US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms...

US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Raceand Disarmament

US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Raceand Disarmament

Matt RosensteinAssociate Director

Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at

UIUC

REES 200October 30, 2006

Matt RosensteinAssociate Director

Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at

UIUC

REES 200October 30, 2006

“Pop Quiz”“Pop Quiz”1. What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security today?

2. What are the greatest threats to Russian national security today?

Objectives for This SessionObjectives for This Session

•What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the US-Russian arms race)

•How did it come to this? (motivations and policies that explain the build-up)

Arms Race

Disarmament and Nonproliferation

•What steps did the US and Russia take to reduce risk of nuclear war and # of arms?

•What are the salient security concerns today with respect to US and Russian nuclear arms?

What Hath We Wrought?What Hath We Wrought?Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear attack?

•United States, on Japan, WWII

•Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945)

Fat Man and Little Boy

The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In

Perspective

The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In

PerspectiveEvent

Iraq war

9/11

Vietnam war

Hurricane Katrina

Pakistani earthquake

Indian Ocean tsunami

Casualties (approx.)

2,800

3,000

47,000

1,800

80,000

275,000

Hiroshima and Nagasaki Estimated that between 115,000-170,000

were killed immediately Twice as many more died over time

(radiation poisoning) 95% of deaths were civilian

Hiroshima and Nagasaki Little Boy: 13,000 tons of TNT equivalent Most nuclear warheads today: yield between

150 kiloton-1 megaton “Tsar bomba”: Soviets exploded a

50-megaton bomb in test (1961) Spasm attack by US or USSR would

result in 40-75 million Soviet and110-150 million US deaths (RAND, 1960)

US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000

US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000

Source: Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets (2005) *=1956 totals

US USSR/Russia

Year Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads

1950 462 400 22* 84*

1960 1,559 3,127 144 354

1970 2,100 5,239 1,985 2,216

1980 2,022 10,608 2,545 7,480

1990 1,903 12,477 2,500 10,271

2000 1,407 7,519 1,266 6,094

2005 1,225 5,966 981 4,732

Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic

Forces

Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic

Forces• Both US and USSR created

“nuclear triad” forces:•Ground (ICBM)• Sea (SLBM)•Air (Bombers)

• Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces:•Ground (ICBM)• Sea (SLBM)•Air (Bombers)

Military Fissile Material Stocks

Military Fissile Material Stocks

Source: Albright and Kramer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Nov-Dec 2004)

Country Pu (tonnes) HEU (tonnes)

Israel 0.51-0.65 ??

Pakistan 0.02-0.06 1.0-1.3

India 0.3-0.5 0

UK 3.2 21.9

France 5.0 30.0

China 4.8 20.0

US 47.0 580.0

Russia 95.0 773.0

The Arms Race: Why?The Arms Race: Why?•Territorial integrity and national sovereignty

•Ideological struggle

•Capitalism vs. communism

•Liberal democracy vs. authoritarian rule

•Military prowess: nukes as visible symbol of power

•USSR could not keep up economically

•MAD = Mutually Assured Destruction

•Deterrence

•Bargaining power / leverage in multilateral bodies

US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology

US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology

1942 US initiates Manhattan Project

1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki

1949 Soviet explosion of nuclear device

1957 Sputnik

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology


1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty

•End of atmospheric testing

•“Hotline”

•Halt proliferation to other states

1969-1972 SALT I

•Set numerical limits on missile launchers (not warheads-->MIRVs)

1972-1979 SALT II

•Broader limits than SALT I…but Afghanistan spoiled negotiations



1972 ABM Treaty

•Limited each to two ABM sites (no nationwide defense)

•Prohibited sea-, air-, space-based systems

•Limit on qualitative improvement

•Problematic: “Star Wars”, US pull-out in 2001-2

1972 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty



1991 START I Treaty

•Negotiated almost 10 years

•Reductions in launchers (max. 1,600) and warheads (max. 6,000)

1993 START II Treaty

•Further reductions; never ratified by US Senate and Russian Duma

Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up

Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up

Major Destruction & Dismantlement SiteChemical Weapons & Support Facility

SSBN BaseICBM Base (Silo)Mobile ICBM Base

Production FacilitiesNon deployed ICBMsHeavy Bombers

KazakhstanKazakhstan

RussiaRussia

UkraineUkraine

BelarusBelarusICBMs:ICBM Launcher Pads:

Warheads:

94 54

~225

ICBMs:ICBM Launchers:

HBs: Warhead:

25817636

~1,984

ICBMs:SLBMs:

HBs:Warheads::

1,3401,924

87~11,296

11510440

~1,462

ICBMs:ICBM Launchers:

HBs: Warhead:

Bioweapons ProgramsBioweapons Programs•1960s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs

•1972: BWC: US, USSR (other actors, such as UK) agreed to halt bioweapons research

•1992: several Russian scientists reported work with smallpox from 1970s-1990s

•Bio program cheaper than nukes

•Grew smallpox in large quantities

•Various research efforts: aerosolizing the virus; placed on ballistic missile warheads…

After the Break-Up:Proliferation and “Brain

Drain”

After the Break-Up:Proliferation and “Brain

Drain” •Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and materials

•Dysfunctional military: command and control?

• ~150,000 scientists, engineers, technicians employed in weapons-related work

•1990s economic crisis meant low wages (or back wages owed…) --> “nuclear entrepreneurs”

•Sell their knowledge?Seek employment in countries with nuclear aspirations?

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Cooperative Threat Reduction

•Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn-Lugar)

•Objectives: assist FSU states in dismantling WMD; secure WMD materials, technology, facilities and structures; reduce threat of proliferation

•Cooperation

•US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

•1993-2003: US spent avg. of $402 million/yr (~0.18% of total US defense budget); $4.4 billion total during that time

Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia


Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination

SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Elimination

SSBN/SLBM Dismantlement & Elimination

Liquid Propellant ICBM/ SLBM Elimination

Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination



Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Russia)…

Cooperative Threat Reduction:

Accomplishments

Cooperative Threat Reduction:

Accomplishments•More than 6,000 nuclear weapons destroyed

•Thousands of launchers, missiles, devices

•Removed all weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan

•Employed thousands of former weapons scientists

•Also destroying chemical and biological weapons

The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road?


•In Dec. 2001, Bush administration gave 6-month notice that US would withdraw from treaty

•Why? US wants to develop NMD to protect against WMD threats from terrorists, “rogue states”

•Putin regime protested vehemently-->felt it would limit their deterrence capabilities (made START II levels undesirable)

•Failure of Russian diplomacy?



•SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), or “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002•Cut warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012•Ratified in 2003 by Duma and Senate

US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns


•Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers

•“Setting a bad example”—weapons stockpiles and fissile materials stocks are disincentives for India, Pakistan, Israel(?), Iran, N. Korea, etc.



•Whither the United States?

•National Missile Defense

•Earth-penetrating nukes, mini-nukes

•Nuclear primacy?

•Whither Russia?

•Superpower nostalgia

•Maintain credible deterrence

•Relations with China, Iran vs. with US, EU

Perceived National Security Threats Today


U.S. national security

• Terrorism

• Proliferation of WMD

• Rogue states (harbor terrorists, foment extremism)

• Regional conflicts

Source: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006

Russian National Security Concept (2000)

• Focus on domestic security concerns: weak economy, organized crime, etc.

• Erosion of multilateral security institutions (UN, OSCE)

• Weakening of Russia’s political, economic, military influence

• Strengthening of military alliances (NATO enlargement)





Russian National Security Concept (2000)

• Foreign military bases near Russia’s borders


• Weakening of integration in CIS

• Conflicts near CIS member states’ borders

• Territorial claims against Russia



Russian national security concerns (2006)

• Domestic issues: economic growth, financial stability, demographic problems

• Terrorism

• Local conflicts (ethnic, religious)


• Lack of military readiness

Source: Putin’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006

US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms...

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