U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980) · U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and...

U.S. Navy Capstone Strategiesand Concepts (1970-1980):

Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents

MISC D0026414.A1/FinalDecember 2011

Peter M. Swartzwith Karin Duggan

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Contents

CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970-1974) . . . . . . . . . 1

Project SIXTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Missions of the U.S. Navy . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

CNO Admiral James Holloway (1974-1978) . . . . . . .32

Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy

NWP 1: Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (Rev A.)

Sea Plan 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward (1978-1982) . . . . . .72

CNO Strategic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

The Future of U.S. Sea Power

Companion reference on USN 1970s documents . . 90

2

ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (CNO Jul 1970-Jun 1974)

Sep 1970 Project SIXTY

An assessment; direction to move

Mar-Apr 1974 “Missions of the Navy”

Missions

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Surface warfare officer

Followed 3 naval aviator CNOs

Served under President Nixon; SECDEFs

Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger; SECNAVs

Chaffee, Warner, Middendorf

4


Drew on previous education & experience

Naval War College & National War College graduate

OSD/ISA (Arms Control), SECNAV EA, 1st OP-96

(Director, Systems Analysis)

Protégé of Paul Nitze (NSC-68 Cold War strategy

author)

Drew on ideas of subordinates (esp. RADM –

later ADM -- Stansfield Turner) & civilians

(created CNO Executive Panel)

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ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (CNO July 1970-June 1974)

Came into office from Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam (COMNAVFORV.

Imaginative COIN thinker & operator in-country

But saw Vietnam War as ill-advised drain on needed USN anti-Soviet resources, esp. for sea control

Had a clear agenda when he came into office and immediately created a capstone document as blueprint

Sought to implement it throughout his term

Had NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner promulgate its overarching themes at end of his term

6


Centralized Navy POM & budget decision-making

Publicly fearful of Soviet Navy

Sought to avoid USN anti-Soviet SSBN prosecution;

focus on SLOC sea control

Opposed to Nixon-Kissinger arms control efforts

(SALT I)

Conflicts with ADM Rickover

Signature programs: FFGs, PHMs, sea control ships,

equal opportunity, personnel reforms

Later, continued to write on US naval policy and

strategy

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7


Memoirs:

On Watch (1976)

My Father, My Son (1986)

8

Project SIXTY (Sep 1970)

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9

Project SIXTY (1970)

Overview

Signed by CNO ADM Zumwalt (Sept 1970)

“Assessment” & “Direction to Move”

Medium-length (30 pp) SECRET brief & memo

CNO flag officer special assistants drafted

Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV

Comprehensive plan, program guidance for Zumwalt term

Precedent for subsequent annual CNO program guidance

To re-optimize USN to counter Soviet threat

4 USN capability categories; hi-low mix

Sea control priority over power projection programs

Listed 22 specific actions taken or proposed

Presented 3 force structure alternatives

Concepts proved more influential than programs

10


Signed by:

CNO ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.

2 months after taking office

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What it was

Billed as “an assessment”, “direction to move,” “concepts”

Secret briefing for SECDEF Laird & DEPSECDEF (Sep 1970)

Secret memorandum to all Flag Officers (and Marine general officers)

Medium-length (30 pages plus slides)

Kickoff for development of POM-73 & precedent for subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt annual Navy program guidance

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Why it was written (I) Show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through SLOC defense

Re-optimize USN vs. growing Soviet at-sea combat & SLOC-cutting capabilities in a NATO-Pact war

Take advantage of SECDEF Laird de-centralization of DOD POM & budget processes to services

Establish CNO guidance as authoritative interpretation of SECDEF guidance

Centralize under the CNO what had been a de-centralized internal Navy program planning process, to implement his policies

To guide USN, USMC flag/general officer actions, especially in developing POM-73 and subsequent CNO ADM Zumwalt POMs

Principal targets: SECDEF, OSD, DON, OPNAV

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Why it was written (II)

Gain OSD & OPNAV support for CNO ADM

Zumwalt vision to reconfigure fleet capabilities

Focus more on sea control, less on power projection

Add “low-mix” ships to established “high-mix” programs

Focus on “capability categories”, to reduce

“union” parochialism

Show that the Navy was conforming to:

New national “Nixon Doctrine” policy of reliance on allies,

focus on USSR

Sharply reduced budget allocations

Leave the 1960s and the Vietnam War behind

Despite current ongoing major Navy Vietnam War combat

operations

14


Context (I) 2nd year of Nixon administration (1969-74)

SECDEF Laird (1969-73) Decentralization of DOD PPBS to services

US-Soviet strategic nuclear weapons parity

Détente, deterrence & disarmament policies vis-a-vis Soviets

Nixon Doctrine: Allies do more

“1 ½ War” national defense planning construct (reduced from “2 ½ wars”)

Vietnam War still raging, but US withdrawing troops

Improving US relations with China

US economy in recession GDP growth slowing; inflation rate rising

Modest U.S. government deficit spending

Price of oil low and steady

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Project SIXTY (1970) Context (II)

AVF impending

USN downsizing; declining budgets

But, DoN TOA now >DoA or DoAF

SECNAV Chaffee (1969-72) (Made VADM Zumwalt CNO)

New CNO ADM Zumwalt (1970-74)

Soviet naval buildup 1st Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 70

Imminent deployment of Delta SSBNs w/ long range SLBMs, & Backfire-C bombers

Six-Day War Egypt Styx anti-ship missile use shock (1967)

N. Korean USN EC-121 SOJ shoot-down (Apr 1969)

Violent Sino-Soviet border clashes & nuclear threats (1969)

US withdrew from Libya Wheelus AFB (1970)

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Context (III)

USN in 1970: 769 battle force ships & declining sharply; 10 new ships authorized

DON budgets declining

CEP, OPNAV OP-00K, NADEC created (1970)

Demise of OPNAV Long Range Planning Group (1970)

Carriers changing to CV/CVN concept

From CVAs & CVSs

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Cited references

Nixon Doctrine (1969)

JCS Plans

DoD FY 72 Fiscal Guidance

FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget

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Context: Other important publications

CAPT E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., “A Course for Destroyers,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Nov 1962)

NATO MC 14/3 Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1968)

Flexible response

NATO MC 48/3 Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area (1969)

SACLANT, Relative Maritime Strategies and Capabilities of NATO and the Soviet Bloc ("Brosio Study“) (Mar 1969)

DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)

Herman Kahn works

Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)

Paul Nitze thinking

Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970) 18

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How it was written

Drafted by RADM-SEL Stansfield Turner

New OPNAV special office (Op-00H)

Drew officers from OP-60, OP-93, OP-96, Secretariat

Finished by RADM Worth Bagley

“60-day effort”

CNO & SECNAV Chaffee briefed SECDEF Laird &

DEPSECDEF Packard, to influence POM 73 (Sep 1970)

Then distributed to USN, USMC flag & general officers

Tracking goal accomplishment (measuring effectiveness)

by new Coordinator of Decisions (OP-09C) (RADM

Emmett Tidd)

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Outline

CNO’s Project SIXTY presentation to SECDEF

Assured second strike potential

Sea control and projection

Overseas presence

Alternative combinations of sea control and

projection forces

Other types of change

Summary

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Key Ideas (I):

Soviets & their navy are the priority threat

Taken very seriously

“CHICOM” threat mentioned in passing

Soviet threat is global

Alarming view of USN capabilities to defeat

Soviets at sea

55% w/ present forces

30% w/ POM 72 forces

Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific

Joint & allied coordination & cooperation

Need allied navies to contribute more to sea control

Reprioritized naval missions

22


Key ideas (II): 22 specific actions taken or proposed

Included topics for further study & analysis

3 force structure alternatives

Theater tradeoffs necessary. Gave details.

Retire obsolescing forces early (for $)

Modernize (“hi-low mix”)

New R&D initiatives

Reduce support costs

Pursue people programs

Reduce forward deployments to ensure optimum rotation policies for personnel retention & motivation

Testing new force packages: Add SSNs to surface task forces

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Project SIXTY (1970) What was new?

Comprehensive USN statement of strategy & policy Annual CNO program guidance

4 prioritized disaggregated capabilities Assured second strike

Control of sea lines and areas

Projection of power ashore

Overseas presence in peacetime

“Strategic deterrence must come first”

Focus on sea control vs. Soviet threat

Shift $ from VN-era USN power projection CV strike to defensive sea control

Many new programs Sea control ships to replace CVSs (aborted)

Perry-class FFGs

Tracking goal accomplishment; measuring effectiveness

24


Not addressed Naval Warfare NWP 10B (1970)

Non-Soviet threats

World trade issues

On-going war in Vietnam

USN submarine ISR operations

Counterinsurgency; terrorist threats

Coastal & riverine operations & programs

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response

Maritime Security Operations

US Coast Guard

US government inter-agency partners

US industrial base & shipbuilding

Little on USMC Just distribution list & USMC CV TACAIR bid

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Subsequent analyses & critiques Herschel Kanter & Thomas Anger, Navy Responses to Changes in the Defense Resource Planning Process (CNA 1973)

ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976)

David A. Rosenberg, “Project 60: Twelve Years Later” (1982)

Jeffrey Sands, On His Watch (CNA 1993)

Included measuring effectiveness

Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space (Ch X) (2000)

CAPT Terry Pierce, Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies (2004)

Edgar Puryear, American Admiralship (Ch IX) (2005)

Harlan Ullman, “A New Maritime Strategy,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Mar 2007)

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Criticisms (I) “A non-Mahanian aberration” (Norman Friedman)

Too defensive and fearful

Too much focus on sea control vs. Soviets

Too little focus on power projection vs. Soviets

Sea control & power projection were actually

intertwined, not bifurcated

Wrongly assumed Soviet priority to cut SLOCs

To abandon naval offensive would lose the fleet & the

war

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27


Criticisms (II): A step backwards from focus on forward USN influence on events ashore Wrong solutions to problems Unaffordable Led to tactical caution Not well connected to national policy of détente Not joint or allied enough Too parochial (surface-warfare advocacy) Too heavy on programmatics and too light on strategy Not a consensual document. One man’s vision

28


Influence (I): Wide within Navy & DOD at the time

Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on sea control

Concepts more influential than specific programs

Many programs repudiated by successors

Subsequent Navy program planning used Project 60 “missions of the Navy” construct: Strategic deterrence, projection of power, control of sea lines

Especially OP-96-led CNO Program Analysis Memoranda (CPAMs)

OP-96 reorganized internally along “mission area” & support area” lines

Overseas presence could not be used to justify forces, IAW DOD guidance

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Influence (II): Institutionalized as annual CNO Policy and Planning Guidance (CPPG) (from 1971 on)

Drafted in OP-96 (Systems Analysis) (RADM Turner (1971-2) et al.)

As a Navy “program planning” document, OP-00H-drafted Project SIXTY & successor OP-96-drafted CPPGs eclipsed influence of OP-06/OP-60-drafted planning & strategy documents as conceptual basis for internal OPNAV & USN thinking during 1970s

Led to USN emphasis on “second P” of PPBS, vice “First P”

30


Why did it have this influence? (I) Personalities:

Strong backing by forceful & thoughtful, but unorthodox & controversial, CNO ADM Zumwalt

Continued advocacy by Stansfield Turner

As RADM & OP-96 (1971-2); and later VADM & President, Naval War College (1972-4)

Effective CNO management techniques (special assistants, NADEC, Z-Grams, successor CPPGs)

Deliberate fostering of OP-96-led OPNAV “program planning” as intellectual center of OPNAV staff, vice OP-06-led “planning”

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Why did it have this influence? (II)

SECDEF Laird left Navy alone to implement its own

plan

Declining US defense budgets & post-Vietnam

operational lull in 1970s led to USN focus on getting

the budget right

Limited internal Navy buy-in on many specifics

Crystallized poles in USN thinking; sparked debates

1982 ENS Rosenberg OP-965 retrospective study

showed utility of comprehensive USN policy statement

Successive descendent CPPGs had become more

programmatic & less conceptual & strategic over time

32


Influence on subsequent capstone documents

Set the example for all

Conceptual roots of Missions of the U.S. Navy

Triggered contrary views in Strategic Concepts of the

US Navy

Studied for lessons leading to The Maritime Strategy

But spawned succession of CPPGs that refocused

many in Navy away from strategy

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Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974)

34


Overview Drafted & signed by NAVWARCOL President VADM Turner (Mar-Apr 1974)

Drafting assistance by NAVWARCOL faculty

Short (16 pp max) UNCLAS articles

Described 4 Navy missions (from Project SIXTY)

Showed relationship of missions to tactics

Deliberate creation of a new vocabulary

Principal target: US Navy officer corps

USN officers should think deeply about their service

Missions construct lends itself to analyzing naval issues

Soviet Union the chief threat for USN to counter

Lasting influence

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Signed by VADM Stansfield Turner

President, Naval War College (1972-4)

Surface warfare officer

Later, NATO CINCSOUTH, Carter Administration CIA

Director (1977-81)

Continued to write extensively on naval policy &

strategy

36


What it was

Billed as “Missions”

UNCLAS Naval War College Review article (Mar-Apr 1974)

Short (16 pages)

Reprinted in Naval War College Review (Winter 1998)

UNCLAS US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Dec 1974)

Derived from Project SIXTY

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Why it was written

To get USN officers to think deeply about their service

To transform Navy internal thinking about what it does

To help naval officers understand what is best for the whole organization, not just their own platforms or programs

To focus the Navy on cross-cutting outputs (missions), vice parochial inputs (platforms, unions)

To inform future naval force structure decisions

To form a basis to establishing priorities for allocating resources

To assist in selecting the best among competing systems

Institutionalize Project SIXTY framework

Principal target: US Navy officer corps

38


Context (I)

Last year of Nixon administration (1969-74)

Watergate scandal 1972-4

All US forces withdrawn from South Vietnam (1973)

Northern combat actions against South Vietnam continued

SECDEF Schlesinger (1973-75)

All-Volunteer Force (from 1973)

US economy in recession again; inflation rate rising

Arab oil embargo; Price of oil soaring

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Context (II)

SECDEF nuclear strategy changes (1974)

Palestinian attack at Munich airport (1970). Beginning of major terrorist campaign

Munich Olympics (1972); Rome airport (1973)

World food crisis (1972-74) Shortages, price hikes led to famines, unrest

Yom Kippur War (1973) Battle of Latakia

1st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-equipped boats, & using electronic deception

40

Missions of the U.S. Navy (1974) Context (III)

Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit meeting (May 1972)

High point of detente

INCSEA agreement with Soviets (1972)

ABM & SALT Treaties (1972)

Soviet naval buildup

Delta-class SSBNs w/long-range SLBMs (from 1972)

USN-Soviet Navy Mediterranean confrontations (1970 & 1973)

USN post-Vietnam War ops

Indo-Pakistani War & Enterprise cruise (1971-2)

Close Soviet-Indian military ties

Improving US relations with PRC

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Context (IV)

Outgoing CNO Zumwalt (1970-74)

OPNAV reorganization: Creation of “3 platform barons” as Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) (1971)

OP-02 (Submarines); OP-03 (Surface); OP-05 (Air)

Formalized increased post-World War II officer specialization

OPNAV OP-090 Net Assessment Office created

OP-96-led “program planning” the dominant intellectual activity in OPNAV, vice OP-06-led “planning”

Declining DON budgets

USN in 1974: 512 battle force ships and declining sharply; 14 new ships authorized

But, DON TOA now >DA or DAF

42


Context (V)

Sea Control Ship experiment on USS Guam with AV-8s &

SH-3s (1972)

Racial incidents on USN ships (1972)

“Turner Revolution” at Naval War College (1972-4)

Curriculum transformation, esp. Strategy & Policy Course (1972)

New top-notch faculty, esp. Strategy Department

Current Strategy Forum instituted (1973)

Increasing USAF minelaying & surveillance support at sea

Army at TRADOC developing defensive operational

doctrine focused on Europe

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Context: Cited references

Mahan

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Context: Other important publications Project SIXTY (1970)

Robert Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy (1968) (resisted)

Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (1970)

USN-USAF MOAs on B-52 minelaying at sea (1971, 1974)

Future Maritime Strategy Study (FUMAR) (1973)

“U.S. Strategy for the Pacific/Indian Ocean Area in the 1970s”

“Project 2000” long-range planning Study (1974)

ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” articles in US Naval Institute Proceedings (with commentaries) (Jan-Nov 1974)

44

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How it was written

Drafted at newly-transformed Naval War College

Drafter: NAVWARCOL President, VADM Stansfield Turner

(Jun 1972-Aug 1974)

Had conceived and drafted CNO ADM Zumwalt’s Project SIXTY

Director of OPNAV analysis office (OP-96) before going to NWC

Leaving Naval War College for command of US Second Fleet

Editor & sounding board: CDR George Thibault

(NAVWARCOL faculty)

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Outline (Naval War College Review article)

Usefulness of categorizing Navy missions

Evolution of Naval capabilities and missions

Definition of naval missions and discussion of their forces

and tactics

Strategic deterrence mission

Sea control mission

Projection of power ashore missions

Naval presence mission

Current and future issues involving naval missions areas

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Key ideas (I):

4 “Missions”

US Naval Institute

Proceedings order

•“Warfighting missions”

•Sea control

•Projection of power

•“Deterrent missions”

•Naval presence

•Strategic deterrence

:

Naval War College Review

order

•Strategic deterrence

•Projection of power

•Sea control

•Naval presence

48


Key ideas (II):

Each of 4 missions subdivided into “tactics”

Detailed & nuanced definitions & discussions of

each

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Key ideas (III):

“To force the Navy to think in terms of output rather

than input”

(Key goal of McNamara-instituted PPBS since 1961-2)

Missions as “outputs”.

Tied to national objectives

Interdependent

NOT prioritized

Tradeoffs within/among missions

USMC implements a few of the tactics

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Key ideas (IV):

USN officers should think deeply about their service

USN sea control focus may yield to naval presence focus

(US Naval Institute Proceedings article)

Discussed historical development of Navy concepts

Placed 4 Missions in historical context

Soviets the chief threat

Communist Chinese threat mentioned in passing

Discussion of “blockade” as a discreet naval operation

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Interdependent Naval Missions

NAVAL PRESENCE

S T R A T E G I C

D E T E R R E N C E

Reproduced with permission from: Naval War College Review. Mar-Apr 1974 Vol XXVI, #5. “Missions of the U.S.

Navy,” by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College.

52


What was new?

Going public with Project SIXTY 4-capability

construct

Explicit discussion of “sea control” as superseding

“control of the sea” terminology

Rejection of “command of the seas” and “sea

power” terminology

Explication of “Presence” mission

Tying mission areas to tactics

Wide subsequent influence and citation

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Not addressed (I)

Explicit priorities among missions

Non-Soviet threats

World trade issues

Submarine ISR operations

Counterinsurgency & irregular warfare

Convoy operations

Coastal & riverine operations & programs


Terrorist threats


“Fleet-in-being” or “force-in-being”

54


Not addressed (II)

Sealift

US Coast Guard; U.S. Army

U.S. Merchant marine

US industrial base & shipbuilding

U.S. government interagency partners

Little joint or allied mention

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Subsequent analyses & critiques

ADM E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (1976)

John Allen Williams, “Strategies and Forces of the U.S.

Navy: A Critical Reappraisal,” Armed Forces & Society

(Summer 1981)

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Were they “missions?”

What is a “mission” (officially)?

1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

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57


Were they “missions?”

What is a “mission” (officially)?

“The terms ‘roles, missions, and functions’ often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. ‘Roles’ are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services . . . were established in law. “Missions” are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. ‘Functions’ are specific responsibilities assigned by the NCA to enable the services to fulfill their legally established roles.”

Joint Pub 02 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (July 2001)

58


Criticisms

These weren’t really “missions”?

These weren’t really the right missions.

“Sea control” really 2 missions: “Offensive” &

“Defensive” (CDR/Dr John Allen Williams

USNR)

Sea control & power projection intertwined, not

bifurcated

Presence not really a “mission”

All 4 missions not co-equal

Implicit primacy of “sea control” right/wrong

New vocabulary shouldn’t supersede older

terms

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Subsequent evolution of ADM Turner’s thought 4 roles/missions of the Navy

Sea control

Projection of power by amphibious assault

Projection of power ashore by bombardment

Strategic nuclear retaliation

Today a new mission may be emerging Defending the homeland or other land areas against attack by

missiles through space

Setting aside homeland defense . . . The other four missions are today of lessening importance to our country’s security

ADM Stansfield Turner USN (Ret)

“Is the U.S. Navy Being Marginalized?”

Naval War College Review (Summer 2003)

60


Influence:

Very wide and very long-lasting

In particular, led to increased DOTMLPF focus on naval forward presence

Cited throughout world defense literature

E.g.: Japanese admiral quoted in 2007 conference paper

Forged a long-lasting consensus on the missions of the US Navy

Spilled over into CNO ADM Holloway 1st (Mar 75) Posture Statement & US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jun 1975)

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Why did it have this influence?

Groundwork already laid by Project SIXTY, subsequent CPPGs, and OP-96-led OPNAV program planning

Simple, elegant construct; Filled a conceptual void & need

Widely adopted by Navy leadership

Personality: VADM Turner reputation as USN’s intellectual leader, inside & outside USN

Adopted by academia (civilian & military)

Links to ADM Zumwalt-specific policies muted

62



New vocabulary used in almost all

But “control of the seas” & “sea power” terms persisted too

4-mission framework triggered contrary views in

Strategic Concepts of the US Navy & The Future of U.S.

Sea Power

Missions restated, re-ordered and/or modified somewhat

in Forward . . . From the Sea, Anytime, Anywhere, Naval

Power 21, Sea Power 21, & added to in NOC (2006)

Missions repeated in 2007 Program Guide to the U.S.

Navy (“crisis response” added)

Missions formed 4 of 6 “core capabilities” of

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (2007)

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ADM James L. Holloway III (CNO Jun 1974-Jul 1978)

Dec 1975 Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy (S)

1976-78 CNO Reports (Posture Statements)

Jul 1976 “U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal”

Jan 1977 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy

(NWP 1)

May 1978 Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy

NWP 1 (Rev. A)

(Mar 1978) (Sea Plan 2000) (S)

A force planning study

64


Naval aviator (nuclear power trained &

experienced)

Served under Presidents Ford & Carter;

SECDEFs Schlesinger, Rumsfeld & Brown;

SECNAVs Middendorf & Claytor

Experienced in initiating concepts & processes

E.g.: NATOPS; USN program planning; CV concept

(1968); Nuclear Powered Carrier Program; changed

USN frigate nomenclature; CVBGs (1977); flexible,

reconfigurable air wing; fostered CWC concept

Combat veteran of three wars & numerous

crises

33

65


Initially let previous concepts stand (he had been VCNO under ADM Zumwalt)

Progressively developed & promulgated a new coherent set of concepts to replace them

At end of his term, promulgated a final comprehensive statement

His DCNO for Plans Policy & Operations, VADM William Crowe, created a new Strategy & Concepts Branch (OP-603), staffed by hand-picked strategists (1978)

Fought successfully to prevent cruise missiles from being banned by US-USSR SALT II agreement

Signature program: CVN, CVBG

66


Later, continued to write on naval strategy & policy, & serve on high-level national & DOD commissions & study groups

President, Council of American-Flag Ship Operators (1978-88 )

Chairman, Special Operations Review Group (investigating 1980 Desert One Iran Hostages Rescue debacle)

Executive Director, President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism (1985)

President, then Chairman of Naval Historical Foundation (1980-2008)

Memoir: Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam and the Soviet Confrontation (2007)

34

67

Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (1975-8)

68

Overview

Drafted and signed by CNO ADM Holloway

“Strategic Concepts”

Principal targets: USN officer corps & Capitol Hill

CLAS memo, then UNCLAS article, NWP, posture statement brochures, revised medium-length (37 pp) NWP

Concepts evolved through various editions

Comprehensive analysis of naval requirement development

Rigorous flow from national policy to systems

Focus on naval warfare tasks, across platforms

Highlighted range of aircraft carrier capabilities

No specific USN adversaries mentioned by name

Still modestly influential


35

69

Signed by:

CNO ADM James L. Holloway, III

Successive drafts after 1 ½ years in office


70

What it was

Billed as “Strategic concept(s)”

Secret signed document circulated to Fleet Commanders for comment (Dec 1975)

CNO Reports (Posture Statements) (Jul 76, Apr 77, Mar 78)

Pocket-sized for portability

US Naval Institute Proceedings article (Jul 1976)

UNCLAS Naval Warfare Publications (NWP)

NWP 1 (Jan 1977)

NWP 1(A) (May 1978): 37 pages

Not formally cancelled until 1993

Later boiled down in Holloway 1985 Oceanus article


36

71

Why it was written (I)

So USN officers would understand basic USN concepts,

doctrine & processes, in order to be able to contribute

effectively to internal Navy decisions, make effective

external cases for the Navy, and understand the

implications of making changes

To lay out the capabilities of the US Navy in support of the

nation, including aircraft carriers

Reaction to Project SIXTY & Turner “Missions”

“Consolidation” of internal USN thinking, esp. “missions”

To emphasize warfare tasks over platforms

And in so doing highlight the versatility of the aircraft carrier


72


To reflect evolution of CNO ADM Holloway’s thinking

To influence Administration policies:

To create a coherent Navy policy statement in anticipation of a

possible Jan 1977 change in administrations (1975-6)

To try to influence new administration policies (1977)

To try to change administration policies (1978)

To enlist Congressional support in influencing/changing

Administration policies (1977-8)

To achieve consensus on US Navy roles, missions,

tasks, functions (and, ultimately, force levels & mix)

Principal targets: USN officer corps, Capitol Hill, DOD


37

73

Context (I)

CNO ADM Holloway (1974-78)

2nd year of Ford (R) administration (1974-77) thru 2nd year of Carter (D) administration

US voters repudiated Ford administration (Nov 1976)

SECDEFs Laird, Rumsfeld (1975-77); SECNAV Middendorf

SECDEF Brown (1977-81); SECNAV Claytor

US economy pulling out of recession (from Mar 1975)

But inflation rate rising & unemployment rate high

Increasing U.S. government deficit spending

Price of oil high but declining somewhat

PRC occupied Paracel Islands; PLAN defeated VNN in South China Sea naval battle (1974)

N. Vietnam victory, occupation of S. Vietnam (1975)

Communist regimes in Laos, Cambodia (1975)


74

Context (II)

National policy shift from Pacific military commitments

Outgoing Ford Administration policies comfortable for

Navy, if underfunded

Soviets deployed SS-20 nuclear missiles Intermediate-

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Central Europe (1975)

US countered with Pershing II & GLCM INF deployment

plans

New Carter administration defense focus on NATO

central region & USN Atlantic SLOC protection

Robert Komer as DOD Special Assistant for NATO


38

75

Context (III)

Arms Control Agreements & talks

Seabed, INCSEA, SALT I, ABM

US-Soviet talks to demilitarize Indian Ocean (1977-8 )

Soviet fleet build-up

New Delta-class SSBNs w/ long-range SLBMs (1972)

Soviet SSBNs no longer needed to deploy far forward & transit GIUK & other barriers to reach CONUS targets

Backfire-B bomber with ASMs (1972)

To keep US carrier aviation beyond striking range of Soviet targets

2nd Soviet global naval exercise: Okean 75

1st USN, Soviet Navy reciprocal port visits (1975)


76

Context (IV)

Increased Soviet interventions in 3rd world

Close Soviet-Indian military ties

1st nuclear weapon test by Soviet-friendly India (1974)

Improving US relations with PRC

Yom Kippur War (1973)

Battle of Latakia

1st naval battle in history between surface-to-surface missile-

equipped boats, & using electronic deception


39

77

Context (V)

Portuguese empire freed (1974-5)

Periodic Korean crises

Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)

Panama Canal transfer treaty signed (1977)

Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene

overseas in 3rd world (“Vietnam syndrome”)

Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil

war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)


78

Context (VI)

Declining USN force levels; fluctuating DON budgets

USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships & starting to

increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized

Emerging USN force level goal: 600 ships

New systems entering fleet

CWC concept entering fleet

Internal USN “Repeal Zumwalt” debates

Bitter internal US government aircraft carrier, VSTOL

budget debates

Culmination: Congress debated adding CVN 71 to carrier-

less FY 79 defense budget (Feb-Aug 1978)


40

79

Context (VII)

Specialized USN ASW carriers disappeared

CVA/CVAN/CVS → CV/CVN

CVWs transformed from 2 specialized air wing types to one

general multi-mission model

New fleet battle organization (1977)

CVTF/CVTG → CVBF/CVBG

Continued primacy of OP-96-led program planning as

intellectual basis for OPNAV activity, vice OP-06-led

planning

OPNAV Op-96-OP-60 rivalry


80

Context (VIII)

USN surface ship reclassifications (1975)

CNO ADM Holloway initiatives

Brought USN “frigate” nomenclature in line with international

practice

Eliminated perceived USN-Soviet Navy “cruiser gap”

Eliminated USN surface combatant “escort” terminology

CG/CLG → CG

DL/DLG → CG or DDG

DD/DDG → DD/DDG

DE/DEG → FF/FFG

PF → FFG

CNO ADM Holloway decision to halt CGN procurement


41

81

Context (IX)

New SACLANT/CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/C2F plans to shift Atlantic convoy routes south, to free up escort forces for northern forward ops

New CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT/C7F plans for northern offensive vs. Soviets in NW Pacific

CINCUSNAVEUR/C6F plans to stand & fight in central, eastern Med

But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner plans to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis


82

Context (X)

USN Advanced Technology Panel (ATP) created (1975)

NAVWARCOL Center for Advanced Research created (1975)

John F. Lehman as CNO consultant (from 1977)

Army at TRADOC developed defensive operational doctrine focused on Europe (1976)

Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea

Military Reform Movement (from 1976)

SEN Taft, then SEN Hart. Bill Lind

Adopted & advocated “lo” end of Zumwalt “hi-lo mix”

Committee on the Present Danger (from 1976)

Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.


42

83

Cited references

Title 10 of U.S. Code

DOD Dir 5100.1 Functions of the Armed Forces and

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (31 Dec 1958)

DOD Total Force Policy

Unified Command Plan

JCS & USN Readiness Reporting Systems

Discussed historical development of USN

strategy & law of the sea


83

84

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)

Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)

Esp. Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976)

Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)

NSDM 242 Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear

Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)

NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)

ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” US Naval Institute Proceedings articles (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)

Bound & published as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)

NSDM 242 Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear

Weapons (Jan 1974) (flexible nuclear options)

OPNAV OP-96, Project 2000 (1974-1977)

USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)


84

43

85

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

Barry Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments:

Prospects and Possibilities (1975)

CBO (Dov Zakheim) reports on USN (1975-80)

David Rosenberg & Floyd Kennedy, History of the Strategic

Arms Competition, 1945-1972. Supporting Study: U.S.

Aircraft Carriers in the Strategic Role, Part I– Naval Strategy

in a Period of Change: Interservice Rivalry, Strategic

Interaction, and the Development of Nuclear Attack

Capability, 1945-1951 (Lulejian) (1975)

Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine Corps

Go from Here? (1976)

SEN Taft “White Paper on Defense” (1976)

US Army FM 100-5 Operations (“active defense”) (1976)


85

86

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings

(1977-9)

NSDM 344 Navy Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977)

Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers

Based on NSC study on “U.S. Strategy and Naval Force

Requirements” (Sep 1976)

John Lehman helped draft

NSC PRM 10 Military Strategy & Force Posture Review

(1977) & PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)

USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)

Sea Plan 2000 naval force planning study (1978)


86

44

87


How it was written (I)

Personality: CNO ADM Holloway the driver

Saw importance of “writing it all down”, himself

Advocate of direct senior involvement; not “completed staff work”

Advocate of standardized processes throughout his career

Denigrated fancy pictures and art work

Assisted by

Executive Assistant CAPT John Poindexter as sounding board

CNO Fellow

OP-60N (LCDR Joseph Strasser, Fletcher Ph.D.); 1-on-1 meetings

CAPT Dirk Pringle (OP-64) for “readiness” section

88


How it was written (II)

Unhappy with “4 Missions of the Navy,” (which had

informed his 1st Posture Statement & 1st US Naval

Institute Proceedings article)

Continuously reworked his ideas, in various media

Added “readiness” section IRT perceived SECDEF

Brown confusion on readiness terminology at Armed

Forces Policy Council meeting

Published in final form as NWP 1 (Rev A) in May 1978

Saw it as a baseline. Ok to deviate from as required

“If you’re going to break the rules, you’ve got to have rules

to break”

45

89

Outline (NWP 1 (Rev A)

Part I: Generation of naval force requirements

1. Introduction

2. National strategy

3. U.S. Navy support of the national military strategy

4. Required capabilities and characteristics of naval forces

5. Navy program development

Part II: Planning, employment and readiness doctrine

for naval operating forces


90

Key ideas (I)

Strategic concepts drive force requirements

Formal orderly top-down general processes

Used accepted DOD definitions of terms

“Mission,” “roles,” “functions,” etc.

Importance to US of open & free seaborne trade

Importance of factors unique to shipbuilding


46

91

Key ideas (II)

Utility & importance of net assessment & analysis

Importance of ship & a/c readiness & employment cycles

Forward deployment & surge posture balance

Coordinated joint & allied ops

USN sea control a prerequisite for sustained Army, Air

Force overseas campaigns (enabling)

Capabilities-based. Discussed only generic threats

Soviets not mentioned


92

Key ideas (III)

Revised (& complexified) Turner concepts, vocabulary

2 basic USN functions

Sea control (prerequisite)

Power projection

3 USN roles

Strategic nuclear deterrence

SLOC security

Overseas deployed forces

Presence = a “clear side benefit” of forward deployment

Must reflect “combat capability”

Presence nota mission; buys “reduced response time”


47

93

Key Ideas (IV)

Fundamental warfare tasks

AAW

ASW

ASUW

Strike

Amphibious

Mine

• Supporting warfare tasks

• Special warfare

• Ocean surveillance

• Intelligence

• C3

• EW

• Logistics


94


NWP 10(B) (1970) “Types of naval operations”

Strike force operations

Amphibious operations

Anti-air warfare

Anti-submarine warfare

Mining & mine countermeasures

Riverine operations

Support operations

Surveillance & blockading

Search and rescue

Domestic emergency operations

NWP 1 (Rev A) (1978) “Warfare tasks”

• Anti-air warfare

• Anti-submarine warfare

• Anti-surface warfare

• Strike warfare

• Amphibious warfare

• Mine warfare

• Special warfare

• Ocean surveillance

• Intelligence

• C3

• Electronic warfare

• Logistics

48

95

Key ideas (V)

Warfare tasks across platforms

Update of earlier NWP 10 listings

Implicit primacy of strike warfare & carrier platform

New CVBG force packages to incorporate CVS missions

USMC = ½ of 1 of 6 “fundamental” warfare tasks


96

Key ideas (VI): Evolution of CNO ADM Holloway

thinking

1975 Posture Statement & NIP article

Followed Zumwalt-Turner “4 Missions” construct

Dec 1975 SECRET Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy

“Sea Control is the fundamental U.S. Navy function”

Naval presence a “unique capability”

1976 Posture Statement & July 1976 US Naval Institute

Proceedings article

Two principal functions: Sea Control & Power Projection

1977 & 1978 Posture Statements

May 1978 NWP 1 (Rev A)

Naval presence a “clear side benefit”


49

97

Generation of

Naval Force

Requirements


98

What was new? (I)

Heavy CNO involvement in initial drafting

CNO signature

Contrast with Naval Warfare (NWP 10) of 1950s & 60s

Comprehensive taxonomies & processes

Even submarine reconnaissance role embedded in chart


50

99

What was new? (II)

Capabilities-based threats

No mention of Soviets

Contrast with ADMs Zumwalt & Turner’s approach

Mention of benefits to US of “a system of free & open

trade”

Reference to a “system” will not reappear for 20+ years

NWP-Posture Statement similarity


100

Not addressed

Soviets (or any other adversary) by name

Terrorist threats



US Coast Guard

Arms control

U.S. government interagency partners

Blockade


51

101

Barely addressed

“Sealift” mentioned as part of “logistics” task

Unconventional warfare, coastal & riverine interdiction

subsumed under Naval Special Warfare


102


Were they “strategic concepts?”

What is a “strategic concept” (officially)?

The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures which stem from it

Joint Pub 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (Oct 2008)

52

103



ADM James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers

at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea,

Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation

(Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007)

103

104

Criticisms Too long & complex

Too dry & lifeless

Too generic, general & abstract

Too hard to update & keep current

Too “doctrinal”

All form & no substance

Did not convey a “story” or “narrative”

Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies

Not the right vehicle to achieve internal USN consensus


53

105

Influence:

In NWP format, modest within USN

Used in war colleges

Still cited in 2005

P.H. Liotta & Richmond M. Lloyd Naval War College

Review article on strategy & force planning

In Posture Statement format, influential on Capitol

Hill during budget battles

Especially spring-summer 1978 re: FY 79 budget & CVN-

71.

ADM Holloway influence on John Lehman


106

Why did it have the influence it did?

Deep, personal involvement by CNO ADM Holloway

But ADM Holloway little known to defense academics

Comprehensive

Wide distribution as internal USN NWP & external Posture

Statements

But USN “wary of doctrine;” limited buy-in by officers

Posture Statement format had short shelf life

Overshadowed by in Washington by Sea Plan 2000 debate

Superseded by The Maritime Strategy

Never updated


54

107


Warfare tasks adopted in The Maritime Strategy


108

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

55

109

Sea Plan 2000 (1978) Overview

Signed by SECNAV Claytor (Mar 1978) Article signed by Under SECNAV Woolsey

Principal target: SECDEF, OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV

SECRET 2-volume force planning study Separate UNCLAS medium-length (23 pp) abridgement of study executive summary

USN Woolsey International Security article

Drafted by a working group; NAVWARCOL professor lead

Maintain stability - Contain crises - Deter war spectrum

Focus on countering Soviet threat

Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with Soviets

7 USN missions

New technology as USN enabler

3 USN force level options

Great short-term influence. Overshadowed later by Hayward views & The Maritime Strategy

110

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Document signed by:

SECNAV W. Graham Claytor (1977-9)

2nd year in office

Went on to become Carter Administration Deputy Secretary of

Defense, Acting Secretary of Transportation (1979-81)

Article signed by:

Under SECNAV R. James Woolsey (1977-9)

2nd year in office

Went on to become Bush Administration CFE Ambassador

(1989-91); Clinton Administration CIA Director (1993-5)

56

111

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

What it was

Billed as a “force planning study”

“Major source document of DoN planning and policy”

Massive SECRET study Book length (889 pages in two volumes)

UNCLAS abridgement of Executive Summary Medium length (23 pages)

SECDEF Brown tasked SECNAV Claytor (Aug 1977)

SECNAV Claytor signed (Mar 1978)

Under SECNAV Woolsey summarized in International Security (Summer 1978)

“Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom”

112

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Why it was written To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily through forward, global, offensive US naval operations

To try to reverse policies & concepts underlying PRM 10, PD 18, general Carter Administration/SECDEF Brown defense policy & strategy, & US Army/USEUCOM recommendations on US defense policy & strategy, especially focus on central Europe & ground combat

To bolster Congressional Navy supporters in ongoing bitter inter-branch government debates on funding more carriers, esp. CVN-71

To act as an advocacy vehicle for SECNAV Claytor & USN Woolsey

Principal target: NSC staff, SECDEF & OSD, Joint Staff, OPNAV, Capitol Hill

57

113

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (I) Early in 2nd year of Carter administration

SECDEF Brown (1977-81) Robert Komer as Special Assistant for NATO Affairs

SECNAV Claytor; USN Woolsey

Outgoing CNO ADM Holloway

Low US economic growth; high unemployment and very high inflation

U.S. government deficit spending plateauing


Executive branch, Congress reluctant to intervene overseas in 3rd world (“Vietnam syndrome”)

Congress blocked US aid to anti-Communist forces in civil war in newly-independent Angola (1975-6)

114

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (II)

Administration defense focus on NATO central

region & USN SLOC protection

Focus on ASW, ASUW, AAW, readiness, not strike,

amphibious ops

NSC PRM 10 & PD 18 policies slighted Navy roles

OMB Randy Jayne indicted Navy for incoherence

Bitter internal US government CVN, VSTOL budget

debates, culminating in carrier-less FY 79 DOD &

presidential budget proposal (Feb 1978)

Congressional dissatisfaction with Carter

Administration naval policies, especially omission

of new CVN in FY 79 defense budget proposal

58

115

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (III)

USN in 1978: 468 battle force ships, & starting to

increase somewhat; 18 new ships authorized

DON budgets fluctuating modestly

Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal

1974: Zumwalt HASC recommendation: 600 ships

1974: Holloway HASC recommendation: 600 ships

1974: DEPSECDEF HASC statement: 575-600 ships

1977: NSDM 344: About 600 ships in mid-1990s

1977: Outgoing SECDEF Rumsfeld: “closer to 600 than to the present 485 ships” by mid-1990s

New systems entering USN fleet

CWC becoming institutionalized in fleet

116

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (IV)

Soviet fleet buildup

Especially submarines & Backfire-B bombers w/ ASMs

Increasing Soviet “out-of-area” deployments

OPNAV morale rattled

Resurgence of OP-06 influence within OPNAV; increasing dissatisfaction with OP-96-led analytical program planning as intellectual center of naval thought

Unofficial “Commanders Cabal” DC-area officer

discussion group (late 1970s)

Convener: CDR Norm Mosher

Members included Sea Plan 2000 contributors, OP-06 and

OP-96 staff officers

59

117

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (V)

Increasing USAF minelaying, surveillance support at sea

US Army implementing defensive operational doctrine

focused on Europe

Internal Army resistance to defensive concepts building, esp. at

TRADOC

Soviets deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe (1977)

US rapprochement with PRC

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dead (1976)

Deng Xiaoping takes power (1978)

Periodic Korean crises

Tree-cutting incident & Operation Paul Bunyan (1976)

Communist regime in Vietnam aligned with USSR


118

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (VI) Increased Soviet interventions in 3rd world

Operations & plans Jordanian crisis (1970)

Cienfuegos crisis (1970)

Indo-Pakistan War (1971)

Mideast War/ resupply of Israel (1973)

Mayaguez incident & amphibious raid (1975)

Increased war gaming activity at NAVWARCOL Center for Advanced Research created (1975)

ONI “Newport Detachment” created (1977)

60

119

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: (VII) Non-DOD policy experts

Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)

Adopted & advocated “lo” end of Zumwalt “hi-lo mix”

RADM (Ret) Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)

“Team B” assessment of Soviet threat (1976)

Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (1976)

John Lehman as independent US Navy CNO consultant

120

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context (VIII)




But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

61

121

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Cited references

NSSM 3 (1970)


(1977)

SEN Taft “White Paper on Defense” (1976)

Other (DOD papers, congressional reports,

studies & theses)

121

122

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: Other contemporary publications (I)



Flexible response

Robert Komer RAND studies on NATO (1973-6)

Esp. Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80) (Nov 1976)

Collaborator: CAPT Ernie Schwab USN (Ret)

NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) (1977-78)


Consolidated Guidance

JSCP & OPLANS 122

62

123

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Context: Other contemporary publications (II)

NSDM 344 Navy Shipbuilding Program (Jan 1977)

Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers

Based on NSC study on “U.S. Strategy and Naval Force

Requirements” (Sep 1976)

John Lehman helped draft

GAO UNCLAS report on NSC study (Mar 1978)

PD 27 Procedures for Dealing with Non-Military

Incidents (1978)

USN-USAF MOA on cooperation at sea (1975)

US Army FM 100-5 Operations (“active defense”) (1976)

123

124

Context: Other contemporary publications (III)

ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” US Naval

Institute Proceedings articles (w/ USN flag officer

commentaries) (1974)

Bound & published as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)


Record & Binkin (Brookings), Where Does the Marine

Corps Go from Here? (1976)

Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks it could

Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” (Commentary Jul 1977)

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

124

63

125

Context: Other contemporary publications (IV) NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)

USN SEAMIX I study (1973)

USN SEAMIX II study (1975)

CNA Sea War 85 study (1975-8) Atlantic campaign in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war

(Scenario for Tom Clancy (LT Larry Bond) Red Storm Rising)

CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings ongoing (1977-9)

CNO ADM Holloway NWP 1 “Strategic Concepts” drafting efforts ongoing

USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978) Ongoing simultaneously

Re: CVNs, CVVs, VSSs, etc.

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

125

126

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)


SECNAV Claytor, USN Woolsey requested SECDEF

authorize DON study of range of USN roles (Jul 1977)

SECDEF so tasked SECNAV (Aug 1977)

To examine probable range of naval tasks

A series of policy and feasibility analyses

USN-USMC study group drafted

Director: F.J. (Bing) West, Jr. (NWC civilian professor; former

USMC)

12 military team members (10 USN; 2 USMC)

Staff incl/ LCDR Ken McGruther (NWC) & LCDR Jim Stark

(OPNAV OP-965), OP-06 representatives, others

64

127

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

How it was written (II) SECNAV Graham Claytor, USN James Woolsey, VCNO ADM Robert Long active oversight

No significant CNO (ADM Holloway) role

Liaison with ADM Hayward & staff (CINCPACFLT)

Influence of consultant Hon. John Lehman

Analytic support: Presearch, Inc. Len Gollubin, President

Tensions between “policy analysts” & “quantitative analysts”

SECNAV delivered study to SECDEF (Mar 1978)

USN Woolsey summarized in International Security (Summer 1978)

128

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Outline (UNCLAS Executive Summary) Introduction

The international environment

Basic study findings and trends

U.S. security objectives: General

Security objective: Maintenance of stability

Security objective: Containment of crises

Security objective: Deterrence of global war

Security objectives and naval missions: A summary

Force/funding options

Assessment of Sea Plan 2000 force alternatives

Fiscal assumptions

65

129

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Key ideas (I):

3 national security objectives & 7 USN Missions

I. Maintain stability

1.Forward deployments

II. Contain crises

2. Calibrated use of force against the shore

3. Superiority at sea in a crisis setting

III. Deter global war

4. SLOC defense

5. Reinforcement of allies

6. Pressure upon the Soviets

7. Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future

No priorities given

Disregarded Zumwalt/Turner & Holloway typologies

130

Sea Plan 2000 (1978) Key ideas (II):

Soviet Union the dominant threat, across the spectrum

One single dominant force sizing criterion is wrong focus for naval forces

Carriers necessary, important, not highly vulnerable

New technology enabled strike fleets to win Especially Aegis, EW

Entire Volume II addressed technology assumptions

Navy-Marine Corps team

Sufficient numbers of ships are important Especially carrier numbers

Vital role of USN forces in supporting, influencing allies But far less on contributions of allied naval forces

“Forward naval operations can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a land war in Europe”

NATO Europe center & flanks interdependent

66

131

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Key ideas (III)

Deter major war: USN contributions

War with Soviets will be global

USN forces should take the offensive worldwide

Operate forward & increase risks to Soviets

Survivable USN SSBN force

USN SLOC protection

Support allies

Capability to open second front, especially in Pacific

Hedge against uncertainty of where & how war would start

A primary use of naval forces:

Contain conflicts & so prevent outbreak of major conflict

132

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Key ideas (IV):

Passing mention of “blockade” as a naval activity

3 USN force level alternatives

Option 1

439 ships (1% budget growth)

Option 2


Option 3


67

133

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

134

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

68

135

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

What was new? (I)

Major Navy future force level needs study (since at least

1945)

Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO involvement

Drafting by committee

Peace-crisis-war spectrum used as framework

7-mission construct

USN lead in anti-air warfare touted

Aegis system introduction

136

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

What was new? (II)

Naval forces can be decisive in crises & in war with

Soviets

Horizontal escalation

Strong USMC amphibious assault role

Call for perception management

Naval forces can prevent major global war through

containing lesser conflicts

Identification of four “uncertainties” to hedge against

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Not addressed (in UNCLAS “Executive Summary”)

Priorities among missions

World trade issues

Jointness

U.S. Army


Mine warfare

Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Response


US Coast Guard

US Merchant Marine

US inter-agency partners

138

Sea Plan 2000 (1978) Subsequent analyses & critiques

James Hessman, “Sea Plan 2000,” Sea Power (May 1978)

“Notebook,” US Naval Institute Proceedings (Jun 1978)

GAO, How Good Are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces? (Feb 1980)

John Allen Williams, “Strategies and Forces of the U.S. Navy: A Critical Reappraisal,” Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1981)

Francis J. West et al., Review of USN Long-Range Planning (CNA, 1985)

ADM (Ret) Stansfield Turner “The Future of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Quarterly (Winter 1992)

John Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (Naval War College Press, 2004)

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Criticisms: Unrealizable

Unrealistic funding assumptions

Overly optimistic re: Soviet threats

Questionable assumptions

Too carrier-centric

Overly focused on conventional anti-Soviet warfighting & offensive sea control; not enough on defensive sea control or 3rd world contingencies (CAPT John Allen Williams USNR) (1981)

Not aligned with contemporary national defense policies

GAO critique “How Good are Recent Navy Studies Regarding Future Forces”

“Executive Summary” not always congruent with analysis

140

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Influence:

Highly controversial for a few years

Center of intense open & classified discussions on

USN roles & forces

Used to support arguments inside & outside Congress

for increased Navy funding, especially for CVN 71

Led to increased DOTMLPF focus on power projection

Experience helped develop new cadre of USN

strategists (e.g.: LCDR Stark, LCDR McGruther)

Influenced 1980s efforts by OP-603 & SSGs

Launched Global War Games to test hypotheses

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Sea Plan 2000 (1978)

Why did it have the influence it did?

Strong SECNAV, Under SECNAV, VCNO, other USN

leadership involvement & ownership

Most coherent & detailed compilation to date of Navy

strategy views in current world & US policy context

Study format & study team composition limited buy-in

by the fleet

Soon superseded by CNO ADM Hayward views & The

Maritime Strategy (which incorporated many elements)

142

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)


Strong & direct conceptual influence on “The Future of

U.S. Sea Power” and The Maritime Strategy

Horizontal escalation

Centrality of naval strike & amphibious assault

Vital importance of NATO flanks & NE Pacific

Enumeration & analysis of uncertainties

“Peace-crisis-war” framework used in The Maritime

Strategy, Forward . . . From the Sea, Navy Operating

Concept, & Sea Power 21

Also, Sea Plan 2000 influenced USCINCPAC ADM Long

Pacific Campaign Plan, which formed core construct for

2nd version of The Maritime Strategy (1984)

ADM Long had been VCNO overseeing Sea Plan 2000

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143

ADM Thomas B. Hayward (CNO Jul 1978-Jun 1982)

Jan 1979 CNO Strategic Concepts (Top Secret)

Jan 1979 CNO Posture Statement (UNCLAS)

May 1979 The Future of U.S. Sea Power

(UNCLAS)

Fundamental principles

144


Naval aviator

Naval War College & National War College

graduate; George Washington University

International Affairs master’s degree

Extensive previous experience in Navy program

planning

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145


Began term as CNO having developed new

theater strategies for the Pacific & influenced

Sea Plan 2000

Previous tours as post-Vietnam Commander, Seventh

fleet, then Commander, Pacific Fleet

Within 6 months as CNO had expanded on his

Pacific theater thinking to embrace the globe

Maintained same course for duration of his term

146


Created flag officer dialogue during 1st year in office

Encouraged NAVWARCOL Global War Game

Created CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG)

Expanded mandate of OP-095 directorate to

encompass all naval warfare; moved responsibility

for warfare area program planning from OP-96 to

OP-095 (1980)

Created OPNAV Long-Range Study Group (OP-

00X) (1980-82)

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147

CNO Strategic Concepts (1979)

148

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)

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149


Overview Signed by CNO ADM Hayward (May 1979)

Primary targets: OSD, Congress, USN officer corps

CLAS briefings & letter; then UNCLAS Posture Statement & very short (6 pp) article

Principal drafter: CNO Executive Assistant

“Fundamental principles of naval strategy”

Call for USN maritime superiority, indeed, supremacy

Global forward, offensive USN ops vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact

More allied naval contributions encouraged

12 CVBGs the centerpiece

Need to keep USN technological edge

Heavy influence on The Maritime Strategy

150


Signed by:

CNO ADM Thomas B. Hayward

Successive versions within 1st year in office

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151

The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979) What it was

Billed as “Fundamental principles of naval strategy”

Classified versions

TS “CNO Strategic Concepts” (Jan 1979)

Vetted at Flag Officer conferences

Briefings

Then much shorter UNCLAS versions

FY 1980 CNO Report (“Posture Statement” (Feb 1979)

Testimony before House Seapower Subcommittee (Feb 1979)

Very short (7 pages)

US Naval Institute Proceedings “Naval Review” issue article “The Future of Sea Power” (May 1979) culled from testimony

Very short (6 pages)

Briefings

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Why it was written (I)

To show USN relevance to conflict with Soviets, primarily

through forward, global, offensive US naval operations

Dampen Zumwalt/Turner/Carter emphasis on SLOC protection

Influence & change perceptions about utility of USN

By U.S. political leadership

By Soviets

Explain why US needed “maritime superiority” – even

“supremacy” – especially in war with the Soviets

Elevate debates on USN budget to strategic level, especially

to provide rationale for high-quality platforms & systems over

less capable ones, and to deploy 12 carrier battle groups

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To catalyze US Navy strategic thinking:

To influence and/or resist Carter Administration policies (1978-80)

To influence Congressional policies toward the Navy (1978-80)

To prepare for possible Administration change (1980)

Expand CNO ADM Hayward’s earlier C7F & CPF fleet

operational concepts to global policy & strategic level

Primary targets: OSD, Capitol Hill, USN officer corps

To achieve internal USN consensus, based on evolution of

ADM Hayward’s thinking

154


Context (I)

3rd year of Carter administration (1977-81)

SECDEF Brown (1977-81)

Robert Komer now Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Continued Carter administration focus on NATO

central region & USN SLOC protection

New CNO ADM Hayward (1978-82)

Low US economic growth; high unemployment and

very high inflation


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155


Context (II)

Continuing Soviet interventions in 3rd world

Esp. Afghanistan Communist coup (1978)

Continuing US rapprochement with PRC

Deng Xiaoping takes power in PRC (1978)

Soviet-aligned Communist regime in Vietnam invaded,

occupied PRC-aligned communist Cambodia (1978)

Emerging concerns over oil security & Gulf region

Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords (Sep 1978)


SALT II Agreement limitations (1979)

156


Context (III)

Continuing Soviet Navy build-up

Especially submarines, Backfire-B bombers with ASMs

Continued increase in Soviet “out of area” deployments

USN force levels rising modestly; DON budgets flat

USN in 1979: 471 ships; 16 new ships authorized

New systems deploying in USN Fleet

CWC concept becoming institutionalized in fleet

CMC full member of JCS (1978)

Increasing USAF minelaying, ISR support at sea

US Army developing new, more offensive operational doctrine

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Context (IV)

Intensified bitter internal US government debates on

carrier funding (1978-79)

Congress added unrequested CVN 71 to FY 79 defense

budget (Aug 1978)

President Carter vetoed entire budget bill due to CVN funding

Congress could not override CVN veto (Oct 1978)

CVN $ to other USN, Army, Air Force programs

CAPT John McCain head of OLA (1977-1981)

Feb 1979 DOD budget request for FY 80 included

CVV

US economic slowdown (1979)

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Context (V)

NIFTY NUGGET worldwide DOD mobilization & deployment

command post exercise (1978)

Exposed weaknesses in joint inter-modal integration, including

sealift

Led to Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) establishment (1979)

Major public debates on US defense policy & strategy

Military Reform Movement (SEN Hart & Bill Lind)

Retired RADM Gene Laroque & Center for Defense Information (CDI) (1972)

Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) revitalized (from 1976) (Paul Nitze, John Lehman, etc.)

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Context (VI)

Evolving 600-ship Navy force goal

OPNAV morale wavering

VADM Bill Crowe (OP-06) & RADM Bob Hilton (OP-60) created new OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) (1978)

CDR Hank Mauz, CDR John Bitoff, CDR Bill West, LCDR Phil Dur, LCDR Joe Strasser, LCDR Peter Swartz, etc.

Global War Games began at Newport (1979)

Examined US-USSR war issues

TACTRAGRUs created

Unofficial “Commanders Cabal” DC-area officer discussion group continued

(late 1970s) Convener: CDR Norm Mosher (OP-965)

160

The Future of US Sea Power (1979)

Context (VII)




But NATO CINCSOUTH ADM Turner had planned to move forces to western Med & LANT in time of crisis (1975-7)

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161


Context: Important contemporary publications (I) (none cited in document)



Flexible response

NATO Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) (1978)


CINCPACFLT ADM Hayward “Sea Strike” briefings (1977-9)

CAPT William Cockell & CAPT James Patton

NSDM 344 “Navy Shipbuilding Program” (Jan 1977)

Lame duck Ford Admin call for 600 ships; VSTOL carriers 161

162


Context: Important contemporary publications (II)

(none cited in document)

Consolidated Guidance


(1977) & PD 18 US National Strategy (Aug 1977)

USN-USAF MOAs on cooperation at sea (1975, 1979)

Sea Plan 2000 naval force planning study (1978)

USN Sea Based Air Platform Study (Feb 1978)

CNA outer air battle studies

John F. Lehman, Jr., Aircraft Carriers: The Real

Choices (1978)

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The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979) Context: Important contemporary publications (III) (none cited in document)

NIE 11-15-74 Soviet Naval Policy and Programs (Dec 1974)

Jamie McConnell et al. (CNA), “Strategy & Missions of the Soviet Navy” (1978), etc.

ADM Gorshkov, “Navies in War and Peace” US Naval Institute Proceedings articles in (w/ USN flag officer commentaries) (1974)

Bound as Red Star Rising at Sea (1974)


Taft-Hart-Lind White Paper on Defense (1978 ed.)

Gen Sir John Hackett, The Third World War, August 1985 (1978)

Col John Boyd USAF briefings on defense reform, maneuver warfare, OODA Loop (1970s)

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Drafted by CNO EA (CAPT Cockell)

Sovietologist w/ law degree

Prior tour as ADM Zumwalt’s CEP Director (OP-00K)

Influenced by Hayward CEP Director CAPT Jim Patton (OP-OOK)

Fletcher School Ph.D.

Prior tour on SECSTATE Kissinger Policy Planning Staff

Heavy personal CNO ADM Hayward involvement

Influenced by recent fleet experience as C7F, CINCPACFLT

Influenced by previous OPNAV experience as Director, Navy Program Planning (OP-090)

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How it was written (II)

Roots: Hayward thinking in fleet as C7F, CPF (1976-9);

previous experience as USN program planner (OP-090)

“Sea Strike:” Hayward-Cockell-Patton-Dr. Al Brandenstein

PACFLT “prompt offensive action” concept vs. Soviet Far East

To pin Soviet forces in place in global war (& avoid PACFLT

“swing” to LANT/EUR), influence PR /Japan decisions (1977-79)

Leveraged existing & new USN technologies. Included USMC

Listed “incompatibilities” that impeded implementation

“Sea Strike” existed only in briefing format. An alternative

concept. Did not reflect actual war plans of the period

Tested in at sea exercises & war games

“Influenced Sea Plan 2000; CINCPAC (former VCNO) ADM Long

PACOM campaign plan; subsequent PACOM, PACFLT war plans

166


How it was written (III)

Circulation to flag officers by TS memo as “CNO

Strategic Concepts” (TS) (Spring 1979)

Numerous flag officer conferences (1979)

Opinions & insights debated

Annapolis, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, San Diego

Publicized externally through briefings, Congressional

testimony, US Naval Institute Proceedings article

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CNO Strategic Concepts (TS) (1979)

Key ideas (I):

Focus on global conventional war with Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact

NATO had global concerns

War in Europe the least likely scenario

USN NORLANT convoy escort only one of many important USN roles

Why & how a war starts will influence USN response capabilities

Uncertainties re: Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea

Strategic nuclear forces & other contingencies not considered

168


Key ideas (II):

Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw

Pact (continued)

NATO-Pact War will be global

USN must be offensively capable to destroy Soviet forces

US is and will be outnumbered

USN margin of superiority = carriers & at-sea sustainability

USN must not mirror-image Soviets

USN must retain technological superiority

USN must draw on sister services & allies

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169


Key ideas (III):

Global Conventional War vs. Soviet Union, Warsaw

Pact (continued)

US must capitalize on Soviet geographical disadvantages

& defensive mentality

USN must fight with what it has on hand

USN must use tactics that ensure favorable attrition ratios

NATO northern flank has direct impact on NATO center

The “Swing Strategy” is an anachronism

US must prioritize key areas & choose order for sequential

control, given limited USN force levels

170


Key ideas (IV): Call for USN “maritime superiority” (even “supremacy”)

“Sea Control” & “Power Projection” seen as “confusing” concepts

Soviet Union the priority threat

War with Soviets will be global

Not confined to Central Europe

Swing strategy an anachronism

US & Allied naval forces will do more in global war with Soviets than protect sea-lanes

Offensive strike operations

Exploit Soviet disadvantages

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Key ideas (V):

12 CVBG minimum: The centerpiece & priority

Need to distribute USN offensive capability among

greater number of platforms

But quality of platforms has priority over quantity Need

for highly capable USN platforms

Vs. Low-end USN ships

Offensive USN ops/ systems have priority over defensive

Need to keep USN technological edge

Sequential operations necessary, given USN force levels

Need for perception management

172


Key ideas (VI):

Discussion of:

8 principles

5 conclusions

Regions of the world

No priorities provided

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173


What was new?

Fleet origins

Call for allied & sister service support to achieve

maritime superiority

Emphasis on the Persian Gulf & access to oil

Call for favorable attrition ratios

Role of naval forces post-conflict

174


Not addressed

Priorities among regions

Non-Soviet threats

US Marine Corps

Amphibious assault


Sealift

U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. Merchant Marine

U.S. industrial base & shipbuilding industry

US inter-agency partners

US Air Force & US Army

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ADM (Ret) Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., “Total Force,” US

Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1979)

In same issue as ADM Hayward article

Focus on SLOC protection as well as NATO flanks

Pessimistic on Soviets, USN CVN vulnerability

Advocated “hi-lo mix” of USN platforms

“Comment & Discussion,” US Naval Institute

Proceedings (Jul-Dec 1979; Jan 1980)

John Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime

Strategy, 1977-1986 (2004)

Gregory Vistica, Fall from Glory (1995)

CAPT James Patton (Ret), “Dawn of the Maritime

Strategy,” US Naval Institute Proceedings ( May 2009)

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176


Criticisms

Too ambitious. Unexecutable

Not aligned with contemporary Carter Administration

national defense policies

Over-emphasis on power projection & carrier strike

warfare; neglect of SLOC security

Only European theater should matter, not Pacific

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Influence: Significant, and grew over time

Began to forge a consensus within the Navy on USN rationale

Engaged Navy Flag Officers & OPNAV staff

Set stage for Strategic Studies Group (SSG) & influenced Global War Games

Influenced Capitol Hill debates

Congress replaced DOD-requested CVV with unrequested CVN 71 in FY 80 defense budget (Oct 1979)

Weakened President Carter did not veto; signed into law (Dec 1979)

Later christened USS Theodore Roosevelt (1984)

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Why this influence?

Powerful, clear, simple messages

Direct CNO involvement & ownership

Repetition

Reinforced by fleet exercises & Global War Games

Not aligned well with Carter administration defense policy when written

But aligned with rising popular, Congressional defense views

Increasingly aligned with new Carter Administration focus on power projection & Third World ops in wake of fall of Shah of Iran & Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (late 1979)

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Strong & direct conceptual influence on The Maritime

Strategy

Especially calls for:

Global offensive forward ops vs. Soviets,

Sister service & allied naval support to USN

Perception management

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1970s: Text & content of each document

Can be found in John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval

Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents (2007)

CNA studies on U.S. Navy strategies and their context Swartz, Peter M., U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider

before you write one, (CQR D0020071.A1/Final, March 2009). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010): A Brief

Summary, (MISC D0026437.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction,

Background and Analyses, (MISC D0026421.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume I, (MISC D0026417.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-2010): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Volume II, (MISC D0026417.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy,

Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026414.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026418.A1/ Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1981-1990): Strategy,

Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026415.A1, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1981-1990): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026419.A1/Final (December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1991-2000): Strategy,

Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026416.A2/Final, March 2012). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (1991-2000): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026420.A2/Final, March 2012). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (2001-2010): Strategy,

Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents, (MISC D0026241.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, The U.S. Navy in the World (2001-2010): Context for U.S. Navy

Capstone Strategies and Concepts, (MISC D0026242.A2/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., and Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010):

Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume I, (MISC D0026422.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-2010):

Comparisons, Contrasts, and Changes: Volume II, (MISC D0026423.A1/Final, December 2011). Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz, Organizing OPNAV (1970-2009), (CAB

D0020997.A5/2Rev, January 2010). Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy – U.S. Air Force Relationships 1970-2010, (MISC

D0024022.A4/1Rev, June 2011). These documents supersede Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1970-2009), (MISC D0019819.A1/Final, February 2009.)

4825 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22311-1850 703-824-2000 www.cna.org

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