US Foreign Policy Towards Northeast Asia.pdf

8/10/2019 US Foreign Policy Towards Northeast Asia.pdf

1/24

3PERCEPIONS, Winter 2012, Volume XVII, Number 4, pp. 3-26.

Key Words

Japanese-Amercan relatons, Japanese-

Amercan allance, Korean-Amercan

relatons, North Korea, Sno-Amercan

relatons, awan Strat ssue.

Introduction

Te date 7 December 2011 was the

70thannversary of the surprse Japanesear attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawa.

Tat day of nfamy long ago not only

brought Amerca nto a global war, but

propelled the US towards becomng the

domnant mltary and poltcal power n

East Asa. US foregn polcy n Asa was

shaped by four wars, three hot and one

cold. Te outcome of the Second WorldWar created a permanent Amercan

mltary presence n the regon and

transformed Japan nto a key ally. Te

Korean War, Amercas frst war fought

entrely on the Asan manland, saved

South Korea, whch became another US

ally. It also created a defensve permeter

for the Cold War, n whch the US faceddown both the Sovet Unon and the

Abstract

Snce the md-19th century, the US hasbeen a Pacfc power. Trough three warsand the Cold War, Amerca became a majorregonal player. Modern Japanese-Amercanrelatons were shaped by the Cold War, anda strong poltcal-mltary allance served thegeopoltcal needs of both countres. As Japanseconomy matured and ts poltcs transformedn the 1990s, okyo sought greater poltcalndependence, and used an upgradng of the

allance as part of ts effort to acheve the morenormal status as a great power. US relatonswth South Korea have been drven by a sharedpercepton of threat from North Korea. Sncethe Cold War, the nature of ths threat hasshfted from mmedate concern about conflctto danger from an essentally faled state. Sno-Amercan relatons centre on the nteracton oftwo great powers. Chnas quas-allance wththe US and market-orented reforms meant

that the relatonshp n the 1980s centred onrentegraton of Chna nto the global poltcaleconomy. Snce the md-1990s, Chnas rsehas led to ncreased tensons, especally nstrategc and economc ssue areas. Amercasclose but unoffcal relatonshp wth awanremans an rrtant to overall Chnese-Amercan tes.

Joel R. CAMPBELL*

US Foreign Policy towards Northeast Asia

* Associate Professor in the Masters of Scienceof International Relations program of royUniversity, teaching on the Pacific Region(Japan and Korea).


2/24

Joel R. Campbell

4

newly communst Chna. Te Vetnam

War, whch has been perceved as a US

loss, nserted Amerca nto SoutheastAsan poltcs, wth Japan as a key

stagng area. wo more recent wars, n

Afghanstan and Iraq, reled on Japanese

bases for supply and tranng.

Post-Vetnam US foregn polcy

downplayed East Asa. Amerca

wthdrew from manland Southeast Asa

n the 1970s, and lost ts Phlppne

bases by 1991. Chna algned tself wth

Amerca n the latter days of the Cold

War, whle t ntroduced economc

reforms and opened up to foregn

trade and nvestment. Te end of the

Cold War eased regonal tensons, wth

only the Korean pennsula remanng

a flashpont. Japan contnued to rely

on Amercan defence guarantees as a

foundaton of ts own foregn polcy, but

ts outszed economc presence n the

1980s seemed on the wane by the md-

1990s.

Amerca has long seen tself as a Pacfc

power, and a key goal of US foregnpolcy has been to prevent any major

power or combnaton of powers ganng

control of Eurasa.1Much was made of

the Obama admnstratons pvot fromSouth Asa and the Mddle East to the

Asa-Pacfc n 2011. Te Presdent spent

most of last November bolsterng US

trade, poltcal, and mltary tes n the

regon. Te US hosted the Asa-Pacfc

Economc Cooperaton forum (APEC)

summt n Hawa. Obamas openng

address noted that the Asa Pacfcregon s absolutely crtcal to Amercas

economc growth we consder t a

top prorty.2He promoted the rans-

Pacfc Partnershp (PP), a free trade

area that would span the Pacfc, whch s

n prelmnary negotatons and has been

sgned up to by Australa, Malaysa, New

Zealand, Sngapore, and Vetnam (Japan,Canada, and Mexco have expressed

nterest n jonng the talks). Vstng

Australa, Obama joned wth Prme

Mnster Jula Gllard to reaffrm ther

allance, and both agreed that 2,500 US

Marnes would begn rotatng through an

Australan base near Darwn. Hs speech

to the Australan parlament focused onfreedom, some observers vewng ths

as an obvous contrast wth Chna. He

then attended the East Asa Summt n

Indonesa, where he announced that

the US was consderng normalsng

relatons wth Burma/Myanmar, based

on the mltary governments recent

prelmnary reforms. Secretary of StateHllary Clnton quckly vsted Yangon,

Te outcome of the SecondWorld War created a permanent

American military presencein the region and transformedJapan into a key ally.


3/24


5

US-Japanese Relations

A History of Mutual Dependence

Te Unted States and Japan frst

encountered each other as md-19th

century rsng Pacfc powers. Te US

sought to open Japan ostensbly to

establsh ports of call for Amercan

whalng shps, and to promote Asan

trade. It was also a way to nsert tself nto

the mperalstc poltcs of Asa. Japan

was perhaps fortunate that a relatvely

small power lke the US came to call

n 1853, rather than the hegemonc

Great Brtan, whch was preoccuped

wth ts efforts to domnate Inda and

Chna. It took the Japanese 15 years to

fully decde how to respond to Western

encroachment, but the Mej Restoraton

n 1868 thrust Japan nto the modern

world along a path of economc and

poltcal modernsaton. At frst, Amerca

vewed Japans transformaton postvely,

as a naton replcatng the Anglo-Saxon

model, and as a counter to Russa and a

collapsng Chna.4

Amercas postve vew gradually

changed as Japan aggressvely entered the

Asa mperalsm game. Unlke European

powers, Japans colonal efforts were

mostly contguous, creatng mmedate

tenson wth other Asan countres.

Amerca protested Japans moves nto

Chna n the 1930s, and rsng blateraltenson culmnated n the attack on Pearl

and met wth both the leaders of the

rulng junta and opposton leader Aung

San Suu Ky.3

Te frst week of 2012, accompaned by

Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, Obama

announced a new mltary strategy to

support ths Asa pvot. Amerca would

draw down forces statoned n Europe

and reduce ts overall mltary strength,

whle mantanng force levels n East

Asa and deployng US Marnes to the

Phlppnes and Taland.

Ts artcle surveys Amercan foregn

polcy n Northeast Asa snce the Cold

War, focusng on shared hstory and

current ssues. It dscusses relatons

wth four key states or enttes: Japan,the Republc of Korea (hereafter called

Korea), Chna, and awan. It suggests

that Asa s once agan becomng

central to US polcy. Te Obama

admnstratons recent pvot to Asa s

only the latest manfestaton of Amercan

preoccupaton wth the regon, and

heralds an enhanced role for Asa nAmercan thnkng over the next decade.

America has long seen itself asa Pacific power, and a key goalof US foreign policy has beento prevent any major power or

combination of powers gainingcontrol of Eurasia.


4/24

Joel R. Campbell

6

Harbor. Japan greatly mscalculated

Amercan wllngness to fght, and pad

dearly for t. Te subsequent PacfcWar (1941-1945) was marked by

ntense brutalty, and ended n Japans

overwhelmng defeat. Te crushng

nature of the vctory, followed by the

benevolence of the occupaton, helped

make Japans poltcal and economc

transformaton relatvely smooth.5

Japan emerged as Amercas key Asanally n the 1950s. Te frst key event

that shaped the relatonshp was the

San Francsco reaty of 1951 whch

restored Japans soveregnty after the

Amercan occupaton; along wth the

later Mutual Securty reaty, t made

Japan Amercas junor partner n East

Asa.6 Te allance was based on threemplct understandngs: Japan would

accept an nferor poston n return for

an Amercan guarantee of ts securty,

Japan would concentrate on economc

development and gan access to the US

market, and Japan could have a degree

of ndependence n ts foregn polcy but

would do nothng that would challengethe new regonal order n Asa or US

hegemonc leadershp.7 Ts trade-off

became known as the Yoshda Doctrne

after Prme Mnster Yoshda Shgeru,and whch stated that the US would

lead n the securty area, and Japan

would concentrate on developng ts

economy. A second key event was the

1960 renewal of the Mutual Securty

reaty whch, despte ant-treaty rots,

put securty tes on a more permanent

bass.8

Te relatonshp held througha number of challenges, notably the

drawn out reverson of Oknawa,

popular opposton to the Vetnam War,

and the Nxon Shocks of the early

1970s (Nxon slapped puntve tarffs on

Japanese exports, and decded to forge

a quas-allance wth Chna wthout

nformng Japanese leaders).As Japan became one of the worlds

largest economes n the 1970s, the

bfurcated nature of the relatonshp

became panfully clear. Whle Japan

contnued to defer to the US on regonal

and global securty, and remaned a

steadfast Cold War ally, Japanese neo-

mercantlst exports and predatorybusness behavour created huge trade

surpluses wth the US, helped destroy

several key Amercan ndustres, and led

to a number of hgh-profle takeovers of

Amercan companes. rade frcton

reached a peak n the md-1980s, as

Amercan calls for apprecaton of the

undervalued yen led to the Plaza Accordn 1985. Japanese banks and ndustral

Unlike European powers,Japans colonial efforts weremostly contiguous, creatingimmediate tension with otherAsian countries.


5/24


7

waters of Japan, and would only work

wth Amercan forces n functonal

areas such as operatons, logstcs, andntellgence. After a three-year process,

okyo and Washngton specfed

condtons under whch the two natons

would jontly operate n future conflcts.

Te two mltares would now cooperate

n peacetme condtons, would work

together to thwart attacks on the

Japanese homeland, and would react toregonal threats that could affect Japans

securty. Tey also lsted new areas of

cooperaton, such as relef operatons

of US forces, support n rear areas, and

jont work on operatons.10

Begnnng n the 1960s, varous leaders

n the Japanese Lberal Democratc Party

(LDP), the governng party at the tme,sought ways to acheve two goals: greater

ndependence for Japanese foregn polcy

and more equalty n Japanese-Amercan

relatons. Comprehensve securty was

an effort n the 1970s to gve Japan more

breathng room n an era of ol shortages.

Meanwhle, okyo became a more actve

partner wth Amerca. By the 1970s,Japan funded 75 % of the costs of the US

frms began to recycle export earnngs

to the US economy, and Japan became

Amercas leadng credtor.Te allance faced ts greatest post-

Cold War test (and thrd key event)

not n East Asa but n the Mddle

East. Durng the 1991 Gulf War, Japan

was roundly crtcsed by Amercan

lawmakers and pundts for ts falure

to robustly support the Amercan-led

allance. okyo belatedly pledged US$4 bllon (wth an addtonal US $9

bllon later) to help defray the US $500

mllon daly war costs, and dspatched

a mne sweeper to the Persan Gulf

after the war had ended. Respondng

to nternatonal crtcsm, Japan wthn

two years undertook two major changes:

t markedly ncreased fnancal supportfor US forces n Japan, and commtted

to jonng UN peacekeepng operatons.

After ts frst successful postwar overseas

troop deployment n Camboda (1992-

1993), t partcpated n UN operatons

n several other countres.9

Upgrading the Partnership

A fourth key epsode was the draftng

of blateral defence gudelnes n 1997.

Earler agreements from the 1970s stated

that Japan would buld up suffcent

forces to provde ts own self-defence,

though the Japanese Self-Defence Force

(SDF) would carry out most of tsoperatons wthn the land and terrtoral

As Japan became one of theworlds largest economies in the1970s, the bifurcated natureof the relationship becamepainfully clear.


6/24

Joel R. Campbell

8

bases n Japan, and had enacted a range

of legal measures to support US forces.

Japans fadng economc pre-emnenceand Chnas rsng economc power

meant that Japan receved less attenton

from Amercan poltcal leaders, and

Japan bashng gave way to Japan

passng n recent years. Domestc

poltcal changes n Japan n the 1990s,

ncludng the meltdown of the pacfst

Socalst Party, allowed conservatveleaders to promote the noton of Japan

as a normal naton, n other words

one that could project ts own mltary

mght as a great power. Te ascent of

Kozum Junchro to the premershp

was a game-changer n that t brought a

full upgradng of the Japanese-Amercan

relatonshp. Kozum beleved thatthe 9/11 attacks created a new global

securty realty, and that partcpaton

n the US-led coalton n Afghanstan

would provde an opportunty for Japan

to attan both greater ndependence and

equalty wth Amerca. Kozum was one

of the frst alles to pledge support for

the US campagn. He pushed the Ant-errorsm Specal Measures Law through

the Det, the Japanese parlament, n

October 2001, and then sent Martme

Self-Defence shps to the Indan Ocean

n support of the war.11

Te Iraq War two years later provded

an even more potent opportunty for

Kozum to boost tes wth Washngton.One of the few Amercan alles to

pledge support n ths war, Kozum

agreed to send an SDF force to do

humantaran and reconstructon workn Iraq. Kozum was lucky that there

were no casualtes, and the two-year

deployment took place wth only mld

protests n Japan.12 Kozum and US

Presdent George W. Bush also generally

agreed about the need to put pressure on

North Korea about ts nuclear weapons

programme, and both were equallyalarmed about the Chnese mltary

buld up. As long as Bush, Kozum, and

Kozums LDP successors were n offce,

the relatonshp remaned farly close,

though dsagreements over North Korea

surfaced when the USs hard-lne stance

dd not produce tangble results (Japanese

leaders were encouraged when Bushsteam made some temporary progress

wth Pyongyang durng hs last 18

months n offce). Te two governments

made headway on realgnment of US

bases to lmt ther mpact on Oknawa,

the creaton of a ballstc mssle defence

system for Japan, and on allowng

Japanese SDF a stronger role n natonaldefence.13 Te two governments also

worked together on a range of securty

ssues, such as ballstc mssle defence,

martme securty, and nter-operablty

of defence systems.14

Perhaps the bggest recent challenge

to the blateral relatonshp was the

landslde vctory of the Japaneseopposton party, the Democratc Party


7/24


9

personnel n manland Japan, okyo

prefers basng n the southern sland

prefecture of Oknawa. Over 70 % of USforces statoned n Japan are based there,

and bases take up around 30 % of land

on the tny sland. Due n part to a strng

of crmes and varous accdents nvolvng

US servce personnel, there s sgnfcant

opposton to the bases on the sland.

Whle many Oknawans work on the

bases, large numbers of people would lketo reduce the mpact of US operatons,

and eventually move Amercan bases

off the sland. After a 1995 rape of a 12

year-old grl by three US servcemen,

whch sparked mass protests throughout

the country, Presdent Bll Clnton and

Prme Mnster Hashmoto Ryutaro

promsed to reduce the Amercanfootprnt on the sland. okyo and

Washngton later agreed to move 8,000

US Marnes to Guam, and to relocate

the Futenma Marne Ar Staton from ts

urban locaton to Henoko n northern

Oknawa.17

Te Oknawan prefectural government,

along wth local envronmental actvsts,has long pressed for the closng of

Futenma wthout relocaton to Henoko.

LDP leaders were commtted to the

agreement, but n 2009 the DPJ came to

power promsng to reopen the ssue. Te

Obama admnstraton dug n ts heels,

and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates

nssted that the agreement would not berenegotated. Prme Mnster Hatoyama

of Japan (DPJ), n September 2009.

Te DPJ platform called for major

changes n the allance, such as ganngmore equalty n the relatonshp,

promotng stronger regonal tes, and

lessenng the mpact of Amercan bases

on Oknawa. Once Hatoyama Yuko

took offce as prme mnster, blateral

tensons mounted.15 However, Japanese

people gave the LDP a landslde vctory,

ejectng the DPJ from power after threeyears durng the general electon on 16

December 2012. Japans recently elected

Prme Mnster Shnzo Abe met wth

Presdent Barack Obama on 22 February

2013 n Washngton, seekng to renforce

US-Japanese relatons n a tme of hgh

tensons for Japan, caused by a terrtoral

dspute between Japan and Chna overthe Senkaku/Daoyu Islands n the East

Chna sea, and a North Korean nuclear

test. At the summt wth Abe, Obama

called the allance wth Japan the central

foundaton of U.S. polcy on Asa.16

Futenma

Te Futenma ssue encapsulates

those unresolved tensons n Japanese-

Amercan relatons. Sxty years after

the postwar occupaton of Japan ended,

Japan stll depends on Amercan securty

guarantees, and a large Amercan

mltary presence remans, but t does

not st easly there. Unwllng to acceptlarge numbers of Amercan mltary


8/24

Joel R. Campbell

10

was unable to convnce the prefectural

leaders to accept the agreement, hs

poston became poltcally untenable,and he resgned after only nne months

n offce. Te fasco ndcated a clear

poltcal falure by the DPJ to transform

the ncdent: attemptng to follow publc

opnon on the ssue, t poltcsed

securty polcymakng, but was not

able to come up wth coherent polcy

alternatves, and blateral securty polcyoutcomes remaned largely unchanged.18

Curts, for one, suggests that the

Obama admnstraton deserves much

of the blame for the crss, especally

for Secretary of Defence Robert

Gates puttng pressure on Hatoyamas

government mmedately after the

electon, and then Obamas reluctanceto help the prme mnster as he began

to flounder.19 Te Futenma agreement

remans n place but, 16 years after the

rape ncdent, t s uncertan when the

base wll be moved.

Recent Issues

Te 11 March 2011 earthquake,

tsunam and nuclear dsaster precptated

the worst humantaran and poltcal

crss n Japan of the postwar era. Te

mpact on an already strugglng Japanese

economy was ncalculable, and the

sluggsh handlng of the crss led to

the downfall of Kan Naoto, Hatoyamassuccessor as prme mnster. Ironcally, the

dsasters aftermath marked an upswng

n US-Japanese relatons as Amercan

mltary unts statoned n Japan assstedn relef operatons n the ohoku

regon (called Operaton omodach, or

frend), and US government agences

advsed ther Japanese counterparts on

dealng wth the crppled Fukushma

Dach nuclear plant. Overall relatons

had been mprovng snce md-2010,

when a Chnese fshng trawler rammeda Japan Coast Guard vessel n the East

Chna Sea. A mn-crss over Japans

holdng of the boats captan was averted

when Kan agreed to return hm to

Chna, but ths hurt the prme mnsters

publc approval. Suddenly, okyos old

fear of a rsng Chna trumped any desre

to equalse relatons wth Amerca, andthe DPJ government began to realse the

value of the allance.20

Japanese and Amercan polcymakershave worked to reduce economc

okyo and Washington havediscussed new frameworksfor cooperation, including

agreement to take bilateralissues to the World radeOrganisation (WO), draftingnew sector-specific agreements,and creating a bilateral freetrade agreement (FA).


9/24


11

trade tes wth the US. Te need to

keep dversfed trade relatons became

manfest n late 2011 and early 2012, asncreased energy mports due to a post-

tsunam nuclear shutdown combned

wth softness n the Chnese market

caused Japan to run ts frst general trade

defcts n a generaton.

US-South Korean Relations

A Shared Treat Relationship

Amercas relatons wth South Korea

are a bond forged n blood, and are

domnated by one ssue: the threat

to the South from North Korea. US

troops occuped the southern half of the

pennsula at the end of the Second World

War, whle the Sovet army took thenorthern half. Te wartme alles agreed

that the two halves would be reunted

nto a democratc Korea, but they could

never agree on the terms under whch an

electon would take place. In 1948, the

Democratc Peoples Republc of Korea

(DPRK) under the Sovet-nstalled

leader Km Il Sung, and the Republc ofKorea (ROK) under the authortaran

Syngman Rhee (Lee Sung Man) began

as separate states. Sovet and Amercan

forces wthdrew from the pennsula, and

the Amercans unntentonally sgnalled

that they would not defend the South

f t was attacked. North Korea nvaded

the ROK n June 1950 and the rumanadmnstraton quckly ntervened n

frcton over the past decade, and have

cooperated on economc recovery snce

the 2008-2009 global recesson. Gonewere the hgh-profle trade dsputes of

the 1980s and 1990s, despte contnued

Japanese trade surpluses, and okyo dd

not protest the Obama admnstratons

efforts to revve the Amercan automoble

ndustry. Japan has attempted no

major devaluaton of ts currency to

take advantage of the recesson, andcontnued ts conservatve monetary

and fscal polcy. okyo and Washngton

have dscussed new frameworks for

cooperaton, ncludng agreement to

take blateral ssues to the World rade

Organsaton (WO), draftng new

sector-specfc agreements, and creatng

a blateral free trade agreement (FA).

21

Obamas polcy pvot to Asa was taken

n part to reassure Japanese leaders,

especally DPJ leaders who felt that the

US had sabotaged Hatoyama over the

Futenma ssue. Obama sees the Japan

allance as bedrock for hs Asa polcy,

snce Amercan forces wll contnue to

be based n Japan for the long term. Forther part, Japans DPJ leadershp by 2011

seemed much more wllng to cooperate

wth the US on Asa-Pacfc regonal

and securty ssues. Japans January 2012

announcement that t wshed to jon

multlateral negotatons on the PP

ndcated that the DPJ had embraced

the LDP polcy to lnk efforts towardsregonal ntegraton to contnued strong


10/24

Joel R. Campbell

12

the conflct. Te ensung Korean War

lasted over three years, takng the lves

of over one mllon Koreans, perhaps300,000 Chnese, and more than 33,000

Amercans.

When the war ended n the stalemate of

an armstce, Amercan troops remaned

n the mpovershed South, whch was

ncorporated nto the US-East Asan

allance. Lke Japan, the ROK sgned a

mutual securty treaty wth Washngton,and Amerca provded heavy mltary and

economc ad to the strugglng country.

Snce the 1950s, the prmary motvaton

of the Korean-Amercan allance has

been to prevent another North Korean

attack on the South. Unlke Japan,

South Korea faced an antagonstc

state bound on ts destructon across aheavly fortfed border, the roncally

named Demltarsed Zone (DMZ).

Outsde threats to the country were

more mmedate, and the Amercan

role n the defence of the country more

heavy handed and drect. Amercan

forces were ntended as a trp-wre,

.e., suffcently large that Pyongyangwould always know that, n the event of

another Korean war, they would agan

face overwhelmng Amercan frepower.

Ts deterrence has apparently worked.Despte varous attempts to destablse

the South wth nfltraton, assassnaton

attempts and terrorst acts, North Korea

has never mounted a sustaned breach of

the armstce, at least untl two serous

ncdents n 2010.

Also unlke Japan, Korean poltcs

remaned authortaran under Rhees

tradtonal strong-man government

untl 1960, and then under the mltary

governments of Park Chung Hee and

Chun Doo Hwan from 1961 untl 1987.

However, Korea followed a Japanese-

style state-led, export-orented growth

path, and ts economy took off n the

1960s, achevng very hgh growth rates

n the 1970s and 1980s and becomng

one of the prosperous East Asan ger

economes (or newly ndustralsng

economes). As wth Japan before t,

blateral trade ssues emerged as sources

of frcton from the 1980s onward. rade

dsputes have been generally more mutedthan those wth Japan, and the two alles

concluded a free trade agreement n

2007 (see below).

Wth the collapse of the Sovet Unon

n 1991, North Korea lost ts most

mportant source of foregn ad and trade,

and ts economy cratered. Te nature of

the northern threat now shfted, as theDPRK was now trapped n ts own self-

With the collapse of the SovietUnion in 1991, North Korealost its most important sourceof foreign aid and trade, and itseconomy cratered.


11/24


13

nuclear development as a precondton

for blateral talks accomplshed lttle,

and so Amercan negotators trednformal blateral talks, leadng to the

Norths agreeng to dsmantle ts nuclear

facltes. Te Obama admnstraton

refused to follow what t vewed as largely

reactve approaches of Clnton and

Bush. North Korea reacted to perceved

US ndfference by gong back on the

nuclear deal, and a seres of provocatons,ncludng another nuclear test n

2009, the snkng of the ROK corvette

Cheonan n early 2010, and shellng of

ROK-controlled Yeongpyeong Island off

the west coast at the end of the year.23

Current US-Korean Issues

Te Bush admnstraton concluded

a free trade agreement (FA) wth

Korea n June 2007. Despte sgnfcant

opposton n both countres, the

agreement was ratfed by the US

Congress n October 2011 and by the

Korean Natonal Assembly the next

month. Te FA s the largest for the USoutsde North Amerca, and sgnfcantly

lowers tarffs and encourages lessened

regulaton of key sectors such as

automobles and beef. Wthn fve years,

the agreement wll elmnate tarffs on

95 % of traded goods, and both sdes

commtted to openng up trade n

servces.24 Implementng the agreementn ways that avod protectonsm on

relance (Juche) deology and seemed

lke a dangerous wounded anmal. It

was at ths pont that the North beganto develop nuclear weapons, leadng to

the frst nuclear crss n 1994. Ts was

defused wth the Agreed Framework,

by whch Pyongyang would gve up

ts weapons programme n return for

a non-weapons grade reactor and a

supply of fuel ol. In the mdst of the

crss, Km Il Sung ded, leavng thecountry n the hands of hs son, Km

Jong Il. A subsequent crss over mssle

development led to another deal n

1998. Due to poor agrcultural practces,

the country descended nto a prolonged

famne, but the Clnton admnstraton

made progress towards normalsaton

of relatons n ts last year. Te SouthKorean governments of Km Dae Jung

and Roh Moo Hyun tred to engage the

North through ther Sunshne Polcy,

but t produced lmted results.22

Te George W. Bush admnstraton

was unnterested n accommodaton

wth Pyongyang, and saw North Korea

as regonal threat equal to that of Iraqor Iran n the Mddle East. Te Norths

admsson that t was refnng uranum

sparked a long-runnng second nuclear

dspute. Te DPRK clamed that t

tested ts frst nuclear devce n 2006,

and experts debated over whether the

country mght already possess several

weapons. Bushs nsstence that thecommunst regme agree to gve up


12/24

Joel R. Campbell

14

ether sde wll test the agreement gong

forward.

North Korea remans the mostmportant concern between the two

alles. Whle lberals Km Dae Jung and

Roh Moo Hyun publcly opposed Bushs

hard-lne approach, Lee Myung Bak has

been eager to work wth both Republcan

and Democratc admnstratons, and

hs approach to Pyongyang parallels

that of the Obama admnstraton. Both

leaders have nssted that they wll not

reward the North for provocatons, and

wll nsst on good-fath negotatons

through establshed north-south and

sx-party talks mechansms. Snce the

Youngpyoung Island ncdent, Lee has

mantaned a hard-lne stance towards

North Korea, but support for hs rulng

Grand Natonal Party (renamed the

Saenur, or New Fronter, Party n

February 2012) has fallen.25

Accordng to a Councl on Foregn

Relatons (CFR) task force, the Norths

nuclear stockple represents the gravest

threat n the regon, and ths ncludesmultple problems: the nuclear devces

themselves, ther relatonshp wth

advanced mssle technology, and

chances that nuclear technology or

materals mght be gven to other natons

or groups, especally n the Mddle East.

Te task force noted that these ssues

have become more dffcult due to anunpredctable and reclusve regme

whose future s uncertan, and progress

n persuadng that regme to gve up ts

nuclear programme has been elusve,as the sx-party talks have remaned

stalled snce 2008. Te CFR called

on the Obama admnstraton to use a

combnaton of sanctons, ncentves,

sustaned poltcal pressure, and

cooperaton wth Chna to acheve the

goal of denuclearsaton.26

North Koreas medum and long-

range mssles also reman a concern to

both alles. Pyongyang has substantally

upgraded ts mssle arsenal snce an

earler agreement wth the Clnton

admnstraton n 1998 to curb

development. Te DPRK may have 800-

1,000 medum-range mssles, ncludng600-plus Scud-types and 200 Nodongs,

whch were developed by the North on

ts own. It has made progress wth ts

long-range aepodong-2 mssle, tests

for whch were only partally successful

n 2006 and 2008. Most worryng for

the US, the North tested the very long-

range Unha-2 mssle, whch could reachthe western half of the contnental US

Both leaders have insisted thatthey will not reward the Northfor provocations, and will insiston good-faith negotiationsthrough established north-southand six-party talks mechanisms.


13/24


15

1911-1912 revoluton easly swept asde

the Qng dynasty, but the successor

republcan government was unable toconsoldate poltcal power untl the

1930s. Just as that was happenng, Japan

conquered much of the ndustral and

agrcultural heartland of the country,

eventually plungng Chna nto the

Second World War.

By contrast, the young and dynamc

Unted States expanded across the

North Amercan contnent, enjoyed

heady economc growth averagng

roughly 4 % per year, bult the worlds

largest ndustral structure, became the

worlds leadng economc and mltary

power by 1945, and led the Western

alles to vctory n the Second World

War. Unlke the other Western powers,Amerca never made any terrtoral

clams n Chna. Beneftng from the

Chna trade, t pushed for an even-

handed Open Door polcy n Chna.

Durng the Second World War, US ar

and ground forces fought alongsde the

Chnese army, Amercan ad propped up

the Chnese economy, and US advsorsasssted Communst forces n the north.

n 2009. Te North has also exported

ts Nodong technology, and Pakstan

Ghaur and Iranan Shahab rockets arebased on t.27

Ultmately, many observers note,

comprehensve negotatons wth

Pyongyang may be needed. Perhaps

the most effectve approach would be

a package deal n whch the DPRK

would trade ts nuclear weapons (and

maybe mssle development and abasket of market-orented reforms) for

recognton, ad, and non-aggresson

pledges from South Korea, Japan, and

the US. Te Norths desre for regme

survval may be key to ts embrace of such

an approach, and Chnas nvolvement

n such negotatons could help reassure

Pyongyang of contnued poltcal

support durng mplementaton.28

US-Chinese Relations

Love and Loathing Between wo

Great Powers

For 2,000 years of ts long hstory,Chna was the predomnant East Asan

power, and most countres on Chnas

borders acknowledged the Mddle

Kngdom and ts emperor as ther

suzeran. Due to populaton pressures,

economc stagnaton, and gradual

encroachment of Western powers, that

domnance waned durng the centuryof shame from 1839 to 1949. Te

Most worrying for the US, theNorth tested the very long-range Unha-2 missile, whichcould reach the western half ofthe continental US in 2009.


14/24

Joel R. Campbell

16

Te sudden trumph of Mao Zedongs

Communsts n the cvl war (1947-

1949) shocked the Amercans and, nthe tense clmate of the early Cold War,

conservatves questoned who lost

Chna? Te massve corrupton and

nepttude of the rulng Guomndang

party (the Natonalst party) vrtually

guaranteed ther oustng, but the fall of

Chna seemed lke a major defeat n the

developng global struggle. Tere were

then two Chnas: the Peoples Republc

of Chna (PRC) on the manland and

ruled by the Communst Party, and

the Republc of Chna on awan ruled

by the Guomndang. Amercan and

Chnese forces battled each other n the

Korean War and, as a result, the two

countres had no formal relatons for

over 20 years and the US fully embracedGuomndang-ruled awan. A low pont

n Sno-Amercan tes came at the 1954

Geneva Conference on Indochna, when

US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles

reportedly refused to shake hands wth

Chnese Premer Zhou En-la. Te two

countres also faced off n two crses

n the 1950s over the awan Strat.Amercan eltes and publc vewed Chna

as part of a Communst monolth,

and were slow to grasp a growng rft

between the Sovets and Chnese. Te

John F. Kennedy admnstraton even

contemplated bombng Chnas nuclear

weapons facltes.29

Te electon of Rchard Nxon as USpresdent changed everythng. Nxon

had been one of the most ardent Cold

Warrors, often lambastng Red Chna,

durng the 1950s. By 1968, the realstNxon saw an opportunty to explot

a growng Sno-Sovet rft and create a

trangular dplomacy that would allow

the US to manage great power relatons,

nudge the Sovets towards negotaton n

the superpower arms race, and allow a

poltcal settlement of the Vetnam War,

whch had become a US quagmre. ForChnas leaders, re-establshng relatons

wth Washngton could gan valuable

manoeuvrng room and releve Sovet

pressure (the two Communst gants

fought a bref border war n 1969, and

Nxon nssted that the Sovets back off

from a full-blown attack on Chna).

Bejng and Washngton cautously edged

towards rapprochement, culmnatng

n Nxons vst to Chna n 1972. On

the trps fnal day, the two sdes ssued

the Shangha Communqu, whch

became the bass for all subsequent

Sno-Amercan relatons. It called for the

two sdes to work towards normalsedrelatons, for the US to accept Bejngs

One Chna concept (.e., that the PRC

allows for only one Chna, ether n

Bejng or ape, to have dplomatc

recognton), and for awans status to

be resolved peacefully. Amercans now

vewed Chna qute favourably, busness

tes began to grow, and blateral goodfeelngs lasted well nto the 1980s.


15/24


17

weakened poston n Asa, and to step

up contanment of the Sovet Unon n

the wake of the perceved loss n VetnamWar. Chna got to be taken serously as

Amercas partner n the Cold War, and

the Chnese pressure on the Sovets may

have hastened the end of the global

conflct.30

Te 1989 bloody crackdown on pro-

democracy protesters n Bejng was

a major turnng pont, as t forced areassessment on both sdes of the Pacfc.

George H.W. Bush, another realst, tred

to contnue the relatonshp, but hgh-

level contacts remaned largely frozen.

Hs successor, Bll Clnton, came to

offce wth promses to get tough on

human rghts but, n hs second term,

moved to create a strategc partnershpon trade and securty and pushed for

Chnese membershp n the WO.

George W. Bush faced a mn-crss only

three months nto hs term when a US

spy plane was forced to land on Hanan

Island. Te ssue was hastly defused,

and blateral relatons quckly warmed

up after the 9/11 attacks. Chna wasone of the frst countres to support

the Bush admnstratons Global War

on errorsm. In return for support of

Amercan efforts n South Asa and the

Mddle East, the US took no acton

aganst Chna for ts suppresson of

Ughur natonalsts n the western

Xnjang provnce, and ssued relatvelymld condemnatons of a 2008 Chnese

Jmmy Carter took the next step

by formally recognsng the Peoples

Republc of Chna n 1979, andendng formal tes wth awan. Chna

quckly became a quas-ally of the US,

and the two natons mltares shared

ntellgence. Ronald Reagan, who

had been one of awans staunchest

defenders, as presdent accepted the

allance wth Chna n the nterest

of defeatng the Sovets n the ColdWar. rade and other blateral tensons

emerged, and the Communst Party

remaned determned to hold onto ts

poltcal power monopoly.

Both powers ganed sgnfcantly from

rapprochement. Te US got Chna

to abandon the path of revolutonary

change abroad, and to focus on trade-frendly, market-frendly economc

development. Bejng also obtaned

US assstance to re-enter the global

economy. Deng Xaopngs reform

and openng polces created a hybrd

socalst-captalst economy that became

a major tradng naton and one of the

worlds largest economes. Te quas-allance also helped bolster Amercas

Nixon had been one of the

most ardent Cold Warriors,often lambasting Red China,during the 1950s.


16/24

Joel R. Campbell

18

crackdown n bet. Durng the Bush

years, there was a good deal of dscusson

of the mplcatons of the rse of Chna.Much of the Amercan elte reacted

negatvely to Chnas sem-offcal noton

of a peaceful rse, whch Hu Jntao

then reformulated as a harmonous

nternatonal socety. A number of

blateral strans began to surface n 2004-

2005, ncludng Amercan concern over

Chnas overtures to the Assocaton ofSouth East Asan Natons (ASEAN)

member countres and Latn Amerca.31

Current and Emerging Bilateral

Issues

Te Obama admnstraton has taken a

harder lne wth Chna snce early 2011.

Chna has done a range of thngs,

asserted Obama n hs press conference

after the APEC meetng, that

dsadvantage not just the Unted States

but a whole host of ther tradng partners

n the regon enough s enough.32

Te US has been partcularly concernedby Chnas asserton of terrtoral clams

n the East and South Chna Seas, and ts

refusal to condemn ts North Korean ally

after Pyongyangs 2010 provocatons.

Amercan offcals also have expressed

alarm over Chnas mltary buld-up and

double-dgt spendng ncreases snce

the early 1990s,33 whle concern aboutChnese suppresson of human rghts

and relgous freedom s never far from

the surface.

Despte these recent strans, Chna hasgenerally adopted a conclatory foregn

polcy lne over the past 20 years, focused

on mprovng relatons wth both regonal

neghbours and the US, and robust

multlateralsm. Chna now cooperates

more completely wth nternatonal

non-prolferaton ntatves.34It has also

resorted to use of postve natonalsm,

whch s much more pragmatcally and

s economcally orented, yet s more

harshly reactve and defensve than ts

deologcal Maost counterpart.35 Ts

natonalsm has often mpacted relatons

wth other major powers, most notably

n the ant-Amercan protests after thebombng of the Chnese embassy n

Serba durng the Kosovo War (1999).

Chnas peaceful rse has enhanced ts

ablty to use soft power and economc

power to reassure neghbours and make

frends n both developng and developed

countres.36 Te unrestrcted natureof Chnas economc ad and loans, .e.,

China has generally adopted aconciliatory foreign policy lineover the past 20 years, focused onimproving relations with bothregional neighbours and theUS, and robust multilateralism.


17/24


19

countres would shape the management

of the globalsed economy through a

G-2 arrangement. Gven obvouslydvergng nterests on such matters as

clmate change and global governance,

that s probably fancful, but the noton

underlnes the mportance of blateral

economc tes.

A recent Bejng foregn polcy whtepaper noted that the external envronment

s becomng more challengng and, lke

Amerca, sees the Korean pennsula as

one of the most troublesome. o be sure,

21stcentury great power competton n

East Asa wll be largely shaped by Sno-

Amercan competton. Te queston s

whether ths wll result n a second ColdWar, or even mltary conflct. Chna

clearly seeks a return to ts tradtonal

domnance of East Asa, and ths could

undoubtedly create tensons wth three

other regonal powers, namely the

US, Japan, and Inda. Bejng hopes

gradually to push the US out of what t

calls the frst sland chan (the Ryukyus),to the second chan (the Maranas), and

wth no poltcal condtons attached,

has ganed t many potental alles n

Afrca and Latn Amerca. Chnas hugestate-owned enterprses and soveregn

wealth funds, wth vast funds and no

shareholder accountablty, can sustan

losses for extended perods. Even so,

Chna may not yet be completely

compettve wth the US and ts Western

alles, snce t has a narrower base and

lmted experence abroad. Te latter hasled to varous soco-cultural conflcts and

msunderstandngs, especally n Afrca.37

Amercas Chna polcy s

contnually constraned by economc

nterdependence. US offcals upbrad

Chna on a range of ssues beyond

Chnas growng trade surplus, such

as ts undervalued currency, the yuan,lmted ntellectual property protecton,

curbs on rare earth exports, and varous

forms of protectonsm. For ts part,

Chna accuses the US of heghtened

protectonsm snce the fnancal crss.

However, Amerca cannot afford to

alenate the Mddle Kngdom, due to

contnued relance on Chna to fundts budget defcts and to fuel ts stock

markets. Amercan companes depend

on Chna as a manufacturng platform

and market. Te 2008 fnancal crss

was a chance to get Chna to partally

coordnate ts economc polces wth

the US.38 Te centralty of the Sno-

Amercan economc relatonshp has ledvarous pundts to suggest that the two

Te centrality of the Sino-

American economic relationshiphas led various pundits tosuggest that the two countrieswould shape the managementof the globalised economythrough a G-2 arrangement.


18/24

Joel R. Campbell

20

eventually the thrd chan (Hawa). As a

Pacfc power, Amerca has no ntenton

of pullng back from the Ryukyus for theforeseeable future, and t would never

leave US terrtores n the Maranas.

Obama announced at the 2009 ASEAN

Regonal Forum a return to Southeast

Asa, and has opposed Chnese moves

n the South Chna Sea.39Te challenge

for Chna s to mprove ts constraned

geostrategc poston whle not openlythreatenng ether neghbours or

Amerca, and the challenge for Amerca

s to mantan ts forward poston n

East Asa and robust economc tes

wth Chna whle avodng great power

conflct n the regon or globally.

America and aiwan: A SpecialRelationship

Te thornest ssue between the US

and the PRC has always been awan.

Tough t has had no dplomatc

relatons wth the US snce 1979,

the sland enjoys a partcularly close

nformal relatonshp wth the USthat shares smlartes wth the even

closer but formal Israel-Amercan

relatonshp. Both awan and Israel

are small, poltcally solated, embattled

states facng larger hostle powers wthn

ther respectve regons. Both countres

have been, to varyng degrees, shunned

by some of the nternatonal communty,n awans case mantanng dplomatc

recognton wth only 23 natons, mostly

ad-seekng states n Central Amerca,

the Carbbean, and West Afrca. Bothcountres have depended on US mltary

ad and economc assstance (access to

US markets and nvestment, along wth

sales of mltary equpment for awan).

Both have long been protected by

powerful poltcal lobbes and bpartsan

poltcal coaltons n Washngton,

the longstandng Chna lobby andconservatve Republcans n awans

case.

Te awan relatonshp traces ts roots

to Amercans sentmental attachment

to Free Chna before 1949. Amercan

traders, mssonares, and wrters

presented the Chnese as a noble people

that needed to be saved from war and

poverty. Durng the Second World War,

the Guomndang regme of Chang Ka-

shek appeared n Amercan propaganda

as a stalwart ally, and the ruman

admnstraton outraged conservatves

by cuttng off mltary ad durng

the subsequent cvl war, but qucklyembraced the Guomndang durng the

Korean War.

Wth US support, awan retaned

Chnas seat on the UN Securty

Councl for a generaton. US forces were

statoned n awan, and the Seventh

Fleet patrolled the awan Strat. All

ths suddenly changed n 1971, whenAmerca dd not oppose a resoluton to


19/24


21

admnstraton permtted awans

Presdent Lee eng Hu to vst hs

alma mater, Cornell Unversty. Bejngwas outraged, snce t seemed lke an

Amercan acknowledgement of awan

offcaldom, and ths led drectly to the

thrd awan Strat crss the next year:

Chna tested mssles and conducted

war games, as two US arcraft carrer

groups patrolled north and south of

the sland. Both countres backed awayfrom the brnk, but Chnese leadershp

was determned to erase ts mltary

dsadvantage n the Strat, and so

accelerated ts mltary buld up.

Te US-awanese relatonshp was

straned wth the electon of Chen

Shu Ban, leader of the opposton

Democratc Progressve Party, n 2000.A awanese natonalst, Chen wanted

to push towards eventual ndependence

from Chna by creatng a Republc

of awan that would replace the

awanese Republc of Chna. Chna

became ncreasngly angered by Chens

moves, whch they vewed as volatons

of the One Chna prncple. Te Bushadmnstraton found Chen rrtatng, as

hs actons dstracted from Washngtons

efforts to cultvate Chna as a partner n

the Global War on error. Under US

pressure and sufferng from personal

scandals, Chen moderated hs rhetorc n

hs last years n offce. Guomndang leader

Ma Yng-jeou, who won the presdencyback n 2008, and was subsequently re-

gve Chnas seat to the PRC (awan

walked out of the General Assembly

before the vote). As the prce for USrecognton of the PRC n 1979, Congress

passed the awan Relatons Act. Ts

legslaton specfed that Amerca would

contnue nformal relatons wth awan,

and guaranteed that the sland would

contnue to be suppled wth the latest

mltary hardware so that t could keep

up wth the manland. Mltary sales tothe awan have been a constant source

of stran wth Bejng. Approvng a

moderate US $5.85 bllon sales package

n September 2011, Obama attempted

to satsfy awan whle not antagonsng

Chna.40

As Sno-Amercan relatons warmed,

Amercan nterest n awan cooledonly slghtly. Lke Korea, awan

became a dynamo ndustral and hgh

tech economy, and ts I ndustry was

heavly ted to Amercas Slcon Valley.

Te sland ganed much legtmacy

wth Amercans by becomng (also lke

Korea) a full-fledged democracy n the

1990s. Te awanese ssue came to thefore agan n 1995, when the Clnton

Like Korea, aiwan became adynamo industrial and high techeconomy, and its I industrywas heavily tied to AmericasSilicon Valley.


20/24

Joel R. Campbell

22

elected n 2012, has begun to buld a

more cooperatve relatonshp wth the

manland. Hs efforts have been vewedmore postvely by US offcals. awans

government seeks to upgrade relatons

wth Washngton by concludng a

free trade agreement, a vsa waver

programme, and an extradton treaty,

whle resumng cabnet-level vsts to

the US. So far, none of these has been

concluded.41

Conclusion

Chnas recent assertveness has

encouraged varous Asan countres to

upgrade relatons wth the US. Openngs

to Vetnam and Burma have been

applauded by both realsts and lberalsas a new paradgm n nternatonal

relatons: a judcous applcaton of

balance of power poltcs that can

advance human rghts and democracy.42

However, ntractable conflcts reman,

and the pvot s unlkely to have any

mmedate effects on regonal hot-spots,

such as the Korean pennsula. Amercamay only be able to make gans there to

the extent that t s able to work wth

other partes, especally Chna.43

Is Amercas pvot to Asa lkely to

reman a long-lastng development?

So far, Obama has had more room to

manoeuvre than hs two predecessors,

who also sought to shft to Asa butwere dverted by events elsewhere.44

Hllary Clnton nssts that the future

of global poltcs wll be decded n

Asa. Asa, she declares, s the keydrver of global poltcs, and that s

msguded to merely come home

as the Iraq and Afghanstan wars wnd

down. Harnessng Asas growth and

dynamsm s central to Amercan

economc and strategc nterests.45From

a realst perspectve, Amerca naturally

wll stay n Asa as t tres to check therse of Chna as a strategc compettor.46

Assessments of Obamas foregn polcy

have been mxed n poltcal crcles, but

many meda and academc assessments

have been farly postve, one notng thaton balance, Obama has proved tough,

dscplned and, overall, reasonably

successful.47 For the short term,

much wll be determned by, among

other thngs, the state of the Amercan

economy. Observers have questoned the

sustanablty of an Asa-centred strategy,

and the pvot could be more lke anIndan summer of Amercan power n

Te importance of tradeand economic developmentnaturally suppresses age-oldnatural strategic rivalries in

the region, and assists EastAsias multilayered regionalintegration centred on ASEAN.


21/24


23

centred on ASEAN. Trd, Japan has

played generally constructve regonal

economc and poltcal roles, and Asansuspcons about ts hstory and possble

re-mltarsaton make t a qute cautous

power. Fourth, Chna has proved a farly

cooperatve nternatonal player snce

the md-1990s, and has commtted

tself to workng wth other East Asan

countres, the US, and the wder

nternatonal communty.50 Amercahas clearly sgnalled that t ntends to

perform ts tradtonal role as a major

power n East Asa, and that t ntends

to upgrade ts regonal presence for the

foreseeable future. And that consttutes a

ffth reason: Amerca wll contnue to act

as East Asan stablser.

the regon.48However, gven East Asas

centralty n the global economy, any

Republcan successors are unlkely tocompletely abandon ths Pacfc shft.49

Despte perodc crses over

North Korean mssles and nuclear

weapons, and concerns about Chnese

assertveness n the East and South

Chna Seas, there are many reasons to

be optmstc about Asas future. Frst,

as the most economcally dynamcregon n the world, Asa generates

perhaps a thrd of global producton and

trade. Second, the mportance of trade

and economc development naturally

suppresses age-old natural strategc

rvalres n the regon, and asssts East

Asas multlayered regonal ntegraton


22/24

Joel R. Campbell

24

Endnotes

1 Stephen M. Walt, Explaining Obamas Asia Policy, Foreign Policy, at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy [last visited 14December 2012].

2 Te White House Office of the Press Secretary, Opening Remarks by President Obama atAPEC Session One, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/13/opening-remarks-president-obama-apec-session-one [last visited 20 March 2013].

3 Steve Jones, Obamas November 2011 Asia-Pacific rip: President Unveils Policy Shifttoward Pacific Region, About.com Guide, at http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Obamas-November-2011-Asia-Pacific-rip.htm [last visited 14 November

2012].4 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008,

p. 277.

5 Ibid.

6 Arpita Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, StrategicAnalysis, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 504-506.

7 Cox and Stokes, US Foreign Policy,p. 278.

8 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, pp. 504-506.

9 Yoshihide Soeya, Redefining Japans Security Profile: International Security, HumanSecurity, and an East Asian Community, Institute for International Policy Studies, at http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf [last visited 18 February 2013].

10 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, pp. 506-507.

11 Heigo Sato, Japan-U.S. Security Relations under the Koizumi Administration: Implicationsfor Bushs Second erm, at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2004/e2004_09.pdf [last visited 12 February 2013].

12 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, p. 509.

13 Ibid., pp. 513-514.

14 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Te U.S.-Japan Alliance, Congressional Research Service Report, 18January 2011, pp. 11-13.

15 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

16 Colette Beukman, Te Abe-Obama Presidential Meeting, Te Journal of urkish Weekly,23 February 2013.

17 William L. Brooks, Te Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: RelocationNegotiations in 1995-1994, 2005-2006, Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 2010, pp. 4-10.


23/24


25

18 Vivian Wong, Te DPJ Effect: Implications of Leadership Changes in Japan on theManagement of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Te United States and Japan in Global Context:2010, Te Edwn O. Reschauer Center for East Asan Studes, Johns Hopkns Unversty,

Washngton, 2010, pp. 10-13.

19 Gerald Curts, Future Drectons n US-Japan Relatons,JCIE New Shmoda Conference,okyo, February 2011, pp. 2-5.

20 Justn Logan, Asas Free-Rders, Foregn Polcy, at http://www.foregnpolcy.com/artcles/2011/11/09/asas_free_rders?page=0,1 [last vsted 14 December 2012].

21 Wllam H. Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economc Relatons: Sgnfcance, Prospects, and PolcyOptons, Congressonal Research Servce Report, 14 February 2012, pp. 6-15.

22 Andreas Henneka, Reflectons on Korean Hstory and ts Impact on the U.S.-North Korean

Conflct,Journal of Scence and World Affars, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp. 19-27.23 Albert Chang, Te North Korean Nuclear Crss: Addressng the Problem wth Carrots

and Stcks, Polcy Background and Optons Paper 1.04, Nathan Hale Insttute Asa Program,March 2004, p. 2.

24 Jeffrey Schott, Prospects for Implementng the Korea-US Free rade Agreement, PolcyBref, Peterson Insttute for Internatonal Economcs, October, 2010, pp. 1-4; US radeRepresentatve Offce, U.S.-Korea Free rade Agreement, at www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta [last vsted 21 February 2013].

25 Internatonal Crss Group, South Korea: Te Shftng Sands of Securty Polcy, Asa

Brefng No. 130, Seoul/Brussels, 1 December 2011, pp. 6-8.

26 Scott Snyder, Charles L. Prtchard and John H. lell Jr., U.S. Polcy oward the KoreanPennsula, Councl on Foregn Relatons, Independent ask Force Report No. 64, 2010, pp.x-x, 3-4.

27 Joel S. Wt, Andrew Hood, Jeffrey Lews, Scott Pace and Leon Sgal, Mssle Negotatonswth North Korea: A Strategy for the Future, US-Korea Insttute at SAIS- Report, JohnsHopkns Unversty, October 2011, pp. 3-5.

28 Chang, Te North Korean Nuclear Crss, p. 16.

29 Cox and Stokes,US Foregn Polcy,p. 280.30 Ibd., pp. 280-281.

31 Aaron L. Fredberg, Te Future of U.S.-Chna Relatons: Is Conflct Inevtable?,Internatonal Securty, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-8.

32 U.S. Foregn Polcy urns oward Asa, Te Washngton Post, 16 November 2011.

33 Jn Canrong, Reason for Optmsm n Sno-Amercan Relatons, East Asa Forum, at http://www.eastasaforum.org/2010/02/14/reason-for-optmsm-n-sno-amercan-relatons/ [lastvsted 13 March 2012].

34 Bates Gll, Rsng Star: Chnas New Securty Dplomacy, Washngton, Brookngs Insttuton,2007, pp. 1-21.


24/24

Joel R. Campbell

35 Chen Zhmn, Natonalsm, Internatonalsm and Chnese Foregn Polcy, Journal ofContemporary Chna, Vol. 14, No. 42 (February 2005), pp. 46-48.

36 Zheng Bjan, Chnas Peaceful Rse to Great-Power Status, Foregn Affars, Vol. 84, No. 5(September/October 2005), pp. 22-24.

37 Kerry Dumbaugh, Chnas Foregn Polcy: What Does It Mean for U.S. Global Interests?,Congressonal Research Servce Report, 18 July 2008, pp. 12-16.

38 anjn Sh and Meredth Wen, Avodng Mutual Msunderstandng: Sno-U.S. Relatonsand the New Admnstraton,Carnege Endowment Polcy Bref,January 2009, pp. 2-3.

39 Jn, Reason for Optmsm n Sno-Amercan Relatons, p. 3.

40 Carlyle A. Tayer, US Arms Sales to awan: Impact on Sno-Amercan Relatons, Chna-US Focus, at http://chnausfocus.com/slder/us-arms-sales-to-tawan-mpact-on-sno-

amercan-relatons/ [last vsted 13 March 2012].

41 Shrley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrson, U.S.-awan Relatonshp: Overvew of PolcyIssues, Congressonal Research Servce Report, 4 August 2011, pp. 9-14.

42 Dan wnng, Burmas Openng and the Balance of Values n Asa, Foregn Polcy, athttp://shadow.foregnpolcy.com/posts/2011/12/02/burmas_openng_and_the_balance_of_values_n_asa [last vsted 14 December 2012].

43 U.S. Pvot oward Asa Unlkely to Have Quck Impact on Korea, Te Korea Herald, 12December 2011.

44 U.S. Foregn Polcy urns toward Asa, p. 1.45 Hllary Clnton, Amercas Pacfc Century, Foregn Polcy, at http://www.foregnpolcy.

com/artcles/2011/10/11/amercas_pacfc_century?page=0,6 [Last vsted 14 December2012].

46 Stephen M. Walt, Explanng Obamas Asa Polcy.

47 Martn S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Leberthal and Mchael E. OHanlon, Obamas ForegnPolcy: Progressve Pragmatst, at http://www.brookngs.edu/opnons/2012/0309_obama_foregn_polcy.aspx [last vsted 11 March 2012].

48 Logan, Asas Free-Rders, pp. 1-2.49 John . Bennett, US Foregn Polcy to Refocus on Asa, Te Hll, at http://thehll.com/

news-by-subject/defense-homeland-securty/185341-us-foregn-polcy-to-refocus-on-asa[last vsted 14 February 2013].

50 Cox and Stokes, US Foregn Polcy,p. 287.

US Foreign Policy Towards Northeast Asia.pdf

Documents

Transcript of US Foreign Policy Towards Northeast Asia.pdf