategic interest and mutual co-

operation.104

As Dennis Kux has observed, during the Cold War, the fight for a common objective, that

is, against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan could no longer cement U.S-Pak relations. In the

absence of a “mutual significant national interests,” tensions between the two unequal partners

were becoming more obvious.105

When the U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1990 under the

Pressler Amendment, the U.S. Department of Defence and military agencies still wanted to work

in close collaboration with Pakistani armed forces. This was because they considered and

perceived Pakistan as a vital state that could play an important role in the Gulf region due to its

cordial relations with the Muslim countries for ongoing U.S. military operations there. As a

consequence of this difference in policy, the U.S. was engaged in a series of selective sales of

military spare parts and equipment to Pakistan.106

In October 1990, the Bush Administration notified Congress and expressed lack of trust

to verify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons. Congress took immediate action and

103 Stephen Philip Cohen, “American Interest & the India – Pakistan Conflict,” (ed) Asian Security, New Delhi:

Lances International, 1991, pp. 132-155. 104 Farzana Sheikh, “Pakistan U.S. Relations.” Pakistan Horizon, 54 (January 2001), pp. 18-33 105 Dennis Kux, The U.S. & Pakistan, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 320. 106 The Washington Post, March 3, 1992.

74

suspended all economic and defence grant for Pakistan under the provision of Pressler

Amendment. The Bush Administration did not prevent Congress from doing so, that clearly

reflects that the Administration wanted Congress to exactly react that way. But apart from these

sanctions, the U.S. continued commercial military sales to Pakistan. Though, the only purpose

was to continue the long standing relations with Pakistan. The Bush Administration made it clear

that this commercial sale would only include spare parts which the U.S. had already sold and not

for the purchase of new weapons.107

After imposing military and economic sanctions under the Pressler Amendment, the U.S.

started pressurizing Pakistan to conduct inspections of its nuclear facilities, but this demand was

turned down by Islamabad. The U.S. insisted that Pakistan should sign Nuclear Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) unconditionally and Pakistan claimed that it had already maintained a clear stance

on the NPT.108

One of the main goals and priority agenda of the senior Bush Administration was to

prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in South Asia and to persuade

Pakistan to sign NPT, and for this it had been blaming Pakistan for some time. But due to

strategic conditions, President Bush chose to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear program. His priority goal

became to contain Soviet influence in Afghanistan for which he needed Pakistan’s close co-

operation. When the Soviet troops finally left Afghanistan, the country slipped into a bloody civil

war and this time the U.S. was not interested to intervene; thus it left Pakistan on its own to

manage the crisis in its backyard.

The basic objective of Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation was mainly based on

the fundamental theme of Islamic Jihad. The slow rise of militancy in Afghan society also

107 C. Uday Bhaskar, “The May 1990 Nuclear Crisis: An Indian Perspective.” Strategic Digest, 5 (May 1998), p.730. 108 Nazim Kamal, “Nuclear and Missile Proliferation Issues: Some Approaches to Stability in South Asia,”

Contemporary South-East Asia, 4 (March 1992), pp. 378-379

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entered into Pakistan which was an expected outcome of the prevailing turmoil. During

subsequent years, the civil war in Afghanistan and movement of freedom in different Eastern

European countries which later emerged as Central Asian Republics (CARs) gave rise to the

tendency of militancy and fundamentalism in this region at a wider scale.109

In addition, hundreds of Pakistani retired and serving officers and non commissioned

personnel were attached to the so-called religious Taliban ‘movement’ during the 1990s. The

Saudi government and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) both were the main financiers to support

the Taliban regime, including logistics, medical support, military training, warfare planning and

most of all intelligence. Pakistani servicemen also stood side by side, dressed in Afghan clothing

and remained impossible to differentiate them from the Taliban during the conduct of strategic

and other course of actions.110

Containing Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and the Gulf region

had become the most vital objective for the U.S. administration during the 1990s. The U.S.

refused to accept the Taliban on an official level and they exerted pressure on the Taliban

government not to violate human rights in Afghanistan. But the major irritant between both the

U.S. and Afghanistan throughout this period remained Afghanistan’s involvement in drug

trafficking; and the use of the Afghan territory by the groups and individuals who were involved

in terrorist activities and were seen as a source of threat to American interests.111 Though the

Taliban leaders denied accusations by the U.S. pertaining to their connection with drug

trafficking and terrorist activities, but on the other hand, they admitted that Osama bin Laden

109 Graham Fuller, “Islamic Fundamentalism in Afghanistan its Character & Prospect.”

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2008/pdf 110 Interview with ex Army Officer, 27 November 2012 111 Interview with ex Army Officer, 07 January 2013

76

was based in Afghanistan. They demanded proof from the U.S. of Osama’s involvement in

terrorist activities before he could be expelled from Afghanistan. 112

In February 1990, tension between India and Pakistan started developing again on the Kashmir

issue:

Indian forces in Kashmir have engaged in immense human rights violations including

extra-judicial executions, rape, torture and intentional attacks on health care

workers…..such killings are approved out as a matter of policy. More than any other

occurrence, these premeditated killings disclose the extent of the human rights crisis in

Kashmir.113

India accused Pakistan of instigating cross border terrorism that was denied by Pakistan. Both

the countries were dragged to the edge of war. The U.S. believed that the two states had nuclear

weapons and any possibility of conventional war or political crisis between them would

eventually lead to nuclear warfare in South Asia. The Deputy Director of the CIA Richard Kerr

later expressed concern over ongoing tensions between the two neighbors and revealed that the

explosive situation in South Asia was more precarious than the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and

the U.S. prevented a nuclear war between the two states of South Asia.114

Pak-U.S. relations remained strained in the 1990s due to continuous Indian efforts at the

international level to label Pakistan as a ‘terrorist state,’ by propagating that Pakistan was

sponsoring terrorism in Indian held Kashmir. With the passage of time, the Clinton

Administration realized that India was the major source of disturbance and was not interested in

solving the Kashmir dispute which was a mutual and outstanding problem between India and

Pakistan. For instance, Assistant Secretary Robin Raphael repeatedly gave statements that India

was showing unfriendly gestures towards Pakistan. On October 28, 1993, she said that Kashmir

112 Interview with ex Army Officer, 02 February 2013 113 Asia Watch on Human Rights, Boston, 1993. 114 Bhaskar, “The May 1990 Nuclear Crisis: An Indian Perspective.” p. 730.

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was a disputed territory according to the United Nations resolutions and denied India’s

legitimacy and rule over Kashmir.115

After the Soviet forces withdrawal from the region, the U.S. no longer needed the

Mujahedin, so they were designated as terrorists and Pakistan was repeatedly accused by the

U.S. of letting them use its territory. Pakistan took some steps in 1993-94 under immense

pressure exerted by the U.S. in this regard. In return for this favor, the U.S. withdrew Pakistan

from the list of the countries that were encouraging and promoting terrorists.116

The most perilous development was the rising support for the Islamic movement in

neighboring Afghanistan and its perpetrators from within the army, which had the repute of

formulating major foreign policy decisions. There was a mounting fear of clear split along

ideological lines in Pakistan Army ranks which further increased the possibility of the military’s

conflict with the Islamists. These elements had developed strong foothold and network within the

establishment which was somewhat disturbing and regarded as an effort to malign Pakistan

Army’s image all across the globe. But in one way or the other, senior retired army officers

joined by hundreds of serving officers and soldiers attended the ideological training

sessions.117General (Retd) Hameed Gul, former head of the ISI, who was intensely engaged in

clandestine operations in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces in 1980s, says: “Officers in

Pakistan Army undoubtedly had always remained religious, but an increasing number of officers

had turned Islamist by then.”118

Pakistan’s military establishment provided its full backing to the Taliban to attain the

goal of strategic depth in Afghanistan thus restricting the influence of other regional actors in

115 South China Morning Post, March 4, 1994. 116 Afghanistan Militias, Global Security. Org. available from

http://www.globalsecurity.org./militaryworld/afghanistan/militia-fac.htm. 117 Naseem Ahmed, “General Musharraf’s Taliban Policy,” The Dialogue, Vol. V No. 2, pp.98-99 118 Hussain, “Jihad Begins at Home,” News-line, February, 2001, p.23

78

Afghanistan including Iran and India and the forces of the Northern Alliance which have never

been on friendly terms with Pakistan. The concept of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan was

presented by then Army Chief General Aslam Beg who “had given the ISI mandate and the task

of running it.”119

Pakistan throughout this period tried to develop good relations with its neighboring

countries, particularly with Iran, Russia and Afghanistan. Pakistan contributed a lot in its effort

to bring peace in war torn Afghanistan and held discussions with Mujahedin groups several

times. Pakistan tried to patch up differences between different Afghan warring groups and in this

regard, Islamabad accord was signed in 1993.120

Pakistan was instrumental in the conclusion of the Islamabad Accord signed on 7 March

1993. This Accord sought to resolve the differences between Rabbani and Hikmatyar.121 The

then Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, played a decisive role in this reconciliatory course

of action; with the moral and financial support of Islamabad’s most important Arab ally, Saudi

Arabia. The Islamabad Accord had the blessing and support of Iran as well.122

When Benazir Bhutto’s government came into power in 1993, she had very limited

authority to formulate an independent foreign policy course without the consent of the military.

Pakistan military has been the major driving force which takes all major decisions pertaining to

foreign policy of Pakistan. Many observers have also emphasized the role of Benazir Bhutto’s

119 Quoted in International Crisis Group’s Report on Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, International

Crisis Group Asia Briefing Paper , Brussels, March 12, 2002, pp.2-4 120 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History, p. 198 121 Gerald Bourke, “Pakistan Brokers Afghan Peace Deal.”The Guardian, 4 March 1993. 122 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 306

79

government and most importantly, Interior Minister, Naseerullah Baber, who had been

instrumental in organizing and supporting the Taliban.123

In the post-Cold War era, Pak-U.S. relations remained fraught due to certain other issues like

human rights violation, drug trafficking, missile development, nuclear explosions and alleged

support to remnants of Mujahedin in Afghanistan were still stumbling blocks between the two

countries, preventing turn to normalcy. It was during the era of President Clinton that Pak-U.S.

relations showed some sign of improvement, because of the Brown Amendment of October

1994.

When President Clinton assumed office, it promised to remove sanctions imposed on

Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment which he himself regarded unfair and unjust. He also

admitted this fact that U.S. had not been fair to Pakistan regarding military sales and assured

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to request Congress to reconsider the Pressler Amendment. The

relations between Pakistan and the U.S. improved as both the states realized that Kashmir was a

focal point of disturbance between Pakistan and India and undoubtedly it is a disputed territory

which could escalate to nuclear war between two neighbors at any point. Apart from that, both

nations showed willingness to the importance of resolving Kashmir issue at the earliest; and

showed eagerness and interest to enhance co-operation in defence sector as well. The F-16

dispute constituted as a major irritant in Pakistan-U.S. relationship. It is worth mentioning that

the Clinton Administration actively sought an agreeable solution to the problem, which dispelled

the traditional perception in Pakistan that Democrats were “anti- Pakistan and pro-India.”124

In 1994, Senator Hank Brown sponsored an Amendment primarily designed to neutralize

the impact of specific Pressler sanctions on Pakistan. Brown initially recommended easing of

123 Ahmed Rashid,“Pakistan & the Taliban.” in Maley, ed., Fundamentalism Reborn, New York: New York

University Press, 1998, pp.74-90 124 Hilali, U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, p. 235.

80

sanctions by lifting the ban on economic assistance and releasing all military equipment frozen

by the U.S., including the supply of F-16s. But he had to drop the F-16s from the package in the

face of rigid opposition by pro Indian lobby.125 The Brown Amendment also provided a way out

of the F-16 stalemate by allowing the sale of these aircrafts to a third country and reimbursement

of already paid money to Pakistan. The country selected by the Clinton Administration was

Indonesia. 126

In 1995, Brown Amendment was passed by the House of Representatives which enabled

the Clinton Administration to release the military equipment and weapons to Pakistan for which

it had already paid much before the implementation of the Pressler Amendment in the 1990s.

The Brown Amendment was welcomed by Pakistan. It was, however, a symbolic victory for

Pak-U.S. security relations; as for the very first time since the imposition of Pressler

Amendment, the U.S. lawmakers agreed to ease sanctions against Pakistan that were widely seen

as discriminatory.

In 1995-1996, a new force comprising of the students of religious schools (Madrassas)

calling themselves the Taliban emerged on the scene of Afghanistan. They denounced all the

warring Mujahedin factions who were engaged with fighting with each other and waged a war

against all. Soon, the Taliban gradually swept entire Afghanistan and conquered major cities

where they developed their strong foothold and entered Kabul in 1996. They established their

own government based on strict Islamic ideology that had nothing to do with the original

teachings and message of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.W)

Pakistan’s good relations with the Taliban’s government sufficed to motivate Pakistan’s

rivals in the Afghan game, namely Iran, India and Russia to arrive at informal strategic

125 Rasul Bakhsh Rais,“Indo-US Relations.” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 14 (Spring & Fall 1997), p.19. 126 Washington Post, 12 April, 1995

81

understanding against Pakistan. These countries bolstered the forces that were against the

Taliban, that is, Northern Alliance led by then Commander Ahmed Shah Masoud. Between 1996

and 2000, Afghanistan became an epicenter of a complex regional rivalry played out by the

leading powers of Southwest Asia for exerting influence in Central and Southwestern Asia. In

this context, Pakistan remained the foremost regional power with the greatest ability to exert

influence in Afghanistan; as a result of the remarkable success of its proxy, the Taliban, in

checking the forces of the Rabbani-Masoud coalition.

When the Taliban movement surfaced in Afghanistan, Islamabad co-opted their strides,

without any formal reluctance and gave recognition to the Taliban government in May 1997

despite facing severe criticism and pressure on its official recognition from the international

community.127A source of friction between Pak-U.S. relations was Pakistan’s support for the

Taliban, who by now controlled most of Afghanistan. The Taliban gained the wrath of the U.S.

by their harsh treatment of women, abuse of human rights and their willingness to provide a safe

asylum for Islamic militants and terrorists.128 Pakistan's attempt to establish a pro-Pakistan

Mujahedin government in Kabul did not yield any fruitful result as it feared that political vacuum

would give New Delhi an opportunity to play against Pakistan from Kabul.

Having established peace and showing a positive posture towards Pakistan, the Taliban

quickly gained the good will of Pakistan. Though the U.S. did not like Pakistan’s close

interaction with the Taliban regime but the U.S. by that time was involved in the Afghan

problem. This time, it viewed the spread of militant Islam as a threat to its own interests which it

127 U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy

Kakul, 2003, p.37 128 Mehtab Ali Shah,“Pak-US Relationship in the Post Cold War,” Pakistan Journal of American Studies, 17 (Spring

& Fall 1999), pp.9-20.

82

ignored completely during its unconditional support to Mujahedin throughout the Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan.

Though the pressure started mounting on Pakistan by the U.S. pertaining to the Taliban

government and it had become an isolated state at the global level. Pakistan did not stop its

support for the Taliban and advocated that Afghanistan should be given a seat in the United

Nations, but the international community did not pay any attention to this request. Pakistan’s

relations with Iran also suffered due to its support for the Taliban government.

The Clinton Administration tried to curtail the production of WMDs in South Asia. In

December 1995, the U.S. came to know that India was all set for a nuclear test. The U.S. officials

privately warned India not to conduct nuclear tests and it also threatened India of dire

consequences under economic sanctions, although that information was not authentic and it did

not turn into a reality. However, the U.S. Administration remained doubtful of Janata Party’s

intentions that had been advocating for turning India into a nuclear country in South Asia.129

In 1996, the U.S. not only tried to bring various Afghan factions on negotiation table but

also wanted to strike a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan and was interested in building a

proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan by two major oil

companies: American oil giant Unocal and Bridas of Argentina.

On 19 April, 1996, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of South Asia Robin Raphel while

visiting Kabul, Afghanistan said:

We do not see ourselves inserting in the middle of Afghan affairs, but we consider ourselves as a

friend of Afghanistan which is why I am here to urge the Afghans themselves to get together and

talk. We are also concerned that economic opportunities here will be missed, if political stability

cannot be restored.130

129 David Chou, U.S. Policy Toward India & Pakistan in the Post-Cold War, Taipai: Sheng Book Co.Ltd., 2003. 130 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil & the New Great Game in Central Asia, Publisher: I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 45

83

It is also believed in Pakistan that the Taliban were being punished by the U.S. and international

community because of their disagreement with the U.S. oil corporations that premeditated to

pipe out Central Asian oil and gas.131 No serious economic foreign investment was possible in

Afghanistan as there was no end to the ongoing political turmoil between warring factions. The

government in Kabul was not in a position to ensure minimum stability and protection to the

investors.132

In 1998, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack on Osama’s bin Laden’s base camp in

Afghanistan close to Pakistan’s border. Osama remained at large but some of his companions

were killed or seriously injured in that cruise missile attack. The Taliban government protested

on these missile attacks and warned the U.S. of serious consequences. The U.S. government also

complained that ISI was supporting the Taliban and their military operations, but no concrete

facts were provided by the U.S. to Pakistan in this regard.133

Not only to the surprise of the U.S. but to the whole world, India tested its nuclear

weapons on 11 May 1998 using China as a threat to its security in the region. The U.S. strongly

condemned the nuclear tests and enacted related sanctions for this act. The Clinton

Administration termed these tests as a terrible mistake.134 The U.S. tried its best to engage

Pakistan to desist from exploding nuclear devices which it was expecting from Pakistan in the

wake of Indian nuclear detonations. But the Pakistan government did not yield to any pressure in

this regard and exploded nuclear devices on May 28 and 30 1998 which was severely criticized

131 Umbreen Javed, “War on Terror: Pakistan’s Apprehensions,” African Journal of Political Science & IR. 5(3), p.

125

132 Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil & the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 126 133 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005, pp. 197-206 134 Benet, May 14, 1998

84

by the U.S. It was assumed that Pakistan was a threat to the U.S.’ non proliferation goals in

South Asia while ignoring the Indian nuclear capability.

It is pertinent to mention that if India had not exploded nuclear devices, Pakistan would not have

gone for 6 nuclear explosions of its own. In fact, India changed the fragile balance of power in

the region and provoked Pakistan to follow suit.135 Indian leaders openly hurled threats at

Pakistan to attack Azad Kashmir. It was a grave situation for Pakistan’s security but Pakistan

responded in kind.

In May 1998, the U.S. Congress approved another set of sanctions against Pakistan after

a series of nuclear tests. There were three sets of sanctions that the U.S. had imposed on Pakistan

in the wake of nuclear tests: these were Pressler Amendment (related to possession of nuclear

weapons), Symington and Glenn Sanctions (related to military takeover) and sanctions imposed

after the nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan in May 1998.136

The U.S. insisted on both countries to sign the NPT immediately. Pakistan showed its

keenness to sign the NPT and give up its nuclear weapons provided that India did the same. On

the other hand, India criticized NPT as a discriminatory treaty and in return set a condition for

Washington and said it would agree to sign it and to give up its nuclear weapons on the condition

that the five nuclear powers in the world destroy their own nuclear devices first. Washington

rejected this condition without any hesitation.137

The U.S. sanctions on Pakistan and India neither changed anything regarding the nuclear

capability nor their attitude towards nuclear policy for their respective countries. The Clinton

administration eventually on July 15, 1998, asked Congress to pass the Pakistan-India Relief Act

which is commonly known as Brownback Amendment that relaxed sanctions on both nuclear

135 Op.cit. 136 Sartaj Aziz, “Pakistan More Secure than Ever Before,”Pakistan Times, 1 January 1999, p.1 137 Op.cit.

85

states of South Asia. On October 1, 1999, Congress passed the Second Brownback Amendment

which allowed Pakistan to receive aid which was earlier suspended under the Pressler

Amendment- the primary reason of deterioration of Pakistan-U.S. relations during the 1990s.138

Towards the end of 1998, some of the Kashmiri freedom fighters crossed the Line of

Control (LOC) and occupied some of the inaccessible and snow bound mountain peaks in Kargil

and Daras sectors. These mountains which up-till now were unoccupied by either side eventually

engaged Indian forces in guerilla warfare thus elevating tensions between Pakistan, India, and

the U.S.139 These freedom fighters, in addition, blocked the Main Supply Route (MSR) of India

to Siachin and posed a very serious threat to Indian military in the area. India plunged its entire

resources to eject the freedom fighters from those mountains leading to a limited war between

the two traditional rivals.

138 International Herald Tribune, October 15, 1999, p.5 139 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, p. 243.

86

The Build-up of Kargil Conflict 1999

Parallel to that, India initiated a propaganda campaign against Pakistan for its alleged support to

intruders who had captured the mountains. The U.S. mediation controlled the situation between

Pakistan and India; freedom fighters withdrew and India was safely pulled out of the quagmire.

Both countries remained on high alert during the Kargil episode and the Clinton Administration

87

had taken Kargil crisis as a flash point between Pakistan and India which could be turned into a

full-fledged nuclear escalation any time.

Again, the American role was very significant in resolving the conflict between two arch

rivals of South Asia through mediation. Although, the U.S. had historically advocated bilateral

negotiations between Pakistan and India and had been successful to resolve their bilateral issues;

but the U.S. has always followed a path of “crisis management” in regard to the frequent crises

which have erupted between Pakistan and India.140

The Nawaz Sharif government had faced severe criticism from the Clinton

Administration on issues associated with Osama Bin Laden and Pakistan’s alleged support to the

Taliban regime; and the presence of many terrorist camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.141

Pakistan had been going through a variety of sanctions imposed by the U.S. on various

pretexts throughout the 1990s. The most recent series of sanctions were imposed in the first week

of September that year when Pakistan was blamed of getting Chinese assistance for the

development of missiles production and held responsible for defying the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR). With the imposition of this last set of sanctions, Pakistan had become

the most sanctioned nation in the year 2001.142 It has been observed that Pakistan’s political and

economic stability in the region is of vital importance to the international community in general

and to the U.S. in particular.

By the end of the 1990s, the policy-makers of Pakistan were highly alarmed and

concerned regarding the Taliban’s ignoring attitude despite severe protest from the Nawaz Sharif

140 Margaret M. Huffman, The United States and Pakistan during Crisis: From the Russian intervention in

Afghanistan to 9/11.” Master Thesis, Faculty of the Department of History, East Carolina University, 2012, pp. 62-

63 141 The Nation, Oct 12, 1999. 142 Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan - U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds,” Pakistan Vision, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2011, pp.

23-61.

88

government against the use of Afghan territory by some terrorists groups who were actively

involved in criminal actions within Pakistan. However, contrary to this, Pakistani establishment

was still of the opinion that the Taliban were the most dependable proxy of Pakistan in

Afghanistan to attain ‘strategic depth’ against India. Consequently, the civilian government’s

complaints were continuously ignored and Pakistan army continued military and technical

support to the Taliban which they deemed important.143 Pakistan’s policy was criticized by Iran,

India, Russia and Central Asian states.

The government of Nawaz Sharif was toppled in a military coup carried out by General

Pervez Musharraf in 1999, but there was no vital alteration regarding Pakistan’s policy for the

Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the new military government which was led by then General

Musharraf followed the same policy. On the other hand, in Pakistan, finally “Democracy

Sanctions” were enacted at the end of the 1990s. The U.S. immediately brought into play Section

508 of the Foreign Assistance Act which immediately brought an end to the U.S. economic and

defense grant to Pakistan.144

Prior to 9/11, the U.S. regarded Pakistan a failing state because it remained unable to

cope up with many external and internal problems, for instance, on the external front, its alleged

support to undemocratic Taliban government in Afghanistan was severely criticized; and at home

front, Nawaz government was unable to tackle many domestic problems including economic,

social and political problems. In sum, the main problem remained terrorism which spread its

tentacles and penetrated deep into Pakistani society. To make matters worse for Pakistan, India

was continuously blaming Pakistan for the growing infiltration of militants into Indian held

143 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan & the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, London: Ashgate Publishing

Limited., 2005, p. 220. 144 Hasnat, “Pak - U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds,” pp. 23-61.

89

Kashmir, who were taken as terrorists by the Indian government. India took this as a great

opportunity to create propaganda and malign the image of Pakistan internationally. Weak

democratic institutions gave way to military takeover and nuclear tests of 1998 were some of the

serious sources of friction between Pakistan-U.S. relations which further aggravated the situation

for Pakistan. So by the late 1990s, Pakistan was internationally an isolated state which was

facing numerous domestic problems on the one hand and external condemnation pertaining to

the Taliban regime on the other.145

Though President General Musharraf after assuming power promised wide-ranging

internal domestic reforms but announced that he had no intention to change the foreign policy

course of action set by the predecessor government. This highlighted Pakistan’s desire of

continuation of its same foreign policy agenda with regard to Kashmir and Afghanistan which

previously had been approved by the Pakistan Army.146 Therefore, the new military regime in

Pakistan was of the view that it should continue its support to the Taliban leadership in

Afghanistan.

Ahmed Shah Masoud humiliated Pakistan further by informing that he had captured

hundreds of Pakistani hostages, including 17 officers of the Pakistan Army. This statement was

straightaway dismissed by Pakistan ‘as the captives were all retired officers from service and

could have gone to Afghanistan on their own and for this, Pakistan Army had nothing to do with

this affair.’147

The Taliban government was further isolated on the international front when on 7

December 2000, Russia and the U.S. moved a Resolution in the UN Security Council urging the

145 Umbreen Javed, “War on Terror: Pakistan’s Apprehensions,” African Journal of Political Science &

International Relations, Vol. 5 (March 2011), pp. 125-131 146 Khalid Ahmed, Pakistan- the State in Crisis, Lahore: Vanguard Books Ptv. 2002, p. 35. 147 Ibid., p. 37

90

UN to take strict actions for intensification of sanctions against the Taliban in Afghanistan

including military sanctions and other related but effective measures. The resolution further

recommended the Taliban to close all the terrorist camps within thirty days on its land and to

allow, “Strict monitoring of such shutting down by the UN officials.”148

The process of Talibanisation posed a serious threat to Pakistan’s security. Moreover, the

influence and control which the Taliban exhibited in Afghanistan was a source of stimulation for

many militant groups who found a safe asylum within the country and created political instability

for Pakistan. These groups with a typical mind set were all set to make Pakistan as a theocratic

state where they could establish a Taliban-style regime with great ease which they earlier

implemented in Afghanistan. With the passage of time, these groups had become strong enough

to exert considerable pressure on the government to surrender before their demands. For

example, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) rejected the UN restrictions on Afghanistan

and severely criticized this resolution as discriminatory and insisted the Islamic countries

including Pakistan, not to accept these sanctions thus boosting the morale of militants all time

high.149

Meanwhile, at the international level, Pakistan stood all alone facing many allegations

including the support of Kashmiri insurgency and its pro-Taliban stance. President Musharraf

safeguarded his pro-Taliban policy by claiming it as a need of hour in both Pakistan’s national

and security related interests which highlighted Pakistan’s strategy in the region. Pakistan in one

way or the other could not simply afford a security threat from Afghanistan’s side, in addition to

the one in the East (India) on its borders.150

148Dawn, December 8, 2000 149 Ahmed, “General Musharraf’s Taliban Policy,” pp.98-99 150 www.state/gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/.html.

91

The U.S. President Bill Clinton in March, 2000 had planned to visit South Asia, but no clear

prior information and details were given to Pakistan’s government till end, whether he would

stop over in Pakistan. Finally, Clinton did visit Pakistan on March 25, 2000, but only for a very

short duration of five hours after paying a visit to India where he stayed much longer. President

Clinton conveyed a blunt message to President General Musharraf, though conveyed in a

pleasant, frank and appeasing manner.151 He clearly set and emphasized certain landmarks for

having more meaningful relationship with Pakistan. These landmarks were: revival of

democracy, resolution of the nuclear issue, and peaceful co-existence with India. Pakistan’s

expectation of the visit by the U.S. President was to have a fair and equitable response for the

resolution of Kashmir issue and economic assistance which were not fulfilled and undoubtedly

remained a great disappointment for Pakistan.152

During meeting with President Clinton, President General Musharraf tried to justify

military takeover. During the meeting, President Musharraf showed strong reservation for

convincing the Taliban to adopt policies according to the International Law.153 In fact, General

Musharraf emphasized the need of international community’s involvement in Afghani crisis in

order to help Pakistan in resolving the crisis by employing diplomatic way. According to

President General Musharraf, the Taliban had controlled 95% of Afghanistan’s territory and it

was not that easy for the U.S. or other regional powers to wipe them off that easily.154

Indeed the 1990 was the decade of Pakistan’s isolation. By that time, the U.S. lost the

influence to contain Pakistan’s behavior due to its sanction strategy time and again on one or the

other pretext. The incentive for change in Pakistan came from within. President General

151 Dennis Kux, The U.S. & Pakistan 1947-2000, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 357 152 U.S. Policy Towards South Asia, Handbook of National and International Affairs, Pakistan Military Academy

Kakul, 2003, pp.115-124 153 Ibid. 154 W. Winchell, International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence, Vol. 16, 2003, p. 379

92

Musharraf soon after assuming power realized that Pakistan was in a much poorer condition

economically than it had been during previous military takeovers. At the end of the 1990s,

Pakistan lost its international standing within the community of world nations and most

importantly, it needed internal stability. The country’s base was being badly jolted and

undermined by the rise of religious extremism which distorted the main social fabric of Pakistani

society and numerous problems emerged from ethnic conflicts and poor governance in the center

and at provincial levels. This placed not only the country’s future at risk but raised a question

mark on the role of Pakistan’s Army. In such a fragile national environment accompanied by

challenges and foreseen threats primarily from fundamentalism, it was not that easy for the

establishment under President General Musharraf to pursue an independent forward policy,

especially toward Kashmir and Afghanistan.155

In sum, the 1990’s was a defining decade for Pakistan’s foreign policy when it comes to

war against terror, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban regime was a central factor in the next two

decades of this war. Secondly, that the 1990’s was a good decade to demonstrate the dictum of

‘no permanent friends, but only enduring national interests’ in that the United States in the post-

cold war era moved away from Pakistan and the nuclear issue/proliferation became its main

concern.

155 Hussain, “U.S. Pakistan Engagement,” Special Report, U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2005. pp. 4-7

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Chapter-4

Terrorism and Terrorist Threats before 9/11

In the 1980s, some countries were labeled as terrorism sponsoring states, including Libya, Iran

and Iraq. As these countries were thought to prepare terrorists on their soil and were also accused

of providing them safe havens, arms and guerrilla training all across the globe. Throughout the

1990s, the U.S. became highly concerned regarding terrorist activities carried out against the

U.S. citizens.

The obsession of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan at any cost had made the U.S.

blind to the dangers of stocking Islamic fundamentalism in the region without considering its

long lasting repercussions for the region in general and for the U.S. in particular. The arming and

raising of the militants, and being tolerant to the expansion of the narcotics trade to a greater

extent created alarming situation in subsequent years. The primary objective was to defeat the

Soviet Union in Afghanistan so these above mentioned important issues were ignored by the

U.S. because they were supporting the U.S. objectives in the region.

After the first Gulf War, Al-Qaeda primarily focused on combating the growing U.S.

influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia wanted the U.S. to withdraw its troops in the name of

providing security to the Middle East. Al-Qaeda showed strong resistance against the presence of

the U.S. troops on Saudi land which it considered the most sacred place. Al-Qaeda severely

criticized Saudi rulers’ policies and bin Laden termed them fake Muslims as they were unable to

protect their land from foreign troops. The ultimate goal of this campaign led by Al-Qaeda was

to remove the Saudi royal family from power and put in place an Islamic regime of Al-Qaeda

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style on the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudi government retaliated as a result of bin Laden’s anti-

state activities and expelled him in 1992 and eventually revoked his citizenship in 1994.156

Al-Qaeda emerged as a well-known transnational network. In addition to following its

campaign against the western world, it largely included numerous militant fundamental groups

that shared some of its ideological beliefs to support in executing violent and aggressive

campaign against the U.S. Osama bin Laden became the main person in charge and patron of the

Taliban.

In Afghanistan, one of these militant groups was Al-Qaeda which was well organized and

established group. They developed good relations with the ruling Taliban government and

received a special status in Afghanistan. This group was headed by Osama bin Laden who earned

a good repute for fighting against the Soviets with the active role of CIA in Afghanistan during

the Soviet occupation. The U.S. supported Osama while fighting against the Soviets and soon he

became a legendary figure in Afghanistan due to his participation in the so-called Afghan Jihad

against the Red Army and became an honored guest of the Taliban government. Guests in this

region are held in very high esteem position and would always be protected at the peril of the

lives of their hosts.

Osama was provided with all kinds of assistance by the Taliban government for his

mission as a revolutionary. Osama wanted to build an Islamic force to fight on behalf of the

Palestinians by motivating young people to join him against the western world and against those

who were helping Israel to occupy more Arab lands and to develop its hegemony in the region.

Osama had started his militant operations from Saudi Arabia during the conflict in Afghanistan

in the 1980s with active collaboration of Pakistan ISI and American CIA. Afghanistan under the

156 Interview with ex-Pak Army officer, 22 February, 2013.

95

Taliban regime was considered the largest producer of heroin in the world. During 1998-99,

Osama was in control and owner of 64,000 hectares of land for opium cultivation.157 This can be

guessed from the financial capability and strength of the promoters of terrorism. Bin Laden was

the main architect of the September 11 terror attacks- the most significant and lethal terror

operation in the history of modern terror till date.158 Its repercussions and lessons will likely be

studied in the years to come and will serve as a wide field of study for researchers both in the

operational areas and in the academic research areas of various disciplines. This unprecedented

attack on mankind and its grave implications raise a new set of security concerns affecting all

civilized nations.

4.1 Terror Threats and Responses

Terrorism is a methodical use of terror to achieve political aims and including the kidnapping of

government officials, identified individuals, innocent civilians, killing of political leaders,

bombing of embassies, and hijacking of aircrafts. Modern terrorism has introduced a new variety

of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threats and responses. Thus an organization

with terror agenda will always prefer to use the techniques of general terror against the

population because of its grave consequences in order to achieve its objectives. If terrorism is

continued without any checks and limits beyond a certain point, it may spring back and may

drive the people towards the fold of revolutionaries.159

Terrorism can be defined as deliberate attempt to use force and inflict harm on innocent

citizens and the basic purpose remains to generate fear thus creating unrest, political anarchy and

157 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Military Operations Outside Afghanistan to Fight Terrorism, Press Release (2001). 158 Osama Bin Laden www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp

159 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001

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chaos to achieve political objectives.160 Akin to all forms of wars, it buys strength from

Clausewitz's phrase that war is a continuation of politics by other means.161 International

terrorism is not a new phenomenon but a political strategy which has been used in the past by

non-state actors, for instance, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Boko Haram, ISIS, and Hezbollah against the

states (e.g., guerilla warfare, the annihilation and bombing of cities, etc to pressurize

governments).162

As a whole, terrorism is generally known in the world community as illegitimate and

morally wrong act against humanity. It is an attack on the social and moral fabric of civilization

to inflict damage to a greater extent without any discrimination. The prevalent recognition of the

criminality and fear of terror inflicted within and across national boundaries. This poses a greater

security threat for governments and nongovernmental organizations alike which in turn calls

them to formulate strategies and effective policies to combat it. According to the principles of jus

in bello, in particular, the law clearly makes distinction and is designed in such a way which

provides noncombatant immunity. The intentional killing of innocent civilians is prohibited and

this as a military and political strategy is never justifiable and acceptable on moral grounds. The

deliberate killing of innocents for achieving political objectives is the very definition of

terrorism.

In most cases, terrorists seek to bring down or destabilize an existing political regime in

order to create political unrest in the country. But on the other hand, totalitarian governments use

the technique of terror to exert strong influence by creating power vacuum and try to exercise the

projection of force. Terrorism has been a practice which is used throughout history of human life

160 Dale T. Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory,” The Online Journal of Peace & Conflict Resolution, 6 No. 1(2004): 128

161 Ibid. 162 Ibid.

97

and in almost every part of the world in order to achieve specific objectives in one way or the

other. Roman emperors resorted to terrorism to sustain their governments; the Spanish used it as

an effective method to root out religious controversies which developed with the passage of time.

The French Revolution went through a period which is called the Reign of Terror; and the Ku

Klux Klan is another example in the post-Civil War era in the southern U.S., this terror group

used threats and other methods of violence to frighten supporters of Reconstruction.163

Terrorism has become the most serious threat for the U.S. administration to deal with. In

the past, the U.S. administrations and Congress have found it pertinent to look at the numbers

and trends of terrorist incidents which have been taking place in the past from time to time as a

predicate for formulating policy decisions. Terrorists are using sophisticated modern computers

and communication technology which is resulting in more information being collected in this

regard. For example, an attack on terrorist hideout is increasingly likely to result in the seizure of

their computers and other valuable data.

Terrorism was not the foremost national security concern or the priority agenda either for

the senior Bush or Clinton Administrations in the early 1990s. But during President Clinton’s

term in office, Al-Qaeda began to surface as a major terrorist threat to the U.S. National Security.

In the late 20 century, terrorism was used as a tool for many groups to exert political influence in

Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The spreading out of international terrorism resulted in many

instances ranging from kidnappings, hijacking and bombings of airplanes, and destruction of

infrastructure and armed attacks on government and public installations.

163Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory.” p. 128

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4.2 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) Attacks

The 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) was not the first attempt on the Twin Towers.

The WTC was the target of another terrorist strike executed in a well planned manner on

February 26, 1993, when a bomb exploded on a second level of the World Trade Center’s

parking basement thus creating a twenty-two feet wide deep crater. The resulting explosion

killed six people and injured more than a thousand. More than fifty thousand people were

evacuated from the WTC building immediately following the blast and resulted in the disruption

of business in the building for next six months.164 FBI and the Joint Terrorist Task Force

working in a close collaboration; identified and brought 21 Islamic militants to trail who were

involved in conspiracy and were suspected behind the attacks. The trail later revealed intensive

plans for terrorists’ acts in the U.S. mainland including attacks on government facilities.165

The main objective of the terrorists’ attack was to demolish the foundation of the north

tower in such a way that it would ultimately collapse onto its twin. The attack was meant to

pressurize the U.S. administration to refrain from meddling in the Middle East affairs and to

restrain its support to Israel. Terrorists selected the WTC as a target because it was a mark of

western economic standards; and destruction would enable terrorists to cause damage of

infrastructure and human causalities at a wider scale thus posing a direct threat to the U.S.

National Security. Ramzi Ahmed Yousaf and Sheikh Omer, masterminds behind the attack were

sentenced to death for plotting the attacks.166

Sheikh Omar Abdul Rehman, who was a cleric and was known as a “Spiritual leader” of

Osama bin Laden, and he was considered an instigator of 1993 WTC explosions and numerous

164 Dwyer, Kocieniewski, Murphy, & Peg Tyre, Two Seconds Under the World, New York: Crown Publishers, 1994. 165 Feb 26, 1993: WTC bombed. Available from www.history.com/this-day-in-history/world-trade-center-bombed 166 Ibid.

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other lethal plots against the U.S. Rehman was also well-known for declaring many anti-

American religious verdicts; one of these in particular authorizing the robbing and killing of

Christians anywhere in the world if they do any anti-Islamic activities. Rehman entered the U.S.

with a great ease claiming he had a tourist visa. The most interesting fact to mention is that, his

name was already on the official U.S. terrorists’ list which is quite astonishing. The Immigration

and Naturalization (INS) provided him permanent resident status as a religious leader. Rehman

quickly gathered a large number of people as devoted followers in New York by preaching in

mosques.167 Ramzi Ahmed Yousaf was another known Islamist terrorist who underwent a trial in

the U.S. for conducting acts of terrorism on American soil including the bomb blasts at the WTC

in 1993.168

4.3 Unsuccessful Diplomacy before 9/11

After the Oklahoma City terror attack in 1995, President Clinton and other members of Congress

stressed the importance to take severe measures to address terrorism which had badly threatened

the National Security. The Anti-Terrorism Act was signed in this regard which turned into law in

April 1996. Under this law, $1 billion were allocated to help the smooth running of federal

programs to fight terrorism. This Act also predetermined death penalty for terrorists and further

fortified penalty for crimes like threatening or frightening the federal employees on official

duties. In addition, this Act augmented and set the punishments for plotting and involving

explosive devices in order to get possession of nuclear materials in an illegal way, and thus

criminalized the use of chemical weapons in all forms.169

167 Dwyer, Kocieniewski, Murphy, & Tyre, 2 Seconds Under the World, New York: Crown Publishers, 1994. 168 Ibid. 169 Thomas P.M.Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004.

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Under the law, the U.S. Secretary of State can authorize certain groups as terrorist networks

based on their notorious and suspicious activities and banned fund-raising of these groups within

the U.S. The Secretary of Treasury is allowed to freeze financial assets of these terrorists’

organizations and strictly warned the U.S. citizens not to conduct any business venture with the

citizens and states which are being declared terrorists by the U.S. Any person who is reported

spokesperson or member of a nominated terrorist organization on the basis can be denied entry

into the U.S. on basis of clear evidences against him. The U.S. Attorney General has the official

right to deny asylum to suspected terrorists and would ask other peace loving nations to follow

suit.170

From February 1997 till September 2001, the U.S. Administration had been trying hard to

use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to stop providing a

safe asylum for Al-Qaeda’s leaders and to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan

unconditionally to a country where he could face justice. But all these diplomatic efforts

included repetitive warnings and sanctions from the UN time and again failed due to non-serious

attitude of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which was not interested in deporting Osama to

any country.

Before 9/11 attacks, the U.S. administrations also pressurized Islamabad to cease its

diplomatic relations and all kinds of support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who provided safe

haven to most wanted terrorist Osama bin Laden. But the U.S. was not able to compel Pakistan

leadership to withdraw its support and to reconsider its deep relationship with the Taliban

government in Kabul because of very little influence on the country.

170 Op.cit.

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4.4 U.S. National Security Strategy for Al-Qaeda before 9/11

Before 9/11 attacks on the U.S. mainland, the Bush Administration did not pay any attention to

the threat from Al-Qaeda and instead was interested in setting the stage for a war with Iraq. It

seemed that the Bush Administration was occupied with many other issues other than security,

pertaining to employment and health sectors. The U.S. National Security was last on a list of

major issues which President Bush planned to deal with in the fall of 2001 at the end of the

year.171

Richard Clarke exposes the Bush Administration’s failure and ineffectiveness to deal

with the security threat posed by the Al-Qaeda to the U.S. in multiple ways in his book, Against

All Enemies. He says, the Bush Administration was so much preoccupied with Iraq’s possession

of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) before the 9/11 terrorist attacks which had become

immediate concern of the Administration to deal with. Condoleezza Rice was then acting as a

National Security Advisor to President Bush interviewed by dozens of journalists between

January and September 2001 clearly reflects that Rice never once showed any uneasiness about

the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its growing network under the leadership of Osama bin

Laden.172

Though Dr. Rice highlighted terrorism in public speeches and interviews throughout

2001; apparently terrorism seemed as a characteristic of only rogue nations such as Iraq. Dr. Rice

seemed more interested in promoting President Bush’s National Missile Defence Strategy which

171 Peter Slevin, “Will Cheney Retract His Statements,” Washington Post, 27 September 2003.

172 Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004.

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the Bush Administration considered more essential and wanted to execute it as a top priority.

President Bush wanted to build a sophisticated missile defence system to defend the U.S.’

mainland against minor missile attacks by so-called rogue states like North Korea, Iraq and

Iran.173

4.5 Al-Qaeda’s Terrorist Activities before 9/11

It is noteworthy that the Bush Administration was already planning an invasion of Afghanistan

long before the attacks on the WTC occurred in 2001. Though FBI released 19 names of

suspected hijackers but did not point out terrorists in Afghanistan in particular. All suspected

terrorists belonged to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE; all across the Middle East without a

particular focus on any one region.174

The terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda were directed against American symbols of

power which were deliberately chosen. The embassies in Africa and the U.S. Navy destroyer in

Yemen also constituted a prelude to the main attacks of September 2001 on the U.S. territory.

In December 1994, according to a general perception in the U.S. State Department,

international terrorism was waning because of the ongoing Middle East peace process which was

underway between Israel and Palestine. The fall of the Soviet Union was another major reason

which previously had provided support for terrorist organizations.

In early 1995, police in Manila revealed a plot of terrorists’ activities which was executed

by Ramzi Yousaf and the main purpose was to blow up the U.S. airliners while they were flying

over the Pacific. In 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia outside the office of the

U.S. Program Manager for the Saudi National Guard. This explosion killed five American

173 Clarke, Against All Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004. 174 Ibid.

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citizens and two others nationals. It is widely believed that Osama had warned of a spectacular

action against the U.S. Ramzi Yousaf was convicted with 1995 plotting to hijack 12 U.S.

airliners.175 This plan was actually devised in Manila but Ramzi somehow managed to escape to

Pakistan in order to get safe haven. Pakistan authorities arrested him and he was immediately

handed over to the U.S. for trial.

In 1996, in another attempt, a truck bomb completely knocked down the Khobar Towers

apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which ended up in killing of 19 U.S. servicemen

and injured many hundreds. The attack was carried out largely by Saudi Hezbollah, an

organization that was known to receive assistance from the government of Iran and later

admitted the responsibility of carrying out the terrorist attack.176

Bin Laden moved to Sudan where he continued his terror campaign until 1996. During

this period, bin Laden as a leader of Al-Qaeda established a strong foothold and got connected

more globally with other terror like- minded groups and networks with the support of its

Sudanese hosts in Iran. Whereas, in Sudan, Al-Qaeda was mainly involved in several terror

incidents and guerilla actions which were carried out with the close collaboration of other prime

organizations. In May 1996, after getting substantial U.S. pressure, the Sudanese government

expelled bin Laden from Sudan and from there he moved to Afghanistan, found asylum and

joined hands with the ruling Taliban who welcomed him.177

After moving to Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden accelerated his anti-American campaign

and this time with full force and vigor. In an interview with the reporter of the Independent in

July 1996, bin Laden admired terrorist attacks in Riyadh and Dhahran on the U.S. stationed

175 National Research Council, Information Technology for Counterterrorism, Washington: National Academics

Press Release, 2003. 176 James Bamford, Body of Secrets, New York: Doubleday, 2001. 177 Ibid.

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forces by declaring it a commencement of war between the U.S. and Muslims all across the

globe. Though he did not take responsibility in a direct manner of executing these attacks but

said that he gave his sincere advice to the U.S. much before the attacks to remove its troops from

Saudi Arabia but the U.S. did not pay any heed.178

Analysts who have been observing Al-Qaeda’s structure and activities say bin Laden’s

Al-Qaeda network is very dissimilar from the other terrorist groups that had been previously

involved in carrying out bombings and hijackings. It is not a firmly knit group with some clear

command and control structure, but in fact it is a loose alliance of different groups who fight for

similar objectives and operates across continents with the greatest of ease.179

In the past, it has been observed that the U.S. has hit out widely and with full force at

those countries which it thought to be involved in anti-American acts and campaigns either by

supporting terrorists or by providing them safe asylum as a violation of International Law in one

way or another.

In 1998, Osama bin Laden and four other likeminded leaders publicly gave an anti-

American self-styled fatwa openly stated that it was God’s consent and every Muslim should try

his best to kill any American across the globe.180

4.6 Attacks in Kenya and Tanzania

In 1998, a car bomb carrying about three quarters of a ton of explosives was detonated next to

the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. As a result of this lethal explosion, 224 people were killed. Most of

them were Kenyans along with a dozen American citizens who were Embassy employees and

178 Independent, July 1996 179 Op.cit. 180 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp

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moreover 5,000 people were injured as a result of this attack. Simultaneously, an additional

suicide attack was carried out in a similar manner near the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salam,

Tanzania. As a result of this suicidal attack, 11 people were killed and about eighty five were

wounded. These attacks signaled the terrorists’ intentions to perpetrate indiscriminate mass

slaughter in attacks wherever possible against American targets throughout the world.181

In 1998, the Clinton Administration reacted aggressively towards terrorism attempts after

the attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa. In response to the attacks, the U.S. launched cruise

missile attack on 20 August, 1998. The main purpose was to strike a terrorism training complex

in Afghanistan and the other one was to destroy a pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in

Khartoum, Sudan. The Clinton Administration assumed that a pharmaceutical company was

producing deadly poisonous gas. Both targets were believed to be financed by wealthy Islamic

radical Osama bin Laden who had been the most wanted target of the U.S. and was allegedly

behind the embassy bombings as well as running an international terrorism network targeting the

western world, particularly the U.S.182 Suspicious areas of Afghanistan identified by the U.S. as

bin Laden’s concentration of troops and equipment bombarded heavily as a strong warning to bin

Laden from the U.S. Three training bases at Khost were suspected by Americans of being used

by a number of militant groups and criminals linked with bin Laden and his network. The

Taliban leader in the aftermath to the U.S. missile attack on Afghanistan said, “O God! We do

not have missiles to retaliate; we pray that the Americans make the mistake of landing on our

181 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 3rd ed., Cambridge: West View, Press, 1995 and 4th ed.,

1999. 182 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp

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soil so that we can teach them a lesson.”183 In 2000, the Clinton Administration came up with the

view of considering Al-Qaeda as the primary threat to U.S. National Security.

The U.S. administration was in search of an opportunity which could press the Taliban hard to

provide them with solid proof to justify their demand of handling over extradition of bin Laden

from Afghanistan because of his involvement in terrorist acts against the U.S.

4.7 The Attack on the USS Cole

In 2000, a boat bomb containing explosives attacked and destroyed the USS Cole at Aden,

Yemen. The suicide attackers belonged and linked themselves to Al-Qaeda organization. This

attack caused heavy causalities on the American side and many soldiers were seriously wounded.

This suicide attack was planned in a very sophisticated way. The bomb was disguised in a

service boat on its way to handle technical repairs on the American destroyer. The two suicide

terrorists were dressed in white as other mariners and therefore did not raise any suspicion at all

and thus achieved their objective in a well planned manner.184

WTC bombings, the annihilation of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salam and Nairobi, the

assault on the USS Cole were significant terrorist acts against the Western world in general and

the U.S. in particular. But the U.S. and other western democracies failed to develop any strong

alliance against international terrorism which is considered as a grave mistake on their part. Due

to this failure, the U.S. and the West failed to develop any coherent strategy to quarantine the

states that supported militants, particularly in the Middle East region and CARs.

By then, President Clinton realized the only possible solution of the problem was to

engage the Taliban through dialogue otherwise it would not be possible for the U.S. to achieve

183 Ayaz Wazir, “FATA Needs a Change,” The News, January 21, 2009. 184 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004.

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its aims in the region in the long run. But on the other hand, the Administration also launched

covert operations through CIA to capture bin Laden alive or killed and his main party leaders.185

These measures did not impede bin Laden or stop Al-Qaeda from working against the U.S.

During 2000, President Clinton and his main advisors resumed efforts to get Osama bin Laden

out from Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally. In this regard, they engaged the

Taliban’s rival including Northern Alliance in order to get enough intelligence information to

attack bin Laden directly.

The U.S. law enforcement agencies wanted to actively pursue all possible options which

they had in hand to get hold of Osama bin Laden. The U.S. considered the Saudi militant the

most dangerous, most wanted and potential international terrorist who could be a serious security

threat for the U.S. in the long run. Al-Qaeda’s main objectives were: the expansion of Islamic

revolutions throughout the Muslim world; to stop the foreign meddling in the Middle East; and

to restrict the U.S. from providing financial, political, and moral support to Israel against

Palestinians.186

After the Afghan war, these Afghan militants or many other groups who joined these

militants in the fight against the Soviet Union either returned to their home countries and joined

ongoing conflicts in Somalia, the Balkans and Chechnya or as a last resort, they preferred to stay

back in Afghanistan. This benefited Al-Qaeda’s global outreach from all perspectives and later

helped to build the second and third generations of Al-Qaeda terrorists across the globe because

of terrorists’ multiethnic background.

185 www.9-11 commission.gov 186 Osama Bin Laden, Available from www.adl.org/terrorism

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Chapter -5

September 11 and its Aftermath

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks shook the sole super power’s prestige and pride and

exposed the flaws pertaining to its national security apparatus. Eliot Cohen, a Security Analyst

declared these terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland as ‘World War IV’ (the Cold War is termed

as World War III) and urged for dramatic changes in the U.S. foreign policy.187

Before the 9/11 attacks Al-Qaeda attacks, the Bush Administration took this terror threat

lightly and did not opt for any strategy to combat it effectively. After assuming office in January

2001, President Bush decided to relegate the government’s Chief Counterterrorism Officer and

shifted the responsibilities of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism to a non-Cabinet-

level position.188 The President’s Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, very easily put

down the possibility of future attacks from Al-Qaeda in April 2001 just five months before the

9/11 attack; stating in a meeting “why we are talking about this one man, Osama? There are

more important threats to contain, for instance Iraq than Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.”189

When a possibility of terrorist attacks on the U.S. became obvious in early summer 2001,

it was too late for the Administration to gauge the intensity of the threat it posed. The Bush

Administration failed completely to deal with the mounting security challenges ahead as the

Clinton Administration did. President Clinton as compared to his successor President Bush was

more aware of the threat and put his Administration on alert in late 1999 on receiving word of

187 Stephen Philip Cohen, “World War IV,” Wall Street Journal, 20 November, 2001. 188 Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 230. 189 Ibid., pp. 230-233

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warning from the Al-Qaeda’s terrorist plotting against the U.S.190 In fact, the Bush

Administration did not hold any formal meeting of cabinet members on the U.S. National

Security until September 4, 2001. President Bush did not give any positive response to urgent

pleas made by Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Clarke felt the

gravity of the matter much before the actual incident and wanted the President to take effective

measures before it gets too late.191

The shocking terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon in the U.S. on September 11,

2001, shocked the whole world which led to the transformation of world politics and had a far-

reaching impact on the U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The television images showed billions

of viewers all across the globe, how hijacked airliners hit the symbols of U.S. military and

economic power with great ease without facing any resistance. This was not only surprising but

strange and it put a question mark on Bush Administration’s security strategy and its inability to

secure homeland which raised many questions itself. This was the most demoralizing terrorist

attack in the history of the U.S. on its mainland as compared to the previous attacks on Pearl

Harbor in 1941, but it distraught the whole American nation as well. Its pride and poise was

deeply shattered as a sole superpower in the world with the urge for taking revenge as soon as

possible.192

Within a few hours of the deadly terrorist attacks on September 11, the Bush

Administration without any delay announced Osama bin Laden and his network Al-Qaeda

functioning from Afghanistan were responsible for the attacks. Al-Qaeda took the responsibility

of executing the terrorist attacks.193 A serious situation developed in Islamabad being a

190 Ibid., pp. 205-215. 191 Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 237 192 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 240. 193 Op.cit.

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neighboring country of Afghanistan and the only supporter of the Taliban leadership in the

region. It was expected that Pakistan had to face hard choices in the days ahead and it was now

obvious it had to pay the price of its relations with the Taliban.194 Before 9/11 US efforts

regarding terrorism lacked a coherent strategy and for Pakistan terrorism was not an issue,

instead they were more concerned with cultivating alliances with the Taliban government which

led to their becoming more distant from the U.S.

The 9/11 attacks can be termed as a huge blow and a setback for the U.S. but these

attacks should not have come as an astonishing factor as some of the analysts and research

scholars had anticipated. The brutal assault which took place on September 11 proved especially

outrageous because they were so devastating and unexpected. The terror attacks resulted in

heavy direct and indirect economic damages amounting to billions of dollars, and their impact

continues to be felt by the American economy in particular and the world economy in general.

The heavy toll of human life of around 3, 000 casualties and the tremendous financial

loss as a direct and indirect result of the attacks, the role of media, and the psychological impact

on public opinion throughout the world brought a new warfare and identified new measures in

coping with terror. The U.S., the only superpower left in post Cold War period, declared a War

against Terrorism and placed this at the head of its international priorities.195

After Al-Qaeda destroyed the economic and military symbols in the U.S., the Bush

Administration started a media campaign at home to contain Al-Qaeda. On October 10, 2001,

five major U.S. television networks, CNN, Fox, ABC, CBS, and NBC received strict instructions

from the White House to censor Al-Qaeda’s video recording. Former U.S. National Security

Advisor Condoleezza Rice urged all the American network organizers not to broadcast videos of

194 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. p. 240 195 "Chronology of Terror: World Trade Center," Available from http://articles.cnn.com

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bin Laden. 196 Bin Laden reacted on this by claiming that the White House was afraid and had no

courage to stand up and face the reality. He further stated, President Bush and his followers did

not want the American people to realize that Muslims are being oppressed in Palestine, Iraq,

Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia, Kashmir, in the Philippines, and throughout the globe. The U.S. was

apprehensive of the reaction of young Muslim generation who are aware that they are being

exploited by the West in general and U.S. in particular.197

By attacking the two skyscrapers, Al-Qaeda also appeared to punish the Americans for

the quest of what they believed as the godless ways of western culture. The victims of this huge

destruction not only were Americans but they were Asians, Latin Americans, Europeans,

Muslims, as well as Christians and Jews from all over the world. Although Osama bin Laden

himself was the most wanted man and had been the top most terrorist according to the U.S. State

Department but still he would not emerge as a compelling threat to the U.S. National Security

until the late 1990s.198

The Pentagon was selected as a target by the terrorists to show the world that the

fundamentalist terrorists had the ability to strike at the heart of the U.S. Military Command and

Control structure with a greater ease without facing any major obstacle. The Pearl Harbor

brought the U.S.’ entry into World War II and eventually made it the leader of the alliance of

Western democracies who were fighting against the Nazis and militarists. Before entering the

World War II, the U.S. adopted a neutral policy and kept itself aloof from the international

politics.199

196 Hugh Miles, Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World, London: Abacus, 2005, p. 116. 197 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p.112. 198 www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks 199 Ibid.

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9/11 Commission Report noted that these attacks were carried out in a well planned

manner. The 9/11 Commission Report explained to the Congress, the Executive Branch and to

the American people that containing terrorism had been the top most National Security concern

of the Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11.200 By acknowledging the fact that it is not easy

to fight terrorism which is not a physical enemy but just an ideology, the Report further says, it is

necessary for global community to deny the safe asylums to the terrorists. As it gives way to

plan, prepare, and instigate operations with a greater co-operation and convenience and thus

terrorists get the ability in return to inflict damage on massive scale.

After these terrorist attacks on American mainland, Americans were left to question the

context and what the attacks meant for the nation as a whole. They do have a historical precedent

to mention, many Americans undoubtedly reached back to Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl

Harbor on December 7, 1941, when the U.S. was attacked during the World War II- another “day

of infamy.”

To make the matter worse, the militant organization, Al-Qaeda which had already been

involved in several pre-planned attacks against Americans and its vital symbols all across the

world, not only admired the attacks but its leader wholeheartedly accepted its involvement and

declared to face the dire consequences as a retaliation by the U.S. Terror is the tool with which

bin Laden and his people sought to make their vision a reality. Since the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has

been involved in massive large scale-terror attacks carried out all over the world. This terror

campaign included the perpetration of terror attacks and mass killings.201

However, bin Laden’s main contribution to Al-Qaeda and his primary objective was the

training of cadres whom he sent throughout the world to execute terrorist activities after

200The 9/11 Commission Report, July 17, 2004, p. 361, Available from http://govinfo.library.unt./911/report. 201 Osama Bin Laden, Available from http://www.adl.org/terrorism

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undergoing training in terror and guerrilla warfare at his camps in Afghanistan which were

established mainly for this purpose.

President Bush declared on September 11, 2001, that the U.S. would lead the world to victory

over terrorism in a struggle which he termed as the First War of the 21st century against Al-

Qaeda and its followers. He made known his plans to visit New York, location of the WTC Twin

Towers that were destroyed by the terrorist attacks. By showing his sympathy for the American

people, he said, he wept and mourned with the U.S. In a phonic conversation with the New York

Governor, George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, President Bush reaffirmed his

steadiness, resolve and strong determination to win the war that had been imposed on America.

President Bush realized that he had a different enemy and a war to tackle with for which he

needed the support of the world community.

Under the guise of its famous slogan, War Against Terrorism, the U.S. made it clear to the

world that it would strike and retaliate without any discrimination not only against individuals

and groups but countries at large who were promoting, encouraging, and providing asylum to the

terrorists.

The U.S. could realize in the very beginning that any winning and productive counterstrike

against the Taliban would not give way to any useful outcome without the logistic support

military co-operation of Pakistan. In a speech to the American nation after the great national

tragedy, President Bush explained the fate of the Taliban regime in very plain and clear words

not only to the American nation but this message was for the world at large, “We will make no

distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them.”202 The U.S.

handed over a list of 7 demands to Pakistan which were as follow: 203

202 www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/President Bush.speech.text 203 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, pp. 35-36.

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i. To stop immediately all sort of arms shipments and logistic support through Pakistan

to Al-Qaeda.

ii. To provide blanket over flight and landing privileges to U.S. aircrafts.

iii. To offer the naval and air bases to the U.S. adjacent to areas between Pakistan and

Afghanistan.

iv. To share all intelligence and immigration information.

v. To express verbal condemnation of the September 11 attacks and denounce support

for terrorism.

vi. To put an end to the volunteers migration to Afghanistan and immediately cut off the

supply of fuel to the Taliban.

vii. To cut off all the diplomatic links with the Taliban regime and demanded support for

the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Taliban to destroy Osama and his

network.

The dramatic events of 9/11 meant that Pakistan had almost no cards left to play given the

determination of superpower like the US to force Pakistan to be ‘either with us or against us’ and

given those difficult circumstances Pakistan played the bad hand that it was dealt in the best

possible way which is to say to the US that we are with you. There was an obvious danger for

Pakistan’s National Security regarding the U.S. declared War on Terror. President Bush

declared, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization

and good (U.S.) or with barbarism and evil (Them). Choose and to those nations that choose

wrongly beware.”204

204 Ishaque Fani, “Pak-U.S. Relations after 9/11,” Pakistan Vision 5( July 2004), p.69

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The military regime in Pakistan led by President Musharraf sensing the gravity of the

situation immediately announced Pakistan’s unconditional support in the form of bases, blanket

over flight rights, logistic support and most important of all, intelligence information which was

badly needed by the U.S. and its coalition forces. President Musharraf gave details about the

consequences, in case Pakistan would not be a part of the U.S. led coalition in Afghanistan

against Taliban.

Pakistan’s support was vital for the U.S. in the region because of two important factors:

Pakistan is a neighboring country of Afghanistan and its vast intelligence information, and its

close association with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were seen as imperative factors for conducting

any military action against terrorists. Pakistan was badly caught in the middle because of the

wrong and ineffective policies towards the Taliban regime and it was very obvious that it had to

pay the price. Pakistan was now being asked by the U.S. to make a difficult choice to help the

Bush Administration to eliminate the Islamic fundamentalist government in Afghanistan which

had a bad record of human rights violation.205

As President Bush made it clear in his speech, “you are either with us or against.”

Similarly, Osama bin Laden in a speech to the Muslims across the globe explained that they too

were in a state of war against western civilization. He argued that “People have been divided into

two camps; those who support the attacks against the U.S., and those who condemn them.”206

After the attacks of 9/11, the Muslim world itself had been divided. Bin Laden stated that

it is essential for Muslims to know the exact nature, struggle, and significance of War against

Islam in order to exactly determine which side to take in the War on Terror led by the western

world. It is a well known fact that in a tape released on December 27, 2001 raised controversy.

205 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, p. 37 206 Wright, The Looming Tower, p.134.

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Bin Laden refused to take any responsibility of his involvement in the September 11 tragedy.

However, later two more videos tapes appeared on the scene to confirm his guilt and

commitment in relation to 9/11 attacks. A key point of disputation for bin Laden had been the

difference of understanding between the nature of war which he regarded as a War against Islam

and not a War on terror. Bin Laden and his likeminded followers saw the U.S.’ War on Terror as

an attempt to take revenge from Muslims. He said, “In light of this clear and evident fact

Muslims must know where they stand in relation to this War.”207

Pakistan, while giving unconditional support to the U.S and allied forces, made it clear

that the U.S. in any case would not be allowed for any combat mission from Pakistan’s territory.

Pakistan did not offer blanket over-flight rights, instead an air corridor was given to the U.S.

planes. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was prepared to cut off diplomatic ties with the Taliban

leadership, but the move was delayed on Bush Administration’s advice. Pakistani Ambassador

Maleeha Lodhi was told in Washington by the U.S. Secretary of State Richard Armitage that

Pakistan should keep the diplomatic channels open with the Taliban government until the U.S.

invasion was completed in Afghanistan.208

Pakistan Army, being the main actor on stage was left with no other viable option to

consider. It could carry on supporting the Taliban or side with the U.S. in its War against

Terrorism. Pakistan’s arch rival, India showed unconditional support for the U.S. military action

in Afghanistan and offered Washington base facilities for invasion purpose while taking

advantage of Pakistan’s volatile situation. Similarly, Russia and the Central Asian Republics also

offered support from their side for the invasion of Afghanistan. Even Washington’s adversary in

the region, Iran, which had been an isolated country because of pursuing nuclear program

207 Wright, The Looming Tower, p.35 208 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 37

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conveyed its willingness to support the U.S military operation against the Taliban and

condemned the terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland.209

The threat was quite obvious for Pakistan; the country’s essential interests would be in danger if

India was given a free hand to launch international propaganda against Pakistan which had

already labeled the Taliban as hand maiden by Pakistan. The other important concern was the

Kashmiri freedom struggle which India tagged as a terrorist insurgency. India threatened that

Azad Kashmir and Pakistani territory could be attacked from the eastern front. Under the pretext

of eliminating terrorist bases, 9/11 attacks provided the real opportunity to India to accuse

Pakistan at the international level for supporting terrorists not only within Pakistan but across the

border as well. It was known that in the late 1980s, India had planned an attack on Pakistan’s

nuclear installations at Kahuta with the close collaboration of Israel. It might again have similar

plans of targeting Pakistan’s nuclear assets.210

The United Nations fully supported the U.S. strategy and urged the world community to

help the U.S. in eliminating the menace of terrorism. On September 12, 2001, the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution 1368 which called upon all the nations of the

world to work together against terrorism and warned those nations who were assisting and

providing safe asylum to terrorists and held them equally responsible for their actions.211

In order to seek Pakistan’s help against the Taliban leadership and Al-Qaeda in

Afghanistan, the U.S. came up with a very strict policy. The U.S. directly threatened to take

Pakistan back to the Stone Age if it did not show conformity with the Bush Administration’s

War on Terrorism. While referring to Richard Armitage’s statement in order to seek Pakistan’s

209 Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan & the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, London: Ashgate Publishing

Limited, 2005, p. 224. 210

Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 242 211 Text of UNSC Resolution No. 1368, adopted by the Security Council at its 4370 meeting on September 12, 2001.

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help against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, President General Musharraf asserted that then ISI

Director General Lieutenant Mehmood Ahmed, who was in Washington at that time, told him on

phone about his conversation during a meeting with Armitage. He warned him without any

hesitation that if Pakistan chose to be with the terrorists, i.e. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban whom it

had been supporting for long, the U.S. would not hesitate to ‘bomb Pakistan back to the Stone

Age.’212

On the one hand, President Musharraf decided to side his country with the U.S. in its War

against Terrorism as it seemed Pakistan was left with no other choice to make. On the other

hand, President Musharraf kept on trying to persuade the Taliban leadership through diplomatic

channels to hand over Bin Laden immediately and without setting any condition on the table. In

addition, he requested them to shut down all the terrorist camps in Afghanistan which were

believed to be run by Osama. ISI Chief General Mahmood Ahmed arrived in Kandhar on

September 17, 2001, met with Mullah Omar and conveyed him the message of President General

Musharraf.213

On September 14, the U.S. Congress passed a unanimous resolution supporting the use of

force to respond to the terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda. The resolution allowed the

President to “use all necessary and appropriate force and strict measures in form of sanctions

against those nations, organizations, or persons he deems planned, authorized, committed or

aided the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons.”214 It

stated:

212 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, New York: Free Press, 2006, p. 201. 213 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, p. 43 214 “11 Sep 2001: The Response” House of Commons Library, London. Research Paper, October 3, 2001, pp. 15-

17.

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Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime.215

This open-ended and far-reaching power gave the U.S. President authority to go after Al-Qaeda

wherever they may be across the globe.

President Musharraf faced huge pressure domestically and from the U.S. as well on how

to proceed vis-à-vis U.S. demands and expectations knowing well the consequences in case of

refusing cooperation to the U.S. The public mood was not in favor of Pakistan’s U-turn against

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In a formal talk to retired generals, diplomats, and politicians

on September 18, President General Musharraf made clear that the decision to extend Pakistan’s

“unconditional support” to the U.S. launched OEF was taken under immense pressure and in the

face of fears and dire consequences for Pakistan in the long run. He also explained, in case of

refusal from Pakistan to join the U.S. led coalition force, a direct military action by a coalition of

powerful countries including the U.S., India, and Israel against Pakistan was inevitable which

could not be eliminated.216

President General Musharraf had little choice to make because of the fear from India that

Washington might used India against Pakistan, “either allowing India to conquer the Pakistani-

held portion of disputed Kashmir or give Delhi a green light to invade all of Pakistan possibly

with American assistance.”217 In President General Musharraf’s opinion, “if we did not join the

U.S., it would accept the Indian offer thus creating much problem for Pakistan in comparison to

215 “11 Sep 2001: The Response” House of Commons Library, London. Research Paper, October 3, 2001, pp. 15-

17. 216 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, London: M. E. Sharpe, 2005, p. 221 217 Eric S. Margolis, “Pervez Musharraf had little choice,” Daily Times, Karachi, October 2, 2006.

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India. He concluded that Pakistan might have the ability to resist an Indian assault but certainly

not a joint U.S-Indian offensive.218

On the other hand, India offered unconditional help to the U.S. in the War against

Terrorism. Indian television reported that the government had stated that its offer of full co-

operation to the U.S. was categorical and unconditional. In an interview to the Times of India,

Jaswant Singh, the then Minister of External Affairs and Defence had clearly declared, “There

have been contacts at all political, operational and executive levels about this.” When he was

questioned by a reporter if this meant India would be ready to offer logistical assistance or a

staging ground for a U.S. military operation against Afghanistan, Mr. Singh replied ‘Yes,’ the

newspaper quoted.219

Indian willingness to offer every kind of assistance to the U.S. in launching attacks

against Afghanistan was considered as a clever tactic to place Pakistan in such a delicate

situation where strikes could be launched at Pakistan’s nuclear facilities and international support

could be mustered for New Delhi’s expanded war in Kashmir by labeling Pakistan as a terrorist

state. During the Dushanbe Conference in Tajikistan in 2001, India joined together with the

Central Asian States to increase support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the only

remaining force in Afghanistan still capable of fighting the Taliban.

President General Musharraf clearly revealed what was at stake for Pakistan in the long

run if it would not render unconditional support to the U.S. Pakistan would be marginalized and

cut off in the international community which it could not afford because of its poor economic

condition. By highlighting India that had already presented its full length cooperation to the U.S.

in the War against Terrorism, President Musharraf warned that in case of Islamabad’s refusal to

218 Op.cit. 219 “India offers help to U.S. against Osama,” Dawn, September 15, 2001.

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U.S. demands’ Pakistan would be labeled as a terrorism-supporting country in the region. He

further added that Pakistan would lose its long-term international commitment and sympathy on

Indian held Kashmi, and the fate of Pakistan’s hard-won nuclear weapons which it had attained

after a great struggle was at risk.220 He explained the consequences in detail for not offering

support to the international coalition led by the U.S.

Pakistan was not in a position to balance the American threat and simply could not afford the

U.S. wrath by supporting the Taliban against the U.S. assault. Consequently, Pakistan decided to

bandwagon itself with the U.S. against the threats which it was getting from the U.S.

Administration in order to protect its’ national interests. In a televised speech to the nation on

September 19, 2001 President Musharraf clearly explained the reasons of taking this important

decision:

In such a situation, a wrong decision can lead to unaffordable losses; what are our critical concerns and important priorities? These are: First of all is the security of the country from external threat. Second is our economy and our efforts for its survival. Third priority is our strategic, nuclear and missile assets. And finally the Kashmir cause.221

While referring to the participation of India in the Conference, Musharraf in his speech to the

nation on September 19, 2001 said:

…recently certain countries met in Dushanbe, India was one of them. They do not have a

common border with Afghanistan anywhere. It is totally isolated from Afghanistan. In my view,

it is not surprising that the Indians want to ensure that if and when the government in Afghanistan

changes and anti-Pakistan government should be installed there.222

India left no stone unturned to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state and fit for a pre-emptive

strike by the U.S. led coalition. It was because, according to India:

220 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001 221 Washington Post, Online, September 19, 2001. 222 Musharraf’s Speech to the Nation on September 19, 2001.

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a. Pakistan possessed WMD

b. Sheltered terrorists and

c. Lacked democracy.223

While delivering a speech to a joint session of Congress on 20 September, 2001, President Bush

said, “The U.S. War on Terror begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there. This war will be

continued until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” 224

The U.S. was now committed to hunting down a global, financially strong terrorist organization

irrespective of international boundaries. The absence of territorial limits which the U.S. did not

set before launching military operations in Afghanistan and the vagueness of this authorization

would also become highly controversial later.

Similarly, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution on September 28, 2001, that

called all the nation states to:

a. Deny safe haven to those who sponsor, prepare, assist, or commit terrorist acts; and

b. Those who are allowing their territories to be used for any terrorist activities against other

nations and innocent civilians around the globe.225

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its

history- a decision which requires willingness by all members of the alliance to act ‘Out of

Area.’ Though the Bush Administration realized that OEF in Afghanistan was not a NATO led

operation; in fact there was a mutual understanding between the U.S. and its allies that NATO

223 Ahmed, “India-Pak relations after September 11, 2001.” The World after Sep.11, Karachi: University of Karachi,

2003, pp. 185-187. 224 The Washington Post, “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation.” Available from

http://www.washingtonpost.com 225 Text of UNSC Resolution No. 1368, adopted by the Security Council at its 4385 meeting on September 28, 2001.

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would enhance its strength manifolds to work together in close collaboration with the

International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF).226

The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power. We should reach out, listen to, and work with other countries that can help.227

The September 11 attacks and the U.S.-led global War on Terrorism and its vigorous campaign

against Al-Qaeda has given Pakistan an edge to advance its relationship with Washington which

had been on the lowest ebb due to nuclear issue, diplomatic links with the Taliban regime, and

the 1999 military take over. The war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan

back in 2001 dramatically enhanced Pakistan’s strategic value to the U.S. in the region and for its

western coalition partners. In the post 9/11 world, the U.S. was compelled to reconsider its

relations with India which it had been pursuing as an “India-first policy,” in order to contain the

“China Threat” in the region. Above all, the need to fight a fully fledged war against the Al-

Qaeda and the Taliban forces turned Pakistan into a frontline state and forced Washington to

maintain a balanced policy toward India and Pakistan, rather tilting towards India.

The U.S. has always been accused on the ground of taking Pakistan as a matter of

usefulness to promote its own strategic interests in the region and nothing more than that. There

are clear evidences when it comes to the U.S.’ support to Pakistan in a time of need, for instance

after the 1965 Indo-Pak War when Pakistan was left alone despite multiple defence agreements.

Another example is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when the U.S. left Pakistan on its own to

deal with the situation erupted after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The U.S. not only

226 The UK and the Campaign against Terrorism, September 2002. 227Ibid.

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abandoned Pakistan but deprived it of substantial economic and military assistance under the

pretext of Pressler Amendment.

It is important to mention that none of the hijackers who crashed planes into the Twin

Towers were from Pakistan. It is widely believed Pakistan has always assisted the U.S. whenever

it has needed Pakistan’s support to promote its own strategic interest across the region. But as a

matter of fact, Pakistan’s role as a U.S. strategic ally was never appreciated and if history is any

indicator, it is proved that the U.S. administrations have always favored India over Pakistan to

make it a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region. It is interesting to note that India was

an ally of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War period and had been a strong supporter of

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during Red Army’s invasion of Kabul in the 1980s.228

Another important source of disagreement between Pak-U.S. relations is the difference of

perceptions and divergent interests. Both partners have their own but different interests in the

region pertaining to their respective roles against the War on Terrorism. The U.S. strongly

believes that the Pakistani Army is going after those terrorist groups who pose security threat to

Pakistan’s own existence while doing almost very little to get rid of terrorist groups that are a

serious security threat to the American strategic interests in Afghanistan and ISAF. According to

one analyst, “These terrorists are closely allied to Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan

(TTP). The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom Madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel,

which is considered a hub of terrorist activities and is known for providing safe asylum to

terrorists.”229

228 Hasnat, “Hillary Converse with Real Pakistan,” The Nation, November 15, 2009. 229 Bill Roggio, “U.S. hits Haqqani Network in North Waziristan, kills 8.” Available from

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/

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As time went on, it had become apparent the main aim of the Bush Administration had

been to galvanize American public resentment and outrage against the Muslims world across the

globe. This was done to justify the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which the Muslim world saw as

an attempt to capture oil wealth of the Middle East and energy resources of Central Asia to

pursue its unilateral corporate agenda which in no way is justified when it comes to illegal

invasion of Iraq in 2003.”230

Due to geopolitical landscape of Pakistan, and its intelligence information on Al-Qaeda

network, the U.S. was desperately looking for Pakistan’s support to fight the terrorists in

neighboring Afghanistan. Though, on the eve of 9/11, the U.S. and Pakistan were not on good

terms. On the political front, Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S. led War against Terrorism

proved to be a blessing in disguise as it did for President General Zia-ul-Haq in 1980s. President

Musharraf received recognition and legitimacy for his military rule from the Bush

Administration. His categorical submission to protect the U.S. strategic interests in the region

were all well acknowledged by the U.S. Administration and duly rewarded afterwards.231

Before 9/11, President Musharraf’s military regime had been the main source of

diplomatic and military assistance for the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Musharraf was

charged with many accusations by the U.S. as he brought an end to the democratic process in the

country; he assisted and extended full support to militant Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups

in Afghanistan and Kashmir; and he advanced Pakistan’s nuclear program, etc. The extended

support from the U.S went to such an extent where the U.S. lifted sanctions that were a basic

source of disturbance in Pak-U.S. relations. These sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan in the

230 Sajjad Shaukat, “Whereabouts of Osama Detected,” The Statesman, December 8, 2009. 231 Hilali, “U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan After September 11, 2001 and its Implications.” IPRI Journal, Winter

2009, Vol.9, No. 1, p.149

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aftermath of its nuclear explosions in 1998 and President Musharraf’s military takeover in 1999

which brought the end of democratic era.

After getting much needed logistic and intelligence support for OEF, the Bush

Administration regarded President Musharraf as a “courageous” and “visionary” leader. In

exchange of his pro-American approach, President Musharraf had been pleased with the U.S.

diplomatic backing for his military regime and massive substantial military and economic aid

which Pakistan needed badly due to sanctions and poor economic profile of the country under

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

President Musharraf surprised the U.S. Administration by showing no reluctance in taking the

crucial decision. He extended full support on behalf of Pakistan to the War against Terrorism. He

promptly said yes to all demands set by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.232 On October

7, 2001, the U.S. started OEF and by November 12, 2001, Kabul had fallen without showing any

strong resistance to U.S led NATO forces. Pakistan provided the U.S. access to numerous

military bases in order to facilitate and it in establishing a number of facilities including

Intermediate Staging Bases at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi- the most required bases

by the U.S. Along with this, Jacobabad and Shamsi bases were provided to U.S. and coalition

forces which were frequently used by over 50 aircraft and 2,000 coalition military personnel in

all that were stationed at these bases.233 The level of support could be demonstrated from the fact

that initially Pakistan provided fuel to aircraft, averaging 100,000 gallons per day without any

prescribed criteria for reimbursement mechanism. Pakistan provided over 35,000 Pakistani

military troops as a security force for protection of these bases234 and it also increased security

along its border with Afghanistan that resulted in the capturing of 420 high value and most

232 Ayaz Amir, “A Passion for Selling Ourselves Cheaply,” Dawn, 21 September 2001 233 C. Christine Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, Washington: RAND Corp, 2004, pp. 28-32 234 Ibid.

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wanted Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders by the U.S. Finally, Pakistan provided intelligence

information pertaining to Taliban and Al-Qaeda to coalition forces, most notably human

intelligence which coalition forces desperately needed to harmonize its technical intelligence in

order to get the maximum with its partnership with Pakistan.235

U.S. National Security Strategy required Pakistan to fight terrorism with all available

tools including military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and

economic support:

One of the four short-term priorities of action in combating terrorism strategy is to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas – including physical, legal, cyber, and fiscal safe havens.236

In return for Pakistan’s unconditional support, the U.S. granted $1 billion worth aid and waived

off $1 billion in external debt. In June 2003, the U.S. also declared a $3 billion aid package for

Pakistan; this amount was to be divided equally between economy and military. Between 2002

and 2005, the U.S. provided Pakistan with US$ 2.63 billion which was a direct aid.237

The U.S. considers Pakistan as a vital ally in the War against Terrorism. Keeping in view

its broader strategic paradigm in the region, the U.S. has acknowledged the importance of

Pakistan’s military operations in South and North Waziristan in order to eliminate the Taliban

and Al-Qaeda’s network. To compensate Pakistan’s military needs for this ongoing operation in

the Tribal areas of Pakistan, the U.S. created the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) which was purely

meant to support and assist Pakistan in meeting the expenditures of fighting terrorism in its own

territory. Pakistan received nearly two-thirds, 60 percent of the money from the U.S. as a part of

235

Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, pp. 28-32. 236 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorists (Washington DC, September 2006), pp. 20-22.

237 K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service, February 10, 2006.

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the CSF.238 Robert Gates, a former U.S. Secretary of Defence emphasized the importance of CSF

funds that have been given to Pakistan’s army keeping in view its growing needs to combat

terrorism and to increase its effectiveness in the battle field.239

In order to boost Pakistan’s military capability to defeat terrorism, Washington began to

provide generous military and economic assistance, including debt forgiveness; thus qualifying it

for speedy U.S. sales and grants, a wide array of military equipment, including military transport

aircrafts, surveillance radars, air traffic control systems, patrol aircraft anti-armor missiles giving

Pakistan a tremendous boost to its military capabilities that can be used in the fight against

terrorist enclaves in Pakistan.240

Much of the logistical support from Pakistan was initially provided to the U.S. led

coalition forces without any prescribed agreement on both sides keeping aside all the terms and

conditions to which extent Pakistan territory should be used as a coalition partner in this War

against Terrorism. The military leadership under President General Musharraf showed no

hesitation and charged no user fees as transportation charges which is normally required for

offering such concessions thus indicating Pakistan’s full support to the U.S. war.241

The invasion of Afghanistan could not have been possible without the co-operation and

active support of Pakistan. The U.S. administration praised Pakistan for its contribution to the

War on Terror. The Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General Abizaid, admitted this

fact in January 2004, that Pakistan has done more for the U.S. in its fight against Al-Qaeda than

238 Azeem Ibrahim, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption” Belfer Center

Discussion Paper 2009, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009, p. 6. 239Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 6, 2008, Available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2008

240 Rajshree Jetley, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics , London: Routledge, 2009, p. xvii. 241Fair, The Counter-terror Coalitions, p.15

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any other coalition partner. By acknowledging its sacrifices and contribution, the U.S. declared

Pakistan as its key ally and upgraded its status in June 2004 as a “major non-NATO ally.” 242

In the 1990s, American policy makers and lawmakers strongly viewed Pakistan as a state

that was not only readily losing strategic importance in the region but on the other hand, it was

also increasingly becoming untrustworthy partner and a “failed state.” There were growing signs

of “Talibanization,” that is, the growing strength of radical/militant Islam within Pakistan.

Pakistan showed unwillingness to sign NPT and thus posed a serious challenge and a threat to

the U.S.’ interests in this region. From the U.S. perspective, extending diplomatic support to the

Taliban despite of getting severe criticism from international community meant promoting

terrorism. In this given context, Pakistan was becoming another rogue state like Iran and North

Korea.243

The September 11 attacks dramatically changed the regional situation specifically the

U.S. strategy regarding South Asia. The U.S. which had been considering China as “foremost

threat” now became much concerned to the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT).

There were several reasons from Pakistan’s perspective for aligning itself with the U.S. led

global campaign against terrorism:

i. Pakistan wanted to undo India’s propaganda to isolate Pakistan on the international

front. As India claimed from time to time that the Taliban were hand-made-en of

Pakistan.

ii. The U.S. not only had received Russia, China’s support but gathered Muslim

countries support against terrorism. That was a grave situation; it was not possible for

Pakistani leadership to go against the mainstream.

242 Kronstadt, “Terrorism in South Asia.” Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, December 13,

2004. 243 Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan Is Facing Terrorist Listing,” New York Times, April 25, 1993.

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iii. President Bush made a clear distinction among the countries to join the U.S. for its

War against Terrorism or to join the Taliban who represented terrorism. He also

warned the nations throughout the globe that provided alleged asylum to terrorist or

had become breeding ground to promote terrorists activities.

By waiving the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments, the Bush Administration gave

official approval to the military coup of President General Musharraf. 244 Washington also

showed willingness to rearrange Pakistan’s outstanding debt to the U.S. which was worth $400

million. It also provided support for loan rescheduling through financial institutions, including

the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Inter-American Development Bank

(ADB), thus facilitating and giving relief to Pakistan’s $38 billion foreign debt.245

Washington also offered an aid package of nearly $1 billion to Islamabad for numerous

purposes including, border control, refugee assistance and poverty alleviation.246By the end of

2001, IMF and the Paris Club showed their satisfaction pertaining to Pakistan’s unconditional

support and pronounced that they were satisfied with Pakistan’s economic progress and further

relieved its foreign debt and offered fresh credits subsequently.247The Pakistani government was

aware of the prime significance of its contribution in the War against Terrorism.

5.1 Growth of Talibanization

The Taliban movement emerged in Afghanistan as a result of continuous political instability and

breakdown of administrative machinery after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.248A small

group of students who called themselves the Taliban became successful in bringing so called

244 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 247-250. 245 Ibid. 246 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 247-250. 247 “Pakistan and the U.S.,” The Economist, September 22, 2001. 248 Begum, The Impact of Soviet-Afghan War on Pakistan, p.200

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peace, law and order to the Afghan society. Later, they imposed Sharia Law in Afghanistan

which not only received popularity from the Afghan masses but also gave their government

legitimacy to stay in power. The Afghan Taliban not only received homegrown support of the

people but they had close links with various seminaries and clerics across the border in adjacent

provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pashoonkhwa (KPK) of Pakistan as well. The Taliban

declared Mulla Omer as their Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful).

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. retaliated with full force against Al-Qaeda and Taliban

forces when it invaded Afghanistan. The leftovers were thought to have escaped from

Afghanistan and later found safe shelter in Pakistan’s Tribal areas for executing terrorist

activities.249

Since 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and its allies have killed or captured top most wanted Al-

Qaeda’s leadership, destroyed their secret hideous throughout Afghanistan and relentlessly

brought damage to the organization.250 The U.S. intelligence agencies have been frequently

reported attacks designed by Al-Qaeda. Working with close collaboration of other overseas

security services, the CIA effectively broke up some of Al-Qaeda’s major network but bin

Laden’s organization remained intact and has been effective thus posing a serious threat to the

world in general and to the U.S. in particular. Before 9/11, many officials of the Clinton and

Bush administrations were of the view that the U.S. should have invaded Afghanistan much

before 9/11.

Pakistan in order to curb and eliminate safe havens of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the

North-west province launched numerous military operations in its Tribal areas. Though these

Tribal people had never accepted the presence of Pakistan Army and in order to show their anger

249 Time Magazine, 1st October, 2001, pp.33-35. 250 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fight against Terrorism, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Deputy Spokesman,” Press Release, February 19, 2002.

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they retaliated against Pakistan’s military operations in the Tribal areas. In 2007, with the help of

Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda members, the Tribal people formed their own militant terrorist

organization which is known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban movement of Pakistan).251

Baitullah Mehsood was chosen as the first leader of this organization. TTP is known for carrying

out most deadly suicide attacks across Pakistan, especially targeting military personals. These

terrorist attacks have further given rise to massive violence, hatred, sectarianism, extremism and

militancy in Pakistani society.

Since 2004, soon after Pakistan’s military decision to conduct operations in order to eliminate

terrorist networks from Pakistani territory, the country has observed the emergence of various

belligerent groups within Pakistani territory and called themselves as “Pakistani Taliban .” They

have not only successfully asserted their power but they have a leading role in propagating self-

originated Islamic Shariah within large number of people in the Pashtun belt. There are now

about more than fifty splinter groups of the Taliban making it difficult for the law enforcement

agencies to deal with the situation. On the other hand, it is not wrong to say that many Pakistani

Taliban commanders have carried out deadly offensive operations against Pakistani security

forces.

251 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan the Struggle with Militant Islam, pp.143-145.

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Pakistan Military Casualties 2001-2011

In August 2009, Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a U.S. drone attack. After his death, Hakimullah

Mehsud assumed the leadership of the TTP and executed deadliest terrorist attacks against

Pakistani security forces. Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack conducted by the U.S.

on 1 November, 2013. The rise of these militant groups and their agenda of forming state within

the state has posed a very serious threat to Pakistani security and survival. Today the north

western part is experiencing heavy drone strikes which are being carried by the U.S.252

Following the events of 9/11 and fall of the Taliban, remnants of militant groups have

unleashed a new spate of violence and unrest in Pakistani society. These militants have

inspirations to continue Jihad, as one of the militants when interviewed said, “We would not stop

252 Tom Coghlan, Zahid & Jeremy, “Secrecy and denial as Pakistan lets CIA use airbase to strike militants,” Times,

17 February 2009.

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even if India gives us Kashmir …. We will also bring Jihad here (in Pakistan). We want to see

the Taliban style regime here.”253

The so-called trend of bringing militancy to Pakistani society has continued since then.

As Pakistan joined the U.S. led global campaign against terrorism, terrorists’ groups consider

Pakistan as their vital enemy and have waged an un-declared war against Pakistan. In fact, even

many hardliners who are deadly against Pakistani government policies support these radicals to a

greater extent and offer refuge to them.254

The process of Talibanization started gaining momentum in Pakistan by 2005 and these

militants exerted strong influence beyond the Tribal areas calling themselves Pakistani Taliban.

These terrorists directly challenged the writ of the government right in the heart of Pakistani

capital Islamabad and the siege of Lal Masjid operation in July 2007255 was the most alarming

incident for the government. This episode resultantly ended with a military crackdown against

terrorists. The siege of the mosque, which according to official sources resulted in just over 100

deaths, was the intense outcome from the militants who showed resentment of military presence

in Waziristan.256 The trend of targeting security forces, government offices, installations, and a

range of soft targets (shrines, markets, mosques, churches, schools, and other public spaces)

gained momentum as time went by.

The Taliban are moving beyond FATA in the settled Tribal districts of Bannu, Kohat and

Dera Ismail Khan where they are in a position to challenge the writ of the government and are

imposing their own ideology thus posing a serious threat for both civil and military leadership.257

253 Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, Nov-Dec 2000. 254Talat Masood, “Extremism:Causes and Consequences,” Dawn 19 June 2007, p-6. 255 Geo TV Program, “Apas ki Baat-Najam Sethi k Saath.” 256 Interview with serving officer of Pakistan Army, 11 February 2013. 257 Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies.," Terrorism Monitor, Volume V, Issue

18, 27, September, 2007, pp. 1-5

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The Government of Pakistan seems helpless to control these elements and clearly reveals its

ineffectiveness to tackle them with an iron hand. The Swat uprising that was successfully put

down in 1994 resurfaced after 9/11, attracted many hard core radical insurgents who were battle-

hardened militants from Waziristan, Bajaur and the adjacent district of Dir.258 The military

campaigns of Swat and South Waziristan have proved nothing but only destructive outcomes.

The militants have targeted security forces, police, politicians and brought extensive damage to

the infra structure thus creating pro-Taliban Islamic militancy.259

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 not only devastated the Taliban but destroyed

their strong foothold in Kabul too. Recognizing that this force would remain significant for

maintaining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, the U.S. accused Pakistani intelligence agencies

as they secretly welcomed them on Pakistani soil in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. President

General Musharraf’s strategy of working with the Bush Administration to defeat terrorism

worked as an effective strategy to a greater extent in the initial phase but lost momentum in the

later phase. With the passage of time, American demands to abandon the Taliban became more

resolute, and the Taliban also grew upset with Pakistan on this double game strategy. As it

becomes more obvious to the Taliban that Pakistan would be used as an instrument to promote

the U.S. objectives in the region, the Taliban came up with more harsh and severe agenda to

weaken law and order situation in Pakistan.

The U.S. National Security Strategy required Pakistan to fight terrorism with all available

tools including military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance and

economic support:

258 Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies,” pp. 1-5 259 Ibid.

136

One of the four short-term priorities of action in combating terrorism strategy is to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas – including physical, legal, cyber, and fiscal safe havens.260

Although the U.S. administration all along have been pressurizing Pakistan to ‘do more,’ and it is

not satisfied with Pakistan’s current role as a frontline state in this ongoing War on Terrorism.

On the other hand, the Obama Administration and the Congress recognized that the difficult war

in Afghanistan requires Pakistan’s close co-operation and coordination in logistics, specifically

human and military intelligence in order to get the required objectives from the War on Terror.

Nevertheless, Islamabad has always rejected Washington’s diplomatic pressure to ‘do more.’

President Bush on June 17, 2004, declared Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally of the U.S. for the

purposes of the Arms Export Control Act.” BBC explained:

This move is in recognition of Islamabad's primary contribution in the fight against Al-

Qaeda from every perspective, and is being seen and acknowledging as Washington's way of saying thank-you. Pakistan will now enjoy a special security relationship with the U.S… Pakistan's new status means that it is now eligible for getting a series of benefits in the areas of foreign aid and defence co-operation, including priority delivery of defence items to enhance Pakistan’s military strength to combat terrorism in most effective way…. (but this) symbolism is more important than the substance itself.261

The 9/11 attacks changed the whole situation vis a vis Pakistan’s policy of ‘Strategic Depth’ in

Afghanistan.262 Since the War against Terrorism has started in 2001, Pak-U.S. military and

intelligence authorities have shared intelligence information on terrorist groups and their

activities on border areas which are considered to be safe places for the terrorists to seek asylum.

The U.S security and intelligence forces have conducted joint operations, i.e. drone attacks in

Pakistan’s Tribal areas with close cooperation and assistance of Pakistani security and

260 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorists, Washington DC, September 2006, pp. 20-22.

261 “Bush names “Pakistan major ally,” BBC News, 17 June, 2004, Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk 262 Ashok K. Behuria, The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 31, Issue

No. 5, p.703.

137

intelligence agencies in order to eliminate Al- Qaeda and the Taliban hideouts. The U.S military

authorities and the Afghan government have been constantly mounting pressure on Pakistani

government to make effective measures to flush out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements that take

sanctuary in Pakistan's Tribal areas and have carried out violent suicidal campaigns against

NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan.263

Pakistan’s categorical choice to support the U.S invasion of Afghanistan by providing

Pakistan’s territory and airspace brought short and long term important consequences.

Undoubtedly, the U.S. has poured massive military and economic grant to Pakistan in the last

few years including the rescheduling of its international debt that has been a great source of relief

for Pakistan from economic perspective. The U.S. also attended Pakistan’s security needs and its

financial requirements. To meet military requirement, the U.S. authorized a $ 1.2 billion arms-

sale package to Pakistan that includes roughly $950 million for the purchase of P3C Orion

aircraft. Besides, in 2006, Pak-U.S. arms purchase deal reached US$3.5 billion which made

Pakistan the largest receiver of the U.S. arms sale in the world that year.264

There is an intense debate over Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in on-going War against

Terrorism. The U.S. Congress that has been viewing Pakistan as an ally who has joined this War

against Terrorism as a matter of compulsion and not as a matter of choice. Pakistan’s due

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) have been delayed on one or the other pretext thus making it

obligatory for Pakistan to come up to the U.S. expectations if it needs continuous flow of aid to

its defense and economic sectors. However, it is quite clear that up till now, no Pakistani

government has been powerful and successful enough to tackle militancy in the autonomous

Tribal areas of Pakistan. It is evident from the fact that Pakistan military has intervened in the

263 Hasan Askari, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”, PILDAT Briefing Paper, April 2004

264 P. Buxbaum, “U.S. Pakistan Personality Politics,” ISN Security Watch, Jan 10, 2008.

138

Tribal Areas for the very first time in the history of Pakistan and it has faced severe resistance to

combat insurgents.

After 9/11, the Tribal people of Pakistan perceive this War against Terrorism as War

against Islam. They have severely resisted the intervention of Pakistan Army and are strictly

against government’s policy of aligning with the U.S. Tribal areas have semi-autonomous status

that dates back to the days of British colonial rule of the Sub-continent. These Tribal people have

a history of not welcoming and accepting foreign forces on their soil and have refused to go

along with any sort of intervention. So they show no sincerity and have never been on

negotiating terms with the government especially in the presence of Pakistani Army there. In

addition, due to numerous ongoing military operations, they have suffered numerous

hardships.265

Mr. Ghalib Iqbal, Pakistani Ambassador in France, says “the U.S. War against Terrorism

has affected Pakistani socio-economic fabric. It has created negative impact. We have lost 78

billion dollars as investment in economic terms. Deficit of energy is growing high which is

further adding problems. Socially, the country has gone under a negative change due to

terrorists’ acts; the whole nation psyche has become a trauma. Coalition Support Funds are being

delayed on one or the other pretext. The U.S. has not given fair acknowledgement to Pakistan’s

role as a frontline state which has added to anti-American feelings in Pakistani society. We have

done more than any other coalition country led by the U.S. in this War against Terrorism.

Pakistani security forces have killed 1,000 Al-Qaeda’s top wanted leaders and we have captured

more than 1,000 terrorists; we have frozen $1 million worth of assets of terrorists.”266

265 “Pakistan's IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group, June 3, 2009. 266 Interview with H.E. Mr. Ghalib Iqbal , Pakistani Ambassador in Paris, France, 30 May, 2013

139

He further added, that 2008 was the year when perception within the country started

changing due to numerous suicide blasts. Pakistan’s sacrifices are not acknowledged by the

Western world. In fact they do not understand what sort of price we are paying as a nation. He

said, “The animal life in the Western world is very precious but a human life loss in Pakistan in

the War against Terrorism is not even considered worth a condolence message.” By referring to

Raymond Davis case, Osama bin Laden’s death and Salala incident of 2011, he termed three

incidents in a row as “a clear violation of Pakistani laws and sovereignty.”

He added, “We cannot quit this War against Terrorism, we have to clear the mess.” By

commenting on Pakistani elections held in May 2013, he said, “if election is the yard stick of

measuring any country’s maturity, then it is a shining example for the West to understand that

people in Pakistan have rejected extremists and militant tendencies and have voted for

progressive, liberal and enlightened leadership in Pakistan.” He welcomed Government’s

initiative of holding talks with terrorists. Answering to drone attacks and media’s responsibility

in Pakistan, he said “We are extremely against drone attacks and we have condemned them at

every forum. Media is not playing a constructive role but playing Politics vs. Terrorism. While

answering another question, he said, “perceptions are not based on in-depth knowledge,

perceptions are usually based on superficial knowledge half cooked half baked which aims to

distort the fact while in-depth fact cannot distort information.”267

Pakistan government’s efforts to exert military control and the use of force against

militants in FATA have met little successes so far. Pakistan’s military operations in the Tribal

areas of Pakistan are in no way a success story. In fact several hundred Pakistani soldiers and

officers fighting militant insurgents are being killed by these terrorists since the beginning of

267 Interview with H.E. Mr. Ghalib Iqbal , Pakistani Ambassador in Paris, France, 30 May, 2013

140

operation till 2016, including ambushes, explosive mines attacks, and poor counterinsurgent

tactics by the military establishment. After acknowledging the failure of military strategy against

the terrorists, President General Musharraf tried to seek diplomatic negotiations with these

warring factions and made several “peace agreements with Tribal leaders,” who in fact have had

strong influence in the area. Under the “Miran Shah Peace Agreement” for North Waziristan

concluded in 2006, the Pakistani Army had to release all prisoners and weapons that it had

already seized. The Army showed willingness to pay reimbursement for maneuver damages in

order to retain a few established garrisons. The other conditions from terrorists included the

dismantling of temporary checkpoints established by Pakistan Army in the area, and to stop

patrolling within FATA. This agreement offered concessions in order to bridge a wide gap

between people of FATA and Pakistan Military.268

Militants never showed compliance to the peace deals which they brokered with Pakistan

military and violated these peace accords from time to time. By August 2007, the peace deals

had widely collapsed and Musharraf’s government was once again looking for the use of force

and resorted to military options available to get the required results.269What become known and

has been a disturbing factor is the loose dispensation and lack of trust between Pakistani military

and Tribal militants. While on the other hand, in some Tribal areas, the Pakistani Army

concentrated on targeting hard core extremists who have been a potent threat, while the lashkars

acted as localized forces to clear the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban out from their areas

with the close collaboration of Pakistan Army.270

268 Government of Pakistan, FATA Sustainable Development Plan, p. 14, 55-57 269 Ibid. 270 Perlez & Zubair, “Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias In Taliban War.” New York Times, 24 Oct 2008,

www. ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20081024635683.html , pp. 1-5

141

After years of engagement in the region with Pakistan as a frontline state, the U.S.

Department of Defence in December 2007 started a review of military aid given to Pakistan

which reportedly found that while the U.S. was spending “significantly” to enhance Pakistan-

U.S. co-operation it was “not seeing any results in a long run.”271 This strict observation brought

a drastic change in releasing of military funding by the Department of Defence and the basic

focus remained on the training of Pakistani forces in KPK region and building of a

counterinsurgency force. The U.S. is supposed to refund the required grant under the CSF to

Pakistani military.

only in the cost incurred in fighting terrorism, over and above its normal military

costs. … The United States has been assuming that Pakistan will use the funds for

counterterrorism. But up until early 2009, the U.S. has given Pakistan the funds

without attempting to set particular outcomes against terrorism which it expects

Pakistan would deliver.272

From 2002 to 2007, the U.S. Congress approved more than $9.7 billion worth of arms sales for

Pakistan, and the U.S. “has traditionally assumed that the military equipment will be used for

counterterrorism in the region.”273

Aijaz Ahmed, Minister, Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, while describing

Pak-U.S. relations says, “The War against Terrorism has redefined and impacted our relations

with the U.S. The U.S. has engaged Pakistan as a full time ally in this war. Afghanistan is a

difficult country to deal with and if history is any indicator, Afghan people have never allowed

anyone to rule them.”274 While emphasizing the importance of geo-strategic location of Pakistan,

271 Azeem, “U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption,” pp. 8-10

272 Ibid. 273 Ibid.

274 Interview with Muhammad Aejaz, Minister Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, 15th June , 2013

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he claimed, “Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance is a vital factor not only for the regional powers

but for the global powers which has enhanced Pakistan’s importance manifold to the U.S.

Pakistan has important role to play socially, economically and politically.” He said, “Media is

playing a mixed role which is a commercial based profitable organization, and the enhancement

of the economic activity is the only way of raising living standard of poor Afghans.” He shared a

very important piece of information pertaining to Afghan people’s social stratification, “The top

most concern for the Afghan people comprises of 3 set of priorities: first, economic activity;

second, tradition, and third, religion. They have never disturbed this order throughout their

history but since this War against Terrorism started, this set of priorities has been in disorder.”275

By ruling out the possibility of war at every front, he says “talks with the Taliban are

inevitable, the other option is to create a buffer zone but that would later turn into potential zone

for the terrorists that of course may not be a viable option from any perspective. A meaningful

dialogue should be conducted because a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in our interest.” He

emphasized that the only solution of the problem is enhancement of economic activity in

Afghanistan. He further added, “Pakistan today is in such a situation where the decision of

withdrawal from the U.S. led War on Terrorism should not be taken in a hasty manner. We have

to disengage gradually by solving many important problems rather than leaving them behind.”

Discussing the role of Pakistan Military in this on-going War against Terrorism, he says,

“Pakistan military role has been commendable throughout history of Pakistan, they have always

strengthened the fragile political system of Pakistan whenever needed.” Referring to Pakistan’s

political situation he states, there is a well-known saying for Pakistan, “whenever a democrat

takes power, he tends to be a dictator and when dictator takes power, he tends to become a

275 Ibid.

143

democrat.” He emphasized, “Establishment is the 5th pillar of state in Pakistan.” He concluded by

saying, “people of Pakistan are ultimate guardian of Pakistan’s sovereignty and integrity and

national interest is supreme. Post Malala period has brought a radical change in the general

perception and election results of 2013 have further augmented this change in masses and only

those parties have come up to the surface who have joined masses’ sentiments.”276

According to Mr. Aijaz, “every institution in Pakistan has undergone a huge transition.

Drone attacks have targeted some high value top most wanted leadership of Al-Qaeda and drone

strikes are restricted to FATA region. The world should understand that Pakistan is not the part

of the problem but a part of solution.”277

ISI has had a remarkable impact in the region of FATA and KPK. Co-operating with the

CIA in the peak days of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the main primary task fell on ISI to

equip the Mujahedin with sophisticated weapons to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s,

and later in 1990s. They backed the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan to contain the powerful

warlords that appeared on the political horizon when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from

Afghanistan. Since 9/11, ISI has come under heavy attacks by the U.S. administrations with

frequent allegations from time to time that ISI operatives have been providing money, supplies,

and above all assistance required to Taliban commanders.278

While the Afghan government under President Karzai faced quite a difficult situation

because the main elements in the insurgency are Pashtun themselves which have been a troubling

source for the Afghan government to tackle with. The expelled Taliban leaders are still revealing

themselves as representatives of the Pashtun and are still determined to fight and get their

276 Interview with Muhammad Aejaz, Minister Chef de Mission Adjoin, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris, 15th June ,

2013 277 Ibid. 278Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, “Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan’s help,” The International Herald Tribune ,

March 25, 2009, Available from http://www.iht.com/

144

country back from foreign coalition forces led by the U.S stationed in Afghanistan. Whether their

actions have some validity on the ground or not, it has always been used to reinforce perceptions

among the Afghan people at large and specifically among those Pashtun who live inside FATA

and KPK region and have been traditional rulers of Afghanistan.

The Taliban leaders used this prevailing perception as a fuel for recruitment of

youngsters in their organization and for gathering support in the Pashtun territories not only

inside Afghanistan but across the border areas in Pakistan too. Consequently, the Taliban

gradually started aligning themselves with various affected groups who think that they have not

been given due status and rights due to one or the other pretext. These Taliban are headed by

former Mujahidin commanders who are the main source of unrest in the society. They are quite

active in different sections of Afghanistan and FATA and execute insurgency against foreign

forces inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghanistan government considers these Taliban

and their allies as traitors who are trying to take back power by applying different tactics

primarily the use of violence. These elements blame Pakistan for providing safe havens to these

insurgents who are a threat to Afghanistan in general and NATO and ISAF forces in particular.

In July 2008, Afghanistan accused Pakistan’s Intelligence Service and Army are behind the

Taliban-led insurgency which in turn creates unrest in Afghanistan, calling Pakistan’s security

forces “the world’s biggest producers of terrorism and extremism.”279

It is strongly believed that most of the Taliban leadership and followers of major

Mujahedin commanders of the Soviet Afghan War during the 1980s have taken sanctuary in

FATA among their fellow tribesmen due to close ethnic ties where they are able to carry out

military operations against the U.S. and Afghan government alike in a very sophisticated and

279 Associated Press, July 14, 2008

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effective way. In the past, the tradition has been strictly observed that the Afghan Taliban have

always avoided getting into direct conflict with their Pakistani hosts in the southern part of

FATA. But this tradition is now shifting.

In the northern section of Pakistan, in Bajaur in particular, there is a clear evidence

regarding the presence of former Afghan leadership which is responsible for carrying out Taliban

insurgency. With the passage of time, it has become very complicated to make a distinction

between the Afghan Taliban and the local ones. In addition, elements of Al-Qaeda, the global

terrorist organization is now comprised of multinational ethnic backgrounds which has used

FATA and KPK region as a primary base and training ground for Al-Qaeda operations since

decades. Joint U.S. and Pakistan military official sources have strongly indicated the presence of

Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs, and other foreigners who have carried deadly suicidal attacks against

Pakistan and Afghanistan thus become the main source of disruption of peace efforts in the

region.280

The balance has been moved back and forth in favor of the militants which have been a

source of disturbance for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The situation has become more severe

as Afghanistan is now facing a remarkable turn from insurgency to civil war while on the other

hand, the Taliban and now the presence terrorists from Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) in

Afghanistan has given rise to numerous problems pertaining to security for the translantic

alliance to deal with.

Islamabad too has sought different options to deal with deteriorating security situation in

FATA and is trying to establish the writ of government in a credible manner. This effort has

yielded no productive result so far. Pakistan Army is fighting to regain control over parts of the

280 Briefing by Gen. David McKiernan, Commander NATO, ISAF in Afghanistan; Washington Post, October 2,

2008.

146

KPK and now this insurgency has spread to Balochistan where home-grown militancy prompted

by separatists has created a parallel regime. The U.S. and other coalition partners in Afghanistan

under NATO flag with the help of the United Nations-mandated ISAF have been involved and

fighting on both military and economic fronts to help in reconstruction of war-torn Afghanistan

which has been in shambles since 2001 since the U.S. invaded Afghanistan.281

Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani, Defense and Air Attache, Embassy of Paris,

Pakistan, expressed his views by saying, “Present Government in Pakistan has tried to get

unanimous consensus on the War against Terrorism which is extremely important in order to

justify Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. led campaign against terror. Lack of sense of ownership

of this ensuing War against Terrorism within masses creates a sense of disengagement. Pakistan

has been confronted with ethnic and militancy problems since the very beginning of its inception

but it is a country which has never accepted these militant tendencies as a norm for the

society.”282 While referring to Kashmir and Afghan wars, he said, “We throughout the history

have been very tolerant and welcoming people coming from the Middle East who had different

motives and these people had different mindsets like participating in the freedom struggle for

Kashmir or Afghan Jihad; we accommodated them without showing any objection to their

presence in our country. That is the reason we have suffered at the end of the day instead of

getting any benefits from the situation.”283

Referring to the Kashmir situation, he added, “Unfortunately we do not have any

concrete coherent Kashmir strategy since the very beginning. It only remained an emotional

281 Nawaz, “FATA-A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2009, pp.8-10

282 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris

27 September, 2013 283 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris

27 September, 2013

147

approach. Nationalism was never a coherent force or supreme emotion and agenda in Pakistan.

There should be a group of intellectuals, scholars and think tanks who can formulate policies for

the government in a long run and the implementation of these policies should be strictly

monitored by the Pakistani government. Intolerance and lack of opportunities created and

manifested many other additional problems.” He says, “We have inherited a very strong armed

forces structure from the British which has been a symbol of pride, glory and strength. But undue

military interventions in the political process have created problems. Institutions should be

strong rather individuals.”

Pakistan has always behaved in a mature and responsible manner at regional and

international levels but things changed when Pakistan had become a nuclear power. Those who

are not happy with us thought very long and deep, they tried to label Pakistan with different

connotations.” While describing the role of Pakistan as a U.S. ally, he said, “Pakistan is a

responsible ally in the U.S. War against Terrorism. We have paid socially, economically and

militarily. But we have not established any coherent strategy and this has been a process of error

and elimination. Today we are not facing any immense threat from external sources but the threat

comes from within. Afghanistan with tribal tradition is a landlocked country which has no access

to the outside world but through Pakistan.”

At the international level, the image of Pakistan is badly damaged. We could not establish our

relevance in an assertive way. As a result, we have become scapegoat or black sheep. We have

overlooked important elements of statehood which is a failure. Despite our official position, we

have been successful in asserting ourselves.”284 On the controversial issue of drone attacks and

hiding of Osama in Pakistan, he said, “Drone attacks is an international subject which is in

284 Interview with Air Commodore Syed Nasir Raza Hamdani Defence and Air Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Paris,

27 September, 2013

148

contradiction to International Law. It is a blatant use of force against civilians and the killing of

Osama bin Laden has badly damaged Pakistan’s repute all over the globe.”

Mr. Hamdani says, “Government has taken a good step in bringing the Taliban to

negotiation table,” but he also emphasized that Pakistan should never negotiate with weakness.

This is a set principle we cannot be on our knees and beg to negotiate.” In the end, he

emphasized upon the importance of National coherence and National strategy which he considers

essential for mainlining peace, generating economic activity and education of masses.”285

The events of September 11 dramatically changed and transformed the nature of the U.S.

aid programs for Pakistan, that is, from developmental aid, which had dominated the Pak-U.S.

relations during the decades of 1950s and 1960s to obtaining Pakistan’s willingness pertaining to

its cooperation in counter-terrorism campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. While

the U.S. aid in the earlier decades mainly focused on helping the people of Pakistan in

strengthening military’s capability and supporting economic growth; aid in the 1980s was given

with a particular purpose to fortify Pakistan’s military and its intelligence agencies. The U.S. aid,

which had been largely seen as productive and considered extremely essential against arch rival

India in the early phase, thus started creating problems with lethal consequences for Pakistan in

later years. Moreover, “developmental aid” which the U.S. had been offering and the “war aid”

are two very different categories of support which Pakistan received from the U.S, thus produced

very different results in Pakistan. For instance, the aid given to Afghan Mujahidin through

Pakistan to contain Communism from Afghanistan is one notable example which later resulted

with severe complications for Afghanistan in general and Pakistan in particular. This given aid

required Pakistan to serve America’s strategic purposes in the region more than Pakistan’s own

285 Ibid.

149

national interests gave rise to such factors that were to cause serious problems three decades

later.

Chapter -6

Pakistan- Frontline State in the War against Terrorism

150

Since Pakistan and the U.S. became partners in the War on Terror, a lot has happened with

regards to U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the wake of 9/11. It would have been rather inconclusive

if the discussion was to be terminated at events occurring till 2008. In order to gain a better

insight into the dynamics of U.S.-Pak relationship, especially after the departure of both

President Bush and President General Musharraf, a brief overview of the subsequent events has

also been included at the end of this chapter in order to draw relevant conclusions.

From the beginning of the 1980s through September 2001, Pakistan has been one of the

three countries, supporting numerous Pashtun militant groups in Afghanistan. These groups were

considered to be friendly and a valuable asset for Pakistan against other regional players,

particularly India, to secure Pakistan’s own strategic interests in Afghanistan.286 Musharraf

writes in his memoir, In the Line of Fire:

Pakistan could not afford a new enemy on the western border, or a vacuum of power which in

turn would give rise to Northern Alliance which is comprised of ant-Pakistan elements. This is

not any hidden reality that Northern Alliance is comprised of anti-Pakistan elements.287

There is a general concern in Pakistan that the Pashtun ethnic majority in Afghanistan will join

the Pashtuns across the border in Pakistani territory for the revival of decade old problem of

“Pashtunistan.” Afghanistan has been supporting the issue of Pashtunistan with active

collaboration of India and Soviet Union in earlier decades in order to destabilize Pakistan. It is

quite important to mention here, though Pakistan developed friendly and cordial relations with

the Taliban in the 1990s, but the Taliban regime refused to accept the Durand Line as

286 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” Journal of Political

Studies, Vol. 22, Issue - 1, 2015, p. 44 287 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 202.

151

international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.288 Similarly, Pakistan did not

acknowledge Afghan claim to the Pashtun areas of Khyber Pakhtunkwa that were annexed by the

British in 1892 and handed over to Pakistan when it came into being in 1947.289

Pakistan’s decision had both internal and external corollaries. However, external security

loomed larger in the minds of Pakistan’s policy makers keeping in view security conditions on

the northwest frontier and east as compared to internal security matters. Pakistan has always

been well aware of its ethnic composition which is linked with its brethren across the Durand

Line and the religious affinities of the Pakistani masses with the popular Islamic clerics in

Afghanistan. These sensitivities sparked a host of problems for the already fragile socio-political

set up of Pakistan. However, hard problems require harsh decisions. Pakistan had to opt for the

choice that would guarantee its own survival.

That was quite evident from the beginning that the U.S. would retaliate with full force

against the perpetrators of 9/11; secondly, 9/11 brought significant implications for Pakistan’s

domestic and foreign policy options. The post 9/11 developments had profound effects on: Pak-

U.S. relations, territorial integrity, political stability, economic situation and geo-strategic

location of Pakistan.290The Bush Administration announced a war to eliminate terrorists’

network and terrorism.

This led to the War on Terrorism and the re-evaluation of American foreign policy and its

National Security Strategy from a very new perspective where security of the U.S. mainland had

become the top most priority for the Bush Administration to deal with. Does this new doctrine

which was proposed by then President of the U.S. constitute an applicable response to terrorism?

288 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” pp. 103-105 289 Ibid. 290 Fani, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities after 9/11,” Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 58, Number

4, October 2005, p.53.

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The U.S. National Security Strategy states clearly:

History will judge strictly those who saw this coming danger (terrorism) but failed to act promptly in order to combat this menace. In addition, it says the new world we have entered in, the only path to peace and security is the path of action to deal with this threat effectively.291

This strategy reveals a very important relationship between terrorist and a state that could

provide aid and shelter to such elements. President Bush articulated this code of conduct on 9/11:

“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who

harbor them.”292 Both were seen as equally responsible and should be dealt with accordingly.

Just War Theory forbids and denounces terrorism or wars of terror in all forms. The

intended killing of non-combatants in the battle field and civilians is a serious war crime which

needs accountability. Such a military strategy which brings out the brutal use of force against the

weaker rival is directly related to an act of terror that is never acceptable. It contravenes the basic

civil rights of population on a huge scale without clearly determining any clear jurisdiction and

making any clear distinction between already set criteria of “Dos and Don’ts” in order to

accomplish military and political ends. The terrorists’ ideology cannot be justified for whatever

purpose the act is carried out. In the given context, terrorism can be seen as morally wrong and

unlawful tactic to apply from the perspective of the Just War practice. It can be disagreed, for

that particular reason, the weaker opponent has got the right of self-defence in the face of

overdue projection of force against terrorism is permissible, and ethically this is an acceptable

norm in International Law.293

291 Fani, Shahab, and Yasin, “Pakistan’s Post 9/11 US Policy: Prospects & Constraints,” Pakistan Vision Vol. 11 No.

2, p. 51. 292Bush. Speech of the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001. Available from

http://www.whitehouse.gov 293 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 45

153

In a global context, the U.S’ strategy is power-driven and is more based on projection of

force. It would not be wrong to call it imperialistic tendency of the only super power to rule the

world. The vital question to address here is: Is the War on Terrorism directly related with the

foreign policy of the super power, especially when its own National Security is at stake? Does it

obtain all the rights to expand its influence and can use military force and power projection by

employing all means against weaker nations? If the expansion of power is the only driving force

behind the U.S. intention, then one can come to the conclusion that the doctrine of pre-emption is

unjustified; it is being driven by the U.S. with wrong intentions in order to rule the world in a

hegemonic manner.294

Undoubtedly, this Bush Doctrine has put Pakistan in a very grave situation with no clear

viable strategy either to back out as a frontline state or go along with the U.S. in supporting its

military engagement and dismantling of Al-Qaeda remnants who have taken refuge within

Pakistan. President General Musharraf himself admitted the fact that in case of Pakistan’s refusal

to join the U.S. led coalition; the use of blatant force was a real and decisive possibility against

Pakistan.295 On the other hand, Pakistani military was very much aware of its close association

with the Taliban regime and Pakistan’s strategic position in the region in the wake of 9/11, and

knew that the relationship formed with the Taliban regime during the 1990s would never come

back to its former strength after Pakistan’s U-turn against the Taliban.

It is believed, terrorism is a new threat replacing Communism in the post 9/11 world for

the U.S. with a new context and dimension in the region. This political situation which emerged

after 9/11 was very much different from the one U.S. confronted during the 1980s to defeat

Communism in Afghanistan. The war against Soviet Union could not be won without the co-

294 Ibid., p.46 295 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 201

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operation of Pakistan; similarly, 9/11 put Pakistan in the same place where fight against

terrorism was not possible without Pakistan’s full length co-operation. But in order to get

Pakistan’s categorical support, the U.S. had to readjust its security dynamics according to the

needs of the situation in a radically changed international setting.296

If a sovereign national government authorizes major violations of the human rights of its

own citizens within its territory by using the option of force against them, and is heavily

involved in committing serious crimes against civilians on massive scale; then a government

basically lost the claim of sovereignty, credibility, protection of citizens, and law of the state. In

such a situation, on moral grounds, the international community can intervene in order to protect

the civilians from aggression.297

296 Pirzada, “Kashmir: Indian Strategic Initiative since 9/11 & Imperative for U.S. Policy in the Region,” IPRI

Journal 11 (Winter 2003): 126. 297 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 46

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Map of Pakistan

156

6.1 U.S. War on Terror: Impact and Apprehensions for Pakistan

The U.S. Administration and major U.S. think tanks have acknowledged the importance of

Pakistan as a crucial ally and are of the view to establish long-term, workable and strategic

partnership with Pakistan even after the drawdown of U.S led NATO troops from Afghanistan.

Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton confessed the fact in a briefing to the U.S. Congress

that one of the biggest U.S. mistakes after the Soviet withdrawal was to leave Pakistan on its

own to bear the consequences emerged consequently from the unsettled political situation of

Afghanistan in the early 1990s. This precarious situation afterwards led to the emergence of

extremism and militancy in Pakistan. Being the most allied ally of the 1950s, the U.S. had treated

Pakistan poorly in the past.298In a later testimony before the U.S. Armed Services Committee,

she said:

The case for action against Al-Qaida and its allies has always been clear, but the United States course of action over the last eight years has not. The fog of another war obscured ourfocus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere, theTaliban gained momentum in Afghanistan. And the extremist threat grew in Pakistan - a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.299

The events of 9/11 and the declaration of War on Terror by President Bush gave the U.S an

exclusive opportunity to expand its influence around the globe with the help of power projection

and intervention against those states who are not economically strong enough.300

In Pakistan, it is widely assumed that the U.S. has proved that it is not a reliable and

trustworthy ally. It introduced many sanctions against Pakistan time and again which further

298 Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” pp. 48-49

299 Amer Rizwan, “South Asian Security Complex & Pak-U.S. Relations Post 9/11,” IPRI Journal X, 2 (Summer

2010), pp. 39-68

300 Wilkinson, International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

157

diminished its credibility. As the U.S. needed Pakistan to fight against terrorism, so it was asked

to join the coalition forces led by the U.S. Though reluctantly but Pakistan has actively pursued

its role as a frontline state. In the beginning, both the nations formed a close collaboration

pertaining to human intelligence sharing of Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban but with the

passage of time this relationship lost momentum. Though the objective is same and that is to

eliminate Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leadership but interestingly both countries have different

strategies with varying degrees to attain this common objective. International media has been

underlining Pakistan’s ineffectiveness as a potential player in this War against Terrorism.

Selig Harrison wrote in Los Angeles Times explaining the importance of U.S. relations

with India as primary and growing economic power in South Asia and is the right choice for U.S.

to defend its strategic interests in the region. While he showed his apprehension by saying: “if

Pakistan is an ally of the U.S., good luck to the United States of America.301 The Bush

Administration was not happy at all with the military coup led by President General Musharraf in

the beginning; later saw him as a powerful leader to serve its interests in the region as military

regimes in Pakistan did during the Cold war period under President Ayub, Yahya and Zia.

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. never threatened Pakistan in a straight-forward manner

but U.S. officials threatened to add Pakistan to the U.S. State Department’s list of seven terrorist-

sponsoring nations; so there was a possibility of the U.S.’ projection of force against Pakistan

due to its close association with the Taliban regime.302 President General Musharraf was told

301 Selig Harrison, “If Pakistan is an Ally of the U.S., Good Luck to the United States of America,” Los Angeles

Times, Jan 27, 2001. 302 Barbara & Nichols, “U.S. pressures Pakistan’s leaders to help bring in Bin Laden,” USA Today, 14 September

2001.

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firmly to either abandon support for the Taliban leadership or be prepared to be treated like the

Taliban; the U.S. tone was aggressive and alarming.303

President General Musharraf states, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was

even more blunt in saying:

Armitage told the Director General of ISI, (General Mehmood) that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorist, we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.304

In his book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, President Musharraf claimed that some of the

demands were “ludicrous.” For example, he explained that the fifth demand depended “on the

interpretation of what comprises of verbal support for terrorism.” In his memoir, President

Musharraf strongly asserted that he never agreed to the second or third demand because granting

the U.S. total access to Pakistan’s naval ports and fighter aircraft bases would jeopardize

Pakistan’s “strategic assets.” He stated that he only agreed to give the U.S. permission to use two

bases, far from “sensitive areas,” that could only be used for logistics and aircraft recovery

purpose, and not for any offensive operations. According to President Musharraf, “The rest of

the demands we could happily live with.” There was a general conception in Pakistan that

President Musharraf accepted the demands completely and without any adjustments.305

Pakistan has always preoccupied a major place in the strategic calculations of the

American policy makers and they are completely aware of Pakistan’s worth in this War on

Terror. Pakistan military once again got a pivotal position and the Bush Administration preferred

303 Fair, “The Counterterror Coalitions,” p.17 304 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 201 305Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 51

159

to rely upon the ISI for sharing important intelligence information pertaining to Al-Qaeda and

the Taliban.306

Soon after the start of the War against Terrorism in October 2001, Pakistan faced

immense international pressure to intervene in the sensitive region of the western border (FATA)

in order to eliminate the Taliban elements that were linked with Afghan insurgency and had been

a constant source of disturbance for peace in region.307 Initially, Musharraf regime not only

banned several militant terrorist organizations308 but it acted in a prompt manner in detaining

thousands of extremists from its territory. It captured many high value Al-Qaeda and Taliban

terrorists thus extending full length support to the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies in

rooting out terrorists’ network.309 Many peace accords were signed with the militants in order to

restore peace but all efforts failed due to non-seriousness of the Taliban forces. Islamabad urged

the tribal leaders to play an effective role and take serious measures in rooting out foreign

elements mainly comprised of Afghan, Tajiks, Usbeks, and Chechens, etc.310 The basic

provisions of these peace deals were that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used as a base

camp to execute terrorist attacks anywhere in the world. In return for such guarantees, Pakistan

Army also provided support to help the local population pertaining to reconstruction and

development of infrastructure destroyed during military operations in the Tribal Areas of

Pakistan.311

Pakistan is an active coalition ally of the U.S. which has done much to eliminate Al-

Qaeda and the Taliban network. A Pakistan Embassy official told in Washington, D.C, “Pakistan

306 Ibid., p. 52 307 Javaid, “War on Terror,” pp. 125-131. 308 From the Text of President Musharraf’s speech to the Nation on Jan 12, 2002. p. 46 309Hussain, “U.S.-Pakistan Engagement the War on Terrorism and Beyond,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 1

Winter 2005-06 pp. 3-25. 310Safia Aftab, The 2014 ISAF pullout from Afghanistan, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre, Dec 2013. 311 Ibid.

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has deployed more than 1,50,000 of its troops to the Afghan border and has successfully

launched more than 38 operations in its Tribal Areas in order to eliminate terrorists and their

networks who are a threat to stability of the region in general and Pakistan in particular. More

than 8,000 Pakistan army and paramilitary troops have been killed, and even larger number

wounded. This number accounts for more causalities than any other U.S ally in the War on

Terrorism. Pakistan is the only South Asian country which has participated in the U.S. coalition

maritime interdiction operations, which is one of the vital maritime components of OEF.

Pakistan helped in the arrest of more than 800 Al-Qaeda suspects. Pakistani government froze 32

bank accounts which were known as terrorists’ accounts.312

Pakistan has certain reservations and raised concern from time to time regarding its role

in the War against Terror. There is a general perception in Pakistani masses and policy makers,

that once the U.S. achieves its objectives in Afghanistan in ongoing War against Terrorism, it

would turn its back on Pakistan. Pakistan will once again be left alone to deal with the after

effects of the war. Pakistan will not lose its frontline status but also the interest of the U.S. in the

region and this is what exactly happened after Soviet withdrawal from the region.313

The main stage of War against Terrorism was Afghanistan but today this war is not

confined to Afghanistan but has entered Pakistani tribal areas which have become the hub of

home grown militancy and fundamentalism. Militants across the border have taken asylum into

Pakistani territory. Pakistani Tribal belt is considered the safest zone for these militants to launch

their terrorist activities. This has been an area where the writ of Pakistani government does not

run. These militants and their activities are a serious threat to Pakistani state and its survival.

312 “Pakistan and the United States: Caught in the Middle,” The Economist, September 22, 2001. 313Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 53

161

This factor has compelled Pakistan Army to take a strict military action against them. The most

worrying aspect of all is that is that these militants are carrying suicide attacks in streets,

markets, mosques, churches and on other security installations and security personals are their

main targets. These militants have mostly foreign nationalities and they are particularly from

Central Asian Republics have now been joined by many local religious militant groups within

Pakistan.314

After the death of Osama bin Laden, these groups have gained more strength; they are

more organized and well equipped than ever before and have established a strong foothold to

carry out terrorist activities. Now after 16 years since the War on Terror started, a large section

of people in Pakistan strongly consider that Pakistan is the net loser as a U.S. partner in the long

run.315

Camile Grand, Director of Foundation Pour la Recherche Strategique, Paris, in a talk

pertaining to Pakistan’s role as a frontline state says, “Perception is ambiguous pertaining to

Pakistan’s position as a frontline state in the Western world, a country who has suffered from

terrorism but on the other hand, due to track record of relations of Pakistan’s ISI with the

Taliban.” He further added, today Pakistan is fighting a dual war against enemies who are non

state actors. It is containing domestic insurgents but also has a suspicious political role and

involvement in the rise of insurgency in neighboring Afghanistan. Pakistan is looking to attain a

“strategic depth” in Afghanistan which makes its role skeptical for other regional countries.

Pakistan is a difficult partner in the War against Terror to work with.”316

314Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 53 315 Umbreen Javed. “War on Terror,” African Journal of Political Science & International Relations, 5 March 2011.

pp. 125-131 316Interview with Camile Grand, Director of Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique Paris, June 27, 2013.

162

Mr. Grand went on saying, “Pakistan’s future role as a neighboring country of

Afghanistan is very crucial. Pakistan is a legitimate stakeholder and it has a say in the peace

process of Afghanistan. It can play a vital role in convincing the Taliban not to spoil the peace

process and this role will be judged by the West as a friend or foe as far as the mediation process

is concerned. Pakistan has a dual role to fulfill as a responsible neighbor in the reconstruction

and rehabilitation of Afghanistan and its ability to exert influence in Afghanistan. Much is

dependent on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.” He emphasized, “There is a need to

labeling the Taliban as terrorists. Drone strikes in Pakistan has been worse regarding killing of

civilians, but has killed several high value terrorists; technology is not the issue but the policy

against which it is used should be based on rational grounds. The U.S. should probably be more

careful in using drones.”317

Mr. Grand believes that Pakistan is a fragile society with host of economic problems.

Pakistan has been a coalition partner in the War against Terrorism where militancy has played a

very crucial role. Pakistan remains in a dangerous and uncertain situation; radical groups are

very active in Pakistan that pose threat to its internal security.318 These militant groups should be

engaged in a meaningful peace dialogue process and if they show reluctance, Afghanistan would

remain in a state of chaotic condition that would lead to civil war situation, and pose a threat to

Pakistan’s security as well. He stated, “For Pakistan, regional developments are intertwined and

interlinked to a greater extent; today Pakistan cannot take a unilateral decision of withdrawal

from the U.S. led War against Terrorism.”319

Gerald Stang, a Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute, Paris,

while, explaining his view point on Pakistan’s role as a frontline state against terrorism stated,

317 Interview with Camile Grand, Director of Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique Paris, June 27, 2013. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid.

163

“Pakistan and the U.S both have divergent interests pertaining to Afghanistan crisis in the region.

In the western world, Pakistan is perceived as a country which has a suspicious track record with

its relations to the Taliban.” Mr. Stang was quite optimistic for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan

in the long run. He says, “The presence of Osama in Pakistan carried a bad image of Pakistan in

the Western world. The U.S. and Canada have the same objectives to bring peace and stability to

Afghanistan. Complexity is real but we have to make deals. Media is powerful and it has played

a very constructive role.” Talking about aid and Pakistan’s role as a frontline ally he commented,

“aid to Pakistan can play an essential role not only in raising living standard of people in FATA

but would help in eradicating terrorism. Pakistan and Afghanistan can improve bilateral trade in

the region. Pakistan cannot get out from this U.S. led War against Terrorism, it should stay

engaged and must help in eradicating terrorism which is the only option.”320

A well known sociologist, Dr. Mariam Abu Zahab, while giving her perspective on the

ongoing War on Terrorism says, “Pakistani government should create economic opportunities for

the Tribal people this is the best way to bring them to the mainstream. Pakistan’s role as a

frontline state in the U.S. led War on Terror unfortunately has not been acknowledged in the

West as Pakistan is an ally with double game strategy.”321

At present, with the widespread U.S engagement in Afghanistan, the U.S. is mindful of

the fact that this War against Terrorism could not be won without a strong and stable Pakistan

which must possess capability and strength to fight terrorism and militant insurgents. On the

other hand, the relationship between the two countries at the same time has both advantageous

and disadvantageous dimensions. Today, Pakistan’s whole security apparatus is fighting the

menace of terrorism. Pakistan is heavily involved in this War against Terrorism which has now

320 Interview with Gerald Stang, Senior Canadian Research Fellow at European Union Institute Paris, June 19, 2013

321 Formal discussion with Dr. Mariam Abou Zahab, Paris, July 30, 2013

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become its own War because its military is fighting with the militants within Pakistani borders

which is no more confined to the Tribal areas but has spread to the major settled areas of the

country.322In the War against Terrorism, Pakistan entered as a front line state to combat terrorism

but today Pakistan is struggling hard for its own security and survival not only from external

forces which pose a serious threat but from the internal tendencies, i.e. homegrown militancy and

fundamentalism that has made Pakistan the frontline target of the terrorists and their plans.323

The situation which Pakistan is facing today regarding terrorism and extremism is

directly linked back to 1980s of General Zia’s era. Pakistan inherited the legacy of the Afghan

war because of its participation in Afghan War against the Soviet Union. Many controversial

laws in the name of religion were introduced which led to weaponization of Pakistani society,

violence, sectarianism, gun culture, cross border smuggling thus further strengthened militant

sectarian and religious groups within Pakistan and they started gaining strong foothold.324 But

despite all these facts, Zia was supported by the U.S. because it needed support for Afghan war

which Pakistan’s military provided. It was also during this period in the 1980s when Mujahedin

were trained and equipped from the Pakistani soil with the active support of CIA and ISI camps

and they were sent into Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and against the expansion of Communist

agenda in the region.

The hundreds of Madrassas established in KPK and Baluchistan under a policy by the

Zia regime, primarily facilitated and encouraged the youth to participate in the Afghan War of

the 1980s. Many of these Madrassas in-return imparted religious educational cum military

training especially in the Tribal areas of KPK and Baluchistan. This Madrassa system was well

322 Gunaratna & Iqbal Khurram, Pakistan, London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 2011, p. 258. 323 Gunaratna & Khurram, Pakistan, p.25 324Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 54

165

established and incorporated in the areas of KPK inhabited by the Pashtun tribes.325Madrassas

were also fully utilized to prepare its students in a guerrilla warfare thus introducing

militarization into the centuries old Madrassa system which had never experienced this trend

before.

The Mujahedin who were left behind after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had no clear

future vision who joined hands with like- minded people and later emerged as the Taliban and

supported Al-Qaeda. These Mujahedin carried hostile agenda, fueled anti-Americanism and

backlash in the region against the Western world and became the most wanted terrorists of the

day thus posing a grave challenge to the security and survival of Pakistan in the aftermath of

9/11. Amir Rana writes in his work:

religious parties, Jihadi groups and former Mujahedin who had fought on behalf of the U.S.

against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and also remained vital to the rise of Taliban regime in

Afghanistan from 1994 to 2001 were later strongly encouraged, supported and motivated in the

aftermath of 9/11 to form or join the local Taliban militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan as

well.326

It is worth mentioning that the U.S.-Pakistani relations remain narrowly based on one common

agenda in the region and that is, counter-terrorism, despite increasingly successful strategic

cooperation against militants but with divergent interests to pursue on both sides. Whatever

Pakistan has gained economically and military, it also sees a host of interconnected problems

lining up with the U.S. encountering terrorism policy. Islamabad has strong reservations

pertaining to its relationship with the Washington in the long run combating terrorism. Despite

the U.S. assurances time and again, Pakistan fear that it again will be left on its own once the

325 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security under President Zia, New York: St. Martin’s Press,1991, pp.54-59. 326 Muhammad Amir Rana, “Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective,” Pak Institute for

Peace Studies, 2009, p.12.

166

U.S. strategic interests in the region are achieved. In this context, the real game for Pakistan and

the other regional players will be started in Afghanistan who would try to fill the power vacuum

in the post U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.327 Pakistan, in particular, would likely experience

growing violence within its borders and refugee influx if the violence in Afghanistan spreads

over. Increased militancy in Afghanistan is already spreading to Pakistan’s adjacent tribal areas

of FATA and Balochistan bordering Afghanistan.328

In addition to the external front where Pakistan is heavily involved in fighting terrorism

against militants and facing threats from both its neighbors in the east and north-west, there are

numerous problems and serious internal challenges in the form of ethnic violence, sectarian

hatred, incompetent police, poor law and order condition, widespread corruption, endemic

poverty, and a deepening financial crisis accompanied by ineffective economic policies which

has made the domestic situation more vulnerable.329 One of the major causes of instability within

Pakistan is due to the lack of good governance since its inception which itself is the root cause of

other problems stem from it. Apparently, it seems Pakistani government has failed to address the

major security challenges.

Thus, despite Pakistan’s offering of unconditional cooperation to the U.S. led coalition in

post 9/11 era to eliminate terrorists’ networks within Pakistani territory, a cloud of ambiguity

still hangs over Pakistan-U.S. relations which have widened the trust deficit on both sides. The

three factors need to be analyzed in this regard:

327 Polly Nayak, “U.S. Security Policy in South Asia Since 9/11,” Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies, February,

2005. pp. 2- 5 328 Sunawar, “The 2014 U.S. Withdrawal: An unsettled Quagmire for Pakistan,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXXII,

No.4, Autumn 2014, pp. 98-120 329 Jonathan S. Landay, “Pakistan on Course to become Islamist State,” McClatchy Newspaper, 16th April 2009.

Available from http://www/mcclatchydc.com

167

The first is the “do more” rhetoric by the U.S. without acknowledging to what extent it

has dragged Pakistan in its own so-called War on Terrorism. Since 2003, the U.S.

military commanders who oversee “Operation Enduring Freedom” have been

continuously raising this concern that Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters have gathered

immense strength with the passage of time; and have full capability to attack ISAF and

coalition troops stationed in Afghanistan and then they cross the Pakistani border with

great ease where they could get asylum.

President Musharraf denied the accusations in his interview with CNN:

I don’t think any other leader has said that we are not doing enough and we need to do

more. It is unfortunate that these statements come from the Afghan leadership’….we are

fighting the same enemy. If we start throwing blame on each other, we weaken our

positions.330

After 2003, President Musharraf had sent Pakistani troops that started combat operations against

militants in Waziristan.

Second, in August 2004, during President Karzai’s visit to Islamabad, Musharraf assured

him of Pakistan’s support in combating terrorism and to dispatch additional 9,500 troops

to border areas for security purpose. As a result, in February 2006, in his visit to

Islamabad, President Karzai handed over a list of names, addresses, and phone numbers

to his Pakistani counterpart of most wanted Taliban fighters and confirmed the possibility

of their alleged links and movements with the approval of ISI. President Musharraf not

only dismissed this possibility but criticized President Karzai’s assertion during his

meeting with President Bush in Islamabad in March 2007. President of the U.S.

330 Musharraf’s Interview with CNN (London), Friday 23 Jan, 2004, Available from www.cnn.com

168

persuaded President Musharraf to do more,331 to take more effective measures to control

Islamic militancy and to stop cross-border movement of the Taliban insurgents into

Afghanistan from Pakistani territory while ignoring Pakistan’s perspective.332

Third, the U.S. strongly believes that Pakistan and especially its western Tribal areas

adjacent to Afghanistan have become a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban

elements. These terrorists have developed sanctuaries and they execute terrorist activities

inside Afghanistan against NATO and ISAF forces and then get back to Pakistan’s Tribal

areas where they enjoy support of masses. In sum, “the Tribal areas of Pakistan are

believed to be an important support base and focal point for the Afghan Taliban engaged

in fighting against foreign troops in Afghanistan.”333

This has been the most serious concern taken up by the U.S. to negotiate with Pakistan civil and

military leadership as it thinks that Pakistan’s territory is being used by the terrorists for

protection and future attacks.

To restrict and eliminate terrorists’ outfits, the U.S. compelled Pakistan to carry out

military action in North Waziristan without any further delay. Due to extreme domestic pressure

from within, Pakistan Army launched fully fledged Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorists on

15th June, 2014. The basic objective is to completely destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban network

in Pakistan.334Though earlier, Pakistan’s military had carried out an operation in South

Waziristan but the government had to face severe domestic opposition of its action from the

media, masses and leading political parties. In addition to this governments’ initiative, terrorists’

331 Syed Adnan, “Internal Dynamics of Afghan after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections,” Strategic Studies, 2

September 2006, pp. 100 – 121. 332 New York Times, 4 March 2006. 333 Khurram, “Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter Strategies,” Conflict & Peace Studies, 2010,

p. 132 334 ISPR briefing, 16th June 2014

169

incidents have enormously increased in Pakistan and become norm of the day. The expenditures

of the operation which is an essential component in the War against Terror also added an extra

burden to an already strained economy of Pakistan. Large numbers of military personnel are

taking part in the ongoing operations in different Tribal areas of Pakistan’s western border for

the first time in the history of Pakistan; Pakistan army has intervened to contain terrorists with

the use of force into the Tribal belt. The growing trust deficit in Pak-U.S. relations accompanied

with the lack of acknowledgement of Pakistan’s role as a frontline state has fraught Pak-U.S.

relations. The U.S. believes that Pakistan government has not done enough to eliminate the

terrorists from its territory and this has created a serious rift in Pak-U.S. relationship.

The ever mounting pressure of CIA in Pakistan is a genuine source of concern. Pakistan

is now in a dire need to protect itself from hostile and unfriendly neighbors. As a result, it has

deployed forces accordingly; especially the deployment of troops on Pakistan’s western side is a

tough job as it is a long and undefined border with Afghanistan. The people generally are highly

critical towards the government for being the U.S. coalition partner and anti-American

sentiments are rapidly increasing thus giving rise to feelings of hatred and retaliation. The people

of the region assume that the War on Terror is actually turned into a War against Islam not in the

region but across the globe.

The deployment of international troops in Afghanistan led by the U.S. in 2001 brought

new challenges for Pakistan to deal with. With American troops based in Afghanistan, the

question of where the border was and Pakistan’s responsibilities for maintaining peace, law and

order in its own territories acquired international attention.335 After a decade long war in

Afghanistan, the U.S. remains spiteful to regional sensitivities and the Global War against

335 Sunawar, “Stopping Illegal X-Border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” pp. 103-105

170

Terrorism has been a struggling venture for the U.S. and coalition forces. It was believed that the

death of bin Laden will make it easier to create a narrative of victory for the U.S. led coalition

against Al-Qaeda and perhaps give way to negotiate directly with the Afghan Taliban but the

death of Al-Qaeda’s leader further exacerbated violence and instability in Afghanistan and the

Tribal Areas of Pakistan as well.

It is generally believed that with the drawdown of the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan,

the situation will be challenging for Pakistan in particular because the U.S. priorities will also be

changed accordingly. In that situation, the U.S. would not hesitate to move closer to India which

it considers economically strong strategic partner than Pakistan in the region. This drastic policy

shift and inclination towards India will definitely make a big difference in this region in general

and for Pakistan in particular.336

India also sees Afghanistan through the lens of its decades old hostility and conflict with

Pakistan. In comparison to Pakistan which has somewhat difficult history of relations with

Afghanistan, India has historically had excellent relations with Afghanistan, apart from the rule

of the Taliban who were deeply hostile to India.337 India has tried rebuild its influence in

Afghanistan since 2001 by investing in the country; but they only delivered 40% of the total US$

2.5 billion they have pledged so far. Pakistan is also contributing its part by investing in

development sector in Afghanistan and has also given US$360 million for different ongoing

projects.338

Reimbursement for the losses incurred by Pakistan in the War on Terror in terms of

human lives and infrastructure is nowhere to be seen till the date. Even the funds as coalition

partner as promised by the U.S. are being postponed, over audited and drastically reduced on the

336 Op.cit 337 Interview with retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 03March 2013. 338 Maria Sultan, Interview with HILAL, The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine. May, 2014. p. 22

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basis of various lame excuses by the U.S. It looks like Pakistan is paying the price of War on

Terror all by itself which is an additional burden on its weak economy.339 In addition to this,

Pakistani civil and military leadership considers Pakistan as a proxy tool to fulfill the U.S.

strategic interests in the region and this time in the form of combating terrorism.

Pakistan’s economy is facing down turn because of heavy external debts and the loss of foreign

investments in the country accompanying inflation and employment which contribute to

numerous problems. People are demanding from the government to get out of this useless and

thankless venture purely keeping in view human, military, and infra structure losses. Pakistan,

while in an utter state of despair, fully understands this fact that it is very actively committed in

the War on Terror and there is no looking back. Its mighty neighbor India would take advantage

of all available options to reckon Pakistan’s stability.

Being the neighboring country of Afghanistan, Pakistani society, politics, security

environment, continuous political turmoil and economic structure has undergone drastic change

in the post 9/11 period. The U.S. installed Northern Alliance soon after taking hold of Kabul.

This Alliance is well known for anti-Pakistan policies; despite Bush Administration’s assurances

to President General Musharraf that no anti-Pakistan government would come to power in Kabul.

This move gave India a value added advantage to intervene in Pakistan via Afghanistan and the

construction of numerous consulates and missions adjacent to the border of Pakistan. This has

also enabled India to sabotage Pakistan’s efforts for peace dialogue process with the Taliban as

well.340

339Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 56

340Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 57

172

World’s major powers have been paying attention to five areas of special concern by

keeping their own national interests supreme: counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, democracy,

human rights, and narcotics. Pakistan has been at the center of each which clearly underlines its

significance as a major partner in the War against Terrorism. The majority of Pakistani public do

not support terrorism, drug trafficking, and nuclear proliferation. There is a small faction who

supports the first two, and though even smaller numbers of people support the third option. But a

majority of Pakistanis do oppose Pakistan’s support to the West in the War on Terror and they

simply do not want to backup the official policy of their government in this regard.341

It is generally believed that effective counter insurgency operations launched by Pakistani

military in South and North Waziristan require time and patience to achieve productive results in

the long run. The terrorists are equipped with sophisticated weapons, are well trained and

financed, familiar with the terrain and above all, they enjoy the support of a local friendly

population. The Tribal areas of Pakistan have become the most affected areas due to ongoing

military encounters between the security forces and insurgents and need five to ten years for

rehabilitation and reconstruction to be pacified through economic development, administrative

and social reforms. This is a challenging task that has already being taken by the government as

the foremost priority.342

Pakistan Army is conducting raids to curb terrorist elements in the Tribal areas. However,

this situation is very much different than in the past when CIA-ISI worked closely together after

Afghanistan’s invasion by Soviet Union in 1980s. According to an Army officer, who requested

for anonymity, the U.S. has always given assurance to Pakistani establishment that the U.S.

would not execute any ground operation prior to consultation of Pakistani establishment as and

341Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 332. 342Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 58

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when possible, and American and Pakistani troops would work together to attain mutual

objectives. However, the U.S. appears to have conducted ground and air raids inside Pakistan’s

Tribal belt without sharing any prior information in this regard.343 The death of Osama bin Laden

in May 2011 without consulting their military counterparts is one of the clear examples in this

regard.

The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan was a big question mark for Pakistani security and

law enforcement agencies. American decision makers have openly speculated and raised concern

about the effectiveness of military aid to Pakistan if Pakistani government and military

establishment were already aware of bin Laden’s presence in a highly sensitive zone. In some

cases, the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies have not come up to the U.S. expectations.

This has further worsened the condition and puts a question mark to what purpose the U.S. aid is

being given to Pakistan if it meets such huge failures and outright deception. This broadens trust

deficit between the two allies. Congressman Howard Berman, Democrat of California and one of

the signatories to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill stated that “I don’t think our military assistance is

serving the interests we are intending it to serve” and that aid “has not been effective.”344

For the Pakistani military, the real problem is not the ongoing insurgency in its Tribal

areas, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban forces or Al-Qaeda, etc. For them, the real threat comes

from India which is deliberately maneuvering the crisis in Pakistan while exerting strong

influence in Afghanistan.345 The close alliance between the U.S. and India has deeply shaken

Pakistani trust confidence in its own alliance with the U.S.

David Sanger in his book, The Inheritance, narrated a conversation between a CIA

officer and a Pakistani military officer in the following words: “when America pulls out, India

343 Interview with serving Army Officer posted in Waziristan, 07 March 2013. 344 Interview to CNN 345 Interview with serving Army Officer posted in Waziristan. 07 March 2013.

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will have full control over Afghanistan due to their strong presence. In this way, Pakistan would

face a two front threat.”346

A Pakistani stance emphasizes that with an effective U.S. support and by exerting unequivocal

pressure against terrorists who are a security threat to NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan,

Pakistan and its military can play an important role in weeding out terrorism.

President Musharraf in a speech to the nation emphasized the importance of Pakistan as

an ally of the U.S by saying no other country on this planet has put more at risk than Pakistan on

this issue of combating the menace of terrorism and no other country of the world has gone to the

extent as Pakistan did in the U.S. led fight against terrorism.347 The U.S. has a long list of

demands towards Pakistan to fulfill in order to achieve its objectives of fighting terrorism and

Washington’s expectations have gone beyond and are all time high whereas Islamabad has

certain strong reservations in carrying out the U.S rhetoric ‘to do more’ and is unable to cope up

with new demands from Washington every now and then. For Pakistan, it has been a long and a

hard-hitting war which has already left it in a position of chaos and is still an ongoing struggle.

6.2 Legal Position – Are Drone attacks justified?

Drone attacks are carried out secretly, thus, it is very important to know whether these actions

which accompany massive use of force are legally justified or not, under International Law.

According to the International Law experts, “Washington appears to be ordering the drone

attacks which are based on far-reaching legal opinions but these opinions may differ that the U.S.

can operate in self-defence to any extent to safeguard itself and coalition forces in Afghanistan;

if neighboring countries are reluctant or incapable to attack militants.” Many legal scholars speak

346 David Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power, London:

Bantam Press, 2010, pp. 244-247

347 Musharraf’s Speech to the Nation. 19 September 2001.

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out, “This is per se illegal unless it is proved that the state is supporting or encouraging the

militants.”348

The strongest conclusion to draw under the jus ad bellum is the U.S. has no legal and moral

justification to use drones in Pakistan. Drone attacks are being conducted with the collaboration

of Pakistani government. Using drones for the sake of self-defence is an argument which carries

no validity under any circumstances. Pakistan has not specifically invited the U.S. to give it a

hand by using blatant force against civilians. In order to probe this, there might be some

understanding between the U.S and Pakistan military establishment. Further, even if due

approval is granted by Pakistan, the attacks can only be carried out and would have to be a part

of Pakistan’s own military operations in areas where required. The U.S. has been responsible for

the deaths of many innocent civilians in the region leading to some serious questions pertaining

to drone attacks validity or whether they may be used consistently under what moral principles

and what sort of legitimacy they carry? 349

Washington has asserted this fact time and again that drone attacks are being conducted

with the support of Pakistan. Even then this assertion is considered unwarranted as far as

International Law is concerned. Article 20 of the United Nations under the heading

“Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,” clearly states endorsement by a

state for the execution of an act to another state to thwart the wrong action in relation to the

affected state, but this action must remain within the limits of that consent.350 But this has never

been the case when it comes to drone attacks in Pakistan’s Tribal areas.

Under the laws, drone strikes which are being conducted by the U.S. are a clear violation of:

348 Op.cit. 349Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan- (2004-2009)” in

Shooting to Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force in Context Simon Bronitt ed., Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 19-25

350 (http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments.pdf

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The Charter of United Nations

Rome Statue of International Criminal Court and

The Geneva Conventions of 1949

All the above ruled out the unruly homicide or a show of unnecessary projection against weaker

country. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which clearly states:

All Members shall refrain in International relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.351

The attacks also breach articles of the Additional Protocol I; the Article 51(2) which says, “The

civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising

from military operations”. Article 51(5) states, “Among others, the following types of attacks are

to be considered as indiscriminate”:

(a) “An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military

objective located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration

of civilians or civilian objects;”

(b) “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to

civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive

in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”352

351 (http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.html) 352 www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/opendocument

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U.S. Drone strikes in Pakistan

This drone technology may have served the U.S. specific objectives but these targeted killings

are causing serious damage to the interests of Pakistan. Islamabad has put this request before

Washington many times during high level official meetings to transfer this drone technology to

Pakistan’s military which is undertaking military operations in the Tribal areas so that it could

eradicate the militants and terrorists who in turn pose a security threat to Pakistan and

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Afghanistan. But CIA probably has its own strategic interests in Pakistan to pursue in the long

run which go parallel to safeguard Israeli and Indian interests in the region.353

The highly controversial drone attacks in north-west of Pakistan have raised serious

concern and discourse around the world over the credibility of the U.S. as a promoter and

protector of democracy and human rights. Drone strikes in Pakistan are subject to Public

International Law. This factor needs to be analyzed in the light of human rights violation and

other moral justified norms.

Drone attacks which are carried out by CIA within Pakistani territory on its civilians are

clear violation of International Law of Armed Conflict (ILOAC) and this makes the action of the

U.S unlawful against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to deal with. Drone strikes not only targeted Al-

Qaeda and the Taliban leadership, but in drone attacks hundreds of civilians have lost their lives

with the loss of infrastructure as well. The U.S. strategy of using drones is productive to some

extent as many Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders are being killed as a result of these attacks but here

the killing of civilians is a clear violation under Article 3 of Geneva Convention which says if a

person is not actively involved in any sort of criminal hostile act, he cannot be killed or subjected

to violence, torture or vicious treatment.354 The U.S. Administration has asserted time and again

that it has taken a position in the light of International Law of Armed Conflict to eliminate the

Taliban and Al-Qaeda which justified the U.S. standing.355

353 Zaheer-ul- Hassan, “U.S. to Redefine Drone Attack Policy.” Available from

http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs 354H Hongju , “The Obama Administration & International Law,” Washington D.C, March 25, 2010

http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases 355 Ibid.

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In retaliation, the U.S. has attacked suspected targets with drones in the FATA region

with regular rate of recurrence and civil causalities are more than expected in the process.356

These drone attacks in Pakistan could not be executed without the patronage, approval and help

of the Pakistani government. A huge section of Pakistani public condemns and wants the

government to withhold its support regarding drone attacks. In this situation, it has become ever

harder for the government to carry out its dual policy in the face of severe condemnation at

home. These outstanding concerns and trust deficit on both sides have generated more

misconceptions and thus give rise to misunderstandings which need to be reduced. In such an

uncertain setting between the two unequal partners, it becomes even more difficult for the U.S.

and Pakistan to form a long term sustainable strategic relationship.

The drone attacks gained momentum in 2007 but the earlier attacks were kept secret, and

were even denied by the government officials.357 This led to a widespread outrage amongst

masses that fully condemned these drone attacks as intrusion on Pakistan’s sovereignty. Whereas

the government of Pakistan fully refutes taking any blame of giving any authorization for these

attacks and it has been condemning these drone attacks at international forums.

The United Nations Charter does not authorize any nation to use aggressive means of

force against other sovereign nations to carry out unilateral attacks and the U.S. has no justified

reason to use drones as a mean of retaliation and revenge. After the 9/11 attacks, however, the

UNSC passed Resolution 1368 and also activated the Article 51 of Self-Defence; 358 but along

with this, it is pertinent to mention that the Security Council did not endorse the use of force

against any state for any self-vested reason.

356 Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, “Charting the data for U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-11,” The Long War

Journal. Available from http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistanstrikes.php

357Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 57 358 Ibid., p. 47

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In the Congressional hearing in March 2009, David Kilcullen said:

I think one of the things we could do that would send a strong message right now is we

could call off the drone strikes that have been mounted in the western part of Pakistan. I

realize that they do damage to al Qaeda leadership. Since 2006 we have killed 14 senior

al Qaeda leaders using drone strikes. In the same time period we have killed 700

Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are

deeply aggravating to the population. And they have given rise to a feeling of anger that

coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism well

outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks. Inside the FATA

[Federally Administered Tribal Areas] itself some people like the attacks because they do

actually target the bad guys. But in the rest of the country there‘s an immense anger about

them. And there is anger about them in the military and the intelligence service. I realize

it might seem counterintuitive, but we need to take our foot off the necks of these people

so they feel that there‘s a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent

relationship, a friendship with them whilst continuing to bomb their population from the

air, even if you do it with robot drones, is something that they see through straight

away.359

It is evident that drones kill not only targeted militants but there is a great possibility that these

drones kill high numbers of civilians. The use of unnecessary missiles and bombs in places

where no terrorist activity occurs and where civilians are living and working in a normal way is

completely unjustified. In armed conflict zones, civilians evacuate or take some prior precautions

in order to be on safe end.360

The drone attacks in Pakistan’s north western frontier are an important factor which has

taken the attention of world and international media. Pakistani leaders apparently condemn such

drone strikes to attain political objectives, but there is clear evidence that they not only turn a

deaf ear to the growing resentment by the masses but favor them allowing the U.S. to get rid of

terrorists within Pakistani territory. In May 2011, WikiLeaks documents came to the limelight

359Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 48 360 Op.cit.

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and revealed a very interesting fact that Pakistani government supports the drone attacks in

private, but condemns them in public in order to avoid resentment from the masses.361

6.3 Postscript

6.3.1 AF-PAK Strategy

The strategy was first proposed by President Obama in March 2009. Af-Pak strategy was later

redefined in December 2009 by U.S. military officials. The strategy concisely outlines the

overall objective of the U.S. towards Pakistan and Afghanistan in the region: “to disrupt,

dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either

country in the future.”362

The strategy apparently promises a broad range of co-operation from the U.S. to its

coalition ally Pakistan in the War against Terrorism and further insisted the international

community to help Pakistan in overcoming the major political, economic, and security

challenges which it is confronted as a coalition partner in the War against Terrorism.363

Islamabad shows deep reservation over Af-Pak strategy which considers Afghanistan-

Pakistan border areas as a single zone pertaining to military operations. There are considerable

differences regarding the U.S. approach of considering Pakistan and Afghanistan on the same

level when it comes to fight terrorism. Former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari had

criticized the Obama Administration for considering two regional countries under a single

361 Hassan Zaidi, “Army Chief Wanted More Drone Support,” Dawn, May 20, 2011. 362 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the U.S. President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan & Pakistan,” Washington:

The White House, 27 March 2009, Available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 363U.S. Department of State, Afghanistan & Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Washington: Office of the

Special Representative for Afghanistan & Pakistan, January, 2010, Available from

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/

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strategy. In an interview with the Financial Times, he clearly pointed out that Afghanistan and

Pakistan are two different countries of South Asia with different political history and cannot be

associated together in a same framework for any reason.364

Pakistan is an established democracy and a country of 180 million people, it possesses one of the

best professional military that is nuclear capable and has an influential middle class with

comparatively better economy with influential print and electronic media at local, provincial, and

state level. On the other hand, Afghanistan is a war torn state with a poor democratic record, a

country where drug trafficking is common with poor law and order situation with almost no writ

of the government exists outside its capital Kabul. The one factor that is common between two

countries is terrorism which is a blatant threat to their security and survival. Pakistani

government disapproved Af-Pak strategy. If the U.S. links Pakistan and Afghanistan together

and it takes action within Pakistani territory to contain the Taliban and Al-Qaeda then this would

certainly undermine Pak-U.S. strategic relationship in this region.

The Af-Pak strategy has brought Pakistan into the limelight and it put a greater emphasis

on Pakistan’s ability to combat terrorism than in the past. It urged the need of pouring more

economic and military assistance to Pakistan from the U.S. and international community. This

lucrative aid package is directly linked to country’s performance in counterterrorism in the

region.

The Obama Administration has acknowledged the “trust deficit” and AF-Pak Strategy is

an effort to reduce the gap, which further states, “that the U.S. government must engage the

364 Lamont & Farhan, “Zardari Rejects Obama’s Af-Pak Strategy,” Financial Times, Available from http://

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/93986082-9d46-11de-9f4a-00144feabdc0.html?catid=5&SID=google.

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Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a

stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.”365

Unlike his predecessor President Bush, the Obama Administration has clearly asserted

the importance of strengthening the U.S. relations with Pakistan via economic and military

assistance, rather than to put pressure on Pakistan with its old rhetoric to “do more,”- a failed

strategy which did not produce any concrete results. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in the

interest of all regional as well as global powers and it could be only possible with the co-

operation and diplomatic support of Pakistan which needs to be strengthened in order to combat

terrorism.

However, the basic objective of the Af-Pak strategy is to offer substantial U.S. civilian

assistance to fulfill Pakistan’s requirement in building agricultural sector, to create more jobs,

education and training, and to facilitate its’ infrastructure. In addition to that, it supports for

rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas that are badly affected by militancy and military

operations.366

6.3.2 Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB)

This bill which is popularly known as “Biden-Lugar bill,” or Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan

Act 2009 was introduced in the Senate by its former Chairman Senator Joseph Biden and Senator

Richard Lugar. The Senate Committee had approved the Bill unanimously in July 2009. The Bill

acknowledged the role of Pakistan as the U.S. frontline ally in fighting terrorism and Pakistan

received $15 billion economic assistance under this Bill over the next 10 years beginning 2009.

At that time the civil government of Pakistan accepted it considering it as the best aid package

365 White House, “Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan & Pakistan.” 366 Daniel S. Markey, “AfPak to PakAf: A Response to the New US Strategy for South Asia,” Washington, DC:

Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, p. 2.

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under circumstances when it badly needed external assistance.367 There has always been a strong

rift between Pakistan’s civil and military leadership over Kerry-Lugar Bill.

The U.S. believed that this piece of legislation would allow the U.S. to attack Al-Qaeda

and their sanctuaries within Pakistani territory. Pakistan Army also showed great concern over

this Bill and showed its reaction to the civil government and U.S. officials in form of

disapproval. Pakistani Army believes this Bill would give the U.S. an extra power to interfere in

Pakistan’s internal affairs.

Under the Kerry-Lugar Bill, Pakistan has received $7.5 billion for civilian sector for the

five years and the primary purpose is to improve the country’s education, health facilities,

reforming police service, infrastructure, strengthening judiciary and democracy, and

development of other civilian sectors in order to make them progress. Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan in October 2009, announced that Pakistan would receive an

additional amount of over $243 million as civilian aid for improving its power sector, raise the

level of its higher education, and in order to meet other important socio-economic needs.368

In one way or the other, this Bill is important for Pakistan, as the U.S. has not only

recognized Pakistan as an important ally, but it also has acknowledged that Pakistani people have

given more sacrifices than any other coalition nation. The U.S. has played a critical role in

encouraging the economic financial institutions like IMF and the World Bank to facilitate

Pakistan in external payment obligations. The economic, financial and political support of the

U.S. for Pakistan is highly acknowledged in the wake of 9/11. This Bill is aimed to strengthen

the Pak-U.S. economic relations.

367 Najam Rafique, “Analyzing the Kerry-Lugar Bill,” Institute of Strategic Studies, Volume XXXI, Issue Number 1 & 2, 2011, pp. 261-262 368 Ishtiaq Ahmed, “The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges & Opportunities for Pakistan,” Asian Affairs: An

American Review, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC., 2010. p. 200

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The main purpose of the KLB is to provide and invest funds for people and programs

related to their social development. Under KLB, the U.S. is more interested to shift its focus

from military spending to public spending in Pakistan including education, health, raising living

standard and building new public institutions. 369

KLB is of great importance to Pakistan when its’ military is heavily involved in combating

terrorism. According to the Kerry-Lugar- Bermann Bill of 2009, Pakistan received $ 10 billion in

next five years on the primary condition that Pakistan will make every effort to ensure peace

along its western border with Afghanistan. This is an opportunity for Pakistan to convince the

Obama Administration that Pakistan’s economic progress is vital and is directly linked with the

prosperity and progress for the region. Moreover, economically strong Pakistan can combat

terrorism more effectively.

Pakistan-U.S. relationship faces a sharp downturn since 2011. Three major incidents in a row

of 2011, including Raymond Davis Case, Osama bin Laden’s death and Salala tragedy at the end

of year marked a clear trust deficit and lack of understanding on both sides.370 Other three

subsequent developments had deep repercussions for U.S.-Pak relations. These are briefly

discussed in the following paragraphs:

6.3.3 The Raymond Davis Case

On January 27, 2011, Raymond Davis, CIA contractor who had been working for CIA covert

operations in FATA in tracking militant groups inside Pakistan killed two men in public in

Lahore. While running away from the scene, he was arrested by the local police who then took

him into custody. After three weeks, the Obama Administration admitted the fact that Raymond

369 Susan B. Epstein and Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service,” June 7,

2011, Available from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row.pdf 370Sunawar, “Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis,” p. 58

186

was a contractor of CIA in Pakistan and described Raymond Davis as being “our diplomat.” 371In

mid-February, then Senator John Kerry paid a visit to Islamabad in an effort to reduce rising

tensions between both countries and offered compassion over the loss of life and played a central

role in the release of Raymond Davis.372 Under extreme political pressure from Washington.

Islamabad accepted his diplomatic immunity which shielded Davis from prosecution. He was

freed and flown out of the country after paying $2.3 million in diyat or blood money to the

victims’ families, under the Islamic Law373 There was public rage against the government

decision to let go a criminal who was involved in murder cases of two men. Raymond’s presence

and his covert activities within the country were also taken as a violation of the sovereignty of

Pakistan. This incident badly damaged Pakistan’s government credibility and brought

embarrassment and condemnation from masses for bowing down to the U.S. demands.

It is a fact that the issue of Raymond Davis case was allowed to grow beyond due proportions

with the help of over projection of this case by domestic and international media.

6.3.4 The Death of Osama bin Laden

The other incident that badly violated the sovereignty of Pakistan took place on 2 May, 2011

when the U.S. helicopters landed in Abbottabad to conduct operation to arrest Osama Bin Laden

from his place of hiding. On May 2, 2011, the most wanted terrorist of the world was captured

and killed by the U.S. Special Forces at his hideout in Abbottabad that was located just one-half

mile away from the Pakistan’s Military Academy. The U.S. Special Operations Forces, led by

the Navy SEALs conducted a successful 45-minute operation, and returned swiftly to their bases

371 Press Conference of President Obama, February 15, 2011. 372 The U.S. Embassy’s February 16, 2011, Available from http://Islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-html 373 “Blood Money Tradition Might Help Resolve U.S.-Pakistani Row,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2011

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in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was subsequently buried at sea. The Pakistani civilian and military

leadership was uninformed about the raid.374

The death of Osama bin Laden reinforced the U.S. doubts regarding Pakistan as a non-

credible ally in the War against Terrorism as it was not possible for Osama to manage to escape

to Pakistan without internal support. John Brennan acted as a Chief Counterterrorism Advisor in

President’s Obama Administration told reporters “it was beyond belief that bin Laden did not

have any support system” within Pakistan.375 Pak-U.S. relationship before this incident was

already in jeopardy due to trust deficit on both sides. Pakistan protested for violating its

sovereignty and territorial integrity but the fact was Pakistan’s credibility suffered a serious blow

at the international level.

Pakistan Army and its military agencies came under heavy domestic criticism for being

unable to detect the presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Ex- Pakistan Army Chief General

Ashfaq Pervez Kyani warmed the U.S. that such incursions by the U.S. would not be tolerated in

future under any circumstances. Pakistan also threatened to close NATO road supply via

Pakistan which was considered vital for the NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan.376 Osama’s

presence in Pakistan however has further intensified the mistrust between two countries; the

relationship was already strained due to Raymond Davis episode earlier in 2011.

The Pakistani government had been embarrassed, cornered, and faced criticism at

domestic and international level. Osama’s presence in Pakistan provided concrete evidence that

it is Pakistan, and not Afghanistan that remains the problem for the U.S. Osama bin Laden’s

presence in Pakistan and retaliatory terrorist attacks within the country raise many serious

concerns and questions; and this particular incident highlighted domestic fault lies in Pakistan’s

374 Pakistan, the U.S. & the End Game in Afghanistan,” Jinnah’s Institute Research Report, pp. 49-52 375 “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. 376 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 17 March 2013

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National Security Strategy. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory gave

President Karzai and his security forces the opportunity to blame their failures against the

insurgency on Pakistan’s security policies.

In the run-up to the Afghanistan transition, the Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies need to

address major challenges, for instance, homegrown militancy and border infiltration by militants

on both sides and they will have to formulate concrete strategies in this regard.377

6.3.5 Salala Border Incident

On November 26, 2011, U.S. NATO forces who were on a patrolling mission opened heavy

machine gun fire from the hill-top on Pakistani check post adjacent to Afghanistan-Pakistan

border just inside the Pakistani territory. The U.S. maintained this claim that its commanders on

the ground had no prior knowledge of two small Pakistan Army outposts who were in the area

which came under heavy attack by NATO helicopters. Pakistani officers kept on telling their

American counterparts that Pakistani soldiers were coming under attack, but 24 Pakistan Army

officers and soldiers were killed before the air assault ended. Pakistanis officials were infuriated

over this national tragedy. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza described and termed the attacks as a

“violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and a flagrant violation of International Law.”378

As a matter of fact, Pakistan responded against Salala incident with a strong reaction. The

political and military leadership were on the same page and passed unanimous Resolution from

the Parliament and condemned this incident. Pakistan asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi Air Base,

located in the province of Balochistan. Pakistan gave fifteen days’ ultimatum to vacate the

airbase after which the U.S. vacated it. This Air base was thought to be used by the U.S. and

377 “Osama Bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea,” Washington Post, May 2, 2011. 378 November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article

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NATO forces for stationing and operation of drone attacks in the Tribal areas of Pakistan.

Besides, Pakistan also boycotted the Bonn conference which was held in December 2011, which

was meant to discuss the political future of Afghanistan in protest to Salala incident.379 Bonn

conference which was attended by more than 90 countries was important pertaining to

Afghanistan’s political situation after the drawdown of the U.S. and NATO troops from the

region.380 Pakistan also suspended NATO supply route for 06 months after the resolution which

was passed unanimously from the Parliament of Pakistan as a means of protest against the

attacks carried out by NATO helicopters.

Pakistan refused to participate in the investigation launched by the Pentagon. That

investigation came to an end in late December 2011. The U.S. Military General who was leading

investigation panel announced that, “the U.S. forces primarily acted in self-defence and there

was no intentional effort to target Pakistani army within its border.” It was revealed that serious

miscommunication and poor coordination between the two militaries were a central factor which

resulted in the killings of Pakistani soldiers, but no NATO personnel were found guilty.381

Pakistan’s military refused to accept the investigation report and labeled it as unjustified

and unacceptable. Pakistani military dismissed NATO claim that NATO forces and ISAF were

unaware of the presence of Pakistani military posts in the border areas with Afghanistan.382

6.3.6 Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Zarb-e-Azb operation was launched by Pakistan Army on June 15th 2014 which continues till

date with full force in North Waziristan. Terrorists have been killed in airstrikes and their

hideouts have been destroyed by Pakistan Air Force using jet air-crafts. In ongoing military

offensive, a huge stockpile of explosives and heavy weapons have been recovered from the 379 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 22 March 2013 380 November 26, 2011, release at http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article 381 Kronstadt, “Pak-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Servive, May 24, 2012, p. 13 382 Ibid., p. 14

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militant-occupied region. Pakistan Army is fighting on both fronts against foreign and local

terrorists to weed them out from North Waziristan Agency and to ensure a free and secure

Pakistan.

According to an ISPR press briefing, terrorists’ hideouts and underground explosive

tunnels have been destroyed. Pakistan civil and military leadership decided to launch a fully

fledged operation against local and foreign terrorists in Waziristan agency. These militants have

been a source of grave concern from security perspective and have taken safe asylum in the

Tribal areas which is considered to be safe haven to execute terrorist activities within Pakistan

and across the globe.383

Jets and artillery began hitting militant targets in North Waziristan to take back full

control of the areas earlier occupied by militants. The assault was finally launched after a

dramatic attack on Karachi Airport on 08th June, 2014 which resulted in the killing of dozens of

people and finally marked the end of an undecided peace process with the Pakistani Taliban.

6.3.7 2014 U.S. Drawdown –Muddling through situation for Pakistan

For many, the U.S. led NATO-ISAF coalition forces have failed in Afghanistan to bring peace

and stability. The announcement of hasty drawdown from Afghanistan clearly reflected that the

Obama Administration is trying to get safe exit without fulfilling its commitment towards a war

torn country. American foreign policy makers consider Pakistan as a vital state- a state which can

play an important role for political reconciliation due to its ethnic and cultural links with

Afghanistan.

383 ISPR briefing on Operation “Zarb-e-Azb.” June-July 2014

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Apparently, Pakistan lies nowhere in the U.S. exit strategy. It is quite evident that Bush and

Obama Administrations both have failed in Afghanistan without achieving the desired

objectives. President Obama stated: “We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place; we

will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the

Afghan government.”384

Sectarian violence and terrorist incidents have gained impetus after the death of Akbar

Bugti in Balochistan. Quetta is known as the headquarters of the exiled Afghan Taliban

leadership. The former ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, declared “Quetta Shura”

as the greatest threat to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Whether or not the shura exists in Quetta

today, the fragile security condition of the province can be easily exploited by militant groups

and there is enough evidence to support that this is happening. Despite tackling the Taliban

threat, on one hand, Islamabad also has to deal with the Baloch separatist movement. Pakistan

believes India is the main player behind the scene and the major source of provoking insurgency

in the province of Balochistan. In addition to that, Islamabad Foreign Office has evidence against

India that it is using Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan and providing regular funding and

equipment to militants and separatist elements to continue work against the interest of

Pakistan.385

Many of the problems affecting Afghanistan and Pakistan are entangled and should be

addressed simultaneously. This includes economic cooperation, cross-border issues such as

refugees, drugs smuggling, and safe havens for militants groups operating in both countries and

thus posing a high security risk. On another level, being a neighboring country Pakistan will be

384 The New York Times, June 22, 2011 385Sunawar, “The 2014 U.S. Withdrawal: An unsettled Quagmire for Pakistan,” Regional Studies, Vol. XXXII,

No.4, Autumn 2014, p.103

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in limelight and will have a primary role after the U.S. drawdown to bring peace and stability to

Afghanistan. Pakistan and Afghanistan do not want an abrupt withdrawal of the U.S troops from

the region as they believe it will exponentially multiply Afghanistan's problems. They believe

that the rapid withdrawal may further embolden the Taliban forces which can become a source of

problem for all regional countries in the future.386 Today Islamabad needs to formulate concrete

and effective strategies to address internal extremism which spreads its tentacles all across the

country.

Failure to reach any political settlement in Kabul is therefore likely to have a spill-over

effect that would further wane Islamabad’s ability to control different extremist groups operating

inside Pakistan’s Tribal Area.387 Despite the complexity of U.S-Pak relations, and being a front

line state in the U.S. led Global War on Terrorism, a complete U.S. withdrawal would not only

give rise to a security vacuum in the region but this would not be in Islamabad’s interest as well.

In early 2012, Pakistan’s Foreign Office publicly declared a ‘strategic shift’388 in its policy

towards Afghanistan which would be based on wide-ranging reconciliation process and actively

reaching out to elements of the Northern Alliance which are believed to be anti-Pakistani.389

As a result, Pakistan’s conception of a friendly Afghan government has evolved overtime

which is vital to Pakistan’s strategic interests.390 At the moment, Pakistani security establishment

following pragmatic approach and is of the view that the Taliban may not be capable enough of

seizing power alone.391 As a result, officially Pakistan does not float the idea that the Taliban

should form the Afghan government alone. This strategic shift In Pakistan’s foreign policy 386 Asmatullah Wazir, “Withdrawal of the U.S. Troops from Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan-

Challenges and a Way Forward,” TIGAH, A Journal of Peace & Development, Volume: 2, December 2012, FATA Research Centre, Islamabad. p. 94 387 Interview with senior retired Colonel of Pakistan Army. 11 November 2013 388 Moeed Yusuf, “Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan,” SIPRI, May 2013, p.17. 389 Ibid. 390 M. Asim, Pak-U.S. Security Relationship 1947-2006, PhD Dissertation, 2010.pp. 507-509. 391 Interview with senior serving officer of Pakistan Army posted in Bajaur. 22 November 2013.

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reflects that Pakistan’s perception has changed vis a vis Taliban which is no longer a reliable

proxy.392

392 Geo TV program, “Apas Ki Baat Najam Sethi k Saath.” July 2014

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Conclusions and Recommendations

I refer back to my two hypotheses from Chapter 1- Introduction:

i. War on Terror put Pakistan‘s security under severe strain and may not be able to

sustain Pak-U.S. relationship in the long run, and

ii. Implications of War on Terror have adversely affected Pak-U.S. relations and

undermined Pakistan‘s security as well.

The discussion in previous chapters has indeed shown that both of these hypotheses are valid.

Realism has been the dominant model of International Relations which seems to provide a useful

framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face

of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. In

international system, the security of the state is the primary aim of every nation. State’s strategies

are based on their threat perceptions, and mostly aimed at balancing the threats not power.

Moreover, they do not unconditionally opt for a strategy but with a rational calculation of costs

and benefits. Pak-U.S. relationship is driven by security needs, power politics and balance of

power dynamics.

It is not necessary that the model of Complex Interdependence always reflects world’s

political reality but both Interdependence and Realist assumptions portray ideal types of behavior

for nation states to adapt according to the changing situations and circumstances. Most situations

fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realists’ assumptions carry more

weight and dominate Complex Interdependence. While at times, Complex Interdependence

presents clearer picture than the Realist assumptions. But in order to make both Complex

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Interdependence and Realist assumption work at the same time, one must decide which one is

most applicable and co-relate to the present situation.393

Security and survival of the nation state is the most vital and determining factor for the

foreign policy makers while formulating foreign policy and in the progress and growth of any

nation. Without security, there is no peace, progress and prosperity in a nation’s life. Pakistan

since inception has been facing more external threats than internal ones; these threats have come

from both hostile India in the east and unfriendly Afghanistan on its western borders. Disturbing

and continuous hostility on the eastern front, however, forced Pakistan especially the military

establishment to form Indo-centric defence and foreign policy.

In order to understand U.S.-Pakistan relationship, it is important to understand different

perceptions of two countries based on self-vested interests over the past 67 years. Thus, it is not

surprising that the history of Pak-U.S. relations is much like a roller costar ride but the most

interesting and remarkable thing is that both countries have a relationship which has survived

many ups and downs, stresses and upheavals, even during the worst times both countries have

managed to sustain a working relationship. The ups and downs are a result of different national

interests and objectives because the relationship between the two countries had been one of

convenience and not based on common conviction. Traditionally speaking, the relations between

the two countries have always been based on single issue which brought them together for

limited or uncertain periods with divergence of interests on both sides. This relationship exists

sometimes between the military or military-dominated government in Pakistan and the White

House, the Pentagon, and the CIA largely determine the course of action towards Pakistan.394

393 Art & Jervis, International Politics, New York: Harper Collins College Publisher, p. 241.

394 Hussain, The U.S-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond, p. 2.

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Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. were established and developed during the period of

Cold War. However, as time went on, this closeness lost its impetus and a variety of issues

started to dominate the relationship. Pak-U.S. relationship was primarily based for defence

purposes and Pakistan signed defence pacts with the U.S. during the 1950s. During the wars of

1965 and 1971, the U.S. did not come to support Pakistan against its traditional rival India. In the

past, during the Cold War despite the alliances such as SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan has

always been a low profile country in the U.S. calculations.

The U.S. policy towards South Asia has revolved around certain national objectives. In

order to achieve these goals and to promote its own strategic interests in South Asia, the U.S.

never followed any permanent policy throughout the Cold War era. After World War II,

containing Soviet Union’s influence in South Asia was the top most priority for the U.S. and

Pakistan served as a frontline state. Geo-strategic location of Pakistan is one of the main vital

factors influencing Pakistan’s security. The geopolitical realities and strategic compulsions in the

region brought both Pakistan and the U.S. together but divergence of perceptions and policies

over a number of bilateral and international issues kept them apart. Thus, it is not surprising that

the history of Pak-U.S. relations is much like a roller costar ride but the most interesting and

remarkable thing is that both countries have a relationship which has survived many ups and

downs, stresses and upheavals, even during the worst times, both countries have managed to

sustain a working relationship.

Pakistanis have noted that Pak-U.S. relationship can be termed as a relationship which

lacks credibility and trust; while the Americans on their part have found the relationship futile

and frustrating. An eminent American analyst of South Asian affairs has called it a “tortured

relationship for both the partners which got closer to each other keeping their entirely different

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national interests supreme.”395 Suspension of the U.S. military aid to India and Pakistan after the

Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971 was clearly demonstrated as a betrayal by Pakistani civil

and military leadership. Pakistan was the country which was heavily dependent on the U.S.

military economic aid and such like sanctions over and over again by the U.S. administrations

proved to be a great setback for Pakistan’s fragile economy. On the other hand, India was ahead

in receiving military and economic aid from other powers including Israel and the Soviet Union

other than the U.S. Taking advantage of this situation, Moscow fully supported India against

Pakistan and fueled Pushtoonistan issue on the western front thus tried to manipulate the

situation in its own favor by deliberately taking advantage of strained relationship between

Pakistan and the U.S.396

The Soviet attack on Afghanistan was a major event in the history of the Cold War which

changed the structure of the international system. During the Soviet Union occupation of

Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan acted as a frontline state in order to contain Communist

threat. Pakistan received millions of dollars to assist Mujahedin who fought against the Red

Army. Soviet Union could not gain its desired objectives in Afghanistan and had to retreat. The

U.S. policy makers and analysts were fully aware and concerned that a large and massive aid

provided for Mujahedin during the Afghan war through ISI was used in the development of

Pakistan’s nuclear capability. But at that time because of the U.S. involvement in the Afghan

War, Pakistan’s nuclear program was set aside. But, once the Afghan war ended, and the Soviet

troops pulled out from Afghanistan, the U.S. dramatically cut-down its aid for Pakistan, and

Afghanistan was dragged into a situation of civil war and political anarchy that resulted in the

395 Norman Palmer, “The U.S. & Pakistan: A Tortured Relationship,” Paper presented at the First Bilateral

Conference on Pak-U.S. Relations held at Arlington, VA., June, 1981. 396 Op.cit.

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rise, expansion and strengthening of Al-Qaeda network and other Mujahedin groups. 397 When

the Soviet threat was no more there, Pakistan also lost its frontline status along with the U.S.

interesst in the region.

The War against Terrorism is a new kind of war with a new dimension. The threat of

Communism is replaced by Terrorism. Both the U.S. and Pakistan are fighting against a common

enemy but like the Cold War period- with different objectives. In this assessment, the

achievements are far less as an ally even after a decade long war than the losses which Pakistan

has to bear. Pakistan was dragged into the War on Terrorism and now it has to face the

consequences all by itself in multiple forms which exhibit in form of: militancy, extremism,

terrorism, burden on economy with loss of foreign investment, involvement of military in the

Tribal areas, drone attacks, and Talibanization of Pakistani society, etc. Pakistan’s pro-Taliban

policy therefore, proved to be a disaster in the post-9/11 period.

The question arises: What could be the likely repercussions and challenges for Pakistan

in the long run if the War in Afghanistan is continued for an indefinite period of time? Firstly,

the so-called nascent democratic regime and continuous anarchic situation in Afghanistan means

a prolongation of the political turmoil that would result in the influx of refugees across the border

with drugs and weapons into Pakistani territory as they already did during the 1980s. This would

eventually create an additional burden on Pakistan’s economy which is already in a precarious

shape; and has also given rise to the criminalization of the Pakistani society at a massive scale. In

addition to this, it will further augment extremism, and political instability in Pakistan.

Pakistan is also keen to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to

Pakistan to supply its growing energy needs and for this reason, it wishes to see peace and

397 Clarke, Against all Enemies, New York: Free Press, 2004.

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stability in Afghanistan. However, a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is an important prerequisite

in this regard. Therefore, Islamabad further needs to look at the implications of the War against

Terrorism and its strategy to contain Al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces and their influence on

Pakistani state and society.

Though, both countries have not shown trust and full satisfaction of the other’s role in

combating terrorism. There are a number of reservations which the U.S. has shown from time to

time pertaining to Pakistan’s role as the closest ally in the region and its contribution in the War

against Terrorism. The situation in Afghanistan is unstable, highly alarming and precarious, and

it will be quite difficult to bring peace to the region as long as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are able

to find refuge in Pakistan. The Obama Administration has been facing a lot of pressure from

within the Congress to curtail economic and military assistance to Pakistan as it has failed to

come up to the U.S. expectations to stop terrorists from using its territory.’398

From the Pakistani military perspective, the real problem is India in the wake of the U.S.

drawdown from Afghanistan, which is manipulating and taking the advantage of aggravated

crisis in Pakistan. The close alliance between the U.S and India has deeply shaken Pakistani

confidence in its partnership with the U.S. The U.S. should develop a comprehensive and

friendly policy towards Pakistan by extending invitation to all major political players who are

stakeholders to come onboard and find the way out to peace process in Afghanistan.399

The U.S policy makers have failed to convince Pakistani establishment that Afghanistan

would not become an Indian client state after the U.S. led NATO forces departure from

Afghanistan. Indian consulates located at the Pak-Afghan border are seen as a threat by Pakistan

to its security and stability in the region. A serving Army officer who is posted in Quetta, on

398 Afsir Karim, War on Terror (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2008), pp. 145-147 399 Muhammad Khurshid Khan, “Analyzing Domestic Terrorism as a Threat to Pakistan’s Security & the Policy

Response,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, IX(2), p. 66. 2009.

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condition of secrecy, confirmed the fact that the Pakistan Army has numerous evidences and

witnesses that the Indian- Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents are funding and supplying

sophisticated weapons to the Pakistani Taliban forces in order to facilitate them in carrying out

insurgency operations in Balochistan and Waziristan as well.

Apart from bad governance, terrorism and worst kind of law and order situation have

badly affected security condition in Pakistan. Another estimate depicts that Pakistan has lost

almost $ 200 million worth as far as foreign investment is concerned from the other foreign

countries due to severe impact of terrorism.400

The U.S strongly believes that Pakistan’s northern Tribal areas which have been a

neglected zone in the past have become a safe asylum for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban elements.

They cross lengthy porous border, take refuge in the Tribal areas of Pakistan with a great ease

where they find sanctuary without any difficulty due to their ethnic ties with local people. To

curtail and destroy the terrorists’ outfits which are a potential threat to its security forces, the U.S

has been pressing Pakistan hard to carry out military operation in North Waziristan. The Pakistan

Army has launched a massive crackdown against local and foreign terrorist in North Waziristan

Agency. The basic objective is to eliminate and dismantle al-Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s hideouts

there.

Earlier, as a result of military operation in South Waziristan, Pakistani government faced

severe resentment from within the masses including media, civil society and various political

parties. The terrorist events have enormously increased across the country and the suicidal

attacks have gained momentum since then. The expenses of the on-going operation also put an

additional load on the fragile economy of Pakistan. A large number of military personnel have

400 Daily Times, September 28, 2004

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been deployed to the northwest border with Afghanistan and for the very first time in the history

of Pakistan, its military forces have put their boots on the ground into the semi-autonomous

Tribal belt.

Time and again, serious uneasiness has been expressed by the U.S. for Pakistan’s nuclear

program. The U.S. believes that poor security situation of the country would strengthen the

militants who can get easy access to nuclear weapons. The weak and unstable civil government

at the center is apparently failed to tackle the major security challenges and it has not come up

with any effective strategy and firm resolve to deal with the internal issues which Pakistan is

facing at the moment. The U.S is of the view that such a fragile situation may arise if

government fails to assert its supremacy. Though Islamabad has assured Washington pertaining

to the safety of its nuclear assets, but the U.S has never showed satisfaction for the explanation

given from Pakistan’s side.

Without any doubt, no coalition state in the War against Terrorism has done as much as

Pakistan has done in combating terrorism that today its own internal security is endangered. In

doing so, Pakistan itself has become a victim of aggression and terrorism. Pakistan at many times

is being accused of not doing enough by the western world in general and the U.S. in particular

and its role being a frontline state is often being questioned on many grounds. While doing so,

the sacrifices which Pakistan has rendered through military and civilian casualties, in addition to

infrastructure damage are not taken into account by the U.S. As a result, trust deficit has become

widened on both sides.

Pakistan’s role as a ‘frontline state’ is not a new phenomenon for Pak-U.S. relations for

two important reasons: as a result of its association with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan

during the 1990s and its new role in the wake of 9/11 against terrorism in the region.

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In this background, there is a need to redefine security relationship that is bringing Pakistan

closer into a conflict with the only super power in the world. If the U.S plans to withdraw from

Afghanistan then it has to set the terms that are appropriate and satisfactory to both Pakistan and

Afghanistan unlike the political vacuum which it created years back after Soviet withdrawal

from Afghanistan leaving Pakistan on its own to fix the problem. Now is the time to get out of

this militancy quagmire which has badly affected Pakistan. There is a dire need to take a clear

position against these Islamic militants which are the creation of Jihad phenomenon came to the

limelight during the 1980s and the concept of Jihad has been misinterpreted in the name of Islam

since then. Pakistan needs serious attempts to negotiate with all stakeholders in the Tribal belt in

order to bring demilitarization, reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Pakistan government

should take initiative pertaining to development, education and better governance.

Afghanistan is propagating this factor that Pakistan is exporting terrorism and instability

to Afghanistan today more than yester years. They strongly feel that Pakistan is sending terrorists

to Afghanistan and has provided sanctuaries to militants, who are fighting in Afghanistan but

they are located in Pakistan. The reality is far different from assumptions, which says both

Pakistan and Afghanistan are the victims of terrorism. Pakistan in comparison to any other

country in the region has paid heavily being the neighboring country of Afghanistan which has

badly sabotaged not only its repute all over the globe but its socio-economic fabric which in

return has given birth to extremism and violence.

Afghanistan today is known as a breeding ground for the spread of militancy, terrorism

and narcotic trafficking. The policy makers lack clear vision and effective measures to tackle the

challenges ahead. Kabul while attaining close collaboration with the international community

should be in a position to formulate an independent foreign policy keeping its national interests

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supreme. International community should not miscalculate Afghanistan’s national interests and it

is essential for Afghanistan to give assurance that its territory will not be used in any case by the

terrorists. The international community can play a vital role pertaining to create balance and

symmetry through strengthening Afghanistan. Above all, Afghanistan needs better security

apparatus to run law and order in the country after the drawdown of the U.S. led coalition forces

from Afghanistan.

The U.S. led War on Terror which the U.S. initiated in 2001 has gone on for almost

sixteen years (at the time of writing) with thousands of lives lost on both ends and today it is not

confined only to Afghanistan but has been spread to the settled areas of Pakistan. In addition, it

has a long lasting impact on Afghanistan which is already a war-torn society and has always

been under heavy influence of regional and international powers. The severe bombing campaign

which was a brutal projection of force in Afghanistan had caused a lot much collateral damage

and particularly civilian community has suffered immensely, and led to anti-American

sentiments.

Fighting Terrorism is not just an uphill task for Pakistan and the U.S. who are facing

massive repercussions and severe consequences but for the entire World community to deal with

this threat. It is clear that a new Pak-U.S. relationship in the wake of 9/11 is crucial and this has

brought a clear shift from the short-term objectives of confronting terrorist threats towards

decisive end. By eliminating extremism and terrorism, it is believed that the U.S. can be

victorious in its pursuit to defeat violence and terror which for now is like a utopian model to

achieve. If the two unequal partners in the War against Terrorism want to achieve their

objectives; mutual faith, support and collaboration must be central to Pak-U.S. relationship.

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Unreasonable demands accompanying criticism on past failures from both sides will not serve

the interests of any partner that both countries want to achieve at the end of the day; but will

instead damage the mutuality of their common understanding. The trust deficit has become

widened after three major incidents, the Raymond Davis case, Osama’s death, and Salala

incident. These three events in 2011 put Pakistan in the limelight and highlighted the fact that

nothing is going smoothly between both countries. The U.S. in particular and the international

community in general raised questions on Osama’s presence in Pakistan. Building a unanimous

agreement to deal with the threats Pakistan is facing requires an effective strategy at both civil

and military level. Terrorism today is a deadly disease which is deeply rooted in Pakistani

society but can be weeded out by a joint strategy.

Pakistani public has shown severe resentment and out-rightly rejected any possibility of

compromising state sovereignty at government level. For instance, drone attacks, presence of

foreign troops on Pakistani soil for a long period, allowing much room for foreign intelligence

agencies to work within the country with greater ease, with interference, the signing of non-

transparent agreements without determining any clear limits to what extent this co-operation

must be extended on the War on Terrorism, etc. All these highlighted concerns have caused great

uneasiness among people; as a result, masses have lost trust on the elected parliament. In the

wake of 9/11, Pakistani nation supported President Musharraf’s decision for joining the anti-

terrorism partnership for the protection of the national interests and in the face of imminent

threats which it faced from India and the U.S. led coalition forces. But it is the high time when

the conditions and limits of collaboration with the U.S should be redefined in a clear-cut way,

especially keeping in view the worsening security situation on Pak-Afghan border.

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FATA today is one of the troublesome regions in the world where the U.S. War against

Terrorism is more unpopular than before. Although it is not an easy task for any government to

deal with the situation which Pakistan is facing but Pakistan will have to make hard choices

ahead since time is running out. Undoubtedly, in the absence of law and order, peace would not

prevail which in turn gives the extremists an opportunity to assert themselves and are shifting

their bases from FATA to Balochistan to carry out terrorist agenda without any difficulty. In

addition to this, the weak provincial government, and ineffective law and order situation in

Balochistan are the crucial factors that provide separatists and extremists enough room to go with

their planning. Without having a concrete strategy, transparency and efficient institution system,

FATA and Balochistan would remain behind and not be able to catch up with the technological

development of the time and benefits from the socio-economic reforms.

It is the foremost effort and one of the priorities of the government of Pakistan to bring

the region of FATA into governance and economic mainstream. For this specific purpose, the

Pakistani government has put into operation a comprehensive ¨Frontier Strategy” plan for the

development which is a two-fold process; Firstly, it emphasizes both economic and social

development for this remote poorly developed region which has been isolated from the

mainstream development program since decades. Secondly, it strengthens the influence of

governance in the center and subsequently increasing the size of the Frontier Corps to regulate

law and order.

The Obama Administration given an affirmative response and is supporting Pakistan’s

contribution pertaining to the Security Development Plan, which is a multidimensional program

to enhance Pakistan’s capability to protect its long porous border with Afghanistan. This plan

which is a result of mutual collaboration of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and the U.S. Central

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Command (CENTCOM) further gives support for the development, preparation and supplying of

necessary equipments to the Frontier Corps and special operations units of the Pakistan Army

including Special Services Groups (SSG) in a modern and sophisticated way.401

Pakistan and the U.S have many conflicting issues and the most upsetting one is of drone strikes

in Pakistan’s Tribal region which contributes one of the major causes of anti-Americanism in this

region. The U.S. has concerns over Pakistan’s double dealing pertaining to this War against

Terrorism.

Even after the half-done pulling out of the U.S. led NATO troops from Afghanistan, this

War on Terror has no ending. Looking to the future, the Pakistani government with an

appropriate strategy, resources, and action should be able to stabilize the Tribal areas, FATA,

and Balochistan by removing their outstanding grievances. In the short run, government must set

parameters for the public to participate in the political process, by giving them incentives in the

forms of education and employment opportunities which would ultimately lead in the defeat of

Al-Qaeda and extremist Islamists from the society.

National security paradigm of any country exists in a certain context, and when the

circumstances change due to regional or international developments, the paradigm has to be

revisited according to the desirability of time. The U.S. confronted a major challenge in the post

9/11 era, with the elimination of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Obama

Administration is concerned about the political set up of Afghanistan and the role of regional

players, particularly Pakistan. The U.S. does not want a political vacuum there to allow Al-

Qaeda and any other non-state actors to gain ground and to reestablish themselves.

401 John Negroponte, “Pakistan's Fata Challenge: Securing One of the World's Most Dangerous Areas” Available

from http://merln.ndu.edu/ archivepdf

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In the dramatically changing security environment, it is of vital importance for the policy makers

of Pakistan to reduce country’s heavy dependence on the U.S. Pakistan needs to look into other

more realistic and unfailing options on fair and equal grounds; and it should move closer towards

time tested friends who withstood with Pakistan in the time of need unlike the U.S. which has

proven itself to be less consistent. For Pakistan’s politics and society, this on-going War against

Terrorism has left far-reaching effects in the long run which are not only difficult to tackle but

are quite challenging at the same time. Extremism and militancy- by products of Pakistan’

alignment with the West in the War on Terror have badly damaged the socio-economic fabric of

the country and divided the society between the two extreme ends- that is, the extremists and

moderates. With no level of tolerance, extremism has further led to militant violence in the

already fragmented Pakistani society. The rise of radicalism has further damaged the society

leaving Pakistan an isolated state with an uncertain future.

Findings

• From the start, Pak-US relationship is complicated and based on convergence and

divergence pattern. It has been at times very close in terms of enhancing military co-

operation and faces breaks in forms of sanctions.

• After 9/11 attacks, the U.S. initiated the War against Terrorism which gave it a new

dimension and Pakistan became a frontline ally.

• Today this war is not confined to Afghanistan, but entered into the Tribal and now settled

areas of Pakistan. Pakistan Army is fighting this war against non-state actors within its

territory.

• Pakistani public has not approved this war.

• Many believe militancy is a result of Pakistan’s engagement with the U.S. as a frontline

state.

208

• Pakistan-US-Afghanistan form a conflict triangle, they need each other to contain non-

state elements and to defeat terrorism in the region. They are fighting the same war but

with different objectives.

• After the U.S. drawdown, things would not be easier for Pakistan, it would face militancy

and Pak-Afghanistan relations would not be trouble free. Pak-U.S. relationship faces

challenges with this background.

• Continuity and Change- Communism is replaced by Terrorism; Republican

administrations have always formed a “special relationship” with Pakistani establishment

in times of crisis.

• The strategy of military force and power projection in Afghanistan by transatlantic

alliance is failed to yield any effective outcomes even after a decade long war.

• It is not necessary that the model of Complex Interdependence always reflects world’s

political reality but both Interdependence and Realist assumptions portray ideal types of

behavior for nation states to adapt according to the changing situation and circumstances.

209

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