US government blocked 9/11 Commission

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February 7, 2002

-THE WHITE HOUSE

'W ASHINGTON

THE VICE PRESIDENTTHE SECRETARY OF STATETHE SECRETAR¥ OF DEFENSE.THE ATTOIUfEY GENERAL'CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRES'IDEmDIRECTOR·OF CSNTRAL

TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL·SECURITY AFFAIRS .

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF SrrAFF

\ .

MEMORANDUM FOR

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SUBJECT: . Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban-Detainees

2. Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief and ChiefExecutive. of the United States, relying on the opinionof the·Department of s January 22, 2002, and onthe' .legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General in hisl e t t e r ' of February 1 , 2002, I hereby detie zmine as ·follows·;·

a. I accept' the legal conclu sion of ofJustice and determine that none of the provisionsof Geneva-apply to ou r conflic t with a l QaedaAfghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because,am ong other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting

t9 Geneva .

b. I accept the iegal conclusion of the Attorney General. and· the Department.of Justice tha t I have the authority.· under Constitution to suspend Geneva as betweenthe United States Afghanistan, but I decline to

1 . Our recent extensive discussions regarding the s ta tus

ofalQaeda and Taliban detainees con firm . that t applicat Lorr-o f the Geneva convention Relative to the Treatment'of War of August 12,· 1949 (Geneva) to theconflic t with al Qaeda and the Talib an involves complexlegal questions. By'its terms, Geneva applies to conflic tsinvolving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be

s ta tes . Moreover, i t assum es the existence of lfregular l l

a rm ed forces fighting 'on behalf of sta tes . However , thewar aga1nstterrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one inwhich groups with broad, ' international reach commit horri fie'acts against innocent civilians, som etim es .with the directsupport of s ta tes . Our Nation recognizes tha t th is newparadigm -- ushered in not by us, but by te rro ris ts .requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that.should nevertheless b

e consistent with the princ iples ofGeneva. .

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exercise that authority at this time. Accordingly, Idetermine that the provisions of Geneva will apply toou r p re sent confl ic t with the Taliban. I res erv e the

r ight 'to exercisethis

authority in this or future,confl icts .

c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the 'Department ofJus t ice and determine that common Artic le · ) of Geneva

, does not apply to either al Qaeda or TalipanOdetainees,b e c a u s e ~ among other reasons, the relevant ,confl ictsare internat ional in scope and common Article '3 appliesonly to "armed confl ic t not of an internat ionalcharacter."

d. Based on the facts s u p p l ~ e d , b y the Department ofDefense and the recommendation ·o f the Department ofJus t ice , I determine that the ,Taliban detainees areunlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify asprisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I notet ha t , because Geneva does not 'apply to our conf l ic twith a l Qaeda, ,a l Qaeda detainees also do not qualifyas prisoners of war.

3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share withmany nations in ' the world, cal l for us to t rea t detaineeshumaneLy, i nc luding those who are ,not legally ent i t led tosuch treatment. Our Nat ion has been and will continue tobe a s trong support er of Geneva, and i t s principles. Asa matce r of policy, . the Uni ted States Armed. Forces shal lcontinue to t rea t detainees h u m a ~ e l y ~ n d , to the extentappropriate and consistent with m i ~ i t a r y necessity, in, a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva.

4. The ,United States will hold states, organizations, andi n d i v i d u a l ~ who gain control of O ~ i t e d States personnel,responsible for t ~ e a t i n g suph personnel humanely andconsistent ·with applioable law. '

5. I h ~ r e b y reaffirm'the order p rev ious ly issued by theSecretary of Defense to the United Sta tes Armed Forcesrequir ing that the detainees be t rea ted humanely and,to the extent appropriate ~ n consistent with militarynecessi ty, in 'a manner ,consistent with the principleso f Geneva,.

I hereby 'd i rect the Secretary of State to communicate my

determinations in an appropriate manner to our a l l i e s , andother countries and internat ional organizations cooperatingin the war against terrorism of global reach,'

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THB WHITE H O U ~ EOffice of the Press secretary

For Immediate Release

FACT SHEST

Februa:r:y 7, 2002

Status of Detaiuees at Guantanamo

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United States'PolicY.

• The United States i s treating and will continue to t reat'all of the individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and,to the exten t appropriate and consistent with m ~ l i t a r y.necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles ofthe Third Geneva Convention of 1949.

• The President has determined that the Geneva Conventionapplies to the T a l i ~ a n detainees, but 'not to the al-Qaidad e t ~ i n e e s . .

• A l ~ Q a i d a ia not a sta te party to the Geneva Convention; it

i s a foreign' te r ror is t group. As such, i ta members are notenti t led to POW sta tus.

, . Although we never ~ e c o g n i z ~ d the Taliban as the legitimateAfghan government, Afghanistan is a party to theconvention, and the ~ r e s i d e n t has determined that theTaliban are covered by the Convention, Under the terms ofthe Geneva Convention, hQwever, the Taliban detainees donot qualify as POWs.

• Therefore; neither the Taliban nor al-Qaida detainees areenti t led to POW s ta tus .

• Even though the detainees are not enti t led to POW

privileges, they wil l be p ~ o v i d e d many POW privi leges as amatter of policy •

. All detainees a t ,Guantanamo are b ~ i n g provided; , .

• three meals a day that meet Muslim dietary laws

• water

• medical care

• clothing and shoes

• shel ter

• showers

• soap and toi let ar t ic les

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• foam sleeping pads and blankets

• towels and washcloths

• th e opportunity to worship

• correspon4ence materials, and the means' to eend mail• ~ h abi l i ty to receive packages of food and clothing,subject to seourity screening

The detainees will not be subjected to physical or mental,abuseor 'cruel treatment. The .International Committee of the RedCross has vis i ted and will continue to be able to vis i t thedetaLnees private ly . The detainees will b perrnitt'ed to raiseconcerns about their conditions and we will attempt to addressthose concerns consistent with security.

Housing. We ~ r building facili t ies in Guantanamo more~ p p r o p r i a t e for housing the detainees on a long-term basis. Thedetainees now a t Guantanamo are being housed in temporary opena i r shel ters unt i l these more long-term faci l i t ies :can bearranged. Their ourrent shelters "are reasonable in l ight of theserious security risk posed by these detainees and the mdldclimate of Cuba.

POW Privi leges the Detainees will not receive. The detaineeswill receive m u c ~ of the treatment normally afforded to POWs, bythe Third Geneva Convention. However, th e deta inee s will notr ~ c e i v e some of the specific privileges' afforded to pows,including:

• access to a "canteen to purchase food, 6oap, and tobacco "

• a montbly advance of pay

• the abi l i ty to have and consult personal f,inano1al accounts• the abi l i ty to receive scientific equipment, musicalinstruments, or sports outfi ts .

"Many detainees a t Guantanamo pose a severe security risk tothose responsible for guarding them'and to each other. Some ofthese individuals demonstrated how dangerous they are inuprisings a t Mazar-e-Shar1f and in Pakistan. The United Statesmust take into account the need for security in establishing theconditions for detention at Guantanamo.

• Background on Geneva Conventions. ,The Third Geneva Conventionof 1949 is an international t reaty designed to protect prisonersof war from inhumane treatment at the hand$ of their captors inconfl icts covered by the Convention. I t i s among four treq.ties

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concluded in the wake of WWII to reduce the human sUffering

caused by war". These four treaties provide protections for fourdifferent classes of people: the mil itary wounded and sick inland confl ic ts ; the military wounded, sick and shipwrecked inconflicts at sea; military persons and civilians accompanying -.

the armed forces" in the field who are captured and qualify as"

p ris on ers o f war; ana oivilian non·combatants who a re int ernedor otherwise found in the hands of a party (e.g. in a mi.litaryoccupation) during an armed conflict.

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, .

)STATUSAND TREATMENT OFDETAINEESAT GUANTANAMO

, . F e b ~ l U ) r y 7, 2002

1. What:has the President decidedabout tbe legal status of the prlsoners at

Ouantanamo? Are they prisoners of war?

Neither Taliban noral-Qaida detainees are entitled toPOW status.

ThePresident hasdecided "that-the Geneva Convention applies totheTalibandetainees, butnotto tlie al-Qaida detainees.

2. What's the basis for the President's decision.?

-A1 ..Qaida is nota state party to theGeneva Convention; it 'is a foreign terroristgroup. Itsmembers are therefore notentitled to the protections of tile GenevaConvention. .

In contrast, Afghanistan is aparty to the Geneva Convention. Although there aregrounds to conclude that Afghanistan was a failed nation state at theoutset oftheconflict, thePresident has declined to determine that the Taliban arenotcoveredby the treaty. However, the Taliban detainees arenot entitled to POW status underthe termsof theConvention.

3. Why don't the Tallban detainees qualify asPOWs undertbeConvention?

The Geneva Convention onPrisoners ofWarwas intended toprotectonly.thosepeoplewho qualify asprisoners ofwar .... hence its name. Article4 of the.Convention specifies the categories ofpeoplewho faU into the'hands·ofthe enemywho areentitled tobe treated as POWs. TheCommentary tothe GenevaConvention explains that U Article 4 is in a sense thekeyto theConvention, since itdefines thepeopleentitled tobe treated asprisoners ofwar." The Taliban,detainees donot fitintoanyof thesecategories. . .

They arenotthe regular armed forces of any government. Rath\Ttheyareanarmed group of militants whohave oppressed andterrorized thepeople ofe- Afghanistan andhavebeen financed by, and in tum supported. a globalterrorist~ " ' ; "

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network. Theydonotmeetthecriteria under which members ofmilitias canreceive sow status either. To qualify asPOWs, militia must satisfy fourconditions: theymustbepart of amilitary hierarchy; theymustwear uniforms orotherdistinctive signs visible at a distance; they must carryarms openly; andthey ..

must conduct theiroperations in accordance.with the laws andcustoms ofwar.

TheTaliban havenot effectively distinguished themselves from the civilianpopulation ofAfghanistan. Moreover, they.have not conducted their operations inaccordance with the laws andcustoms ofwar; instead, they haveknowinglyadopted andprovided support totheunlawful terrorist objectives of al-Qaida.

TheTaliban donotqualify underArticle 4(a)(3) which covers "members of regulararmed forces whoprofess allegiance toa government or an authority not'recognized by theDetaining Power" because theConvention applies 'only to .regular armed forces whopossess the attributes of regular armed forces, l.e,

. distinguish themselves from the civilian population andconduct theiroperations in. accordance with thelawsandcustoms C? f war.

4. Is th.ere a precedent in our 4istory for this decision?

In theVietnam War, theu.s. concluded that theVietCong were not·entitled toPOW status because theydidnothavetheattributes of a regular armed force ormilitiagroupcovered by Article 4 of the Convention. TheU.Sw did treat theVietCong as POWs asa matter ofpolicy.

.·5. Why has t decision.takenso long-? What is the legalcomplication?

TheGeneva Convention onPrisoners ofWaris a very important treaty to theUnitedStates, Thewaron terrorism is a conflict unique in recent history. Careful,thoughtful analysis was required to sortout the issues as to howthetreaty appliesin the current conflict. This is a newkindofwar notenvisioned in 1949w It isneither a large-scale conflict between twonation-states nora civilwarbetween anation-suite andantnsurgent group. Global terrorists who transcend nationalboundaries, owe no loyalties to anycountry, and intentionally. target innocentcivilians werenotcontemplatedwhen theConvention.wasadopted morethan so

years ago. <And the situation inAfghanistan andthe role theTaliban hasplayedwithin thatcountry is complicated aswell.



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6. Ate you sayingthat the Geneva Convention Isoutdated for modern

confiicts? Is theAdministration abandoning it?

No. TheUnitedStates remains fully-committed to theGeneva Convention andrecognizes the critical role it plays in securing basic protections forprisoners of

war. At the'same time, theConvention by Its terms simply' does -not covereverysituaiion in which peoplemaybe captured ordetained by military forces, aswe seetoday inAfghanistan. ThePresident'sdecision makes cleat that the treatydoes notapply to international armed conflicts with foreign terrorist organizations, whichwould not respect the rules regarding treatment ofPOWs inany event, The treatydoes apply to conflicts with nation-states, but even there, groups maynotbeentitled to invoke POW protections if theyadopt Unlawful objectives, do not actlikeregulararmed forces', and donot respect the laws and customs of war. .

7. What's the practical effect of the P r e s i d e D ~ ' s decision? Will the

"detainees be treated any dlfferendyas a resultof tb1s decision? Will theTallban detaineesbe treated differendy from tbe al..Q a f d ~ detainees?

No. As wehavesaid aU along.we have decided asa matterof policyto treatall ofthe detainees atGuaritanamo humanely andconsistent withthe principles of theGenevaConvention. We are even providing many of the things provided to "

POWsunder the Convention, to the extentappropriate and consistent with securityand thetemporary nature of the facilities in Guantanamo.

Thismeans that all detaineeswill continue to receive three appropriate meals a.day, medical care, clothing, shelter, showers, and the opportunity toworship. The

detainees will notbe subjected to physical ormental abuse. The International. 'Committee of theRed Cross is being "allowed tovisiteach detainee privately, :which is something to whichonly POWs areentitled. We arebuilding long-termfacilities to bouse thedetainees.. None of this has changed orwill change. "

Otherthanthe fact thatthe detainees are indetention, their material livingconditions are .substautially better than theywerebefore they werecaptured.

, .

8. Why not treat aU the detainees as POWs? Wbocares?

Severalreasons. First, there is an important principle at stake. The Genevatt Convention. hasestablishedcriteria forPOW status. Oneof the reasons it does is

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to ensurethatonlymembers oflegitimate armed forces receive POW privileges,notother groups who takeup arms unlawfully and donotobservethe lawsandcustomsofwar .: If allcaptured 'combatants were provided POW privileges, thatwould eliminate ODe disincentive to terrorism orother types of unlawful combat.

Second, wewant to incentivize the armed forces of'other countries to conductthemselves so as·tobe eligible forPOWstatus, This means wearing uniforms thatdistinguish themselves from civilians andrequiring' them not to involve the civilianpopulation in a conflict inways·that subject civilians to risk. Insisting that thecriteria for POW status aremetprotects civilians bymaintaining a sharp distinctionbetween combatants and non-combatants. .

Third, we takeour treaty obligations seriously and we believe in applying the.termsof theConvention. The Geneva Convention for good reason clearlydifferentiates between those entitled toPOW status and thosewho are not.

. Finally many privileges given to POW s under theConvention are simplyinappropriate in the currentsituation. Some of thespecific treatmentconditionsprovided to POWs bytheGeneva Convention were.suitable forregularsoldiers in1949but are not.appropriate for terrorists in 2002: Sometreatmentconditions arenot compatiblewith the extraordinary security riskposed by these detainees, whoare extremelyviolent anddangerous andposea threatto theU.S. forces ·who areguarding themandto eachother, .

For example. wedo notplan to install canteens where detainees maypurchase .food, soap,and tobacco. We'will'notbe giving thedetainees atGuantanamo amonthly'advance ofpay,orallow them to have andconsult personal finencial .

accounts. Detaineeswillnotbe allowed ioreceive scientific equipment, musicalinstruments, or s p ~ r t s outfits.

9, Will there be tribunals to establish whether any or-thedetainees are.rows, as provtded in theGeneva Conventlon?

TheGeneva Convention requires thata tribunal make a determination as to_whether a personqualifies as a POWonly if there is "anydoubt." The Conventiondoes not require reviewby it tribunal in everycircumstance. There isno doubt thatthe .al-Qaide andTalibandetainees areDot POWs.

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That said, wedo have a careful process in place to screen thepeople taken toGuantanamo. Theywere screened at least twice before they were transferred.They were screened. by u.s. Armed Forces before they.were taken toKandahar,and theywere interviewed a second time inKandahar. Although we believe thateach detaineeis an appropriate candidate for detention) we areprepared to review

individual cases should anydoubt arise.

10. Doesn't tbe President's decision underminethe Geneva Convention andadversely affect treatment o f U ~ S , forces In future cperanons or conflicts?

.NOr The UnitedStatesremains deeply committed to the GenevaConvention and

has a proudhistory ofcomplying with theConvention sinceitentered into forcemore than 50 years ago. TheUnited Stateshasbeenone of the leadersin thedevelopment of lawof'wardoctrinea andplayeda majorrole in thedevelopment of·the Geneva Convention.

In this conflict,we haveadopted Q, policyof treating the detainees humanely andconsistentwith the principles of theConvention, aswehave in ,the past. The

President's decision that,as a legalmatter, thetreaty.does not affordPOWprotectionsto terroristgroups - orotherswhoadopttheir objectives and fail tomeet the standards ofa regular armed force _. is fully consistentwith the treaty.The decisionshould have no legal or practical effecton U.S. AImedForces, whichare a regulararmed force thatcomplies withthe lawsandcustoms ofwar. Weexpect othercountries to treatourarmedforces in accordance withtheGenevaConvention. . ,.

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II. , Doesthis d e c i s l o ~ mean that any country that Is a state sponsor ofterrorism is not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Cenventlen in the

event 9f an armed conroet?

I am not 'going to speculate on the application of the treaty to other hypotheticalarmed conflicts. Eachcasehas tobe resolved on its own facts.

12. You say that the Geneva Convention doesn't fit this new kind of war

.very well. Would the U,S'-support negotiation ora new treaty or Protocol to

the Geneva Convention that would apply to conflicts with terrorists or othersnot covered by the Geneva Convennon?

IV/-II)

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We think it might be appropriate to consider a new instrument to cover thetreatment of detained persons inconflicts not envisionedin 1949, and we are opento discussing this possibility with other nations,

13.· How was tbis decision made? Whodid thePresidenthear from?

.Tl:te President chaired twomeetings of-the NSC. TheVice President, theSecretaryof State, theSecretary ofDefense, the Attorney General, the Chainnan of the JointChiefs, theDlrecror ofCentra] Intelligence, theWhite House Counsel, and theNational Security Advisor all participated in advising the President on thismatter.Thesearediffic.ult issues and thePresidentwanted to hear the legaland policyviews of all of his advisors.

.14.What

did the President decideO.D

January,18?

The President decided on January 1 8 ~ a t none ~ f t . h e Taliban or al-Qaidadetaineesare entitled to POWstatus. .

A.,~ : IS. Did the President "condder" or ."re-conslder" the Issue ofwbethe.r the.Geneva Convention applied? .

I'm not going to comment on theprocedural posture. Because thisis a newkind ofconflict that doesnot fall squarely within theGeneva 'Convention, President Bush

asked forthe views of bisnationalsecurity advisors on whether theGenevaConvention applies or shouldapply to cover the Talibanandal ..Qaida.

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LEGAL AUTHORITIESProperly.conducted.and authorized interrogatio

• Do not violate the federal nntt-torture statute, 18 U.S ..C. 2340-2340A

• D "not violate the.Constitution. They do not'''shock the conscience" un

the 5th and 14th Amendments. The 8tb Amendment prohibition on crue

unusual " p u n i s h m e n e ~ is inapplicable.

• Do not constitute "cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishme

under the Convention .Agafnst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman an

Degrading Treatment because, under U.S. law, those terms are limited

U.S. constitutional requirements. .



CIA/OCA/FRONT OFFICE

OCA 2007-00342

S:\DCI\OCA\FRONTOCA\2007 Correspondence/Markey Response

Dis t r ibu t ion :

Originals - Addresses (w/encl).. . .

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c o ~ ~ i A L I 1 2 0 3 2 n 6 1 4~ , ~ ; ; ; ; ; ; ~ 8 c o c e Asen<.)'

14 June 2007

Office of Recorda ManagementThe White House

Washington l D.C. 20500

- i 'N' \o C . l ~ ..\- i I p..)

Dear.

(U) 1 ~ i s is in response to Representatives Markey,

Delahunt, an d Nadlerls 24 May 20n7 l e t t e r addressed to the

P re sid en t in which they expressed conce rn about th e or igin ofclaims made by the President and his Administrat ion before the

I ~ l a r c h 2003 invasion of I raq. The Members alao requested

answers to seven r e la t ed quest ions . The Central Intel l igence

Agency has reviewed these questions and is unable to answer

them because each is either a policy question requiringresponse by the White House or the Nationa l Securi ty Council

o r perta ' ina to opera t iona l i ssues t ha t are not br iefed to

non-oversight Members of Congress .

I f you have any quest ions regarding th i s l e t t e r orr equ i r e a dd it io n al i nf rmation, please do n contact of my s taf f a t ...............

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Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure:White House Office Refer ral

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THEWHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

JuneOl ,2007

TO: CENTRALINTELLIGENCEAGENCY

ACTION REQUESTED: APPROPR1ATE ACTION

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

10: 726801

MEDIA: FAX

DOCUMENT DATE: MAY 24, 2007

TO: PRESlOENT eUSH

FROM;

SUBJECT:

ED f·'ARKEY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE ORIGINOFCERTAIN CLAIMS

r>1ADE BY THE PRESIDENT ~ N MEMBERS OFHISADI.HNISTRATION BEFORE THE MAR 03 INVASION OF IRAQ

AND REQUEST ANSWERS TOTHEQUESTIONS USTED IN THIS

LETIER

COMMENTS:

KSHEET AND COpy OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT)

OFFICEOFRECORDS t-1ANAGEMENT • THE WHITERETURN ORIGINAL CORRESPON

TO: DOCUr..,ENT TRACKING UNlT,

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PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL •• IF REQUlRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9

WORKING DAYS 0IiECElPiliUNLESS OTHER ISE STATED, PLEASE TELEPHONE THEUNDERSIGNED AT

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THEWH1TE HOUSE I I ; ~ , ~ J I . ' ~ · I I I ' m · ~ I ' I ..OCUMENT MANAGEMENT AND TRACKING ~ "WORKSHEET - - - - ....---- ._- - ~ - - ~ -

DATE REceIVED: 6/1/2007 CASE 10; 726801

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ED NARKEY

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THEORIGINOF CERTAIN CLAINS f\1ADE BYTHE

PRESIDENT AND NEt>'\BfRS OFHIS ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THEMAR03IMVASION OF IAAQ ANDREQUEST ANSWERS TOTHEQUE'STIONS LISTED IN THIS

LETTER

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20?21.f;OOU2 line 10'3 1,0 43 P I'll 05 24 2001 2/5 _

<!Lottgreng of fq.e 'Initeo state6maaqingtnn, :IDm 20515

May24,2001

President GeorgeBushTheWhite HouseJ600 Pennsylvania Avenue,N.W,Washington, D.C.

DearPresident Bush:

\Ve are writing toexpress ourdeepconcernabout the origin of certainclaimsmadeby yourselfandmembers OfYOllT AdministrationbeforetheMarch2003 invasionof iraq, specifically that. Iraqhad provided trainingin theuse of chemical andbiological weapons to al-Qaeda, It OO\'.,l

appears that this claim rested entirelyuponthe interrogation by a foreign intelligenceservice.possibly under torture or threatof torture} ofthe detainee Ibn al-Sbaykh al-Libl. This raisesserious questions about thedecisionmilkingprocess whichconcluded withcustody of al-Lil»being transferred by the United Statesto a foreign government, andabouttheU.S, Government' 5decision to subsequenrly uti11ze statements madeundertortureto informnational policy.

Thefalse information provided by al-Libi,potentiallyundertortureby a foreign intelligenceservice,was cited repeatedlyby yourAdministration as a casus belli priorto the invasion of Iraq.In an October?, 2002 speechinCincinnati, yousaid,"We've learnedthat Iraq has trained aiQaedamembers in bomb making andpoisonsanddeadlygases." In his February 5,2003,presentation before the UnltedNationsSecurityCouncil, then-Secretary of State ColinPowellreference-d the interrogationof al-Libi, slating: 1'1 can trace thestoryof a senior terroristoperative telling how Iraq provided trainingin these [chemica! andbiological] weapons to alQaeda. Fortunately, this operativeis nowdetained, andhe has toldhis story.11

It now appears that the interrogation of a . \ ~ L i b i constituted a totalityof the evidence suggestingthat Iraq had provided training in the use of chemical andbiological weapons to al-Qaeda,According to 6 September 2006 report by the Senate SelectCommitteeon Intelligence, "the CtA'relied heavily on the information obtainedfrom thedebriefing of detainee Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi,a senior al-Qa 'ida operationalplanner, to assessIraq's potential caw training of ~ I - Q o 'ida."lThe same report stated that, '1he other reports of'possihle al-Qa'jda CBW training from Iraqwere never considered credible by the IntelligenceCommunity, No other information. bas beenuncovered in Iraq or from detainees that confirmsthis reporting.1l2

AceordLUg to thc September 2006Senate SelectCommitteeon Intelligence report, in January2004 al-Libi recanted the informationthat he had provided undertbe foreign intelligence

I Sennre SelectCommitteeon11llelligeo.;A:, "Reportof theSelectCommittee 00 [nlCUigcnce onPostwarFindingsAbout Iraq's WMD Programs Ilrld Links fO Terrorism and How Thcy Compare wilh Prewar Assessments,"~ e p t c m b e r 8, 2006, pg. 76.I Senate Select Committee on Iatelligeuce, "Postwar Findings,' pg. 82.

P/IIH1£OONHEtvClW PH''''

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CIA 3-002



Line I03 ~ 01 pm 3/ 5

service's interrogation: claimingto theCIAthathe had lied sothathewould notbe tortured.

Th e report states: .

Afterhis transfer to a foreign government (redacted], al-Libiclaimedthatduringhis initialdebriefings "he lied to the [foreign government service][redacted] about future operations toavoidtorture." AI-Libi told-the-CIAthat theforeign government service [redacted] explained to himthat a"long list ofmethods couldbe used against him whichwereextreme" andthat "hewouldconfess because three thousand individuals had been in thechair beforehim andthat each had confessed."

When al-Libi first claimed to the foreign intelligence servicethat lraq had provided chemical and

biological weapons training to'a\.Qaeda,theU,S, Defense Intelligence Agency issued a reportcautioning thatal·Ubi wasmost likelyfabricating the information. That report stated that, "...helacks specific details on the Iraqi's involvement. theCBRNmaterials associated with th e

assistance, and the locationwhere the training occurred. It is possiblehe does not know any

further details; it ismore likelythisindividual is intentionellymisleading thedebriefcrs, Ibn alShaykh has beenundergoing debriefs fOT several week!' and may be describing scenarios to the

debriefers that heknows ""111 retain their interest." Suchbebavior would be expected if 3detainee were subject to torture. YourAdministration never mentioned this important Defense

intell igence Agen cy dissent to al-Lib i' s claims under interrogation when speaking to the

American people.

Unfortunately, ou r intelligence operatives could not can duel an independent verification to allay

the concerns of the Defense IntelligenceAgency because tile United States ha.drelinquished

custody of al-Libi to a foreign government. AJuly9j 20011. report by the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence concluded that, "Due to the lack ofunilateral aourccs on Iraq's links

to terrorist groups like al-Qaida [redacted], the IntelligenceCommunity (lC) relied too heavily

on foreign government service reportingand sources towhom it didnot have direct access todetermine the relationship between Iraq and [redacted] terrorist groups,,,5

'Ne are deeply concernedthat an important facet ofyourAdministration's case that SaddarnHussein posed an imminent threat to theUnitedStates, whichhasbeen demonstrated os false,

rested upon information extracted through torture by a foreign intelligence service . As a rule,custody of btgb-vetue detainees should not be transferred to foreign governments, as to do sowill result in the loss ofUnited States control over the detainee and his interrogation, and 0.

concomitant loss of confidence in any intelligence obtained through the interrogation.Furthermore, under U.S. and internatlonal law, it is forbidden to transfer anyone to "a country

where there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger ofbeingsubjected to torture."

j Senate Select Comrnitteeon Intelligence, "PostwarFindings," pgs.80-81,quotingCIAoperationalcable, February5,2004.

; Defense IntelligenceAgeccy, Defense IntelligenceTerrorismSummary,Febroary22, 2002.

SCM-It! SelectCommitteeon lntelligeeoe, "Reportof'dlc SeleclCommittee onIntelligenceon the U.S, IntelligenceCouunuairy's Prewar IntelligenceAssessrnenu on Irsq," July 9,2004, pg. 14.

CIA 3-002



J0227.600U2 woe 10'3 H 22 Ilm· O S ? ~ 2007

We request that you provideuswithanswers to the following questions:

1. Please describein detailthe decision makingprocess which concluded withal-Libibeingtransferred to a foreign government. Who madethedecision to transfer custody of elLibi to a foreigngovernment? 00 what basiswasthisdecision made? Was thereconsideration ofthe consequences of interrupting theongoing and successfulinterrogationof al-Libt by agentsof theFederal Bureau ofInvestigation? Didthe FederalBureau 0 f Investigationexpross a view on transferring custody 0 f al-Libi? PIease provideany information, includingphysicaland electronic documents, relating 10 this decision

making process.

2. Does theUnitedStateshave a uniform policyregarding thetransferof an individual intothe custody of a state that appears on the list of states that engagein torture in the

Country Reportson HumanRights Practices submitted to theCongress by theDepartment of Statepursuant tosections 11 ~ ( d ) and S02(b) of theForeignAssistance Actof 1961, as amended, andsection504 of theTradeActof 1974, as amended? If so,whatis that polioy, andhowwasit appliedin [hecase'of'al-Ltbi?

3. Was therethoughtgiven to thepossibility that under the custody of II foreign governmentel-Libi might be tortured, especially if theforeigngovernment whichreceivedcustody ofal-Libi had beencitedby theDepartment of State's annual CountryReportson HumanRights Practicesfor tortureor abuseof prisonersanddetainees? If sal did the UnitedStates seek, and did theUnited Stutesreceive,assurances thatal-Libi would be treated

humanely and in accordance with international Jaw'! Wern such assurances verba' orwritten? What steps were taken to ensure that on>' such assurances weremet, and to

ensure strict compliance withour obligations under domestic and international law with

respect to the transferof persons?4. Ceneal IntefbgeuceAgencyoperationalcablesfrom February 2004, as quoted by the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, contain many references to allegations by a].

Libi that he was torturedhy the foreign intelligence service, When did the United States

first become aware thatal-Libi alleged he had been tortured by the foreign intelligence

service? What actions did your Administration take once it knew of these allegations?

What actions were taken to assess the validity of al-Libi's claims of torture? Were hisclaims judged tobe accurate?

5. After transferring custodyof al-Libito a foreign government, wereUnited States

personnel involved in the interrogarion of al-Llbi,or washis interrogationperformedpurely by a foreign intelligenceservice? If Uuited Statespersonnel were involved in al

Libi's Interrogation after his transfer to a foreign government, please describe their role inhis interrogation. . .

6 Please describe in detail thejudgments your Administration made as.to the veracity of the

information obtained from al-Libiunderinterrogationby the foreign intelligence service.

\Vhat steps were taken to confirmthis information? Did anyone in yourAdministrationhave concerns about the veracity ofinformation obtained under torture or threat of

torture? Did anyone assess the concerns raised by the Defense intelligence Agency about

the veracity of the information? To whom and in what form were these concerns

raised? Who was aware of these concerns? What action, if any, was taken in response tothese concerns?

CIA 3-002



--------------------_ ....._- _._--------------------,

2 0 2 2 ~ 6 0 0 , ) 2 l. lne I 0:1 .,1 43 p rn OS 2 2007 SUi

7.

We appreciate your promptresponse to thisrequest.

Sincerely,

William D. Delahunt

cc.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Director of National IntelligenceMike McConnell

Director, Central Intelligence Agency Gen.Michael V. Hayden

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations RobertS. Mueller, III

CIA 3-002



EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET

2. Date

Phono

6a. Response to DAC I 1 ~ . r k J t 1 om.:. roComphr.J 5b. DACControl # (DACUno OnIyJ..Originating Office Control ,

or mmerJiatB and Priority Acrlons)

o Priority. §Immediate

7, CoordinationY v ' - ~ ~ ~ \ ) J - l ' J . _ ~ ~ ~ ~ c l . J ) ) ~ ~ ~ l ~ _ ..... --- .__ ..._._ ....-

""Y\J-»- { ~ \ ( . ; L . C \ . . - \ . . A . ~ ~ b < u . . ~ ~ ~ l ~ \ t -( ~ ~ ~ ' \ ( ~ G'-\... .\:<QV\.L\. ~ G. .

SIGNAl1JRE

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SIGNATURE

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Dnlnne

SIGNATURE

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SIGNATURE

CIA 3-012



,I

T O ~ T I•

suriJECT:

,,_Review of

CIAIn ter rogat ion Program

Distribution:

Orig - 'Addressee

1'- ocr

1 DDCr1 EXDrR

1 DAC

1 GC

1 - SDGC

1 ,AGe/OD

1 - CTC/LGL

•s,

•

,

5 ~ q 3 - 1- / ~ 1 \ "'N-I t't.1"R-"'" -,'.. . -.--- .... --.- ---------_.

: . ~ . :CIA 3-012



•

'"

, ,

OFFICE OF THE VlC,E PRESIDEN·TWashington, ·D.C. 20501

,FACSIMI¥E T M N S M 1 ~ S I O N

: !. I , I ' • I ' , :.

'.A t t a ~ h e d . is theone-pagertripartite letter (Rnmsfeld..A s h ~ f t ~ Tcnet) proposed as a response to

.. the in:ceming Zelikownote from the9111 Commission (copyalso attached). TheDCIwantedan'opport:uxllty to nu l itby the operators:

As I mentioned to theoct Andy' Card, AIGonzales, and Condi Rice have 'cleared the attached ' ,text ( O b v i o u s ~ Y I 'thesigners need tobe.pJeas:ed with it, top, i f they are signing it) .

. P l ~ s e call meas'soonas youcan tlUs a : . f t ~ o o ~ · v r i t h word on whether 6 not the Dei's 'signature .. is good to 'go. ", ' . . . ' . . ," ... . . . . ..

, :

. . _ _ _

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• • ."! _... _ ; . ; . ..:. _ : • '- ~ . . . ~ . . . . _ ". . _ : " . .. •.• .•• ; .. = -:.':: h

.--- ._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CIA 4-007



•Department ofDefense.

W B S b i D g t ~ n , D.C. 20301 '

.Department of Justicev r ~ , ~ o ~ D . C : 2 0 S 3 0

Central Intelligence AgencyWLShingtol1t D.C. 2

'TheHonorable Thomas H..Kean,Chairman .

TheHonorableLeeH.Hamilton. Vice ChainnanNatiOnal Commission'onTerroristAttacks: ., Uponthe United States' ,

. ~ ~ h i n ~ o n , D . C . 2 0 4 0 7 :

Gentlemen:

• 4 ' .'Your staffhas-advised tis that the Commission seeks toparticipate in the questioning 'ofcertain

" enemycombatantS.detainedin the waX against terrorists of globalreach, Such actionby t)le

,,Commission would substantially interferewith the ability oftheUnitedStates to perform its law

enforcement,'defense and intelligence function.s in the'protection o theAmerican people., ,

. y ~ U r l e ~ ~ l a t i v e e O ~ ~ i o n has had ~ ~ ~ ' - indeed, ~ n ~ r e c e d e n t ~ : i D the annals of.Americanhistory' - access tomanyof the N a t i o n l S ~ 1 n o s t sensitive secrets in, the . c o o ~ u c t of its

'work, includingdetainee.infcrmation, In response to the Commission'sexpansive requests for.access to.secrets, ~ executivebranch-bas providedsUch' access in full cooperation. There is, '

: '. : however, a tin:c that theCommissionsbould notcross ~ the line separating the,Commission's' ,". proper inquiryinto' the September11,200J attacks from interference with theGovernment's .

, ,-aOilit'y to safeguard thenationalsecurity, includingprotection ofAmericansfromfuture terrorist. . attacks.' .The .Commlssion staffs proposed participation in questioningof detainees wouldcross. that line.. ' , ." . ,

As theofficers of the Unitcl S ~ t e s responsibleforthe law enforcemeat, defense md i n t e l i i g ~ e 'functions of theGovernment, we urge"yourCommission Dot to furtherpursuethe proposed

"-request to participate in the questioning of detainees. . .

. ~ .._....... ...... '-:--. --'--r'.', ,John Ashcroft Donald H Rumsfeld ' George J. Tenet

' Attorney General ' Secretaryof1?efensc. , Director ofCentral Intelligence" ,

':. .. - - ' ' ' ' . , , ~ ,...".00·.·.·' . , . " " . = , ~ : ~ , , , , : , , , : , , ~ , : ~ - : " , ~ , ; ; - ; . " c ' = C ..':' ',d · , . : . - , . ~ " " , ~ - , . , . " " . ~ ~ ; . , , ~ . . - - . - -CIA-4=007----



. 'MEMORANDUM

. TheComrn,is1ion meto forward theatt.1Cbed. dn:ft letter to each ofyou. If thead.toiD.istratioIl's position rc:t!1ains unchanged, thQ ComnUssion. b.u cleeidecl to. s and 'release the fin:11etter next week. Ourfundamtataltonecm a·substmtive. Vv·c believe the

, ~ e a l . ~ t a n e e s significa.otly lindt·out' abilitytou:nclerstand" ~ p ~ e - 9 / 1 1 a.ctivities of

. t h C O D s p ~ t Q r s and the d e v e . l ~ '.of theplot ':0 a t : ~ ~ k A:naici.

.Wemoain' ready to work ~ v c l y With you CD any' o p t i ~ n Uatc:.ao allowU! to aid ~ .intelligence tOQ\I.!:luWty i.n crcss..e;qm;njng J;onspire.ton QJ l JIIAJ1)' c.riticaldeteils, c l a r i . ~

, 'far. w:hat Ut:conspirators arc.&.ctUa.11y s a y b : i ~ andallow to cvah1atc the ::redibility 0 (

these rqtlics. '. .

. ! - e c H . ~' ' V I a ~'S.i.&::.bud :a eJ:I, v . r r ~ ~ ' ~ l

~ S . G o n : & ! cS!at!c Gor'c):1

n Q ~ X ~~ o h . a · ~ . ~.T'UQorhYT.ll"emcr

. J ~ R . ~ Q Q .

..ibmpD, Zd&ow.t..>:xet.".vx ;):JI,!C1'O" .

....

To; A 1 b ~ Ganzues .S,ott t\!uUe:SteveCambone

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. ..... ~ ...._... ~ _ --- .._------

: i ! " r ~ 3 J l ~U;f, (2a2lZCJ6-i3ti~ " : c n ~ k - : t ' , . . : ' ~ \ '



•• DRAFT

Januery 14,2004

The ,Honorable DonaldHIRumsfeldSecretaryofO'efense

1010 DcfenscPentagon ..Wa s h i . n g t o ~ DC20301-1010 -

'The Honorable GeorgeJ. TenetDirectorofCentral Intelligence

. ',ceEltral Intelligence Agency'. W a . s h i n g t D ~ DC 2 0 ~ 0 5

DearSecretaryRumsfeld andDirector renet

. - .

'..

With YC;1Ir assistance, the CtmrnissioIihas madegoodprogress ~ many· asp'ects of 0\1(' Wotk. Yet weneedto rai'e aniasueon w cb. we still have a .· . ~ g n i . f i c a n . t pbint of difference: Cotnmissior. pll;I'ticipaticn i:i the q u e s t i o ~ g of.,core c o n ~ i r e . t O I S in the 9/11 plot who- above rill others noW under t.',S. -

control ..•• helped. conceive, O r g a . n i z ~ , supervise) f i n ~ c e ) and carry outthese·.a.ttacks.. " .

. '

Whilewe have e'ValuCLted reports frOm more than one'hundred detainediodividuals,,:we a:re limiting -our r e q u ~ .001'y to5cvee0 fparticular i n t e : r ~ b.y

.reesen of their,involv.emeot in the9/11 plot. 'We have provided 'your staffswith the;. identity9{ those se.vE!O core conspirators.

- . 'When wemet \\ithDirector 1 ' ~ ~ h e , . ~ l a i n e d onbehalf.of tl1e i u t 4 g e n c ~coDJIIIUJJ.ity thathe coulG llQt reveal tha l o o n t i o ~ of thesa conspirators' toCoromission r e p r c s Q 1 l A t i v e s ~ ' He expressed concern th,s.t,c'tIorls to obtain

. currentintc11igcoce would be impeded by.theintroduction ofnewinterrcgators into theProcess. ... .' .: ' . . .

WeWant,to aSS\U"o Jori that we agree to P t ~ c e c ; i u t e s thatean ,adeq1JatclYprotect the secarilYintereosts oftbe Ucitcd ~ - t l 1 t e s :md t b e . l o c a t i o n . o f t h ~ e .

indi'Yiduals t We are prepared to work with youon procedureswhich will nat ~ 5upplmc fhe role of t ? - ~ . f m : a i l i ~ intcr:ro~ t o r s J bu t whichwill allow our staff ' IIme:mb crs to observe Q1JcstiQ$g in real time and then to put forwatd to ~

· i n t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t e l z e ! l s e r l t l f J . . 1 § J ! 9 ~ Y i ~ ~ o ~ M . . ~ 1 t h t h " c ; . 0 2 f ~ I \- - - - _ . ' _ _- - . . -,

, .l J . ~ N - ~ ~ - 3 ~ C ' l ~ O . '

CIA 4-007



.,

•

•

: \

TheHoncracie WCn-,i,:.lJ IL , : ' \ . i m ~ u . \ o o . , \ " ' ; _- _ • • • . _."

']anuory 14: 2 . ~ 4Page 2

to ind eo.demlyevaluate the replies. W ~ ~ e Y ! i that one-way g@s5,

, a Joining rooms or Slml a:r techniques caneccoIOIttod4te ourmutual eoneems.. • reo ;

Wearc tnlnd:fu1 of theimportance ofcontinuing to q u ~ 1 i o n these key'conspirators about C:UJrenI'intcUi'geucc, justas weare sureyeu a n d e r s ~ our'

: : i t a t u t o r y ' ; I : l l u i d a t ~ to provide a ''fu.l1 and compl=te accountingt" ofthc' ~ ! 1 1 ',attaoks. Our, request ccneerus p ~ a i p a t i o n in q,Ue5tioning onlywith respect

'to 9U1' ro.aoc4te, not your ongoingmission. " .

,.Weappreciate Director Tenet's'offer to do e v pOssio1e to take,our, questions and. tryto get them answered by otheroffic.ial3. Even$0 , we b e 1 i ~ c" theCommission needs 10 patticipa.te inquestioclo£ of these seven individuals' '

in ~ limit;ed mannerwehave p r c p o s e ~ in order to fulfill 'Cut m ~ d 2 . t e by thedeadline specified'by la.w. We. aU you to c o u s i ~ the f?Uowing: ,

• The C Q : m n i ~ s i 9 n 'boas developed ~ o n s i c k r a b l e expertLseon1ho9f11 "plot that may wellexceed theknowledgebase of tu.rtt:nt interrogators.

,Ow

Particip a.tion can helpin the evaluati0:;1

of conspirators' statementsthat are,incomplete or coaflictdirectly v.;tb other evidence.

• The: procedure offeree dOe:J not meet the Commission's eempresseddeadline ~ ~ m p l ~ t i o » · o f itswork. In October weprovided two .memoranda dctcilingmapy specific anomalieS andgaps i t l t o ~ I e p o i t s " ,and listiDg certainqueStions we asked tobe posed to the' censpiratcrs, ,.The i n t e l l i g = c . e . c o m l n u n i t y . . a n S w e r . c d . a . s ~ b e ~ l L t o . u l d . i n . l i o ~ b e r f__ ':'-" ._ . . . . .

.but onlya raw of oursubmi1ted q U ~ S ~ Q O S havebeen addressed. The ' "

. various substantive problems temail1 after analyiing even the: most.recent infopnation wehave received, We can:qot detail theseproblem!in this ~ s i f i e d letter, , .

• Thetime elapsed inthis process ' ~ Q " p e r s u a d e 5 us r.h.a.f the"Cotnmissiop. needs toparticipa.te iIi the .limited manner VIe have',pzoposed In· o r ~ e r to conduct ,immediate f o U Q w " l J p ~ " . '

_;0 i ' t o ~ e ~ we have proposedwill ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ S l i i o n te fotID. itsown-

llldepe.ndent eve.1oation cfthe CZ"ccb.1:Iility Q f ~ e ~ n s p i t a t . o r s · statements. We,~ e J . c o m e the opportunityto meetwithyou 2.I!d yourstaffon this issue again to

. 'try to coma to agtt:ementj webelieve'a failure to reach 'a·greCiID.cot 'Would

inevitably i n Y i t ~ , p u b 1 i e and eengressicnal serotioy. .. ' . ", '.

~ c . c a u s ~ we arc: sensitive to D 3 t i c ~ ~ sceurityccneems abollt the protectionof .in!orrnanon and thewayit is colleeted, we ba.vc li.:cnitoi our ICqUesf aclyto

" , , those indivi¢.talswho areat the very center Q f t h ~ plot,we.havebeen charged '

__

__ ~ ? i o . . ~ ~ ~ s . ~ . _ : T h t : . _ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ 1 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ J ! . Y J , ~ u n ~ l ~ ~ ~ . Y J ~ youto,.

.',96%

CIA 4-007



•The Honorable Dcnclc. H.Ruuufcic and ~ " \ e ~ o n c n b l ~ lieOrge J. 1 ~ ; ' C l \1aneary14, 2004 . .

Page 2' ,

.consider favorably our request farparndpatiotl in the guestioning process inthe l U : n i t ~ ID-aIJ.!ler wehaveproposed. .

SincCIt211·

.' .

•

--.- ,

, Tho.tna.S H. Kcan. Chait

Lee H, Hamilton.Vu:.e' Cheir

4• • ....... :" •• ~ . .: . . .. . , . ~ . ' . ' : ' . . . .. . . • . • • • _ • . ~ : ~

? C

CIA 4-007



• • \ ... • :_t i. !' ",_:;'1:' .: : I : •• iF •

Del ACTION CENTERROUTING SLIP

OOCUMENiNO:_

Action Officer: I I•••••COORDINATION/ROUTING:

_Group to coordInate withAOCI/AP reDOCEX, All c o n g r e s s i o n ~~ l n 8 t e d with OCAto complete tasking. OCA Point of Contact l SUMMARY:

Memorandum Irom David Shedd, NSC, regarding 25November2003 latter from Sanator C h a m b l i ~ toCondoleezza Rice, As,slstant to the Presldsnt lor N

I • . . . : :- . . .:; :: . -I I • "I

Date: 10December2003

ReceivedIn DAC: 10December 2003

Po-liAlS 061101025 P 03

CIA 2-049



...... ..

j ~ T l 0 N A L~ E C U R l T YCOUNCIL

~ A T I O N A L SECUR1TY COUNC I L

FAX COVER SHEET

. t , ~ F r o m : David Shedd

f ~ T o : Stan MoskowitzI ~ : li ~ 1 A g e ~ c y ~ CIAtD/DCI

~ f a x Number:'r;;,'f!:DatelTfme; 12110/03

.17th & Penn, N.W, ~ ashlnpton, D,C, ~ ~ o . of pages to follow: 5

0504 ~ 1 M e s s a g e : Chambliss Letter

,Old you geta complete. \ dear transmissron? Ifnot,-Uplease call: J.~ ,

;t:::

¥-'jk1\za

1.1

CIA 2-049



DEC.le.2003 12:55PM NO. 960 P.Z

NATIONAl. SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, O.C. ~ 0 9 0 t f

Decerrber le, 2003

NsC/!ntel

SUBJECT: Chambliss Letter

Please see a tt ached le t ters , The incoming November 25 l e ~ t e rChambliss is

d 1 r e c ~ e dto Pro Rice and.SecDef

,... .... ... • • ':

CIA 2-049



CIA 2-049



DEC.10.2003 12:5GPM .~ 1 - 2 B 0 3 ~ 6 : 2 3 SEN ~ r s s

SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIEn - RANDLE AS CLASSlFlW. CHM1BlfSS110\'.01.'

i

IIC\JL I"URE"

JDICIAIl:V

~ i t t d ~ t a t t s ~ m Q t tWASHINGTON, DC 20no-lOO7

November 25,2003

202.224 7963 ~ . P.S

I t > ~ < ' i ~C l l ~ " , " ' I I · O H J ; I ~w DC2titt-1COlN l I l C ~ m 4 n l

nULESDr.'CondeleezzaRice

Assistant to the President forNational Security AffairsNationalSecurityCouncilTheWhiteHouse1600 Pennsylvania AVCDue, NWWashington, D.C. 20500

ThoHonorableDonaldl t u m s f ~ l dBeererary ofDe!enso1000DefensePentagonWashingtonDC)20301·]000

DearDr. Rice andSecreta..7 Rllm.sfeld:

Iamwriting todayto express my deep and growing e,oncem about several issuelrelated to our impOt1ant work iJllnq thathave reetilUy come tomyattention out&idc t}lC.ontext ofmy c l a s ~ f i c d workon the armed smticee andintelUgcnt-o ovemihtcommittees. This letter is unelassified, but ithasnothem drafted assuebin antioipiltionof it being released. It tssim-ply an cffort toadvise you ofwhalImt hea.."iDg that isincreasingly worrisome tome penolU1ly.

The fuit issue regards thealleged lateness ora s u p p o s ~ vt:r:'J reem( decision to

reestablish anindigenous intelligenc;.c capability inIraq that canbeused tomore

"8ffcGtlveJy penetrate pro.Saddam fot'Gt$. If true, itwould be w o n i ~ O D l C ifnotnegligentthat sucha concepthas takenso IODi totome to fiuition.. Nowthat thedccl$ioI1mayhave finallybeenmadeto move f o % V l ' ~ it will u n d ~ a n d a b l y t8ke moro valuable tizr.c.

- whichis in shortsupply - todevelop And ~ x c c U t c theoperations thatbadpwrlouslybcetlbeyondourcapabilities. Thequestion o!whyQ\ll coreHUMINT c o l l ~ l o n bv e

allegedlybeea focused on tacticalforce profedion requirements rarhcrthan&tratcgic. p=nC:UfltiO,:\ operadons uamarterbest discussed ,,'itbintheconfines oftheintelligencecommittee. It isworthnotiDg. however, that l'(mctrating gumlla lcadmhip II a l ~ ~ lsuMcient to gleanplans andintenlions b theoniyway toguareJItC(.Coree protectiou.

What concerns meevenmorethanthoaforementioned a.re lUisesUom recentlymade tome thatthe enormous effortbeingputintodebr\cfillg Iraqidetainees iu--eountryatmultipledebriefing cm\C%$ bas beenundermined bysyatermc procedural andmanagement shortcomings resulting inclassic Infonnation sbarinS·brcakdownt thatwe. .\hould haveaddressed bynow. Forexample. I have neard thatIraqi deWneei areoften

debriered multipletimesat lnultiplclocation! oftenwithout OUfdebri.cfert being' aware of9hc fact ofprovioU6 debrieiings and theinformation preViously pro"ided. USeJful

SENSmYE 'UNCLASSIPI.5D - HANDLB AS CLASSTP!ED

I·1

Ii

I

CIA 2-049



DEC. HI, 2303 12:57PM

J1-aaoo 16 /2 4 SEN OA "\BLTSS

SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED -HANDLE AS CLASSIFIED

information. when it is acquired. ~ l$ often notP ro Fl) ' w.re4511 a. centralized

system that ensures timely disseminatIon to all CO'DiumC;'S with a "need1Q know!' As

you may kaow, I haveparticular interest and tXperience in information sha rin g 16&Uu

from having eoauthcred the Information SbJring Act:of2002, aloXiS withmy intc1UieDCe

aim homeland i e i ) ' c e oversight 'Work in both theHOtlS6 iU1d Senato,. If$Uch

allegations are t J and 1have reasen to c i they may be, I foil to comprehend why

we havenI t donemore to c e 1 gJarmg deficiencies sooner. cspC;Cil11y giVCJ:Iou r

expmenee with complex information sharing obstacles [elated to eountertenorlsm in lhe

run up 10 the 9-11 t

Finally I it- ismy understaDdtng that We ate making little if .any beadway in

addres&ing themassive documeD.l exploitation baddog rcla1ed 10 Ifaq, and that lhere stiU

isno coherent 'YStOJt\ in place on Iraq doeumenu U h OCOOCSXn progrut\ thatWa5

designed and honedafter9..11 to cover nca-Inq rotatc-d:tCtrOnst threat information, .

.While the magm tudeo f the job and the: lack of cleared and properly trainlXi linguist!: may

makemuc.h o( ....hatwoultimately learn from these Iraqi documents more useful to

, historians than to , ~ g and the fnlelJigence Community, we &bolJ1d have a Jl10n

rad.onal system in plaee to do processing, explctrsnon, anddissemination.

In an effo rt to better understand theaforementioned lOSw:i and whatwehave done

(and haveutt yet done) fa address a,em, I intend 10 engage nunc fully myeol1eagucs on

tho anncd services and inteHfscuee committees, and to a5kmore direct que&tion.s of

executive branch depvtmCllts and ~ ; . In the meantime, however, I believe the

dangerous, fluid, and mcrcasinily clu11en$ing $ecuOty situation b Iraq require, meto

brin g th is information andmy resultiDg concerns to you rattention without delay. .

TIunk you foryoureon'Jideration and for the extraordinary job you arc both doing

to keep Axnerie;ms saf eathome and around the world in tho face ,'f terrorism,

r i ~ i 1 and otherpress

mg and comp}cx th."elts to our national security. Ai

I stand ready to do alII canto asns t you in these crucial endeavcn.

SC:jj

CC: SenateMajorityLeader Bin Prist

Senalor JohnWa.met .

SenatorPat Roberts

I

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DfRECTORS ACTION CENTER

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Nellanal Security Affairs, The V\.'hite House, forwatding copyof! .his response toSenator Warner, Senator McCain, andSenator IGraham regarding theExecullve Orderthataddresses Common_____ ...;.:..A;,:,;rt:.:,;::cf.:.:e;..:3;.:..._ i

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CIA 2-054



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CIA 2-054



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LETTER SENTTOSENATORS WARNER, MCCAIN, AND GRAHAM PAGES:

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TKrl WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 2007

Dear Senator W arner , Senator McCain, and Graham;Thank you for your le t te r cf July 19 1 2007. AB I indicated toover the telephone in responding to le t te r of July 6.007, the Administration appreciates the importance you attacho Common Artic

le 3 of the Geneva Conventions {IlConm::>n Artic ler.} and to the and of that requirement.ithin the we have discussed the issues you naveaised in ,developing the executive Order thatddressee Common 3, and that resulted invarie ty of changeG the way the is drafted. Weelieve l;hat., as a result I the Order 16 much improved.At the same tiiroe, ! indicated that further delay would not beossible . Issuance , of the Execu tive Order now enables us tonsure that'we have &vailable the complement of tools needed toake fu l l advantage a timely fashion of opportunities weurrently have to counter trueate against this N ation in the Warn The President stated that the CentralAgency's interrogation program hae proved extremelyaluable in th is and for that the

EXecutiverder foouses on forth the procedural and substantiveequirements tha t must be met before euch a program can proceed.recent le tte r July 19 indicated concernartic ipation of the Oapartment and the Judge Advocateseneral (JAGs) in developing the order and addresaing relatedssues . 50th the Department of s ta te and the ofefense have been involved in the development of th is Order a the moac levela, and other affec=ed aoencies andhave participated extensively in-the ofhe Order as well. As the State Department, i t has beenlosely involved in formulation of the Order, reviewed thein a l of the order, and did net object to the Order'sesuance. In the la s t couple of days, the were briefed ine ta i l on the Order! s pzopceed content e . They provided veryseful com m Enta, and tne Executi

ve Order was revised as ao address of these com ments. In addition, as you know,

CIA 2-054



2

General Havden briefed eeveral senior JAG office=s on guidelines~ n p r o c e d ~ e s associated with the Central Intelligence Agency's

interrogation prcgramr which ar e designed to ensure the safeadmin is tr at ion o f th e program and compliance w!tn a l l applicable

law!!. They made some useful auggest ion!J which General Haydenintends to incor,porate into the g"idelifiee and procedures.

Finally, you r e q u e 8 t ~ o c l a r ~ f 1 c a t i o n regarding th e s cope andapplication of che B ~ e ~ u t 1 v e Order. T h r o ~ g h the Executive

O::der I tht! Preaident La inteL-pretins the meaning and ~ p p J . i c a t i o nof Common Article 3 with respect to certain detentions and

i n t e r ~ o g a t i o n s . The Executive Order indicates th e proceduraland substantive reauirements that ~ a be sat isf ied in order fer

an i n t e r r o g a t i o ~ p;ogrem of th e type d e ~ c ~ i b e d in th e Order to

be undertaken inc o m p l i a ~ c e

withCommon ~ t i c l e

3.~ 1 l e

Executive Order e ~ r e e B l y e ta te s in s e ~ t i o n 3{a} that th e o rd er~ -authoritatiye fo r a ll purpoeeB as a r r ~ t t e r of United Stateslaw, inaluding satisfaction of th e internaticnal obligations ofthe United 5 t ~ t e s , ' Common Axticle 3 of course applies beyond

t he Cen tr al I nt el li genc e Agency to th e entire U.S. Government ini t s conduct of th e War on Terro:.

Agair" thB.1'1.k: you :o r yOl1!' thoughts on th is important· matter. r~ g r e e with you that th e iseuance of thia Order oresEote a realo p p o r t ~ ~ i t y for th e U n ~ c e d Statee to d e m o n g t r a t ~ i te commdtmentto America'S internat ional obligations, while at th e same timewaging a robus t offensive in th e War on Terror,

SinceralYJ

__ ::r ' r t & l - ~ / t J 1 . . .stephen J . HadleyAsGistant to the President

for NatiorAl Secu=1ty Affair6

The Honorable J o ~ ~ WarnerTneHonorable J o r ~ McCain

~ 1 Honorable Lir.daey GrahamUnited States SenatoreWashington, D.C,

US government blocked 9/11 Commission

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