U.S. FO REIGN POLICY€¦ · u.s. national security strategy u.s. fo reign policy agenda volume 7...

U.S. National Security

Strategy

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

VOLUME 7 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 4

DECEMBER 2002


StrategyA NEW ERA

“The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and

totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom — and

a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free

enterprise. In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment

to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic

freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their

future prosperity....

“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength

and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and

principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a

balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can

choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. In a world that is

safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists

and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will

extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

— George W. BushPresident of the United States September 20, 2002

With those words President Bush submitted his National Security Strategy (NSS) to the U.S. CongressSeptember 20th. Each administration is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to submit anannual report to Congress setting out the nation’s comprehensive strategic security objectives. Thetradition began with President Harry S Truman in 1950 with NSC-68, a report that focused on theUnited States and the then-Soviet Union and calling for a doctrine of containment that dominated theensuing Cold War. Each president since then has submitted a similar document to Congress in varyingforms and with varying degrees of specificity.

This issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda examines the newly developed Bush NSS through a series ofarticles, commentary, and references from national security experts within the administration, theCongress, and the academic sector.

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice discusses the NSS in broad terms while Deputy Secretaryof State Richard Armitage examines its relationship to alliances and allies; General Richard Myerslooks at the NSS from today’s threat environment; Under Secretary of State Alan P. Larson explains theeconomic security component; and Professors Robert Lieber and Keir Lieber give a thoughtfulanalysis; while Professor Richard Kugler looks at the NSS and the impact of globalization.

U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, a publication of the Office of Political Security in the State Department’sOffice of International Information Programs, is intended to examine and advance an understanding ofcurrent trends in U.S. foreign policy issues for a global audience.

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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4 • DECEMBER 2002

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An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: A NEW ERA

CONTENTS

_ FOCUS

A BALANCE OF POWER THAT FAVORS FREEDOM 5

By Condoleezza RiceAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 10

By Richard L. ArmitageDeputy Secretary of State

THE U.S. MILITARY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 14

By General Richard B. MyersChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19

By Alan P. LarsonUnder Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs

_ CONGRESSIONAL FOCUS

SPEAKING TO OUR SILENT ALLIES: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 23

By U.S. Representative Henry J. HydeChairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives

_ REGIONAL FOCUS

AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN 28

By James Fisher-ThompsonWashington File Staff Writer, Office of African Affairs Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State

_ COMMENTARY

THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 32

By Keir A. LieberProfessor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, andRobert J. LieberProfessor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University


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Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy AgendaPolitical Security — IIP/T/PSU.S. Department of State301 4th Street, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of AmericaE-mail: [email protected]

Please note that this issue of U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA can belocated on the Office of International Information Programs’ International HomePage on the World Wide Web at“http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/ijpe1202.htm”.

Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael T. Scanlin

Managing Editor. . . . . . . . . . . . Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.

Associate Editor . . . . . . . . . . . Wayne Hall

Contributing Editors . . . . . . . Brenda Butler

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ralph Dannheisser

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Denny

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Margaret Kammeyer

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carol Locke

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Margaret A. McKay

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jody Rose Platt

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jacquelyn S. Porth

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jay Richter

Reference Specialists. . . . . . . Sam Anderson

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Camille Lyon

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rebecca Ford Mitchell

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vivian Stahl

Program Assistant . . . . . . . . . Tracy Nelson

Political Security Intern . . . . Jennifer Flahive

Art Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Min Yao

Graphics Assistant . . . . . . . . . Sylvia Scott

Editorial Board . . . . . . . . . . . . James Bullock

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George Clack

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 7 • NUMBER 4 • DECEMBER 2002

A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD 36

By Richard L. KuglerProfessor and Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

U.S. USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD 41

By Richard F. GrimmettNational Defense Specialist, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, U.S. Congressional Research Service

_ FACT SHEET

OVERVIEW OF AMERICA’S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 44

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

_ A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INTERNET SITES 45

Spotlighting other views and Internet links to resources on related issues

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of theWorld Trade Center were the bookends of along transition period. During that period

those of us who think about foreign policy for aliving searched for an overarching, explanatorytheory or framework that would describe the newthreats and the proper response to them. Some saidthat nations and their militaries were no longerrelevant, only global markets knitted together by newtechnologies. Others foresaw a future dominated byethnic conflict. And some even thought that in thefuture the primary energies of America’s armedforces would be devoted to managing civil conflictand humanitarian assistance.

It will take years to understand the long-term effectsof September 11th [2001]. But there are certainverities that the tragedy brought home to us in themost vivid way.

Perhaps most fundamentally, 9/11 crystallized ourvulnerability. It also threw into sharp relief thenature of the threats we face today. Today’s threatscome less from massing armies than from small,shadowy bands of terrorists — less from strong statesthan from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, thereis no longer any doubt that today America faces anexistential threat to our security — a threat as greatas any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called“Good War,” or the Cold War.

President Bush’s new National Security Strategyoffers a bold vision for protecting our nation thatcaptures today’s new realities and new opportunities.

It calls on America to use our position of unparalleledstrength and influence to create a balance of powerthat favors freedom. As the president says in thecover letter: we seek to create the “conditions inwhich all nations and all societies can choose forthemselves the rewards and challenges of politicaland economic liberty.”

This strategy has three pillars:

• We will defend the peace by opposing andpreventing violence by terrorists and outlawregimes.

• We will preserve the peace by fostering an era ofgood relations among the world’s great powers.

• And we will extend the peace by seeking to extendthe benefits of freedom and prosperity across theglobe.

Defending our nation from its enemies is the first andfundamental commitment of the federal government.And the United States has a special responsibility tohelp make the world more secure.

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A BALANCE OF POWER THAT FAVORS FREEDOMBy Condoleezza Rice

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

“President Bush’s new National Security Strategy offers a bold vision for protecting ournation that captures today’s new realities and new opportunities,” says National SecurityAdvisor Condoleezza Rice. “It calls on America to use our position of unparalleledstrength and influence to create a balance of power that favors freedom. As the presidentsays in the cover letter: we seek to create the ‘conditions in which all nations and allsocieties can chose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economicliberty’.”

(This article is adapted from the 2002 Wriston Lecture, delivered to the

Manhattan Institute in New York City on October 1, 2002.)

_ F O C U S

In fighting global terror, we will work with coalitionpartners on every continent, using every tool in ourarsenal — from diplomacy and better defenses to lawenforcement, intelligence, cutting off terroristfinancing, and, if needed, military power.

We will break up terror networks, hold to accountnations that harbor terrorists, and confront aggressivetyrants holding or seeking nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons that might be passed to terroristallies. These are different faces of the same evil.Terrorists need a place to plot, train, and organize.Tyrants allied with terrorists can greatly extend thereach of their deadly mischief. Terrorists allied withtyrants can acquire technologies allowing them tomurder on an ever more massive scale. Each threatmagnifies the danger of the other. And the only path to safety is to effectively confront both terroristsand tyrants.

For these reasons, President Bush is committed toconfronting the Iraqi regime, which has defied thejust demands of the world for over a decade. We areon notice. The danger from Saddam Hussein’sarsenal is far more clear than anything we could haveforeseen prior to September 11th. And history willjudge harshly any leader or nation that saw this darkcloud and sat by in complacency or indecision.

The Iraqi regime’s violation of every condition setforth by the U.N. Security Council for the 1991cease-fire fully justifies — legally and morally — theenforcement of those conditions.

It is also true that since 9/11, our nation is properlyfocused as never before on preventing attacks againstus before they happen.

The National Security Strategy does not overturn fivedecades of doctrine and jettison either containment ordeterrence. These strategic concepts can and willcontinue to be employed where appropriate. Butsome threats are so potentially catastrophic — andcan arrive with so little warning, by means that areuntraceable — that they cannot be contained.Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacramentare unlikely to ever be deterred. And new technologyrequires new thinking about when a threat actuallybecomes “imminent.” So as a matter of common

sense, the United States must be prepared to takeaction, when necessary, before threats have fullymaterialized.

Preemption is not a new concept. There has neverbeen a moral or legal requirement that a country waitto be attacked before it can address existentialthreats. As George Shultz recently wrote, “If there isa rattlesnake in the yard, you don’t wait for it to strikebefore you take action in self-defense.” The UnitedStates has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense — from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 tothe crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1994.

But this approach must be treated with great caution.The number of cases in which it might be justifiedwill always be small. It does not give a green light —to the United States or any other nation — to act firstwithout exhausting other means, includingdiplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at thebeginning of a long chain of effort. The threat mustbe very grave. And the risks of waiting must faroutweigh the risks of action.

To support all these means of defending the peace,the United States will build and maintain 21stcentury military forces that are beyond challenge.

We will seek to dissuade any potential adversaryfrom pursuing a military build-up in the hope ofsurpassing, or equaling, the power of the UnitedStates and our allies.

Some have criticized this frankness as impolitic. Butsurely clarity is a virtue here. Dissuading militarycompetition can prevent potential conflict and costlyglobal arms races. And the United States invites —indeed, we exhort — our freedom loving allies, suchas those in Europe, to increase their militarycapabilities.

The burden of maintaining a balance of power thatfavors freedom should be shouldered by all nationsthat favor freedom. What none of us should want isthe emergence of a militarily powerful adversary whodoes not share our common values.

Thankfully, this possibility seems more remote todaythan at any point in our lifetimes. We have an

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historic opportunity to break the destructive patternof great power rivalry that has bedeviled the worldsince the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century.Today, the world’s great centers of power are unitedby common interests, common dangers, and —increasingly — common values. The United Stateswill make this a key strategy for preserving the peacefor many decades to come.

There is an old argument between the so-called“realistic” school of foreign affairs and the“idealistic” school. To oversimplify, realistsdownplay the importance of values and the internalstructures of states, emphasizing instead the balanceof power as the key to stability and peace. Idealistsemphasize the primacy of values, such as freedomand democracy and human rights in ensuring that justpolitical order is obtained. As a professor, Irecognize that this debate has won tenure for andsustained the careers of many generations of scholars.As a policymaker, I can tell you that these categoriesobscure reality.

In real life, power and values are married completely.Power matters in the conduct of world affairs. Greatpowers matter a great deal — they have the ability toinfluence the lives of millions and change history.And the values of great powers matter as well. If theSoviet Union had won the Cold War, the world wouldlook very different today — Germany today mightlook like the old German Democratic Republic, orLatin America like Cuba.

Today, there is an increasing awareness — on everycontinent — of a paradigm of progress, founded onpolitical and economic liberty. The United States,our NATO allies, our neighbors in the WesternHemisphere, Japan, and our other friends and alliesin Asia and Africa all share a broad commitment todemocracy, the rule of law, a market-based economy,and open trade.

In addition, since September 11th all the world’sgreat powers see themselves as falling on the sameside of a profound divide between the forces of chaosand order, and they are acting accordingly.

America and Europe have long shared a commitmentto liberty. We also now understand that being the

target of trained killers is a powerful tonic that makesdisputes over other important issues look like thepolicy differences they are, instead of fundamentalclashes of values.

The United States is also cooperating with Indiaacross a range of issues — even as we work closelywith Pakistan.

Russia is an important partner in the war on terrorand is reaching toward a future of greater democracyand economic freedom. As it does so, ourrelationship will continue to broaden and deepen.The passing of the ABM [1972 Anti-BallisticMissile] Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treatyreducing strategic arms by two-thirds make clear thatthe days of Russian military confrontation with theWest are over.

China and the United States are cooperating on issuesranging from the fight against terror to maintainingstability on the Korean peninsula. And China’stransition continues. Admittedly, in some areas, itsleaders still follow practices that are abhorrent. YetChina’s leaders have said that their main goal is toraise living standards for the Chinese people. Theywill find that reaching that goal in today’s world willdepend more on developing China’s human capitalthan it will on China’s natural resources or territorialpossessions.

And as China’s populace become more educated,more free to think, and more entrepreneurial, webelieve this will inevitably lead to greater politicalfreedom. You cannot expect people to think on thejob, but not at home.

This confluence of common interests andincreasingly common values creates a moment ofenormous opportunities. Instead of repeating thehistoric pattern where great power rivalry exacerbateslocal conflicts, we can use great power cooperation tosolve conflicts, from the Middle East to Kashmir,Congo, and beyond. Great power cooperation alsocreates an opportunity for multilateral institutions —such as the U.N., NATO, and the WTO [World TradeOrganization] — to prove their worth. That’s thechallenge set forth by the president to the U.N.concerning Iraq. And great power cooperation can be

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the basis for moving forward on problems thatrequire multilateral solutions — from terror to theenvironment.

To build a balance of power that favors freedom, wemust also extend the peace by extending the benefitsof liberty and prosperity as broadly as possible. Asthe president has said, we have a responsibility tobuild a world that is not only safer, but better.

The United States will fight poverty, disease, andoppression because it is the right thing to do — andthe smart thing to do. We have seen how poor statescan become weak or even failed states, vulnerable tohijacking by terrorist networks — with potentiallycatastrophic consequences. And in societies wherelegal avenues for political dissent are stifled, thetemptation to speak through violence grows.

We will lead efforts to build a global trading systemthat is growing and more free. Here in our ownhemisphere, for example, we are committed tocompleting a Free Trade Area of the Americas by2005. We are also starting negotiations on a freetrade agreement with the Southern African CustomsUnion. Expanding trade is essential to thedevelopment efforts of poor nations and to theeconomic health of all nations.

We will continue to lead the world in efforts tocombat HIV/AIDS — a pandemic which challengesour humanity and threatens whole societies.

We will seek to bring every nation into an expandingcircle of development. Earlier this year the presidentproposed a 50 percent increase in U.S. developmentassistance. But he also made clear that new moneymeans new terms. The new resources will only beavailable to countries that work to govern justly,invest in the health and education of their people, andencourage economic liberty.

We know from experience that corruption, badpolicies, and bad practices can make aid moneyworse than useless. In such environments, aid propsup bad policy, chasing out investment andperpetuating misery. Good policy, on the other hand,

attracts private capital and expands trade. In a soundpolicy environment, development aid is a catalyst, not a crutch.

At the core of America’s foreign policy is our resolveto stand on the side of men and women in everynation who stand for what the president has called the“non-negotiable demands of human dignity” — freespeech, equal justice, respect for women, religioustolerance, and limits on the power of the state.

These principles are universal — and President Bushhas made them part of the debate in regions wheremany thought that merely to raise them wasimprudent or impossible.

From Cairo and Ramallah to Tehran and Tashkent, thepresident has made clear that values must be a vitalpart of our relationships with other countries. In ourdevelopment aid, our diplomacy, our internationalbroadcasting, and in our educational assistance, theUnited States will promote moderation, tolerance,and human rights. And we look forward to one day standing for these aspirations in a free andunified Iraq.

We reject the condescending view that freedom willnot grow in the soil of the Middle East — or thatMuslims somehow do not share in the desire to befree. The celebrations we saw on the streets of Kabullast year proved otherwise. And in a recent U.N.report, a panel of 30 Arab intellectuals recognizedthat for their nations to fully join in the progress ofour times will require greater political and economicfreedom, the empowerment of women, and better,more modern education.

We do not seek to impose democracy on others, weseek only to help create conditions in which peoplecan claim a freer future for themselves. We recognizeas well that there is no “one size fits all” answer. Ourvision of the future is not one where every personeats Big Macs and drinks Coke — or where everynation has a bicameral legislature with 535 membersand a judiciary that follows the principles of Marburyvs. Madison.

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Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, SouthAfrica, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey show thatfreedom manifests itself differently around the globe— and that new liberties can find an honored placeamidst ancient traditions. In countries such asBahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar, reform isunderway, taking shape according to different localcircumstances. And in Afghanistan this year, atraditional Loya Jirga assembly was the vehicle forcreating the most broadly representative governmentin Afghan history.

Because of our own history, the United States knowswe must be patient — and humble. Change — evenif it is for the better — is often difficult. And

progress is sometimes slow. America has not alwayslived up to our own high standards. When theFounding Fathers said, “We, the people,” they didn’tmean me. Democracy is hard work. And 226 yearslater, we are still practicing each day to get it right.

We have the ability to forge a 21st century that livesup to our hopes and not down to our fears. But onlyif we go about our work with purpose and clarity.Only if we are unwavering in our refusal to live in aworld governed by terror and chaos. Only if we areunwilling to ignore growing dangers from aggressivetyrants and deadly technologies. And only if we arepersistent and patient in exercising our influence inthe service of our ideals, and not just ourselves. _

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Late last month, as Americans prepared tocelebrate Thanksgiving, the people of SriLanka also had much to be grateful for. On

November 25th, the representatives of 22 nations —including the United States — came together in Oslo,Norway, to pledge political and financial support forSri Lanka’s peace process, the best hope in manyyears of bringing an end to two decades of violenceand terror.

That day was a clear reminder that even for a smallnation such as Sri Lanka, resolving conflict takes thesupport of a coalition of international partners. That day also served as a reminder that no countrycan expect to deal effectively with the challenge of terrorism, as well as the conditions that cannurture such violence, without help from othernations and institutions.

Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, the UnitedStates stands alone as a nation of unmatcheddiplomatic, economic, military, and cultural might.As a people, we have greater capacity and capabilityto protect and advance our interests in the world thanat any other time in our history. As a nation, we havegreater responsibility to exercise leadership than atany other time in our history.

Nonetheless, for all of our clout and influence, theUnited States faces some of the same securitychallenges that countries such as Sri Lanka face.

Indeed, no nation can hope to tackle successfully thedecisive challenges of this age alone.

This is a fundamental, underlying principle ofPresident Bush’s National Security Strategy. Beyonddevoting a chapter to the strategic importance ofalliances and partnerships, the document underscoreson nearly every page the necessity of cooperatingwith other nations, institutions, and organizations.International cooperation is an indispensableingredient, whether the strategy is focused onfighting the war against terrorism, sustaining regionalstability, expanding trade and development,maintaining friendly ties to global powers, or dealingwith transnational challenges such as weapons ofmass destruction, infectious disease, andinternational crime.

The U.S. commitment to international cooperationreflects not only pragmatism, but also a principle, onethat runs through our history and our vision of thefuture. As the President’s National Security Strategymakes clear, U.S. foreign policy will serve not justthe American people, but “the cause of humandignity” on every continent. This is an ambitiousagenda, one that will require us not only to prevail inthe war against terrorism, but also to apply thelessons we learn and relationships we build in thiswar to every other challenge we will face in the 21stcentury. As the lead agency in developing andmaintaining international relations now and for the

ALLIES, FRIENDS, AND PARTNERS ON EVERY PAGE:INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGYBy Richard L. ArmitageDeputy Secretary of State

“September 11th was a devastating day in American and world history, but perhaps somegood has come out of those terrible events,” says Deputy Secretary of State Richard L.Armitage. “In a sense, the National Security Strategy reflects a grand global realignmentin which all nations have an opportunity to redefine their priorities. In redefining ourpriorities, we also have an opportunity to focus international partnerships not just onwinning the war against terrorism, but on meeting all transnational challenges to states.”

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future, the Department of State, in particular, isplaying a key role in implementing this vision. Andas the president’s representative in this effort,Secretary of State Colin Powell is taking hisresponsibility for building these relationships andorchestrating the efforts of the Department with theutmost gravity and industry.

A basic responsibility for any government is toprotect the governed. President Bush’s top strategicpriority, therefore, is to protect the American peoplefrom another terrorist attack. As the recent bombingsin Bali and Kenya illustrate, however, terrorism is agrim reality around the world, and a threat to allnations and peoples. Therefore, our response — andthe effect of our policies — must be global. Whilethe United States will always reserve the right to actalone in its own interests, our national security isenhanced when other countries choose to play aconstructive, proactive role in helping the UnitedStates protect itself. Given the global ambitions ofterrorists, national security today is a function of howwell all countries protect each other, not just howwell one country protects itself.

And while coalition warfare is as old as war itself,today’s coalition against terrorism is unprecedentedin scale and in scope. In a monumental diplomaticundertaking, the United States has joined with some180 other nations to counter the threat of terrorismusing all of the tools available to us — intelligence,finance, law enforcement, and military operations.The United Nations set the stage for such acomprehensive coalition by passing Security CouncilResolution 1373, which obligated all nations toactively combat financing, recruitment, transit, safehaven, and other forms of support to terrorists andtheir backers, as well as to cooperate with othernations’ counterterrorism efforts.

America’s global network of alliances andpartnerships, many configured for Cold Warchallenges, quickly adapted to this post September11th security environment. In the immediateaftermath, for example, NATO, ANZUS [Australia,New Zealand, and United States] and theOrganization of American States for the first timeinvoked 50-year-old self-defense mechanisms.Indeed, NATO forces drawn from European nations

flew patrols over American skies in the days andmonths following the attacks. Other multilateralinstitutions changed course to meet pressing needs.The Financial Action Task Force, originallyconstituted to track funds fueling the internationalnarcotics trade, took the lead in the hunt for themoney trails that lead to terrorists. The G-8 nationsmoved to secure global networks of commerce andcommunication, including by stationing customsinspectors in each others’ ports through the ContainerSecurity Initiative. New relationships also came intoplay. For example, U.S. diplomats for the first timenegotiated with the states of Central Asia for accessand overflight rights to American and coalition forces.

This mutually reinforcing mix of ad hoc alliances andmore formal arrangements has led to a sustained andsuccessful campaign over the past 14 months.Coalition military operations have excised al Qaedafrom Afghanistan, destroying its infrastructure andkilling or capturing many of its operatives. The restremain in hiding and on the run. Intelligence-sharingand law enforcement cooperation have led to thearrest or detention of nearly 2,300 suspectedterrorists in 99 nations, and have prevented many,though unfortunately not all, attacks on civiliantargets around the world. More than 160 countrieshave frozen more than $100 million in assetsbelonging to terrorists and their supporters. In eachof these efforts, foreign policy professionals haveplayed a key role in securing the necessaryagreements and actions.

Beyond waging war and building the long-termcapacity to fight terrorism, the current internationalcoalition also has been essential to the liberation ofAfghanistan. Although this effort is partlyhumanitarian, it is also an important securitymeasure. For too long, Afghanistan served as boththe proving grounds and the launching pad forterrorists. Peace and stability for Afghanistan is inthe direct interests not only of the 23 millioninhabitants of that country, but also the neighboringnations who suffered from destabilizing waves ofdrugs, criminals, and refugees from that territory, andall of the nations of the world whose investment inthe rule of law has been put at risk by al Qaeda’sactivities.

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Decades of war have taken an extreme toll onAfghanistan. The country lacks everything from basicinfrastructure to civil society institutions, all of whichwill take considerable resources to restore. Considerthat rebuilding a paved road from Kabul to Herat willcost an estimated $260 million — at least — and thatone project alone will take the concerted resources ofJapan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Today, itwill take a sustained international political andfinancial commitment from the community ofnations, and the hard diplomatic work to get andsustain this commitment, to keep Afghanistan from chaos.

The twin campaigns to defeat terrorism andreconstruct Afghanistan are stretching globalresources and testing international resolve. U.S.leadership — and especially the diplomaticleadership of the Department of State — has beenessential to mobilizing both the resources and theresolve, with far-reaching results. As the NationalSecurity Strategy notes, “in leading the campaignagainst terrorism, we are forging new, productiveinternational relationships and redefining existingones in ways that meet the challenges of the 21stcentury.”

Like terrorism, many of the challenges of the 21stcentury will be transnational in nature, fromproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to theneed to ensure that all nations can benefit from aglobalized economy, to the spread of infectiousdiseases. Even internal unrest will continue to haveregional consequences. These transnational problemswill require transnational solutions, and the currentwar is helping the United States to develop therequisite patterns and habits of cooperation.

Cold War alliances and rivalries, reinterpreted for theage of terrorism, are showing promising signs offlexibility. In particular, as the National SecurityStrategy notes, the United States may have a newopportunity for a future where “main centers ofglobal power” cooperate more and compete less.From Russian President [Vladimir] Putin’s immediateoffer of condolences and support after the 9/11[September 11, 2001] attacks, U.S.-Russiancooperation in the war on terrorism has been path-

breaking in its breadth, depth, and openness. TheUnited States has also forged new relationships withChina, which has provided valuable assistance intracking terrorist finances. In both cases, the overlapin our current efforts is opening new possibilities fordialogue in areas that have traditionally beendifficult, including regional security issues,proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, humanrights concerns, and key trade issues, such asaccession to the World Trade Organization.

Multilateral institutions also are showing signs ofnew growth. Following extensive U.S. diplomaticefforts, the United Nations passed Resolution 1441,for example, taking a tough new stand against thethreat posed by Iraqi possession of chemical,biological, and potentially nuclear weapons. NATO,too, has retooled to meet today’s needs. At the recentsummit in Prague, NATO invited seven Europeannations to join as new members, reaffirmed itscommitment to developing updated militarycapabilities, and emphasized its new and deepeningrelationships with Russia, Central Asia, and otherregions beyond Europe.

The international recognition that underlyingcorrosive conditions — such as repression, poverty,and disease — present a threat to internationalstability is also spurring the growth of newcooperative mechanisms. U.S. leadership is key tothese efforts, as well, but will only truly be effectiveinsofar as it leverages commitments from othernations. HIV/AIDS, for example, presents astaggering public health crisis and ultimately a risk tothe stability of many regions. The United Statesmade the initial and single largest donation to a newGlobal Fund, kicked off by the G-8 [Group of Eightindustrialized nations] and endorsed by the UnitedNations, to prevent the spread and deal with theeffects of the disease. That Fund has now reached atotal of $2.1 billion [$2,100 million]. At the UnitedNations Conference on Financing for Development inMonterrey and other such venues, the United Stateshas helped to forge new approaches to internationalaid, based on principles of accountability, fiscalresponsibility, and good governance. Indeed, the U.S.has established the $5,000 million MillenniumChallenge Account — a 50 percent increase in the

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U.S. commitment to foreign assistance — which willbe dispensed according to these basic tenets.

Ultimately, these habits and patterns of cooperationwill persist because of the dual imperatives ofpragmatism and principle. First, cooperation indealing with transnational challenges is in the self-interest of so many nations, and second, nations havea dedication to certain shared values. Terrorists, forexample, present a clear and direct threat to the ruleof law, to international norms and standards forhuman dignity, and in the end, to the internationalsystem of states itself.

September 11th was a devastating day in Americanand world history, but perhaps some good has comeout of those terrible events. In a sense, the NationalSecurity Strategy reflects a grand global realignmentin which all nations have an opportunity to redefinetheir priorities. In redefining our priorities, we alsohave an opportunity to focus internationalpartnerships not just on winning the war againstterrorism, but on meeting all transnational challengesto states. Every nation in the world — from SriLanka to Afghanistan to America — stands tobenefit. _


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Let’s look back at September, when the nationwas shocked by an extremist’s attack. In theaftermath, the president declared that the

extremist struck at the “very heart of the Americanrepublic.” And as happens after events like that, ofcourse Wall Street took a dive. Certainly themotivation for that attack in part came from howothers perceived America and our role in the world.For example, the Philippines was caught up in aconflict between their Muslim and Catholiccommunities. And U.S. forces were there to help.

Now, some may think I am talking about September2001. Actually I was referring to September of 1901.The point is that there are parallels over time.

A hundred years ago, the extremist attack that I wasreferring to was done by an anarchist who hatedAmerica and all it stood for. He took out his wrathby assassinating President William McKinley. Today,of course, we probably wouldn’t call him an anarchist— he’d be an extremist or perhaps a terrorist. It wasalso a hundred years ago that the nation debatedAmerica’s Manifest Destiny, as it brought in newterritories of Wake and Guam and Hawaii and they allcame under the American flag. Of course, theparallel today is the debate over the part the UnitedStates will play in globalization.

In 1901, the U.S. armed forces had to adapt to meetthe new challenges. President Teddy Roosevelt

championed many of the efforts that today we wouldcall transformation. The U.S. Navy was rankedfourth or fifth in the world. In the Atlantic, theGerman Navy had 12 battleships to the U.S.’s eight.And to fix this, Roosevelt built 24 new capital ships.This fleet was called “the Great White Fleet” that setsail in 1907. The Army underwent similar changeswhen they went to the Enfield rifle. They alsopurchased new bayonets because the old ones wouldbend in hand-to-hand combat.

But it’s not the hardware change that makes suchefforts transformational; it is the intellectual andorganizational changes. Roosevelt’s Secretary ofWar, Elihu Root, created the [National] War Collegeat Fort McNair in order to give military officers themental agility to anticipate events in this newinternational environment. He also set up the armystaff, so that the army could have a cadre of planningexperts on hand. This ensured that the army had theflexibility to meet the new challenges of going fromstrictly a U.S.-based force to one that would haveworldwide interests.

My point is that 100 years ago, those involved in ournation’s national security business wrestled withmany of the same, or certainly similar, issues that weface today. Then and now, regional powers canthreaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then,as now, internal strife from religious hatreds, ethnicrivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead to

One hundred years ago, those involved in the nation’s national security business wrestled with many of the same, or certainly similar, issues that we face today, saysGeneral Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Then and now, regionalpowers can threaten the nation’s interest in distant conflict. Then, as now, internal strifefrom religious hatreds, ethnic rivalry, tribal conflicts, can, and often does, lead tobloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops often play a role in the crisis to restore peace.”This article is based on remarks made by General Myers at a recent event at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

THE U.S. MILITARY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF PEACE ANDSECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By General Richard B. MyersChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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bloodletting. And then and now, U.S. troops oftenplay a role in the crisis to restore peace.

But compared to 100 years ago, our 21st centurysecurity environment has, I think, two profoundchanges that makes it different. First is the presenceof transnational actors. They find sanctuary bydesign within the borders of hostile states. Or theyfind sanctuary by default within the borders of failingstates or in ungoverned areas.

The second profound change is that belligerents of alltypes have access to dramatically more sophisticatedtools. It’s probably an outgrowth of our great globaltelecommunications industry that gives hostile statesand terrorists alike access to a treasure ofinformation. The post-Cold War arms markets offerthem many different types of weapons — advancedradars, sophisticated submarines, and so forth.Unfortunately, these markets also include weapons ofmass destruction: chemical, biological, radiological,nuclear, and the know-how to make them and usethem. And this proliferation of advanced technologyaccentuates a trend in warfare that has a potentiallyprofound impact on our security.

Since the time of Thucydides, the premise of conflictbetween nations is that the stronger states coulddefeat the weaker ones. That was the commonwisdom. In the past 200 years, that’s been roughlytrue about 70 percent of the time. But as we saw inVietnam, and the Soviets saw in Afghanistan, greatpowers can fail because there’s a mismatch ininterest. What is a peripheral issue to a powerfulstate may be a core issue of survival to a weakerstate. This disparity of interest, then, can gettranslated into a disparity of commitment. It’s onereason why a weak power can overcome a strongernation’s designs.

And since 1980, one political scientist reports thatthis trend for the weaker to succeed has actuallyincreased as the weaker states have come out on topalmost half of the time in the last 20 years.

And now if you add weapons of mass destruction tothe equation, you have a case where relatively weakactors may have access to lethal power that rivals

what the strongest nations have. Weak actors canpotentially inflict unprecedented devastation on agreat nation. With weapons of mass destruction, theycan hold at risk large portions of societies.

During the Cold War, we faced the threat of nuclearconflict with a superpower, but deterrence containedthat threat because we placed at risk something theadversary held very dear. That was, in essence, theirvery existence. Today, if a weak power is a terroristnetwork with weapons of mass destruction,deterrence won’t work most of the time. Whenthey’re willing to commit suicide to further theiragenda, what do they value that we can place at risk?

This dilemma reflects the unprecedented nature oftoday’s security environment. And to meet these verydaunting challenges, the president recently publisheda new National Security Strategy. In support of that,let me tell you about three broad considerations ofthe military’s role in supporting our new nationalsecurity strategy.

The first consideration is that the United Statesmilitary has got to accomplish a multitude of tasks.We must promote security, of course, to fight and winour nation’s wars. But nothing is more central to ourmission today than to defend this nation here athome. And that’s why we’ve made a series of verysignificant changes to the way the President tells ushow to go about our business. We call that theUnified Command Plan. It’s how the president says,“Here’s what I want your various commands to do.”

One of the central things we’ve done is establish U.S.Northern Command. It stood up on October 1, 2002,so it’s a little over a month old. And to say it knowsexactly where it’s going would be a mistake. It’s gotabout a year before it gets up to what we think wouldbe its full operational capability. We gave it themission to deter, prevent, and defeat aggressionaimed at the United States. And should the necessityarise, from an act of war or an act of God, NorthernCommand will provide the talents and the skills ofour armed forces to assist and, in most cases, besubordinate to civilian authorities for whatever thecrisis of the moment is.

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Key to Northern Command’s effectiveness incarrying out the mission that I described is the flowof information. This applies to not just inside theDepartment of Defense, and not just inside this newNorthern Command, but to all the Federaldepartments and agencies that have something to dowith keeping us safe.

In our new security environment, we know thateverybody has a role — State, Treasury, Justice,Customs, intelligence agencies, the FBI and, I think,all the way down to local law enforcement agenciesand departments.

Recently, I was fortunate enough to see a programthat we’re experimenting with and that we hope tobring to fruition fairly quickly. It’s the project we callProtect America and it sounds simple. It involvesintegrating techniques in a way that has not beendone, at least inside the government. It’s a web-basedcollaborative and interactive tool that offers a lot ofpromise in integrating data from different people andallowing people to interact with that data. It’sstructured in a way that allows hands-off gathering ofdata until it becomes important to you.

These kinds of tools are absolutely essential if we’regoing to come up with the agility and the flexibilityto deal with the terrorist threat that we see today.What they’re going to enable us to do is to thinkfaster than our adversary. And I would submit thatearly on in Afghanistan we were absolutely thinkingfaster than the adversary, and therefore we were verysuccessful. I think you could make an argument nowthat we’re not thinking as fast as we need to think,that we’re not inside the decision loop, if you will, ofthe adversary. We need to speed that up.

Another complex factor is that it’s not just inside theUnited States that this information flow has to workvery well. We’ve all got to be able to interact, at leastin an informational way, certainly, with a commonfoundation, if we’re going to be effective against thisterrorist threat.

I see our new Northern Command as the catalyst tohelp the rest of government develop theseinformation-sharing techniques — from a cop on a

beat somewhere who notices something interestingand unusual going on, to the Coast Guard whichtracks shipping coming into our ports, to individualswho just want to call up and make a report. You’regoing to have to have some way to manage it in orderto avoid completely inundating the law enforcementnetwork, and that’s what I’m suggesting. These aretasks that we’ve got to do today.

At the same time, we’ve got to ensure our military isready for tomorrow. And it’s not something that wecan do tomorrow, it’s something we’ve got to dotoday for tomorrow. So we made some other changesto our Unified Command Plan. We have a commandin Norfolk, Virginia, called Joint Forces Command,and we’ve given them a primary job now oftransforming our military in terms of our exercisesand experimentation. And we removed one of thehats that this command used to have — and that wasthe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, which wasa NATO command. We’ve done it with somecontroversy, but we’ve done it. And the way it willprobably wind up is that that command in Norfolkwill also have a NATO hat that will worktransformation and the interoperability of the UnitedStates and European nations. This is still in theproposal stage, but that’s probably the way it’s goingto work out.

The second consideration is our military’s role in this,the 21st century, and geography. The question youmight ask is: Should the military be focusedregionally or should we focus more globally? Myunequivocal answer is yes. On the one hand, we’vegot to focus regionally because so often that’s wherethe interests are. That’s where we’ve got to maintaina local capability. The regional combatantcommanders — the Pacific Command, the European,the Central Command, the Southern Command —they’re out there to promote stability, to foster goodmilitary cooperation between forces, and to providethat immediate crisis response force — fromhumanitarian up to conflict.

On the other hand, we know that there are certainthreats that transcend regional and political borders.So our response must transcend those borders as well.And that means that we’ve also got to have a global

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capability that’s equal to our regional capability,which we don’t have today in most respects. This issomething that’s going to be evolving.

We did stand up a new U.S. Strategic Command inOmaha. We’ve always had a Strategic Command inOmaha, but what we did is give it a dramatically newmission by closing down what’s known as U.S. SpaceCommand in Colorado Springs and putting the twotogether with a brand-new command. We’re alsolooking at giving the command new missions thatweren’t assigned before.

These missions, I think, reflect the kinds of globalcapabilities that we need, things like missile defense.There is a need to look at such issues as global strike,information operations, and command and control,intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on aglobal basis, not just regionally.

Let me explain the missile defense issue to you.Hypothetical situation: A missile is launched fromIraq into Israel. Iraq happens to be in one of ourregional commands called Central Command. Israelhappens to be in European Command. Soimmediately we have two commands involved, andperhaps Strategic Command.

Those kinds of events are inherently multi-commandand more global in nature than they are regional. Soto do the job right, we’ve got to have a globalapproach to how we integrate our missile warning,our command and control, the defensive options thatwe have, and the attack options, for that matter, thatwe have. And we need one commander that looks atthis holistically on a global basis.

So those are a couple of examples that explain whatwe’re talking about in developing a more global viewof the world. And it particularly has applicabilitywhen you think about dealing with terrorists becausethey’re not respecting any boundaries. They go backand forth very, very easily.

The third role is an issue that’s been talked about a lotlately. It’s in the national security strategy, and themilitary has a role. It’s the issue of preemption. At

times, and especially if you pay attention to a lot ofthe articles that have been written, you wonder iffolks have really read the national security strategy.

Because if you do, you’ll realize that the nationalsecurity strategy really describes using allinstruments of national power to prevent an attack. Itdescribes how preemption must include strengtheningour non-proliferation efforts, to use diplomatic andfinancial tools to keep weapons of mass destructiontechnology out of the wrong people’s hands. And ittalks about ensuring our military forces are well-equipped to deal with the weapons of massdestruction environment. It would cause anybelligerent who would want to use weapons of massdestruction to pause to think if they might be able togain their desired effect. It clearly states thatpreemption doesn’t have to include the use ofoffensive military force at all.

I would submit that this concept isn’t really new toAmericans. In fact, it was President FranklinRoosevelt (FDR) who talked about it in the daysbefore Pearl Harbor, before the U.S. was involved inWorld War II. It was during a fireside chat onSeptember 11, 1941, where FDR talked about a Nazisub that had attacked the destroyer USS GREER nearIceland. He told America, “Let us not say: We willonly defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds inhitting home or if the crew and the passengers aredrowned. The time for active defense is now.”

In addition, international law for a long time hasrecognized exactly what FDR described. A nationdoes not need to wait for attack before it acts. InFDR’s time, absorbing the unprovoked torpedo attackcost a couple of hundred lives of sailors and civilians.It certainly was a tragedy. But today absorbing a firstblow of a chemical, or a biological, or a nuclearattack, radiological attack, could cost up to tens ofthousands, perhaps more, of innocent lives. Thatwould be a catastrophe. So the questions we’ve gotto debate are: Can, or should we accept this risk?And in today’s dramatically different era, must a freepeople wait until the threat is physically presentbefore you act? Or can you act if there is some sortof mix of latent potential and demonstrated motive

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that you don’t think you’re going to be able to deter?Having an open discussion about these sorts of thingsis, I think, very, very important and very, veryhealthy.

In my view, any discussion we have in the futurealmost has to include weapons of mass destructionand the dramatic change they’ve brought to oursecurity environment. If terrorists or hostile regionalpowers have them, they can hold at risk our society

and certainly the societies of our friends and allies.

To help counter the threat, our Armed Forces areincreasing our ability to operate in a coherent and ina global manner. We’ve got to have that global viewand put this competency on a par with our regionalcapabilities. And we’ve got to talk about risk — therisk of action and, of course, the risk of inaction, andwhen the U.S. should act in its own defense. _

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The President’s National Security Strategy aimsto “help make the world not just safer butbetter.” And a world that is better will also be

safer. National security and global economicprosperity are inexorably linked.

Economic strength and resiliency are the foundationof our national security. The economic dimension ofthe National Security Strategy focuses on threepriorities:

First, we must assure economic security by makingthe U.S. and global economies more resilient toeconomic shocks.

Second, we must advance a global prosperity agendaby expanding trade and investment between nations.

Third, we need to ensure poor nations participatefully in the rising tide of prosperity.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

To ensure our economic security we must focus onfour tasks in the coming years. We must developdiversified and reliable supplies of energy. We mustmake international transportation of people andgoods safe and secure. We must cut off financing forterrorists. We must ensure stability of theinternational financial system and the economicstability of key allies.

Energy Security: The National Security Strategypledges that, “We will strengthen our own energysecurity and the shared prosperity of the globaleconomy by working with our allies, trading partners,and energy producers to expand the sources and typesof global energy supplied, especially in the WesternHemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspianregion. We will also continue to work with ourpartners to develop cleaner and more energy efficienttechnologies.”

We need to secure reliable supplies of energy atreasonable prices in order to foster economic growthand prosperity, and to ensure that oil cannot be usedas a weapon. We must deal with some hard factsabout the international oil markets. Two-thirds ofproven world oil reserves are in the Middle East.Europe and Japan, like the United States, rely onimports to meet a growing portion of oil needs.Aftershocks from global oil supply disruptions willripple through the global economy. Finally, problemstates control significant amounts of oil.

Our energy security requires a robust internationalstrategy and close cooperation with other countries.Working with the International Energy Agency, wehave already established a well-tested approach toprevent sudden disruptions in the oil market fromdamaging the world economy. In the mid- to long-term, we must continue to increase and diversifyproduction of energy in the United States and in

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

By Alan P. LarsonUnder Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs

“The National Security Strategy recognizes the importance of strengthening our economicsecurity, expanding trade and investment, and promoting economic development,” saysUnder Secretary of State Alan P. Larson. “We are working to achieve these goals throughdiplomacy and by sharing the experience of our own development, based on our politicaland economic freedoms. Success in achieving these economic policy goals is a core part of our National Security Strategy.”

reliable producing countries. As part of this effort,we are undertaking to improve the climate for oilsector investment in many countries, and are activelyhelping to improve the infrastructure necessary togain access to relatively new suppliers, such as thosein the Caspian and Central Asian region.

Transport Security: Safe air travel, maritimetransport and secure borders are critical to oureconomic security and prosperity. We are workingdiligently with foreign governments and internationalorganizations to ensure the safe flow of goods andpeople across our borders. Working with theInternational Civil Aviation Organization, we aredeveloping and implementing an even more robustairport security audit program. We are strengtheningcockpit doors on aircraft as quickly as possible.Tougher visa and travel industry personnelidentification procedures are being put in place.

We also must ensure that terrorists cannotsurreptitiously transport either hazardous materials orthemselves across our sea or land borders. We havepartnered with countries around the world toimplement the Container Security Initiative and otheraspects of the G-8 (Group of Eight industrializednations) Cooperative Action on Transport Securityand the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)forum’s Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR)initiative. These steps will ensure we can screen thecontents of containers coming into the United Statesto detect possible hazardous materials, weapons ofmass destruction, and the terrorists who might usethem against us. We must also support efforts to helpthe International Maritime Organization implementshipping and port facility standards around the world.

Terrorism Finance: Terrorists receive supportthrough networks of financial backers andintermediaries. They raise money to support theiroperations through means such as common criminalactivity, including fraud, extortion, kidnapping andcorrupt trade. They also use front companies, skimprofits off legitimate businesses, and abuse charitiesand non-profit organizations. They transfer fundsthrough formal and informal financial systems, andthrough the smuggling of cash, precious metals, orgems. This exploitation of international financialnetworks and charitable organizations threatens

public safety and undermines the viability oflegitimate institutions. The international communitymust have a unified global strategy for denyingterrorists access to the financial means to commitatrocities, and for using the financial trail to locateand disrupt terrorist cells.

The United States is leading international efforts,based on international norms developed by theUnited Nations and the Financial Action Task Force(FATF), to create counter-terrorist financing regimesthat identify and freeze terrorist assets, promoteaccountability and transparency in financialtransactions, deny terrorists access to formal andinformal financial systems, and prevent abuse ofcharitable fundraising mechanisms. Together withour allies, we will provide necessary technicalassistance to countries engaged in the front-line ofthe struggle to disrupt terrorist financing.

Financial Stability of Key Allies: In the war againstterrorism, we worked to secure the support of nationsaround the world. It is in our interest to make surethat those nations engaged in the front-line of thiswar are not threatened by economic and financialinstability. We provide necessary support to thesefront-line states by working actively with othercountries, the International Financial Institutions(IFIs) and the private sector to prevent financialcrises and to more effectively resolve them when they occur. Promoting regional trade will also playan important role in fostering economic growthamong key front-line states, including Afghanistanand Pakistan.

We address financial disruptions (notably in LatinAmerica) that threaten the economic stability ofemerging markets. We work with the IFIs to provideadvice and support to countries that are trying topursue sound macroeconomic policies, providegreater transparency, adopt prudential standards, andkeep debt levels manageable and inflation low.

AN OPEN MARKET AGENDA FORPROSPERITY

The President has outlined a plan for igniting a newera of global economic growth through free marketsand free trade. The National Security Strategy notes

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that “A strong world economy enhances our nationalsecurity by advancing prosperity and freedom in therest of the world.”

Nations who would stand with us to address threatsfrom terrorism and rogue states need strongeconomic growth and stability to be able to supportour common efforts and values. The United Statescan strengthen this global coalition by promotingeconomic growth at home and in other developednations, promoting the economic development of thepoorer countries, and setting an open market agendafor prosperity.

To achieve this, we work with our major tradingpartners to spur growth and opportunity worldwide.We begin by solidifying the economic gains madeunder the North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) with our closest neighbors, Mexico andCanada. One immediate consequence of stricterglobal security requirements was a temporaryslowdown in the delivery of intermediate goodsacross the borders with our NAFTA partners. TheUnited States developed smart border action planswith both Canada and Mexico, which will providegreater security while facilitating trade between thethree NAFTA countries.

Europe and Japan are vital trade and investmentpartners. They are our staunch allies in the waragainst terror — and know that their own security isat stake. Concerted efforts by the United States, theEuropean Union (EU) and Japan are imperative inimplementing the new World Trade Organization(WTO) Doha Development Agenda, which will addbillions in new opportunities and help anchor trust inmarkets and in integration, and lead the worldeconomy towards stability. Japan is mired ineconomic malaise and Europe is growing beneath itspotential. The United States and the world needJapan and Europe to be strong and healthy. We aresupporting Japan’s efforts to reform its critically illbanking sector so it will be able to fully exercise itspotential for economic leadership and growth.

The economic aspects of our critical strategicrelationships are becoming ever more important.Measures to expand trade and investment are now

central to those relationships. China has become amember of the WTO. Russia is pursuing WTOmembership. We are working closely to encouragegreater private investment in that country.

The United States has developed a comprehensivestrategy to promote free trade. In addition to ourmultilateral efforts in the WTO, we are moving aheadwith regional and bilateral trade initiatives. We beginwith a firm base of our success in the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement. A Free Trade Areaof the Americas is our next goal. Building on oursuccessful bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan,we will work to complete agreements with Chile,Singapore, Australia, the Southern Africa CustomsUnion, and others.

EXPANDING THE CIRCLE OFDEVELOPMENT

Last March (2002) in Monterrey, Mexico, thePresident said, “The advance of development is acentral commitment of American foreign policy. As anation founded on the dignity and value of every life,America’s heart breaks because of the suffering andsenseless death we see in our world. We work forprosperity and opportunity because they’re right. It’sthe right thing to do. We also work for prosperity andopportunity because they help defeat terror.”

He added, “Poverty doesn’t cause terrorism. Beingpoor doesn’t make you a murderer. Most of theplotters of September 11th were raised in comfort.Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead tohopelessness and despair. And when governmentsfail to meet the most basic needs of their people,these failed states can become havens for terror.”

The international community acknowledged earlierthis year in Monterrey at the Conference onFinancing for Development that developing countrieshave primary responsibility for their owndevelopment, but that we must be their partners in success. That success requires that all theresources for development be unlocked and usedwell, including domestic savings, public sectorresources, trade and investment, and human talentand innovation.

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Productive investment is essential for development.Foreign and domestic private capital far outweighofficial development assistance as a source fordevelopment investment. Capital is a coward,however. It flees from corruption, bad policies,conflict, and unpredictability. It shuns ignorance,disease, and illiteracy. Capital goes only where it iswelcomed and where investors can feel confident of areturn on the resources they risk. To help create thissecure investment environment, we must encourageother nations to live by the rule of law, follow soundeconomic policies, fight corruption with transparencyand accountability, and invest wisely in their people.

Official development assistance can also play animportant role in helping countries on the road toeconomic prosperity and political stability. At theMonterrey Conference on Financing forDevelopment, President Bush unveiled hisMillennium Challenge Account Initiative (MCA)which will increase our assistance to poor nationsover the next three years to a new level — some 50percent higher than it is today. The $5,000 million innew money will go every year to accelerate lastingprogress in developing nations that govern justly,invest in their people, and promote economicfreedom and enterprise. The MCA is an investmentin our collective future. It will promote partnershipwith countries taking the often hard steps to realdevelopment, which includes promoting freedom andopportunity for their own people. It promotes sharedefforts, shared values, and shared successes. Thefriendship and better lives of those it helps is ourreturn on investment.

The United States can lead but cannot spur lastingdevelopment alone. We must work actively with thedeveloping countries themselves, with other donorsand with the IFIs to ensure a global effort to raise

living standards in the poorest regions of the world.We must hold developing countries accountable inpartnership for working to ensure that their people’slives actually improve. We must hold ourselvesaccountable for providing effective help for thosecommitted to development. We will continue toencourage the multilateral development banks tofocus on increasing economic productivity indeveloping countries. We need measurable resultsfrom programs that improve agriculture, watertreatment and distribution, education, health, the ruleof law, and private sector development. The supportfor development assistance to the very poorest shouldbe in the form of grants instead of loans.

Opening markets worldwide will also speeddevelopment for those countries making sounddevelopment efforts, including efforts to seize tradeopportunities. Increasing the trade in both goods andservices between developing countries whereenormous unmet opportunity exists, as well as withother nations, will accelerate development andprovide a foundation for a more secure and stableglobal economy. The expansion of beneficial tradeinvolving developing countries has been a majordriver behind unprecedented progress on reducingpoverty in recent decades.

CONCLUSION

The National Security Strategy recognizes theimportance of strengthening our economic security,expanding trade and investment, and promotingeconomic development. We are working to achievethese goals through diplomacy and by sharing theexperience of our own development, based on ourpolitical and economic freedoms. Success inachieving these economic policy goals is a core partof our National Security Strategy. _

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The newly revised National Security Strategyissued by the Bush Administration eloquentlylays out a comprehensive agenda to guide U.S.

foreign policy through the next decade and beyond.By linking together our fundamental principles, ourlong-term goals, and the challenges we will confrontin the new century, this document provides an excellentand concise guide to thinking strategically about howthe United States can best employ its resourcestoward promoting its interests around the world.

Of necessity, a study of such sweeping scope candevote only a limited discussion to each of its manysubjects, inevitably prompting calls for moreattention to be given to one facet or another. Eachreader will have his other favorite to champion. Onethat I believe deserves much greater emphasis in ourforeign policy decision-making is the role of publicdiplomacy.

The updated National Security Strategy proceedsfrom an understanding that the power of the UnitedStates is immense and unprecedented, but it alsowisely notes that we cannot achieve all of our goalsby acting alone. We must have allies to help shoulderthe tasks, especially if we are to render ouraccomplishments secure.

There are many countries whose interests mayintersect with ours over a sufficiently broad range ofsubjects and time to merit the term “ally,” but Ibelieve that our most powerful and most enduringallies are to be found among the peoples of the world.

And public diplomacy is the most effectiveinstrument we possess for engaging them.

Public diplomacy — the collective name given toefforts by the U.S. government to explain its foreignpolicy to the world and encourage greater familiaritywith the United States by the populations of othercountries — embraces international broadcasting,exchange programs, and a range of public informationservices, along with many other programs andfunctions by a surprisingly large number of agencies.But in addition to this essentially passive approach,there is an additional capacity and a larger purposewhich have never been fully recognized, namely theuse of public diplomacy to speak directly to thepeoples of the world and enlist them in our long-termefforts to promote freedom, prosperity, and stabilitythroughout the world.

If we are to achieve this ambitious goal, we mustbegin by reversing the long neglect that hasconsigned public diplomacy to the periphery of ourforeign policy decision-making. Our initial focusmust be on stripping away the encumbrance ofmisunderstanding and disinformation that has beenallowed to distort the image of the United Statesabroad, distortions that now seriously threaten ourinfluence and security. Only then can we begin to laythe foundation for a deep and lasting connection withthe peoples of the world that is complementary to,but separate from, our relationships with theirgovernments. The necessary elements for thishistoric task are already in hand.

SPEAKING TO OUR SILENT ALLIES: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By U.S. Representative Henry J. HydeChairman, Committee on International Relations,

U.S. House of Representatives

“The updated National Security Strategy proceeds from an understanding that the power of the United States is immense and unprecedented, but it also wisely notes that wecannot achieve all of our goals by acting alone,” says U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde,chairman of the House International Relations Committee. “We must have allies to help shoulder the tasks, especially if we are to render our accomplishments secure.”

_ C O N G R E S S I O N A L F O C U S

Let me explain that task and the rewards that await usif we accomplish it.

As Americans, we are justly proud of our country. Ifany nation has been a greater force for good in thelong and tormented history of this world, I amunaware of it. We have guarded whole continentsfrom conquest, showered aid on distant lands, sentthousands of youthful idealists to remote and ofteninhospitable areas to help the world’s forgotten.

Why, then, when we read or listen to descriptions ofAmerica in the foreign press, do we so often seem tobe entering a fantasyland of hatred? Much of thepopular press overseas, often including thegovernment-owned media, daily depict the UnitedStates as a force for evil, accusing this country of anendless number of malevolent plots against the world.Even as we strike against the network of terroristswho masterminded the murder of thousands ofAmericans, our actions are widely depicted in theMuslim world as a war against Islam. Our efforts,however imperfect, to bring peace to the Middle Eastspark riots that threaten governments that dare tocooperate with us.

How has this state of affairs come about? How is itthat the country that invented Hollywood andMadison Avenue has allowed such a destructive andparodied image of itself to become the intellectualcoin of the realm overseas? Over the years, theimages of mindless hatred directed at us have becomefamiliar fixtures on our television screens.

All this time, we have heard calls that “somethingmust be done.” But, clearly, whatever has been donehas not been enough.

I believe that the problem is too great and tooentrenched to be solved by tweaking an agency hereor reshuffling a program there. If a strategy is notworking, we should not insist on more of the same.Instead, we must begin by rethinking our entireapproach.

It is increasingly clear that much of the problem liesin our ineffective and often antiquated methods. Forexample, broadcasts on short-wave radio simplycannot compete with AM and FM channels in terms

of accessibility, to say nothing of television, the mostpowerful medium of all. Shifting our efforts intothese and other broad-based media, including theInternet and others, will take time and money, butthis reorientation is a prerequisite to reaching ourintended audience.

But there is a deeper problem. According to manyobservers, we have largely refused to participate inthe contest for public opinion and thereby allowedour enemies’ slanders to go unchallenged. The effortto avoid controversy has come at the cost of potentialpersuasion and of much of the reason to listen to us at all.

The results are sobering. In testimony last yearbefore the House International Relations Committee,the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors,which oversees our international broadcasting efforts,stated that “we have virtually no youthful audienceunder the age of 25 in the Arab world.”

We have several tasks, then. We must develop boththe means of reaching a broader audience and alsothe compelling content that will persuade them totune in. These objectives will not be easy toaccomplish, especially in an increasingly competitivemedia environment, but they are prerequisite to ourhaving an opportunity to present our case in clear andpersuasive terms. Our work does not stop there, forwe must make our case not once but over and overagain and be prepared to do so for decades to come.

It is for that reason that I introduced legislation aimedat accomplishing these and other goals, legislationwhich I am proud to say has enjoyed broad bipartisansupport and which the House passed unanimouslylast July. Unfortunately, we were not able to persuadethe Senate of the merits of this legislation before bothhouses adjourned, but we shall take it up again in the108th Congress.

This bill, H.R. 3969, is divided into three sections.The first reshapes and refocuses the StateDepartment’s public diplomacy programs, includingspecifying a series of objectives to be attained andrequiring an annual plan be formulated to determinehow these are to be implemented. Far greaterprominence will be given to public diplomacy

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throughout all of the Department’s activities, andgreater resources will be made available to ensurethat these new responsibilities can be met.

The second section establishes a series of exchangeprograms focused on the Muslim world. Our purposehere is to lay the foundation for long-term change ina part of the world to which we have given far toolittle attention. As we respond to the immediateproblems before us, we must remember that the taskwe face has no obvious endpoint.

The third section of the bill reorganizes ourinternational broadcasting services in order toprepare them for far-reaching and innovative reforms.Given the importance of broadcasting to our largerpurpose, we cannot afford to be constrained by howwe have always done things. New approaches andenhanced resources will be central to any prospect ofwinning an expanded audience, and this bill is but thefirst step in that direction. To this end, the House hasauthorized $135 million to launch an ambitious effortinto television broadcasting.

Let me now turn to what I believe should be thelarger purpose of our public diplomacy efforts. Tosome, that purpose is self-evident: to provideobjective news and information, to convey anaccurate and positive image of America, and topresent and explain U.S. foreign policy.

Unquestionably, these are essential functions. If wedo them well, they will comprise an indispensablevoice of clarity regarding our foreign policy, oneotherwise absent from the world’s airways.

However, I believe that public diplomacy’s potentialis even greater. To understand that, we must firstunderstand that half of our foreign policy is missing.

Let me explain.

As the most powerful actor in the internationalsystem, the United States conducts the world’s onlyglobal foreign policy, one that dwarfs in extent andresources that of any other country. Its range extendsacross the entire spectrum, from the political andmilitary to the economic and cultural, and centers onan elaborate array of relationships with virtually

every sovereign government, from Russia to VaticanCity, with scores of international organizationsrounding out the total.

Nevertheless, for some years now, scholars havetalked about the emergence in world politics of whatthey call “non-state actors.” While the nation-stateremains the primary “actor” on the world stage, it isno longer the only one — and in certain instances,what nation-states do and don’t do is heavilyconditioned by what those non-state actors do anddon’t do.

Poland’s Solidarity movement in the 1980’s is apowerful example of a “non-state actor” which had adramatic and positive impact on the course of events.I needn’t remind you that al Qaeda has demonstrateda contrary ability to sow destruction.

Thus, it should be obvious to all that the dynamics ofworld politics are no longer determined by foreignpolicy professionals only. As important as they are,what they think and do is conditioned by what ishappening in the hearts and minds of almost 7,000million human beings on a shrinking globe in an ageof almost instantaneous information. That is whypublic diplomacy — the effort to persuade thosehearts and minds of the truth about our purposes inthe world — must be a crucial part of our foreignpolicy effort.

My point is this: Our focus on our relations withforeign governments and international organizationshas led us to overlook a set of powerful allies: thepeoples of the world.

Uniquely among the world’s powers, a dense networkconnects the United States with the populations ofvirtually every country on the planet, a network thatis independent of any formal state-to-stateinteraction. On one level, this is not surprising: asthe preeminent political, military, and economicpower, the presence of the United States is a dailyfact of life in most areas of the globe. America’scultural impact is even broader, penetrating to themost forbiddingly remote areas of the world, with arange continually expanded by the boundless reach ofelectronic media.

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But there is an even deeper connection, a bond thatderives from the universal values America represents.More than a simple wish list of desirable freedoms, attheir core is the belief that these values have universalapplication, that they are inherent in individuals andpeoples by right of their humanity and not by thegrace of the powerful and the unelected. Theyprovide hope even for those populations which havenever experienced hope.

The advancement of freedom has been a prominentcomponent of American foreign policy since thiscountry’s inception. Given the nature of theAmerican people, it is certain to remain so. But inaddition to genuine altruism, our promotion offreedom can have another purpose, namely as anelement in the United States’ geopolitical strategy.

Despite the laments and exasperations of thepractitioners of Realpolitik regarding what they seeas our simplistic and naive images of the world, wehaven’t done so badly. That virtually the entirecontinent of Europe is free and secure today is largelydue to America’s powerful and beneficent embrace,one that stretches from the landings in Normandy tothe present day.

The history of the last century taught us many lessons,one of the most important being that the desire forfreedom we share with others can be a remarkablypowerful weapon for undermining geopoliticalthreats. The prime example is the Soviet Union.

Decades of enormous effort on the part of the UnitedStates and the West aimed at containing andundermining the threat posed by the Soviet empireenjoyed considerable success. But it was only withthe advent of democracy in Russia and the othernations of the Soviet prison house that the communistregime was finally destroyed and with it the menaceit posed to us and to the world as a whole. Thisshould be a deep lesson for us, but it is one thatcuriously remains unlearned.

Candidates for the application of this lesson comereadily to mind: the list of countries posing threats tothe United States, such as Iraq, Iran, and NorthKorea, contains no democracies. All are repressive,all maintain their rule by coercion. Given the closed

nature of these regimes, the conventional toolsavailable to the United States to affect the behavior ofthese and other regimes can seem frustratinglylimited, often amounting to little more than a mix ofsanctions, condemnation, and diplomatic isolation.Despite great effort on our part, each of theseregimes continues its course toward the acquisition ofweapons of mass destruction, holding out thefrightening prospect of a vast increase in their abilityto do harm to the United States and its interests.

In our deliberations regarding our policy toward theseand other challenges to U.S. interests, we shouldremember that the fate of the Soviet empire providesan instructive example of how peaceful change canbe encouraged by those outside.

To secure its rule, the Soviet regime trained its vastpowers on all who would dissent, dividing andisolating the population —and even sending in thetanks when necessary — in an effort to deny hope toany challengers. But the West was able to providehope anyway, with the role of two individuals beingespecially important.

The first was the election of Pope John Paul II. Hisinitial message to his countrymen in Poland toldthem: “Be not afraid.” From that beginning, a massmovement took shape, Solidarity was born, and thePolish regime began its unstoppable slide to oblivion.Poland is now free.

Equally significant was the election of RonaldReagan. Against the advice of many, Reagan refusedto tame his remarks about the Soviet Union. Whenhe called the Soviet Union “an evil empire,” he wasopenly derided by many in the West as an ideologueor a warmonger and especially by those who assertedthat our interests lay in an accommodation with the regime.

Many dismissed his declaration as “empty words.”But veterans of the democracy movement in theformer Soviet Union point to his statement as aturning point in their struggle. For it was the firsttime that a Western leader had called the SovietUnion by its real name, had openly stated that theregime was illegitimate and proclaimed it mortal. Itwas an unambiguous statement that, at long last,

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America was casting its lot with the powerless andnot with the all-powerful regime, a declaration thatwe would never abandon the oppressed merely tosecure better relations with their oppressors.

That infusion of hope, the unambiguous declarationthat America was openly aligning itself with thosewho were struggling against impossible odds, helpedset in motion the events which dissolved the SovietUnion, almost without a shot being fired. We knowthe importance of the role played by the West becausethose who led that resistance have repeatedly told us.We must understand that although the long decadesof pressure by the West on Moscow were essential toits demise, in the end it was the victory of our allieswithin — the unfree peoples of the Soviet Union —which actually vanquished the empire.

I have used the term “alliance” when speaking of ourrelationships with peoples around the world. I do notuse the term lightly, nor is it merely a figure ofspeech. Although our global responsibilities requireus to maintain a full complement of officialinteractions with regimes around the world, and evento cultivate good relations with them, we mustremember that our true allies are the people they ruleover. We are allies because we share a common aim,which is freedom. And we have a common opponent:oppressive regimes hostile to democracy.

Does this mean that we must cast our lot with theuncertain prospects of the oppressed around theworld and forgo cooperation with their rulingregimes? Must we renounce traditional foreignpolicy goals, and even our own interests, in the nameof revolution? Obviously, the answer is no. Adopting

such a course would be profoundly foolish and wouldquickly prove to be unsustainable. Our interestsrequire that we cooperate with a range ofgovernments whose hold on power does not alwaysrest on the consent of the governed. The first andenduring priority of American foreign policy is andmust remain the promotion of the interests of theAmerican people; our desire to help others must notbe confused with an obligation to do so. But neithershould we ignore the necessity of maintaining ourconnections with the populations of thosegovernments whose cooperation we need but whosetenure in power is not eternal.

This, then, is the purpose I would set for our publicdiplomacy and for our foreign policy as a whole: toengage our allies among the peoples of the world.This must include public pronouncements from thePresident and from the Congress that clearly state thelong-term objectives of U.S. foreign policy. We musthave good relations with the world’s governments,but this must be complemented by our speaking pastthe regimes and the elites and directly to the peoplethemselves.

For all of America’s enormous power, transformingthe world is too heavy a burden to attempt alone. Butwe are not alone. The peoples of the world representan enormous reservoir of strategic resources waitingto be utilized. The formula is a simple one: we canbest advance our own interests not by persuadingothers to adopt our agenda but by helping themachieve their own freedom. In so doing, we mustalways remember that although we have many vocalopponents, these are vastly outnumbered by thelegions of our silent allies. _


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U.S. officials as well as several notedAfricanists, in separate conversationsrecently, agreed that President Bush’s new

national security plan is clear evidence that a stableand democratic Africa remains a priority goal of theU.S. government. According to “The NationalSecurity Strategy of the United States of America,” aplan of action issued by the White House onSeptember 20, Africa is important to peace andsecurity worldwide and will receive all necessaryhelp from the United States aimed at furthering itsoverall political and economic development.

The top Africa policy-maker at the State Department,Assistant Secretary of State for African AffairsWalter Kansteiner, made that point at a talk he gaveon conflict resolution at the Heritage Foundation inNovember 2002. “Africa is of great importance tothis Administration, I’m pleased to say, and I think[this is] reflected in the President’s National Securityreport.” Looking toward the future, he added, “Ithink Africa is going to continue to play an importantrole in our national interests ... becoming much moreviable to the United States” over time.

Brett Schaefer, Africa specialist at the HeritageFoundation, was not surprised at Africa’s place in thestrategy plan. “I think the president has actually putquite an emphasis on Africa over the past year or so,”he said. “Then-Secretary [of the Treasury] PaulO’Neill went over there for an extended trip; Bush

announced the Millennium Challenge Account [50percent of which will go to Africa] and he announcedthe HIV/AIDS and water initiatives, both of whichare targeted at Africa. So it was natural that Africagot the mention it did in the security paper.

“From a national security standpoint, theadministration’s recommendations are quiteconsistent,” Schaefer added. “They are trying tofocus on reducing conflict and instability withinAfrica, which is a large priority. And they want towork with their European allies to achieve thoseobjectives, especially if there is a need for peaceoperations.”

On the latter point, Schaefer said, “Africa, asimportant as it is, obviously is not a place whereAmerica would seek to station vast amounts oftroops. So the administration is trying to multiply itsimpact by working with other nations such as theregional powers it mentions in the strategy.”

In contrast, Steve Morrision, director of Africaprograms at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS), said the plan’s emphasis on Africa is“pretty dramatic on several levels. First of all, at aconceptual level, it is a departure from business asusual because the new terrorism prevention strategysays: ‘Broken, chaotic places that we thought weremarginal before are in fact now a priority becausethey are places that could provide venues for the

AFRICA: A TOP POLICY PRIORITY IN THE NEW BUSH STRATEGY PLAN

By James Fisher-ThompsonWashington File Staff Writer, Office of African Affairs,

Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State

According to President Bush’s new National Security Strategy, “Africa is important topeace and security worldwide and will receive all necessary help from the United Statesaimed at furthering its overall political and economic development,” says James Fisher-Thompson, a Washington File Staff Writer in the Office of African Affairs. Fisher-Thompson interviewed a series of current and former U.S. government officials andprominent American scholars specializing in African affairs on what the security strategyplan has to say about U.S. policy toward Africa.

_ R E G I O N A L F O C U S

shadow networks of terror.’” Second, “the explicitmention and designation of Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan,and Nigeria as key partners” is unique for such apolicy document. And third, “the assertion that wewould work very aggressively, with those four andothers, within sub-regional settings to manage crises”is new.

Bush’s strategy plan “elevates the possible levels ofachievment and lays out a much more ambitiousrange of diplomatic and political instrumentsAmerica is now prepared to use to help Africans” tocombat scourges like corruption, political instability,terrorism, and disease, he explained.

Chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee,Representative Ed Royce (Republican of California),commented on the plan’s importance saying, “I ampleased that the Bush Administration has articulatedthe critical importance of Africa to U.S. interests inits National Security Strategy. It is very importantthat we build strategic relationships with countriesand regional organizations in Africa for our mutualsecurity.”

On the economic level, the lawmaker added,“President Bush and I are united in our belief thatone way to significantly increase political andeconomic freedom on the continent is through U.S.trade and investment.”

With the war on terrorism the U.S. government’schief foreign policy priority, the Bush strategy paperemphasized that America can never be secure whileeconomic hardship and political unrest abound. In apreface to the plan, President Bush said, “Poverty doesnot make poor people into terrorists and murderers.Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption canmake weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”

According to the plan, in Africa “promise andopportunity sit side by side with disease, war, anddesperate poverty. This threatens both a core value ofthe United States — preserving human dignity —and our strategic priority — combating global terror.”Therefore, it says, the U.S. government “will workwith others for an African continent that lives inliberty, peace, and growing prosperity.”

The section of the Bush strategy plan entitled “WorkWith Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts” cites threekey “interlocking strategies” for U.S. policymakers:

• working with countries “with major impact on theirneighborhoods, such as South Africa, Nigeria,Kenya, and Ethiopia;

• coordinating with European allies and internationalinstitutions, which is “essential for constructiveconflict mediation and successful peaceoperations”; and

• aiding Africa’s “capable reforming states andsubregional organizations,” which “must bestrengthened as the primary means to addresstransnational threats on a sustained basis.”

For former Assistant Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs Herman Cohen, the focus on Africa in thenational strategy paper is “a pleasing development,but not a great surprise.” He said, “It’s good that he[Bush] stressed the development aspect becauseAfricans are making serious attempts to reform,although Africa is not a source of terrorism like otherregions of the world.”

Cohen, a former U.S. Ambassador to Senegal whonow runs his own international consulting firm, said,“Africa suffered terrorist attacks [on U.S. embassiesin Kenya and Tanzania in 1998], but these came fromoutside” the continent. “I can’t think of a singleinstance where there was an anti-American terroristattack coming from Africa itself. And there were noAfricans in these groups — al Qaeda or what haveyou — even though 50 percent of Africans areMuslims — and devout Muslims at that.”

Cohen said that “African nations are cooperating withU.S. authorities on the war on terrorism and aremaking the kinds of political and economic reformsthat attract investors. So it’s only natural that thisadministration sees Africa as worthy of the type ofdevelopment assistance that enhances trade andinvestment.”

Royce said, “By trading more with African countries,we increase the capacity of those governments andthe standard of living of Africans, cooperatively

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building a stronger state in which people can exercisetheir freedoms and terrorists cannot so easily thrive.It is noteworthy that trade with the continentincreased last year, while trade with other continentseither stagnated or declined.”

He added, “Aside from working with Congress onextending the benefits of the African Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA), the Bush Administration isalso in the process of developing free tradeagreements with Morocco and the countries of theSouthern Africa Customs Union.” President Bushsigned into law last August an amended version ofthe trade bill called AGOA II, which extendsfavorable trade benefits even further for more than 35eligible nations in sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to the points raised by Royce, the nationalsecurity strategy outlines U.S. government assistanceto the continent that includes:

• Ensuring that World Trade Organization (WTO)intellectual property rules are “flexible enough toallow developing nations to gain access to criticalmedicines for extraordinary dangers likeHIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria”;

• Stepping up development assistance in the form ofthe new multi-billion-dollar Millennium ChallengeAccount, 50 percent of which will go to eligibleAfrican nations that President Bush said “governjustly, invest in their people, and encourageeconomic freedom”; and

• Proposing an 18 percent increase in U.S. contributionsto the International Development Association(IDA), the World Bank’s fund for poor countries,and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

“It’s a complicated business to get involved inAfrican affairs, but the continent does needinstitutional development for cooperation and theUnited States can help” by working with foreignallies as well as regional organizations on thecontinent, said I. William Zartman, the director of the Conflict Management Program at The JohnsHopkins University School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS) and former director of its AfricanStudies department.

He said the security plan’s focus on coordinating with“European allies” is “absolutely on target, especiallyconcerning the French.”

“It is time we worked with France to get over theirpart and our part of the ‘Fashoda complex,’ wherethey see any American activity or presence in Africaas an attempt to kick them out and where we see theFrench as leftover colonialists. We have got todiscontinue this spitting war that has hurt us toomuch,” Zartman declared.

On the report’s call to strengthen “Africa’s capablereforming states and subregional organizations,” theSAIS scholar said, “I think the most important reformproposed for Africa over the last decade was theCSSDCA, or the Conference on Security, Stability,Development and Cooperation in Africa, otherwiseknown as ‘the Kampala Document.’ It was the mostimportant blueprint for change on the continent anddeserves our support.”

Zartman recently co-authored a book on the subjectwith fellow Africanist Francis Deng, called “StrategicVision for Africa.” While CSSDCA has becomesomewhat fragmented, he said, a part of its “spirit” —the idea that intervention by a group of states into theaffairs of another state can be justified because ofgross humanitarian violations — has been taken upby the new African Union (AU), the successor to theOrganization of African Unity (OAU).

This came about, the scholar explained, becauseCSSDA was modeled after the 1975 HelsinkiAccords, whose emphasis on human rights eventuallycontributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union. LikeHelsinki’s “baskets” of issues, CSSDA has a numberof “calabashes,” he explained, adding, “Interestingly,the development calabash seems to be pretty muchreplicated in NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment].”

NEPAD is a socio-economic framework for developmentformulated by leaders on the continent like SouthAfrica’s President Thabo M’beki and now endorsedby the African Union (AU). Unique among similarAfrican roadmaps for development, NEPAD includesa “peer review mechanism” that encourages politicalreform and transparency for eligible African nations.

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The White House security plan singled out the AUfor mention, saying, “The transition to the AfricanUnion with its stated commitment to goodgovernance and a common responsibility fordemocratic political systems offers opportunities tostrengthen democracy on the continent.”

This “is an appropriate move,” said former assistantsecretary Cohen, because, “the AU, as well asgrassroots efforts like NEPAD, are making a genuineattempt to understand why African development hasbeen lagging. They have discovered that thatincludes bad economic policies that have to bereformed and also that good governance anddemocracy have been lagging, which are needed toencourage investments.”

The brainchild of leaders like Nigerian PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo and South African PresidentThabo Mbeki, NEPAD is as much a guide fordevelopment on the continent as it is a plan of action.Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner recentlypraised the program saying, “At the core of NEPAD’stheology ... is a notion that good governance is notonly expected, but good governance is going to berequired.”

Kansteiner said, “That’s a different perspective thanwhat we’ve seen in the past, and we think it’s animportant one — we embrace it fully.”

Cohen called NEPAD “very encouraging because it isnot just the U.S. telling them what to do, but it is theAfricans themselves recognizing that they have aproblem and moving to correct it.”

With that in mind, the security plan’s focus on AGOAwas also a good move, Cohen said, because “if youlook at some of the trade statistics since AGOAstarted [two years ago], the countries that are doingbest in terms of economic growth are the ones

benefiting from AGOA. For example, South Africa isexporting BMW cars [to the U.S. market].”

This means that “a lot of South African workers andtheir families are doing better now because ofAGOA,” Cohen said. And, he added, “I personallybelieve that is what Africa needs — more revenuefrom trade so that wealth can be created forgovernments to provide more social services andinfrastructure like clean water and electricity.”

Heritage’s Schaefer agreed with Cohen on thebenefits of AGOA, noting, “All in all, the trade acthas been a very large success for the continent as faras exports are concerned.” The Africanist disagreed,however, on the importance of the newly formed AU.“I’m a little skeptical of the AU,” he said. “It seemsto be a repackaging of the old organization in newpaper.”

He added: “The promises sound great, but it [AU]has been reluctant to chastise one of the most horrificabusers of his own people on the continent —[Zimbabwe’s President] Robert Mugabe. This lapseseems to be a bright neon arrow pointing to theweakness of the organization, and that is [the factthat] African nations seem to be very reluctant tochastise each other.”

In order to keep Africa from being bypassed or“marginalized” in the new global economy — animportant requisite to political well being and security,policymakers say — the U.S. Government has put itsmoney where its mouth is. In 2001 alone, itcontributed more than $1,100 million to developmentprograms and humanitarian assistance in sub-SaharanAfrica. It is the single largest donor to HIV/AIDSprograms on the continent as well as the singlelargest contributor to assistance programs incountries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Somalia. _


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President George W. Bush’s first NationalSecurity Strategy (NSS) report, released by theWhite House on September 20, 2002, has

attracted great attention at home and abroad as acompelling statement of American grand strategy inthe post-September 11th world. The new document,entitled, “The National Security Strategy of theUnited States of America,” has been both praised as aclear, farsighted, and impressive response to thethreats America now faces, and criticized as a radicaland troubling departure from American foreignpolicy tradition. Although the new Bush NSS is abold and candid proclamation of Americanobjectives, much of the document articulates whathas been implicit in American strategy since theUnited States became a great power a century ago.Moreover, what is new is generally reasonable giventhe nature and magnitude of the threats that haveemerged in the post-September 11th internationalenvironment.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires thepresident to submit an annual report to Congresssetting forth America’s grand strategy. Although thelaw calls for a “comprehensive description anddiscussion” of U.S. interests, goals, and capabilities,these reports have more often consisted of loftyrhetoric or uncontroversial restatements of officialpolicy. Exceptions to this tradition exist. NSC-68,Paul Nitze’s classified report to President Harry

Truman in 1950, drew a comprehensive picture of amonolithic communist threat of global dominationthat could only be met through a massive Americanmilitary build-up and doctrine of containment.President Bill Clinton’s first NSS, although no NSC-68 to be sure, made the case for the administration’swidely cited doctrine of “engagement andenlargement.” On the whole, however, documentssuch as the NSS rarely mark a significant departurein U.S. strategy or spark public debate.

Four key themes of the Bush NSS have generatedcontroversy. First, the NSS calls for pre-emptivemilitary action against hostile states and terroristgroups seeking to develop weapons of massdestruction (WMD). Second, the NSS announcesthat the U.S. will not allow its global military strengthto be challenged by any foreign power. Third, theNSS expresses a commitment to multilateralinternational cooperation, but makes clear that theUnited States “will not hesitate to act alone, ifnecessary” to defend national interests and security.Fourth, the NSS proclaims the goal of spreadingdemocracy and human rights around the globe,especially in the Muslim world. The remainder ofthis article explores each of these themes in turn,paying particular attention to the logic, degree ofchange or continuity, and implications of eachnational security objective.

THE BUSH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGYBy Keir A. Lieber

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dameand

Robert J. LieberProfessor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown University

“The Bush National Security Strategy is an ambitious and importantwork and it is not surprising that the document has attractedconsiderable attention and wide debate,” say Professors Keir A. Lieber ofthe University of Notre Dame and Robert J. Lieber of GeorgetownUniversity. “The NSS is broadly consistent with American strategictradition while setting forth a coherent grand design for American policyin the face of new and dangerous threats.”

_ C O M M E N T A R Y

Keir A. Lieber Robert J. Lieber

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PREEMPTION

The Bush NSS advocates the preemptive use ofmilitary force against terrorists or state sponsors ofterrorism that attempt to gain or use WMD. Theseare the most serious threats facing the United Statesand, according to the document, “...as a matter ofcommon sense and self-defense, America will actagainst such emerging threats before they are fullyformed.” The preemptive use of force in the face ofimminent attack makes good strategic sense, and issupported by international law and the just wartradition. This aspect of the Bush doctrine iscontroversial, however, because it broadens themeaning of preemption to encompass military action“even if uncertainty remains as to the time and placeof the enemy’s attack.” Critics argue that this attemptto include preventive military action under thecategory of preemption has no legal or practicalbasis, and thus see the Bush doctrine as a worrisomebreak from tradition.

The United States has often walked a fine linebetween preemption and prevention. In fact, therehave been only a handful of clear-cut cases ofmilitary preemption by any states in the last twohundred years. (Israeli preemption in the Six DayWar in 1967 is perhaps the most cited example.) Thecurrent NSS declaration that “our best defense is agood offense” reflects a long-standing willingness touse military action before an actual attack isimminent. In addition to a number of cases of U.S.-supported regime change during the Cold War, aprominent example is President Kennedy’s navalquarantine of Cuba in 1962 to force the removal ofSoviet nuclear missiles. In another case, theAmerican campaign to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991was partly justified among U.S. policy-makers on thegrounds of a future WMD threat from Iraq. Asanother example, the 1994 Agreed Framework accordwith North Korea was negotiated under the implicitthreat of American military action to prevent NorthKorea from developing a nuclear arsenal.

Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive tomake explicit the conditions under which Americawill strike first, and there are compelling reasons forblurring the line between preemption and prevention.The attacks of September 11th demonstrate that

terrorist organizations like al Qaeda pose animmediate threat to the United States, are notdeterred by the fear of U.S. retaliation, and wouldprobably seize the opportunity to kill millions ofAmericans if WMD could effectively be used onAmerican soil. A proactive campaign againstterrorists thus is wise, and a proclaimed approachtoward state sponsors of terrorism might help deterthose states from pursuing WMD or cooperating withterrorists in the first place. Other critics have arguedthat the Bush NSS goes well beyond even the right toanticipatory self-defense that has been commonlyinterpreted to flow from Article 51 of the U.N.Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermineinternational law and lead other states to use U.S.policy as a pretext for aggression. The most commonexamples are that the broad interpretation oflegitimate preemption could lead China to attackTaiwan, or India to attack Pakistan. This logic is notcompelling, however, as these states are not currentlyconstrained from taking action by any norm againstpreemption, and thus will not be emboldened byrhetorical shifts in U.S. policy.

MILITARY PRIMACY

The Bush NSS confidently acknowledges America’sunparalleled position of power in the world andunapologetically holds that a fundamental goal ofU.S. grand strategy should be to maintain U.S.primacy by dissuading the rise of any challengers.“Today, the United States enjoys a position ofunparalleled military strength and great economicand political influence. In keeping with our heritageand principles, we do not use our strength to press forunilateral advantage. We seek instead to create abalance of power that favors human freedom....”And, in a passage that has stimulated muchdiscussion and debate, the NSS declares, “...[O]urforces will be strong enough to dissuade potentialadversaries from pursuing a military build-up inhopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of theUnited States.” Critics of the Bush NSS see in thisproclamation a worrying move toward U.S.overconfidence and imperial overstretch.

The desire to maintain American primacy by seekingto prevent the rise of a peer competitor has guidedU.S. foreign policy for the better part of the last

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century. The basic strategic logic explains in largepart why the United States eventually intervened inboth World Wars, and why American forces werebrought home after World War I, but wererecommitted to the defense of Europe not long afterthe end of World War II (i.e., the presence of a peercompetitor in the latter case, but not the former).Even the objective of seeking to preserve Americanmilitary hegemony is not new. In 1992, a leakedDepartment of Defense strategic planning documentoffered a blueprint for precluding the rise of any peercompetitor, using strikingly similar language to thecurrent Bush NSS. (The 1992 document languagewas subsequently disavowed by U.S. officials, but thebasic concept was not abandoned.)

There are compelling reasons to think that U.S.primacy is, in fact, good for global peace andstability, as well as far preferable to the alternatives.Perhaps the best evidence in support of this claim isthe fact that a U.S. military presence is welcomed in agreat number of areas around the globe. Regionalstate motivations may range from free-riding on theAmerican security umbrella, to the pacifying orstabilizing impact of an American presence, but thebasic effect is the same. Despite obvious andexpected political tensions inherent in stationing U.S.forces abroad, many states see U.S. military primacyas necessary for stability, and preferable to thealternatives, especially in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

At the end of the day, this element of the new BushNSS is less likely to reshape the contours ofAmerican foreign policy. For example, the UnitedStates is unlikely to take deliberate actions aimed atretarding the economic and military growth ofpotential great powers such as China. On the otherhand, American defense spending is likely to continueto rise with the war on terrorism, thus furtherwidening the military gap with potential competitors.This may actually dissuade potential adversaries fromseeking to challenge the U.S. militarily.

A NEW MULTILATERALISM

The NSS declares that, “We are guided by theconviction that no nation can build a safer, better

world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutionscan multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.The United States is committed to lastinginstitutions....” The document goes on to say, “Whilethe United States will constantly strive to enlist thesupport of the international community, we will nothesitate to act alone....”

Some have interpreted the new Bush doctrine as oneof unabashed unilateralism befitting a Texas LoneRanger, or as simply the rhetorical velvet glovecovering the mailed fist of brute American power.These views are wrong. The Bush NSS is clear aboutthe benefits and necessity of multilateral cooperation,especially with other great powers, and is thus moregenuinely multilateralist than even theadministration’s own recent behavior might suggest.What is different is that the Bush administrationappears to reject the single-minded pursuit ofmultilateralism for its own sake; that is, as somethinginherently necessary for international legitimacy ormorality. Instead, the Bush NSS holds that a basicwillingness to “go it alone” is consistent with, andmight even facilitate, productive multilateralcooperation. Here again, the break from the past canbe exaggerated. Even the Clinton administration,which was self-consciously committed tomultilateralism, frequently subordinated itsmultilateral principles in the pursuit of more directnational interests when the two clashed.

The explicit willingness to act alone makes goodstrategic sense. The Bush NSS stipulates that theglobal war on terrorism requires internationalcooperation among like-minded states. But it is alsoapparent that others will make their own calculationsabout the costs and benefits of working with (oragainst) the United States. Even those countries thatbristle at U.S. unilateralism will often end up workingwith the United States if the alternative is to stand onthe sidelines. A case in point is the recent unanimouspassage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441demanding full Iraqi compliance with itsdisarmament obligations. Several permanentmembers of the Security Council (Russia, China, andFrance) as well as an Arab state (Syria) initially hadvarying disagreements with American policy, butultimately opted to cooperate by voting in favor.

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THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY

The Bush NSS is not just about power and security inany narrow sense. It commits the United States tospread democracy worldwide and promote thedevelopment of “free and open societies on everycontinent.” To this end, the document calls for acomprehensive public information campaign — “astruggle of ideas” — to help foreigners, especially in the Muslim world, learn about and understandAmerica.

This commitment embodies deep-seated themeswithin American grand strategy and evokes long-standing American beliefs about foreign policy. Inparticular, the idea that the exercise of Americanpower goes hand in hand with the promotion ofdemocratic principles can be found in the policypronouncements of U.S. presidents from WoodrowWilson to John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and BillClinton. This combination of values reflects both abelief in democracy and freedom as universal ideals(“The United States,” the document declares, “mustdefend liberty and justice because these principles areright and true for all people everywhere.”), and ajudgment that promoting these principles abroad notonly benefits citizens of other countries, but alsoincreases American national security by makingforeign conflicts less likely.

The Bush NSS commits the United States to “activelywork to bring the hope of democracy, development,

free markets, and free trade to every corner of theworld.” This objective is driven by the convictionthat the fundamental cause of radical Islamicterrorism lies in the absence of democracy, theprevalence of authoritarianism, and the lack offreedom and opportunity in the Arab world. In thepast, this idea might have been dismissed as politicalrhetoric. After September 11, even the UnitedNations in its Arab Development Report hasidentified the problem and called for ways to extenddemocratic institutions and basic human freedoms tothe Muslim Middle East.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Bush National Security Strategy is anambitious and important work and it is not surprisingthat the document has attracted considerable attentionand wide debate. The NSS is broadly consistent withAmerican strategic tradition while setting forth acoherent grand design for American policy in theface of new and dangerous threats. In scope andambition it is a worthy successor to the mostimportant previous statements. It is likely to remainfor some time the definitive statement of Americangrand strategy in the post-September 11th world. _

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.


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The long-awaited National Security Strategyprovides a sophisticated portrayal of theemerging U.S. role in world affairs for the

early 21st century. Contrary to the expectations ofcritics, it is neither hegemonic and unilateralist, norultra-militarist and focused on pre-empting enemies.Instead, its assessment of U.S. interests and valuesresults in a “distinctly American internationalism”aimed at creating a balance of power that favorshuman freedom and makes the globalized world asafer and better place. Intent on judging how to applyU.S. strengths, this strategy pays weighty attention tohandling today’s dangerous security problems andcountering the threats posed by terrorists and tyrants.But it also aspires to promote global economicprogress, democracy, and human freedom in troubledregions. One of its key goals is to double theeconomies of poor countries within a decade. Thestrategy shows that the United States is a superpowerwilling to pursue new policies that cut against thegrain of established practices when necessary. But italso makes clear that the United States will be aresponsible leader of the democratic community anda full participant in alliances and multilateralinstitutions, including the United Nations.

The new U.S. strategy thus is amply endowed withlofty visions and balanced aspirations, as well as abipartisan blend of continuity and change. It also isattuned to the rising dangers and still-existingopportunities ahead. The central issue is not its

conceptual soundness, but whether it will receive theU.S. resources and support from key democraticpartners that are needed to carry it out. An equallyimportant issue is whether this strategy will begrappling with challenges that are amenable toprogress or instead are mostly intractable. Themanner in which these issues are resolved willdetermine whether this strategy achieves itsambitious goals fully, partly, or not at all. Only timewill tell, but the coming years promise to be eventfulbecause a newly assertive U.S. global involvementhas arrived on the scene.

IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION

What makes the National Security Strategy distinctlyAmerican is that it is truly global. Whereas mostcountries address mainly their own regions, the U.S.strategy covers virtually the entire world. This wide-ranging focus is partly the case because the UnitedStates has interests and values at stake nearlyeverywhere. Moreover, it has security commitmentsto many nations in multiple regions, widespreadeconomic involvements, and membership in a host ofglobal and regional organizations. The accusationthat it prefers to act unilaterally is wrong. A leadingarchitect of the 20th century’s most successfulalliances and international bodies, the United Statesremains the most multilateral country in the worldtoday.

A DISTINCTLY AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD

By Richard L. KuglerProfessor and Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy,

National Defense University

“The long-awaited National Security Strategy provides a sophisticated portrayal of theemerging U.S. role in world affairs for the early 21st century. Contrary to the expectationsof critics, it is neither hegemonic and unilateralist, nor ultra-militarist and focused on pre-empting enemies,” says Professor Richard L. Kugler of National Defense University.“Instead, its assessment of U.S. interests and values results in a ‘distinctly Americaninternationalism’ aimed at creating a balance of power that favors human freedom andmakes the globalized world a safer and better place.”

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Globalization plays a potent role in reinforcing thisworldwide outlook because it is compelling theUnited States to think and act with many regions inmind. As used here, “globalization” does not meanan ideology or a policy, but instead a factual trend:the process of growing international activity in trade,finances, investments, technology, weapons,communications, ideas, values, and other areas. As aresult, previously distant regions are being drawncloser together in growing ties, once-separatefunctional activities are influencing each other, thepace of change is accelerating, and interdependenceis increasing. Events in one place are no longerisolated because now they can have big ripple effectselsewhere. In essence, the world is becoming asingle stage upon which many actors — nations,multinational institutions, and transnational bodies —now play important roles and interact continuously.Many countries must now be internationalist in theiroutlook, and the United States more than all others.

As a deep-seated and irreversible trend, globalizationin the information era may be the central drivingreality of our times, one that creates a frameworkwithin which other powerful dynamics unfold. To adegree, globalization has been unleashed because thedemocracies emerged victorious in their prolongedstruggle with totalitarian ideologies during the 20thcentury. The collapse of the Cold War’s bipolar orderhas opened the door to an upsurge of internationalactivity, in a setting where representative government,free markets, flourishing trade relations, andmultilateral collaboration have become the model forprogress in many places. A few years ago,globalization was seen as uniformly positive becauseit stimulates economic growth and open societies, butrecent experience shows that it has downsides. It canhelp destabilize countries, alienate traditionalcultures, and make entire regions vulnerable tovolatile swings in the world economy. It can leaveless-fortunate countries resentful of their fates anddismayed at the barriers to progress facing them. Inaddition, it can provide disgruntled actors thetechnologies and other means to strike violently atlong distances, against not only their neighbors butthe United States and its allies as well.

Partly owing to globalization’s diverse effects, theworld has become bifurcated. The democraticcommunity, which totals about 30 percent of theworld’s population but has 70 percent of its wealth,finds itself stable, united, and prosperous. Butelsewhere, conditions are not nearly so good, andprogress is less rapid. This especially is the casealong the so-called “southern arc of instability” thatstretches from the Middle East to the Asia littoral.This huge zone is rendered chaotic by a host ofproblems: security vacuums, power imbalances,poverty, ineffective governments, highunemployment, and extremist Islamicfundamentalism. The result is a breeding ground fortoday’s principal dangers, including terrorists, tyrants,rogue governments, proliferation of weapons of massdestruction (WMD), ethnic tensions, failed states,resource shortages, geopolitical rivalries, drugtrafficking, and organized crime. As the NationalSecurity Strategy says, these problems and dangersmust be brought under control if the future is to bepeaceful and the opportunities of a globalized worldare to be realized.

THE STRATEGY’S KEY FEATURES

The National Security Strategy is composed offeatures that are also distinctly American.Throughout the Cold War, U.S. foreign policypursued a combination of stable security conditions,democratization, and economic progress. The newstrategy applies these hardy perennials of Americandoctrine to the fluid conditions existing today. Inorder to defend the American homeland against newthreats and bring peaceful progress to zones ofturmoil, the strategy’s eight key features call forefforts to:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.2. Strengthen alliances to prevent and defeat global

terrorism.3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.4. Prevent enemies from threatening peace with

weapons of mass destruction.5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth

through free markets and trade.6. Expand the circle of development by promoting

open societies and democracy.

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7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with maincenters of global power.

8. Transform America’s military and other nationalsecurity institutions.

In response to the events of September 11, 2001 andtheir aftermath, robust security measures figureprominently in this agenda. The National SecurityStrategy makes clear that the United States will actvigorously to defeat global terrorists and theirsponsors, and to prevent them from attacking the U.S.homeland and America’s friends. The strategy saysthat the United States will not hesitate to act alone inconducting military strikes against terrorists. But italso proclaims that the United States will buildcoalitions with friends and allies, and that it willwage a war of ideas against terrorism, supportmoderate governments in the Muslim world, and seekto improve the harsh economic conditions that giverise to terrorism.

The National Security Strategy puts forth a similarlyfirm stance for dealing with WMD proliferation byrogue countries. It calls for robust homeland securitymeasures, missile defenses, and upgraded militaryforces capable of proactive counter-proliferationmeasures. It makes clear that the United States willbe prepared — on a selective and limited basis — tolaunch pre-emptive attacks against WMD-equippedrogue countries and terrorists that pose an imminentdanger of attack. But the strategy also states that theUnited States will work multilaterally with partnersin using diplomacy, arms control, export controls,and threat reduction assistance to discourage WMDproliferation. Likewise, the strategy calls for strongdiplomatic efforts to help defuse regional tensions,such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Indo-Pakistan conflict, that stimulate terrorism, WMDproliferation, and other dangers.

Accusations that the United States will act like aunilateralist hegemon in handling security affairs arerebutted by the National Security Strategy’s call forclose multilateral cooperation with old allies and newcollaborators. It emphasizes NATO’s need to preparefor new missions and to develop improved Europeanmilitary forces that can operate alongsidetransformed U.S. forces. In Asia, it calls for existing

U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australiato acquire a regional focus, and for use of ASEANand APEC to help promote progress. Importantly, thestrategy also calls for collaboration with such majorpowers as Russia, China, and India in handlingsecurity problems. Indeed, it asserts that the end ofbipolarity has opened the door to peaceful relationsamong the major powers in ways that can helpstabilize global geopolitics for many years, providedthey resist the temptation to fall into rivalry.

Likewise, accusations that the United States isnarrowly preoccupied with security politics andmilitary affairs are rebutted by the National SecurityStrategy’s call for sustained efforts to promotedemocratization and economic development. Aboutone-half of the world’s countries are democracies,covering North America, Europe, and major parts ofAsia and Latin America. The new strategy hopes tospread democracy to new regions in order to advancehuman rights, provide better governance, andencourage free enterprise. It suggests thatauthoritarian governments can follow a gradual pathto democracy by pursuing political reforms and opensocieties a few steps at a time. The strategy’seconomic component envisions bilateral and regionalagreements aimed at spreading prosperity from thewealthy democracies to such poor regions as LatinAmerica, the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, andparts of East Asia. It does not envision an economicmiracle for these regions, but instead faster annualgrowth in order to double their wealth in ten years. Itsays that if the wealthy democracies have healthyeconomies, this will help encourage growth amongpoor countries by promoting exports and imports. Itjudges that free trade, investments, capital flows,finances, and enhanced productivity are the bestmechanisms for encouraging their growth. It alsocalls for greater U.S. economic aid through a newMillennium Challenge Account and grants ratherthan loans, coupled with help from the World Bankand International Monetary Fund (IMF), but mainlyto countries that are pursuing the effectivegovernments and economic reforms essential for aidto be decisive. Along with this aid are to comeefforts aimed at promoting public health, workers’rights, education, new energy sources, and control ofgreenhouse gas emissions.

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PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS

Although the National Security Strategy iscontroversial in some quarters and misunderstood inothers, its prospects for success are reasonably goodif it is carried out strongly and wisely. Commentatorshave noted that the new strategy shifts some policiesin conservative directions: scuttling of the Kyotoglobal warming accord is an example. But the largerreality is that it remains firmly anchored in thebipartisan tradition that has guided American foreignpolicy for many years. Also important, it alters thestatus quo in favor of innovative departures thatrespond to new dangers and rapid changes abroad.Fresh policies that initially come across asunilateralist are often candidates for a newmultilateralism: an example is U.S. withdrawal fromthe ABM treaty, which led to a new agreement withRussia on reducing offensive weapons even as thinmissile defenses are fielded. As a result, the newstrategy seems capable of commanding widespreadconsensus in the United States even though itsspecific features will be debated and doubtless willevolve as it matures.

A main strength of this strategy is its far-sightedvision and its effort to weave security endeavors andeconomic policies into a coherent whole. Basicallythe strategy hopes that by applying U.S. strengths, inconcert with help from close allies and great powers,it can quell emerging threats and establish afoundation of stable security affairs in turbulentregions, upon which economic prosperity anddemocracy can be built. Progress in these areas, inturn, hopefully will further ameliorate securitytensions in ways that encourage a new era ofinternational collaboration. Beyond question, thisambitious and demanding agenda will require theentire U.S. government to take national security quiteseriously in the coming years, and to apply the fullset of instruments at its disposal. Adequate resourcesin all areas will also be essential.

The National Security Strategy calls for a defensetransformation effort, backed by rising defensebudgets, that will prepare U.S. forces for new

strategic missions, including surprising contingenciesin unfamiliar geographic locations. Astransformation accelerates, U.S. forces will acquireinformation networks, new technologies, and newoperational concepts that prepare them for jointexpeditionary warfare. The effect will be to ensurethat U.S. forces remain the world’s best, capable ofswiftly defeating future adversaries. This endeavor,however, must be accompanied by efforts toreorganize other national security bureaucracies fornew purposes, and to strengthen intelligence andglobal law enforcement. Commitment of sufficientresources to support U.S. diplomacy, economicassistance, trade policies, and other activities alsowill be necessary. Equally important, successfulperformance in the information age will beknowledge-based. The ability of the U.S. governmentto marshal the necessary brainpower — so that it canunderstand the global setting and accurately gaugethe consequences of its actions — will be a criticalfactor in determining the success of the new strategy.

A continuing challenge facing the U.S. governmentwill be that of staying focused on its long-termagenda while handling daily crises. Because theUnited States cannot carry out this agenda alone,success at mobilizing help from allies, and atreforming old Cold War alliances to perform newmissions, will be critical. NATO’s successful PragueSummit of November, 2002 took a big step in theright direction by calling for a new Response Forceand other military capabilities for power projection.The need for help also applies to big powers thatstand outside the U.S.-led alliance system, includingRussia, China, and India. Building better coalitionpartnerships with other countries in chaotic regions isanother key endeavor. Although recent trends areencouraging, these tasks do not promise to be easilyaccomplished.

Even if allies and partners provide help, many of theworld’s problems will be hard to fully solve anytimesoon. Quelling specific threats may be feasible butdifficult. Creating peaceful security affairs inmultiple regions could be nebulous and complex.While European-Russian relations are hopeful, the

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triple agenda of preserving tranquil relations withChina in fluid Asia, dampening the Indo-Pakistanrivalry, and stabilizing the Middle East/Persian Gulfwill be a tall order. Likewise, promoting economicprosperity and democracy everywhere promises to befrustrating and time-consuming. The new U.S.strategy thus has its work cut out, it likely will haveto set priorities and acknowledge limits, and it mayexperience setbacks. But even if it is only partly

successful in ways that bring safety to the UnitedStates and its allies coupled with measured progressin turbulent regions, it will have served its purposesand made a worthy contribution. _

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.


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U.S. USE OF PREEMPTIVE MILITARY FORCE: THE HISTORICAL RECORD

By Richard F. GrimmettNational Defense Specialist in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and

Trade Division, U.S. Congressional Research Service

This report reviews the historical record regarding the uses of U.S. military force in a “preemptive”manner, an issue that has emerged from the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy of theUnited States. It examines and comments on military actions taken by the United States that could bereasonably interpreted as “preemptive” in nature, says Richard F. Grimmett, a specialist in the NationalDefense at the U.S. Congressional Research Service.

BACKGROUND

In recent months the question of the possible use of“preemptive” military force by the United States todefend its security has been raised by President Bushand members of his administration, includingpossible use of such force against Iraq.1 This analysisreviews the historical record regarding the uses ofU.S. military force in a “preemptive” manner. Itexamines and comments on military actions taken bythe United States that could be reasonably interpretedas “preemptive” in nature. For purposes of thisanalysis we consider a “preemptive” use of militaryforce to be the taking of military action by the UnitedStates against another nation so as to prevent ormitigate a presumed military attack or use of force bythat nation against the United States. The discussionbelow is based upon our review of all noteworthyuses of military force by the United States sinceestablishment of the Republic.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.

The historical record indicates that the United Stateshas never, to date, engaged in a “preemptive” militaryattack against another nation. Nor has the UnitedStates ever attacked another nation militarily prior toits first having been attacked or prior to U.S. citizensor interests first having been attacked, with thesingular exception of the Spanish-American War.The Spanish-American War is unique in that theprincipal goal of United States military action was tocompel Spain to grant Cuba its political

independence. An act of Congress passed just priorto the U.S. declaration of war against Spain explicitlydeclared Cuba to be independent of Spain, demandedthat Spain withdraw its military forces from theisland, and authorized the president to use U.S.military force to achieve these ends.2 Spain rejectedthese demands, and an exchange of declarations ofwar by both countries soon followed.3 Variousinstances of the use of force are discussed below thatcould, using a less stringent definition, be argued bysome as historic examples of preemption by theUnited States. The final case, the Cuban missilecrisis of 1962, represents a threat situation whichsome may argue had elements more parallel to thosepresented by Iraq today — but it was resolvedwithout a “preemptive” military attack by the UnitedStates.

The circumstances surrounding the origins of theMexican War are somewhat controversial in nature —but the term “preemptive” attack by the United Statesdoes not apply to this conflict. During, andimmediately following the First World War, theUnited States, as part of allied military operations,sent military forces into parts of Russia to protect itsinterests, and to render limited aid to anti-Bolshevikforces during the Russian civil war. In major militaryactions since the Second World War, the Presidenthas either obtained congressional authorization foruse of military force against other nations, in advanceof using it, or has directed military actions abroad onhis own initiative in support of multinationaloperations such as those of the United Nations or of

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mutual security arrangements like the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). Examples of theseactions include participation in the Korean War, the1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnian andKosovo operations in the 1990s. Yet in all of thesevaried instances of the use of military force by theUnited States, such military action was a “response,”after the fact, and was not “preemptive” in nature.

CENTRAL AMERICAN AND CARIBBEANINTERVENTIONS

This is not to say that the United States has not usedits military to intervene in other nations in support ofits foreign policy interests. However, U.S. militaryinterventions, particularly a number of unilateral usesof force in the Central America and Caribbean areasthroughout the 20th century, were not “preemptive”in nature. What led the United States to intervenemilitarily in nations in these areas was not the viewthat the individual nations were likely to attack theUnited States militarily. Rather, these U.S. militaryinterventions were grounded in the view that theywould support the Monroe Doctrine, which opposedinterference in the Western hemisphere by outsidenations. U.S. policy was driven by the belief that ifstable governments existed in Caribbean states andCentral America, then it was less likely that foreigncountries would attempt to protect their nationals ortheir economic interests through their use of militaryforce against one or more of these nations.

Consequently, the United States, in the early part ofthe 20th century, established through treaties with theDominican Republic, in 1907,4 and with Haiti, in1915,5 the right for the United States to collect anddisperse customs income received by these nations,as well as the right to protect the receiver general ofcustoms and his assistants in the performance of hisduties. This effectively created U.S. protectorates forthese countries until these arrangements wereterminated during the administration of PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt. Intermittent domesticinsurrections against the national governments inboth countries led the U.S. to utilize Americanmilitary forces to restore order in Haiti from 1915-1934 and in the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924. But the purpose of these interventions,buttressed by the treaties with the United States, was

to help maintain or restore political stability, and thuseliminate the potential for foreign militaryintervention in contravention of the principles of theMonroe Doctrine.

Similar concerns about foreign intervention in apolitically unstable Nicaragua led the United States in1912 to accept the request of its then-PresidentAdolfo Diaz to intervene militarily to restore politicalorder there. Through the Bryan-Chamorro treatywith Nicaragua in 1914, the United States obtainedthe right to protect the Panama Canal, and itsproprietary rights to any future canal throughNicaragua as well as islands leased from Nicaraguafor use as military installations. This treaty alsogranted to the United States the right to take anymeasure needed to carry out the treaty’s purposes.6

This treaty had the effect of making Nicaragua aquasi-protectorate of the United States. Sincepolitical turmoil in the country might threaten thePanama Canal or U.S. proprietary rights to buildanother canal, the United States employed thatrationale to justify the intervention and long-termpresence of American military forces in Nicaragua tomaintain political stability in the country. U.S.military forces were permanently withdrawn fromNicaragua in 1933. Apart from the above cases, U.S.military interventions in the Dominican Republic in1965, Grenada in 1983, and in Panama in 1989 werebased upon concerns that U.S. citizens or other U.S.interests were being harmed by the politicalinstability in these countries at the time U.S.intervention occurred. While U.S. militaryinterventions in Central America and Caribbeannations were controversial, after reviewing thecontext in which they occurred, it is fair to say thatnone of them involved the use of “preemptive”military force by the United States.7

COVERT ACTION

Although the use of “preemptive” force by the UnitedStates is generally associated with the overt use ofU.S. military forces, it is important to note that theUnited States has also utilized “covert action” by U.S.government personnel in efforts to influence politicaland military outcomes in other nations. The publicrecord indicates that the United States has used thisform of intervention to prevent some groups or

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political figures from gaining or maintaining politicalpower to the detriment of U.S. interests and those offriendly nations. For example, the use of “covertaction” was widely reported to have beensuccessfully employed to effect changes in thegovernments of Iran in 1953, and in Guatemala in1954. Its use failed in the case of Cuba in 1961. Thegeneral approach in the use of a “covert action” isreportedly to support local political andmilitary/paramilitary forces in gaining or maintainingpolitical control in a nation, so that U.S. or its allies’interests will not be threatened. None of theseactivities has reportedly involved significant numbersof U.S. military forces because, by their very nature,“covert actions” are efforts to advance an outcomewithout drawing direct attention to the United Statesin the process of doing so.8 Such previousclandestine operations by U.S. personnel couldarguably have constituted efforts at “preemptive”action to forestall unwanted political or militarydevelopments in other nations. But given theirpresumptive limited scale compared to those of majorconventional military operations, it seems moreappropriate to view U.S. “covert actions” as adjunctsto more extensive U.S. military actions. As such,prior U.S. “covert actions” do not appear to be truecase examples of the use of “preemptive” militaryforce by the United States.

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962

The one significant, well documented, case of note,where “preemptive” military action was seriouslycontemplated by the United States, but ultimately notused, was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.When the United States learned from spy-planephotographs that the Soviet Union was secretlyintroducing nuclear-capable, intermediate-rangeballistic missiles into Cuba, missiles that couldthreaten a large portion of the Eastern United States,President John F. Kennedy had to determine if theprudent course of action was to use U.S. military airstrikes in an effort to destroy the missile sites beforethey became operational, and before the Soviets orthe Cubans became aware that the U.S. knew theywere being installed. While the military

“preemption” option was considered, after extensivedebate among his advisors on the implications ofsuch an action, President Kennedy undertook ameasured but firm approach to the crisis that utilizeda U.S. military “quarantine” of the island of Cuba toprevent further shipments from the Soviet Union ofmilitary supplies and material for the missile sites,while a diplomatic solution was aggressively pursued.This approach was successful, and the crisis waspeacefully resolved.9 _

1. See speeches of President George W. Bush at West Point on June 1,2002 at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html]; and the President’s United Nations. speech of September 12,2002 at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-I.html]; Washington Post, June 2, 2002, p. A1; Washington Post,September 13, 2002, p.Al.

2. Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898 [Res. 241 30 Stat. 738.]

3. There was no direct military attack by Spain against the United Statesprior to the exchange of declarations of war by the nations, and initiationof hostilities by the United States in 1898. See Declarations of War andAuthorizations for the Use of Military Force: Background and LegalImplications. CRS Report RL31133, by David M. Ackerman and RichardF. Grimmett. A notable event, the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havanaharbor, provided an additional argument for war against Spain for thoseadvocating it in the United States. The actual cause of the sinking of theU.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, even today, has not been definitivelyestablished. More recent scholarship argues that it was most likely notdue to an external attack on the ship, such as the use of a mine by anoutside party, but due to an internal explosion.

4. 7 UST 196.

5. 8 UST 660.

6. 10 UST 379.

7. For an excellent background discussion of U.S. policy toward theCaribbean and Central American nations during the first half of the 20thcentury see: Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the UnitedStates. New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1965, pp. 519-538.For a detailed historical study that provides valuable insights andcommentary on U.S. actions taken toward Caribbean and CentralAmerican countries see chapters 9, 11, and 12 in Samuel Flagg Bemis,The Latin American Policy of the United States. New York. Harcourt,Brace & World, 1943. [reprinted in paperback in New York, by W. W.Norton & Company, Inc., 1967].

8. Section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, definescovert action as “An activity or activities of the United States Governmentto influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it isintended that the role of the United States Government will not beapparent or acknowledged publicly.”

9. For detailed background regarding the issues surrounding the possibleuse of “preemptive” military force against the Soviet missile sites beingestablished in Cuba, and the deliberative process engaged in byPresident Kennedy and his key advisors, see the published transcripts oftape recordings made during their White House meetings in TheKennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis.Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.). Cambridge, Massachusetts.Harvard University Press, 1997.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.


44

“Our nation’s cause has always been larger thanour nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight,for a just peace — a peace that favors liberty. Wewill defend the peace against the threats fromterrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace bybuilding good relations among the great powers.And we will extend the peace by encouraging freeand open societies on every continent.”

— President Bush West Point, New York, June 1, 2002

The United States possesses unprecedented — andunequaled — strength and influence in the world.Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and thevalue of a free society, this position comes withunparalleled responsibilities, obligations, andopportunity. The great strength of this nation must beused to promote a balance of power that favorsfreedom.

For most of the 20th century, the world was dividedby a great struggle over ideas: destructive totalitarianvisions versus freedom and equality.

That great struggle is over. The militant visions ofclass, nation, and race which promised utopia anddelivered misery have been defeated and discredited.America is now threatened less by conquering statesthan we are by failing ones. We are menaced less byfleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies inthe hands of the embittered few. We must defeat thesethreats to our nation, allies, and friends.

This is also a time of opportunity for America. Wewill work to translate this moment of influence intodecades of peace, prosperity, and liberty.

The U. S. national security strategy will be based on adistinctly American internationalism that reflects theunion of our values and our national interests. The aimof this strategy is to help make the world not just saferbut better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear:political and economic freedom, peaceful relationswith other states, and respect for human dignity.

And this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.To achieve these goals, the United States will:

• champion aspirations for human dignity;

• strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism andwork to prevent attacks against us and our friends;

• work with others to defuse regional conflicts;

• prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies,and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;

• ignite a new era of global economic growththrough free markets and free trade;

• expand the circle of development by openingsocieties and building the infrastructure ofdemocracy;

• develop agendas for cooperative action with othermain centers of global power; and

• transform America’s national security institutionsto meet the challenges and opportunities of thetwenty-first century. _

Source: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,September 2002, The White House.

_ F A C T S H E E T

OVERVIEW OF AMERICA’S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY


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U.S. GOVERNMENT SITES:

U.S. Commission on National Securityhttp://www.nssg.gov/

U.S. Department of State: International InformationPrograms: International Securityhttp://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/

U.S. National Security Councilhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

U.S. National Security Council. THE NATIONALSECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA. Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, September 2002. 35p. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html

U.S. President: Policies in Focus: National Securityhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/response/index.html

ARTICLES:

Gaddis, John Lewis. A GRAND STRATEGY OFTRANSFORMATION (Foreign Policy, no. 133,November/December 2002, pp. 50-57)http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_novdec_2002/gaddis.html

Hirsh, Michael. BUSH AND THE WORLD (ForeignAffairs, vol. 81, no. 5, September/October 2002, pp. 18-44)http://www.foreignaffairs.org/articles/hirsh0902.html

Kissinger, Henry. PREEMPTION AND THE ENDOF WESTPHALIA (New Perspectives Quarterly,vol. 19, no. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 31-36)http://www.npq.org/archive/2002_fall/kissinger.html

Kucia, Christine. COUNTERPROLIFERATION ATCORE OF NEW SECURITY STRATEGY (ArmsControl Today, vol. 32, no. 8, October 2002, p. 30)http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/secstrategyoct02.asp

O’Hanlon, Michael; Rice, Susan; Steinberg, James B.THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGYAND PREEMPTION. Washington: BrookingsInstitution, November 14, 2002. 11p. http://www.brook.edu/views/papers/ohanlon/20021114.htm

Rice, Condoleezza. ANTICIPATORY DEFENSE INTHE WAR ON TERROR (New PerspectivesQuarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 5-8)http://www.npq.org/archive/2002_fall/rice.html

Spencer, Jack. THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGY: AN EFFECTIVE BLUEPRINT FORTHE WAR ON TERROR. Washington: The HeritageFoundation, September 25, 2002.http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/WM149.cfm _

U.S. National Security Strategy: A New EraBIBLIOGRAPHY & KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

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VOLUME 7 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 4

DECEMBER 2002


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