US-Turkish Relations in the Obama Era
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© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY/MARCH 2013 VOL. 158 NO. 1 pp. 40–46 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2013.774638 THE RUSI JOURNAL U pon coming to power in 2009, the Obama administraon undertook a complete overhaul of US foreign policy. One of the principal outcomes of this process was a new approach to relaonships with countries in the Middle East. The previous administraon’s approach to the region, which was perceived, at least by many in the Middle East, to be built on bellicose rhetoric and an inclinaon toward unilateral acon, severely damaged the image of the US in the Muslim world, drew the country into an impasse in Iraq, and led to the deterioraon of relaons with strategic allies such as Turkey. As part of a concerted effort to move away from this immediate past, the Obama administraon has tried to revitalise its partnerships in the region, first and foremost by seeking to end combat operaons in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the key pillars of the revised American policy towards the region was Obama’s objecve of reinvigorang co-operaon with Turkey, with the relaonship between the two states having been badly damaged by the US invasion of Iraq, the emergence of suspicions among Turkish military and polical elites and the wider populaon that the US may have the covert objecve of creang an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, as well as the growing gap between US and Turkish posions on Syria and Iran, especially during the second term of the George W Bush administraon. 1 Obama’s efforts to normalise relaons with Turkey were based on several strategic calculaons. Key among these were fears that the official withdrawal of American forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 could lead, perhaps quite quickly, to the emergence of a power vacuum in the region, which could potenally be filled by the expansion of Iranian influence, while Turkey, as well as the Iraqi Kurds, had long been perceived as a bulwark against the spread of Iranian influence in Iraq. Another reason for the administraon’s focus on improving US-Turkish relaons was Obama’s wish to restore America’s image within the Muslim world, given the detrimental effects of the War on Terror iniated by President Bush, and parcularly US incursions into Iraq and Afghanistan, which many Muslims perceived as a new form of ‘crusade’. The first step toward revitalising the bilateral relaonship was Obama’s visit to Turkey in April 2009. In his speech to the Turkish Parliament, Obama emphasised the importance of strategic relaons between the US and Turkey, stressing the crical nature of the alliance and the need for the two countries to stand and work together to overcome the challenges they both faced in the region. 2 However, despite a warm response by the Turkish leadership to Obama’s visit and posive statements made by Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul on US-Turkey co-operaon in different spheres, 3 during the first two years of Obama’s tenure there was no evident improvement in bilateral relaons. Instead, Turkey connued to be acvely engaged in the Middle East along the lines of the policy of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ pursued by Ahmet Davutoglu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s top foreign-policy adviser and, from mid-2009, Turkey’s foreign minister. The main goal of this policy was a more self-confident strategy of diplomac engagement with all countries surrounding Turkey, in line with the percepon, on the part of the Jusce and Development Party’s (AKP) leadership, that Turkey had long neglected its historical es – as well as its economic and polical relaons – with its neighbours in the Middle East, North Africa and Eurasia. 4 This new approach was launched in the mid-2000s and resulted in improved Turkish relaons with its neighbours. US-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE OBAMA ERA BENIAMIN POGHOSYAN As the new-look Obama administraon sets foreign policy goals for the coming four years, many of the changes that swept through the Middle East during the US president’s first term will connue to reshape regional geopolics. It is within this context that the relaonship between the US and its NATO partner in the region, Turkey, could come to play a vital role. Beniamin Poghosyan argues that aſter a period of apparent distance, during which Turkey priorised its relaons with non-Western allies, Ankara’s recent policies show a renewed emphasis on its strategic alliance with the US in its aempt to successfully ride the waves of unrest in the Middle East.
Transcript of US-Turkish Relations in the Obama Era
©RUSIJOURNALFEBRUARY/MARCH2013VOL.158NO.1pp.40–46 DOI:10.1080/03071847.2013.774638
THE RUSI JOURNAL
Upon coming to power in 2009,the Obama administrationundertookacompleteoverhaul
ofUSforeignpolicy.Oneoftheprincipaloutcomes of this process was a newapproachtorelationshipswithcountriesin the Middle East. The previousadministration’sapproachtotheregion,whichwasperceived,atleastbymanyintheMiddleEast,tobebuiltonbellicoserhetoric and an inclination towardunilateral action, severelydamaged theimage of the US in the Muslim world,drewthecountryintoanimpasseinIraq,andledtothedeteriorationofrelationswith strategic allies such as Turkey. Aspartofaconcertedefforttomoveawayfrom this immediate past, the Obamaadministration has tried to revitaliseits partnerships in the region, first andforemost by seeking to end combatoperationsinIraqandAfghanistan.
OneofthekeypillarsoftherevisedAmerican policy towards the regionwasObama’sobjectiveofreinvigoratingco-operation with Turkey, with therelationship between the two stateshaving been badly damaged by theUS invasion of Iraq, the emergence ofsuspicions among Turkish military andpoliticalelitesandthewiderpopulationthattheUSmayhavethecovertobjectiveofcreatinganindependentKurdishstate
innorthernIraq,aswellasthegrowinggap between US and Turkish positionson Syria and Iran, especially during thesecond term of the George W Bushadministration.1
Obama’s efforts to normaliserelations with Turkey were based onseveral strategic calculations. KeyamongthesewerefearsthattheofficialwithdrawalofAmericanforcesfromIraqat theendof2011could lead,perhapsquite quickly, to the emergence of apowervacuumintheregion,whichcouldpotentiallybefilledbytheexpansionofIranianinfluence,whileTurkey,aswellastheIraqiKurds,hadlongbeenperceivedasabulwarkagainstthespreadofIranianinfluenceinIraq.Anotherreasonfortheadministration’s focus on improvingUS-Turkish relations was Obama’s wishto restore America’s image within theMuslim world, given the detrimentaleffects of the War on Terror initiatedby President Bush, and particularly USincursions into Iraq and Afghanistan,whichmanyMuslimsperceivedasanewformof‘crusade’.
ThefirststeptowardrevitalisingthebilateralrelationshipwasObama’svisittoTurkeyinApril2009.InhisspeechtotheTurkish Parliament,Obama emphasisedthe importance of strategic relationsbetween the US and Turkey, stressing
the critical nature of the alliance andtheneedforthetwocountriestostandand work together to overcome thechallengestheybothfacedintheregion.2
However,despiteawarmresponsebytheTurkishleadershiptoObama’svisitandpositivestatementsmadebyTurkey’sPresident Abdullah Gul on US-Turkeyco-operationindifferentspheres,3duringthe first two years of Obama’s tenurethere was no evident improvement inbilateralrelations.
Instead, Turkey continued to beactively engaged in the Middle Eastalong the lines of the policy of ‘zeroproblems with neighbours’ pursuedby Ahmet Davutoglu, Recep TayyipErdogan’s top foreign-policy adviserand, from mid-2009, Turkey’s foreignminister. The main goal of this policywas a more self-confident strategyof diplomatic engagement with allcountries surrounding Turkey, in linewith the perception, on the part ofthe Justice and Development Party’s(AKP) leadership, that Turkey had longneglected its historical ties – aswell asitseconomicandpoliticalrelations–withitsneighboursintheMiddleEast,NorthAfrica and Eurasia.4 This new approachwas launched in the mid-2000s andresulted in improved Turkish relationswithitsneighbours.
US-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ObAmA ERAbENIAmIN POgHOSyAN
As the new-look Obama administration sets foreign policy goals for the coming four years, many of the changes that swept through the Middle East during the US president’s first term will continue to reshape regional geopolitics. It is within this context that the relationship between the US and its NATO partner in the region, Turkey, could come to play a vital role. Beniamin Poghosyan argues that after a period of apparent distance, during which Turkey prioritised its relations with non-Western allies, Ankara’s recent policies show a renewed emphasis on its strategic alliance with the US in its attempt to successfully ride the waves of unrest in the Middle East.
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In particular, one of the mainpillars of the ‘zero problems’ policywas the improvement of relationswithneighbouring countries – among themIran and Syria – with whom relationshadpreviouslybeenstrained.Syriahadpreviously actively backed the Kurdishmovement inside Turkey and hadprovided Abdullah Ocalan, head of theKurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),5 withshelter until 1998. At the same time,relationshadalsobeenstrainedovertheapportionment of water reserves fromthe Euphrates and Tigris rivers. As forIran,theTurkishsecularistestablishmentperceived Iran’s Islamic leaders’ callsfor Islamicrevolution in theregionasathreattoTurkishnationalsecurity.
Regionally, Syria has been a keycomponentoftheTurkishgovernment’s‘zero problems’ policy. As a countrythatalmostwent towarwithTurkey in1998,6 Syria has become the test casefor Davutoglu’s aspiration to engageall regional actors, including formeradversaries, through trade, investment,and political and cultural exchanges.7As for Iran, improved Iranian-TurkishrelationshavebeenperceivedinAnkaraasnecessaryinordertobolsterTurkey’s
influenceintheregion,especiallyamongShia Muslims. The Turkish-Iranianrapprochement was launched in July2004withthesigningofanagreementonco-operationinthesecuritysphereduringavisitbyErdogantoTehran.Inaddition,the two states established a high-levelbilateral strategic co-operation counciland, in 2009, signed an agreementeliminating visa requirements for visitslastingnolongerthanninetydays.
Meanwhile,themaindisagreementbetweentheUSandTurkeyduring2009–10 was on the issue of Iranian nuclearpolicy. In his holiday video greeting toIran, released inMarch2009,PresidentObamadeclaredtheUnitedStates’desiretopursueengagementwithIranthatwashonestandgroundedinmutualrespect.8However, after the Iranian authoritiesrejected the offer made by the P5+1in October 2009, which suggestedtaking Iranian 3.5 per cent enricheduranium, enriching it up to 19.75 percentinRussia,andfabricatingitintofuelassembliesinFrancewhichcouldbeusedintheoperationoftheTehranResearchReactor,9thenewadministrationstartedto actively push, in the UN SecurityCouncil, for increased sanctions against
Iran.Turkeyexplicitlyrefusedtosupportthis approach, instead engaging withBrazil in separate negotiations withIran, and, in the most acute exampleof US-Turkish disagreements over Iran,votingagainsttheproposedUNsanctionsregimeintheUNSecurityCouncilinJune2010.10
The only area in which US-Turkishrelations improved during 2009–10was the Kurdish issue, with TurkeyestablishingcloseeconomicandpoliticalrelationswiththeIraqiKurds,whowerealsothekeyUSallyinpost-SaddamIraq.Toachievethisoutcome,theUSactively,andsuccessfully,workedtoconvincetheTurkishgovernment toengagewith theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG)11as the only way to curb the growingIranianinfluenceinIraqaswellastohelpfindasolutiontotheKurdishissuewithinTurkey. At the same time as cultivatingbetterrelationswiththeKRG,theTurkishgovernment also announced the new‘Kurdish initiative’ aimed at grantingmorerightstoitsownKurdishminority,12which has long struggled to defend itsrightssuchasKurdish-languageeducationandTVandradiobroadcasting.Withpartofthispopulationhavingbeeninvolvedin
MembersofleftistTurkishgroupsholdanationalflagastheyprotestagainstthevisitofUSSecretaryofStateHillaryClinton,Ankara,Turkey,August2012.Courtesy of AP Photo.
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thearmedstruggleagainstTurkeysince1984,Turkeyhoped,throughengagementwiththeKRG,toweakentheinfluenceofradical domestic Kurdish elements andsimultaneouslytogaineconomicleverageovertheKRGleadership.
Revitalising the Strategic Partnership Sincemid-2011,newtrendsinUS-Turkishrelationshaveemerged,triggeringmuchcloserstrategicco-operationbetweenthetwostatesatboththeinternationalandregional levels.Thishasbeentheresultofthenewgeopoliticaljunctureatwhichthe regionfinds itself,whichhas led torecalculationsbytheTurkishgovernmentastoitsstrategicpositionintheregion,aswellastothedynamicsofUS-Turkishrelations.
Bidding for Regional LeadershipAs previously described, the ‘zeroproblems with neighbours’ policy hasfacilitated Turkish engagement in theMiddle East, strengthened relationswithIran,IraqandSyria,and,alongsidestrongeconomicgrowth,hascontributedtoTurkey’smoreself-confidentregionalpolicy, based on a model combiningmoderateIslamwithWestern-styleliberaldemocracy. Turkey’s earlier criticism ofIsrael over its 2008 military incursioninto theGaza Strip,meanwhile, aswellasitsvocalsupportforPalestinianrightsininternationalfora,haselevatedTurkishinfluenceamongArabsonthestreets.13
Atthesametime,Turkeyhasopenlyexpressed its readiness to assume theresponsibilities of not just a regionalbut also a global actor, as well as itsintentiontoshapeitsforeignpolicywithavalue-basedapproachtointernationalproblems, to act autonomously indevising its priorities, and to adopta vision-oriented approach to crisismanagement.14
Yet suchaspirations for,ultimately,a leadership role in the Middle Easthave inevitably placed strains onrelations with Turkey’s neighbours,most notably Iran, a country also vyingfor regional influence. The early stagesof this covert competition with otherregionalplayersalsocoincidedwiththeArab upheavals, which brought abouttectonic shifts in the balance of power
in theMiddleEast, and indeedactuallyrevealed the limitsofTurkishauthority.However, it simultaneously creatednew opportunities for the country inpromptingTurkeytoreassessthefutureofitsrelationshipwiththeUS.
Promoting the Turkish ModelOneofthemostimportantfactorsbehindthe Turkishmove to revitalise relationswiththeUSwasthecountry’sdesiretopromoteitsownsocio-politicalmodelintheregioninthewakeoftheupheavalsof 2011, an ambition viewed by theTurkish leadershipasacoreelementoftheprojectionofTurkishsoftpower.
Since late2002,whentheAKP–apartywithIslamistroots–cametopower,Turkeyhaspossessedauniqueabilitytocombine moderate Islamic views withWestern-styledemocracy.Indeed,duringitsfirstyears inpower,Turkey’scurrentruling party took greater steps towardsEU-inspired political and economicreform than had been taken by theseculargovernmentsofthe1990s,thuspavingthewayforofficialEUaccessionnegotiations in 2005. The amendmentsto the Turkish constitution approved ina referendum in September 2010 alsobrought Turkey more closely into linewithWesternstandardsofgovernance.15
If the AKP’s approach could beemulated by some of its neighbours,thiscouldgoalongwaytoresolvingthecentral problem of contemporary Arabpolitics,whereby thereappears tobeachoiceonlybetweentheauthoritarianismofprevailingregimesandtheperceivedtheocracy of Islamist groups. Both intheMiddleEastand in theWest,muchdiscussion has been generated by theTurkishmodel,whichemphasisesamoretolerantconnectionwithIslam,wherebyreligiously motivated individuals seekto Islamise their environments throughgrassroots activism and solidarity,social networks, and education,entrepreneurship and the media, withsuch bottom-up processes taking placewithin the democratic framework. ThesecondpillaroftheTurkishmodelliesintheTurkishIslamists’specialconnectionwiththeeconomy.TurkishIslamistshavea market-oriented approach, wherebyeconomic successes and gains, ratherthan pure ideology, are seen as the
main driving forces. This suggests thatdemocracy can function in a Muslimcountry and that conservativeMuslimscanalsobedemocrats.16
Thepossibilityofusing theTurkishmodel has also been actively discussedby key figures involved in the Arabrevolutions. Upon the resignation ofHosni Mubarak, one of the leaders ofEgypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, AbouAl-Fotouh, declared his support for theformationofanewpartyalongthelinesof Turkey’s AKP.17 In the wake of theTunisian revolution, meanwhile, RashidAl-Ghannushi, the intellectual leaderof Tunisia’s Ennahdaparty,which camefirst in the parliamentary elections ofOctober2011,stressedtheimportance,to both Tunisia and other Arab states,of the Turkish model.18 In a furtherexample,theprominentIslamicscholar,anddescendantofthefounderofEgypt’sMuslim Brotherhood, Tariq Ramadanstated in February 2011 that Turkey’sexample should be an inspiration forthose observing the Arab upheavals,19remarking in March that, althoughotherMiddleEasternandNorthAfricancountriesmay not be able to copy theTurkishmodel,Turkey’ssuccessoverthelast decade is nonetheless important,indicatingasitdoesthepossibilityofthecoexistenceofIslamwithdemocracy.20
ThepromotionoftheTurkishmodelintheMiddleEastisthereforeoneofthekeystrategicareasinwhichTurkishandAmerican interests meet, a fact whichhas prompted Turkey to reconsider itsstrategic partnershipwith theUS.Withthe collapse of autocratic but secularregimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya andYemen and the emergence of powervacuums in each of these countries,oneofthekeyUSinterestsintheregionremainsthatofcombatingradicalisation,the riskofwhichhasgrowndue to theoverall instability in the region.21 HereTurkeymayplayapivotalrole,withthecountry’ssuccessincombiningIslamwithdemocracy potentially boding well forUSeffortstothwarttherisinginfluenceof radical Islamists in countries such asEgyptandTunisia.22
FromtheperspectiveoftheTurkishgovernment, US support in promotingthe Turkish model as one worthy ofemulation will be vital in helping the
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countrytocultivateapositionofregionalleadership, gaining an advantage notonlyoverIranbutalsooverSaudiArabia.Alongside this, however, Ankara willneed to find a balance between actingonbehalfof theUSandmaintaining itsreputation for independent decision-making.
Implications of the Syrian Crisis for US-Turkish RelationsYet,aspreviouslymentioned,theactuallimitsofTurkishinfluenceanditsabilityto project power in the region as anindependent actor have been provenwithinthecontextoftheArabupheavals,andmorespecificallyoftheSyriancrisis.Atthebeginningoftheanti-governmentprotests,Turkeyattemptedtousewhatit perceived to be its close relationshipwith the Syrian leadership to convincePresidentBasharAl-Assadtoimplementthe necessary reforms to prevent thesituationfromdeteriorating.23However,with Assad’s intransigence, Ankarawas forced to accept the reality of itsconstrained influence on the groundveryquicklyand,sincetheendof2011,hasbeenactivelyinvolvedinanti-Assadactivities, criticising Assad’s behaviour,urging the president to step down,24andultimately severed itstieswith theregimeinfavourofamoreaggressiveandhostilestance,hostingseveralmeetingsoftheSyrianopposition,mostnotablyinSeptember2012inIstanbul.25
This recent position on events inSyria reflects the myriad elements ofTurkey’sbroaderforeignpolicy,includingits bid for regional leadership and itsdesire to counter the spread of Iranianinfluence in the region by breaking the‘Shiaarc’extendingfromIran,viaIraq,toSyria,LebanonandtheGazaStrip.
At the same time, the deepeningSyriancrisisandgrowingunderstandingonthepartoftheTurkishleadershipofitsinabilitytoconvinceAssadtostepdownhasservedasanotherfactorunderlyingthe recalibration of Turkey’s positiontoward the US, with the clear posturetakenby theObamaadministration (itscalls for Assad to step down) and theresultingconvergenceofUSandTurkishpositions on Syria, constituting a keypillarofbilateral strategicco-operation.Turkeyisalsoconcernedbytheconstant
flowofSyrianrefugeesaswellasbythepossible spillover of the crisis onto itsterritory.Theseconcernswerereinforcedin October 2012 by the shelling, fromSyria, of Akcakale – a Turkish townneartotheSyrianborder–causingfivecivilian deaths.26 In retaliation, TurkeyissuedagravewarningagainstSyriaandfired on Syrian army positions, whilethe Turkish Parliament granted thegovernment authorisation to conductcross-border military operations.27ConcurrentconsultationswithNATOalsoledtoaNorthAtlanticCouncilstatementcondemningtheshelling.28
The close co-operation betweenthe US and Turkey on Syria waselevated to a new level after Secretaryof StateHillary Clinton’s visit toAnkarain August 2012. This resulted in thedecisionbythetwocountriestostepupco-operation at the operational level,to enhance co-ordination betweentheir respective intelligence servicesand armed forces, and to start workon contingency planning.29 The Syrianissuewasalsodiscussedduringthevisitof the US chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff,General Dempsey, to Turkey inSeptember 2012,30 with the US-Turkeypartnership on Syria emphasised onceagaininastatementbySecretaryClintonon26October–Turkey’snationalday.31
The Kurdish IssueDespiteitsbroadsupportfortheSyrianopposition, Turkey is concerned bythe possibility of Kurdish autonomy innorthernSyria,andbytheSyrianKurds’desiretoemulatetheexperienceoftheKRGinIraq,whichmayresultinincreaseddemands for the establishment of afurtherautonomousKurdishareawithinTurkishterritory.Potentialdevelopmentsin this area are another key driver ofTurkey’srenewedco-operationwiththeUSintheregion.AlthoughTurkeyhasfewleversavailabletoinfluencethesituationwithin Syria’s Kurdish territories, one itdoeshaveisMassoudBarzani,presidentof northern Iraq’s KRG, who is activelyinvolvedinSyrianKurdishaffairs.Barzanirecently brokered a power-sharingagreement within the Kurdish areas ofSyria, between the Kurdish NationalCouncil (KNC) – a grouping comprisingaround sixteen small Syrian Kurdish
parties – and the Democratic UnityParty, the best-organised, best-armedandsingle-largestKurdishpartyinSyria,andasupporter,ifnotanactualbranch,ofthePKK.32ThisagreementhasboostedBarzani’s status as a power-broker andregional leader. However, the deal hasalsoraisedseriousconcernsinTurkeyinrelationtothegrowing influenceofthePKK-relatedSyrianKurdishgroupovertheSyrianKurdishpopulation.
The KRG has also developed closerelations with the US, which, perhapsalongsideIsrael,isamongtheKurds’fewallies in their struggle against the Shia-dominatedIraqicentralgovernmentoverthedistributionofoil revenuesandthefateoftheoil-richtownofKirkuk.Thus,revitalisedUS-Turkishrelationsmaywellhelp Turkey’s efforts to gain additionalleverage over the KRG, and potentiallyprovideitwithnewtoolstoinfluencethesituationintheKurdishregionsofSyria.
Thepossibilityofthecreationofanautonomous Kurdish territory in Syria,within which PKK-related forces couldyieldsomeinfluence,couldhaveseriousramificationsfortheKurdishissuewithinTurkey. The Syrian government hasretained some influence over the PKKsince itwas forced to expel PKK leaderOcalan from Damascus in 1998 amidTurkish threats to launch a militaryintervention, and growing PKK activityin Turkey in recent months, includingepisodes such as the kidnapping ofa Turkish MP,33 has been perceivedby many in Ankara as retaliation bythe Syrian government for Turkey’sstaunch anti-Assad position.34 As such,growingtensionsalongtheSyria-Turkeybordermay further destabilise Kurdish-populatedareasofTurkey.
Growing Competition with IranThe Arab political upheavals, andespeciallytheongoingSyriancrisis,haveled to disagreements with Iran. TehranperceivesAssadtobeitskeyally,andaconduit for projecting its influence intoLebanonand theGazaStrip through itsproxies Hizbullah and Hamas. As such,Turkey’sincreasingsupportfortheSyrianopposition,aswellasitscriticismoftheSyrian authorities, has raised seriousconcerns in Tehran,with the possibilityofthefallofAssadposingamajorthreat
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toIran’sstrategicinterestsandpotentiallyleaving Tehran even more isolated.In August 2012, Iranian Chief of StaffMajorGeneralSeyedHassanFirouzabadiwarned Turkey that it could becomethe next target of terrorist groupsshould it continueto ‘helpadvance thewarmongering policies of the UnitedStatesinSyria’.35
Turkey’sagreement,lastSeptember,to host NATO’s early-warning missileradar system on its soil has strainedrelations with Iran even further, withTehran claiming that the main goal ofthesystemistoprotectIsraelandtargetIranian missiles, and that the systemposes a real threat to Iranian nationalsecurity. Iran is also unhappy aboutTurkey’s efforts to project its influencein the region by popularising itsmodelof governance.36 Covert Turkish-Iraniancompetition is thus another factorpushingAnkaratorethinkitsrelationshipwiththeUS,withTurkeyneedingsupportinordertogainadvantageoveritsrival,andwiththeUSbeingwell-positionedtocontribute. Meanwhile, however, bothTurkeyandIranaretryingtopreventanyfurther deterioration in their relationsand, at least in the short term, areseeking to avoid direct confrontation.Iran,forexample,undersevereWesterneconomic sanctions, needs to cultivateco-operativerelationswithitsimmediateneighbours,withbothAnkaraandTehranthereforeseekingtoavoiddisagreementswhere possible.37 In themedium term,however, the growing conflict in theMiddle East between Sunni and Shiacamps will likely bring about a furtherdeteriorationofTurkish-Iranianrelations,withIranactingastheleaderoftheShiacampandTurkeyvyingforleadershipoftheSunnicamp.
Russian-Turkish Relations Overthelastdecade,meanwhile,TurkishrelationswithRussiahaveimproved,withthetwostatesmakingsignificantprogressintheireconomicrelationsinparticular.In 2008, Russia displaced Germany asTurkey’s largest tradingpartnerwithanannual trade volume totalling US$38billion,38andwithoneofthemainareasofco-operationbeingtheenergysector,inwhichRussiaisthelargestnaturalgassupplier toTurkey. InMay2010,during
President Medvedev’s visit to Turkey,thetwocountriesreachedanagreementto build the first nuclear power plantin Turkey, with an estimated value of$20billion.39 InDecember2011,Turkeyofficially granted Russia permission toconstructandoperatetheSouthStreamgas pipeline, transporting Russian gasthroughtheBlackSeatoBulgariaandontoEuropeviaTurkey’sExclusiveEconomicZone.40
The early stages of this Russian-Turkish rapprochement coincided withthedeteriorationofUS-Turkishrelations,perhaps indicating Ankara’s shiftingforeign-policy priorities.41 However,since 2011, disagreements betweenTurkey and Russia have emerged inseveral strategic areas. The differencein the two countries’ positions onthe Syrian crisis, for instance, has thepotential to seriously damage bilateralrelations,asshownon10October2012whenaSyrianA320airliner,enroutetoDamascus fromMoscow,was forced tolandinAnkarabyTurkishfighterjetsandonly allowed to continue its flight afterinspections. Despite Russian ForeignMinistry statements to the contrary,Turkish authorities claimed that cargoaboardtheaircraftobviouslyhadmilitaryapplication.42TheTurkishdecisiontohostthe NATO anti-missile defence systemis another thorny issue in Ankara’srelationship with Moscow. Therefore,while Turkey will likely continue tocultivate close economic relations withRussia, disagreements in other areasmeanthat this isunlikelytounderminetheongoingreinvigorationofUS-Turkishrelationsas abasis for securingTurkishstrategicgoalsintheregion.
Co-operation on Ballistic-Missile DefenceAnother factor in support ofre-establishing US-Turkish strategicrelationsisTurkey’squesttoenhanceitssecurity in the face of regionalmilitarythreats, especially ballistic-missileattacks. Turkey’s efforts to equip itselfwithacapablemissileshield, tonegateitslackofcapabilitiesinthisregard,havemoved in parallel with NATO efforts todeploy an Alliance-wide system. Afteryear-long negotiations over the termsof stationing a NATO anti-missile radar
system on Turkish soil – with Turkeywanting assurances that its militarypersonnel would be stationedwith theAmericantroopsoperatingtheradarandthat intelligence from the radar wouldnotbesharedwithnon-NATOmembers– Turkey agreed to host the US-maderadarforNATOand,inSeptember2011,signed an agreement on NATO radardeployment.43
Turkey has also been seekingreassurance from NATO that the newNATO Active Layered Ballistic MissileDefense(ALTBMD)system,agreeduponattheNATOLisbonsummitin2010,andof which the radar deployed in Turkeyforms a part, will address immediatethreats to Turkish territory – yet so fartonoavail.44Despite this, thecountry’sagreement to host the radar has beenperceivedbytheUSasastrategicchoiceonthepartofTurkeyinordertoanchoritself in a US-led, Western militaryalliance,tosomedegreedownplayingUSandotherNATOmemberstates’concernsthat Turkey is turning its back on theWest.TheimportanceofNATOtoTurkeywasalsounderscoredbyTurkishForeignMinisterAhmetDavutoglu,whorecentlystressedthesimilaritiesbetweenNATO’sandTurkey’sapproachestothechangingsecuritylandscapeinthepost-ColdWarera. According to Davutoglu, therefore,Turkeywillcontinuetobeanassetfor–and an influential actorwithin –NATO,should the Alliance need to becomeinvolvedagainintheMiddleEastinthefuture.45
ConclusionsThe US-Turkish relationship underwenta profound transformation during thefirst four years of Obama’s presidency.Furthermore, the revitalisation ofstrategicco-operationbetweenthetwocountries has been subject to furtheremphasis since mid-2011, driven bythe convergence of US and Turkishstrategic interests in the Middle East.Turkey is currently seeking to attainregional leadership by increasing itsinfluence throughout the Middle East,viewing its governance model, whichsuccessfully combines democracy andmoderate Islam, as the primary vehicleforspreadingitsinfluenceinthemedium-to-long term through the soft-power
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paradigm.Meanwhile,developments inLibya and Syria have revealed the realconstraints on Turkish foreign policy,highlighting the importance of havinga powerful ally to support its bid forregionalsupremacy.
The US, at the same time, hasreachedacriticaljunctureinrecalculatingitsstrategiccommitmentsandresourcesandisnowmakingdifficultchoicesaboutreducingitsinvolvementinsomeregionsto concentrate its efforts on the Asia-Pacific.TheUSthereforeneedsstrategicallies which are prepared to share itsburdensandpromoteAmericaninterestsintheregionswhereUSinvolvementistobereduced.This isespecially importantin the Middle East, where the Arab
upheavalshavecreatedapowervacuumwhich could potentially be filled byradical Islamist movements sponsoredby either Iran or Saudi Arabia. In thissituation, the possibility of the TurkishgovernancemodelbeingemulatedmayserveUSinterestswell instemmingthegrowing influence of radical IslamismandthwartingIranianeffortstoachieveregionalhegemony.
Meanwhile,itshouldbeemphasisedthatTurkeyisnowmuchmoreconfidentthanitwasinthe1990s,andareturntoasituationinwhichTurkeyisperceivedasaUSclientintheregionishighlyunlikely.Turkey will co-operate with the UnitedStates as much as it suits its nationalintereststodoso,andwill,atthesame
time, be prepared to say ‘no’ to someAmerican suggestions. Nevertheless,the current convergence of strategicinterests looks set to continue tofoster revitalised US-Turkish strategicco-operation in the region in the shortandmediumterm.
Beniamin Poghosyan is the deputy director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defense, Armenia. Before joining the institute in 2009, he was foreign policy adviser to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia. He completed a PhD in History in 2004.
Notes
1 IanOLesser,‘Turkey,theUnitedStatesandtheDelusionofGeopolitics’,Survival(Vol.48,No.3,Autumn2006),pp.83–96.
2 ThefulltextoftheUSpresident’sspeechtotheTurkishParliamentisavailableat<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11376661.asp>,accessed4February2013.
3 TheWhiteHouse,‘JointPressAvailabilitywithPresidentObamaandPresidentGulofTurkey’,pressrelease,6April2009,<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Press-Availability-With-President-Obama-And-President-Gul-Of-Turkey/>,accessed4February2013.
4 OmerTaspinar,‘Turkey’sStrategicVisionandSyria’,Washington Quarterly(Vol.35,No.3,Summer2012),p.128.
5 EstablishedinTurkeyin1978,thePKKembracedarmedstruggleagainstTurkeyin1984,demandingthecreationofanautonomousKurdishregioninthemostlyKurdish-populatedareasofTurkey.
6 BulentArasandHasanKoni,‘Turkish-SyrianRelationsRevisited’,Arab Studies Quarterly(Vol.24,No.4,Fall2002),pp.54–55.
7 GonulTol,‘The“TurkishModel”intheMiddleEast’,Current History (Vol.111,No.749,December2012).
8 ThomasErdbrinkandGlennKessler,‘Obama’sToneinIranMessageDiffersSharplyFromBush’s’,Washington Post,21March2009.
9 USDepartmentofState,‘BackgroundBriefingonP5+1TalksinGeneva’,1October2009,<http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2009/130181.htm>,accessed4February2013.
10 UNSecurityCouncil,‘SecurityCouncilImposesAdditionalSanctionsonIran,Voting12inFavorto2Against,with1Abstention’,pressrelease,<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm>,accessed15February2013.
11 TheKurdistanRegionalGovernmentgovernsanautonomousKurdishregioninnorthernIraq,borderingTurkey.
12 Hurriyet Daily News,‘InteriorMinisterAtalayOutlinesDemocraticInitiative’,13November2009.
13 HenriJBarkey,‘TheEvolutionofTurkishForeignPolicyintheMiddleEast’,TESEVForeignPolicyProgramme,July2012,<http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/e9461835-7524-4d67-85cd-9f72a425f684/Henri%20Barkey_final.pdf>,accessed4February2013.
14 AhmetDavutoglu,‘PrinciplesofTurkishForeignPolicyandRegionalPoliticalStructuring’,VisionPapersNo.3,CentreforStrategicResearch,MinistryofForeignAffairs,April2012.
15 Reuters,‘Factbox:Turkey’sConstitutionalAmendments’,12September2012;MadeleineKAlbright,StephenJHadleyandStevenACook,‘U.S.-TurkeyRelations:ANewPartnership’,IndependentTaskForceReportNo.69,CouncilonForeignRelations,2012,pp.14–19.
16 AlperYDede,‘TheArabUprisings:Debatingthe“TurkishModel”’,Insight Turkey(Vol.13,No.2,2011),pp.23–32.
17 DavidIgnatius,‘CantheMuslimBrotherhoodReallyTakeOverinCairo?’,Daily Star,19February2011,<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/Feb/19/Can-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-really-take-over-in-Cairo.ashx#axzz2HQ3pAIMz>,accessed9January2013.
18 World Bulletin,‘Ghannushi:PublicMadeRevolution,OurModelisTurkey’,25January2011,<http://www.worldbulletin.net/index.php?aType=haber&ArticleID=68984>,accessed27October2012.
19 TariqRamadan,‘DemocraticTurkeyistheTemplateforEgypt’sMuslimBrotherhood’,Huffington Post,2August2011.
20 Hurriyet Daily News,‘TurkeyisaModelOnlyforTurkey,AcademicTellsIstanbulSummit’,15March2011.
©RUSIJOURNALFEBRUARY/MARCH2013
US-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE ObAmA ERA
carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/19/turkey-and-russia-evolving-relationship>,accessed4February2013.
39 Ibid.
40 Gazprom,‘TurkeyGrantsPermitforSouthStreamConstruction’,28December2011,<http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2011/december/article126759/>,accessed4February2013.
41 FionaHillandOmerTaspinar,‘TurkeyandRussia:AxisoftheExcluded?’,Survival (Vol.48,No.1,Spring2006),pp.81–92.
42 Turkey’sPrimeMinisterRecepTayyipErdoganhasmadenewclaimsthatthecargoconfiscatedfromaboardaSyrianairlinerinAnkaraairportinOctober2012wasmeantformilitaryapplication.SeeVoice of Russia,‘TurkishPMMakesNewClaimsSyrianJetCarriedMilitaryCargo’,16October2012,<http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_16/Turkish-PM-makes-new-claims-Syrian-jet-carried-military-cargo/>,accessed4February2013.
43 SeeAaronStein,‘TurkeyMarchestowardMissileDefense’,Nati onal Interest, 23August2012,<http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkey-marches-toward-missile-defense-7387?page=show>,accessed4February2013;Today’s Zaman,‘Turkey,USSignAgreementonNATORadarDeployment’,14September2011,<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-256744-turkey-us-sign-agreement-on-nato-radar-deployment.html>,accessed4February2013.
44 SeeThomShanker,‘U.S.HailsDealWithTurkeyonMissileShield’,New York Times,15September2011;NilsuGoren,‘Turkey’sPlansforMissileDefenceareShapingUp’,Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East, <http://www.middleeast-armscontrol.com/2012/08/08/turkeys-plans-for-missile-defense-are-shaping-up/>,accessed4February2013.
45 AhmetDavutoglu,‘TransformationofNATOandTurkey’sPosition’,Percepti ons(Vol.17,No.1,Spring2012),pp.16–17,<http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/AhmetDavutoglu2.pdf>,accessed4February2013.
21 USDepartmentofState,‘RemarksbyJeffreyDFeltman,AssistantSecretary,BureauofNearEasternAffairs’,HouseForeignAffairsCommittee,SubcommitteeontheMiddleEastandSouthAsia,9May2012,<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/05/201205105459.html#axzz23boHBKX1>,accessed23January2013.
22 MatthewLee,‘ClintonEyesTurkeyasModelforArabReform’,Guardian,16July2011.
23 Now.mmedia.me,‘ErdoganCallsAssadtoPressforReform,SourceSays’,27May2011,<http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=275450>,accessed21September2012.
24 Haaretz,‘Turkey’sErdoganUrgesAssadto“FinallyStepDown”forSakeofMideastPeace’,22November2011,<http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/turkey-s-erdogan-urges-assad-to-finally-step-down-for-sake-of-mideast-peace-1.397058>,accessed5February2013.
25 SerkanSaglam,‘SyrianNationalCouncilPlansforPostAssadEra’,Today’s Zaman,20September2012,<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-292965-syrian-national-council-plans-for-post-assad-era.html>,accessed5February2013.
26 JurgenGottschlich,‘PlayingwithFire:TurkeyEdgesTowardWarwithSyria’,Der Spiegel,4October2012.
27 RT.com,‘TurkishParliamentAuthorizesCross-BorderMilitaryOperationsinSyria’,4October2012,<http://rt.com/news/turkish-parliament-military-syria-651/>,accessed28October2012.
28 NATO,‘NorthAtlanticCouncilStatementonDevelopmentsontheTurkish-SyrianBorder’,3October2012,<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_90447.htm>,accessed28October2012.
29 USDepartmentofState,‘HillaryRodhamClinton,RemarkswithForeignMinisterDavutogluAfterTheirMeeting’,Istanbul,Turkey,11August2012,<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/08/196358.htm>,accessed21January2013.
30 JimGaramone,‘U.S.,TurkishLeadersDiscussSyrianWar,Region’,AmericanForcesPressService,18September2012,<http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=1005>,accessed21January2013.
31 USSecretaryofState,‘OntheOccasionoftheRepublicofTurkey’sNationalDay’,pressstatement,26October2012,<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199840.htm>,accessed23January2013.
32 AlizaMarcus,‘KurdsintheNewMiddleEast’,Nati onal Interest,22August2012,<http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/kurds-the-new-middle-east-7377>,accessed23January2013.
33 BBC News,‘KurdishMPinTurkeyAbducted“byPKK”’,12August2012.
34 Today’s Zaman,‘AKPartySaysHasNoDoubtAssadUsingPKKAgainstTurkey’,29August2012,<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-290797-ak-party-says-has-no-doubt-assad-using-pkk-against-turkey.html>,accessed4February2013.
35 Today’s Zaman,‘IranSaysitWillBe“Turkey’sTurn”ifitGoesAheadWithSyriaPolicies’,7August2012,<http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=288818>,accessed4February2013.
36 StephenLarrabee,‘TheTurkish-IranianAllianceThatWasn’t:HowtheTwoCountriesAreCompetingAftertheArabSpring’,Foreign Aff airs, 11July2012,<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137773/f-stephen-larrabee/the-turkish-iranian-alliance-that-wasnt?>,accessed4February2013.
37 Daily News,‘TurkishPM,AhmadinejadDiscussSyrianCrisis’,17October2012,<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-ahmadinejad-discuss-syrian-crisis.aspx?pageID=238&nID=32590&NewsCatID=359>,accessed4February2013.
38 SergeyMarkedonovandNatalyaUlchenko,‘TurkeyandRussia:AnEvolvingRelationship’,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,19August2011,<http://
Members’ Events 2013
Angus Robertson MP, Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC MP and Rt Hon SirMenzies Campbell MP will debate the security implications of Scottish independence.
Members’ Discussion Panel – The Security Implications of Scottish Independence1245, 13 May 2013
For more information, visit www.rusi.org/events
Members’ Lectures are open to RUSI Members only.r more information on RUSI Membership please visit www.rusi.org/membership
Commodore Steven Jermy RN, Visiting Professor of Strategy and Leadership, University of Plymouth, will assessthe strategic utility of carrier-enabled power projection and the role of aircraft carriers in providing sovereigndeployable air power and forward presence.
A lecture by Professor Michael Clarke, Director-General, Royal United Services Institute, to commemorate thefounding of RUSI in June 1831 by the Duke of Wellington.
RUSI Founder’s Day Lecture – The Battle of Waterloo: The Human Face of Grand Strategy1300, 18 June 2013
Whitehall Dialogue – The Strategic Utility of Carrier-Enabled Power Projection1545, 8 April 2013
Gill Bennett OBE MA will discuss her latest book – Six Moments of Crisis: Inside British Foreign Policy – withProfessor Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, FBA, unravelling the story of six crucial British foreign policy challengessince the Second World War, from the Korean War to the Falklands conflict.
Six Moments of Crisis: Inside British Foreign Policy1300, 27 March 2013
