US Field Artillery Journal 1986

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Volume 54 July-August 1986 Number 4

ARTICLES

8 Dogsled to SUSV—A New Prime Mover for the Arctic Artillery by Captain Michael G. Edrington and Captain Charles F. Gillis

12 Army Acquisition—From Concept to Disposal by Major Thomas H. Barfield

19 Liquid Propellants—A Potential Power Punch by Mr. Bob Lessels

23 Shooting from the HIP—A Change in Concepts by Mr. Robert M. Forrest

28 Much Ado Abou t Something by Captain Suzann W. Voigt

31 Electromagnetic Propulsion: The Wave of the Future by Captain F.M. Aubin, Royal Canadian Artillery

36 The Positioning and Navigation Puzzle by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Roy E. Penepacker

43 Touchtone Dialing and the Redleg Connection by Mr. Richard F. (Dick) Brown

49 Movin' On: Advancing Logisti cs Support by Captain Scott R. Gourley, USAR

FEATURES Front cover photo by CPT Michael G. Edrington

1 On The Move 39 Right by Piece

2 Incoming 48 Redleg News

18 Command Update 51 Fragments

33 View from the Blockhouse

The Field Artillery Journal (ISSN 0191-975x) is published bimonthly at the US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK. Funds for printing are approved by Department of the Army.However, unless otherwise stated, material does not represent official policy orendorsement by any agency of the US Army.PURPOSE (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in 1911): "To publish a journal fordisseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery'sprogress, development, and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, acommon understanding of the power and limitations of each; to foster a feeling ofinterdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promoteunderstanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objectsare worthy and contribute to the good of our country."SUBSCRIPTIONS: May be obtained through the US Field Artillery Association, P.O. Box

33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON 639-5121/6806 orcommercial (405) 355-4677. Dues are $16.00 per year ($31.00 for 2 years and $46.00 for 3years) to US and APO addresses. All other addresses should add $9.00 per subscriptionyear for postage.SUBMISSIONS: All letters and articles should be addressed to Editor, Field ArtilleryJournal, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON639-5121/6806 or commercial (405) 351-5121/6806. Material submitted for publication issubject to edit by the Journal staff; footnotes and bibliographies may be deleted due tolimitation of space.REPRINTS: The Field Artillery Journal is pleased to grant permission to reprint articles.Please credit the author and the Field Artillery Journal. POSTMASTERS: Second-class official mail postage is paid by the Department of the Army,DOD 314, at Lawton, OK 73501. Send address changes to the Field Artillery Journal, P.O.Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

Heads Up on What's New!

You won't have to walk the corridors of Snow Halllong before you hear a well-intentioned Redleglament, "I wish these School guys would stop talkingabout the systems we'll have in 1990. Why can't theydeal with today's problems? Making things happennow is my job; not developing some fantastichowitzer for the future." Such observations betray thedeep-seated frustrations and concerns of thoseleaders charged with executing an ambitious doctrine

in an age of evolving equipment and organizations.But are such emotional lamentations reasonable? Aren't they really rationalizations, evenabandonment's of responsibility?

This issue of your Journal clearly establishes that weall share responsibility for the future of the King ofBattle. Fort Sill's combat developers don't have amonopoly on foresight, shrewdness, andinnovativeness. What's more, the wholedevelopmental system mandates the involvement of"field soldiers" from the earliest stages of conceptarticulation to the ultimate retirement of a weaponsystem. True, our individual responsibilities vary. Butwe all have a reserved piece of the modernization pie.

To play our appropriate roles in this importantenterprise, we Redlegs need to understand thedevelopmental system. This magazine should helpus not only gain an appreciation for the Army's

complex acquisition program, but also learnsomething about many of the intriguing technologiesthat signify great things for the entire Fire SupportCommunity. And, of course, this Journal underscoresthe abiding truth of General Matthew Ridgway'sobservation, "There is still one absolute weapon . . . .That weapon is man himself."

EDITOR

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr.

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOLCommandant:

MG Eugene S. Korpal

Assistant Commandment:BG Jerry C. Harrison

JOURNAL STAFF

Editor:MAJ Roger A. Rains

Managing Editor :Tammy D. Hawthorne

Art Di rect or:Donna Jeanne Covert

Circulation Manager:Joanne Brown

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On the Move

Know Your Foe

MG EUGENE S. KORPAL

However absorbed a commander may be in the

elaboration of his own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into account.

Winston Churchill

Churchill's words have never beentruer than today. Before we can decidewhat, when, where, and how to attack, weRedlegs must know our foe. Ourindividual and collective training mustinclude educating ourselves and oursoldiers on the Threat's capabilities and

likely intentions. We must know the size,quantity, organization, equipment, andtactical capabilities of the Threat forceswe are likely to encounter. Moreimportantly, we must know theirweaknesses and vulnerabilities in order tostrike them hard and leave their carcasses,not ours, lying in the sun.

At present and in the foreseeable future,the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies

pose the single greatest threat to NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)forces in Europe. Trends in Warsaw Pactdoctrine suggest that in time of war theSoviets will rely on large-scale, combined

arms operations employing numericallysuperior armored, motorized, air, airassault, and special forces. Furthermore,they will exploit massed indirect fires toachieve unprecedented destruction and

prompt psychological paralysis whileusing speed and surprise to conduct closeand deep battle operations simultaneously.

To counter this burgeoning Threat,Western planners are focusing on two areas.

● First, they're relying on advancedtechnology and innovative doctrine to gainan advantage.

● Second, they're counting onknowledgeable, well-trained, and well-leadsoldiers to withstand the initial Sovietonslaught and go on to win.

Armed with new, highly lethal weaponsystems and advanced doctrine, these

NATO warriors must strike Threat forceswhere their operational, technical, andhuman weaknesses make them mostvulnerable. In order to do so, our Redlegsmust be aware of some significant trendsin Warsaw Pact military developments. Wemust understand that many of the reportedweaknesses in the Warsaw Pact aredisappearing, yet others remain. Forexample, the recently published Soviet

Military Power, 1986 notes that:

● The Soviets are increasing the speedand effectiveness of their command,control, and communications systems byintroducing numerous computer systems

and automated aids.● In 1985, the Soviets began activating

high commands within their theater ofmilitary operations (TVD) and appointingvery senior officers as their permanentcommanders-in-chief. These stepsincreased the readiness of Soviet forces bymoving the peacetime command structuremuch closer to a wartime footing.

● The Soviets are expanding andreorganizing their tank and motorized rifledivisions to conduct high-speed, combinedarms operations on both conventional ornuclear battlefields.

● The Soviets have also formed twocorps-level structures suited to act asoperational maneuver groups (OMG).These highly armored, self-sufficient unitsshould be capable of conducting high-speedoperations deep into an enemy's operationaland strategic rear areas.

● Some Army-level artillery regimentsare becoming brigade-sized organizations

with the addition of a fourth battalion.What's more, their battalions are expandingfrom 18 to 24 guns each. These changesalone have resulted in a 40 percent increasein artillery pieces in the Soviet brigadesfacing NATO. Furthermore, large numbersof self-propelled artillery are reachingground forces at all other levels ofcommand.

Of course, it is not enough merely toknow the facts. Each Redleg must also lookfor an approach to pit our strengths againsttheir weaknesses. Soviet shortcomings mayresult from gaps in their dispositions or the

predictability of their commanders oroperations. Remember, the Threat is not "10feet tall." Our challenge is to know theenemy and, when necessary, defeat him. Todo this we must:

● Educate ourselves regarding theThreat's exploitable weaknesses andvulnerabilities.

● Understand how the Threat will likely

operate and what countermeasures we canemploy against him.

● Know how the Soviets make battlefield decisions and what can causedisruptions in their decision-making cycle.

● Train to demanding standards as ourunits rotate through the National TrainingCenter (NTC) and participate in otherrealistic training activities.

In a 1939 radio broadcast Churchillcommented, "I cannot forecast to you theaction of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in amystery inside an enigma...." We must

penetrate the Soviet's military enigma andunwrap their riddles if we are to prosper on afuture European battlefield. Then we must

put all our knowledge to work in our dailytraining and contingency planning. Onlythen can we ensure the synchronization oftotal combined arms operations and directour growing firepower at the Threat'svulnerabilities. Only then will we be able to

win the AirLand Battle.

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IncomingLETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Fresh Ideas and Big Concerns

The map "squares" concept creates a situation map that covers areas of operation.The overlay numbering system makes it easier to identify adjoining map squares.

Modular Maps—

A Concept that WorksWord has gotten back to the Field

Artillery School that oneEuropean-based field artillery unit isusing a very interesting map "squares"concept. Other organizations may find ituseful in constructing mapboards thataccommodate fast-paced, modernoperations.

The concept consists of a series of17½-x18½-inch tactical maps attached to⅛-inch masonite hardboard squares. The

back of the masonite squares have Velcrostrips applied. Operations personnel can

then use the Velcro-surfaced wall of thetactical operations center or hardboard asa portable mounting surface. The mapsquares are then quickly affixed in seriesto the mounting surface creating asituation map that covers the area ofoperations.

As movements occur, operationscenter personnel simply remove, adjust,or affix new map squares to keep themap up-to-date. Ease in identifyingadjoining map squares can result from anumbering system similar to that shownin the accompanying figure.

Robert Adair

COL, FAFort Sill, OK

Observations on Fire

Planning with TACFIRE

As a second lieutenant fresh out ofthe Field Artillery Officer's BasicCourse, I was assigned as an instructorin the tactical fire direction system(TACFIRE) Training Division of theTactics and Combined ArmsDepartment (TCAD). One of thesubjects I taught was non-nuclear fire

planning (NNFP in TACFIRE jargon).After about 9 months of teaching andfielding thousands of "off-the-wall"questions I could honestly say that Iknew TACFIRE fire planning insideand out. I also thought that was allanybody needed to know about fire

planning. Then my bubble burst!

I can still remember the day; I waslecturing on the development of target

lists and explaining how to giveinstructions to place targets in phaseswhen I saw a hand go up. The hand

belonged to Major Joseph Sheridan, who just happened to be an instructor withthe Advanced Tactics Division ofTCAD. He asked me what types oftargets are scheduled in what phases andwhy there was a Phase 4 on the formatwe were discussing, while doctrinallythe most a schedule could have was

three phases. Needless to say, I could notgive him a satifactory answer.

was more like "correctly filling outformats in sequence to produce thenecessary reports." I was teachingTACFIRE fire planning when I shouldhave been teaching fire planning withTACFIRE .

Fortunately, Major Sheridan workedwith me the remainder of the courseand led me to a great realization:Whether we use a scheduling work

sheet or a TACFIRE computer, currentdoctrine dictates the manner in whichfires are scheduled—not just because itis doctrine, but because maneuver

battalion, brigade, and divisioncommanders expect and deserve tohave us support them with scheduledfires in accordance with the combinedarms tactics found in FM 6-20, FireSupport in Combined Arms

Operations.

But the full significance of this eventdid not hit me until sometime later.Even though we instructors often hearquestions we cannot answer, thisquestion was fundamental. It was like agunnery instructor not knowing the

basic elements of a call for fire. What Ihad been teaching could hardly becalled "fire planning." It

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The dichotomy between TACFIRE anddoctrinal fire planning was made evenmore apparent to me when I became thefire direction officer of a battalion inEurope. One of the first things I noticedwas that the fire planning annex in theunits' TACFIRE standing operating

procedures (SOP) was based almostexclusively on the "standard" SOPs

distributed by the Field Artillery Schooland the Communications and ElectronicsCommand (CECOM) new equipmenttraining teams. It contained separate

procedures for fire plans done by battalion operations and intelligence and by fire support officers. Other battalionSOPs were all much the same in thisrespect. If units are in fact following theseSOPs for their operations and training,then I submit that both tactically andtechnically they are not fire planningcorrectly.

As a possible explanation, I will briefly review the programs of instructionfor NNFP in TACFIRE school and forfield artillery fire planning that I receivedin the advanced course. Ninety percent of

NNFP instruction revolves around theTACFIRE fire planning sequenceoutlined in TM 11-7440-240-10-7.Students concentrate mainly on thesequence, the TACFIRE formats used,and the various entries for those formats.Little emphasis focuses on developingdifferent schedules—preparations,

programs, and so on—phasing of targets,or the rules of fire planning.

Maneuver commander's attack

guidance is another area of disconnect.Most TACFIRE graduates would have adifficult time incorporating guidance suchas "I want 10 percent effects on offensivetargets and 5 percent on defensive" into afire plan because they are trained on

specifics on what TACFIRE will accept;not on general guidance they will morethan likely receive.

The advanced course approachesfire planning differently. The emphasisis on interpreting the operations orderand fire support annex to developappropriate schedules to support thescheme of maneuver. Responsibilities

of fire support teams, fire supportofficers, and battalion tacticaloperations centers, are clearly definedright at the outset. There are noseparate fire planning sequences forfire support officers and battalionoperations and intelligence sections.Commander's guidance and the rulesof fire planning are learned,understood, and incorporated intoevery schedule. Although the advancedcourse graduate may not knoweverything about fire planning, he hasa much better idea of what is requiredthan the TACFIRE long-coursegraduate.

What frequently happens, however, isthat the TACFIRE graduate is assigned toa battalion fire direction center. After all,he knows more than anyone else in the

battalion about TACFIRE fire planning.Of course, he ends up doing the fire planhimself, and in consequence, the fire planreflects the TACFIRE fire planningsequence, not FM 6-20. Often, the entire

plan is accomplished from the battalionfire direction center—because that iswhere the TACFIRE expertise is.

Now you might say, "If we have a problem here, wouldn't an externalevaluation point it out?" Not when keyelements of the battalion fire supportsystem are not evaluated when their

battalion is; and certainly not if the battalion tactical operations center isevaluated on fire planning from inside theTACFIRE shelter.

Furthermore, there is no singledocument today that adequately meshesTACFIRE procedures with FM 6-20doctrine for fire planning. Unit, school,and new equipment training team SOPstend to follow TACFIRE proceduresexclusively. FM 6-20, although revised toinclude TACFIRE, is too general in thearea of TACFIRE fire planning.

What I propose is an annex to battalionSOPs which integrates FM 6-20 into TM11-7440-240-10-7. At the very least, thiswill give the TACFIRE battalions a singledocument with which to plan fireaccording to published doctrine andaccepted TACFIRE procedures. The

bottom line is that we need to learn to use

TACFIRE to produce schedules not fire plans.Peter J. Zielinski

CPT, FAAPO, New York

Take Another Look

No Guarantees on

"It's Guaranteed!"

Although I fully agree with, espouse,and teach the situational leadership theory,I find the article "It's Guaranteed!"(November-December 1985 Field

Artillery Journal) by Captain Brian M.Ludera to be an inadequate attempt toexplain the theory and its practical

application. Several hours in the officeradvanced course are dedicated to teachingsituational leadership and developing anunderstanding of its application in theoverall scheme of subordinatedevelopment.

The title "It's Guaranteed!" must betaken in jest. Nothing in leadership or thedevelopment of subordinates isguaranteed. I agree with the author thatsituational leadership tells leaders not

only what to do but also what they oughtto do to be effective. Moreover, thetheory does this better than otherleadership models developed over theyears. However, there are still noguarantees.

Situational leadership requires riskon the part of the leader. Varying one'sstyle of leadership to correspond to thematurity level of subordinates andcontinuing to vary it as subordinates

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develop is risky. As subordinates'maturity levels increase and the leadermoves toward a delegative style ofleadership, the perception often developsthat the leader is no longer in control.Supervisors who use a high degree ofcontrol quite often view this approach toleadership as inappropriate in theirorganization.

Situational leadership encompasses theskills of counseling, motivating,

providing direction, and implementing.These skills are part of the be-know-doattributes presented in the new leadershipmanual, FM 22-100.

The rewards of developingsubordinates are great. More maturesubordinates equate to more time for theleader—more time to represent the unit,acquire resources, coordinate, create, and

accomplish long-term strategic planninginstead of micro-managing, fire-fighting,

and punishing. More mature subordinatesalso equate to subordinates who developtheir own subordinates in the same way.The bottom line is more effective,confident, and cohesive units which areable to fight and win.

Michael E. Aston

MAJ, SCFort Sill, OK

performance. Many Field Artillery Journal readers will recall the oldersystems but will be unfamiliar with thenewer ones. The change in names isdeliberate to differentiate between

the older and newer systems and toacknowledge HYDRA 70's antiarmorcapability.

Jack E. KingBEI Defense Systems Co.

Out with the OldThe article "A System That Could

Make a Difference" (September-October1985 Field Artillery Journal) by CaptainCharles B. Brenner pictures two

prototype versions of my company's products. The photo captions and thearticle's text refer to the older versionknown as Slammer VI. This older versionadapted the Army's earlier MK-40

2.75-inch rocket for surface launches.The newer version known as the rapid

deployment integrated rocket system VI,or RADIRS VI, adapts the Army's newMK-66, 70-mm rocket for surface launch.The nonfiring photo in the original articleis of RADIRS VI.

Though the two systems resemble eachother they are very different in

performance. RADIRS/HYDRA 70 is theresult of a product improvement programthat greatly improves system

The RADIRS VI multi ple rocket launcher.

More on

"More Than Meets the Eye"

Although Major Mark D. Studer'sarticle "More Than Meets the Eye"(November-December 1985 Field

Artillery Journal) provides valuableinsight into the inner workings andorganization of detachment-type units, Ifeel the current image this type ofassignment has within the Field ArtilleryCommunity merits further discussion.

Historically, the mission of artillerydetachments originated as a result of

various multinational agreements madeduring the Kennedy-McNamara era under provisions of the foreign military sales program (FMSP). Today, these units provide critical technical support to ourAllies who have purchased Americandesigned and manufactured weaponsystems. An analysis of personnel figures

indicates that more artillerymen performthis mission at any given time than thesum of the personnel assigned to any twodivision artillery-sized organizations.

The Army's nine battalion-sizedcustodial units are continuouslymisrepresented by titles such as fieldartillery groups and detachments. Largerin many instances than a typical battalionor battery, some of these artilleryorganizations mystically fall undercombat service support headquarters likethe 59th Ordnance Brigade. Efforts toredesignate such units as batteries or

battalions have been stymied by the factthat this action would invalidate theoriginal international Service-to-ServiceTechnical Agreements (SSTA) that stillcover these organizations.

Perceiving field artillery officers andsoldiers assigned to such units assomething less than "True Redlegs"

not only constitutes a grave injustice, butalso belittles the critical duties they

perform. Unlike most "real" artillery unitswhich merely train in peacetime for theirwartime role, custodial units executeformidable peacetime missions as well as

prepare for war. Actions on the part ofterrorist groups and political activistsexacerbate the difficulties of this

peacetime mission. Located hours awayfrom the nearest American community,these artillerymen work hard on behalf oftheir nation.

Obviously, soldiers assigned to thesespecial units must meet extremely highreliability and proficiency standards.Providing capable leadership to theseremarkable soldiers and meeting the difficultstandards of both peacetime and wartimemissions are tremendous challenges. Buttoday's field artillery officers and theirsubordinate leaders are doing



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just that. They have an opportunity tolead with much more discretion andautonomy than is ever possible in anordinary battalion. Needless to say,they're making the most of it.

The newly established nuclear warheaddetachment course (NWDC) will better

prepare company-grade officers for suchassignments. Although the concept of a

resident course of instruction has helped

undercut the notion that Redlegs indetachments are "second-classartillerymen," this unfounded image still

persists. Elimination of thisunsupportable perception requireseducation. Artillerymen must learn thatdetachment soldiers often enjoy greaterdevelopment opportunity and personalsatisfaction than many of their

line-battalion counterparts.

In the past, Redlegs have asked "Whyshould artillerymen perform thismission?" I contend that the answershould be "Only artillerymen are capableof doing this important job!"

Steve Artman

CPT, FA

Fort Sill, OK

Getting Back to the Four Rs

The problem described by Dr. JosephHalloran in his article "The Four Rs"(September-October 1985 Field Artillery

Journal) is one of the most pressingissues affecting the current fire supportsystem. Our ability to select the rightweapon and munition and attack the righttarget at the right time could well be adeciding factor between victory or defeat

in the AirLand Battle.

For this reason, the Field Artillery isexploring a number of possibilities whichcould assist in resolving the problemsassociated with the allocation anddistribution of fires. One of these

possibilities is a planned, but as yetunapproved, exercise called the combinedarms effectiveness evaluation. This exercisemay offer an effective means of distributingthe fires available at the maneuver brigadelevel. As currently envisioned, the

evaluation will consider those types of fires

normally provided by the total firesupport system including long-range,antitank, and aviation resources.

Field artillerymen everywhere can holdout some hope that this effectivenessevaluation will give us a clearer insightinto how to select the four Rs.

Bill Rittenhouse

DCD, USAFAS

Fort Sill, OK

Set Your Priorities!

Providing fire support in the corpsrear area is a problem that defies easyresolutions. Lieutenant Colonel PaulTreolo's article "Fire Support for theRear Battle" (January-February 1986Field Artillery Journal) outlines severaloptions and deals with a number ofquestions and issues requiring detailedstudy by a variety of service agencies.

Unfortunately, there are errors in thearticle that we need to consider. Thearticle addresses the Field Artillery asthe primary provider of rear area firesupport. It simply overlooks the otherfire support assets that are moreresponsive and capable of providingcorps rear area fire support

coverage. Rather than be "resigned tocall for attack helicopters" as ColonelTreolo suggests, we should considerhelicopters as one of the first optionsfor fire support in the rear area.

Providing fires for the rear area is acomplex issue upon which each corpsand the Field Artillery School havetaken a position. The School's view isthat artillery ranks last on the prioritylist of rear area fire support means. In

fact, it follows the organic mortars ofthe maneuver unit assigned the reararea mission, attack helicopters, andclose-air support. Artillery resourcesare simply too scarce to loiter in therear area waiting for a threat strike.

When the situation dictates, fieldartillery units should receive on-order

missions to support the rear area units.The responsiveness of such artilleryorganizations is obviously a limitingfactor. It will take a considerable amountof time for the units to implement theiron-order missions, move to the rear,orient themselves, and provide fires. Butto reallocate fire support units to reararea duty is tantamount to robbing thefront to support the rear. The front line

maneuver commander who loses thatsupport will be faced with a significantloss of a combat multiplier. Furthermore,if an artillery unit relocates out of itsnormal logistical support channel,someone must provide additionallogistical assets to support that unit.

The command, control,communications, logistical support, andtraining of the rear area fire supportassets require attention. FM 90-14, Rear

Battle, attempts to address these topics,and participants at the 1985 FireSupport Conference at Fort Sill

proposed several remedies to the

inadequate doctrine contained in themanual. Those suggested curesincluded:

● Procedures for the clearance offires and the decentralization of thelevels I and II battles.

● Composition of the corps' reararea operations center and the addition

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of fire support coordinators at all levels ofrear area command.

● More rear area play in command postand field training exercises and and betterrear area operations center training forReserve Component personnel.

● The need for prepackaged logisticsfor rear area resupply.

●

The requirement for the corps rear

area operations center to communicate

digitally with the corps fire supportelement.

Field Artillery School agencies willdeal with these issues and many more asthe Combined Arms Center revises FM90-14. It's axiomatic to Redlegs that firesupport must be provided when requested.Soldiers everywhere look to the fieldartillery to be the primary supplier of that

support. This mind-set must be broken!

Field artillery is only one facet of the firesupport arena. When commanders needfire support for rear operations, they mustconsider all fire support means. Artilleryis not necessarily the primary asset!

William F. Clewe III

CPT, FA

Fort Sill, OK

Computer Views

in hasty traverse to the new orientingstation have been entered (figure 1).

● Execute and then recall by first

pressing the previous segment and thenthe next segment on the keyboard. Thelocation of your aiming circle willappear in the coordinate field of the last

gun (figure 2).

Another interesting technique is the process of firing two or more firing platoons laid by two or more aimingcircles as one battery. This techniqueworks superbly as long as all firingunits are laid on the same azimuth of

fire and can be selected to

fire the same charge. This process wassuccessfully field-tested by Battery C,4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery atGrafenwoehr, Germany.

Because of the difficult terrain atGrafenwoehr, the battery was forced tooccupy two, three-gun positionsseparated by nearly 2,000 meters. Thefirst platoon was set up in thecomputer under the normal setup

procedure. The second platoon'saiming circle was entered in thecomputer as gun 7. Each gun of this

platoon was then la id f rom gun 7 usingthe appropriate polar data (figure 3).The guns were linked to the

Believe It or Not!

If you are the type of person who believes in doing everything by the book, then this information isn't foryou. If you believe that the batterycomputer system (BCS) has some

unknown capabilities which need to beexploited, then read on. You might besurprised!

The battery computer system wasnot designed by the wizards of theField Artillery Community to replacethe fire direction officer or firedirection center. Its primary purpose isto expedite firing operations by servingas a tool for professional Redlegs. Toexploit the full capabilities of thissystem, users require technical skill aswell as common sense. It takes skill tomake the computer function correctlyand common sense to put it to practical

use.

One such practical purpose not foundin the book is the process of using the

battery computer system to computehasty survey data. Valuable time is oftenconsumed by using the hand-held TI-59or doing the tedious process of manualtraverse. By using the BCS pieces format,the coordinates for your new orientingstation (OS) can be computed in a matterof seconds. This process requires thefollowing inputs:

● Enter your original orientingstation longitude coordinates into the

format as gun 1.● Enter gun 2 as being laid from gun 1.● Skip over and enter the first angle

(if 6400 use 0000), distance, andvertical angle in the polar data fields forgun 2.

● Repeat this process by entering thenext angle as gun 3 laid from gun 2 and soon until all the angles turned

Figure 1. Enter data, then execute to compute hasty survey location.

Note: If computing data while the BCS;PIECES format is empty, you can begin by entering gun 1 in the orienting station of the AFU:UPDATE formatand start with gun 2 on the BCS;PIECES format. Also do not use guns 1, 2, and3 if the battery computer system is loaded with current piece locations; jump toguns 7, 8, and 9 for doing the hasty survey computations.

Figure 2. Results of executed figure 1. Gun 4 is new orienting station location.



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Note: Don't forget to delete gun 7, (or whatever gun number was used as the startpoint for hasty survey computations) after computing piece locations, so you will havethe proper battery center recorded in the coordinate field of the AFU:DATE.

Figure 3. Gun 7 is the second aiming circle. Battery is fired as one fire unit.

fire direction center by several hundredmeters of wire. As we began firing, theaccuracy was excellent as all roundsimpacted around the target area.

Subsequently we experienced a wirefailure and were forced to revert

to our backup procedures. The guns in thefiring platoon with the battery operationcenter (M561 BOC) were directed to placetheir terrain gun position corrections ontheir sights. The battery operation centerestablished digital communications with

the fire direction center with a digitalmessage device, and firing continued.For each mission the fire directioncenter would transmit a SYS;PTM withcharge, deflection, quadrant, and timefor the center gun to the batteryoperation center, who would thenannounce the fire commands to theguns over a voice land line. This

procedure for spli t battery operationsresulted in superb battery sheafs withminimum time delay in mission

processing.While it looks like high technology

has infiltrated the Artillery Corps andis here to stay, here are four basic ruleswhich can help you when dealing withthe computer era:

● Use the computer as a tool; don'tlet yourself become its slave.

● Always put the mission first.● Work at being innovative and

practical.

● Use common sense.It is important to remember that many

of the best books are written based uponexperience. Believe it or not!

Brett E. MorrisCPT, FAAPO NY

Computer FreebiesThe Field Artillery Community is

rapidly becoming fully automated in the

area of fire control. The tactical firedirection system (TACFIRE), the batterycomputer system, and the back-upcomputer system have increased ouraccuracy and efficiency across the

battlefield. Individual soldiers are quickly becoming computer literate as a result ofcourses taught at the Field ArtillerySchool as well as by taking the personalinitiative to purchase homemicrocomputers.

It behooves leaders to collect asmuch inexpensive or free software asthey find useful without resorting to

pirating copyrighted programs. Butwhere does a leader go for publicdomain software? There are severaloptions available.

● Free software can be obtainedfrom your local computer club.

● It can also be obtained by tappinginto certain services over the telephonelines. Of course, you need a modem

(a device which connects your computerto the telephone to exchange informationdigitally).

● Public libraries are beginning tostock public domain software. Nye

Library on Fort Sill, for example, has over550 free programs for the asking, and theyhave a computer that you can use by thehour.

● The best military programs can befound at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, withthe Command and Control Military User'sGroup (C2MUG).

The C2MUG is a central repository forfree software with a military slant.

Members of C2MUG can:

● Learn about the latest

developments in software.● Contribute software ideas for

Army use.

● Seek solutions to individualcomputer problems.

● Provide blank disks which will beloaded with public domain software andreturned by mail.

● Get copies of the C2MUG Bulletin.

● Receive the semiannual softwarecatalog of "freebies."

● Attend an annual microcomputer

seminar at Fort Leavenworth.There are over 200 systems in the

C2MUG library. Membership is availableto all Department of Defense personnel,

both military and civilian. The cost isabsolutely nothing. We also encourageyou to share any software that youdevelop for microcomputers.

You can find the C2MUG at theManeuver Control Directorate(Building 138) at Fort Leavenworth. To

join the C2MUG, write to CECOMMCD, ATTN: AMSEL-FL-MCD(C2MUG), Fort Leavenworth, KS

66027-5600; or call AUTOVON552-7550/7552.

Joseph TeeplesCPT, FA

Fort Sill, OK

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Dogsled to SUSV—A New PrimeMover for the Arctic Artillery by Captain Michael G. Edrington and

Captain Charles F. Gillis

At 0400 hours, 14 October 1984, thesoldiers of the 1st Battalion, 37th(Arctic) Field Artillery responded to arecall. A mock war had begun, but this wasno mere game for Alaska's only Redleg

battalion. This was their Superbowl —anexternal evaluation of the unit's ability to

perform in a wartime environment with thenewly fielded prime mover, the M973 smallunit support vehicle (SUSV). Thesubsequent evaluation proved what theArctic gunners had anticipated: The trackedSUSV has virtually redefined theemployment of artillery in an arcticenvironment.

Since that event, the SUSV has laidtrack in exercises across Alaska. Its

performance has been nothing short ofextraordinary. But it can be better. That'swhy the 1st-37th FA leadership has madeseveral modifications to the SUSV. Thisarticle not only recounts the history of theSUSV, but also describes the 37th FieldArtillery's adaptation and employment of

this remarkable vehicle.

The Background

The earliest representatives of the USArmy in Alaska relied on many forms oftransportation in defense of the "GreatLand." Of these, the best known and mostwidely used was the dogsled.

Since those early days, the prime modeof Army transport in Alaska has changedmany times, but the driving factorregarding each of those changes hasremained the climate. Unless a vehicle ismechanically reliable and has the ability tonegotiate widely varying terrain under

some of the harshest winter weatherconditions in the world, it simply won't doin Alaska.

With the deletion of the M29"Weasel" half-ton tracked cargo carrierin 1958, the Army began a



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The new support vehicle has excellent on- and off-road mobility year-round, iseasily maintainable, and is highly reliable under extreme cold weatherconditions.

transport for fire support teams (FIST)and survey parties; ammunition, supply,and communications support sections.They also serve as field ambulances,command and control vehicles, and,most importantly, as prime movers forthe battalion's M101A1 105-mmhowitzers.

SUSV TECHNICAL DATA

CURB WEIGHT: 9,790 lbs

MAX WEIGHT: 13,980 lbs

MAX PAYLOAD: 4,190 lbs

MAX TOWED WEIGHT: 5,513

FULL LOAD GROUNDPRESSURE: 1.8 PSI

MAX BRAKE HORSEPOWER:125 at 4,350 RPM

LENGTH: 270.8˝

HEIGHT: 94.56˝

WIDTH: 72.89˝

GROUND CLEARANCE: 11.82˝

TRACK WIDTH: 23.43˝

search for a new over-snow vehicle forsupport of extreme cold weatheroperations. To fulfill the Army'srequirements for arctic operations, itwas essential that the new supportvehicle have excellent on- and off-roadmobility, be easily maintainable, highlyreliable in extremely cold weather,carry at least 1 ton of supplies, and behelicopter transportable.

Testing of various vehicles, includinga joint American-Canadiandevelopment known as the SMJ71,continued for several years. Then in1977 the Army became interested in a

Swedish vehicle, the Bandvagen 202(BV 202), manufactured by Volvo. TheBV 202, already used by several NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)countries, possessed excellentover-snow capabilities. AnotherSwedish vehicle, the Bandvagen 206(BV 206), appeared to be a reasonablealternative to the BV 202.

A US Army team observed bothvehicles during testing by the SwedishArmy. They concluded that bothvehicles exhibited the potential to fulfillthe Army's requirement for an Arcticclimate vehicle. Subsequently, the

Army procured two vehicles of eachmodel. In the testing that followed, theBV 206 proved superior, and in 1983the Army negotiated a contract fornearly 300 BV 206s with the Hagglundsmanufacturing firm. The official Armydesignation for the Bandvagen 206

became the M973 1½-ton tracked cargocarrier, what we now call the small unitsupport vehicle.

The SUSV consists of two plasticreinforced, fiber-glass compartmentseach mounted on a chassis with twinsolid rubber tracks. An articulated

steering joint joins the cabs. The frontcompartment contains the crew area aswell as the engine which is readilyaccessible from the interior of thevehicle. The rear cab is heated and

serves as a cargo or troop carrier. Aturbo-charged, five-cylinder Mercedesdiesel engine provides the power for theSUSV.

The vehicle is capable of operating atspeeds in excess of 30 miles per hourwith a range of 120 to 200 milesdepending on terrain. When travelingover deep snow, the SUSV tracks rarelysink more than a foot below the snowsurface. And the vehicle will travel up to

150 miles cross-country at 10 to 15miles per hour combat-loaded whiletowing a howitzer. The SUSV has thecapability of climbing grades of up to 70

percent and has a bilge pump forswimming operations. The vehicle iscapable of transporting 17fully-equipped troops or a driver withover 2 tons of supplies. It is also airtransportable in the C-130 aircraft andcan be sling-loaded under a CH-47Chelicopter.

Arctic Artillery Service

The 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artilleryreceived its complement of M973SUSVs during the summer of 1984. Thenew vehicles became the primary

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With a towing weight of 5,510pounds, the SUSV is capable ofpulling the 5,000-pound M101A1howitzer over any snow drift andmost terrain.

Howitzer Section

Prime Mover As the howitzer section prime

mover, the SUSV has increased thefiring batteries' mobility over snow.The SUSV tracks across snow intowhich a 1½-ton truck would merelysink. With a towing weight of 5,510

pounds, the SUSV is capable of pulling the 5,000 M101A1 howitzerover any snowdrift and most terrain.The only obstacle to the SUSV isterrain with a heavy timber down-fall.In such cases, the only transportabilityoption becomes air assault.

During emergency missions theSUSV allows the howitzer section to

pull off the trai l and be ready to firein a few minutes. The vehicle's lowerground stance provides the howitzersection faster access to the towing

pint le. The wide rear car door givesthe crew greater accessibility toammunition and equipment which isessential where timeliness is at a

premium.

Battery Fire Direction

Center Vehicle

The fielding of the battery computer

system (BCS) brought some unique problems to the 1st-37th FA. The BCSand the battery fire direction personnelhad to be able to accompany thehowitzers. The battalion's leadershipconcluded that they needed a SUSV asthe fire direction center's prime mover.Unfortunately, they had no installationkit available to fit the BCS into theSUSV. To solve this problem, the

battalion sent a team to FortMonmouth, New Jersey, to develop andfabricate an appropriate installation kit.The end result was that the BCS has

been installed along with

communications equipment in the rearcar of the SUSV. This allows theoperator to sit in the door and computedata.

With the BCS installed in the rearcar of the SUSV, there was no room forother section operations. But that didn'tstop the gunners of the 1st-37th FA.When the SUSV was first fielded,they developed an extension suitable

for use as infantry and artillery battalion tactical operations centers(TOC) and battery fire directioncenters. The final product employed thelighter weight 10-man Artic canvas to

allow ease in set-up and tear-downoperations during extreme ice and cold.Local seamstresses moved the vestibuledoor to accommodate the SUSV doorand tailored each tent corner toaccommodate a Yukon stove.Furthermore, 1st-37th innovatorsdeveloped a special entry mechanismso the SUSV could back into and awayfrom the extension leaving itfreestanding and light-secure. Theframework of the extension was astandard M577 extension frameobtained through normal supplychannels.

The battery computer system SUSVhas improved the battalion's split batterycapability dramatically. The vehicle'smobility and the computer's capability letit go virtually anywhere and compute datafor widely disposed gun sections. The

battery operations center also uses aSUSV.

Fire Support Team SUSVThe SUSV serves as a

communications platform for firesupport team operations.

The unit's battery computer systemis housed along withcommunications equipment in therear car of the SUSV. The outsideview of t he vehicle is shown above.



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Preparing to fire is Battery B, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery. The SUSV hasushered in a new era in the employment of Arcti c artillery.

P h o t o b y C

P T M i c h a e l G .

E d r i n g t o n

The SUSV gets warm, rested soldierson the move and to the fight quickly.The vehicle can transport the entirecompany fire support team overalmost any terrain.

The vehicle can transport the entirecompany fire support team over almostany terrain. Because the SUSV bodiesare made of fiberglass, they affordsoldiers little protection against attack

by even the lightest weapons; but thecars do provide a warm vehicle capableof getting rested soldiers to the fightquickly. The brigade and battalion firesupport coordinator SUSV serves as anintegral part of the infantry tacticaloperations centers. A SUSV extension

connects to the battalion S3's SUSVextension thus allowing a third infantrySUSV to be used as a jump tacticaloperations center.

Conclusion

The advent of the M973 SUSV uponthe Alaskan scene has ushered in a newera in Arctic mobility. Its widespreademployment, coupled with the recentactivation of the new 6th InfantryDivision (Light), has set the stage for

new and exciting tactics in the frigidlands of the North. The Arctic artilleryhas made a commitment to lead the wayin the adaption of the SUSV for use bythe King of Battle. And to date, the

battalion is making good itscommitment. On The Minute!

Captain Michael G. Edrington, FA, isthe Adjutant of the 1st Battalion, 37thField Artillery, Fort Richardson, Alaska. He was commissionedthrough ROTC at the University ofCalifornia at Davis. He has served inthe 1st-37th FA as an infantrybattalion fire support officer, batteryfire direction officer, and companyfire support officer. He has alsoserved as deputy public affairsofficer and as a basic trainingexecutive officer at Fort Jackson,South Carolina. Captain Edrington isa graduate of the Field ArtilleryOfficer Basic Course; AirborneSchool; and the Public Affairs OfficerCourse at the Defense InformationSchool, Fort Benjamin Harrison,Indiana.

Captain Charles F. Gillis, FA, is the S4of the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Art il lery. He was commissionedthrough ROTC at the University ofMaine and is a graduate of the Field Art il lery Officer Basic and AdvancedCourses as well as the Lance Missile

Officer Course. His past assignmentsinclude Lance missile maintenanceand assembly platoon leader,executive officer at a warheaddetachment with a British missileregiment in Germany, and as aninfantry battalion fire support officer.Captain Gillis is currently serving hissecond tour in Alaska.

July-August 1986 11


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ARMY ACQUISITION— FROM CONCEPT TO DISPOSAL by Major Thomas H. Barfield

Have you ever wondered how theArmy comes up with new organizations,

tactics, and equipment? Have you ever

marvelled at the ability of a piece of

equipment to withstand abuse and keep on

working?

The Army acquisition sys tem dependslargely on deficiencies identifiedduring soldier training.

The mechanism that bringsconcepts to fruition in the Army is theconcepts based requirements system(CBRS). Combat, materiel, andtraining developers use it to designthe structure of our forces, the shapeof our hardware, the logic of ourdoctrine, and the foundation of ourtraining.

The bedrock of the CBRS is athorough assessment of the threat toUS national interests as far as 20 yearsinto the future. This analysis does notfocus on war in Europe alone; rather itexamines the entire spectrum of warfrom terrorism on one extreme toglobal thermonuclear war on the other.

In fact, the continuing review of theThreat produces a series of semiannualdocuments which chart a course thatresponds to the greatest threat tonational political and economicsecurity.

One of these studies is the annual joint strategic planning document

(JSPD), which not only projectstechnological advances in Soviet andother foreign military hardware andchanges in Warsaw Pact strategy, butalso assesses the ability of our Allies toengage in mutual defense. The JSPDand several other documents are thespringboards for change.

But of the various avenues of changeavailable, the Army leaders regardmateriel acquisition as the leastdesirable recourse when countering anew threat. They prefer to modifydoctrine, change the way we train, oralter the way we structure units. Forexample, the use of special forcesgroups in a low intensity conflictepitomizes a doctrinal change to meet athreat to US interests in CentralAmerica, South America, and Africa.The upgrade of field artillery groups to

brigades is a force structure changedictated by the "agility" component ofour AirLand Battle doctrine.

Life Cycle Systems Model

But when doctrinal, force design, and

training changes fail to deal with theevolving threat, the Army turns to theMateriel Development and AcquisitionCommunity and ultimately to theassociated life cycle systemmanagement model which takes a rawidea and eventually turns it intohardware. The life cycle managementmodel also provides a system formonitoring the Army's developingmateriel.

Under this complex system, thegenesis of any change in materiel is arequirement: a statement describing a

need . In materiel acquisition, the initialrequirement expresses the need intactic not equipment terms. Arequirement merely identifies a specificdeficiency in our existing capability.The acquisition process will determinethe best equipment solution to meetthat need.



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Definitions of Terms ASARC – Army system acquisitionreview council. Provides advice andassistance to the Secretary of the Army.

BOIP – basis-of-issue plan.

CFP – concept formulation package.This document summarizes the resultsof the concept exploration phase.

DCP – decision coordinating paper. Adecision paper for the Secretary ofDefense that gives the reason forcontinuing, reorienting, or stopping adevelopment program at each criticaldecision point during the acquisitionprocess.

DSARC – defense system acquisitionreview council.

DT – developmental testing. Testing ofmateriel systems conducted by themateriel developer.

FUED – first unit equipped date.

IOC – initial operational capability. Thedate a unit and its supporting elementsare able to operate and support a newitem of equipment.

IPS – integrated program summary.Summarizes the various facets of theimplementation plan for a majorsystem acquisition.

JMSNS – justification of major systemnew start.

LOA – letter of agreement.

MAA – mission area analysis.

MFP – materiel fielding plan.

O&O plan –operational andorganizational plan. The O&O plan isthe program

initiation document in the materielacquisition process. It is prepared tosupport the acquisition of all newmateriel systems. The initial O&O planshould describe any deficiencies whichwere indentified in the mission area

analysis and any constraintsapplicable to systems development.

OT –operational testing. Testing andevaluation of materiel systemsaccomplished with typical useroperators, crews, or units in as realisticand operational environment aspossible.

PM –project manager—programmanager—product manager. Anindividual, chartered by the Secretaryof the Army, who is assigned theresponsibility and delegated thefull-line authority of the materiel

developer for the centralizedmanagement of a specific acquisitionof a materiel readiness project.

PMD – program managementdocument. A document which containsrecords of program decisions andrequirements. It provides analyses oftechnical options and the life cycleplans for developing, producing,training, and supporting materiel items.

POM –program objectivememorandum. An annual documentsubmitted to the Office of the Secretaryof Defense containing the Army's

proposals for resource allocation. Itdescribes the forces, manpower,materiel acquisition equipmentdistribution, and logistics supportneeded by the Army to meet thestrategy and objectives.

RFP – request for proposal.

ROC – required operational capability. A Department of the Army documentwhich states concisely the minimumessential

operational, technical, logistical, andcost information necessary to initiatefull-scale development or acquisition ofa materiel system.

SCP – system concept paper. Thedecision management documentationprepared for the Milestone I decision.

SDDM –Secretary of Defensedecision memorandum.

STF –special task force. Composed ofthe task force director,representatives of the user, materieldeveloper, trainer, Department of the Army, combat developer, operationaltester, logistician, and the programmanager-designee. This task force isconvened during the conceptexploration phase to conduct anin-depth investigation of the need for

the system described.TBOIP – tentative basis-of-issue plan.

TDLOA – training device letter ofagreement. A jointly prepareddocument in which the combat andmateriel developers outline the basicagreements for further investigationsof a potential materiel system or itstraining devices.

TDR – training device requirements.

TEMP – test and evaluation masterplan.

TOE – table of organization and

equipment.

TQQPRI – tentative qualitative andquantitative personnel requirementsinformation. A tentative plandeveloped by the materiel developerin coordination with the combatdeveloper and trainer which identifiespersonnel, military occupationalspecialty, and annual maintenancemanpower required to support thenew or improved materiel system.

Concept ExplorationDuring concept exploration a special

task force examines the requirement,develops a long-range acquisition strategy,and initiates systems engineering

programs to devise several viable butcompeting solutions to the requirement.The leadership of the Army MaterielCommand establishes centralizedmanagement immediately after initiation.

However, Army practice is to wait until a

specific type of system emerges as the best solution from the competingalternatives before selecting the projectmanager.

The goal of concept exploration is toselect two or more concepts to bedeveloped into prototypes for acompetitive "shoot-off." Conceptexploration culminates in Milestone1—the point where the Army system

acquisiton review council (ASARC)

decides to terminate or proceed with the program. For projects reviewed by theSecretary of Defense, a defense systemacquisition review council (DSARC)follows the Army council.

There are two possible outcomes of aMilestone 1 decision: cease work orcontinue work. Most often, if the decisionis to cease work it is because the concept

being explored has dropped in



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CONCEPT EXPLORATION PHASE MILESTONE 1

priority compared to other programs and,therefore, has lost funding.

Three documents result from the

concept exploration phase.● A system concept paper which is a

summary of all the program managementdocuments.

● A test and evaluation master planwhich identifies the required testing,

personnel, materiel, facilities, troopsupport, logistic support, and fundsnecessary to complete the test programs.

● A draft request for proposals—acritical document in the competitiveselection of the contractors who willcompete against each other in the next

phase of the life cycle.

Demonstrationand Validation

In the demonstration and validation phase, the Army Materiel Commandawards contracts for systemdevelopment, testing, drawings,specifications, and other engineeringdata. Most of these research anddevelopment contracts call for costreimbursement as opposed tofixed-price remuneration. This

arrangement is necessary because of thehigh technical risks associated withresearch and development.

The newly appointed projectmanager faces many challenges duringthis phase of the life cycle. Forexample, he must determine how muchmoney should be spent on logistics,how many competitors receivecontracts, and how much testing isadequate. He makes the decisions

based upon data, experience, and ahost of decision-making modelsavailable. He seeks to reduce risk butto produce the best possible system asquickly and economically as possible.

DEMONSTRATION AND VALIDATION MILESTONE 2

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Full-Scale Development

The goal of full-scale development is a production-ready prototype. During this phase:

● Soldiers receive training on thesystem and assess the method andadequacy of their training.

● Army and contractor teamsdevelop product specifications.● A second operational test occurs to

determine any additional weaknesses inmateriel, organizational structure, ortraining.

● Personnel requirements areupdated and a fielding plan is produced.

Full-scale development ends with athird and final milestone decision review.Based on this review, the Army's leaders

decide whether or not to produce andfield the system. Ideally, the result is therelease of a request for proposals tovarious contractors for the actual

production of the system. In practice,however, the same contractor used forfull-scale development usually capturesthe contract for production.

Production and

Deployment

Production and deployment beginswith an approval at Milestone 3,continues throughout the operational lifeof the weapon system, and ends when thelast item goes to the scrap yard.Production occurs when the system's

design is relatively stable, money isavailable, and there is a valid need for thesystem.

As the pieces of equipment leave theassembly line, they go to selected Armyunits on a priority basis. Normally, thefirst items reach schools where operatorsand mechanics receive their training. Thesecond production batch will go to a fieldunit having the highest priority asdetermined by the Army's Deputy Chiefof Staff for Operations and Plans.

To assist the user receive and deploy thenew systems, the materiel developer will

prepare and coordinate a materiel fielding plan. During the fielding process the projectmanager supervises the distribution ofsupport items—parts, manuals, trainingdevices, test equipment, and so on—and

FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT MILESTONE 3

PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT

July-August 1986 17


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the development of new equipmenttraining teams. His aim is to achieve theinitial operational capability onschedule. Typically, the time betweenthe unit's initial receipt of equipmentand its initial operational capabilitydate is the time needed to train a unit toArmy training and evaluation programstandards.

Operational Life

The operational life of a systemoccurs from the initial operationalcapability date until disposal of thesystem. The duration of a system'soperational life depends on whether thesystem continues to meet a valid threatand is still affordable.

We have systems that are over 40 yearsold and yet continue to fulfill a need. Butmost systems have had a much shorter life.They have required periodic modificationsin order to enhance their capabilities or toreduce operational and maintenanceexpenses. For example, Army leadersdecided to modify the M48 and M60 tanksuntil Soviet technological advances

made it apparent that we needed acompletely new tank. This increasedthreat prompted the Army to develop theM1 tank.

Disposal of a weapon or piece ofequipment occurs after Army leaders decidewe have no further use of that particularsystem. In such instances, the Army offersthe system to our sister services. If they

have no use for the equipment, it becomes acandidate for foreign military sales. Shouldthe State Department, Congress, or thePresident decide it is not in the best interestof the United States to sell the weapon, theitem is demilitarized.

Conclusion

This has been a cursory andsimplified overview of the life cyclemodel by which the Army acquiresmateriel. Professionals must realize thatoften the left and right boundaries ofeach of the phases described above

become blurred and that difficultiessometimes arise. Normally the greatest

problems occur when the Army's leadersmust make production decisions

very early in the life of a system. Suchdecisions naturally constrain subsequentevents and developments. ButCongressional pressure and a rapidlychanging Threat can often force suchrisk laden decisions. But when all is saidand done, the life cycle systemmanagement model is a good one. It hashelped the Army deliver thousands of

first-rate weapon systems into the handsof the world's best troops.

Major Thomas H. Barfield, FA, iscurrently the Executive Officer ofthe 2d Battalion, 37th Field Arti llery,Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He received hiscommission through ROTC atVanderbilt University. He has heldassignments as the adjutant of the212th Field Artillery Brigade and

weapons test officer in the Field Arti llery Board. He taught ROTC atthe University of Alabama and is agraduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College.

Command UpdateNEW REDLEG COMMANDERS

BG Jerry C. HarrisonAssistant Commandant,

USAFAS

BG Gerald P. StadlerIII Corps Artillery

COL Jerry M. SollingerUS Army Field ArtilleryTraining Center

COL Charles S. Nobles2d Armored Division Artillery

COL John J. Okeefe3d Infantry Division Artillery

COL Thomas E. Swain25th Infantry Division Artillery

COL Clifton A. Potter210th Field Artillery Brigade

COL Robert H. Stryjewski212th Field Artillery Brigade

LTC Thomas R. Hogan1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery

LTC John E. Fletcher1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery

LTC Everett E. Hawthorne, Jr.1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery

LTC Gary L. Moon2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery

LTC Christopher Shoemaker2d Battalion, 29th Field Artillery

LTC Kenneth W. Teasdale6th Battalion, 33d Field Artillery

LTC Dennis C. Cline1st Battalion, 36th Field Artillery

LTC Michael G. Maclaren1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery

LTC Robert G. Anckaitis1st Battalion, 75th Field Artillery

LTC Ronald E. Townsend1st Battalion, 76th Field Artillery

LTC James A. McDaniel3d Battalion, 79th Field Artillery

LTC Terrance D. Barcellos2d Battalion, 83d Field Artillery

LTC Jeffry Johnson294th Artillery Group

LTC Meredith Mazza2d Cannon Training Battalion

LTC John C. Merriam4th Training Battalion

LTC James C. Pack7th Training Battalion

LTC Richard D. WorrellStaff and Faculty Battalion, USAFAS

LTC Ronald D. KoontzOfficer Student Battalion, USAFAS



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T

Liquid Propellants—

A Potential Power Punch

by Mr. Bob Lessels

he Army's Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) isconducting research into liquid propellants for Army

tank and artillery ammunition. Program managers believethat their efforts may lead to a revolution in armoredvehicle design, ammunition handling, logistics, and combatcrew safety—not to mention billions of dollars in savings.

Army studies on liquid propellants began in the late1940s when researchers looked at two systems using liquid propellants. The first system, commonly termed bulk-loaded,simply involved injecting a specified amount of propellantinto a gun chamber and igniting it. This system proved to beimpractical in weapons where repeatability is important.Chamber pressures and muzzle velocities of the projectilesvaried significantly due to hydrodynamic instabilities in bulk-loaded systems. Today, experts see little potential forthis form of liquid propellant guns, except perhaps as airdefense cannons or small caliber weapons.

The second system, known as regenerative injection, ismuch more promising. It involves using a piston to force theliquid propellant in the form of a jet or spray into the gunchamber during the combustion process. The result is a

controlled burn. With this system, the liquid propellant can be metered accurately, and repeatable pressures and muzzlevelocities can be achieved.

Exploration of both systems accelerated as a result of theKorean War, and by the mid-1950s the Army was exploringthe design of a tank gun based on a liquid propellant concept.However, 1950s technology proved lacking and the programlanguished.

EVOLUTION OF PROPULSIONCONCEPTS

LP BULK LOADED

• SIMPLEBUT

• DIFFICULT TO CONTROL

REGENERATIVE INJECTION

• BALLISTIC CONTROLBUT

• MECHANICALLY COMPLEX

SOLID PROPELLANT

• UNDERSTOODBUT

• MATURE

July-August 1986 19


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OPERATIONAL IMPACT

An additional benefit associated with liquid propellantsinvolves transportation of the chemicals. Federal and state

laws strictly govern the transportation of solid propellants.Many bridges and tunnels cannot be used, andtransportation routes must avoid highly populated areas.Such restrictions may not apply to less hazardous liquid propellants. This situation should bring down associatedtransportation costs.

In fact, because the components of the liquid propellants are not propellants by themselves, they can betransported much more freely and with far greater safety.Once the chemicals arrive at their storage depot, they can be kept in complete safety for an indefinite period.

Like transportation safety, vehicle vulnerability on the battlefield is also a major concern. Studies of vehicles

destroyed in the 1973 fighting in the Middle East suggestthat most vehicle losses resulted when the impact ofantiarmor munitions triggered a secondary explosion of theammunition carried in the vehicle. If the vulnerability ofon-board ammunition is eliminated, BRL analysts feelmany more armored vehicles hit by enemy weapons can berepaired and returned to action.

More significantly, liquid propellants promise to save

the lives of crewmen. Experience suggests that if theon-board ammunition explodes, few vehicle occupants

usually survive. If an antiarmor round should penetrate avehicle carrying liquid propellants, only those soldierscaught in the small spall cone of fragments from theantiarmor weapon would be injured.

What this means for the Army of the future is smaller,safer combat vehicles. The propellant will require lessstorage space and fewer crewmen to handle it. Thevehicles could not only be lighter because armor can beconcentrated to protect the crew, but also faster becausethe lighter weight of the vehicle can be propelled withless demand on the engine's available horsepower.

Yet another advantage of the liquid propellant system isits potential cost savings. The system can be retrofitted to

existing combat vehicles thereby reducing production costs.But even more significantly, the costs of the propellant will please most taxpayers. A standard packaged artillery chargecosts about $60 per pound of propellant. An equivalentamount of liquid propellant costs about $1. Furthermore, theraw materials used in the production of liquid propellants areavailable commercially. Therefore, the cost

July-August 1986 21


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The liquid propellant howitzer promises smaller, safer combat vehicles. A 155-mm self-propelled howitzer, using anautoloader and liquid p ropellant, can theoretically achieve a remarkable rate of fire of 15 to 20 rounds per minute. Theextra space made available inside the vehicle can be used to store additional proj ectiles.

of liquid propellant production facilities will be muchlower than comparable solid propellant plants becauseindustry will have to use only commercially available processing equipment. BRL studies comparing peacetime production costs of a solid propellant with a liquid propellant from October 1982 through September 1989indicate that adoption of liquid propellants could save theArmy more than $1.25 billion.

In wartime if ammunition demands reach levels projected by the Army, the potential savings would beenormous. Basing their study on 155-mm ammunition

alone, the researchers projected monthly savings of about$200 million.Of course, the real test of new weapons technology is

its effectiveness on the battlefield. A 155-mmself-propelled howitzer, using an autoloader and liquid propellant, can theoretically achieve a remarkable rate offire of 15 to 20 rounds per minute. Adjusting fire onto atarget would be easier using liquid propellants because theamount of propellant used to launch the projectile can bemetered more accurately than when using solid propellants.In fact, the "right" propelling charge is always there. Also,the extra space made available inside the vehicle can beused to store additional projectiles. The cannon can putmore firepower on target faster, and it will be able to carrymore projectiles which will reduce logistic supportrequirements.

Another concern for artillery crews deals with blast pressures near the cannon. Liquid propellants reduce the blast over-pressures caused by re-ignition of muzzle gases.Contemporary solid propellants produce carbon monoxide,hydrogen, carbon dioxide, water, and nitrogen oxides at themuzzle. Several of these gases are toxic, and carbon

monoxide and hydrogen can re-ignite outside the muzzlecausing a telltale secondary blast and flash. In fact, suchre-ignition can enable an enemy observer to spot ourartillery. With liquid propellants, the by-products arealmost exclusively carbon dioxide, water, andnitrogen—all of which are inert and nontoxic.

Elimination of the secondary blast and of toxic fumeswithin turrets is of interest to other Department of Defenseagencies. The Navy, for example, is investigating the use ofliquid propellant gun systems on its warships. They toorealize the technology offers greater safety to gun crews as

well as reduced danger to crewmen outside the weapon'sturret. What's more, liquid propellants also reduce the needto protect ammunition storage areas with heavy armor.

Implementation of the liquid propellant technology isstill 4 to 5 years in the future. Experts have proven theconcept using 30-mm cannons. In fact, General ElectricCompany has independently demonstrated a rate of fire ofabout 500 rounds per minute in such a weapon. BRLresearchers are now working not only to scale thistechnology to 155-mm caliber but also to establish theshelf life of the propellant. Even the disposal ordemilitarization of the liquid propellant offers an unusualadvantage. The simplest and most beneficial way of gettingrid of waste stocks of a propellant may be to dilute it withwater and pour it onto any farm field. BRL chemists reportthat the propellant is an excellent fertilizer!

Mr. Bob Lessels is a member of the media relationsteam at the US Army Test and Evaluation Command,

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.



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Shooting from the HIP—

A Change in Conceptsby Mr. Robert M. Forrest

S a m O

r r

A

The howitzer improvement program enables a sing le self-propelled how itzerto dri ve into an area, stop, fire an emergency mi ssion, move a sho rt distance,and then fire again without anyone leaving the cab of the howitzer. Theimproved cannon will operate in much the same manner as the multiplelaunch rocket system.

rtillerymen attending one of the

new system demonstrations at

Fort Sill's Moway House over the past

few years witnessed several phenomena

which herald a revolution in the business

of fire support. Most observers draw a

deep breath as the multiple launch rocket

system (MLRS) and Copperhead provide

spectacular evidence of new

developments. In fact, few Redlegs will

forget the awesome inferno of an MLRS

ripple streaking off toward Quanah

Range or the instantaneous destruction of

a target on Signal Mountain by a single

Copperhead. But the truly thoughtful

observers are even more impressed by

the least spectacular part of the

demonstration: a single self-propelled

howitzer which drove into an open area,

stopped, fired an emergency mission,

and then moved a short distance and

fired again. What amazed the onlookers

about this hipshoot was that no one left

the cab of the howitzer—no collimator

was emplaced, no gunnery sergeant stood

by his aiming circle shouting "Battery

adjust; aiming point this instrument!" The

howitzer simply stopped and began

delivering accurate indirect fire.What the audience saw was the

Human Engineering Laboratory's (HEL)Howitzer Test Bed III (HTB III). Thishowitzer contained prototype equipmentthat presaged the dramatically improvedM109 howitzers which will

July-August 1986 23


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Howitzer Modernization Program Comparisons by Captain Charles J. Fogle

or those following the progress ofthe howitzer modernization

program, the comparison chart shown

below highlights some of thedifferences between the howitzerextended life program (HELP),M109A3E1; and the howitzerimprovement program (HIP),

M109A3E2/E3. The HIP will eventuallyincorporate the proven improvementitems from the HELP to field a single,

improved howitzer in 1989. For thebackground of the howitzermodernization program, see "GettingHELP and HIP," Field Artillery Journal,September-October 1985.

ITEM HELP (M109A3E1) HIP (M109A3E2/E3)

Cannon Same as M109A2/A3 (M185 cannontube).

Modified armament system ModifiedM185/39 caliber cannon (M109A3E2).

Advanced armament M199 compatiblecannon and an extended range cannon(M109A3E3).

Turret Ammunition stowage is the same asthe M109A2/A3.

At this writing, it will be the new (larger)HIP turret which will have a full widthbustle to accommodate propellant

segregation. All or most projectiles willbe stored in floor racks or on thesponsons Ceiling is raised about 6inches and there probably will be noright turret door.

Traversing andElevation

Traversing and elevation are donemanually with the aid of gunnerassemblies (GA) which display thedeltas ( ) needed to zero out therequired deflection and elevationdifferences from where the gun tube ispointing to where it should point.

Gun drive servos which automatically"point" the cannon by the COS interfacewith the automatic fire control system(AFCS).

Positioning andNavigationalCapability

Automatic gun positioning system(AGPS) keeps track of HELP'sposition and direction by use ofstrap-down gyroscopic technology.

Modular azimuth positioning system(MAPS) will keep track of HIP's positionand direction. It will be the genericpositioning and navigational device forall DA-required systems.

Technical FiringData

Section chief's display control unit(SC-DCU) is a "dumb terminal" able toreceive digital fire mission data fromBCS.

Automatic fire control system (AFCS)will perform the ballistic computationson board.

NBC CollectiveFiltering System

Ventilated face piece system (VEPS)provides filtered and warmed air toM25A1 protective masks.

VFPS is incorporated into themicroclimatic system (MCS). MCS willalso provide cooled air to vests thatcrew members wear beneath theirMOPP suits.

Travel Lock Remotely powered and operated fromdriver's compartment to permit thetube to be taken out of and returned totravel lock position without a crewmanleaving the howitzer.

Same concept, different design fromHELP.

Spades Electric winch and controls permit the

raising and lowering of spades fromwithin the howitzer.

Same manual operation as on the

M109A2/A3.

Radio AN/PRC-68 Small Unit Transceiver(SUT).

At this writing, two single channelground and airborne radio system(SINCGARS), AN/VRC-89.

Sights Same sights as on M109A2/A3. Panoramic telescope, M117A2, willincorporate improved a direct firecapability to eliminate theM118A2/M118CA1.

They refer to these alternatives as themodified armament system (MAS) andthe advanced armament system (AAS),respectively.

The MAS involves the leastmodification to the existing turret. This isno small consideration because HIP is aretrofit to existing equipment and strivesfor low cost. The modification would fill in

a keyway, which was cut into the cannontube to hold a brass torque reaction key,and replace the key with an externaldevice. Complemented by suitableupgrades in the mount, the MAS should becapable of withstanding the increasedshock of the M203 charge.

The more radical AAS requires extensivemodifications to the turret; however, the

benefits may be worth the added expense.The AAS actually consists of two cannontubes, which could be interchanged at directsupport maintenance levels. The breechwould remain attached to the new modular

recoil system. The "short" tube will besimilar to the M199 cannon tube used on theM198, a weapon already capable of firing 30kilometers. The "long" tube will have alength of somewhere between 53 and 58calibers, which will achieve ranges in excessof 40 kilometers.

Recent trade-off studies done during thecourse of design show that rather thanmodifying the existing turret, it will be saferand more cost-effective to design a newturret which will accommodate both theMAS and the AAS. This may also have animpact on the system's survivability.

Putting HIP to Work—A

Radical Operational

Departure

HIP will obviously increase survivability.It will do away with the entire system ofoccupying battery positions and firing fromfixed, readily identified locations. Becausethe HIP carries a navigation system, thegun's location will be available to theonboard fire control computer at all times.This will allow the crew to stop the howitzervirtually anywhere and deliver fires withoutemplacement or laying. Previously, laying

only served to place the weapon on"common direction." Provided the crew has

properly set up the navigation system, thehowitzer will be on common survey evenwhile it is moving.

Individual howitzers will operate in anassigned firing area, which will be a roughlycircular area about a kilometer


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The platoon leader and the platoonsergeant will be doing tasks nowassociated with battery commandersand their executive officer. The platoonleader will reconnoiter platoon areas.The platoon sergeant will be directlyinvolved in keeping up with the

position of the howitzers, ensuring thatthey have adequate supplies of

ammunition and other necessities, andkeeping the section chiefs abreast ofthe tactical situation.

Perhaps the most radically changed position is that of section chief. With

equipment and organization,the section chief is responsible for thefiring of his weapon. With HIP he will

become a grass-roots tactician. Thesection chief will have to become askilled map reader and be able toanalyze terrain to select his own firing

position. He will need to be moreaware of the enemy situation, and hewill have to make informed decisionson the spur of the moment regarding

current

whether he should displace or not.What's more, the section chief will alsoneed to become proficient in the use ofthe on-board fire control equipment.Although the computer and its operatingsoftware will be relatively easy to useand self-prompting, he'll still have to bean expert.

Conclusion

After all the flash and dash is over atMoway House—after the MLRS hasstreaked off across the range, theCopperhead has devastated a tank, andthe Aquila has peered behind ridges andinto creekbeds to disclose unseentargets—after all that there is theimproved M109. But this trusty old warhorse is an Arabian stallion indisguise—it's the HIP—the revolutionary

new American howitzer.

in diameter. The section chief willroutinely displace within his firing areaafter every few rounds in accordancewith the platoon or battery standingoperating procedure. The HIP batterywill include three subelements:

● Two firing platoons with fourHIP sections and one fire direction center

per platoon.

● A battery support area whichwill establish a trains position generally

between and to the rear of the platoonoperation areas.

Officers assigned to HIP units willfind themselves dischargingresponsibilities generally associatedwith battalion-sized organizations.The battery commander will do manyof the same things that the battalionexecutive officer, S3, and S4 currentlyaccomplish. He will be primarilyconcerned with locating areas ofoperations for the battery and for the

trains. The task of running the batterytrains will fall to the first sergeant.The traditional first sergeantresponsibility of battery defense willnot exist as such. Because thehowitzers will not be located together,local defense will be the responsibilityof the section chief.

Mr. Robert M. Forrest is a BMY data management coordinator on thehowitzer improvement program. He recently left Active duty where heserved as a project officer in the TSM-Cannon Division with theDirectorate of Combat Developments at Fort Sil l, Oklahoma.

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July-August 1986 27


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Much Ado AboutSomething

by Captain Suzann W. Voigt

uch ado about something is probably the best way tothe Army's drive to lighten its

light forces. In fact, the most provocativenews since the dissemination of theoriginal AirLand Battle doctrine has beenthe Army's decision to field five suitablyequipped light infantry divisions. Thisannouncement spawned miles of print on

topics ranging from historical precedentsto detailed tactics and techniques. In theFire Support Community, leaders havehad to face challenges associated withsupporting these new maneuverorganizations. They've had to determinehow to move, shoot, and communicate

but keep their units light.

describe

These challenges created materielneeds that initially appeared to surpassexisting weapons technology. The

versatility and power of the towed155-mm weapon like the heavy M198

just didn't seem achievable in a light,mobile howitzer. Today, all that haschanged. Last December the Armyawarded three technology-challengingcontracts to develop a 155-mm towedhowitzer at half the weight of the M198.

BackgroundAmerican tactics have historically

focused on heavy forces on a European battlefield. According to Army historianSteven L. Canby, this criterion no longerapplies. Today "the situation...haschanged to the point where we can no

longer defend Western Europe without

destroying what we are pledged to

defend," Canby writes. What's more,

experts like Lieutenant General James F.Hollingsworth contend that we won't beable to speed sufficient reinforcements tostall the overwhelming Warsaw Pactforces. In fact, these two experts believe"the days of massive and slow build-up of

forces through sealift are over forever.

What we need are rapidly deployable

light organizations."

The Germans first grasped the value ofthe tactical advantages of a light, mobileinfantry force during World War I.According to Canby, they realized that newcommunications capabilities coupled withdisplacement of troops and increasedfirepower required "a combination of stealthand stalking microtactics and high-tempo

operations." The emphasis in this doctrinewas flexibility of maneuver and

M



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Current recoil techno

US Field Artillery Journal 1986

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Transcript of US Field Artillery Journal 1986