COVER: Vietnamese board CH-53s in Sai-gon 's LZ 39, aparking lot. The 9th MAB ex-tracted39i Americans and 4,475 Vietnameseand third-country nationals in April 1975.Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A150961

U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAMTHE BITTER END

1973-1975

by

Major George R. DunhamU.S. Marine Corps

and

Colonel David A. QuinlanU.S. Marine Corps

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONHEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1990

Volumes in the Marine CorpsVietnam Series

Operational Histories Series

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and CombatAssistance Era, 1977

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1965, The Landing and the Buildup, 1978

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding IVar, 1982

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1984

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1969, High Mobility and Standdown, 1988

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1970-1971, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1986

In Preparation

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1968

US. Marines in Vietnam, 1971-1973

Functional Histories Series

Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971, 1985

Marines and Military Law in Vietnam. Trial by Fire, 1989

Anthology and Bibliography

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-19 73, An Anthology andAnnotatedBibliography,1974, reprinted 1983; revised second edition, 1985

Library of Congress Card No. 77-604776

PCN 190-003109-00

Foreword

This is the ninth volume in a nine-volume operational and chronological historical ser­ies covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate functionalseries complements the operational histories. This volume details the final chapter inthe Corps' involvement in Southeast Asia, including chapters on Cambodia, the refu­gees, and the recovery of the container ship SS Mayaguez.

In January 1973, the United States signed the Paris Peace Accords setting the stagefor democracy in Southeast Asia to test its resolve in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Theresult was not a rewarding experience for America nor its allies. By March 1975, democra­cy was on the retreat in Southeast Asia and the U.S. was preparing for the worst, thesimultaneous evacuation of Americans and key officials from Cambodia and South Viet­nam. With Operation Eagle Pull and Operation Frequent Wind, the United States ac­complished that task in April 1975 using Navy ships, Marine Corps helicopters, and theMarines of the III Marine Amphibious Force. When the last helicopter touched downon the deck of the USS Okinawa at 0825 on the morning of 30 April, the U.S. MarineCorps' involvement in South Vietnam ended, but one more encounter with the Com­munists in Southeast Asia remained. After the seizure of the SS Mayaguez on 12 May1975, the United States decided to recover that vessel using armed force. Senior com­manders in the Western Pacific chose the Marine Corps to act as the security force forthe recovery. Marines of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines playeda key role in the events of 15 May 1975 when America regained control of the ship andrecovered its crew, concluding American combat in Indochina and this volume's history.

Although largely written from the perspective of the III Marine Amphibious Force,this volume also describes the roles of the two joint commands operating in the region:the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, and the United States Support Activities Group,Thailand. Thus, while the volume emphasizes the Marine Corps' role in the events ofthe period, significant attention also is given to the overall contribution of these com­mands in executing U.S. policy in Southeast Asia from 1973 to 1975. Additionally, a chapteris devoted to the Marine Corps' role in assisting thousands of refugees who fled SouthVietnam in the final weeks of that nation's existence.

The authors, Major George Ross Dunham and Colonel David A. Quinlan, individual­ly worked on this volume while assigned to the History and Museums Division, Head­quarters Marine Corps. Colonel Quinlan, who is now retired and resides in Hartford,Connecticut, began the book in 1976. Major Dunham, who recently retired and residesin Dunkirk, Maryland, inherited his co-author's work and completed the majority of thevolume during his tour from 1985 to 1990. Both authors are graduates of the U.S. NavalAcademy and have advanced degrees. Colonel Quinlan, who was an infantry officer, hasa juris doctor degree from George Washington University (1979) and Major Dunham,who was an aviator, has a master ofarts degree in history from Pepperdine University (1976).

f?d£:~E. H. SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

111

Preface

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall payany price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, opposeany foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty.

John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address20 January 1961

US. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973-1975 is a story about commitment,sacrifice, and the price America and its ally, South Vietnam, paid. It answers no ques-tions, places no blame, and offers no prophetic judgement, but provides an historicalaccount of the end of a state and the beginning of new lives for those fortunate enoughto escape that upheaval. This description of the United States Marine Corps' involvementat the bitter end of America's military presence in Southeast Asia also traces the effectsof uncontrolled fear on a society fighting for its survival.

The effect of fear on the fighting man on the battlefield was no different in 1975 inSouth Vietnam than it was more than 2,400 years earlier, when the Athenians foughtto defend their beloved city. In preparing his Marines and sailors for battle in thePeloponnesian War of 429 B.C., and anticipating their fear of death, Phormio of Athenstold them:

Fear makes men forget, and skill which cannot fight is useless.

The South Vietnamese Armed Forces in the spring of 1975 were rendered useless asa fighting force. No level of training or skill, no program of Vietnamization, no amountof money could have reversed the rampant spread of fear that engulfed all of South Viet-nam in March and April of 1975. Incredible acts of courage temporarily checked the na-tion's slide into oblivion, at places like Xuan thc and Bien Hoa, but fear ruled the day.Its only antidote, courageous leadership at the highest levels, rapidly disappeared as theNVA war machine gained momentum. As one senior leader after another opted to usehis helicopter to evacuate rather than to direct and control the defensive battle, strategicretreats turned into touts and armies turned into mobs of armed deserters. Amidst allthis chaos, the U.S. Marine Corps aided its country in the final chapter of the VietnamWar, the evacuation of American citizens, third-country nationals, and as many SouthVietnamese as conditions permitted.

To describe those events accurately, the authors used, for the most part, original sources,including interviews of many of the participants. A debt of gratitude is owed to manypeople for the compilation and collation of that material. In particular, we thank theother Services and their respective historical agencies for their contributions, with a spe-cial note of appreciation due to Dr. Wayne W. Thompson and Mr. Bernard C. Nalty,both of the Office of Air Force History, and Dr. Edward J. Marolda of the Naval Histori-cal Center. A large portion of the available source material was provided by the staff ofthe Marine Corps Historical Center and for that contribution we are very appreciative.In particular, we thank the Historical Center librarian, Miss Evelyn A. Englander, andarchivist, Mrs. Joyce Bonnett, and their staffs; the Reference Section (Mr. DannyJ. Craw-ford and staff); the Oral History Section (Mr. Benis M. Frank and Mrs. Meredith P. Hart-

V

vi

ley); and the Publications Production Section (Mr. Robert E. Struder, Mrs. Catherine A.Kerns, Mr. W. Stephen Hill, and Corporal Andre L. Owens III). Of course, history can-not be read until it has been written, and rewritten, and for that demanding task of edit-ing, we thank the Chief Historian, Mr. Henry I. "Bud" Shaw,Jr.; the head of the VietnamHistories Section, Mr. Jack Shulimson; and our colleagues in the section who had to readour work in its most primitive state (Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Solis, Major CharlesD. Melson, and Mr. Charles R. "Rich" Smith). To those whose names are too many tomention here, we extend our sincerest gratitude for loyalty and special acts of assistancein this project, and for those who reviewed our manuscript and contributed commentsand pictures, we offer you a book bearing your imprint, and our thanks. The authors,however, are responsible for the content of the text, including opinions expressed andany errors in fact.

We would like to salute every Marine and American who served in Vietnam and dedi-cate this book to those who paid the ultimate price for the "survival and success of liberty."In particular, we commend the sacrifice of the four Marines who died in South Vietnamon 29 April 1975: Lance Corporal Darwin D.Judge; Corporal Charles McMahon,Jr.; FirstLieutenant Michael J. Shea; and Captain William C. Nystul; and ask that the fourteenMarines who lost their lives on Koh Tang in Cambodia, on 15 May 1975, also not beforgotten.

GEORGE ROSS DUNHAM DAVID A. QUINLAN

Table of Contents

Foreword iiiPreface vTable of Contents viiList of Maps x

PART I THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. . . .. 1

Chapter 1 The War Goes On. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2Paris Peace Accords.................................................. 2The NVA Marshals in the South. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7A Division of Marines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 16

Chapter 2 The United States Presence in Southeast Asia 22The Forces in Thailand 22The Forces Afloat. 27The III Marine Amphibious Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29Americans Ashore................................................... 36The Marines in Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37

Chapter 3 Contingency Planning " 40The Plan for Cambodia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 42Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52

Chapter 4 The Fleet Marines are Readied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55The Air Contingency BLTs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55The Eagle Pull Command Element. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 57The 31st MAU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 60The Other Contingency 65

PART II SOUTH VIETNAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 67

Chapter 5 The North Vietnamese Winter-Spring Offensive, 1974-75:The Mortal Blow..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 68

The Collapse of the Central Highlands " 68Defeat in Military Region 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 76A Wasted Division " 79

Chapter 6 The Evacuation of South Vietnam's Northern Provinces. . . . . . . . . . .. 85The Amphibious Evacuation RVN Support Group " 85Initial Operations in Vietnamese Waters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 88Military Sealift Command Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 92Meeting the Needs.................................................. 97

PART III OPERATION EAGLE PULL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 99

Chapter 7 The Evacuation of Phnom Penh 100The Khmer Rouge 100The Khmer Communists' Last Dry Season Offensive 102

Vll

viii

The Marines Move into Position 105

Final Preparations Ashore 111

Final Preparations at Sea 115

The Execution of Eagle Pull 119

PART IV ENDING AN ALLIANCE 125

Chapter 8 The Other Contingency 126

Marine Security Guard Detachment, Da Nang 127

Military Region 2: Nha Trang 131

III MAF and the NVA Onslaught 132

9th MAB and Task Force 76 136

The Brigade 138

Chapter 9 Planning the Evacuation 143

Brigade Planning and Liaison 143

The Restructured 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade 146

The Concept 148

Additional Forces, Plans, and Liaison 152

DAO Planning: The SPG and Project Alamo 155

Chapter 10 The Final Days 160

The AESF 160

Xuan Loc Remembered 168

Saigon and the Final Preparation Pieces 170

Consulate Marines 173

PART V OPERATION FREQUENT WIND AND A NEW BEGINNING 177

Chapter 11 The Evacuation 178

9th MAB 181

The DAO Compound 183

The Embassy 195

Chapter 12 Refugee Operations 204A Link to Freedom: The Exodus and a New Beginning 204

Way Stations 207Preparations: 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and the Task Force 212

Evacuation and Passage: Frequent Wind and the AESF's Final Chapter 216

A Vietnamese City in Guam 222The Final Link: Camp Pendleton 228

PART VI AFTER 'VIETNAM' 237

Chapter 13 Recovery of the SS Mayaguez . . . . 238

The Mayaguez Crisis .. . .238The Initial Decisions . . . .239Assault Preparations . . . . 242

The First Assault Wave . . . . 245

The Linkup .. . .253The Second Wave ... .255The Retrograde . . . . 257

The Aftermath . . . . 262

Chapter 14 Epilogue . .. . 266

NOTES. 269APPENDICES

A. Command and Staff List, Southeast Asia, 1973-1975 281

B. Command Staff, BLT 2/4, 29-30 April 1975 284C. U.S. Marine Officers Serving in Billets in

South Vietnam and USSAG, Thailand, 1973-1975 285D. Company C, Marine Security Guard Battalion, January-April 1975 286E. Mayaguez Rescue Force (BLTs 2/9 and 1/4), 12-15 May 1975 287F. Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 288G. Chronology of Significant Events, 1973-1975 294H. List of Reviewers 296I. 1st Battalion, 4th Marines Detachments, 3-11 April 1975 298J. Frequent Wind Forces 299K. Helicopter Flow Table for Frequent Wind 300

INDEX 302

ix

x

List of Maps

Ho Chi Minh Trail Network 9

Southeast Asia, 1973-1975 41

Phnom Penh Evacuation Sites, 197 3-1974 49

The Battle of Phuoc Long, December 1974-January 1975 69

The Fall of Ban Me Thuot, 10-18 March 1975 72

Administrative Divisions of South Vietnam 75

Military Region 1, VNMC Division AO, 1 January-15 March 1975 77

Military Region 1, VNMC Division AO, 15-31 March 1975 81

The Khmer Communists' Last Dry Season Offensive 103

Phnom Penh Evacuation Sites, 12 April 1975 112

USS Okinawa and 31st MAU, 1200-2000, 12 April 1975 117

Da Nang City, 2 7-30 March 1975 130

Administrative Divisions of South Vietnam 134

The Fall of Xuan Loc, 9-22 April 1975 135

Administrative Divisions of South Vietnam 161

The Fall of Saigon, 2 5-29 April 1975 167

Potential Evacuation Sites 173

USS Okinawa and Task Force 76, 29-30 April 1975 180

DAO/Air America Complex 191

Mayaguez Recovery, 15 May 1975 243

PART I

THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE

IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

CHAPTER 1

The War Goes OnParis Peace Accords—The NVA Marshals in the South—A Division of Marines

Fifteen minutes after noon on 29 April 1975, unitsof the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB)received the order to execute Operation FrequentWind, the plan for emergency evacuation of noncom-batant civilians from Saigon, and to supply the finalepisode of Marines in Vietnam. Less than two hourslater, the first elements of the 9th MAB's ground secu-rity force (GSF) landed in South Vietnam for the lasttime. Specifically organized to provide security for theevacuation landing zones, the first elements of the 9thMAB entered the Defense Attache Office (DAO) com-pound at 1506 Saigon time. The men were met by:

the cheers of awaiting evacuees, almost all ofwhom were overcome by emotion at the sight of theorganized and well disciplined Marines."l

These troops, many of whom were veterans of previ-ous Vietnam battles, provided protection for the refu-gees in the DAO Compound. With the departure ofthe last evacuee, the Marine security force beganreturning to the safety of Seventh Fleet ships. Elementsof the GSF also deployed to the American Embassyin Saigon where a few Marines remained until the bit-ter end. As the last CH-46 helicopter lifted off theEmbassy rooftop at 0753 on 30 April with 11 Marineson board, U.S. involvement in South Vietnam ended.*

Paris Peace Accords

The signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 27Janu-ary 1973 represented a formal end to hostilities.Negotiated at the Paris Conference on Vietnam, itwould serve as an important backdrop to events in acountry where war seemed endemic.

The "Agreement on Ending the War and RestoringPeace in Vietnam" required the United States and itsallies to cease military activity and leave South Viet-nam within 60 days of the signing. To accomplish this,the Paris Accords required the U.S. to dismantle allits military bases and withdraw all military personnelincluding its advisors to the Republic of Vietnam

*For the Majine Corps, involvement began in 1954 with thesignment of the first Marine advisor (Lieutenant Colonel VictorJ.Croizat), continued with the insertion of a helicopter task force atSoc 'Thang in 1962, and increased significantly in March of 1965 withthe landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang.

Armed Forces. By 27 March the conclusion of the60-day implementation phase, South Vietnam and theUnited States had completed most of the changes re-quired by the Accords and its protocols. The absenceof the same effort and commitment on the part of theNorth Vietnamese and the Viet Cong would soon de-fine the meaning of "peace" in Vietnam. In essence,the precarious balance of power in Southeast Asia andthe future of South Vietnam rested on a piece ofpaper.

For the critical transition from war to peace, the Ac-cords empowered three commissions to oversee the im-plementation phase and resolve any differences. TheFour-Power Joint Military Commission (JMC)represented each belligerent: the United States, SouthVietnam, North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong. At theconclusion of the 60-day cease-fire, this commissionwould in theory shed its protective outer garment (U.S.and North Vietnam) and become the Two-PowerJointMilitary Commission, an insular body representing theinterests of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)and the Provisional Revolutionary Government ofSouth Vietnam (PRG, the Viet Cong). The third com-mission, and the most important one, involved inter-national participation in the transition to peace.Entrusted to regulate and oversee the implementationof the Accords' articles, the International Commissionof Control and Supervision (ICCS) consisted of fourmembers: Canada, Hungary, Poland, and Indonesia.2The ICCS bore the implied responsibility of enforce-ment, but lacked the power to do more than reportthe violations to the Joint Military Commission. TheICCS was to cease functioning when the Accords' pro-visions had been fulfilled, signalled by a supervisednational election and the installation of the newgovernment's elected officials. The ICCS' goal and thefinal determinant of its existence would be the attain-ment of this "peace," but in the interim the commis-sion's immediate and overwhelming problem wouldbe settlement of territorial disputes and ceasefire vio-lations. Final resolution of these and any other mat-ters pertaining to the Accords ultimately required aunanimous vote of the JMC. This rarely happened.

The Four-Power Commission attempted to deal with

THE WAR GOES ON 3

Photo courtesy of Capt Russell R. Thurman, USMC (Ret)

Two CH-53Ds from HMH-462 carrying elements of2d Battalion, 4th Marines head forSaigon. The first helicopter landed in the DAO compound at 1506 on 29 April 1975.

The Paris Peace Accords, with this introduction, were signed by the U.S., South Viet-nam, North Vietnam, and the ProvisionalRevolutionary Government on 27 January 1973.It restricted the U.S. to a maximum of 50 military personnel in South Vietnam.

AGREENT ON ENDING THE WAR

AND

RESTORING PEACE IN VIET-NAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on

Viet-Nam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in

Viet—Nam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's

fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's

right to self-determination, and to contributing to the

consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake to

respect and to implement them:

4 THE BlUER END

charges and countercharges of landgrabbing, decep-tion, and deceit by both the North and South Viet-namese. Having little or no success, it merely servedas a conduit for frustration and diplomatic infight-ing. The U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam, andViet Cong representatives of the Four-Power groupresolved little, leaving as a legacy to the Two-PowerJoint Military Commission (South Vietnam and VietCong) and the International Commission of Controland Supervision unresolved problems, misguided ef-forts, and mutual distrust.

The ICCS, virtually powerless, found enforcementof the Paris Peace Accords impossible. The North Viet-namese indifference and flagrant disregard of thepeace terms so frustrated Canada that it gave propernotice and quit the commission on 3lJuly 1973. An-nouncement of the decision to withdraw came on theheels of the 15 July Viet Cong release of two Canadi-an observers whom the Communists had illegallyseized and held captive since the 28th of June. Aftera personal request from President Richard M. Nixonto Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Iran agreed toreplace Canada on the ICCS and on 29 August its first

observers arrived in South Vietnam. The new mem-ber soon learned what Canada and the other mem-bers of the ICCS already knew: some of the signatoriesto the Paris Peace Agreement had chosen to ignoretheir own words. Just prior to its departure fromSoutheast Asia, Canada charged that North Vietnamregularly had been violating Article 7 ". . . by mov-ing thousands of troops into South Vietnam and thatthe infiltration was continuing on a 'massive' scale."The terms of that part of the protocol allowed onlya one-for-one replacement of worn-out or damagedarmaments, munitions, and war materials, andprecluded anyone from introducing troops, militaryadvisors, or military personnel including technical as-sistants into South Vietnam.

The Communists argued that the United States didnot adhere to the spirit of the Accords. General TranVan Tra, the Viet Cong representative to the Four-Power Commission, maintained that the United Statesand South Vietnam attempted to use the agreement,"in accordance with their existing plans, . . . to paci-fy, encroach, and build a strong army in order tochange the balance of forces in their favor and gain

Between 27 January and27 March 1973 the last American military forces left South Viet-nam. US. Army soldiers and US. Air Force airmen board a plane bound for the UnitedStates while representatives of the four-power Joint Military Commission observe.

Marine Corps Historical Collection

. / /1

I

t

THE WAR GOES ON 5

complete control of South Vietnam."*8 He further al-leged that the United States violated three articles ofthe Peace Accords: Article 8 of the Protocol by leav-ing behind in Vietnam all "their weapons, ammuni-tion, and military equipment"; Article 3 by

withdrawing troops prior to a withdrawal plan ap-proved by the Four-PowerJMC and supervised by theICCS; and Article 6 by failing to submit a plan forU.S. base dismantlement and in fact dismantling nobases when it had agreed to dismantle all of them.Tran Van Tra accused the Americans of a deception"brazen beyond words" because they had told him,

we have no bases in South Vietnam. All of themwere turned over to the Republic of Vietnam prior tothe signing of the agreement. [We] are now stationedin camps temporarily borrowed from the Republic ofVietnam.' "8

Even more critical than the issue of total removalof U.S. forces and their allies from South Vietnam wasthe question of what to do with North Vietnamesetroops still occupying RVN territory. It represented dis-agreement between the United States and its ally. Inattempting to conclude a peace acceptable to all par-ties, President Richard M. Nixon authorized HenryKissinger, head of the U.S. delegation in Paris, to agreeto North Vietnam's demands. This decision did notmeet with President Nguyen Van Thieu's approval.During the ongoing negotiations in Paris, the leaderof South Vietnam repeatedly had voiced his opposi-tion to any agreement which would allow North Viet-nam to leave its troops in the Republic of Vietnam.To President Thieu this military arrangementrepresented an important strategic advantage for theCommunists and a decided disadvantage for thegovernment of South Vietnam (GVN), and it onlyserved to intensify his displeasure with the Accords.Neither the events in Paris nor Kissinger's overtureshad changed his position. Thieu contended thatAmerican estimates placing North Vietnamese mili-tary strength in the South at 140,000 were "imaginaryand misleading" and suggested that the actual figurewas not less than 300,000. Yet in the end when con-fronted with the possibility of a unilateral signing by

*Some of Tran Van Tra's statements are based on highly ques-tionable sources as evidenced by his use of a quote from a reportissued on 6 April 73 by the Committee to Denounce War Crimesin Vietnam, a U.S. antiwar group. He writes: "In the 2-month periodbetween 28 January and 28 March 1973, the Saigon administra-tion violated the Paris Agreement more than 70,000 times, including19,770 landgrabbing operations, 23 artillery shellings, 3,375 bomb-ings and strafings of liberated areas, and 21,075 police operationsin areas under their control." B2 Theatre, pp. 18-19.

the United States and Nixon's repeated pledges thatthe U.S. would"'.., take massive action against NorthViet-Nam in the event they break the agreement,'President Thieu reluctantly agreed to comply with theterms of the Paris Peace Accords. It would not be hislast tough decision nor would he have to wait longfor his concerns to become reality.9

Despite serving as voting members of the Joint Mili-tary Commission responsible for maintenance of thepeace, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong openlyviolated the ceasefire agreement. Using force where-ver necessary to accomplish political ends, Communistmilitary activities focused on strategically importantareas. One such area and the site of numerous cease-fire violations was the Mekong River which played acentral role in the resupply of Cambodia and U.S. sup-port of that government.** On 29 June 1973, Con-gress altered that role when it voted on theCase-Church Amendment, a measure to end militaryassistance to Cambodia. Unlike its predecessor, theCooper-Church Amendment which had attempted toban combat activity in Cambodia in 1970, this riderto a continuing funding resolution passed. It prohibit-ed the United States, after 15 August 1973, from en-gaging in any combat activity in Indochina, especiallyair operations.*** Without U.S. combat air supportto protect the overland lines of communication, the

**ln 1970, a coup replaced Prince Norodom Sihanouk, an avowedneutralist, with Lon Nol, who openly professed his alliance withthe United States, which then immediately recognized the new Cam-bodian government and began aiding it in its struggle with Com-munist insurgents. For more information on Cambodia, see Chapter7.

***In response to the American incursion into Cambodia in 1970,Senator Frank F. Church, a Democrat from Idaho, and SenatorJohnSherman Cooper, a Republican from Kentucky, cosponsored anamendment to the Foreign Militaiy Sales Act which would have pro-hibited the use of American troops and advisors in Cambodia andoutlawed direct air support of Cambodian forces. It passed the Senatebut failed in the House and when finally passed on 29 December1970 as part of the Defense Appropriations Bill, it only barred theintroduction of U.S. ground troops in Laos and Thailand. Two yearslater, Senator Church and Senator Clifford P. Case, a Republicanfrom New Jersey, combined forces to sponsor a bipartisan measurebearing their names. Its passage in June 1973 reflected the grow-ing disenchantment of Congress with even minimal American in-volvement in Asian combat. In December 1973, Congress passedyet another ban on combat activity in Southeast Asia. This one,a part of the foreign aid bill, forbade the use of any funds for mili-tary operations in or over Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. Col HarryG. Summers,Jr., Vietnam Almanac (New York: Facts On File Pub-lications, 1985), pp. 132-133; "Senate OKs Another War Curb' FactsOn File (1973), p. 498; and "Foreign Aid Authorized," Facts OnFile (1973), p. 1078.

6 THE BIITER END

Mekong River supply link became even more impor-tant, representing Cambodia's best chance for survival.North Vietnam, recognizing the strategic value of thisborder area, already had begun offensive operationsto harass the civilian population and disrupt daily ac-tivities. The U.S. Navy in its segment of an April 1973Defense Attache Office report described the effects ofthe Communists' ceasefire violations in this region ofSouth Vietnam:

In the area of the Tan Chau Naval Base there are now nocivilians. Because of the daily artillery attacks of the NorthVietnamese communists the civilian populace has relocat-ed to Chau Dot and Long Xuyen. . . . Since the beginningof the recent attacks (approx. 1 month) over one hundredcivilians have been killed and hundreds wounded. ICCS in-spection teams have visited the sites of the atrocities, butfor fear of being rocketed themselves disappear after a shortvisit.10

In the face of diplomatic agreements to the con-trary, including a second ceasefire signed by the UnitedStates and North Vietnam on 13 June 1973, the warbetween North and South Vietnam continued. TheNorth Vietnamese shifted the emphasis from batt-lefield engagements to logistics. Part of North Viet-nam's plan was to deprive the South Vietnamese andCambodian forces of their supplies while at the sametime reinforcing its positions and, when able, stock-piling supplies for future actions.

Military and political control of the countryside inwestern South Vietnam and eastern Cambodia madeit possible for North Vietnam to modify its warfight-ing methods while still continuing to develop its long-range strategy. In prophetic testament to the chang-ing tides of war and the shift in North Vietnam'speacetime battlefield tactics the authors of the U.S.Navy's portion of the April 1973 DAO Report wrote:"The decision of the enemy to control the "BlueWater" Mekong River as well as establish Hong Nguas an entry point to Vietnam makes for a determinedenemy."'

There was no "peace" in sight as conditions in SouthVietnam seemed to indicate that no one really want-ed the Paris Accords to work. Despite the uncertaincombat conditions and the numerous ceasefire viola-tions, the Marine Corps adhered to the terms of theAccords. It terminated the Vietnamese Marine CorpsAdvisors Program, thereby reducing its presence to ahandful of officers in the reorganized Defense AttacheOffice, Saigon, and a Marine Security Guard compa-ny. A Commander Naval Force Vietnam message, 13

March 1973, said in pan: "The Marine Advisory Unit,NAVADVGRP, MACV will be disestablished effective29 Mar 73 . . . . With the disestablishment of the Ma-rine Advisory Unit, follow-on technical and materialsupport to the Vietnamese Marine Corps will be coor-dinated by the VNMC Logistics Support Branch, NavyDivision, Defense Attache Office, Saigon."12

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) appoint-ed Major General John E. Murray, USA, an expertlogistician, to head the DAO and serve in the capaci-ty of defense attache. An Army officer who had be-gun his career as a private in July 1941, Major GeneralMurray quickly discovered that defense attache dutyin Saigon in 1973 would differ significantly from thenorm. As the senior American military officer in SouthVietnam, he would work with the Ambassador, butreport to the Secretary of Defense. The Ambassadoronly had direct authority over the defense attache inthe area of public affairs and media matters. A brief-ing on his mission responsibilities provided him withhis clearest indication of the drastic changes under-way in Vietnam: "One of the things I was told my as-signment entailed was not to lose any more Americanlives. And number two, I was told to get the hell outof there in one year."3 America was leaving SouthVietnam and Major General Murray had been chos-en to complete Vietnamization with a staff of 50 mili-tary men. Of the 50 assigned to the DAO, only fourwere Marines. In fact, within two months of DAO'sfounding, the entire American military complementin South Vietnam totalled less than 250 men, a farcry from the peak total of 543,400 in April 1969.'

With such a minimal presence in Vietnam, theUnited States had difficulty influencing events. Thissituation most affected the enforcement of Article 8.More than any other part of the Paris Accords, Article8 (MIA Accountability) depended on good faith andcooperation.' Mutual trust and confidence, alreadyin short supply, became even scarcer when discussionfocused on the accountability of personnel missing inaction. An international point of humanitarian con-cern, MIA accountability, quickly became the mostserious Peace Accords issue. The Communists not onlyfailed to cooperate in resolving the status of Ameri-cans and others missing in action, but also actively ob-structed United States and South Vietnamese effortsto do so. On 15 December 1973, in a rice paddy 15miles southwest of Saigon, the Communists ambushedan American-South Vietnamese team searching (as

THE WAR GOES ON 7

permitted by the agreements) for the bodies of miss-ing Americans.* Fatalities included one U.S. Armyofficer, Captain Richard Morgan Rees, of Kent, Ohio,and one South Vietnamese pilot.16 In addition to theseveral injured South Vietnamese, the ambush wound-ed four American servicemen including Army FirstLieutenant Ben C. Elfrink. The seemingly mild, offi-cial U.S. reaction to this unwarranted killing of oneof its military officers (unarmed) on aJMC-sanctioned,MIA recovery mission reflected the American public'sgrowing detachment from Southeast Asian affairs.Americans had begun to view Indochinese events asSouth Vietnam's problems. Besides registering a pro-test with the ICCS and North Vietnam, the UnitedStates did little else. A few days later, a Des MoinesTribune editorial, entitled "Murder in Vietnam," cap-tured the relationship between the "non-action" andthe subtle changes underway in America: ". . . givingup searching for American servicemen would be sadbut not as sad as running the risk of more incidentswhich might give some U.S. military men a reason totake 'necessary measures.' Surely the military establish-ment, the administration, and Congress have learnednot to walk into that mess again."7

In Vietnam, the DAO had already begun its analy-sis of the ambush in an attempt to discern the Com-munists' purpose and intent. In a "back channel"message to the Pentagon, Major General Murrayoffered his conclusions: "The enemy's hostility towardJCRC operations has been clearly demonstrated in theambush . . . . All search operations are subject to ene-my intervention . . . we see no definite change in theenemy's attitude The only change that did oc-cur was for the worse. In June 1974, the North Viet-namese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government(PRG) broke off all negotiations on MIAs by refusingto meet with the United States and South Vietnameserepresentatives.18

The PRG, having already (May 1974) stoppednegotiating with the South Vietnamese on mattersmandated by the Paris Accords, merely concluded themasquerade by supporting the North Vietnamese on

*Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. "Tony" Grimm, Plans Officer,USSAG, Thailand, from April 1974 until April 1975, rememberedthat "The lasting impact of the enemy ambush ... was that Am-bassador Graham Martin ordered a halt to any future JCRC opera-tions in RVN. From then on theJCRC had to rely on. . . broadcasts

and leaflets encouraging Vietnamese villagers to free their hamletsfrom the spirits of dead Americans." LtCol Edward A. Grimm, Com-ments on draft ms, 28Nov88 (Comment File, MCHC).

Photo courtesy of LtCol George E. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

LtCol George E. 'jody" Strickland chiefof the DAOVNMC Logistics Support Branch which helped supplythe Vietnamese Marine Corps, poses in MR 1 with thecommander of 4th Battalion, 147 Brigade, VNMC,LtCol Tran Ngoc Toan, shown here as a maJor

the MIA issue and jointly they ended all negotiations.Ceasefire meant "less fire," but little else without con-sultation, cooperation, and some form of negotiations.

The NVA Marshals in the South

Immediately after the signing of the Accords, at thebeginning of the ceasefire, there was a noticeabledecline in the level of combat activity throughoutSouth Vietnam.** This was cause for considerable op-timism in Washington and elsewhere. Yet, the abate-ment in violence was merely a sign that the NVA hadsubscribed to new methods. Even though the Com-munists' tactics had changed, their strategy had not.

**U.S. Congressional records reveal that ARVN soldiers killeddropped from 28,000 in 1972 to 13,500 in 1973. On the last dayof December 1974, when the statisticians compiled the totals forthe year, a new trend became readily apparent, war had again sup-planted peace. ARVN troops killed in action in 1974 were 30,000.Senate Report Vietnam, p. 1, and House Report Vietnam, p. 45.

North Vietnam's objective was still the conquest ofSouth Vietnam, and the planned lull in fighting al-lowed it to refit and reinforce its units, reconstruct itslines of communication, and replenish its supplies inthe south. During the early stages of this marshallingperiod, the NVA continued to maintain a militarypresence in South Vietnam and to apply pressure tothe Army of the Republic of Vietnam through local-ized small unit actions. While the North Vietnameseparticipated in these disruptive activities, the Ameri-can public remained largely uninformed; Vietnam wasno longer front-page news.

By May of 1974, U.S. analysts agreed that Hanoiplanned to continue its buildup in the south, and,in a matter of a few months, would have enough troopsto conduct a major offensive. At year's end, thestrength increase of the North Vietnamese forces inSouth Vietnam was so dramatic that some expertspredicted an imminent attack.'

Although aware of the North Vietnamese Army'spreparations and its size, American analysts still be-

lieved that if any large-scale attack occurred, it wouldfail. By basing their forecast on the command and con-trol inflexibility displayed by the North Vietnamesein both the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 EasterOffensive and the expectation of effective air support,the analysts erred. Lieutenant Colonel George E."Jody" Strickland, who served in Saigon at the DAOas the Chief, Vietnamese Marine Corps thgistic Sup-port Branch, Navy Division (Chief, VNMC LSB), fromJune 1973 untilJune 1974, offered his candid recollec-tion of this evaluation: "The dichotomous assessmentof an imminent NVA attack on one hand and the fore-cast of its failure on the other had obvious detrimen-tal influences." Lieutenant Colonel Strickland relatedthat despite the prediction of failure most Americansand South Vietnamese still vigorously prepared for theanticipated enemy offensive, including the VietnameseMarine Corps (VNMC) which reacted by ". . . build-ing up supplies, hardening defenses, and expandingreconnaissance and offensive operations in MR 1."20Yet others refused even to consider the possible con-sequences of an NVA success. The American Embassy,

8 THE BlUER END

North Vietnamese Army Photo

North Vietnamese Army soldiers build the Truong Son highway in western South Viet-nam. Vietnamese Marines reported the activity in 1973, but RVN troops couldn't stop i.

• -4

THE WAR GOES ON 9

Map adapod from Col WIIrnm E. I.o Gro, USA. Vrot,rom from Crmr-Ffro to Coprtrrhotio,r (Washington: U.S. Army Crnsrr of Military Hirrory, 1981)

—IWENT/ANE

-.t_

N

THAILAND

Bafl'ambang I

\K.arnpong Cham ,_

Loc

- TayPHNOM PENH

J_ \fa Tien

Can Thou

OLF-

- ,Xuan Loc

SAIGON01 4

MvTho Ta.i

C

HO CHI MINH TRAIL NETWORK

100 MILES

0 100 KILOMETIRS

10 THE BlUER END

a bastion of optimism thrcughout this period, react-ed to the forecast by agreeing to a reduction in thesize of its security force and by refusing to acknowlegethe need for contingency evacuation plans. The con-flicting opinions on the extent of the North Viet-namese Army's progress and its offensive capabilitypersisted until the bitter end. Fourteen years later,Strickland proffered his opinion of the consequencesof this argument, stating: "Conflicting GYN [Govern-ment of Vietnam] decisions at the start of the 1975NVA offensive were rooted in the disastrous predic-tion of NVA failure."21

The failure never occurred because of exhaustive ef-forts by the North Vietnamese to remedy longstand-ing deficiencies in command and control. Developingnew lines of communication became their "peacetime"mission and evidence of significant new constructionreflected the priority attached to it. Beginning, notby coincidence, with the ceasefire and immediate free-domfrom U.S. air interdiction, the Communists builtor improved a road network that ran from North Viet-nam through the western reaches of the three north-ernmost regions in South Vietnam. East-west spursfrom the main highway ran into the A Shau and QueSon valleys in the northern part of South Vietnam andinto the Central Highlands. Aerial photographs in De-cember 1974 revealed the extent of these improve-ments.* In western Thua Thien Province, a mere trailtwo years prior had become a hard-surface, all-weatherroad. Formerly a trek to South Vietnam on foot con-sumed 70 days, but now North Vietnamese Armytrucks could carry a battalion from North Vietnam toMilitary Region 3 in less than three weeks. With NVAtroops riding instead of walking a majority of the dis-tance, the number of casualties from fatigue, malar-ia, and other diseases significantly decreased?2

Yet without a sufficient supply of petroleumproducts, the Communists' road network meant lit-tle. North Vietnam could not sustain a major offen-sive in South Vietnam without a guaranteed sourceof fuel. To satisfy this need and properly complementtheir improved LOCs, the NVA constructed an oilpipeline from North Vietnam extending almost toPhuoc Long Province in South Vietnam. The lengthof pipeline in South Vietnam totalled 280 miles, ofwhich about 270 were constructed after, and in viola-

*Lieutenant Colonel Strickland stated that the road's discoverywas reported by VNMC LSB personnel as early as August 1973 atwhich time airborne hand-held photos were provided to the DAO,VNMC, and HQMC. Strickland Comments.

tion of, the ceasefire.23 General Van Tien Dung boast-ed of this accomplishment: "Alongside the strategicroad to the east of Tuong Song range was a5,000-kilometer-long oil pipeline which ran fromQuang Tn through the Tay Nguyen and on to LocNinh. "24

With the opening of the pipeline, the NVA nolonger had to rely for petroleum, oil and lubricant(POL) on barrels laboriously man-handled into posi-tion and cached in the countryside. In addition to thesupplies of petroleum which it was able to store inSouth Vietnam, the NVA by January of 1975 hadstockpiled an estimated 65,000 tons of ammunition.One estimate projected that this amount of ammu-nition could support an operation of the intensity ofthe 1972 Easter Offensive for at least one year. TheCommunists now possessed sufficient fuel to put these"bullets" to good use. 25

By enhancing the means of transport which allowedan increase in the frequency of replenishment, theNorth Vietnamese Army almost doubled the numberof artillery pieces and quadrupled the number of tanksit had in South Vietnam. Between January 1973 andJanuary 1975, the enemy increased the number of ar-tillery weapons in the South from 225 to an estimat-ed 400. In armored firepower, the NVA expanded itsforce from an estimated 150 to approximately 600100mm gun tanks including Soviet-built T-54s andChinese Type 59s. Ominously indicating their inten-tions, the North Vietnamese also augmented theircombat power by increasing the number of antiaircraftartillery (AAA) regiments in South Vietnam from 13to 23. This threat included four battalions of the SA-2surface-to-air missile, which they deployed in thenorthern part of South Vietnam, just below thedemilitarized zone, from Khc Sanh to Dong Ha. Inaddition to the SA-2s, the NVA emplaced radar-directed 85mm and 100mm AAA guns in MilitaryRegion 1. The North Vietnamese also reintroducedsizeable quantities of the SA-7 (Grail), a man-transportable, shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missilewhich complemented its improved antiaircraftcapability.26 Because of the higher altitude potentialof this antiaircraft system, it became increasingly morehazardous and difficult for the South Vietnamese tofly close air support missions, particularly in the north-ern provinces. Lieutenant Colonel Strickland recalledthat during his tour (June 1973-74), "VNAF [SouthVietnamese Air Force] close air support for the Viet-namese Marine Corps was virtually zero."27 With

THE WAR GOES ON 11

Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtCol Anthony Lukeman, pictured later as a lieu-tenant general, replaced LtCol Strickland in 1974 as

chief of the VNMC LSB. In that year he was concernedover severe cuts in funds for the Vietnamese Marines.

almost no interdiction from the air, the NVA wastedlittle time in exploiting this window of opportunity.The North Vietnamese Army's combat troops in SouthVietnam, judged at the end of 1973 to be in excessof 149,000, grew in the next 12 months to over185,000. Additionally 107,000 support personnel sta-tioned in South Vietnam assisted the frontline troopsby keeping the lines of communication open. Besidesthese regular soldiers, unofficial reports in January of1975 placed 45,000 guerrillas in the Republic of SouthVietnam.28

At first cautious, especially in the months immedi-ately following the ceasefire, the North Vietnamesesoon pursued their activities with impunity as theSouth Vietnamese showed themselves ineffectual instopping the build-up. By its own admission, theNorth Vietnamese Politburo, which directed the mili-tary activities in South Vietnam, kept a weather-eyecocked toward the United States to gauge the reac-tion to each of its moves. They needed no reminderthat a powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet in the South Chi-na Sea and an equally powerful U.S. Seventh Air Forcebased in Thailand were disconcertingly close. Yet whatthey did not see and hear, especially in the South Viet-

namese skies, reassured them and encouraged muchbolder actions in the days ahead.29

During Fiscal Years (FY) 1974 and 1975, the U.S.Congress slashed budget line items providing militaryaid to South Vietnam. Although not cut entirely, thefunding equaled only 50 percent of the administra-tion's recommended level. During FY 1973 the Unit-ed States spent approximately $2.2 billion in militaryaid to South Vietnam. In FY 1974, the total droppedto $1.1 billion. Finally, in FY 1975, the figure fell to$700 million, a trend that was not misread in Hanoi.As General Dung very candidly phrased it, "Thieu[President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam] wasforced to fight a poor man's war."3° Perhaps more dis-tressing, as far as the recipients of the military aid wereconcerned, was the fact that by 1975 the dollars spentfor certain items were buying only half as many goodsas they had in 1973. For example, POL costs were upby 100 percent, the cost of one round of 105mm am-munition had increased from 18 to 35 dollars, and thecost of providing 13.5 million individual rations ex-ceeded 22 million dollars. Considering the steadyreduction in funding and the almost universal increasein prices, the South Vietnamese in 1975 could buyonly about an eighth as much defense for the dollaras they had in 1973.'

InJune 1974, just before the start of FY 1975, Lieu-tenant Colonel Anthony Lukeman replaced LieutenantColonel Strickland as Chief, VNMC LSB. Almost im-mediately he began to notice the effects of the reducedfunding, less than a third the size of the 1973 budg-et. In September, in a letter to HQMC, he pennedhis concerns:

Briefly, the current level means grounding a significantpart of the VNAF [South Vietnamese Air Brce], cutting backon the capabilities of the VNN [South Vietnamese Navy],and running unacceptable risks in the stock levels of am-munition, POL, and medical supplies. I am concerned itwill mean, in the long run, decreased morale, becausereplacement of uniforms and individual equipment will startto suffer about a year from now, and the dollars spent onmeat supplements to the basic rice diet will be cut way back.At this point, the planners have concentrated (understand-ably) most of their attention on shoot, move, and commu-nicate" but have lost in the buzz words a feel for the manwho will be doing those things.32

The South Vietnamese attempted to adjust to thedecreased funding and rising costs, but each of theseadjustments had the effect of placing them in a moredisadvantageous position relative to the strengthenedNorth Vietnamese forces. The tempo of operations ofall services, most particularly the Air Force, was cut

12 THE BIITER END

back to conserve fuel. The expenditure rate of muni-tions also dropped. Interdiction fire was all but halt-ed. The decreased financial support forced the SouthVietnamese to consider cutting costs in all areas ofdefense including the abandonment of outposts andfire bases in outlying regions.

The overall impact of the budget reduction on theallocation of military monies was readily apparent. InFY 1975 at the $700 million level all of the fundedappropriations were spent on consumables. There wasnothing left over for procurement of equipment toreplace combat and operational losses on the one-for-one basis permitted by the Paris Accords. Handcuffedby a lack of funds, the South Vietnamese could der-ive little comfort from an agreement which authorizedboth sides to resupply selectively as losses occurred.

In an effort to increase South Vietnam's purchas-ing power while complying with restrictions imposedby the Accords, the U.S. reduced the number ofcivilian contract maintenance personnel in South Viet-

nam. These U.S. civilians provided highly technicalassistance to the South Vietnamese in the areas ofmanagement, maintenance, and supply. The reduc-tion in the availability of their critical skills had animmediate and debilitating effect on the overall read-iness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Technical ex-pertise and training, an important element insuccessful combat service support, became a criticalfactor in the highly complicated task of maintainingreliable aircraft. The Vietnamese tried to shouldermore of the burden in this area, but as expected, theysuffered severely from lack of experience. It requiredseveral years to develop the skills necessary to managea field as complex as aviation maintenance, and thattime did not exist.

In an oversight hearing to develop the FY 1975budget, the Subcommittee of the Committee on Ap-propriations of the House of Representatives discussedthe merits of Fiscal Year 1975 military assistance toVietnam. A comparison of raw statistics relating to ar-

The UH- 1 helicopter, shown here, could carry a ft:ht crew and 12 soldiers. The SouthVietnamese operated 861 UH- is; helicopters totaled more than 40 percent of R V/V aircraft.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A801616

I

w

tillery reveals how misleading the numbers game reallywas. In total numbers of artillery pieces, the SouthVietnamese were down from 1,600 at the time of theceasefire to 1,200 in January of 1975. On paper thisstill presented a distinct advantage for the South Viet-namese when compared to the estimated 400 tubesthe North Vietnamese operated in South Vietnam. Ifthe comparison ended there, the South Vietnameseenjoyed an imposing three-to-one edge over the NVA.Yet the characteristics of the weapons presented a vastlydifferent picture. The North Vietnamese wereequipped with 85, 100, 122, and 130mm guns, all ofwhich could fire faster with a longer range than theirSouth Vietnamese counterparts. The ARVN, mean-while, possessed primarily 105mm and 155mm howit-zers. They augmented this array of weapons with 8017 5mm guns, the only ones with enough range to firecounterbattery, while all of the enemy's artillery pos-sessed this capability. Compounding this problem wasthe fact that the ARVN by this time was fighting abasically static war from fixed positions, budget reduc-tions having limited their ability to conduct prudentclearing and counter-offensive operations. In contrastthe NVA enjoyed relatively unrestricted freedom ofmovement. With the ability to mass its weapons atthe time and place of its choosing, the NVA gaineda significant edge. To neutralize the NVA advantage,the ARVN used air support, which often during timesof critical need was not available, and when on sta-tion, usually ?neffective.

The question surrounding the reliability of air sup-

port arose from the combined effects of funding cut-backs and enhanced North Vietnamese AAAcapability. This combination had a detrimental im-pact on the readiness and effectiveness of the SouthVietnamese Air Force (VNAF). The VNAF numberedsome 62,000 men and was subdivided into six air di-visions with bases at Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, TanSon Nhut, Binh Thuy, and Can Tho. At the time ofthe ceasefire, South Vietnam operated 2,075 aircraftwith Article 7 of the Accords allowing a one-for-onereplacement of lost aircraft. More importantly, theVNAF composition reflected a serious degradation infirepower and the ability to suppress the enemy's airdefense system. The South Vietnamese strike force con-sisted of 388 attack aircraft (79 A-is, 248 A-37s, iiAC-47s, and 50 AC-119s) and 143 F-5A/B fighters. In1972 it added two squadrons (32 aircraft) of C-l3OAsto its arsenal, significantly modernizing its transportfleet of 56 C-7s, 14 C-47s, 16 C-119s, and 19 C-123s.Still, the bulk of the VNAF, over 44 per cent, consist-ed of helicopters: 861 UH-ls and 70 CH-47s. Thus thisseemingly impressive figure of 2,075 aircraft quicklytranslated into only 391 jet-propelled fighter and at-tack aircraft and no electronic warfare planes capableof neutralizing the enemy's highly effective, mobileair defense system.36

The North Vietnamese had used extensive numbersof radars to build a very deadly air defense networkcentered around three closely integrated weapon sys-tems. As General William W. Momyer, a former com-mander of the Seventh Air Force, later wrote: "The

THE WAR GOES ON 13

Photo courtesy of BGen William A. Bloomer, USMC (Ret)

An EA-6B Prowler cruises near ships of the Seventh Fleet providing electronic counter-measures support to the Navy-Marine Corps team. These aircraft of VMCJ-1 would flyfrom the USS Coral Sea around the clock in support of Operation Frequent W7ind

r'I. 4

F

14 THE BITTER END

air defense in North Vietnam was a thoroughly in-tegrated combination of radars, AAA, SAMS, andMiGs. It was Soviet in design and operation."37 Thiscombination of high speed aircraft (MiGs), antiaircraftartillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) like the SA-2,and numerous radar sites posed a serious threat to al-lied air superiority. To insure the primacy of allied airpower, this enemy challenge had to be met with in-creasingly more sophisticated American weapons sys-tems and antiair procedures. Before the ceasefire, thesemethods included jamming enemy radars using elec-tronic counter-measure (ECM) aircraft such as the AirForce EB-66 and the Marine Corps EA-6A, high speedavoidance maneuvering (possible with low-flying, verymaneuverable, tactical fighters —F-4s, A-4s, and A-7s),sophisticated detection devices installed on specific air-craft (code-named Wild Weasel) to detect, harass, anddestroy SAM sites, and introduction of antiradiationmissiles, precision-guided munitions (PGM5, such aslaser-guided "smart bombs"), and chaff bombs (fullof metallic strips used to confuse NVA radars attempt-ing target identification).38

Although most of the Communist air defense sys-tem remained in place in North Vietnam, some of itappeared near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in 1972.When North Vietnam launched the Easter Offensivein April 1972 it deployed SA-2s, radars, and a hand-held weapon, the SA-7, in support of its army. Thepresence of this modernized, mobile, ground airdefense system in South Vietnam had immediate con-sequences for the United States and significant long-term effects for the VNAF: "No longer was it feasibleto operate below 10,000 feet without using counter-measures."39 The presence of the SA-7 with its heat-seeking missile meant that "low and slow" aerial deliv-ery of munitions was unsafe and, as such, outdated.The alternative was to fly higher where the results weremuch less predictable. The SA-7, in effect, had re-moved a third of South Vietnam's attack aircraft fromthe battlefield as the Soviet-built weapon virtually"put some aircraft such as the A-i out of business."40

In 1972, the United States countered this NVA movewith new ECM and anti-SAM tactics including moresophisticated chaff delivery, flares to confuse the SA-7,and introduction of a new jamming aircraft, the Ma-rine Corps' EA-6B Prowler. As successful and neces-sary as these measures proved to be, the United States,bound by the terms of the 1973 Paris Accords, hadno choice but to remove its aircraft and highly tech-nical weapon systems from South Vietnam. Overnight,

the VNAF arsenal lost its means of suppressing theenemy's ground air defenses. The United States hadbequeathed the South Vietnamese Armed Forces anair-ground team absent its most essential element, airsupremacy. General Momyer succinctly summarized,"The contest for air superiority is the most importantcontest of all, for no other operation can be sustainedif this battle is lost. To win it, [one] must have thebest equipment, the best tactics, the freedom to usethem, and the best pilots."' The South VietnameseAir Force had none of these. Possibly worse, it had noall-weather attack aircraft like the A-6A Intruder, nonavigational bombing punch in the form of F-4 Phan-toms equipped with special electronic equipment (Lo-ran), and no B-52s. Instead, out of necessity, theVNAF relied on the belief that, when needed, U.S.air power, technological aid, and money would beforthcoming. This belief would persist until the bit-ter end. Former Commandant of the Vietnamese Ma-rine Corps and a member of the Joint General Staff(JGS), Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, ex-pressed the psychological and emotional importanceof that faith: "We needed only one American planeto come in and drop one bomb to let the North Viet-namese know we were still getting strong U.S. support.We felt at that time (1975) if we could get one planeor a little bit of air support the war might change."2

Compounding their strategic problems were tacti-cal and logistical problems. By 1 January 1975, theSouth Vietnamese had suffered the loss of 370 aircraftas a result of operational training and combat. Noneof these aircraft was ever replaced. The South Viet-namese simply could not afford replacement aircraft.Additionally, 224 aircraft were placed in flyable storagebecause the spare parts and petroleum products need-ed to keep them flying could not be funded withinthe constraints of the new $700 million U.S. budgetpackage. The i,48i operational aircraft in the SouthVietnamese inventory on 1 January 1975 reflected atwo-year attrition of nearly 25 percent. The debilitat-ing effect of unreplaced aircraft losses and an impos-ing NVA antiaircraft threat had combined to producea South Vietnamese Air Force simply incapable of neu-tralizing the North Vietnamese firepower advantage

With South Vietnam's air force nearly impotent, thenavy represented a potential alternative. The U.S. Navyhad provided gunfire support for ground operationsprior to the ceasefire and many South Vietnamesemilitary leaders expected the same level of firepowerfrom the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The concept ofa navy to serve the coastal nation of Vietnam began

THE WAR GOES ON 15

with the French, but "During the years from 1954 to1959, the Navy section of the Military Assistance Ad-visory Group, Vietnam worked to develop a viable navyfor South Vietnam." Its efforts produced a Viet-namese Navy which within 15 years was capable ofmanning 672 amphibious ships and craft, 20 minewarfare vessels, 56 service craft, and over 240 junks.Composed of 42,000 men, the VNN in April 1975consisted of a naval staff with Vice Admiral ChungTan Cang as its chief of naval operations, a sea forceheaded by Captain Nyugen Xuan Son, and amphibi-ous forces commanded by Commodore Hoang CoMinh. This navy operated on rivers, along the coast,and at sea using everything from destroyer escorts topatrol craft. Sixteen coastal radars, also manned by theVietnamese Navy, assisted them in monitoring NVAcoastal activity and supporting approximately 400 seaforce vessels responsible for stopping resupply by sea.Within months of the U.S. Navy's departure, thecoastal radars failed for want of parts and proper main-tenance. Lacking the technical expertise to keep its ra-dars operating, the VNN lost its best means of locatingand interdicting North Vietnamese infiltrators. TheVietnamese Navy's other mission, supporting groundoperations, fared little better.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC), which forpolitical reasons had been made a separate service in1965, complained often about the VNN's inability toprovide naval gunfire support. Accustomed to the U.S.Navy's version of firepower, this supporting armsuffered severely under the much smaller VietnameseNavy. The VNN failed to provide the Vietnamese Ma-rines with much needed, integrated, and coordinat-ed naval bombardment. Captain Nguyen Xuan Sonrelated that the VNMC often complained that it wasnot receiving enough gunfire support. It had beenconditioned by the U.S. Navy, which upon request,would provide up to 1,000 rounds a day. Having ex-perienced that type of firepower, the VNN maximumof 100 to 200 rounds a day fell far short of the Ma-rines' needs and expectations. Captain Son describedthe navy's dilemma, "we had to explain to the Ma-rines and to theJGS that our ships had only one gun,one 5-inch barrel, or the maximum which was two3-inch barrels, and if we lined up five ships then wehad five barrels and they could not fire all day."

Although many of the weaknesses of the Viet-namese Armed Forces can be attributed to problemsof inflation, cutting of funding, shortages, inferiorequipment, broken promises, and North Vietnamesesubterfuge, South Vietnam was not entirely blame-

less. Army Colonel Richard I. McMahon, a memberof the Defense Attache staff during this period, laterwrote that the South Vietnamese required:

[a] formidable military force at their side . . . [theSouth Vietnamese commanders had little reason to believethey could stand on their own. . . . Although the depar-ture of the American military was the major reason for thislack of confidence i was not the only one. Combat perfor-mance of the South Vietnamese Army was not good andits commanders knew it.46

Other factors, including corruption and poor seniorofficer leadership contributed to the eventual collapseof the Saigon government. As enemy pressure inten-sified, these cracks in the armor began to surface, es-pecially on the battlefield.

In the late fall of 1973, the Communists began toincrease direct military pressure on the ARVN forces.In November, the NVA launched a division-size offen-sive in Quang Duc Province, located on the Cambo-dian border just south of Darlac Province. The attackin the southernmost province of Military Region 2resulted in the heaviest fighting since the ceasefire.Between December 1973 and February 1974, the NVAattacked and seized several South Vietnamese outpostsin the remote border areas, including Tong Le Chanin western Military Region 3. During the spring andsummer of 1974, fighting flared throughout SouthVietnam'

In the early morning hours of 17 May 1974, ele-ments of the 2dRegiment, 3dNVA Division launcheda heavy attack against Phu Cat Airbase in Binh DinhProvince, Military Region 2. The objective was to neu-tralize the base in preparation for a general offensivethroughout the province. After suffering initial set-backs, the 108th and 263d Regional Force Battalionscounterattacked, driving the NVA forces from the vi-cinity of the base. The NM4 16th Antiaircraft Battal-ion and the 2dBattalion, 2dRegiment of the 3dNVADivision were rendered ineffective for combat as aresult.48

On 10 August 1974, elements of the ARVN 22d Di-vision opened a counteroffensive against the 3dNVADivision guarding the entrance to the An Lao Valleyin northern Binh Dinh Province. Combat operationsin the valley, a Communist stronghold, representedsome of the typical problems the ARVN experiencedduring this period of fiscal austerity. Due to budget-ing considerations, the South Vietnamese Joint Gener-al Staff was forced during the operation to restrict theuse of artillery and air support. Elsewhere in MilitaryRegion 2, the ARVN's 82d Ranger Battalion withstood

16 THE BITFER END

a month-long siege in Camp Plei Me in southern Plei-ku Province. Against the unrelenting pressure of the48th and 64th NVA Regiments, the Rangers held outfrom 4 August until relieved by elements of the ARVN53d Regiment on 2 September 1974.

Between 27 and 30 September 1974, NVA forcesdrove ARVN defenders off Mo Tau Mountain. Fromthis vantage point, the North Vietnamese artillerycould command Phu Bai Airfield, the major govern-ment airstrip north of Hai Van Pass, located in Mili-tary Region 1. The NVA immediately brought up itsguns and cleared the airstrip by fire. The mountaincomplex was occupied by four NVA battalions, whichwere finally dislodged by elements of the ARVN 1stDivision and 15th Ranger Group on 11 December. 50

During the first week of December, heavy fightingerupted in Military Region 4 when Communist forceslaunched attacks in both the northern and southernportions of the Mekong Delta. The major threat wasthe 5th NVA Division whose regiments, refitted inCambodia, were moving into Kien Tuong Province(just south of the Parrot's Beak region where a penin-sula of Cambodian territory pokes a nose into SouthVietnam). To parry the Communist incursion, the 9thARVN Division engaged the NVA as they first enteredthe Cambodian border region.'

While major unit fighting was taking place in Mili-tary Regions 1 and 4, an equally ominous event oc-curred that December in Military Region 2. The NVA's968th Division, which had been operating in southernLaos for several years, moved en masse into the Cen-tral Highlands. This marked the first time since theCease-fire Agreement that an entire NVA division hadentered the south as a unit. During this period Mili-tary Region 3 had remained relatively quiet. Yet as theyear came to an end, NVA units were closing in onSong Be, the capital of Phuoc Long Province. As thesun set on the last day of 1974, its shadows foretoldmore than just the impending arrival of a new yearin the Republic of Vietnam.2

By the end of 1974, the North Vietnamese hadwrested the initiative from the thinly spread and over-committed ARVN Divisions. The Joint General Staffhad no uncommitted reserve. Its strategic reserve, theAirborne Division and the Marine Division, were al-ready deployed to Military Region 1. As early as 1973when the United States installed an Army general asthe head of its newly formed Defense Attache Office,Americans began to recognize the seriousness of thesituation. General Murray recalled, "I was shocked todiscover that they had no general reserve. All thirteen

of their divisions were fully committed. We had leftthem without a general reserve."53 The need for areserve and the strategic value it offered as a meansto buy time and avert forced withdrawal or even defeatwould become readily apparent in 1975. It would notbe a good year for the South Vietnamese. Time wasrunning out.

A Division of Marines

Following the Easter Offensive of 1972, the SouthVietnamese Marine Division remained in the north-ernmost part of Military Region 1. It faced three NorthVietnamese divisions in defensive positions to thenorth and west. The division's assigned area of opera-tions (AU) encompassed over 1,600 square miles ofdiverse terrain. Bounded on the north by the ThachHan River, the AU stretched south to the vicinity ofPhong Dien. The South China Sea was the easternboundary while to the west the foothills of the moun-tainous Hai Lang forest west of Route 1 marked theextent of the Marines' responsibility. The divisionheadquarters was located in Huong Dien, a villagenortheast of Hue in the coastal lowlands of Thua ThienProvince. Numerous units of the division's support-ing organizations, among them the amphibious sup-port battalion and the motor transport company, werebased in Hue.54 The Vietnamese Marine Corps' head-quarters remained in Saigon at 15 Le Thanh Ton inthe old French Commando Compound. This locationalso contained the Americans' VNMC Logistic Sup-port Branch, DAO. Thus Lieutenant Colonels Strick-land and then Lukeman maintained an office in thesame building as the VNMC chief of staff, ColonelLe Dinh Que. Besides a division rear headquarters, theVNMC operated a training center, ranges, and a hospi-tal complex at Song Than (10 miles northeast of Sai-gon, near Bien Hoa off Highway 1 at Di An); trainingfacilities and a supply section at Thu Duc; and a train-ing base at Vung Tau.* Opened on 8 September 1972and occupying part of the former 1st U.S. Army Divi-sion encampment, Song Than also housed theVNMC's recruit depot and a company of LVTs, a fewof which regularly trained at Vung Tau.5

The Marine Division was one of the best divisionsin the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Until Decem-

*Unhike the USMC, the Vietnamese Marine Corps as a separateservice had its own medical battalion. Another unusual arrange-ment provided for the existence of two chiefs of staff. To assist himin his duties as division commander and commandant, General Lanhad established a second billet at Huong Dien into which he con-tinuously rotated officers junior to Colonel Que, the chief of staffat division headquarters in Saigon. Strickland Comments.

ber of 1974 when the newly formed 468th Brigade*was added, the division consisted of three MarineBrigades: the 147th, the 258th, and 369th and sup-porting units. It was reinforced by the 1st ARVN Ar-mored Brigade, the 15th Ranger Group, and eightRegional Force battalions. Brigadier General Bui TheLan, Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps**and a graduate of both the U.S. Marine Corps Am-phibious Warfare School and Command and StaffCollege, personally commanded the Marine Division.Lan also had operational control of the 2d AirborneBrigade. Additionally, the Marines maintained 12 jointMarine and Popular Force platoons living in assignedvillages and hamlets within the AO, a variation of theearlier U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Programin MR 1. Concentrated in the hamlets surroundingHuong Dien, these platoons provided additional secu-rity for the division command post.56

*Originally, before the shifting of units began, the brigade desig-nation corresponded to the battalions in that organization, e.g. bat-talions 1, 4, and 7 constituted the 147th Brigade. StricklandComments.

**On 4 May 1972, President Thieu appoinced the commandantof the \TNMC, Lieutenant General I.e Nguyen Khang to the jointGeneral Staff as assistant for operations. The next day, Colonel Lan,the division commander, became acting Commandant (CMC) ofthe Vietnamese Marine Corps. On 1 June 1972, exactly eighteenyears after receiving his commission as a second lieutenant, Bui TheLan pinned on his stars. At that moment, Brigadier General Lanofficially became CMC, but he began his new role while maintain-ing tactical command of the division. LtCol G. H. Turley and CaptM. R. Wells, "Easter Invasion," reprinted in The Marines in Viet-nam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography(Washington: MCHC, 1985), p. 190; "VNMC/MAU HistSum."

While deployed in MR 1, the Marine Division re-mained part of the RVNAF General Purpose Strateg-ic Force. Controlled and directed by the joint GeneralStaff, rather than by Lieutenant General Ngo QuangTroung, the MR 1 commander, the Marine Divisionreceived its orders from Saigon. TheJGS believed thatwhen the NVA began their general offensive, the majorthrust would come from the north. Apparently, thismilitary assumption was sufficient reason for Saigonto maintain direct control of the strategically placedMarine Division. Despite this awkward command ar-rangement, General Lan and General Troung estab-lished and maintained an amicable workingrelationship.

To prepare for the expected offensive, General Lanpersonally directed the construction of a formidable,in-depth defense throughout the division's AO. Foreach crew-served weapon there were three alternatefall-back positions. All were bunkered, stockpiled with14 days of ammunition, and well-camouflaged. Thesewere the best protected, best concealed positions thatLieutenant Colonel Strickland had seen in his fourtours in Vietnam.58

The construction of the observation post and for-ward command post bunkers was unique. General Laninsisted that these critical command and control fa-cilities be able to withstand a direct hit by a 130mmartillery shell. Several candidate structures were test-ed by command-detonated, captured 130mm shellsplaced directly on top of the bunkers. Through thisprocess of trial and error, the VNMC built a bunker

THE WAR GOES ON 17

Photo courtesy of LtCol George E. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

Entrance to VNMC Training Center and Song Than base camp on the outskirts of Saigon.

—

18 THE BlUER END

Photo courtesy of LtCol George B. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

In front of the 369th Brigade command bunker in-side the Citadel at Quang Tui City are LtCol GeorgeE. Strickland and brigade commander LtCol Luong.Bunkers were stockpiled with 14 days of ammunition.

that satisifed General Lan. The final product wasremarkably simple, but effective. The process of con-struction consisted of digging a hole, erecting withinit a pyramid of pierced steel planking, and then com-pacting four feet of earth over the pyramid. Thebunker, designed to accommodate three Marines —one standing and two sitting, plus their two PRC-25radios — adequately withstood the 13 0mm detonationtest. The unanswered question remained — couldtroops survive a similar explosion and a direct hit?General Lan solicited volunteers to find out, and threemen agreed to enter the bunker and remain there dur-ing a second detonation. When the smoke had cleared,the bunker was still there. How had the troops fared?When asked for his comments on the experience, oneof the Marines replied, "Very loud." With these for-tifications complete, General Lan felt confident thathe and his subordinates could exercise effective com-mand and control, even under the most intense at-tacks.59

Of all the weapons at his disposal, General Lan tookparticular, almost personal care of his antitank mis-sile launchers that fired the TOW (Tube-launchedOptically-tracked Wire-guided) missile. The Viet-

Vietnamese Marine Commandant BGen Bui The Lan, right, and his chief of staff ColLe Dinh Que, discuss VNMC matters with LtCol Strickland, chief of the VNMC LSB,

Photo courtesy of LtCoI George E. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

THE WAR GOES ON 19

namese Marines were among the first to employ theTOW in combat. In the Easter Offensive of 1972, theyachieved 57 kills of NVA armored vehicles out of a to-tal of 72 missiles fired. Serious about its use, GeneralLan's Marine Division possessed 12 TOW systemsdespite an authorization for only nine. General Lan'sconcept of employment was to attach some of theweapons to his battalions deployed in the enemy's like-ly avenues of approach. The remainder he kept un-der his personal control for operational use as a mobilereserve to reinforce the action at its hottest spots.

The VNMC displayed a remarkable ingenuity indeveloping its total TOW capability, particularly themobile part. General Lan was not satisfied with thestandard M-151 jeep as a prime mover for the TOWsystem. With the weapon and a two-man crew, therewas not enough space remaining in the jeep to carrymore than two missiles. Also, General Lan did not likethe idea of carrying spares in a trailer towed behinda vehicle. Displaying as much resourcefulness here asthey had in developing the bunker, the South Viet-namese Marines solved the problem. Instead of usingthe standard M151, General Lan mounted the TOWsystem on the M170 ambulance jeep. This vehicle hada longer bed than the MiS 1, and it could easily ac-commodate the launcher and its crew. Spare missileswere carried by welding special racks on either side ofthe vehicle. General Lan produced a mobile 'iLIW sys-tem capable of carrying crew, launcher, and seven mis-siles all in the same vehicle.

General Lan felt so strongly about the TOW thatif he discovered anyone abusing this prized possession,he took immediate remedial and punitive action. Suchan incident occurred during one of his daily visits tothe forward deployed battalions. General Lan, uponlearning that one of his supplymen was using a TOWbattery as a source of current for the light in his tent,called for the battalion supply officer and the battal-ion commander. Nonjudicial punishment proceedingswere conducted on the spot. He fined the clerk, thesupply officer, and the battalion commander the costof the battery, $900. Additionally, the battalion com-mander received one week confinement at hard labor.This incident took place in early 1974, when TOWcomponents were in short supply.

With their TOWs and their in-depth defense, theVietnamese Marines did not fear an NVA land attack.One of the two concerns that Lieutenant ColonelStrickland observed as keenly critical to the VNMCcentered around the practice of laterally shifting forces(General Lan's other major concern was VNAF close

Photo courtesy of LtCol George E. Strickland, USMC (Ret)

Col Le Dinh Que, at left, the VNMC chief of staffdiscusses with LtCol Strickland the transfer of a pla-toon ofLVTP-5s to Military Region 1. The vehicles be-came obsolete as budget cuts and high petroleumprices combined to make their operation too costly.

air support). Too clearly, the VNMC had seen the routof the 3d ARVN Division during the Easter Offensivewhere the division, in the midst of shifting units, hadbeen caught by the NVA with its guard down. Com-monplace throughout the war, the lateral shifting ofunits between highlands and lowlands addressed nottactics, but morale. The average South Vietnamesetruly believed that the highlands and not the lowlandswere infested with malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Theseinherited beliefs forced commanders to shift units inorder to maintain morale.* General Lan knew that theNVA were familiar with this routine. Certain theywould try to capitalize on it, General Lan devised aplan to overcome this weakness. All lateral shifts ofMarine battalions were conducted under a cloak ofsecrecy with no advance warning. They were executedno differently than a surprise attack.6°

In 1973 the South Vietnamese Marine Corps provid-ed the country another type of surprise, a technologi-cal one. Just six months after signing the PeaceAccords, the VNMC displayed for the first time its"new" LVTP-5. The big amphibian tractors that rum-bled through the streets of Saigon in July 1973 dur-

*Evenwajly medical researth proved that the malaria did originatein the highlands and not the lowlands as originally thought.

-

ing South Vietnam's Armed Forces Day parade causedquite a stir.* Several of the attaches of the foreign em-bassies in Saigon wanted to know what new weaponthe VNMC had acquired for its arsenal. They mightnot have been as impressed had they known the restof the story. The LVTP-5 was an outdated piece ofequipment. The USMC advisor's turnover file in 1972stated: "The LVTP-5 is a 20 year old vehicle designedfor a maximum 10 year usage. It has a gasoline en-gine, is a fire hazard and gets 2-4 miles to a gallon.Spare parts are almost non-existent. Many parts areno longer manufactured." 61 The spare parts shortagewas so severe that the amphibian tractors were literal-ly towed to the parade starting point. Apparently, theJoint General Staff was as impressed by the event asthe spectators. Shortly after the parade, they orderedthe transfer of four LVTP-5s from the VNMC's Am-phibian Tractor Company at Song Than to Military

*The procurement of 31 LVTP-5s had been arranged under aproject known as Enhance Plus, a program established to strength-en the VNAF and make Vietnamization a success. The delivery ofthese vehicles to the VNMC on 8 November 1972 resulted in theformation of an amphibian tractor company at Song Than BaseCamp. Their arrival predated the Peace Accords and therefore didnot violate the prohibition on the introduction of new weapons.VNMC/MAU HistSum.

Region 1. In addition to this deployment, the Viet-namese Marines kept a small detachment of LVTPs atthe training base at Vung Tau.

Operational use of the LVT brought about a closerassociation between the Taiwanese and South Viet-namese Marine Corps. The Chinese not only operat-ed the LVTP-5, but maintained it as well. Moreimportantly, the Taiwanese Logistic Commanddesigned and tooled a supply system to manufacturespare parts unique to the LVTs. Lieutenant ColonelStrickland, through the U.S. Marine advisors on Tai-wan, gained approval from the Commandant of theChinese Marine Corps to supply spare parts for am-phibian tractors to the VNMC on a contract basis. Fur-thermore, Lieutenant Colonel Strickland escorted thecommanding officer of the VNMC Amphibian Trac-tor Company to Taiwan, where he learned shortcutsin LVI maintenance. The net result of these initia-tives, despite supply shortages, was a significant in-crease in 1974 in the number of amtracs operationallyready for combat.62

The defensive mission and posture of the divisiondid, not prevent General Lan from conducting a veryaggressive program of reconnaissance of NVA-occupiedterritory. Long-range reconnaissance companies regu-

20 THE BlUER END

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Members of the newly formed 468th Bregade undergo training at Song Than base camp.Originally a three-brigade division, at the direction of the Joint General Staff the VZ\,TMCadded a fourth brigade in December 1974, meant to be fully operational by April1975.

THE WAR GOES ON 21

larly were sent north to the Rock Pile and into thewestern reaches of Quang Tn Province around KheSanh. All the Marines selected for these elite recon-naissance companies were handpicked by Colonel Tn,the Assistant Commandant of the VNMC. One ofthese platoons obtained an excellent hand-held camerashot of the SAM-2 sites around Khe Sanh. Thesepatrols also provided the information which ultimatelyled the VNMC to conclude that a NVA division head-quarters was located in Lang Vei, the old Special Forcesoutpost near Khe Sanh. Intelligence gathering was atwo-way proposition as the NVA occasionally remindedthe Vietnamese Marines by sending a reconnaissanceflight over their AO. Expecting the Vietnamese AirForce (VNAF) to intercept these violators of SouthVietnamese air space, General Lan became increasinglydisconcerted when the VNAF failed to even challengethe NVA intruders. It seemed that even when theagonizing process of requesting tactical air supportfrom battalion to brigade to division to Military Region1 headquarters in Da Nang provided a timely con-tact, the Vietnamese Air Force still did not respond.*To Generals Truong and Lan, and their troops as well,who had become accustomed to and reliant upontimely tactical air support (formerly provided by theU.S.) this absence was an ominous portent. LieutenantColonel Strickland noted that this issue more than anyother preyed on General Lan's mind and colored hisoutlook for peace in Southeast Asia.63

Following the signing of the Cease-fire Agreement,enemy ground activity in the Marine's AO consistedof monthly, sporadic mortar shellings, small but sharpfirefights, and isolated ground attacks. Both sidesspent considerable time and effort in firing propagan-da barrages across the relatively fixed defensive lines.Major artillery or ground attacks were rare, but in earlySeptember enemy activity throughout the AO in-creased significantly. The tempo reached a peak justa few days before the major NVA thrust against MoTau Mountain, slightly to the south. On 21 Septem-ber 1974, the Communists launched a battalion-sized

*The VNMC had no Direct Air Support Center (DASC) or theassociated tactical air control infrastructure and its accompanyingtactical air request and air direction radio networks.

ground attack against the 8th VNMC Battalion. Thepreceding day, the Marines had observed a 30-truckenemy convoy moving toward a possible assembly area.At approximately 1930, an observation post reportedseeing what appeared to be helicopter lights approach-ing the vicinity of the suspected staging area. Basedupon these reports, the Marines redeployed the sup-porting artillery to positions from which the 8th Bat-talion could receive more firepower. The enemyopened the engagement by directing approximately5,500 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar rounds atthe VNMC 8th Battalion positions. They followed thepreparatory fires with a ground attack. The VNMCstopped the NVA infantry battalion in its tracks; af-ter taking heavy casualties, the enemy withdrew. Manyof the North Vietnamese casualties (247 KIA report-ed) resulted from artillery fire readjusted from groundobservation posts. Approximately 300 rounds of4.2-inch mortar fire from the ARVN armored brigadehit the advancing enemy with resounding accuracy. Ef-fective small arms fire combined with the expenditureof over 50,000 M-60 machine gun rounds helped turnthe planned NVA offensive into a VNMC victory.6

Following the engagement, enemy activity fell off,except for periodic mortar attacks against variousVNMC positions. The remainder of 1974 was markedby light, sporadic NVA activity. Poor mobility causedby seasonal rains further contributed to the low levelof activity. In December of 1974 theJGS, in an effortto reconstitute a mobile strategic reserve, directed theVNMC to form a fourth brigade and have it fully oper-ational by the end of April 1975. The 14th, 16th, and18th VNMC Battalions comprised the newly designat-ed organization, the 468th Marine Brigade. Uponcompletion of its training, the 468th (formed and in-itially trained in Military Region 1) moved south tothe Song Than Base Camp near Saigon. During themonths immediately prior and subsequent to thisevent, the remainder of the Vietnamese Marine Corpsenjoyed the relative "calm before the storm."65

On 13 December 1974 in a letter to HQMC, Lieu-tenant Colonel Lukeman prophetically wrote: ". . . TheVNMC is getting a good rest from heavy fighting.They will need it in the spring 66