AD 697 844

EVOLUTION OF THE U. S. ARMY DIVISION 1939-1968

Virgil Ney

Technical Operations, IncorporatedFort Belvoir, Virginia

January 1969

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COMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP coýa-U A' D Cotrl -

CORG MEMORANDUMCORG-M-365

EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY DIVISION

1939-1968

by

Virgil Ney

January 1969

CEAR ING HOU 5 1

Prepared by

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, INCORPORATEDCOMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP

underDA CONTRACT NO. DAAG'05-67-C-0547

for"UIESAE HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

Li

Distribution Notice

Distribution of this document is unlimited.

was

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Destroy this report when no longer needed.Do not return it to the originator.

The findings in this report are those of the CombatOperations Research Group and are not to be construedas an official position of the United States Army Combat

Developments Command or of the Department of the Armyunless so designated by other authorized documents.

Ii

I

COMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP

CORG MEMORANDUMCGRG-M-365

EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY DIVISION1939-1968

by

Virgil Ney

January 1969

Prepared byTECHNICAL OPERATIONS, INCORPORATEDCOMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP

underDA CONTRACT NO.- DAAG-05-67-C-0547

CORG-PROJECT NO. A-3820for

HEADQUARTERSUNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINEDBLANK PAGES THAT HAVE B~ albeC pNBest Available CopyS~BEEN DELETED

! EVOLUTION OF TH E

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1939-1968:

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ABSTRACT

The division first appeared in the United States Army in the AmericanRevolution. European military professionals established the divisionalstructure, which was refined during and after the French Revolution. TheNapoleonic wars saw the infantry division in all armies; the French influenceon divisional structure has always been strong.

The modern United States Army infantry division dates from World War Iwhen the t of war was influenced by the tremendous firepower and lackof maneuver of opposing forces. Massive attacks against heavily fortified,limited objectives demanded strength to absorb heavy casualties. Theadvent of the airplane and the trench-crossing tank helpud to restore move-ment to the war, and posed the requirement for less ponderous units forrapid maneuver.

World War II and the Korean War were fought by divisions of aboutone-half the strength of those of World War I. The division was triangularrather than square. Infantry, airborne, motorized, and mountain divisionswere organized. Specialized divisions either survived combat orreverted to standard infantry organization. Air transport, armoredvehicles, and new heavy infantry weapons influenced infantry divisionalstructure.

The "cold war" and the possibility of nuclear conflict forced the drasticreorganization of the US infantry division. Pentomic, or ROCID, ROTAD,and finally ROAD were the new formats. Flexible response concepts andstudies of the Army helicopter and the structure of the armored divisioncombined to establish a common division base for the attachment ofbattalions as building blocks, thus eliminating the regiment. In Vietnam,infantry and airmobile divisions continue to demonstrate the validity ofthe matching of the ancient tactical principle of fire and maneuver with theconcept of flexible response.

CORG-M-365 iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the preparation of this study valuable assistance was receivedfrom the following institutions and individuals: The National Archives,Mrs. Lois Aldridge; The Army Library, The Pentagon, Miss Dorothy Savageand Miss Evelyn Robinson; The Office of Chief of Military History,Department of the Army, Mr. John Wike, Miss Hannah Zeidlik andMrs. Mary Lee Stubbs; the Engineer School Library, Fort Belvoir,Virginia, Emma M. Braund; and Mrs. Eva M. Johnson, who functionedas research assistant during the course of this study.

Special thanks are due to the following former division commanderswho replied to queries connected with their command experiences InWorld War II and the Korean War: Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel,Major General Frederick A. Irving, Major General James C. Fry, andMajor General Joseph P. Cleland, all United States Army Retired. Theircomments were most helpful and served to clarify certain points in thematter of organizational structure and operations of the infantry division.

CORG-M-365

CONTENTS

Page

A BSTRA C T .................................................. i

ACKNOW LEDGEMENTS ...................................... iv

SUM MA RY .................... ................ ............ viii

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1775-1939 ........................ 1

The American Revolution ................................. 1Early Theorists in France ................................. 2The Napoleonic Army ..................................... 3Weapons Developments of The Industrial Revolution .......... 4The United States and The Mexican War ..................... 5TheAmerican Civil War ................................... 5

The Infantry Division in the 20th Century .................... 12US Involvement, World War I .............................. 18

POST-WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II, 1939-1945 ........... 36

Post-World War I Developments ........................... 36World War HI Divisions ................................... 40Pooling ................................................. 49

POST-WORLD WAR 1I AND THE KOREAN WAR .................. 57

Postwar Organization ..................................... 57Korea - A New Kind of War ................................ 59After Korea -- Reorganization ............................. 70

THE DIVISION OF THF 1950' s-1960's AND VIETNAM ............ 71

The Pentomic (ROCID)Division -- An Interim Measure ....... 71The ROAD Division ...................................... 75The ROAD Infantry Division ............................... 83The ROAD Infantry Division (Mechanized) ................... 86The ROAD Armored Division..............................87The POAI Division Base .................................. 87The Brigade and the Combat Arms Regimental Stystem ....... 90The Ai_,-mcbile DAsion ................................... 92Ouftlook for the Future .................................. 100

APPENDIXES

A. Tark Assignment ...................................... 103B. Evolution of Spaa oi Control - 1777 to ROAD ............. 105C. Tentative Orgonization oý Infantry Division -

1 December 1936 .................................. 110D. The General Board, Conference on the Infantry Dlvis!on ... 112E. Infantry Division - 1950 (Korea) ........................ 143

CORG-M-365

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CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

APPENDIXLS (Concluded)

F. Infantry Battalion TOE (ROAD) ........................... 170G. Infantry Battalion (TOE 7-16G) ........................... 177Ht. The 27th Division Task Force............................ 192

LITERATURE CITED ........................................... 193

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... 196

DISTRIBUTION ................................................ 216

TABLES

I. Infantry Division, Strength by Unit Category ................. 21II. Comparisons of Division Strength, 1917-1918 ................ 25

Ill. Organic Composition of the Infantry Division, 1936-1945 ....... 33IV. Infantry Division Recommended Following th-

Field Test, 1937 ....................................... 34

V. Troops in Divisions and In Nondivisional Units,by Branch, 31 December 1943 and 31 March 1945 ......... 46

VI, Major US Airborne Assaults ................................ 97

FIGURES

1. The Grand Army, 1806 ................................... 42. Civil War Army Organization .............................. 73. Typical European Division, World War I .................... 134. Typical British Division, World War I ...................... 13A5. T/O Infantry Division, 3 May 1917 ......................... 196. Division Recommended by the War College

Planners, 10 May 1917 .................................. 207. The Square Division, World War I .......................... 22

S8. Infantry Division Recommended Following theField Test, 1937 ........................................ 32

9. Plan for Building an infantry TriangularSDivision, 1942 .......................................... 44F 10. Organization of the Infantry Division ...................... 48 Js

11. Organization of the Triangular Division, Korean War ......... 5812. The Pusan Defense Perimeter ............................. 6413. Organization of Pentomic Infantry Division ................. 7214. Organization of Pentomic Armored Division ................ 7215. Organization of Pentomic Airborne Division ................ 7216. Inlantry Division Battle Group ............................. 7317. ROAD Division Basic Structure . .......................... 7518. ROAD Division Command and General Staff Organization ..... 7719. ROAD Division Special Staff Organization ................... 7720. ROAD Infantry Division...................................7821. ROAD Armored Division ................................ 79

vi COR G-M-365

__

CONTENTS 1Concluded)

2age

FIGURES (Concluded)

22. ROAD Airborne Division ................................ 79

23. ROAD Infantry Division, Mechanized ...................... 8024. ROAD Division Support Command ........................ 8125. ROAD Airmobile Division. .................................. 92

Iv

CORG-M-%65 vii

Ft

SUMMARY

SHistorical Background (1775-1939) begins with the evolution of the

division in the American and French Revolutionary armies. The effectof certain European military theorists upon divisional organization In all

armies is noted. Napoleon Bonaparte contributed several organizationaland operational patterns to the division, The Industrial Revolution withits development of new metals, weapont. and explosives contributed to thechanges in the divisions. Weapon lethality forced deployment and moredispersion upon the battlefield. The American Civil War (1861-1865) wasfought on both sides with the tactic,. and divisionai organization of theNapoleonic era. In this conflict, weaponry was far ahead of tactics.America participated in World War I with divisions patterned after thoseof the Allies. The machinegun ruled the battlefield and eliminated move-ment from the tactical formula of fire and movement. Divisions becamelarger in manpower to absorb the heavy casualties exacted by the firesof massed artillery and automatic weapons. The advent of the tank reducedthe effect of the machinegun and partially restored mobility to warfare.The airplane further influenced the tactical formations of the infantrydivision in World War I and the influ--ue continued with the evolution offighter and bomber aircraft. The US division remained virtually unchangeduntil the late 1930's when US Army planners endeavored to reduce itsstrength and bring it into consonance with new weaponry and evolving air-S~power tactics.

Post-World War I and World War 1, 1939-1945 covers an era of dynamic

change from the old " square" divisional concepts of World War I and thepost-war period to a streamlined "triangular" division with thousandsfewer personnel assigned. General Lesley J. McNair, the Chief of ArmyGround Forces, was a consistent and positive brake upon expensive,overmanned, and specialized divisions. His policy was that all divisionalelements must be functional in combat and that manpower be utilized tothe maximum. The armored division, as developed during World War 11,with its separate combat commands, established a pattern of flexibilityof response to combat demands.

Specialized divisions, (jungle, mountain, and motorized) were foundto be unnecessary. Combat experience established that the standardinfantry division was capable of operations under all conditions of environ-ment and types of combat encountered in a global war. At the end ofhostilities in the European theater of operations, a study was made by aspecial board of officers to evaluate the European experiences of Americandivisions and their subordinate units. The results of the study were tohave salient effects upon the future divisional structure in the US Army.

Post-World War 11 and the Korean War covers the organization ofthe division in the period immediately following the end of World War 11.The reductions made necessary by rapid demobilization and post-wareconomies caused the infantry division to be short in manpower, weapons,and equipment. This situation was to have a disastrous effect upon the

viii CORG-M-365

divisions entering combat in Korea. The divisions in Korea found that theywere not fighting a European-type war but rather one of combined conventionaland nonconventional tactics. This fact exerted considerable effect upon theimplementation of the "flexible response" doctrine in the post-Korean Warplanniag of divisional reorganization.

Ti.e Division of the 1950s-1960s and Vietnam continues the evolution ofthe modern division. The requirements of the "Cold War" and possiblenuclear warfare established the Pentomic-division, in which the battalion andthe regiment were abolished and the battle group instituted as an interimanswer to this tactical dilemma. A return of the flexibility cf the World War IIand Korean War armored divisional organization was achieved by the returnof the battalion in the ROAD type divisions. During this period, the divisionalstructure became entirely functional and many of the political and sociologicalaspects of the traditional Army division were lost in the desire to achieveflexibility. Vietnam serves as a "proving ground" for new divisional concepts.The helicopter, basically developed during the Korean war, prompted theorganization of a maximum mobility type division--the airmobile division.The period witnessed significant development and improvemeni of weaponsand vehicles, including both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.

Since the end of the Korean War, the infantry division of the UnitedStates Army has been in a constant state of reorganization. Internationaltensions impose the requirement that the infantry division be one capable of aflexible response to any intensity of war- nuclear, conventional, or noncon-ventional. As in World War II, there have been those whose answer was:specialized units or troops. These units, in spite of heavy opposition fromtraditionalists, got into the organizational format as Special Forces butthey were never organized on divisional levels. In addition to their departurefrom organizational patterns of the US Army, they were too highly committedto special type missions - many of which depended little on the tacticalprinciples of fire and movement. Civic action and other noaviolent formsof military-sponsored activity tended to lessen the hard conventional combatmission of Special Forces. The delivery of organized violence upon theenemy and his materiel and installations still remains the primary missionof the infantry division.

The inclusion of brigades and reinstitution of battalions in the ROADdivision reduced the span of control of the division commander from thePentomic division. However, it should be noted that the brigades are per-forming essentially the same fuiction accomplished by the old regiment.Further, the brigade possesses a flexibility of attachment and detachmentof battalions never achieved by the regiment. The regimental structurewithin the infantry division of World War II and the Korean War was inflexible,i. e., battalions were permanently assigned to the regiment. Today, thebrigade has no permenent battalions - with its headquarters and headquarterscompanies as the brigade base, it receives battalions within the division asrequired by the mission. The brigades of the division are, in essencepower handles to which the battalions (tools) are attached for operations. Thedivision base is essentially a master power handle to which the brigades areattached.

CORG-M-365 ix

The mechanized division with its armored personnel carriers and othercombat vehicles offers a solution to the problem of ground contaminationduring a nuclear conflict as well as providing mobility to the division. Howeffective the carriers will be against radiation and fall-out cannot b(. assessedaccurately at this time. However, the mechanized division does seem tooffer the best type of unit structure and equipment for protection of groundforce personnel conducting combat operations under nuclear conditions.

How the soldier is transported into combat determines the kind of adivision to which he is assigned. The soldier who parachutes into combatfrom a transport plane may be properly termed "airborne" ; the soldierwho rides into battle and fights from and in an armored personnel carriermay be designated as " mechanized" ; the soldier who is lifted into combatby helicopter is "airmobile" ; the soldier who is transported in a tank andfights from the tank and with its weapons system is "armored. " Con-temporary infantry division organization and structure is centered aroundthe transport and weapons systems available and their adjustment to themission. The functions of divisions are similar: close with the enemy,destroy him and his installations, and secure and occupy his territory.The means (equipment and weaponry) govern how the mission will beaccomplished. Under the "flexible response" concept the trend is towarda division capable of operating under all conditions of combat. Revertingto Guibert' s historical "ordre mixte," the infantry division of the nextdecade may be a composite type: standard infantry, mechanized, airmobile,and airborne brigades assigned to a common division base uncer the ROADsystem of interchangeable "building block" units.

Future warfare tactical patterns and weaponry may require aimosttotal dispersion of the division and elimination of the Army corps. Eventually,the brigade may become the larger-unit operational headquarters with thedivision base functioning solely in the area of administration. Maneuverbattalions, with their maximized flexibility, may operate independentlyof brigades. They have this capability now and it will become morecommon-place in the future. Battalion commanders must expeet to assumetasks and missions now considered within the purview of brigade commanders.

The Selected Bibliography lists books, articles, reports, official andsemi-official publications, and relevant materials consulted in the studyresearch.

The Appendixes include charts and diagrams pertaining to the evolutionof the division span of control, historical development of tactical communi-cations, miscellaneous tables of division organization, and a copy of aportion of the Division Board Report and Questionnaire published by theGeneral Board, European theater of operations, after termination ofhostilities in that theater.

x CORG-M-365

* I'

EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY DIVISION

1939-1968

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1775-1939

The American Revolution

-historians of the Revolutionary War have noted that American t;rooporganization was very informal. The patriots, guided by the British Armyorganizational patterns, used the battalion as the basic combat unit and theregiment as the command and administrative base for the battalions.Brigades and divisions often served as administrative units, until the influ-ence of such foreign officers as Baron Fric ick von Steuben, MarquisMarie Joseph de Lafayette, and Baron Johann de Kalb led to their organizationas tactical units.

The continental Army of 1775 comprised thirty-eight regiments of greatly varying size. TheMassachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Islandregiments stood on a basis of 590 enlisted men, whileConnecticut regimental tables of organization sometimescalled for 1,000 enlisted men, sometimes for 600.

* Washington organized these regiments into six brigadesgenerally of six regiments each, and into three divisionsof two brigades each. The brigades and divisions were

* primarily administrative headquarters. The key tacticalL unit was the battalion, which was usually the same body

of men as a regiment, "regiment" being another termdenoting an administrative unit, while "battalion" wasthe tactical term. The possibilities of employing astactical entities units larger than battalions but smallerthan an army were only beginning to be reali inEurope. the advent of the division as a tactical mrmationmainly awaited the Wars of the French Revolutiwi. SinceWashington and his lieutenants patterned the tactics of theAmerican Army on what they knew of European armies,The Army tended to fight not by divisions or brigades butas a tactical whole, its constituent units of maneuverbeing the battalions. (Ref 1, p 62)

CORG-M-365

Early Theorists In France

The division was the creation of French military theorists and writers.Even before the French Revolution added the division to Napoleon' s Army,military innovators had tried to solve the problems of maneuver and fire onthe battlefield. Among these were Guibert (1743-1790) and Marshal Mauricede Saxe (1696-1750). Guibert was caught between two schools of thought:

... that of the "lineal disposition" or that of "dispositionin depth. " The works of Guibert introduced an interme-diate formula which, through the simple movement ofcolumns of battalions, made it possible to pass withrelative speed from the column or "order of march"to "the order of battle" or lineal formation, andintroduced an element of flexibility into the armedmasses. (Ref 2, p 82)

Marshal of France, Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750), whose Reveries onthe Art of War is a military classic, laid down the formation of the autonomousinfantry division at the beginning of the 18th century (Ret 3). For mobilityand firepower, de Saxe's division consisted of two infantry brigades, twocavalry brigades, and artillery units, probably of battalion size. De Saxecited the flaws of 18th century warfare. The Marshal established mobility,maneuver, and supply as conditions for decisive success in the field andcondemned military inflexibility and lack of mobility. De Sa-%e recommendedorganizing the army on a divisional basis for improving command andcontrol. He urged that light infantry be adopted for mobility and furthernoted the commander must concentrate his strength against enemy weaknessand be relentless in pursuit once the enemy line has broken under the pressureof attack. Marshal de Saxe's approach was a century ahead of his time.He suggested using distinctive badges for divisional and lower units todevelop pride in unit identification. He advocated the use of music,cadenced marching, permanent identification of regiments, and meritpromotion to boost morale and promote a sense of national service.

In 1778, du Teil propounded a plan to join artillery and infantry inbattle to achieve a common mission. Briefly, the artillery was to bombardthe enemy line to the front from a distance of 1, 000 yards while deliveringenfilade fire, from a flank, over the entire length of the enemy position.General Gribeauval, founder of a weapons system employing various caliberhorse-drawn field guns in specific formations, urged that the new short-tubedguns be pushed forward and employed at close quarters. This meant acompromise between mobility and fire power which drew attention to theissue of concentration of force. Chevalier Folard, one of the great militarytheorists of the 18th century, advocated accomplishing this concentrationby abandoning the infantry line for parallel infantry columns. On a penetra-tion mission these columns could be supported by light infantry. Thisinnovation complemented the theories of Guibert who had prescribed footmovements by which troops could change from line to column and back toline as required in battle. In essence, this was the beginning of a modernbattle drill (Ref 4).

2 CORG-M-365

The 11apoleonic Army

Napoleon did not invent the infantry division but he did influence itsorganization and operational patte-.s. The infantry division of Napoleon'sday lacked mobility and could not maneuver rapidly in the field; its combatcapabilities were greatly limited. The battalions, integral parts of theregiments of the division, were moved about the battlefield like chesspawns. They could be deployed only in columns or in a lineal formation.The latter was generally employed by the infantry division when closingwith the enemy--usually on a front of 1,000 to 1,500 yards. A line ofsharpshooters or skirmishers moved out ahead of the infantry and eachbrigade deployed its two infantry regiments in battle order and closedcolumn, respectively. To ensure the necessary depth for an attack requiringshock action, the regiments formed their Lattalions in column, thus assuringadeqaate penetration of the enemy line or fortified position. At this point inthe history of the infantry division there was little or no coordination ofeffort among the infantry, artillery, and cavalry; each made its independentbattle effort as ordered. Liaision between the arms, when and if achieved,was initiated at army level. Communications were primitive; orders wererelayed by messengers or staff officers to army, division, and brigade levels.Within the regiments, battalions, and companies, command was exercisedby visual signs and voice.

Profiting from the flaws of the system he observed, Napoleon createda larger unit, the corps d' armee. This new unit enabled the Emperor toreduce his span of control and offered a system of supply for the divisions.Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the French corps of the Grand Armyin 1806.

The corps

... by grouping the divisions, coordinating theirmaneuver, and combining their efforts in battle,had permitted a more centralized control to beexercised and had prevented a dispersion ofefforts from taking place. It was the latter whichhad wrecked the division organization when ithad been applied to mass armies. The corpsorganization facilitated and lighted the armycommander's task; it possessed a certaincharacter of permanence, and, consequently,a personality. (Ref 5, p 59)

The formation of the corps d' armee gave the Emperor an extra and* most valuable link in the chain of command. The corps commander, either

a general or marshal of the Empire, was directly responsible to Napoleonfor the effective employment of the infantry divisions within the corpsunder his command. Thus, Napoleon was relieved of directly commandinga great number of division commanders. Inbtead, he commanded a smallgroup of corps commanders.

CORG-M-365 3

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CORPS RESERVE

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FI16 PIECES

06J8 PIECES 10 PIECES

[•I0 PIECES

TOTAL UNITS - SUPFPLY

Infantry 26 Battalions Artillery 44 Pieces L..mSERVICESCavalry 12 Squadrons Engineer I Company

Figure 1. The Grand Army, 1806

Within four years the corps was an integral part of the French highcommand. The division became an organizational vehicle for incorporatingthe troops and their weapons for combat operations. Baron Antoine HenriJomini, Chief of Staff to Marshal Michel Ney, commander of the Third Corps,stated categorically that the division was a combat unit and that its commandinggeneral commanded all arms and services (Ref 6). For the first time thedivision commander was regarded as a generalist as well as a general. Hewas expected to understand- the employment of the combined arms team(infantry, artillery, and cavalry). The corps commander thus became acommander of division commanders. This concept has survived until thepresent day.

Weapons Developments of The Industrial Revolution

The Industrial Revolution in Europe had an enormous impact on warfare.Better steel, improved explosives, and the development of weapons,(breechloaded rifles and rifled small arms and artillery) led to changes in

CORG-M-365

Il

military concepts. In mid-19th century Germany, von Dreysee inventedthe needlegun, forerunner of the modern breechloading bolt-action militaryrifle. Primitive forms of fixed ammunition began to appear; Captain M~n16of the French Army designed a gas leak-proof bullet. These Improvementsin weaponry meant'increased range, accuracy, and lethality which, in turn,f demanded dispersion of troop units in combat. Rifling of the shoulderweapons Increased the range from the flintlock smoothbore musket' s 300yards to about 1,000 yards. The waterproof percussion cap gave the infantryall-weather capability. Further, with breechloading shoulder weapons, thesoldier could load and fire while prone on the ground behind protectivenatural cover. These improvements in the tools of war meant that tacticsand tactical formations had to be changed to counter the new and deadlyaccuracy of the foot soldier's weapons. Artillery was improved concurrentlywith the advances in shoulder weapons and side arms. But tactics did notkeep pace with innovations in weaponry, as will be shown later.

I The United States and The Mexican War

The small US Army did not become involved with the problem of largeunit organization until the Mexican War. This war marked the firstemployment of the division as a tactical unit in American military experi-ence. The campaign in Mexico required tactical formations larger thana regiment; the brigade and division were formally organized as units underthe command of general officers. One of the greatest problems was to findofficers qualified to handle large units in combat.

The troops in Mexico were the first Americansoldiers to be organized systematically into divisions,the somewhat autonomous armies in miniature that !had appeared with the growth of armies during theFrench Revolution. But it was almost as difficult tofind officers capable of handling a division well as tofind army commanders. Among the division commanders,William J. Worth had qualities of brilliance but wasI erratic and self-centered, and his quarrels withTaylor and Scott limited his usefuiness to both of them.David F. Twiggs was blunt and unimaginative, devotedto the frontal assault because everything else was toosophisticated for his taste, John E. Wool may havebeen the best of the division commanders because hewas the steadiest, but he demonstrated no capacitiesthat were strikingly large. (Ref 1, p 182)

The American Civil WarThe American Civil War (1861-1865) gave the US Army a maximumopportunity for the utilization of infantry divisions in the field. However,the advances made in metallurgy, weapons, ammunition, explosives, andtransbportation made obsolete the division as conceived by Napoleon. Thiswas a period of military history when weaponry had advanced years beyond

CORjG-M1-365 5

the Napoleonic tactics then in vogue. As a result, the Civil War was themost costly in manpower of any major war up to that time.

The infantry could no longer advance to assaultdis~arioe without suifering the consequences; itneeded support to advance under enemy fire. Therange of artillery was increased to 3,300 yardsand it was capable of firing faster. Firing overfriendly troops became possible. The artillerynot only laid down preparatory firc but continuedits support throughout the engagement. Thecavalry ceased to be a shock arm and had to leavethe battlefield proper. The Increase in firepower,favoring the defense, required reorf.anization thatwould permit this increased power to be used inthe offense. (Ref 2, p 83)

French military doctrine was available to the US Army during the CivilWar through translations and writings of American military professionals.Among these interpreters were General Winfield Scott, General Henry WagerHalleck, Colonel William J. Hardee, and General Silas Casey, whosetranslations of French military doctrine into manuals perpetuated Napoleonicconcepts of organization and tactics (Ref 7). The chief contribution fromthe French doctrine was the establishment of the corps d' armee as aformation in both the Northern and Southern Armies (Fig. 2).

Although Civil War tactics lagged far behind weapon developments,some progress was made in modifying military tactics. The parade groundrigidity of line formations was eliminated from the battlefield and men weretaught to take cover and to advance by bounds and small unit rushes as

skirmishers. Since the division and the brigade were still mass assem-blages of 3oldiers fighting as companies, battalions, and regiments, therewas little "battle drill" for these larger units. In effect, the overallcombat effort of the brigade or division was the sum of the fire and move-ment involved in those lesser combats being waged by the component units.

... it must be said that the Civil War occurred inone of those periods, common in history, whenweapons have outdistanced organization and jtactics.It is true that deadly fire brought about modificationsin the use of infantry, one of which was the ise of asuccession of lines in the assault, another tne regularemployment of temporary field works. But even aftertaking these into account, it seems clear that the rifledmusket was more modern than the organization of theinfantry and the resultant formations used in the assault.Otherwise stated, organization and tactics werebasically those of the beginning of the nineteenthcentury, while the weapons were fifty years moremodern. This discrepancy between weapons andminor tactics accounts in part for the shockingdestructiveness of the Civil War. (Ref 8, p 25)

6 CORG-M-365

q'

ARMYGeneral (CSA)Mai"r General WUSA)

CORPS

LiLeuCenant General(CSA)

Major General (USA])

DIVISION

Major General L _

SBRIGADE

Brigadier General

* 1(less than: I l~ompanis(10lcompanies)

1 0 c mp a n es)C olo n el o r!ietnnor CooeMajor Lieutenant Colonell

Captain 75-100 men.

CORG-M-365

During the Civil War it was not unusual for an entire brigade or divisionto be led in a charge by its commanding general against the enemy positionsor formations. The regulation rifled-musket bullet of 0. 58-inch caliberwas highly lethal at close range, and artillery fire of canister and grapetore huge gaps in the advancing lines behind the skirmishers. As casualtiesoccurred and men dropped, the lines and ranks closed, and the advanceagainst the enemy fire continued.

Eventually the dispersed sk-rmish line tactics of the French revolution-aries were employed as a partial answer to the heavy casualties inflictedupon the massive attacking formations.

Except for being unwieldy, regiments and their com-ponents proved otherwise adaptable to wartime conditions.For example, heightened fire power more than everbefore demanded skirmishers in front of the battle line.These the regimental organization was able to supplysimply by assigning any of its companies to the duty.Likewise, regimental organization lent itself well tothe attack formation which became characteristic ofthe Civil War. This was a succession of lines. Eachline was composed of two ranks with a prescribeddistance of thirty-two inches between them. Of course,the lines varied greatly in length, and in the distanceat which they followed each other. Some were aslong as a wihole brigade lined up in two ranks, othersonly a company. If there was a usual length, it wasthat of a brigade, since attacks by divisions in columnof brigades were most frequent. In any case, regimentsas organized were easily utilized in that type of attack

formation, as they were in others. (Ref 8, p 24)

There was little maneuver at brigade or division levels, except tomove by the flank, tW avoid terrain obstacles or artillery fire, or tointercept or halt an enemy attack. The movement of divisions and brigadeson the battlefield was reminiscent of Waterloo in 1815.

During the Civil War, troops were raised in the states by regiments

and later organ.ized into brigades and divisions. No formal divisionalorganization was accomplished until the regiments assembled at arendezvous point. There were no tables of organization and equipment forthe brigades or divisions. Identity with the commanding general was theusual means of designation of the division.

In the course of the war the United States raised1,696 regiments of infantry, 272 of cavalry, and 78of artillery. ¶ihese regiments came to be gatheredinto higher operational organizations includingbrigades, divisions, army corps, and field armies.The War Department originally ordered the formation3f brigades of four regiments each and of divisions

8 COR G- M-365

of from three to four brigades. In practice, however,none of the units higher than the regiment was a tableof organization unit in the modern sense; all of themrather were task forces, composed of varying con-stituent elements as circumstances and accidentdecreed. Brigades usually consisted of anywherefrom two to six regiments, sometimes even more;divisions of two or more brigades. Perhaps themost usual alignment was five regiments to abrigade, three brigades to a division. In addition fto their infantry, divisions generally had organicartillery, that is, artillery permanently allottedto them; in the Army of the Potomac from theGettysburg campaign onward, however, 3rtillerywas organic principally to an army corps, withabout nine batteries to each corps. Early in thewar some infantry divisions had attached cavalry.Later, cavalry was organized mainly into divisionsof its own. By the middle of the war, an infantrydivision averaged about 6,200 men. (Ref 1, p 227)

The concept of divisional organic artillery units and control of artilleryby the corps was a modern approach for those times. The attachment ofcavalry to infantry divisions for reconnaissance duties was not unusual.

From the above extract, it may be noted that the standard Civil Warinfantry division was less than one-half as large as the present-day ROADinfantry division.

Revised Army regulations issued in 1863 provided some guidance forthe organization of an army in the field as follows:

The formation by divisions is the basis of the

organization and administration of armies in the field.

A division consists usually of two or threebrigades, either of infantry or cavalry, and troopsof other corps in the necessary proportion.

A brigade is formed of two or more regiments.f The first number takes the right.

Mixed brigades are sometimes formed ofinfantry and cavalry and light cavalry especiallyfor the advanced guards.

As the troops arrive at the rendezvous, thegeneral commanding-in-chief will organize them

into brigades and divisions.

CORG-M-365 9

Ia -

The arrangement of troops on parade and inorder of battle is 1st, the light infantry; 2d, infantryof the line; 3d, light cavalry; 4th, cavalry of the line;5fan, heavy cavalry. The troops of the artillery andengineers are in the centre of the brigades, divisions,or corps to which they are attached; marines take theleft of other infantry; volunteers and militia take theleft of regular troops of the same arm, and amongthemselves, regiments of volunteers or militia of thesame arm take place by lot. (Ref 9, pp 71-72)

Approved official printed tables of organization and equipment for thebrigade and division did not exist. Tables of organization for regimentsof the various arms were maintained at the War Department. Larger unitorganization appears to have been simply a matter of gathering subordinateunits (regiments) together at the rendezvous point, forming them intobrigades and divisions, and moving toward the battle zone. Training wasconducted en route or in bivouac. There were few training camps forindividuals and units. At this time, the French doctrine of the depot as theunit support base was carried over into the American military scene.

General F. V. A. de Chanal of the French Army served as an observerwith the Federal troops during the campaigns of the Civil War. His com-mentary follows:

Our methods have been copied very exactly. Itwill be readily seen that the American troops havingbeen continually in a state of war, cannot in mattersof d•Ail be compared to European troops. Thoseorganizations, however, which were drilled in thevarious forts and depots before joining the army,are well enough instructed. (Ref 10, p 26)

Inasmuch as brigades and divisions and corps were not formed inpeacetime in the United States Army, except by express authority of theSecretary of War, the officers of the pre-Civil War US Army were notexperienced in commanding large bodies of troops. Because of the Indiancampaigns, the Army was scattered over the West in small company-sizeposts; it was a rare event to assemble a complete regiment or battalion.The following comment from the Union Commander at Bull Run, MajorGeneral Irwin McDowell, explains the situation facing a commander ofthat period-

There was not a man there who had ever maneu-vered troops in large bodies. There was not one inthe Army. I did not believe there was one in thewhole country. At least, I knew there was no onethere who had ever handled 30,000 troops, I hadseen them handled abroad in reviews and marches,but I had never handled that number, and no onehere had. (Ref 11, pp 256-257)

10 COR G-M-365

The following comment is significant of the command training of theUnited States Army at the beginning of the Civil War:

When the Civil War began, only the divisioncommanders of the Mexican War had experiencein leading any really sizable body of troops, andno v those men were generally too old or otherwisedisqual'fied to be considered for field command. -.

There wts no staff school, no adequate theory ofstaff work upon which to found adequate assistanceto army, corps, and division commanders in thecomplex work of caring for and moving thousandsof men.

Thus all the techniques of command at itshighest level had to be learned pretty much bydoing, and men capable of exercising high commandhad to be sought out by trial and error. Naturallyblunders occurred, some of them in matters ofcommand and staff work that would later seemelementary. Army commanders expended theirtime and energies on tasks they had no businesstouching: Irwin McDowell personally reconnoiteredroads while his army marched to Bull Run, andGeorge McClellan personally sighted artillery piecesas his army came up to the Antietam. (Ref 1, p 241)

In the years following Bull Run, American officers learned theirlessons in many hard-fought fields and campaigns. By April 1865,brigades, divisions, and corps were welded together by their battleexperiences. They learned as they fought and became some of the world' sfinest troops. Under such skilled commanders as Grant, Sherman, andSheridan, troops marched, rode, maneuvered, and fought decisive actionsinvolving hundreds of thousands of men.

In the US Army, the identification of troops with a certain division wasbegun by the use of badges and patches during the American Civil War.This boosted morale and also helped to establish discipline and controlwhen the troops were away from the unit. Unit pride and esprit de corps,often began witih the privilege of wearing a designating bit of clot, whichothers, outside the unit, could not wear. While unit identification issometimes taken for granted, the Civil War was noted for pride in specificunits, such as " The Iron Brigade.

The first system of standard unit badges ir Vhe

United States Army grew out of the corps organization.When Major General Joseph Hooker became commanderof the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1863.. he

ordered that each corps be identified with a distinctivebadge, as Major General Philip Kearny had alreadyidentified the 3rd Division of the III Corps with a red

CORG-M-365 11

I

diamond. The badges were cut from flannel and weregenerally blue, white, or red to designate the 1st, 2nd,or 3rd division of a corps, respectively. They wereworn conspicuously on the soldier' s cap. Theystimulated unit pride, and they incidentally eased thejob of identifying stragglers. The corps of the otherfield armies adopted their own badges about a yearafter Hooker prescribed them for the Army of thePotomac. (Ref 1, pp 227-228)

The Infantry Division in the 20th Century

Post-Civil War Developments

Post-Civil War developments changed the character of infantry combatand exerted considerable influence on the organization of the infantry division.The introduction of the machinegun was one of the most decisive of thesedevelopments. A weapon of opportunity in attack and deliberation in defense,its high rate of fire could effectively stop a battalion attack. The machinegun,with its superior shock value, eliminated the cavalry from the divisionalorganization. Without the mobility of the cavalry, the infantry was nowwholly charged with responsibility for maneuver on the ground. In 1914,the German army was equipped with machineguns and heavy siege artillery.In the employment of these weapons, the Germans were far in advance ofcontemporary armies. Field telegraph and wireless, carrier pigeons, andsignal flags and signal flares were used by both the Germans and the Alliesin conducting communications for purposes of unit ccntrol. The tactical-imployment of machineguns by the German army was to have marked effectupon the conduct of the war of 1914-1918. While other armies were markingtime in weapons development, the Germans established doctrine and methodsof employment of the machinegun which eventually changed the character ofthe war. By 1916, the Allies were facing the Germans in a positional, siegetype of trench warfare. The machinegun ruled the battlefield and mobilityhad been sacrificed to safety in the trenches of the Western Front. Courdi-nation of machinegun and artillery fires with the massive, wavelike infantryattacks was only a partial solution to the stalemate.

The infantry division became a huge mass of soldiers responsible for

holding successive lines of deep, heavily-revetted trenches againstdevastating artillery preparations and wavelike infantry attacks(Fig, 3 and 4). The division, as such, had lost its mobile character.Without the ability to maneuver, the infantry division had to rely upon fireto hold its lines. Hence, heavier concentrations of trench mortars, automaticrifles, and light and heavy machineguns were the order of the day. Theseweapons were located at section and squad levels, the smallest units of thedivisions and the only units with a modicum of mobility. Upon them dependedthe inch-by-inch, foot-by-foot, and yard-by-yard advances that were notedon the operations maps at division headquarters. The battlefield wasparceled into barbed wire sectors of responsibility for the units concerned.

.. Frontages were laid out in accordance with unit strengths--man for man.

12 CORG-M-365

ii

S[ INF DIV ]12,000

-

-f77

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ARTY BTR Y

F igure 3. Typical European Division, World War II

G

INF DIVý J

FSIG CO 60 IbsMD

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tFigure 4. Typical British Division, World War I

CORG-M-365 13

Larger areas and gaps where men were not available to cover with theirfires were covered by interlocking bands of machinegun fires. Zones ofresponsibility, phase lines, and delineation of terrain objectives were allindicated as new means of unit control in both defensive and offensivecombat. When the latter was undertaken, it was generally in the form of agigantic, mass movement of troops out of the trenches toward definite sec-tions of the enemy line. Preparatory to the "jump off" or the departurefrom the security of the trenches, the troop-i were organized into "waves"consisting of echeloned lines of sections. Highly specialized tasks wereallotted to the individual members of the section which had replaced theconmvntional infantry squad as it was known to the United States Army.Controls was vested in the sergeants and chiefs of platoons; the company andbattalion organization was almost purely administrative rather than tacticalin its function. In the attack against the limited objective of trench warfareor In the defense, unit control was maintained basically by means of thesmall unit or team concept. This was forced upon the military by thenature of the war it was fighting. With mobility and maneuver almost com-pletely negated by the advent of the machinegun and highly concentratedartillery forces, unit control was on a shoulder-to-shoulder basis.

Improvised trenches ran from Switzerland to saltwater. When these were reinforced with barbed wire andconcrete, the war in the West became a war of attrition,one of the longest and the bloodiest in history (Ref 12, p 225).

Their carefully planned war was.., smashed to piecesby fire power... so devastating that.., there was no choicebut to go under the surface... like foxes. Then.... tosecure these trenches from surprise,. .. each side...spun hundreds of thousands of miles of steel webaround its entrenchments... Armies, through their ownlack of foresight, were reduced to the position of humancattle. They browsed behind their fences and occasionallysnorted and bellowed at each other. (Ref 13)

The Maneuver Division

In 1917, The United States Army faced a near-tragic situation withreference to Its higher echelons of military unit organization. Divisionaland brigade organization had been provided for the Regular Army but therehad been little implementation. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was anearly advocate of the "Maneuver Division."

When Stimson took office, Wood had alreadyembarked on the unprecedented experiment of assemblinga whole division in peacetime. The "Maneuver Division"formed around San Antonio beginning in March, 1911, theonset of the Mexican Revolution providing a convenientpretext for the effort. It took almost ninety days to con-centrate fewer than 13,000 troops, to make a divisionthat was both understrength In terms of the latest

14 CORG-M-365

*1

fI

tables of organization and an organizational hodgepodgeat that. Regiments throughout the country had to beskeletonized to do even that much. Officers with aknowledge of European armies blushed to imaginewhat the polite European military observers must bethinking,

But at least the division gave officers a tentativeexperience in handng large bodies of men, andespecially it afforded interesting tests of new SignalCorps equipment, irncluding telephones, wirelesscommunications devices, and "aeroplanes" for obser-vation and messenger service. The chief signalofficers said of the latter innovation:

"If there was any doubt in the minds ofindividuals of this command as to the utility of theaeroplane for military purposes, that doubt has beenremoved by aeronautical work done in this division."

Meanwhile, the very shortcomings of the ManeuverDivision served the purposes of the high command,permitting Wood to write in McClure' s that thedivision "demonstrated conclusively our helplessnessto meet with trained troops any sudden emergency,"while Stimson wrote in similar vein in the Independent.(Ref 1, p 334)

Stimson persuaded Congress to authorize the first peacetime tacticalUS Army units larger than a regiment, These were four divisions. Asnoted in Weigley:

... within a few weeks the coup against MexicanPresident Francisco Madero by General VictorianoHuerta touched off a spreading civil war that might lapacross the Rio Grande. President Taft askedStimson whether a strong force could quickly supple-ment the Army' s border patrols, and Stimson wasable to reply that he could aocomplish it with "only asingle order." On February 24, 1913, he ordered themobilization of the 2nd Division under Brigadier GeneralFrederick Funston at Texas City and Galveston.(Ref 1, p 335)

When the Mexican episode occurred, Stimson assembled an experimental"Maneuver Division" composed of three brigades, one field artillery brigade,and one independent cavalry brigade with supporting troops.

Reorganization and The National Defense Act

In 1915 World War I was raging in Europe and the American peoplehoped to avoid participation in the conflict. Propaganda, incidents,

CORG-MI-365 15

I

I-I

submarine warfare, diplomatic maneuvering, spying, and sabotage--allcontributed their share toward pushing the United States over the brink.SStimson, realizing the possibility of United States involvement, began to

reorganize the United States Regular Army on a modern divisional unitI basis. The following extract shows how this most important step wastaken and the result achieved:

The Secretary and the chief of staff followed up byinstructing the War College to prepare a plan for thetactical reorganization of the Army, to create a per-

manent divisional organization. If the "hitching post"forts could not be abolished, future concentrations mightbe facilitated by planning the assignments of thescattered garrisons, and division commanders mightcoordinate the training of all their units. If divisionswere created on paper, Congress might at leastagree to their occasional assembly for maneuvers.Early in 1913 Stimson brought together all the generalofficers who were within the continental United Statesto present the War Department plan to them. Someof the older ones still hesitated before so drastic aj departure from what they knew, but Stimson puthis experience as a barrister to good use andpersuaded them of the wisdom of creating the firstpeacetime tactical units larger than a regiment inthe Army's history: four divisions. (Ref 1, pp 334-335)

In 1916 Congress passed the National Defense Act. For thefirst time in American history, there was a clearcut charter for thenational defense. This document was a great political and militaryachievement. In the creation of the modern infantry division, it is alandmark. Historically, it went farther than any previous attempt toorganize the military forces of the country. Specifically, it prescrib(. ithe component parts of the infantry division in addition to establishing -hestrength of the various components of the Regular Army. The followiagoutlines the broad provisions of the act:

The National Defense Act of 1916 passed theSenate on May 17 and the House on May 20.

It provided for an increase of the authorizedpeace strength of the Regular Army to 175, 000 overa period of five years. In war the Regular Armywould be expansible to 286, 000 by building up thecadres of its 65 infantry regiments, 25 cavalryregiments, 21 field artillery regiments, 7 engineerregiments, 2 mounted engineer battalions, 263 coastartillery companies, 8 aero squadrons, and supportingformations. The law authorized tactical divisionsand brigades, three brigades to a division, threeregiments to a brigade. (Ref 1, p 348)

16 CORG-M-365! II',

fi

Inasmuch as tne national military policy and suggested organizationhad been generally followed by the States of the Union (especially with re-ference to military organization and equipment), the War Department urg, J 14

that the several States establish National Guard divisions based upon thepattern set forth in the National Defense Act of 1916. In view of the waroverseas, the possibility of national mobilization was an ever-present factof the national existence. However, the National Guard divisions did notbecome a fait accompli until America entered the war._

The War Department urged the states to createbalanced Guard divisions including cavalry and artilleryas well as infantry, but neither the federal governmentnot (sic) the states appropriated the funds necessary tofinance the more expensive specialized arms. TheNational Guard remained almost entirely infantry,without their own supporting units. (Ref 1, p 324)

The United States militpry professionals observed the European con-flict for over three years. The General Staff of the United States Armycame to the conclusion that the US Army infantry division, as organized inaccordance with the National Defense Act of 1916, was already obsolete.There were valid reasons for reaching this conclusion. Up to that time,the most recent American military experience had been against Mexicanbandits and revolutionaries. This campaign was one of mobility and wasprimarily conducted by cavalry units. In the trenches of the WesternFront in France, mobility was nonexistent and the infantry was boggeddown in mud and wire. The patterns that had been developed and usedsuccessfully in operations in Flanders and France were studied. With"tactical maneuver passe, fire from both small arms and artillery wasa possible solution to the stalemate. But massive firepower was exactingheavy casualties on both sides. Hence, the infantry division had to belarge in order to absorb heavy losses and continue to be combat operational.

The Army Lineage Book states the approach taken:

Three years of observation of the war in Europehad convinced the General Staff that American tables oforganization were obsolete. Accordingly, on 14 July 1917a series of changes in them began. The first one alteredthe triangular division, containing elements gri ýped bythrees, to a square one. In this change, the threebrigades of a division and the three regiments of thebrigfade gave way to two of each. These alterationswere based on the observed fact that a square division

demonstrated far greater power to penetrate thesystem of trenches (peculiar to World War I) thanother types. The result was a much larger divisionand brigade than any used by the nations of Europe.As finally shaken down, an American division con-tained 27, 123 men, nearly twice the number inEuropean units. Fire power in both division andbrigade was greatly augmented. (Ref S, p 35)

CORG-M-365 17

The war in Europe had reached a stalemate because of loss of mobility,high rate of fire of the machinegun, and the lethality of artillery and trenchmortars. General John J. Pershing, the designated Commander-in-Chiefof the American Expeditionary Forces to ba sent abroad, rioted the role ofthe machinegun and made a vital interpretation:

Indeed, machineguns are credited with having createdthe war of position, and the accompanying stalemates whichprevailed during 1915, 1916, and 1917. General Pershingcarried this interpretation farther. He said that trenchwarfare had caused the belligerents in Europe to embracea faulty doctrine. The latter placed too great a relianceon artillery and on mechanical aids. Pershing insisted,in contrast, that the basis of a sound army remained, asit had always been, a sturdy infantry. Accordingly, herequired that American foot soldiers be trained primarilyfor open warfare, and only incidentally for duty in thetrenches. (Ref 8, p 38)

US Involvement, World War I

The Square Division

The United States of America entered the war on 6 April, 1917 andthe War Department was quick to take action to begin a series of changeswhich would bring the US Army organization into line with that of the Frenchand British Allies. How the planners in the War Department in Washingtonapplied the observed and reported battlefield lessons in divisional reorgani-zation was shown in the development of a provisional infantry division whichwas to be the answer to the requirement that the infantry of the US Armytake its place alongside the veterans of three years of combat in Flandersand France (Fig. 5 and 6 and Table I). This was indeed a pioneer effort asdesignated by Pizer in the following:

$ The pioneer square division, the provisional1st Expeditionary Division, was established in 1917.It was composed of a headquarters, two infantrybrigades, a field artillery brigade, a machine gunbattalion, an engineer regiment, a signal battalion,and support and service units. Each of the infantrybrigades included two infantry regiments and onemachine-gun battalion. Each of the infantry regimentsconsisted of three infantry battalions and one machine-gun company. The field artillery brigade consistedof two 3-inch field gun regiments and one 6-inchhowiýzer regiment. (Ref 14, p 34) (Fig. 7)

Developments in Weaponry

Machineguns were used in the US Army prior to 1917, but they werenot organized in specialized units, except in the infantry regimental

18 CORG-M-365

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TABLE I. INFANTRY DIVISION, STRENGTH BY UNIT CATEGORY

INFANTRY DIVISION

Table of Organization, Provisional Orf. author.

4ay 3, 1917. Ifed by the W. 0. andpublished In, 0. 0. i14,

UNITS A. E. F., July 15, 1917.

No. of No. ofSunits Strength units Strength

Division Headquarters i 153 I 153infantry Brigades: 3 lal 2 (a) "

Brigade Hlqrs. 3 57 2 38Infantry Reginmnts: 9 Ib) 4 (ib

Reg ie•rtal Hdqrs. 9 4 8itS-rters Co. 531 4 1136

Mx Sfi ne Gun Cos, 9 1cl 702 0 (cl 0k Suipply Cos . 9 35 4 456

infatry Battalions: 27 12Battal ion Mqrs. 27 54 12 24Rifle Cos. 1(0 16524 36 7544Machine Gun Cos. 0 (cl l 12 1c) 1824

NWdical Dept. arl Chaplains for 3 Brig. 342 for 2 Brig. 152Field Artillery Srifice 1 I I

Br igade Headquarters I1 19 I 19

3-inch Field Guns, Regt. 2 2616 2 26766-Inch Hoeitzers, Regt. IId) 1308 I 1514ITrenich Mwrtar Battery 01 I 0 1 le) 193 "•

Medical Dept. ard Chaplains 87 l98

Ernginers, FAegt. 1098 I If) 109:Field Signal Battalion I 262

r Aero Squ•dron I '73 I 173

Total for Dlv. I less Trains) 25871 17170

Trains: - - [g)Train Hjqrs. and iit. Police I 332 I (h) 234

SMlpnition Train 1 (i) 647 1 M 949Supply Train I 309 Ijl 309Ligirneer Train I 170 I Wl 115W nitary Train 1 927 j I I) 715

-ota! for Trai.is 23E6 2322

Aggregate for the dl islon 2862% 19492

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22 CORG-M-365

machinegun company. By July 1917, just two months after America'sentry into the war, a machinegun company was assigned to each infantrybattalion of the three battalions integral to each infantry regiment. Later,in France, the machinegun companies were organized into separate battalionsand not assigned organically to the infantry regiments, Eventually, therewere two types of machinegun battalions, as noted in the extract below:

In May 1917 there was but one machine-gun companyto each infantry regiment, while by July the number hadrisen to one per battalion. The ideal arrangement, afterJuly, was to include three machine gun companies inevery infantry regiment. Unfortunately, this could notbe done--because of the way the National Defense Actwas worded--without cutting some rifle companies outof the regiment. Accordingly, it was necessary to createmachine-gun battalions that were elements of brigades anddivisions, leaving just one company organic to infantryregiments...

The brigade battalions of machine guns containedthree companies, while the division battalion was at firstorganized with four. This made a very awkward arrange-ment since machine gun companies had to be drawn fromthree sources--regiment, brigade, and division--in orderto work with infantry battalions. Although the arrangementremained awkward throughout the war, and brigade anddivisional battalions continued in being, the divisionbattalion was finally reduced to two companies. Thesewere motorized and used as a highly mobile element ofthe divisional reserve. (Ref 8, p 36-37)

Because of the tremendous firepower of automatic weapons and theabsolute requirement for enough men to reach the objective and drive outor destroy the enemy, considerable depth was required for all formationsof the infantry d-vision in the attack. Allied combat experience prior tothe entry of American troops showed conclusively that it was the smalltactical units that accomplished the final assault phase of the mission. Tosurvive and reach the objective, each formation had to be echeloned indepth.

... depth was necessary to infantry formations. In theattack this meant successive waves of men; in defense,"numerous positions, staggered irregularly one behindthe other. Accordingly, all units from division downto platoon were organized to give the required depthwithin their respective sectors. Having mentionedplatoons it is important to register the fqct that the warconfirmed the trend toward refining the organization ofinfantry units. Squads and platoons proved to be indis-pensible in twentieth century combat. Frequently the

CORG-M-365 23

I1

outcome of a fight depended on the integrity of thoseelements since they, and they alone, could be con-trolled personally by their leaders when under veryheavy fire. (Ref 8, p 38)

The use of the new weapons, established by past operational experiencesof the Allies, was rapidly learned by American infantry divisions. TheFrench and British had reached artiliery-like precision of fire withmachineguns. French mortars, grenades, and automatic rifles werespecialized infantry weapons and required trained specialists and teams tooperate them. The infantryman was no longer only a rifleman; he wasrequired to master numerous unfamiliar weapons.

The advent of the trench mortar had considerable effect on the tacticalorganization of infantry division units during World War I and thereafter.Mortars, first and foremost, gave the infantry units their own artillery.Infantry mortars were a limited but acceptable and handy substitute forthe light 75mm artillery of the day, although they never displaced theheavier artillery as an integral part of each division organization. Theinfantry, artillery, and tank (armor) team were to emerge from World War Ias permanent features of military operations. Mortars assured the infantryheavy fire support for advances in conjunction with tanks without the assistanceof heavier artillery.

In addition to being organized to give depth, units atall levels were formed to give effect to the new weapons,and to avoid losses from them in the hands of the enemy.It has been noted that the expanding use of machine gunsrequired reorganizations which reached from divisionsdown to companies. The other weapons exacted changes,but they were not quite as widely disseminated. Forexample, infantry mortars and one-pounder guns found aplace in the headquarters companies of regiments. Handgrenades, rifle grenades, and automatic rifles causedmany changes in the organization of companies and theircomponents. The fact is that the question as to their bestarrangement was never definitely settled during the war.All were included in a rifle company, but sometimes theAR men were formed together, as were the grenadiersand rifle grenadiers; other times they were scatteredamong the squads. As late as November 1918, in theMeuse-Argonne battle, the specialists stayed together incombat groups, but the trend was toward dispersion so thatevery squad contained at least one AR man, one goodgrenade thrower, and one rifle grenadier. (Ref 8, pp 38-39)

The American Infantry Division, World War I

The historical rationale for the figure of 27,000 men and about 1, 000officers recommended for the American World War I infantry division was

* the decision of General Pershing (Ref 15) (Table 11). European divisions

S 24 CORG-M-365

24

TABLE II. COMPARISONS OF DIVISION STRENGTH, 1917-1918

I PliSIONAL 0A ORGANIZATION GsIc. Oai. PROJ. TAOL[.

TAOL( OF O An,; A7 I0 ZATI 01 lZE BY ThE A3 MODIF7IEO f ORGCA4106'OI.

00 WAll 0DPT. 0 PUOLiOEO 40 f10., 6 T_ &FU 0. ISNr0 O-units M MAY 1917 o s0 1., A',F. II T. OF0. 3001S A, It Nov 19t0

11 JULY I lt S A60 1917

N0. Units IS 5trigt no. Units •trength No. unIts 3tSItngtn .0. Unlit Strength

.v 0i1QS 1 15i 1 153 1 308

Ir rit 3 -- 3 -- 2 - 3

Srig 990 57 3 6 2 i 1 500In•' 00311 '9 -- 8 -" A --

0egO0r 9q O II A 54A I A .

l190 COs 511 4 1,13: 4 1.001 1.37'1

Sc 3o 7o 2 - - 712• 71Sup 91 I1 Co II •I 40 .. 18

In 21 -1 12 -- 12 -

210 S 521 12 2a 12 30 1t t6

l1Ifl0 C+s I 0 16.531 16 7. s8a 17.680 Is 12 , 7641

MIG Coo - tl 1.82A - - - I

ING ii5 .. ....- 7 1. 110 1,518

MeoC| a LIh•. lobs ror i~ s -- rto, 2 Pigs to, 2 6rign for 2 Mt• 30s 6 ot r fo rigs 2.0

0Onance 0Dept . ...- - 0 - 80

IN1 jI Fed tinitS 2- -ir.l0 Alit - I 1r I -I I J

3rar gun ory I 1s I 10i 1 07?

6 I6101 6 C•, ol.lIns -- I 96 - 107 0

Ordfl 001 D-e -

V I F:tII Ofil .Unit1c.l~) se + + .57o .. ..CA,1 ry AlM0 O1 . . .9.. 1 - " --

Conhlr, .. . ..n-- - - I -i 1 -0

A Io~n HQ At-- I so

AM, 6 1 . , , 1 ,6 I 1. D

'mwiCo -a A"pa~ -1 2 3540I0'CAI 004 -h -I~n-.. . .. . 10 -- 1

Ordnance Dept .-. - 6

Air46r h l I 1.- |.07 1.. . .

650061A CIOIIV332 -1 -) -- 3 j 11-A I - -- "

T OsI - 1, 0 1,I -- )o6 1 205 1

SIrldn H31 64 SO 1 739 I 763 .... .. o~

lAfri Hl 0.1.... I t 113613)8 -

Y'*V 518 - -.... -I•+ l o

xl~e l a vat Sect.. .... 1Eyet iI- .. .. - 310 1 11o0r6o.06, . . ... .. - 19Li

Arexi Train 1 6017 1 99 I 1." Iat 1.31

Sup ply T r ain 1 310 1 30 9 t 0 71 1 301

tng•si, r Tra in 1 176 1 119 1 80 1 60

Sanitary Train I 917 I 719 1 -It -Train NO ...., I

mIul Sect

i ,lý el~ u I sec .111- 1

C o,-Ani1-d•0r6V . ... 16 1 19Field Hwp .5• -I*

C000 -r-n. I 6 1 7

Co Molvr-d6.4 1 70 11 267

CoS - Atn4I-dr .n .. .. 7 17 : ] 01

Ca• Inf i rnwir ia+... 16DA- 1MedIcal - --8.... . 1 unit

Total 11.-i T Jos8 - .! ,9 .1300nI iC l o~l'l tf7n, -- --.-1 -- - -, 1 -- 9,06

G0l40 TOTAL - s,6,lob1 30.156 It ) 19.9II 71, 3 30.103

CORG-M-365 25

I_1

were much smaller (one-half as large) but Pershing believed that the infantrydivision should possess the personnel strength to absorb expected battlecasualties. Pershing was motivated by a desire to get the troops out of thetrenches and into an operational pattern where the doctrines of fire andmovement (mobility) would again rule the battlefield. Casualties would beheavy in view of past operational experiences. Although the General'sdecision has been criticized, the judgment of history seems to be on his side.Weigley explains, in some detail, the situation confronting the AmericanExpeditionary Forces commander as he estimated his organizational situation:

French, British, and German divisions formally num-bered about 12, 000 combatants each, and when MarshalJoffre visited the United States immediately after thedeclaration of war he recommended the same size: European

officers believed that 12,000 combatants represented themaximum number that one general and his staff couldhandle. Actually, French and British divisions were oftendov, n to as few as 5, 000 combatants. In a debatabledecision, however, Pershing fixed an American divisionat 979 officers, 27,082 men, with support troops makinga total of about 40, n00. His purpose was to achieve acapacity for sustained battle which would ensure thatAmerican divisions would not falter short of their objec-tives as British and French divisions so often had done.For the warfare of the Western Front, where rapid andflexible maneuver was not at a premium, Pershing' sjudgment may have been right.

The American infantri division consisted of twobrigades of infantry, one of field artillery (two regimentsof 75-mm guns, one of 155-mm guns), a regiment ofengineers, a division machine-gun battalion, a signalbattalion, and the division supply and sanitary trains.Each infantry brigade in turn comprised two infantryregiments, each including three battalions and amachine-gun company. The battalion numbered fourcompanies of 6 officers and 250 men each; the strengthof a regiment was 112 officers and 3,720 men. TheTables of Organization and Equipment allotted to aninfantry division 72 artillery pieces, 260 machine guns,and 17,666 rifles. The division was the basic, self-contained unit and could be shifted readily from onecorps to another or from one part of the front toanother. (Ref 1, p 386)

To effect the desired changes in the divisional organization of theArmy, subordinate units were dropped, added, or reformed. Changesin weaponry and unit organization were incorporated. (Many of thesewere to survive the severc test of World War I combat and to reappear inTables of Organization for World War I1.) Trench warfare demanded that

26 CORG-M-365I,

specific weapons be created or revived for specific purposes and missions.

Regimental organization underwent some changes,but the National Defense Act forbade increasing the numberof companies in a regiment beyond fifteen. Among thefifteen, a headquarters, a supply, and a machine-guncompany received permanent status for the first time.In any case, the changes reflected the requirements oftrench warfare in Europe. As a result, an infantryregiment jumped from 2,002 to 3,720 enlisted men withan even larger increase in firepower.

The increase in size resulted from the need for deepformations in both attack and defense. In the attack, two

battalions abreast might make up the first wave and thecompanies within them would be arranged also in depth.Behind the attack wave would come a support wave, perhapsthe third battalion, and behind it would be elements, with-drawn from the three battalions, operating as a reserve.Likewise successive positions in depth were the standardformation in defense. Such formations to be adequaterequired large regiments. As had been the case since theWar with Spain, infantry regiments contained three bat-talions of four companies each. (Ref 8, p 36)

The war was a positional or trench war until 1918, when the Americanand Allied divisions broke out of the trenches and penetrated the almostimpregnable enemy defense (the Hindenburg and the Argonne Forest,Chateau Thierry, and Belleau Woods). Divisions were large because of therequirement for the power of large regiments and the ability to sustaincasualties in both the attack and the defense.

Aerial Warfare

The warfare of 1914-1918 opened a new dimension for combat. Aerialwarfare became the most novel form of combat and the airplane became ahighly specialized weapon in the arsenal of war. The function of the airplanesand pilots was, at first, reconnaissance in the manner of the old-timecavalry. This concept changed as planes waged aerial combat and heavierplanes functioned as artillery in dropping bombs. The advent of the aerialwarfare affected the size and operations of the infantry, division. No longerwas the foot unit to be free from enemy harassment; rear areas wheredivision supplies and ammunition were stored became prime targets forairplanes of all types. A new form of defense, antiaircraft artillery, emerged,distinct from field and heavy artillery. Most important the best defenseagainst an airplane was another airplane and soon infantry division hadaerosquadrons (battalions) of airplanes and pilots attached to meet and defeatthis threat from the skies. The following comment is significant of the newweapon:

The advent of Pircraft increased the vulnerabilityof rear areas, but it also improved reconnaissance.

CORG-M-365 27

To counter this new weapon, antiaircraft units wereformed, and friendly aircraft were assigned counter-airresponsibilities. While "aero" squadrons were attachedas far down as division, some flexibility was retained.Pershing created a separate air section for the AEF,for the purpose of over-all supervision of air activities.Training and equipping of American air units was accomplishedin France. On several occasions, aircraft were massed

L for offensive action. The first such large-scale air actionof the war took place under First Army control in con-junction with the St. Mihiel offensive. At that time nearly1,500 aircraft were employed -- of which about one-thirdwere attached to subordinate units. (Ref 16, p 53)

Restoration of Mobility

Another development in weaponry was the advent of the armored tankwith fire superiority over machineguns. The somewhat more mobileinfantry division required portable supporting heavy weapons in the attackingwaves of its units.

The partial restoration by the tank of a degree of mobility to thebattlefields of World War I, and the accelerated speed of the infantry rateof advance, brought forth an immediate requirement for a light, portableinfantry mortar. This weapon, of necessity, had to be one that could beserved by a crew of one, two, or three men and carried by hand as thedisplaced forward. In reality, the tank became a light artillery andmachinegun, mobile, armor-covered platform. As such it was effectiveagainst troops in the trenches. It could crush wire obstacles, pillboxes,and strong points. But the number of tanks was limited and the infantryman,taking maximum advantage of the newly restored mobility, required portablemortars and machineguns. Thus, the restoration of mobility had the directeffect of causing the trench artillery (heavy mortars) to be replaced bylighter, more portable weapons, such as the Stokes. In essence, the Stokes

Swas a highly portable, three-inch-diameter steel pipe which threw a high-explosive shell.

With the restoration of mobility and the possibility of maneuver, thecommand and control of the infantry division was placed where it belonged--in the hands of the division commander and his staff officers. Dependingupon the type of maneuver intended, the commander could utilize hissubordinate units to give weight and penetration to certain areas in theattack. Depending upon the strength of the enemy position and its troops,the division commander could adjust the frontage of his attack. Thus, froma combat pattern of small, semi-independent actions in trench warfare, apattern of mobile, coordinated operations -merged, sweeping the divisioncommander and his staff into direct contro and direction of the unitsconcerned with the carrying out of the division' s overall mission. By the

28 CORG-M-365

end of World War I:

If the division were engaged in a breakthroughoperation, the commander would concentrate his meansto assure a penetration. His division, deployed in asquare of three battalions abreast by three in depth,would attack supported by tanks on a front of 1. 5 to2.5 miles with the objective of effecting a penetrationthree to five miles deep. If enemy resistance wereweak, he might operate on a front of six to eight miles,decentralizing the action of his regiments and placingdirect support artillery at their disposal. He wouldkeep a maneav,,wz 7"g force of one infantry regiment andhis general s,,i )It artillery. (Ref 2, p 85)

World War I was instrumental in tV-c development of the first "modern"infantry division which maneuvered and delivered fire in a manner notdissimilar to the infantry division of Napoleon. But it was huge and unwieldy,retaining much of its personnel from the casualty-ridden days of frontalattack trench warfare.

World War I infantry divisions were supported logistically by a com-bination of organically assigned animal-drawn and motorized vehicles(see Fig. 8). The a-lditional use of motorized infantry was not a new concept.Indeed, in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany therehad been prewar experiments with internal combustion engine-poweredvehicles, both air and ground, for military purposes. The automobile wasto exert great influence on military organization and tactics.

Both the victors and the vanquished learned from their mistakes andsuccesses. Almost immediately, the professionals were faced with pre-paration for the " next war. " Military policy and doctrine continued to beenunciated by the war offices of all nations. France, the United States,and Great Britain, with their joint experiences on the battlefields of France,developed similar divisional organizations.

Post-War Developments

World War I ended with the signing of the Armistice on 11 November, 1918.The divisions of the National Army, including those of the Regular Army andNational Guard, were shipped home from France and, in most cases,demobilized. The Regular Arny and National Guard division were retainedand many of the wartime National Army divisions were kept on paper in areserve corps status. In 1920, the National Defense Act of 1916 was amendedand published as the National Defense Act of 1920. The Act provided for thenational defense and specific illy constituted the Army of the United States(the Regular Army, the Nati isl Guard, and the Organized Reserve). Underthe Act, the entire country wrs divided into nine corps areas (groupings offive or more states able to fu. nish ample personnel for an active Army corpsin event of a national emergei iy). Within each geographical corps area, therewere assigned a Regular Arm, division, two National Guard divisions, and

CORG-M-365 29

I!,,-

three divisions of the Organized Reserve. Further, an Officer's ReserveCorps was established. The enlisted personnel for the Organized Reserveunits, in event of emargency,were to come from the operation of the SelectiveService System. At last, the need for a permanent divisional organizationfor the three components of the Army of the United States had been recognizedand incorporated in future mobilization plans. The World War I division wascarefully examined with a view to needed reorganization.

Immediately after World War I ended, the Army hadbegun a reexamination of the huge infantry division of thatwar. The 1917- 18 division had possessed the greatstaying power that Pershing expected of it, but it was alsoa cumbersome division difficult to maneuver and support.Pershing himself was willing after the war to study asmaller, more nimble division, better suited to the openwarfare which he himself so strongly emphasized, and tobe supported with completely motorized transport. Out ofthe consequent studies came the plan for the triangulardivision of three regiments, with brigade organizationomitted, to rcplace the square division of four regimentsin two brigides. (Ref 1, p 461)

In the Regular Army service schools at Fort Benning and Fort Sill,in the Office of the Chief of Infantry, and in the Infantry Board, ideas andsuggested new formations were tried out for the infantry division. Despitethe limitations of the budget and the 1v f weapons and equinnent thesmall Regular Army continued to advan,;e and test ideas. This was an ageof experimentation and,

The Chief of Infantry, The Infantry School, the InfantryBoard, the Department of Experiment, the Tank Board,and the Tank School engaged vigorously in .he developmentof infantry. The earliest fruit of their attention was acomplete revision of the tables of organization. In thisalteration, made during the twenties, the square divisionsurvived, but some of its infantry components wereconsiderably modified. The most extreme change tookplace in infantry battalions, where one rifle company waseliminated and replaced by a machine-g-an company. Thisalteration corrected the confusion of World War I in theuse of machine-guns by placing the heavies under thecontrol of infantry battalion commanders. Almost asextreme was the reduction of the number of platoons ina rifle company from four to three. Both these changeswere in the direction of what was later called " triangular-ization, " although it was not yet accepted as a broadprinciple. (Ref 8, p 42)

Participation in World War I gave the United States Army its firstexperience with modern 20th century warfare. As a result, improved andmore lethal weapons and equipment had been made part of the equipment

30 CORG-M-365

A

i

I

of the infantry division (Table II). In the infantry division there were basicproblems of organization to be solved to ensure that firepower and move-ment could be achieved by a smaller division. To maintain the firepowerof a 28, 000-man infantry division while reducing it to 15,000 men was thedilemma of military planners of the 1920's and 1930' s. The improvementof firepower with more or new weapons, the reorganization of the basicunits within the division, especially those smaller ones which would bearthe responsibility of physically closing with the enemy in a future war--allthese considerations were given due weight in the deliberations of the testboards. World War I combat-experienced members of the various boardsand service schools experimental units often were not in complete agreementwith the radical and drastic organizational changes proposed. Eventually,the experiments and the testers were brought into proper focus and agree-ment because

... the object sought was an infantry division that wassmaller and faster than the old but with as much fire-power. To obtain it the infantry establishment, fromsquad up to division, was given the most thoroughexamination it had ever received. Not everyoneengaged in the examination agreed as to the mcansto the end. Most accepted three infantry regimentsto a division, but differed as to their composition.The Chief of Infantry, for example, proposed four,instead of three platoons to a rifle company, and afourth rifle company in e-, * battalion

•. in 1937, the 2d Division was formed into a pro-visional unit to test the various proposals. Forseveral months it tried out the suggested arrange-ments in the field. The trials were remarkablythorough, although they were handicapped by shortagesof weapons and vehicles. For example, no lightmortars were available, while only one regimentcould be completely equipped with the M1 rifle.There were not enough .50-caliber machine-guns,and, of course, no light machine-guns at all.(Ref 8. p 46)

A result of the Army experiments and studies was a new "triangular"divisional organization, approved in 1939, contrasted to old World War I"square" division (Fig. 8; Tab)e IV). Test divisions were formed inaccord with the various formations suggested; trial maneuvers on the groundwere conducted under the highly professional guidance of General Lesley J.McNair, who initially served as chief of staff of one of the experimentaldivisions. McNair's concepts of military formations for modern warfare,were instrumental in shaping the World War 11 infantry division. Weigleysays of McNair's policy on divisional organization:

The new organization was approved in principlein 1935, and in 1937 and 1939 the model of the new

CORG-M-365 31

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CORG-M-36

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34 CORGM365

division was developed through field tests, perhapsthe most elaborate of their kind ever conducted inpeacetime in the United States.

McNair himself did the main work of trans-forming the new division from theory to actualityas chief of staff of the test division. Out of thetests came a report recommending a triangulardivision of 10,275 men to replace the 22,000-mansquare division. The War Department did notapprove quite so drastic a reduction even thoughit approved the principal organizational patternsthat emerged from the tests; it adopted a divisionof 14,981 men. During the interval when McNairwas chief of staff, GHQ, he lost direct connectionwith infantry reorganization, and in his opinion fatbegan to accumulate In the division anew. When hebecame commander of AGF, he created a studygroup to trim down the infantry division again, fromits then authorized strength of 15,500 men.

"The triangular division was initiated some fiveyears ago [ he said] with the primary purpose ofstreamlining the organization and rendering it moreeffective in combat. Since the reorganization therehas been a steady succession of changes, all in thedirection of returning to the cumbersome and im-practicable organization of the old square division.It is felt mandatory that every proposal which in-creases overhead must be resisted if the divisionis to be effective in combat. " (Ref 1, pp 461-462)

Basically, the three-part infantry division consisted of the maneuverforce made up of infantry, artillery, and tanks. But revolutionarytechnological developments were in the offing; the appearance of the airplane,the rapid-firing cannon, automatic small arms, and improved motor vehiclesand high-speed tanks were to change the structure and organization of theinfantry divisions of all armies. General Charles de Gaulle, GeneralHeinz Guderian, General J. F. C. Fuller, General William Mitchell,Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart were among the military thinkers who, between1920 and 1940, exerted tremendous influence upon military organizationand tactics at all levels. General Fuller theorized on mobility and mechanizedwarfare; Guderian, on tank tactics; General deGaulle offered forecasts of thearmy of the future, and Liddell-Hart conducted profound studies on mobility.All, except the late General Mitchell, the great advocate of airpower, wereto see their theses proven in the crucible of war.

CORG-M-365 35

POST-WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II, 1939-1945

Post-World War I Developments

The period following World War I was a "Dark Age" in the historyof the Army. It was evident that reorganization was needed, but militaryexperimentation and testing had to be curtailed--first because of thepacifism of the postwar years, then because of the economic depression.The long overdue reorganization study was not begun until 1935. The Chiefof Staff of the Army described the problem and offered his views in a com-munique circulated to commanding generals of all major commands, tobranch chiefs, War Colleges, the Command and General Staff School, andthe National Guard Bureau. He defined the goal of the study board with aquote from General Douglas MacArthur's final report as Army Chief of Staff.

This process of stripping from combat units every uselessimpediment must go further than the mere removal of con-tingent supplies and equipment. It will likewise affectorganization. Difficulty in movement mounts rapidly withthe size of the command, and the effort must be to reduceevery echelon to the smallest possible size consistentwith requisite power in shock and fire action. (Ref 17, p 34)

The Triangular Division

In January 1936, a special committee was appointed to conduct a studyon the modernization of the Army. Reorganization was considered in thelight of the need for mobility and the advances which had beeri made inweaponry, transport, and communications; a particularly importantconsideration was the impact of air power. The committee's report,submitted six months later, proposed a triangular divisional organization.The two brigade headquarters were eliminated and one infantry regimentdropped. In place of the brigades there were three infantry regiments ofthree rifle battalions each.

... a motorized reconnaissance battalion (200 men),a signal company (197 men), an engineer battalion toinclude a traffic control detachment (500 men), and"service troops" (1820 men). This last category wouldconsist of a grouping, under a brigadier general, ofthe quartermaster, ordnance, medical, and all otherdivisional supply and maintenance units. Such a grouping,the committee felt, would provide a slot for brigadiergenerals dispossessed of their brigade commands.

All technical signal communications, except withinthe artillery battalions, would be provided by the SignalCorps. The former infantry and artillery brigade head-quarters were eliminated. The slot in the service groupaccommodated one brigadier general; the job of infantryadvisor was created, apparently to provide for the other.The division staff was reduced, and the G-1 section elimi-nated, its functions being transferred to the AdjutantGeneral s section. (Ref 17, pp 3 5-36)

36 CORG-M-365

The plan provided for a specific support element for the division. Forthe first time supply and maintenance units were grouped. (This concepthas survived to the present with the advent of the support command of theROAD Division.)

The triangular division was tested successfully in the field in 1937 and1939. But the new organization was not in the form of an approved Tableof Organization until after the collapse of France in 1940. All RegularArmy divisions were then reorganized in conformity with the new table(See Appendix C ). After Pearl Harbor, the National Guard divisions wererequired to conform. This situation was fraught with political repercussionsbecause it eliminated grades and commands and overage commanders wererelieved (Ref 18). Jacobs discusses the birth of the triangular division:

The War Department endorsed this idea in 1935; thenew tactical concept was given limited tests in the fieldin 1937, and then tried more extensively in maneuversin 1939. The 2d Division was the first to be madetriangular, in 1939; but not until after the fall of Francein 1940 did the War Department actually come up witha new table of organization.

This table established a strength level of apprcximately15, 000 men in contrast to the 28,105 in a World War Idivision. The brigade headquarters were eliminated,thus doing away with an unnecessary intermediate head-quarters in the chain of command. The triangulardivision got its name from the fact that three infantryregiments of three battalions each were its basic elements.The division had four artillery battalions. One remainedunder division control for general support; each of theothers was normally assigned to support a specificinfantry regiment. Thus each division commander hadin effect three well-balanced combat teams, or regimentalcombat teams. (Ref 19, p 26)

The new triangular organization was put into effectin the Regular Army during 1939. Within the NationalGuard, however, the square organization, somewhatmodified, persisted even after many units had enteredFederal service in 1940.

AUl in all, the Chief of Infantry contended, andrightly, that in the years from 1937 to 1941 AmericanInfantry had undergone a real revolution. Organization-wise, the foot establishment was arranged along linesthat had been more carefully tested than ever beforein peacetime. As for weapons, they were turned overcompletely, except for the .30-caliber heavy machinegun. In other words, the 60-mm mortar (first adopted-s standard in 1937, but remaining scarce) had replaced

' ;5 . ; 37

the old Stokes and its suceessors, while a heavier mortar,81-mm, had been introduced. A light machine gun hadactually been adopted and the BAR so much improved asto be virtually made over. Finally, the Springfield 1903shoulder rifle had yielded place to the semi-automaticM1. In addition, new small arms such as carbines andsubmachine guns had entered infantry armament, togetherwith the larger machine gun, the .50-caliber.(Ref 8, pp 47-48)

Armor and Combat Cars

The groundwork had bepn laid for a permanent mechanized force andan armored division as enurly as 1928 when Secretary of War Dwight F. Davisvisited'England and saw a tank demonstration at the famous British trainingground at Aldershot, Salisbury Plains. He was so impressed by the smallbattalion-size mechanized force of tanks, artillery, engineers, and signaltroops that, when he returned to the United States, he ordered the develop-ment of a similar unit in the US Army. In 1930, an experimental mechanizedforce was assembled at Fort Eustis, Virginia (although it was later abandoned).At the conclusion of the experiment, the arms and services were directedto carry on their own experiments in mechanization. The infantry, underthe National Defense Act of 1920, was charged with responsibility for thetanks. The cavalry, the most mobile arm, possessed some armored carsin addition to its horses.

In a skillful maneuver, the Chief of Cavalry had the tanks assigned tohis arm designated "combat cars" in order to avoid competing with theinfantry in tank development.

To allow the Cavalry to develop armor along linesindependent of the Infantry, the mechanized cavalry wasformed under the Chief of Cavalry. Though not equippedwith tanks, its so-called, combat cars were similarto the infantry tanks. (Ref 20, p 14)

The infantry continued its experiments with armored vehicles whichwere essentially designed for the support of infantry in close combat.But the cavalry

.. forced to seek a substitute for the horse, sawthe tank and its organization as organically combiningall the supporting arms - infantry, artillery, air,signal corps, and engineer and other auxiliary services.Contrary to the basic infantry concept of the combatrole of the tank, the cavalry concept was based uponthe combined arms team idea, with great mobility,long radius of action, away from a base. The cavalryconcept gave armor the independence required toenable it to conduct missions deep in hostile territory.The combat value of stock action as in the old horsecavalry was stressed by the cavalry proponents ofarmor. (Ref 21, p 22)

38 CORG-M-365

II

The Tank-Infantry Relationstip

Modern warfare emphasized a high degree of motorized mobility anda growing airpower. Armored vehicles and tanks were capable of speedand firepower far beyond that of the lumbering World War I tanks.

The postwar period had demonstrated, beyond the shadow of a doubt,that the armored tank had a permanent place in the arsenal of war. Whereit belonged, who controlled it, and its basic mission in combat were pointsof dispute between the military intellectuals of all forces.

American military doctrine recognized that the tank and the footsoldier were interdependent. The tank helped the infantry to advance; thesoldier on the ground protected the tank as it advanced. Up to 1939, theUnited States Army Field Service Regulations prescribed that the Infantrydivision include a company of light tanks in its Table of Organization.This minimal allocation indicates that the armored division had not yetprogressed much beyond the "planning board stage."

The Army Lineage Book, Volume 11, Infantry, offers the followingcomment on the matter of infantry control of the tanks:

The World War had displayed two very pressingneeds in warfare. One was for protection from devastatingfires, the other for greater mobility. When applied toinfantry, the two were contradictory, for the more pro-tection the infantryman had, the heavier and slower hetended to become. After the war, as we have seen,tanks were made part of the infantry. They offered tofoot soldiers some added mobility and some protection.Accordingly, infantry doctrine took tanks into account,and the American infantry division included a companyof light tanks in its organic structure. Indeed, in thebasic theory, expressed in the Field Service Regulationsof 1939, armor was given the primary mission ofhelping the infantry advance. This being so, one canunderstand why the Chief of Infantry strongly protestedwhen, in July 1940, armor was removed from thecontrol of infantry. As of 1939, tanks dropped out ofour infantry divisions, and never reentered organicallyuntil after the second World War. (Ref 8, p 45)(Emphasis added)

The supportive relationship of the infantry and tanks was recognizedby General Lesley J. McNair, Chief of the Army Ground Forces. Whenthe office of the Chief of Infantry was phased out, McNair took over itsfunctions in March 1942. The organization and employment of the tank-infantry relationship were molded to his concepts. The following definesthe basic position of the General,

... who had always doubted the invulnerability ofthe tank. It became clear that tanks would frequently

CORG-M-365 39

have to be escorted by foot troops sent ahead to locate anddestroy antitank defenses. It was recognized that thearmored division, internally, required more infantry inproportion to tanks and, externally, would usually operatein closer proximity to infantry divisions than had beensupposed. The increasing rapprochement between tanksand infantry raised not only the question of the internalstructure of the armored division but also that of thenumber of armored divisions which ought to be mobilized...(Ref 22, pp 322-323)

While military planners wrestled with problems of reorganization,history-making events were taking place. The invasion of Poland by theWehrmacht in September 1939 gave a startling demonstration of how armorhad restored mobility to warfare. German armor with Its tremendousshock power and breakthrough capability, created a new dimension in warfare.In the 1940 attack on France, the German "marriage" of the low-flyingattack bomber to the armor attacking columns moving below added a newterm--Blitzkrieg or lightning war--to the military vocabulary. TheUnited States' immediate reaction was to plan an armored force.

World War II Divisions

Armored Division

The following commentary on the organization of the armored divisionduring World War II is helpful in understanding the general bases of thedivisional structure. There were those armor enthusiasts in the US Armywho believed that the day of infantry had passed and that the fast-movinghard-hitting tank was the solution to all the tactical problems confrontingthe modern battle commander. General McNair had always doubted theinvulnerability of the tank and subsequent events were to prove him right.

The organization of the armored division passedthrough several stages during the war, largely in re-sponse to the activities of the Germans. Germansuccess in the employment of armored formationsgave great weight to the views of the Armored Force.At first, the American armored division was modeledon the panzer division -- a high ratio of tanks with littleinfantry. However, the successful use of antitank gunsand mines by the Germans, Russians, and Britishcast some doubts on the effectiveness of tanks operatingalone. The armored divisions, introduced in September 1940,had a strength of about 15,000 with nearly 400 tanks.Six had been activated by 1942, with tentative plans foractivation of a total of almost fifty. During the war atotal of 16 were created. (Ref 16, pp 78-79)

40 CORG-M-365

Richard M. Ogorkiewicz discusses the infantry-tank relationship inArmor:

Infantry and its relationship to tanks has been oneof the thorniest aspects of the evolution of mechanizedforces. For years it has been argued that the principle (sic)function of tanks is to support the infantry and that they,-therefore, should be subordinate to it. For almost aslong a few have argued that tanks can critically dispensewith the infantry and, in general, assign a subsidiaryrole to the latter. The former view still finds supportin tradition-bound military doctrine but arguments andcounterarguments about the superiority of infantryover tanks, or vice versa, are essentially futile forthe two arms are complementary and the real problemis not to decide between them but to effectively combinethem together. (Ref 23, p 385)

During the period 1939-1942, new and more glamorous types of militaryunits were involved in the combat overseas; there was a change in thegeneral attitude toward the standard infantry division. Weigley noted that,after the 1940 Blitzkrieg, the emphasis was on armor. American plannersestimated that as many as fifty to sixty armored divisions were requiredto be organized and fielded if the United States was to win the war. By22 May 1942, the Operations Planning Division of the War Department,General Staff, projected a troop basis for the wartime army that calledfor forty-six armored divisions. After the defeat and occupation ofFrance by the Wehrmacht and its Panzertruppen, the United States Army' sarmor commanders and protagonists,

... envisioned armored corps and divisions sweepingdeep into the enemy' s country, striking the vital blowsof the war, while conventional infantry contented itselfwith mopping-up operations. The chief of the ArmoredForce said as late as July, 1942:"The triangular division has its place in the scheme ofaffairs to protect lines of communication, to holdground, to assist the armored units in supply and thecrossing of obstacles such as rivers, defiles, etc.They do not carry the spearhead of the fight and neverwill when tanks and guns are present. ,, (Ref 1, p 467)

The success of British and Russian antitank weapons proved that armorwithout infantry support was vulnerable. As antitank weapons continuedto improve and newer ones were developed, the infantry division, with itsartillery, was restored to its proper place as a standard high level unitof ground combat. General McNair' s concept of the role of the tank andthe armored division was substantiated.

CORG-M-365 41

One of the contributing technological factors in the creation of thearmored division was the great improvement in communications techaiques.On the battlefield even the infantry squad possessed portable radios forcontact with its parent unit and others. High mobility and wide dispersionon an ever-widening battlefield would have made command and controlunder these circumstances most difficult, if notiimpossible, withoutvehicular radios.

Battlefield communication continued its trend towardimprovement, a trend which stretched back to the CivilWar. Improvements in communications equipment(small portable radios, vehicular radios) facilitatedcontrol of widely dispersed tactical elements. It seemsprobable that, without vehicular radios, the creation andemployment of armored divisions would have been imprac-tical. (Ref 16, p 75)

Eventually, the regiment in the armored division was eliminated forflexibility and economy of personnel. The battalion became the primaryarmor combat unit. The real achievement here was in the doctrine thatthe battalions could be added, detached, and moved about in the armoreddivision in combinations to meet the specific tactical requirements ofthe combat operation involved. The standard infantry division lackedthis flexibility because it still retained its regiments which were respons-ible for the tactical employment of the infantry battalions. (Theintermediate infantry brigades had been lost when triangularization of theinfantry division was accomplished in 1936.) The advent of armoredinfantry and the substitution of the combat commands for the regimentin the armored division were highly significant organizational developments(particularly in relation to their eventual influence on the organization ofthe ROAD Division in 1962). The following commentary discusses thisimportant organizational landmark:

Therefore the tank would have to work in closecooperation with infantry. The design of armoredformations themselves changed to Incorporate agrowing proportion of infantry, to assist in takingas well as to hold ground. As designed in 1940-42,American armored divisions numbered 14,620men, with 4,848 in tank units, 2,389 in armoredinfantry, and 2, 127 in armored artillery. Therewere two tank regiments of three battalions each,one armored infantry regiment of three battalions,and three artillery battalions. The armored infantrywas equipped to move in lightly armored half-tracks.In 1943, however, the armored division was re-modeled to comprise an equal number of Infantryand tank battalions, three of each, plus the threeartillery battalions.

42 CORG-M-365

Regiments now disappeared from the armoreddivision, in pursuit again of McNair' s goal offlexibility. With no fixed regimental formationspresent in the division anyway, additional battalionsof tanks, infantry, or artillery could readily be added ordetached in any combination as any situation re-quired. To handle these flexible arrangements,armored division headquarters included two "combatcommands," each a subheadquarters to which thedivision commander might assign such task forcesas he chose. (Ref 1, pp 467-468)

Infantry Division Assault Doctrine

In the infantry division, as in all large ground combat formations, thefinal success of the overall assault depends upon the smallest units underthe command of the lowest-ranking combat leaders.

The cornerstone of all infantry organization, the squad,was enlarged in wartime from eight men to twelve. Thiswas done in spite of the evidence produced in the fieldtests that seven or eight men were all one corporal couldhope to control in battle. The Chief of Infantry stronglyurged the increase. The command weakness of so largea squad was corrected late in 1940 when the leader wasmade a sergeant and his assistant a corporal. With•wo noncoms in charge of it, the infantry squad remainedat twelve throughout the coming war. (Ref 8, p 47)

The initial World War U1 infantry assault doctrine was based largelyupon World War I experience. It was soon found that although this doctrinewas based upon the sound and traditional infantry doctrine of fire andmovement, it did not always work against determined resistance. Extrapower was needed; the infantryman found this power in the tanks within hisinfantry unit, generally his company. How it was done is shown in thefollowing extract:

Infantry assault doctrine of World War H was basedon the covering-fire tactics of the final phase of World WarI. Each twelve-man rifle squad was to have a two-manscout section, a four-man fire section and a five-manmaneuver and assault section. The squ.r leader and thescout section would locate the enemy, *Aj•j the leaderwould then call upon the second section' s fire, whichincluded the squad's Browning Automatic Rifle. Underthat fire, the third section would advance.

Unfortunately, this method brought only a fractionof the squad' s power to bear fully in the climacticadvance; and too often the squad leader was pinneddown with the scout section. Often, the infantryturned for help to the tanks. Partly for this reason,

CORG-I- 365 43

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tanlks became habitually assigned to all sizable infantryformations. A favorite method of attack came to beone in which a team of three to seven, or possiblymore, tanks combined with an infantry compary.Sometime tanks advanced first, sometimes theyadvanced with an infantry skirmish line, sometimesthe infantry rode them. In any case, the tanks tookon centers of resistance, while the infantry elim-imated antitank weapns. (Ref 1, p 471)

Organization

In March 19,_9, three months after the Japanes attack on Pearl Harh-l-,the War Department issued a directive which activated new triangular war-time divisions ,(Ref 24) (Fig. 9). The directive listed six types of divisionsto be organized: infantry, motorized, armored, airborne, mountain, andcavalry. 1 The directive established that the infantry division would

... comprise approximately 15,500 men to be "a generalpurpose organization intended for open warfare in theaterspermitting the use of motor transportation," and to haveorganically assigned to it a minimum of artillery andauxilliary elements,"on assumption that the division is

a part of a larger force from which it can obtain pr, mptcombat and logistical support." (Ref 25, p 274) (Table V).

Specialized Divisions

Under the directive, specialized divisions in the infantry werecategorized as motorized, mountain, jungle, and light. Essentially, themotorized divisions were infantry divisions mounted in trucks for highmobility in open warfare desert-type operations. These divisions wereorganized for operations in such desert areas as North Africa. (TheGermans used motorized infantry successfully in the R-ttle of France.)When the Americans were ill NfTh_ Africa, their combat experiences, aswell as those of the British, established a concept of allotting the infantrydivision motor transport which would be applicable to all situations. Themotorized division, with its large number of vehicles, required as muchshipping space as an armored division, yet did not have the fire and shockpower of the armored division. The following comment is signiiicant ofthe organizational problem:

The coming of war resulted in the largest expansionof the infantry ever undertaken. During the three years

The cav'alry division was no longer mounted on horses as horseshad been phased out of the US Army prior to World War II. Traditionwas preserved by retaining the cavalry division as the "First Cavalrybivision" but actually the division fought as infantry. In the Korean War,the 1st Cavalry Division again served as infantry, Todty, the 1st CavalryDivision is serving in Vietnam as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

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1941-1943, it increased 600 perceiit. AlLhunugh this was100 percent more than the field artillery, it fell farshort of some of the newer arms, for example the anti-aircraft artillery, which expanded 1, 150 percent andlater had to be cut back. In any case, beforc the conflictended sixty-seven infantry divisions came into being,plus one mountain and five airborne divisions, Even thecreation of armored divisions cxpanded the infantry,since they contained substantial foot components.

Thcere were in all, at some time during the war, 317regiments of infantry of various kinds. Among these weretypes unknown before the war, such as three mountain,twelve glider, and sixteen parachute infantry regiments.In addition there were 99 separate battalions, some ofwhich were also very highly specialized. (Ref 8, p 48)

The Directive of March 1942 created a controversy over specializationof types of higher tactical units, This was especially true on the divisionallevel of organization. The six type divisions authorized in March 1942 werenot accepted wholly by the War Plans Division of the War Department.Writer Bruce Jacobs notes that many", including General McNair, held thatwith the lack of available manpower they could not afford the luxury of havingunits "sit around twiddling their thumbs between operations." T'0- Chiefof Army Ground Forces strongly recommended that "excessively specializedorganizations which would be useful only upon occasion should be dis-couraged." But the controversial directive was approved and implementeddespite McNair' s vigorous opposition (Ref 19, p 28).

The specialized motorized division was soon found to be impracticableand, after Mlarch 1943, all motorized infantry divisions were convertedback to standard infantry divisions with the prescribed allotment oforganic motor transport (with the exception of the 4th Division which wasnot returned to standard format until a later date) (Fig. 10).

F..rLici, ation in a global war, in an unfamiliar, difficult climate andterrain, led to the establishment of the light division as a solution tocampaigning under unusual conditions. Traditionally, the United States Armyhas always been interested in what European military authorities termed"light troops.' From the days of the American Revolution, light troops havebeen found in the regimental, brigade, and divisional organizations. Basically,these were highly mobile, lightly-armed elite troops, specially trained andequipped for attack missions requiring speed and celerity in rugged ordifficult terrain. The light division of World War II was planned to carry anabsolute minimum of motor and animal transport. Consequently it requiredless supply anri maintenance personnel than a normal infantry division.

Eight light infantry divisions were scheduled initially; eventually therewere ten such units programmed by the War Department (a tý,al of sixlight infantry and four airborne divisions to carry out hit-a.nd-run warfarein difficult terrain).

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The light division was an interim solution to the vexing problem of thevaried terrains and environments encountered in a global war. The threelight infantry divisions that were eventually formed were the 89th LightDivision (Truck), the 10th Light Division (P.-ck, Alpine), and the 71st LIghtDivision (Pack, Jungle). In the Southwest Pacific, the light divisions wereuseless for the required amphibious opxerations and the Theater Conmmanderwas unwilling to accept them in his theater. During the scheduled testingperiods for the divisions, the light divisior.s were unable to deploy theirtactical elements effectively. Furthermore, presumably because of theirreduced organic transport, they could not properly supply themselves. Itshould be noted that the mountain and jungle type divisions were almostwholly dependent on men and mules for transport of supplies. The 10thMountain Division was the only specialized infantry division which was keptactive; eventually it was deployed to Italy to servL during that campaign.

The Airborne Division

Another Innovation of World War 11 was the airborne infantry division.The essential difference between a standard and airborne infantry divisionwas that the latter used the airplane for transport and delivered troops byparachute or glider. Parachute and glider units in regimental strength wereintegral partz of the airborne division. Morale was high; the airborne soldierbelieved he was a cut above any other soldier in the US Army. There wasesprit de corps and a sense of glamor and daring in these units,, However,

once they were on the ground, they operated as standard infantry. Theypossessed more mobility than any other infantry division at that time. Theywere highly effective in special missions and their presence exerted a strongpsychological effect. The airborne division had the mobility which theplanners wanted and modern warfare required. In essence, with proper

fighter escort, they could be transported and dropped with relative impunitybehind the enemy lines. They added a new dimension to warfare--the verticalassault.

PoolingWeigley discusses the addition of the doctrine of "pooling" as applied

to anits and equipment. Tne success of this doctrine made it applicable, years

later, to the standard infantry division.

In 1943, however, the armored division was remodeledto comprise an equal number of infantry and tank battalions,three of each, plus the three artillery battalions.

Regiments now disappeared from the armored division,in pursuit again of McNair's goal of flexibility. With nofixed regimental formations present in the division anyway,additional battalions of tanks, infantry, or artillery couldreadily be added or detached in any combination as anysituation required. To handle these flexible arrangements,armored division headquarters included two " combat commands, '1each a subheadquarters to which the division commandermight assign such taks forces as he chose. "Although thedivision organically probably will aggregate something like

CORG-M-365 49

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11,000." Mc Nair said, "you may make it 20, 000 ifyou so desire, simply by adding armored or infantrybattalions."

In practice, the armored division did not becomequite that flexible. Usually there was no pool of infantrybattalions from which to draw, since the need for infantr,divisions forced the incorporation of virtually all battalionsinto the divisions. Usually there was no pool of tank bat-talions either; while the reduction of the organic tankstrength of each armored division seemed to create a pool,the requirements of infantry-tank cooperation drewpractically all tank battalions out of it into more or lesspermanent attachment to infantry divisions. (Ref 1 , p 468)

Pooling of equipment was always controversial. During and up to themiddle of World War 11 the controversy centered on the pooling of majoritems of equipment such as tanks, tank destroyers, and antia~rcraft artillery(Table I). Many high-level field commanders wanted these weapons assignedorgaaically to divisions. But the high degree of mobility of this equipmentcalled for more flexible combat assignments, although battlefield conditionscreated uncertainty as to their optimum employment. Variations in

... enemy armor and air capabilities, coupled withwide differences in terrain combined to fitvor anorga',ization which could concentrate those weapons ordisperse them depending on the local situation. Tworeasons were advanced for resisting demands formaking such weapons organic to divisions. First,experience indicated that when the enemy attacked withair or witb tanks he employed them in massedformations. Dispersed friendly weapons could nothandle such attacks. Secondly, it was believed thatthcrc was a dangcr iii cncourgin4 a " dufensive"psychology which surrounds "anti" weapons. Asa result of much study and discussion, a decisionwas made not to assign the weapons organically toinfantry divisions. (Ref 16, p 77)

There were other cogent reasons for the adoption of pooling as asolution to the problem of weapon assignment and optimum usage hi battle.A planner s formula existed governing the organic assignment or the poolingof weapons. The formula was based on the range of the weapon and widthof front it could cover. The 60mm mortar could cover a wider front thanthe rifle platoon; hence the mortars were pooled at one level above - thecompany level. Fisher rationalizes the concept in the following extract:

Similarly, the 81-mm. mortar, heavy machine gun,antitank guns, and field artillery weapons were pooledabove company level--even though lower levels werefully capable of servicing and operating the weaponsand, presumably, of exploiting their effect. If suchreasoning is valid, then it may be concluded that if

50 CORG-M-365

lower units had had wider planned frontages, according to1942 doctrine, then such weapons as discussed above mightwell have been pushed down the chain toward the lowestechelon whose frontage corresponded to the rangecapabilities of the weapons. (Ref 16, p 76)

Pooling was one of the most important factors in reducing the size ofthe infantry division (World War I division strength: 28,000; World War IIdivision strength: 15,000). To accomplish this reduction, it was necessary,from a supply and equipment viewl)oint, for the division to be under thecommand and control of a larger unit, the corps and the army. With poolsof personnel and equipment and weapons established by the next command,the division and component units could retain only that organic equipmentessential for normal combat operations. This was a step in the directionof flexibility, mobility, and economy of equipment and shipping space.Within the regiment, an integral unit of the infantry division, poolingwas accomplished by the organization of a battalion heavy weapons companywhere all heavy and crew -served weapons were grouped. Similarly, theywere grouped in the weapons platoons of the rifle companies. The antitankweapons of the infantry regiments were pooled in an antitank company; theheavy weapons (heavy mortars, etc.) of the battalions were placed in heavyweapons companies. The light .30-caliber machineguns and the 60mm and81rmm moi tars were located in the weapons platoons of the rifle companiesof the infantry battalions. The principle of pooling, as enunciated by theChief of the Army (iLound Forces during World War I!, was a notableinfluence on the type of organization found within the infantry--from thedivision down to squad level.

Analysis of World War II D(velopments ,

After the 7 May 1945 armistice, a board was convened to study theinfantry division. This board, officially known as the General io.d,United States Furces, European Theater, was established by GeneralOrder 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army,

dated 17 Jane 1945; amended by General Order 182, dated 7 August 1945,and General Order 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters, UnitedStates Forces, European Theater. Its broad mission was " to preparea factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employedby the United States Forces in the European Theater. " (Ref 26)

One of its specific missions was to prepare a detailed report andmake recommendations on the organization, equipment, and tacticalemployment of the infantry division. Innumerable division and corpscommanders were askad to serve as consultants to the Board. The Boardinterviewed hundreds of combat-experienced officers of all ranks. Amongthose interrogated were officers with command experience with thedivision artillery, armored division commanders, and regimental andbattalion commanders of the combat arms. Their recommendations wereincluded in the overall report.

CORG-M-365 51

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The Board made a thorough factual study of the combat performance ofthe infantry division. "Combat lessons" from After Action Rcplorts ofthe units were carefully extracted and studied; questionnaires were sent tocommanders at all levels. (See ApllŽndix D) An all-out comprehensiveeffort was made to

... obtain the views of expericrced combat leadersavailable in the European Theater. Questionnaires com-pleted by over 50 officers were received and a summaryof their opinions... charted. . After action reports ofcombat units with outstanding records were studied andaiualyzed. Full consideration was given to other records...Finally, a group of combat leaders who had fought through,-out the European Campaign were assembled in conferenceand their views obtained... (Ref 26, p 1)

The committee conducting the study consisted of 19 officers, gradedfrom brigadier general to captain. During the examination, the committee

... kept in mind the great advantage of preservingflexibility in the employment of supporting units ouch

as artillery, engineers and others by retaining themin hi~her echelons rather than assigning then, organicallyto divisions. It also has been impressed with the loss ofmobility and maneuverability of the division as units andnumbers are added to it. The committee therefore hasbeen reluctant to add units to the division.

On the other hand, .... there are ovw-r-riding advan-Ltges in assigning organically to the division suppor-tingunits which habitually had to be attached to it. Thecommittee is supported in this view by the almostunanimous opinion of the combat leaders it has questioned.The advantages result principally from greater espritde corps and teamwork, hetter understanding of standingoperating procedures and an increase in morale of theattached units. These units want to wear the divisionshoulder patch and to feel that they have a home.(Ref 26, p 1)

The Board began the study with certain preconceived ideas and usedwell-established standards in judging the infantry division. These ideasand standards were the product of more than 150 years of US Army militaryexperience in peace and war. The concept of an infantry division and itsorganization was derived from historical American military experienceand doctrine. Traditionally, much of this doctrine had its roots in theforeign concepts used by the American Army in the Revolutionary Warand subsequent conflicts. But there was also a distinct American adherenecto General Pershing' s World War I doctrines of fire and movement and

52 CORG-M-365

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combined arms. The Board defined the role ,,t th infantry division in theUnited States Army at that period of our military history:

The infantry division is the basis of oronination ofthe field forces. It is thc . iI:,ll l u it that is comp)oVc(dof all the essential ground arms and services, and whichcan conduct, by its own means, operations of gu1i.;alIimportance. It can strike or penetrate effectively,maneuver readily and absorb reinforcing units easily.It can act alone or as a part of a higher unit. It; combatvalue is derived from its ability to combine the action ofthe various arms and services to maintain combat overa considerable period of time (FM 100-5 par 1010).Experience in the European Theater indicates that themajor subordinate units of the inf.utry division wercinsufficient in strength and general composition to insurethe division's ability to conduct offensive and defensiveoperations independently with maximum efficiency. Tabsence of tanks in the division organization was especiallyfelt. (Ref 26, p 2)

While operations in the Western European Campaignhave indicated no necessity for changes in our pres(.. ""tactical doctrinczs, it can be expected that these doctrireswill require modification with tbe future development ofimproved weapons and equipment. It is pertinent toremark at this point that the tactical mathodb empioycdin World War II were vastly different and improved overthose used in World War I. The fact that the United StatesArmy had developed these modernized tactical methodsduring the years of peace permitted it tf start withdoctrines and methods that proved successful in battle.The tactics and techniques of the various arms, andof the combined arms, must be reviewed continuouslyin the light of new developments. The ever increasingtrend toward armor protection to reduce casualties,lighter weapons, improved as to fire power, range-and destructive capabilities, and speedier means of"transportation, demand continuous adjustments intactical methods and techniques in order to fully ex-ploit the improvements in the weapons of war. _:. lyby this means can we hope to be fully prepared forthe next war. (Ref 26, pp 14-15)

The Board concluded th',t:

a. The comm!'nd and staff organization of divisionheadquarters iv satisfactory.

CORG-M-365 53

,. The service units are deficient in men andeqipment for adequate support of the combat elements;the ordnance and quartermaster unitL should be increasedto battalion size and the other units considerablyaugmented by additional personnel.

c. The cannon company is necessary for the closesupport of the infantry regiment, but the present cannonis unsatisfactory and should be replaced by the 105mmhowitzer mounted on the m'.,.ium rank (assault gun)pending development of a lighter, smaller, self-propelledcannon, having equivalent ballistic qualities.

d. The present anti-tank company weapon (57mmtowed gun) is unsatisfactory and should be eliminated.Since the medium tank is recognized as the best anti-tank weapon at present the anti-tank company shouldalso be eliminated and its mission taken over by theorganic tank unit of the division.

e. Infantry weapons should be iighter and moremaneuverable; the automatic rifle is preferred to thelight machine gun in the rifle squad; the 81mm mortaris preferred to the 4.2" mortar in the heavy weaponscompany; the heavy machine gun must be improved, .

retaining its sustained fire power but reducing its weightand increasing its flexibility.

f. The rank of the infantry regimental commandersshould be raised to brigadier general.

g. Except for minor additions of personnel toregimental headquarters company, battalion headquarterscompany and service company for communication,military police, intelligencýe and reconnaissance andadministrative duties, the general composition of theother units of the infantry regiment is adequate.

h. The division artillery is deficient in 155mmhowitzer power and an additional battalion should beassigned organically. All batteries, 105mm and 155mm,should be increased to six guns. The 105mm howitzersshould be self-propelled and the 155mm howitzer shouldremain towed pending development of a self-propelled155mm howitzer possessing the ballistic characteristicsof the towed weapon. All self-propelled mounts shouldbe Aightened, should be capable of high-angle fire andshould be provided with overhead cover.

i. An anti-aircraft artillery battalion should bean organic part of the infantry division.

54 CORG-M-365

'I

j. Armored units should be organic in the infantrydivision. A medium tank regiment comprising threebattalions of three companies each should be an organicpart of the infantry division for the purpose of aocomplish-ing both tank and anti-tank missions.

k. The reconnaissance troop should be replaced bya mechanized cavalry squadron.

1. The engineer battalion should be increased to atwo battalion regiment.

m. A reinforcement (replacement) cadre, con-sisting of six officers and 30 men, should be made anorganic part of the infantry division for the purpose ofproviding a nucleus to handle an organic reinforcementbatta'oion within the division.

n. Every effort should be made to improve ourpresent weapons and equipment and at the same timecontinue research for new and better weapons and equip-

ment. While preliminary tests of recoilless weaponswere favorable, more extensive tests should be con-ducted.

o. No material changes to our tactical doctrinesas prescribed by Field Service Regulations and fieldmanual3 were brought out as result of combat experiencein the European Theater. Tactical doctrines, methodsand techniques of the various arms and of the combinedarms must be continuously reviewed in the light of newdevelopments. (Ref 26, pp 15-16)

The Board recommended:

a. That the revised infantry division as presentedin Appendices 2-12 inclusive be adopted.

b. That pertinent Tables of Organization andEquipment be amended by appropriate agencies of theWar Department.

c. That the rank of brigadier general be authorizedfor the infantry regimental commander. -

d. That continuous research be conducted towardthe development of lighter, more mobile and more powerfulweapons.

e. That our tactical doctrines and methods be thesubject of continuous study so that tney may be keptabreast of new developments in the weapons and meansof making war. (Ref 26, p 16)

CORG-M-365 55

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The Board also stated:

The basic concept of the division requires thatit be self-sufficient at all times. To maintain this self-sufficiency, it must have available constantly means forits own defense against any threat which may normallybe expected and which cannot be anticipated in time toobtain the necessary defensive weapons from a sourceoutside of the division. With the trend towards higher-speed aircraft, this threat from the air is a major one,especially against divisions in an attack. A division,therefore, must be ready at all times to protect itselffrom any air attack. (Ref 26, Incl 1 to App 14, p 2)

5p

56 CORG-M.-365

POST-WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR

The infantry division of the post-World War 11 period was subjected topersonnel cuts and other economies. Essentially, between the end ofWorld War 11 in 1945 and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, the USArmy did little more than maintain a status quo infantry division for trainingand occupation duties. The reduced-strength divisions, which originated as"Redeployment Divisions" in the middle of World War H, were all that theUS Army possessed.

Postvar Organization

On paper, the division was the World War II infantry division. It con-sisted of a headquarters, a division headquarters company, a militarypolice company, an ordnance maintenance company, a quartermaster com-pany, a replacement company, three infantry regiments, four divisionartillery battalions, an engineer combat battalion, a heavy tank battalion,

and a medical battalion. The full strength of the division was 17, 752 officers ,and men (Fig, 11).

The divisions had been stripped of regimem's, battalions, and supportingartillery to the point where they were not strong enough to function in combatas they had during VWorld War 11. This ieduction in strength was to pose a

serious problem when the skeletonized infantry division faced a determined,strongly manned enemy in Korea.

The North Korean Army invaded the Republic of South Korea withoutwarning on 25 June 1950. In accordance with previous agreements, theUnited States sent a small task force to help buttress the South Korean Army' s

attempt to stem the tide of tanks and men pouring down on them from theNorth. Task Force Smith was an interim measure to secure time for thedeployment of the combat divisions then stationed on occupation duty inJapan. The Regular Army divisions in Japan were the first to reachbattle in the Korean campaign under the United Nations Command. 2 TheSelective Service System inductees and voluntary enlistees were used asindividual replacements in the Regular Army divisions. Eventually eightNational Guard divisions were ordered to active duty for the Korean War.All divisions in Korea served under the Eighth US Army (see Appendix Efor ta~le of US Army divisions in Korea).

The combat strength of the United States Army at the beginning of theKorean War consisted of ten divisions. These units had been severely

2 Membersof the United Kingdom, Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada,

France, Philippines, Sweden, Union of South Africa, Turkey, Thailand,India, Greece, and Belgium. Later Ethiopia and Colombia also came in.The Republic of Korea furnished large numbers of troops but it was not amember of the United Nations. These UN units were attached by battalionsto the US divisions in Korea. The Commonwealth brigades were combinedinto an independent division.

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reduced in strength. Many of their essential combat elements had beenassigned to corps or army pools. Among these were the division tankbattalion and the antiaircraft battalion that had played a vital role inWorld War II. The only Army infantry division remaining at full strengthwas the 1st Division, assigned to occupation duty in Germany. In the otherdivisions, one rifle battalion was eliminated from each infantry regiment,making a regiment of two battalions. In the artillery, one battalion wasdropped and, within the battalions, there were now two batteries instead ofthe usual three.

These radical reductions exerted a considerable handicap upon thefunctioning of a tactical system that traditionally assumed three-battalionregiments. Practically, this meant that the commander of the regiment incombat would have to operate with a singlc battalion in the line, if he wishedto keep out a reserve. The alterrnative was to assign both battalions in lineand fight without a reserve. This violated the tactical doctrine of retaininga reserve to deal the final blow or repulse counterattacks. The absence oforganic armor in the division was a serious deficiency. In the rifle batta-lions one rifle company had been eliminated; thus, the battalion commanderwas deprived of his reserve and mobile striking force. Further, no divisiouwas in possession of its full combat allotment of weapons, and ammunitionsupplies were small. The units that were in support of the divisions wereoften in worse condition, logistically, than the divisions themselves (Ref 27).

Korea - A New Kind of War

Limitations of Tactical Units

The US infantry livisior was preparea to fight the war in Korea inWorld War II style--with reduced and partially equipped units of divisionsize and smaller (see AppendixE for division organization). Shifted hurriedlyfrom occupation duty in Japan, the infantry divisions were undermanned andundergunned in comparison with the Soviet-armed and -trained North Koreans.

... deficiencies in training, toughness, unit cohesion,and psychological readiness were graver weaknesses inKorea than the tactical deficiencies resulting from an un-accustomed type of war. The retreat to the Naktong Riverin the summer of 1950 was less a display of faulty tacticalconcepts than of faulty execution by troops who were toolightly trained, too loosely disciplined, and too lacking inmotivation to match the determination of the enemy.(Ref 1, pp 519-520)

The infantry division of the Korean War period faced a different kind ofenemy, waging a mixture of conventional and unconventional war. The NorthKorean used infiltration and penetration guerilla-type tactics; his ultimateweapon was terror. Unarmed American prisoners were shot; prisoners ofwar were subjected to ruthless, brutal treatment. The North Korean hadreceived excellent tactical training under Soviet advisers. The fanatic!illingness of the Oriental to die in battle was one of his great strengths.

CORG-M-365 59

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Initially, American divisional units were not equipped with weaponsheavy enough in caliber and power to counter the Soviet tanks and weapons.It was soon discovered that the American divisions had been reduced to thepoint of combat ineffectiveness (insufficient personnel to maneuver, absorbcasualties and firepower, and continue to fight). "Limited war" requiredfull-strength World War 11 type divisions.

One of the first divisions deployed to Korea from Japan was the 24thUS Infantry Division under the command of Major General William F. Dean.This unit made a gallant stand against overwhelming odds until it was over-run and disintegrated. Its commander was finally taken prisoner by theNorth Koreans.

This serious defeat of the first division of US troops sent to Koreaconvinced the United States that it was up against a tough, well-organized,efficaiently commau~ded enemy. It indicated further that the reduced USdivisions were not able to function well in war.

Flexible Response--A New Concept

Historian Weigley offers an explanation for the inflexibility of theAmerican infantry division at the beginning of the Korean War. He com-pares the tactics of the Communists with those of the American IndiansI and the insurgents of the Philippines. He notes that the North Koreansused guerilla tactics and that the American div~sions initially lacked theflexibility for effective response. At this point in our history a new miLitaryconcept was horn--the concept of a requirement for flexible rtsponse ir.the iniantry division. The following extract offers a rationale for reorg-anizingthe infantry division for a flexible response capability:

The Asian Communists, their tactics conditioned byguerrilla warfare, placed great emphasis on penetration

of weak points and encirclement of detachments. TheKorean terrain facilitated their encircling tactics. TheAmericans, accustomed to the relatively neat linearbattlefields of Europe, ncver wholly adjusted to a chaoticsort of warfare in which the enemy continually insinuatedhimself into flanks or rear and in which attacks repeatedlycame from several directions at once. The Americansnever wholly adjusted to an enemy who not only infiltratedtheir lines by stealth and at night but who usually attacked

at night. The old Indian-fighting Army had habituateditself to fluid tactics with elements of guerrilla-style war;the Army of 1950 had long since forgotten the tactics ofthe Indian wars. The Army of 1950 had become roadbound,while the North Koreans and Chinese could move acrossroadless hills that the Americans customarily thought im-penetrable. The Army had become dependent upon artillerysupport that could not always be available in the Koreanhills. The Army had become dependent on elaborate radioand telephone communications that could not always functionin the Korean mountains. Its habituation to European war

60 COR G-M-365

L -

sometimes put the American Army in Korea approximatelyin the condition of Braddock' s Regulars on the Monongahela.(Ref 1, p 519)

Examination of the infantry TOE reveals that the infantry division wasbasically a reorganized 1943 World War II infantry division (see App F).The tactics and formations were essentially those of World War II. Thecombat strength resided in ten divisions, the European Constabulary ofdivision size, and nine separate regimental combat teams patterned afterthose of World War Hl fame.

The Rotation System and KATUSA

One of the most serious problems confronting the Army division inKorea was the continual weakening of the unit strength through a rotationsystem based on points for service in Korea. 3 On the sdrface, the systemappeared to be equitable as far as spreading the burden of combat serviceamong the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve personnelordered to Korea. But its internal operation kept the ranks oi all units inthe division in such a state of flux that it was almost impossible to developesprit de corps. Since the men concerned did not develop a sense of unitmembership and pride, there was a lack cf teamwork in the lower units(squads, platoons, and companies). This lack of cohesion reduced theireffectiveness in combat.

The ample supply of manpower of the Republic of Korea A as either inKorean Army divisions or in training centers. A plan was developed toincrease US division strength by integrating Korean troops into US units.Entitled "Korean Augmentation to the United States Army" (KATUSA), itwas, in many respects, a brilliant plan. The Kcrean recruits constitutedthe first instance, in modern times, of foreign troops serving within theranks of a US unit. The following extract from Appleman indicates how this Inovel step was acL~omplished:

Concurrent with the steps taken in August torebuild the ROK Army, the Far East Commandplamnned to incorporate 30,000 to 40, 000 ROKrecruits in the four American divisions in Koreaand the one still in Japan but scheduled to go toKorea. This was admittedly a drastic expedientto meet the replacement requirement in the depletedAmerican ground forces. As early as 10 August,Eighth Army began planning for the Korean augmen-tation, but it was not until 15 August thatGeneral MacArthur ordered it- General Walker was

3 Rotation was based on a system in which each soldier received fourpoints a month for service in combat, three points for s( rvice anywhere inthe combat zone, two points for service anywhere in Kor,!a. Upon attain-ment of 36 points the soldier was rotated out of Korea.

CORG-M-365 61

to increase the strength of each company andbattery of United States troops by 100 Koreans.The Koreans legally would be part of the ROKArmy and would be paid and administered by

the South Korean Government. They wouldreceive US rations and special service items.(Ref 28, pp 385-386)

The following extract from Appleman's Table 3, Estimated UN Strengthas of 30 September 1950, illustrates the effect of attaching Koreans to theinfantry divisions.

AttachedOrganization UN Forces Koreans

Total Ground Combat Forces 198,211 22,404

Total US Ground Combat Forces 113,494 22,404

Combat

Eighth Army 1,120

I Corps 4,141 267

1st Cavalry Division 13,859 2,961

24th Infantry Division 15,591 3,606

IX Corps 4,224 1,009

2d Infantry Division 14,122 2,756

25th Infantryj Division 14,617 3,230

X Corps 8,344 600

7th Infantry Division 15,805 7,975

1st Marine Division (reinforced) 21,611

ROK Army 81,644

British Ground Combat Forces 1,704

Philippine Ground Combat Forces 1,369

(Ref 28, p 605)

The Command

On 23 December 1950 General Walton H. Walker, Commanding Generalof the Eighth Army, was killed in a jeep accident while on the way to thefront. His replacement was Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, dis-tinguished airborne troop commander in World War 11. General Walkerhad exploited the principles of fire and movement to the maximum. He

62 CORG-M-365

employed his divisions and subordinate units as "fire brigades" movingthem when and where they were needed to plug gaps in the UN defenses.

Ilis excellent tactical leadership, particularly in his brilliant defenseof the Pusan-Tacgu Perimeter, has accorded him a place in history as agreat commander. He was ingenious at "making do" with his undersizedand undermanned divisions. He covered vast frontages with what he hadavailable and prevented another Dunkerque or evacuation of the US divisionsto Japan.

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's Intelli-gence Chief during World War II and in Korea, described in detail the-frontages which the reduced US and Republic of Korea divisions wererequired to occupy in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter.

Date Location Div. Front Yds. nfantry

Aug. 1950 Yongdok 3rd ROK 70,300 5/6,000Aug. 1950 Kusangdong Cap ROK 38,100 4/5,000Aug. 1950 Ulsong 8th ROK 41,800 5/6,000Aug. 1950 Kinrwi 6th ROK 41,800 6/7,000Aug. 1950 nsjang 1st ROK 34,400 5/6,000Aug. 1950 Waegwan 1st US (Car) 103,600 6/7,000Aug. 1950 Naktong 24th US (id) 59,200 6/7,000Aug. 1950 Masan 25th US (Id) 81,400 6/7,000

The density per yard factor represents an averageof one or two riflemen every ten yards and nothingbehind them; of course, there is no such rubber-banddistribution; there were miles of gaps through whichthe enemy infiltrated.. It is a miracle that the perimeterheld at •1i, though caving in locally, here and there,to be patched up by General Walker shuttling his wearyreserves from one crisis to the next. (Ref 29, p 364)(Fig. 12)

Further, General Willoughby compared the frontages occupied byWorld War I US infantry diyisions with the frontages covered by the US

divisions in defense of the Pusan-Taegu Perimeter:

Date Location Div. Front Yds. Infantry

Aug. 1918 St. Die 5th 32,500 12,000July 1918 Baccarat 77th 18,500 12,800Aug. 1918 Lucey 89th 17,500 12,000Aug. 1918 Alsace 29th 15,500 12,800

SAug. 1918 Sazerais 1st 11,500 13,000 I(Ref 29, p 362)

A6VJCORG-M-365 6

S1 5

1 VIKK,,

3 Z"

W¶?Masan

Taegu

/•• ,.F 1--9 Americar DivisionsSFi • • L--JI South Korean Divisions' '. _ .. (• Front M i;es .

Source: Reference 29 -Figure 12. The Pusan Delense Perimeter_

64 COR G-M -365

Ii

General Ridgway, Walker' s successor, infused his divisions with a newspirit. lie toured the frontline units, was an Inspiration to his corps anddivisional commanders. Ridgway set an example of basic battle leadershipthat filtered down through the higher levels of command. His insistenceon unit discipline eventually improved the professional quality of the EighthArmy units in spite of the rotation system.

F General Ridgway recalls his remarks as Eighth Army commander onhis first visit to the battlcfront:

Then I talked a little about leadership. I told themtheir soldier forebears would turn over in their gravesif they heard some of the stories I had heard about thebehavior of some of our troop leaders in combat. Thejob of a commander was to be up where the crisis ofaction was taking place. In time of battle, I wanteddivision commanders to be up with their forwardbattalions, and I wanted corps commanders up withthe regiment that was in the hottest action.(Ref 30, pp 206-207) (Emphasi added)

Ridgway was essentially an airborne infantryman and his tactics weredifferent from those of General Walker. Weigley points out that GeneralWalker, who had served under Patton in World War It, " preferred to

concentrate American forces in relatively good tank couvtr, of the valleyinvasion routes. " On the other hand, Ridgway "increasingly committedhis troops to the mountains. " (Ref 1, p 521) .

He made the Americans learn to fight there in what

had been the enemy's chosen ground, and thus he min-imized the possibility of deep Chinese penetrations likethe one that had -ut them into the ridges between theEighth Army and the X Corps in the North. His tacticalsystem called for the maximum exploitation of firepower,including air and artillery, to soften up the enemy inmethodical attacks, in place of the swift but vulnerablemovements of mechanized columns that had approachedthe Yalu. In the idiom of his troops, he introduced the

tactics of the meat grinder, to chew up Chinese man-power at a rate even the Chinese could not afford.

(Ref 1, pp 521-522)

Limited War

The Korean War was a 'limited war, " in terms of limited terrainand limited political and national objectives. It called forth the firstlimited mobilization of the US Army in modern history. Before the endof the war, the Army mobilized a total of 2,834,000 men and twentydivisions. Eventually, eight Army divisions and onc Marine Corps divisianparticipated in the Korean campaign. While no Army Reserve divisionswere mobilized, additional National Guard divisions were ordered to active 5duty as the Chinese came into the, war. These units were the 31st Division

CORG-M-365 65

k:

(Alabama and Mississippi), 37th (Ohio), 44th (fllinoib), and 17th (Minnesotaand North Dakota). The 49th and 45th National Guard Divisions were sentto Korea, and the 28th and the 43d were sent to Germany.

Weaponry

The weaponry available to the infantry division at the beginning of theKorean War was essentially that of World War H--the M1 rifle, the famousBrowning automatic rifle of World War IL Browning machineguns of .30 and.50 calibers, a 2.36-in. rocket launcher (bazooka), and 60 and 81 mm mortars.(These were supplemented in firepower by the 4.2-inch former chemicalmortar, which had been so effective in the Southwest Pacific against thejapanese-held caves in the island-hopping campaigns).

General Matthew 13. Ridgway, Commander of the 82d Airborne Divisionin World War U, describes the condition of the divisions of the Eighth USArmy in Japan prior to the North Korean attack:

Every one of the Eighth Army' s four infantry divisions(including one called the 1st Cavalry Division) was belowits authoriZed make-shift strength of 12,,500, a figureitself dangerously below the full wartime complementof 18,900. Every division was short 1500 rifles and allits 90-mm. antitank guns, -nissing three infantry bat-talions out of iflne, lacking one firing battery out of.every three in the divisional artillery, and all regimentaltank companies. Cnly the 1st Cavalry Division hadretained its organic medium tank battalion. There wereno corps headquarters and no vital corps units such asmedium and heavy artillery, engineer and communicationstroops. (Ref31, p34)

From the first, American combat troops faced a difficult task. Inthe division the two-battalion regiments were lirabie tI furnish and usestrong maneuver and reserve elements against a force that had theadvantage of momentum and numbers. The highly succes;3ful 2.36-in, bazookaof World War II fame was no match for the armor of the Soviet T-34 tanks.The 105mm artillery could I kill" the tanks but there was not sufficientammunition on site. Further, there were no antitank mines available inJapan and no Sherman tanks closer than America.

Iu some respects, Korea was considered r'n artillery war. The artillerydeveloped and improved the delivery of close support fire missions for theinfantry units. These close fires, delivered fifty yards in front of supportedinfantry units, were reminiscent of World War I. In addition, harassingand interdiction fires and fires of opportunity were delivered against enemytargets by the artillery.

In Korea superior firepower was eventually established by the infantrydivision, the artillery, and by tactical air support. It is doubtful that theAmerican infantry division in Korea could have stood firm without the firstrate tactical air support of the US Air Force. In spite of the fact that the

66 CORG-M-365

2

infantry division weapons were mostly those of World War II, larger caliberbazookas (3.5-inch) and 105mm recoilless rifles were added to the infantry-

man' s armament. When the veteran Sherman tanks carrying a 76mm gunarrived, they were highly maneuverable in the rough Korean terrain. TheM-2G Pershing tank mounting a 90mm gull was a most powerful weapon.

Air Power

Air power played an important part in supporting the infantry divisionin Korea. General Ridgway notes that:

There were those who felt, at the time of the KoreanWar, that air power might accomplish miracles of inter-diction, by cutting all the flow of reinforcement andsupply to the embattled enemy. The fact that it couldnot accomplish these miracles has not yet been acceptedas widely as it should have been. No one who foughton the ground in Korea would ever be tempted to belittlethe accomplishments of our air force there. Not onlydid air power save us from disaster, but without it themission of the United Nations Forces could not havebeen accomplished. (Ref 31, p 244)

General Ridgway' s commentary lends credence to the idea that themodern infantry division must depend heavily upon air power of everyvariety. This is especially true of mass air transport which is adaptableto the present day infantry division. Obviously, General Ridgway wasreferring to the transport and attack facilities of the Air Force which wereavailable to the infantry division in combat.

One of the revolutionary developments to come out of the Korean Warwas Army Aviation. While the US Air Force rendered assistance to theground forces in Korea, the Army was evolving its own air support. Thisbranch of the Army developed as an aviation unit, integral to the ArmyS~organization and separate and distinct from the Air Force.

The light airplane (L-5) had been used in spotting and directing artilleryfires during World War II. It also performed an important service inliaison and command activities. In Korea, light aircraft (L-19 and L-20)functioned as transport, supplementing the work of the ground vehicles. IThe rotary-wing aircraft, or helicopter, was a natural vehicle for duty inthe mountainous and rugged terrain of Korea. Its primary missions werethe evacuation of the wounded and command missions for isolated unitsin combat. These new vehicles, proven in combat, were to play a mostimportant role in post-Korean experiments in infantry division organization.

In a sense, Xorea became. a combat laboratory for the study of battletactics and techniques. All units, from corps, division, and regimentallevels, were studied closely to evaluate and improve their combat per-forman :. These studies were to have salient effects on the shape andsize of L.e post-Korean military organization of units of the US Army.

6CORG-M-365 67-

The Cease-Fire Period

When General Ridgway took over General Mac.Arthur' s post, he wassucceeded by General James A. Van Fleet as Eighth Army commander.Under Van Fleet' s command, the divisions of the Army fought to positionsnorth of the 38th parallel and held them, At this point the US and the Peipinggovernment were in the preliminary talk stages of a cease-fire negotiation.From the point of view of the evolution of the UN infantry division, the cease-fire period of the Korean War represented a return to defensive tactics. Inessence this meant that, for the first time since World War I, US infantry-men were in stabilized trench warfare.

"Weigley comments on the static situation of the war in Korea.

The American government believed that whateverthe apparent futility of ground battles for outpost hills,the ground battles had to be won if Communist prestige andpower were to suffer sufficiently to force the Communisttruce negotiators to a cease-fire. Therefore the Americaninfantry still had to fight, the hill battles continued, andAmerican casualties persisted at a rate of thirty thousanda year. All this occurred while the American rotationsystem came into full effect. (Ref 1, p 524)

The US divisions stabilized along lines, such as Line Kansas, a fortifiedarea. The following extract illustrates the resemblance to World War Iliving and combat conditions.

By 1 July the main fortifications of Line KANSASwere nearly complete. To expedite the work, Van Fleethad sent three Soutlh Korean National Guard divisionsforward to serve as labor troops, one to each U.S.corps. The log-and-sandbag bunkers and deep, narrowtrenches along the KANSAS line resembled World War Ientrenchments. Bunkers, usually adjoining and for-ward of lateral trenches, housed automatic rifles andmachine guns. Most of the bunkers were dug intohillsides or saddles on the military crests with thelarger ones on the higher hills serving as forwardcommand and observation posts. (Ref 32, pp 74-75)

Historical accounts of the heavily fortified positions show that theinfantry divisions of the Eighth US Army had lost their movement capabilities.With the loss of movement, the division was forced to depend on fire forsuccessful tactical defense. In effect this was a return to the World War Isituation, with the heavy weapons of the infantry sited on final protectivelines of fire. Mortar and mine concentrations were prepared in advancein case of attack. Barbed wire was used as it had been in 1918 with oneslight difference--it was also used to funnel the attackers into the mine fieldsand defensive fires. Without movement, the US divisions held their positionsby delivery of massive fires, destroying even the Chinese "human wave"attacks. Other weapons, such as tanks, were also employed as noted inthe following.

68 CORG-M-365

L

Along the lateral trenches, the riflemen and rocket-launching crews notched revetted bays for firing theirweapons and slightly behind them recoilless rifle em-placements were dug in and revetted with sandbags. Indefilade on the reverse slope of the hills, protectedmortar firing positions were constructed and roadswere cut to permit tanks to move up and fire fromparapeted front-line positions. Camouflage nets andshubbery were used extensively to conceal the bunkersand prepared positions.

To delay enemy offensives barbed wire fenceswere laid out and mines were planted in patterns tIhatwould funnel attackers into the heaviest defense fires.In the U.S. I and IX Corps sectors, where WYOMJNGpositions were occupied rather than KANSAS, thetroops plotted mine fields and dug the holes, then tstored the mines nearby to be buried when and if aretreat from Line WYOMING should prove necessary. I(Ref 32, p 75)

Trench warfare, patrolling, and fighting for key hills occupied theEighth Army until the Korean War ended with the signing of the armisticeon 27 July 1953. Unit histories are full of names like Heartbreak Ridge,Pork Chop Hill, and the Punchbowl. Hermes describes how the smallerunits of the divisions were situated and armed.

Since I Company defended an extended front, ithad additional automatic weapons on hand to cover theenemy approach routes. One .50-caliber, six .30- icaliber heavy, and twelve .30-caliber light machineguns were backed by fifteen automatic rifles in the

bunkers. Three 57-mm. recoilless rifles, three3.5-inch rocket launchers, and two M2 flame throwerswere located in open emplacements. The . 50-calibermachine gun, five of the heavy .301 s, and six of thelight .30' s, sited to provide interlocking bands of fire,were sector weapons and I Company would leave themin place when it left the area. The added strengthin automatic weapons permitted Lieutenant Duerr tothrow "a sheet of steel" at the enemy when he

* i attacked.

ti

LA

CORG-M-365 69

Three tanks from the regimental tank company withfiring positions on the ridge line and on the reverse slopesprovided antitank defense from approximately the centerof the company front. The tanks were M4's with 76-mm.rifles. Besides the 60-mm. company mortars, the60-mm. mortars of L Company, the 81-mm. mortarsof M Company, 4.2-inch mortars of the 27th InfantryRegiment, and the 105-mm. howitzers of the 64thArtillery Battalion could be called upon for directsupport. (Ref 32, pp 371-372)

After Korea--Reorganization

The Korean campaigns demonstrated conclusively that the US triangularinfantry division needed complete reorganization to enable the division torespond to any and all conditions of ground combat. The triangular divisionhad fought its last war. Soon after the war, planners began to take stepsto give the US Army a more flexible all-purpose infantry division. Butthis was not accomplished overnight. The problem of the best divisionalorganization caused much debate and controversy at the highest levels ofcommand. Cutbacks in Army appropriations resulted in the resignation orretirement of several of the strongest ad.,ocates of reform and reorganization.In the meantime, the Army continued to test, analyze, and compare variousorganizational forms that could meet the flexible response requirementsof organic interchangeability, firepower, air mobility, ground mobility,dispersion, control, and communications.

The international tensions of the Cold War made planners aware ofthe possibility of the infantry division having to operate in a tacticalnuclear environment. Nothing from past experience could furnish guidelinesfor the formulation of such a unit. In 1956, three years after the end ofthe Korean War, the Army introc' -, ed a new division--the Pentomic infantrydivision. The organization and deielopment of this division will be coveredin detail in the following chapter.

Korea added another category of war to the classification usuallyemployed by the US Army, that of "1 limited war. " Korea was our firstmodern limited military operation and it demonstratei that limited warcannot be conducted with limited resources. Politically it was termeda "police action" until dhe disaster at Taejon. Korea proved conclusivelythat an interim peacetime type of military organization was inadequatewhen the country entered war. Further, Korea showed that there was noshortcut to effective tactical organization in the matter of personnel andunit organization. Finally, Korea demonstrated, without q ,'c. *n, thatin the warfare of the future the tactical organization of the infinrt y divisionof the US Army must possess every kind of flexibility to successfully wagemodern war.

70 CORG-Ml-365

THE DI VISION 0OF THE 1950O's -1960O's A ND VIEETNA M

The Cold War, which continued throughout the 1950' s, exerted consider-able influence on US Army organization. Military plaHners had to reorganize

for the probability of a future war of tremendous destructive potential. Otherforces also affected the organization of the modern division. Contemporarytechnological advances in weaponry and fixed and rotary-wing light aircrafthad completely changed the face of modern war. infantry weapons weretotally different from those of World War II and Korea. A reduced caliberrapid-firing, semi-automatic shoulder weapon, a new machinegun andgrenade launcher, and improved mortars of heavier caliber were now in theinfantryman's arsenal. New vehicles, such as the Ml13 Armored PersonnelCarrier, had been added to the inventory and other load carriers were beingdeveloped and tested. Innovations in tactical airmobile units were to becomethe subject of exhaustive trials and tests.

The Pentomic (ROCID) Division--An Interim Measure

The period from 1956-1961 might be termed the pentomic period inthe history of the infantry division. The triangular concept of three unitshad proven to be effEct've for attack in World War II but, on the defensive,threes were not as adaptable as four or five subordinate units in an overalldivisional structure. In the matte,, of numbers there were planners who,harkening back to Clausewitz, believed that an even number of units did notlend itself well to control in offensive operations. Five, as an odd number,was preferred as a logical compromise for both offense and defense.

The five-unit division concept was advanced as the one most capable ofgiving the Army a highly flexible and powerful divisional organization fornuclear or nonnuclear warfare. Of necessity, as an infantry division, it hadthe ability to attack or defend by fire and maneuver. The "pentomic" (ROCID)organization was adopted as the one offering the highest degree of responseto the doctrine of flexibility.

Army planners believed that the battlefield of the future would bebroader and deeper than any ever encountered in previous military operations.

Organization

The structure of the pentomic division was almost entirely differentfrom that of the triangular organization (Fig. 13, 14, and 15). Instead ofregiments and battalions, there were five of the new battle groups. Innumbers and strength, the battle group was a self-contained, combined-arms unit which possessed a capability of independent combat operations.Organically, the pentomic infantry division contained artillery and missileunits capable of delivering either conventional fires or nuclear explosives.Heavier artillery support for the pentomic division was to be found in missilecommands sited in the combat zones of future theaters of operations.

The structure of the armored division of World War II and the KoreanWar had permitted maximum mobility and dispersion. Since the shiftfrom triangular to pentomic was aimed at achieving these capabilities,

CORG-M-365 71

.1

j I f

* CVSOIJ TRLAtNS

H4 .. d I'q d., GM 0O M d be .

Figure 13. Organization of Pentomic Infantry Division

F.t-

Figure 14. Organization of Pentomic Armored Division

S~Ib 8....

Figure 15. Organization of Pentomic Airborne Division

Source for Fig. 13, 14, and 15. Army Information Digest, September 1965

72 COIl3-M-3¢i

i

t

t2

there was a minimal amount of restructuring needed in the armored division.The armored division structure survived the pentomic period and the laterconversion of the pentomic to the ROAD division. The combat commandsthat were so successful on the battlefields of World War II were to reappearin the ROAD infantry divisions as brigades. (Infantry division brigades hadbeen dropped when the square division went triangular in 1939).

The most significant change was found in the battle group itself (Fig. 16).This group, which was midway between the regiment and battalion, achieved --

an increase in fighting strength over the battalion. But the battle group wassmaller than the regiment it replaced. Army planners hoped that the battlegroup would be a less profitable target on an atomic or nuclear battlefieldthan the infantry regiment of the old triangular infantry division.

Battle Group

Hq and Hq RfeCombat ICompany Company

01 203 Company

Figure 16. Infantry Division Battle Group

Limitations

The first US Army infantry division to be reorganized under the ROCID(Reorganization Objectives, Current Infantry Division) or pentomic conceptwas the 101st Airborne Division. This was effected by the Army Chief ofStaff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, who had commanded +he 101st AirborneDivision in Europe during World War II. Testing commenced almostimmediately and continued as flaws were uncovered. The 1st Infantry andthe 1st Armored Divisions were also included in the tests of the new divisional

!* concept. Field test results demonstrated conclusively that there was aSCORG-M-365 73

marked imbalance between the unit' s nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities.Basically, the unit' s role was predicated on the national security policiesthat existed in 1956, when the new concept was to be tested. Continuingchanges in broad nationa! security strategies indicated that "imassiveretaliation" was out and "flexible response" was in. Inherently, massiveretaliation was a rigid and inflexible solution to a nuclear situation. Adivisional structure was needed that could solve the tactical dilemma byincreasing the nonnuclear firepower of the division without weakening itsnuclear firepower delivery potential. The pentomic divisions were relativelyinflexible, without specific tailoring to adapt them to widely varying environ-ments. Because of the elimination of the echelons between the companyand divisional commanders, the latter' s span of control was increased toan unmanageable sixteen.

Intensive field maneuvers in the late 1950's and early 1960's indicatedthat the pentomic division was better for the defensive that for the offensive.The division's heavily weighted firepower, in the form of artillery and heavymortars, made it an unlikely unit to conduct offensive warfare or aggressivedefensive operations in a conventional nonnuclear combat situation. Numer-ically, the battle groups were not large enough to carry out sustained attacks.Further, it was expected that the Army's missions would be broad and in theareas of nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. Hence, the division's structure,firepower, and mobility had to be reconstituted for maximum flexibility andadaptability in war.

The pentomic division, adopted as an interim measure for the Cold War,pointed the way to reconciling the need for dispersion with fire and maneuvercapabilities. The pentomic concept was a step toward de-emphasizing theemotional, traditional, and institutional aspects of military organization,and creating new functional units that would meet the requirements of modernconventional or nuclear warfare. The elimination of the battalion and thesubstitution of the battle group was a basic step toward the eventual eliminationof the regiment from the divisional structure and the later return of thebattalion. Pizer comments upon the pentomic division as follows:

The pentomic division was not intended to be a per-manent or even a long-term solution. It was intendedfrom the outset as a workable, interim measure to fit thedivision framework to the demands of both conventionaland nuclear warfare. Meanwhile the search for a betterdivision structure continued.

One factor that Army planners meant to retain andto extend in the new division was the combat commandformat peculiar to the armored division. Both in itsearlier triangular form and now in its pentomic con-figuration, the armored division included three so-calledcombat commands. They were nothing more than small,tactical headquarters to which the division commandercould allocate any combination of the division's combatelements for an operation or a series of operations.

74 CORG-M-365

II

The combat command provided the means of exercisingcontrol over the tactical units, and it gave the divisioncommander a vital link for coordinating and maneuvering -his combat elements. The combat command concept madefor the kind of flexibility that is necessary on a modernbattlefield without sacrificing the control that preventFsa combat operation from deteriorating into a number ofuncoordinated little actions. The combat command system -was built Into the new division concept that was developing Xrapidly. (Ref 14, p 38)

The ROAD Division

Maxwell D. Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, and an advocate of "flexible response n served as militaryadvisor to President John F. Kennedy. In 1961 Taylor urged further reor-ganization of the Army and its divisions to ceet the challenge of the Inter-national power struggle. In that year the Army adopted a new organizationalconcept, the "Reorganization Objectives Army Divisions 1965' (ROAD).The basic structure of the ROAD division is shown in Figure 17.

BASIC STRUCTURE 1MI. FOUR

DIVISIONS

qMaxwel D. Tayor form r Arm Che SafCar man ov Sth Joit

rgl n t r de and Div arty

*Number and type of maneuver battalioni may vary.

"*The support command commande,'% responsibilities for the administration company arelimited to tactical, security and movement aspects.

Figure 17. ROAD Division Basic Struhcture

CORG-M -365 75

Organization

In a sense, the Army' s reorganization was a return to the triangulardivision format that had been so effective in World War II and the KoreanWar. The new concept, ' The Reorganization Objective-.- Army Division"(ROAD), was a radical departure from traditional US Army divisionalorganization. Briefly, the new ROAD division consisted of a commondivision base, three brigades including headquarters, and assigned supportingunits. Unlike the brigades of the earlier square divisions, the ncw brigadeswere highly flexible headquarters; the battalions, infantry, mechanized,armored, or airborne units could be attached and made operative by thebrigade headquarters. In addition, the RGAD division was prepared to mixand operate nuclear and conventional weapons if required. The rationalefor the basic pattern for the flexible brigades was found in the old combatcommands of the World War II armored division. While ar, almost unlimitednumber of battalions could be assigned, the overall division strength washeld to about fifteen thousand men. This maoc the ROAD division heavierthan its predecessor, the pentomic division. Basically, the ROAD divisionwas triangular--three brigades were, in effect, headquarters for highlyadaptable and flexible task forces

The ROAD division headquarters contains, beside the commandinggeneral and staff, two assistant division commanders with the rank ofbrigadier general (Fig. 18 and 19). Their duties are divided between thedirection of the maneuver elements (the battalions) and logistical supportactivities (the support command). In addition to the headquarters andheadquarters company, the division comprises:

* An armored cavalry squadron of three armored cavalry troopsmounted in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled mortarsand an air cavalry troop.

• A signal battalion of three companies, equipped with telephones,teletypes, and long-range radios for communications.

• An engineer battalion containing five companies, one of which isan engineer bridge company.

• An aviation battalion, including a headquarters company; ageneral support aviation company, equipped with airplanes and helicoptersfor reconnaissance and liasion missions, and an airmobile company con-sisting of three airlift platoons, each equipped with eight troop-carryingaircraft. (In addition, there is a service platoon).

* A military police company.

* A division support command. All technical and soipply elementsare in a sCngle unit, not established along separate technical branches,but instead organized to operate functionally.

The artillery which is organic to the division consists of three battalions(with 105amm howitzers, towed) with a total of eighteen guns to thebattalion. The 155mm and 8-inch howitzers are organized into a composite

76 CORG-M-365

jII

ORGANIC DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

COMMANDER

ASSISTANTCOMMANDERS

CHIEF OF STAFF

G i__5 Ll• -]

(AUG)

Figure 18. ROAD Division Command and General Staff Organization

"DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

CHEMICAL HEADQUARTERS [RNPORTATION SUGONRADIO.OGICAI. COMMANDANT [UGO

DIVISION ADMINISTRATION COMPANY

INS PECTOR ADJUTANT STAFF JUDGE CHAPLAINGENERAL PGENERAL ADVOCATE*

S

IN IONA . ALSO MEMBERS PERSONAL STAFF FINANCEOF COMMANDING GENERAL i ji

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OR ORGANIC DIVISIONAL UNITS

SALL[RY [ ARMY 1AVIATION

IL PROVOSTIMARSHAL

Figure 19. ROAD Division Special Staff Organization

C(ORG-IA.-365 77

F

battalion; additionally, there is a missile battalion assigned. Three brigadeheadquarters are permanently assigned to the above division base, eachcommanded, not by a brigadier general, but by a colonel. At the end ofWorld War II, it had been recommended that infantry regimental commandersbe accorded the rank of brigadier general (Ref 26). This was never approved.

The maneuver elements of the ROAD infantry division usually includeeight infantry and two armored battalions (Fig. 20). The armored ROADdivision contains six armored and five mechanized infantry battalions (Fig. 21).The airborne division includes nine airborne infantry battalions and anairborne gun battalion (Fig. 22). The infantry division (mechanized) consistsof the standard ROAD division base plus at least three tank battalions andseven or more mechanized infantry battalions attached or assigned (Fig.. 23).

XX15,594

UPGV ENGR BRIGADE HOco M BN a HQ CO

ISou rce:!Ref ernc 1pi4,p43OA ApRON ARTILLERY BNt BN• ~COMl l

AM .o Hag,-L

HQ NO&14 155/8 ISCco & BMtO TAMRON-- dD

Source: Reference 149 p 43Figure 20. ROAD Infantry Division

The ROAD Support Command

Basically the ROAD division is an advanced form of military organizationfor solving the bulk of the command and logistical problems encountered intraining or in combat. Supply, in combat or campaign, has always presenteda complex problem of logistics. Without ammunition, food, and equipmentthe soldier is ineffective. The solution to the problem of logistics in combatwas the creation of a "Logistical Division, " a supply division organizedto serve the armies, corps, and divisions in the field. In essence, it was

i a smaller, mobile version of the Logistical Command of the Korean Warperiod.

78 CORG-M-365

xx

IN 15,966

A CO HO up

M D IV I CHUIE

SU I .Y DIVIS ONTA NSTPMPB••A.Y• lN IOSSP • ICO ARTILLERT" Y ON, , WI

DM IN CO MR".,

HR6~ O AL4I .40A MIN

STRY

"" 49D 155/8 INCH

IAI&HO & FAIO HOWTPR ON 105 SP

uAI:T 811e,- 1 4 Source: Refernc 14, p 45

Figure 22. ROAD Airborne Division

CORG-M-365 79

Ix me w PI I 1-3

Ii

XXF iCHANIZEO

DIVISION 15,976

I -- " FF1HO&HQMP AVN SCEG lIAEH

CI • [ CO NBN &HOCO

OIISON DAAR IV SIONN

COMMAN S NRTILLERY TN

CO & B:flD 1O HHO

SUPPLY 1 A HOW BNE a RANP SN 105 P

Source: Reference 14, p 46 £

Figure 23. ROAD Infantry Division, Mechanized

Colonel (now Major General) Willard Pearson, a brigade and divisioncommander in Vietnam, notes that

The best known example of a trains organization isthe armored division trains. In World War II the trainsorganization provided the flexibility required for thedivision staff to coordinate the mobility inherent inarmor units. In addition, the trains commander becameresponsible for rear area recurity. The armoreddivision had a pressing requirement for such anorganization because of its mobility. After a break-through and during the exploitation phase, its sup-porting services became more vulnerable than therear area of an infantry division.

In the armored division trains organization thegeneral stdff has direct access to the special staffoperators, and the special staff, in turn, is responsiveto the coordinating instructions of the general staff.No intervening headquarters is interposed between thegeneral staff planners and the special staff operatorsto lengthen the chain of command. The flexibilityinhereiit in existing general-special staff organizationand operations thus is retained. (Ref 33, p 17)

80 CORG-M-365

!I

f

The support command of the ROAD division provides the logistical Aservices for the division (Fig. 24), furnishing medical, administrative,maintenance, and supply services. The command is very much like thedivision trains of the World War ] armored division. The mission of tiledivision administration company, an integral part of the division supportcommand, is much like that of the division headquarters company. Essen-tially, the division headquarters company serves as the carrier unit for staffpersonnel assigned to the forward echelon sections of the division head-quarters; the administration company performs a similar service for per-sonnel assigned to the rear echelons.

Pizer discusses the function of the support command as well as thatof the division artillery in the following extract:

The support command provides the division's medical,administrative, maintenance, and supply services.The division artillery (slightly reduced and modifiedfor the airborne division) includes three 105-mm.howitzer battalions, a missile battalion equipped withHonest John and Little John rockets, and a compositebattalion of 155-mm and 8-inch howitzers. TheHonest John and Little John rockets and the 8-inch and155-mm. howitzers all possess a nuclear capability inaddition to a conventional capability. Firepower, bothnuclear and conventional, is greater in the ROADdivision than it was in the pentomic organization.(Ref 14, p 40)

mA

I "

SFigur~~AJK e 24.r RODDiiio upotComn

kw~ C~ar"M d

reW.sftes wre .ro te !DTvbca Secunty. andimýA*"ct The Cayc'IlT isxoSv

Orlauc to ,ve h~rn~e DOrLin h~e 0. fma Srwirl ~'Cpw, a" .te JutIl NOM.S M 7

I

Figure 24. ROAD Division Support Command

COHG-M-363 81

Command and Control

In 1963, Colonel James M. Snyder briefly summarized the commandrelationships in the ROAD divisions.

The ROAD concept of division organization-tailored units to meet specific needs - gives to theArmy the ability to alter quickly its weapons andtactics, to meet any ground opponent in any groundarena of action. It has opened up new areas ofconcern in the relationships between the commanderand his staff, and between the staff and the sub-ordinate units.

But the areas of concern, at least at this time,appear to present no insurmountable problems. Asmore and more of the Army' s combat divisionschange over to the ROAD concept, the areas ofconcern will undoubtedly be brought into focusand resolved. kRef 34, p 62)

In the ROAD division command and control is exercised through threedivisional command posts -- a tactical, a main, and a rear command post.The tactical command post operates o _il when required by tactical operations.It is unique in the history of military command posts in that it possessesno set structure (although its persornel never exceeds twenty people).Further, the entire tactical command post can be airborne when thesituation requires. The main division command post arranges for othercommand posts of the division. It commands the brigade command postsand the command posts of the division artillery and the support command.There are twenty-three elements of the staff and the support located at"division main" but, because of the possible threat of nuclear attack,alternate division command posts must be established. A practical solutionis to split the G-staff (the G-1 and the (3-4) at an alternate location andlocate the rest of the staff at the "division main." A further use of thealternate command post would be to station one of the assisi.'nt divisioncommanders there. When such an arrangement would not be feasible, thereserve brigade or the division artillery command post might be utilizedas an alternate division command post.

Pizer notes the flexibility of the ROAD Division in the following extract.

The great feature of the ROAD division is its highdegree of flexibility and versatility. This it owes toits three brigade headquarters and its maneuverbattalions. (The battle group introduced in the pentomicdivision was abandoned in the ROAD division in favorof a return to the smaller battalion.) Within thisframework, the division commander has the means totailor a task force around each of the brigade head-quarters. As the circumstances suggest and hisjudgment determines, he can allocate to a brigade

82 CORG-M-365

any mix of maneuver battalions, artillery, engineers,and other support elements for a specific mission.If the circumstances alter, he is free to adjust thecomposition of each brigade task force by regroupinghis units. ROAD divisions provide commanders thekind of flexibility and freedom they must have tocope with swiftly changing combat situations. -.

(Ref 14, p 40)

The ROAD Infantry Division

The MOAD infantry division consists of the standard division base plusassigned or attached tank and infantry battalions, the number of which mayvary to meet the requirements of the mission. Characteristics of thedivision are as follows:

MISSION: To destroy enemy military forces and tocontrol land area including populations andresources.

ASSIGNMENT: To Army.

CAPABILITIES: a. Conduct 3ustained combat opera-tions ag'ainst similarly or lesswell-ecuippec ground forces.

b. Conduct operations in difficultweather or terrain.

c. Conduct Army airborne operations.

d. Perform as a part of a joint taskforce, amphibious operations.

e. Perform as a part of a joint taskforce, airborne operations.

f. Control enemy populations.

g. Restore order.

h. Operate with austere logi*ticalsupport

i. Handle up to fifteen maneuverbattalions.

LIMITATIONS: a. No air defense artiller-y.

b. Limited airlift capability.

c. Limited mobility.

d. Limited protection against armor.

e. Limited protection against artilleryand nuclear effects. (Ref 35)

CORG-M -365 83

Infantr3y Division Brigade

The infantry division brigade replaces the infantry regiment in theinfantry division and, as such, commands and controls the operations ofthe battalions attached to it. There are three brigades in the infant:-y division;each is commanded by a colonel and each centains an organic headquartersand headquarters company. The company is completely mobile. It isdependent upon the division administration company for personnel servicesand upon the infantry division artillery for nuclear fire support.The cinaracteristics od this company follow.

MISSION: To command and control attached combat andcombat support elements in both training andoperations.

ASSIGNMENT: Organic to the Infantry Division, TOE 7G.

CAPABILITIES: a. Command attached elements of thedivision' a combat and combatsupport elements in offensive anddefensive combat operations.

b. Accept or release attached elementson short notice.

c. Conduct brigade operations onsustained 24-hour-a-day basis.

d. Supervise the movement andsecurity of attached or supportingadministrative elements.

e. Establish liaison with higher andadjacent headquarters.

f. Supervise tactical training ofattached divisional elements.

g. Act as emergency successoroperational headquarters fordivision in event of destruction ofdivision headquarters.

h. Control up to five maneuver battalions.

i. Provide a security element for thebrigade headquarters.

j. Engage (as individuals, exceptchaplains and medical personnel)in effective, coordinated defenseof the unit' s area or installation.(Ref 36)

84 CORG-M-365

Infantry Battalion

The infantry battalion, the basic maneuver alements of the ROAD infantrydivision, consists of three rifle companies, each with 181 officers and men,and a headquarters company. Within the headquarters company is a recon-nalssance platoon, a mortar platoon (.1. 2-Inch), and an antitank plv.toon. Itshould be noted that the 4.2-inch mortar is a holdover from the battle groupsof the pentomic division. In the latter, the 4.2-inch mortars were served byartillerymen attached to the infantry. In ROAD divisions these heavy mortarsare operated by infantrymen. The rifle company consists of a headquarterssection of thirteen officers and men, and three rifle platoons of forty-fourmen each. Every rifle platoon is organized into three rifle squads of tenmen. Organic to the rifle platoon is a weapons squad of eleven men. Theinfantry rifle squad Is divided into two five-man teams. Each fire teamincludes an antomatic rifle in its armament. Six rifles and two grenadelaunchers are distributed among the other eight men in the squad. Two lightmachineguns and two recoilless rifles (90mm) are assigned to four men ofthe weapons squad. These men are armed with pistols and the remaindercarry rifles.

The mission of the infantry battalion is to close with the enemy by meansnf. fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel hisassault by fire, close combatt, and counterattack. It should be noted thatthere are no limitations. (Ref 37)

Rifle Company

The element of the maneiver battalion with the vital mission of closingwith the enemy is the rifle company, infantry battalion, Infantry division.The rifle company i& 15-percent mobile. It is dependent upon the headquartersand headquarters company, TOE 7-16G, for the provision of mess facilitieswhen centralized at battalion level. The characteristics of the rifle com-pany are as follows:

MISSION: To close with the enemy by means of fireand maneuver in order to destroy or capturehim or to repel his assault by fire, closecombat, and counterattack.

ASSIGNMENT: a. Organic to Infantry Battalion,Infantry Division, TOE 7-15G.

b. Organic to Infantry Battalion,Separate Infantry Brigade,TOE 7-15G.

CAPABILITIES: Provide a base of fire and maneuver,seize and hold terrain, maneuver in alltypes of terrain under all climatic con-ditions, and capitalize on all forms ofmobility. (Ref 38)

CORG-M-365 85

The ROAD Infantry Division (Mechanized)

The infantry division (mechanized) (Fig. 23) is characterized by thefollowing capabilities:

MISSION: To destroy enemy military forces and to seizeor dominate critical land areas, their popula-tions, and resources.

ASSIGNMENT: To field army as determined by operationalrequirements.

CAPABILITIES: a, Conduct decisive, highly mobilewarfare against similarly orless well-equipped forces.

b. Accomplish wide envelopment,deep penetration, and pursuit.

c. Disperse and concentrate rapidlyover extended distances.

d. Exploit success, including theeffects of nucJear, non-nuclear,and chemical fires.

e. Condiut covering force operations.

f. Conduct mobile defense.

g. Perform amphibious operations,as part of a joint force.

h Conduct airmobile operations byelements of this division whensupported by non-organic aircraft.

i. Control operations of fifteenmaneuver battalions

LIVIITATIONS: a. When employed in airmobileoperations, committed elements losemuch of their shock effect and groundmobility.

b. Vehicular mobility is restricted byjungle, dense forest, untrafficablesteep or rugged terrain, and water

obstacles.

c. Considerable logistic support isrequired to maintain mobility andstriking power. (Ref 39)

86 CORG-M-365

F

The ROAD Armored Division J

The ROAD armored division consists of the standard ROAD division baseplus assigned or attached tank battalio. s and mechanized infantry battalions,the number of which may vary to meet the requirements of the mission.The characteristics of the armored division are as follows:

MISSION: To destroy enemy military forces and to seize or Idominate critical land areas, their populations,

r and resources.

ASSIGNMENT: To Army.

CAPABILITIES: a. Conduct sustained combat operationsagainst any type of opposing groundforces.

b. Accomplish rapid movement, deeppenetration, and pursuit.

c. Disperse and concentrate rapidlyover great distances.

d. Exploit successes, including effectsof nuclear, non-nuclear, and chemicalfires.

e. Conduct covering force operations.

f. Conduct mobile defense and providecounterattack and maneuvering force.

g. Perform amphibious operations asa part of a joint force.

h. Optimum protection against antitank,artillery, and nuclear effects.

[i. Control operations of fifteen

maneuver battalions.

Lh1MITATIONS: a. No organic air defense artillery.

b. Primary fighting vehicles are notair mobile.

c. Mobility restricted by jungle, denseforest, untrafficable and steeplyrugged terrain, and water obstacles.

d. Requires heavy logistical support,including rail or highway transport oftrack vehicles for long hauls. (Ref 40)

The ROAD Division Base

The ROAD division base of the infantry division is identical in organizationalstructure to the division bases of the infantry division (mechanized) and the

CORG-M-365 87

armored division, except that the infantry division base contains an aviationbattalion not organic to the other two types of ROAD divisions. With thisexception, the typical division base comprises the command and controlheadquarters and the organic combat and combat support elements. Thcorganization serves as the base to which varying numbers of maneuverbattalions, infantry, infantry (mechanized) or tank, may be assigned asappropriate. j

A mechanized battalion was an infantry battalion

equipped with armored personnel carriers as organictransportation. An airborne battalion as usual hadlighter ,and fewer vehicles than a standard infantrybattalion. An armored battalion included reconnais-sance and self-propelled mortar platoons plus threetank companies of eighteen tanks each. In the middle1960' s the tanks were mainly fifty-one-ton M-601 sfiring 105-mm guns, heavy tarks of the sort that hadbeen so conspicuously lacking in World War 11.(Ref 1, p 541,

Tank Battalion

The tank battalion, armored division, infantry division, or infantrydivision (mechanized) consists of a headquarters and headquarters companyand three tank companies. This unit is dependent upon the US Air Forceto provide a iorward air controller (FAC) for directing tactical air support.The significant characteristics of the battalion are:

MISSION: To close with and destroy enemy forces usingfire, maneuver, and shock action in coordinationwitn other arms.

ASSICNMENT: Organic to:

a. Armored division, TOE 17G.

b. Infantry division, TOE 7G.

c. Infantry division (mechanized),"TOE 37G.

CAPABILITIES: a. Conduct operations requiring ahigh degree of firepower, mobility,armor protection, and siock action.

b. Attack or counterattack under hostilefire.

c. Destroy enemy armor by fire.

d. Support mechanized and infantry unitsby fire, maneuver, and shock action.

e. Provide the mobility, armor protection,firepower, and flexible communications

88 CORG-M-365

V

to successfully exploit the effects ofnuclear and non-nuclear fire support.

f. Conduct combat operations underlimited visibility conditions employingnight viewing devices and surveillanceequipment.

g. Participate in air-transported operationswhen the armored reconnaissance/airborne assault vehicle is substitutedfor the main battle tank. (Ref 41)

Headquarters and Headquarters Compaay, Tank Battalion

The headquarters company of the tank battalion, armored division,infantry division, or infantry division (mechanized), consists of a battalionheadquarters and a headquarters company. This unit is dependent upon theUS Air Force to provide a forward air controller (FAC) for directingtactical air support. The significant characteristics of the company are: I

MISSION: To furnish command, administration, supply,mess, and maintenance for the tank battalion,organized under TOE 17-35G.

ASSIGNMENT: Organic to the tank battalion, armored,infantry, or infantry division (mechanized)TOE 17-35G.

CAPABILITIES: a. Command, control, provide staffplanning, furnish communications,and supervise operations.

b. Furnishes supply, mess, transportation,b.organizational maintenance, and

administration for organic and attachedunits.

c. Provide unit level medical serviceto the tank battalion and attachedunits to include furnishing aidmento the tank companies.

d. Provide indirect fire support for thetank battalion and attached units.

e. Provide centralized or decentralizedmessing as required.

f. Provide reconnaissance supportfor the tank battalion and attached units.

g. Engage as individuals, except medicalpersonnel, in effective, coordinateddefense of the unit' s area or installation.(Ref 4 2)

CORG-M -365 89

Tank CompanyThe tank company of the armored division, the infantry division, or the

infantry division (mechanized) tank battalion (TOE 17-35G) consists of acompany headquarters and three tank platoons. The company is 100 percentmobile in organic transportation, with a portion of the company class IIl.and V basic load transported by the battalion support platoon. A ten-mansecurity squad with equipment must be provided by augmentation when thiscompany is employed in certain Aperational environments. The companyis dependent upon the headquarters and headquarters company for messfacilities and transportation of a portion of its class III rind class V basicload. Characteristics of the company are as follows:

MISSION: To close with and destroy enemy forces,using fire, maneuver, and shockaction in coordination with other arms.

ASSIGNMENT: Organic to the tank battalion, armoreddivision, infantry division, and infantrydivision (mechanized).

CAPABILITIES: a. Attack or counterattack underhostile fire.

b. Destroy enemy armor by fire.

c. Support infantry, infantry(mechanized), reconnaissance, orother tank units by fire, maneuver,and shock action.

d. Provide the mobility, armor pro-tection, and firepower to successfullyexploit the effects of nuclear andnon-nuclear fire support. (Ref 43)

The Brigade and the Combat Arms Regimental System

The establishment of the ROAD division returned the brigade to theUS Army. In a sense, the brigade eliminated and replaced the traditionalregimental organization. The division base, in reality is no longer thetraditional division headquarters and staff of the wars of the past. Con-ceptually, battalions are no longer permanent, integral parts of the whole.Instead, they are self-contained tools which can be attached or detached asoperations require. With ROAD, the division has become an almostcompletely functional military unit. With the regiment dropped, the traditional"home" of the soldier no longer exists. But individual morale and unitesprit de corps have not completely vanished from the present ROAD infantrydivision. Colonel Sidney B. Berry (now Brigadier General), an outstandingsuccessful brigade commander in Vietnam, indicates how the brigade re-placed the regiment as far as morale and esprit de corps are concerned.He notes that, since the brigade does not possess the historical lineage ofthe old regiment or division, it must build on the present achievements

90 CORG-M-365

and not upon the past. The Army has devised a system ,utitle.i Cor.b.Arms Regimental System which serves to identify the neý, unite witr- ]a:seof the old AriuY -- through lines of geneological descent.

Within a division, unit esprit is built mosteffectively around the battalion and the division itselfsince '.as? ha e aistinctive histories and traditionsand A fixed organization. However, the brigadpcommander hae a different problem in buildingbrigade esprit. Being one of three tactical head-q.arters which, at one time or another, commandsever)y battalion in the di,-sion, the brigade shouldbuild its own eRrit in a manner that disparages no,ther u.oit and cmntributes "o the ability of allbattalioans and brlgades Lc work together smoothlyanw in wholehearted cooperation. Being recentlycreated and lacking a iistinctive history ortradition, the brigade must build its esprit ontht, presenc and the future, not the past.

The brigadee' s operational effectiveness andprofessionai raanner of accomplishing its missionis the f)oundatron upon which brigade esprit is built.Coriperitiou sbould be against an absolute standardo' military profe.srionalisin and operational effective-ness. A brigade' s erit is healthy and soundlyeetablished whb-n it.; members know that their brigade ¶.s good Pnd diat is is p.uing to be better, and whenrbattalions look forward to operating under thebrigade's comm-ad because they respect itsoperational effectiv~ness and like the way it operates.(Ref 44, p 46)

. nder the Combat Arms Ei.gimental System, the historical backgroundsof most o the div-ioni" and separate brigades will take up their historyfiomr b-rgades which formerly existed in the old Army. Those new elementsof the ROC.AD division which have no historical background will

.erpetuate the history and tradition of elementsnow aotive in the division. The support command willperpetaate the hi~iory of the division trains and band;th•e supply and xransport battalion will continue thehistory of tie division Quartermaster company, whilethe maintenance battalion will continue the history ofthe Ordnance battalion. (Ref 45, p 24)

Brigade histories will come from three differentsources, depending upon the brigade and the divisionto which it is organic.

Brigades that were inactivated or disbanded whenRegular Army divisions were triangularized in 1939 - 40.Except for the 1st and 2d Infantry Brigades, which

CORG-M-365 91

served briefly in World War II as Airborne Infantry bri- -gades, and from 1958 to 1962 as Infantry brigades,the Regular Army Infantry brigades have not been used -

since then. This source will provide two of the threebrigades for the 1st through 8th Infantry Divisions. Thethird brigades in each division will perpetuate the historyof the former division headquarters company, which wasinactivated when division headquarters was expanded toform the current division headquarters and headquarters

company. (Ref 45, p 24)

The Airmobile Division

In June 1965, a new type of division appeared in the United States Army.This unit, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was a Iqndmark in theevolution of US Army organization (Fig. 25). This novel division was the

result of over three years of intensive study of tactical mobility. A boardof officers, headed by General Hamilton H. Howze, a leading proponent of

mobility, studied the problem during the summer of 1962 at Fort Bragg,N. C., and established trial units at Fort Benning, Georgia. After therecommendations of the Howze Board were approved by the Joint Chiefs

XX

AIour8e: R0eren0e I4, p847

II

COHG -M -6S:.NAL

N~~ O A HO COBACOMBAT [I

Sore eeec 4 7~~CO EIKG CO cc

Figure~~~~~F' 25 ROKAroieDvso

coI

Dii RTY VIAI04 GICU

ICONRGIN 36FA O LI III IRII SUPOPAERSIAN

ry

of Staff, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and the 10th Air Transport

Brigade were formed to test the airmobile concept in the field. 4 In July 1965,the 1st Cavalry Division, less personnel and equipment, was transferredfrom Korea and reorganized as the new 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).Compared to the ROAD division, the airmobile division consists of thefollowing:

A IR MO BILE ROAD

Men: 15,787 15,900Aircraft: 434 101Vehicles: 1,600 3,200I (Ref 46, p 34)

The infantry division of the future will be influenced considerably by thecombat experiences of divisions in Vietnam. In a sense, Vietnam is a provingground for the concept of the modern infantry division. However, future warsmay or may not be similar in pattern to Vietnam. They may be entirelyconventional, or a mixture of both the conventional and unconventional, as isVietnam. The airmobile concept appears to be an effective divisional struc-ture for fluid warfare. By this is meant where the frontline is not well-defined on the ground and the "front is everywhere."

How the airmobile concept would function in a combat environment in accnventioral operation upon level and rolling open terrain is speculative. Thevulnerability of the helicopter to ground fire (small arms, larger caliberautomatic weapons, and antiaircraft artillery) presents the airmobile divisionwith several problems of survival. In mountainous country, interlaced withvalleys and deep draws and gullies the helicopter can approach a verticalassault point with assurance of some cover. Speed is the essence of allairmobile operations and, in optimum terrain, troops may be inserted into the

combat area with minimal casualties to both troops and vehicles. In flat,open country, the transport of troops by helicopter can be accomplished withgreat dispatch and speed - provided there is little, or no, antiaircraft andground fire. Helicopter gunships, flying ahead of the transport waves, willhave the mission of direct fire to suppress antiaircraft opposition. Tacticsfor helicopter operation against hostile fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft haveyet to be devised, refined, and established as doctrin'. In 1968, helicopterweapons systems for this purpose were under development, experimentation,and study. Unfortunately, Vietnam furnishes little experience with thistype of formal opposition - except antiaircraft and ground-based missile fires.

Organization

The airmobile division is an answer to the historical military problem oforganizing a truly lighL division. As in other types of ROAD divisions, theairmobilc organization

4 The Department of the Army has announced new designations for itstwo airmobile divisions in Vietnam. The 101st Air Cavalry Division is nowknown as the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); the ist Air Cavalry Dii- Asion has become the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The" (Atrmobile)".suffix has been added to division elemer-ts such as maneuver battalions.

CORG-M-365 93

-~---:.•

U

.. is built on a division base and a variablenumber of maneuver battalions. Approximatelyone-third of the men in the maneuver battalionsare qualified paratroopers, thus enhancing thetactical versatility of the division. The airmobilebase includes division headquarters, the threebrigade headquarters, division artillery, a supportcommand, an aviation group, an engineer battalion, anair cavalry squadron, a signal battalion, and a military3olice company. Division artillery comprises three105-mm. howitzer battalions, an aerial artillery battalion,and an aviation battery. The support command includesa maintenance battalion (for other than aircraft), anaircraft maintenance and supply battalion, a supply andservice battalion, and a medical battalion. (Ref 14, p 42)

The airmobile division weighs about one-third as much as the ROADInfantry division. The division can be transported in C-130 aircraft, withthe exception of the Chinook helicopters which can be carried in C-133transport planes. As well as being highly mobile, the airmobile divisionpromises to be economical because of the speed with which it can accomplishits missions. However, since the new division lacks organic armor andmedium artillery, it cannot operate without close liaison with the Air Forcefor air support. Further, because of its potentially wide range of operations,it is expected that greater overall reliance on the Air Force may be required.

Vietnam -- The Proving Ground

Vietnam, growing in intensity from an aavisory activity to full-scalelimited war, became the proving ground for the new concepts. The helicopter,especially, came into its own as a highly mobile form of military transport.Weigley discusses the effect of Vietnam, on combat mobility:

When they discovered a trap in the making, theyeither forestalled the enemy with a spoiling attack,or they waited to allow him to draw them into thetrap upon which they would throw enough force againsthim to turn the tables. Especially the latter techniquerequired the utmost mobility and firepower. For mobility,

' the helicopter came into its own in Vietnam as a heavy-

duty troop carrier, joining with airplanes and going whereairplanes could not go to permit concentrating troopswith rapidity far beyond the enemy' s ability to match.A new kind of division appeared, the Ist Cavalry (AirMobile) Division, equipped with a full complement oftransport for movement by air and expressly outfittedto be " sky cavalry. " But so much did other divisionsalso become "air mobile" that the new 1st Cavalryseemed likely to follow the course of the motorizeddivisions of the early days of World War II; it wouldsimply hasten the process by which all divisionsgeared themselves for rapid movement. (Ref 1 , p 545)

94 CORG-M-365

Capabilities 4

Although the airmobile division is a ROAD-type division, it differs from theother ROAD divisions in that it is capable of complete mobility by either fixedor rotary-wing aircraft. It is the most mobile division ever organized in the _

US Army (or any other army). Basically dependent on its organic airframes for •transport, it also possesses the unique advantage of having airborne, organic,flying artillery gunships. These vehicles provide one of the most advancedforms of close fire support. Another feature of the division is that field gunscan be transported by helicopter to places that were formerly inaccessible.Pizer discusses the concept of the airmobile division in the following:

A completely new type of ROAD division -- the airmobiledivision--emerged in mid- 165 with the activation of the 1stCavalry Division (Airmobile) to meet the pressures of thewar in Viet-Nam.. .There were cogent reasons for creationof the new type of division, and all of them hinged on one ofthe major keys to modern land warfare: mobility. All ROADdivisions have some degree of mobility by air. The armoreddivision, with its great weight of tanks and of wheeled andtracked weapons and equipment, is least adapted to air trans-port. The infantry and the mechanized divisions are a littlebetter suited to an airlift. Much better adapted to air trans-port is the streamlined airborne division. But the newairmobile division possesses an inherent capacity for airtransportability far exceeding that of the other four types ofROAD divisions. Its unprecedented ability to fly into combatis due, in large part, to its own built-in air-lift capability.The airmobile division possesses nearly 450 aircraft (allbut 6 of them helicopters of 3 types), as compared to approx-imately 100 aircraft assigned to each of the other ROADdivisions. And the load that the airmobile division musttransport has been dramatically lightened. For example,the almust 3,200 ground vehicles of the infantry divisionhave been cut to some 1,600 in the airmobile division.

Because it is so "flyable" and because it can soaraloft on its own wings, the airmobile division has givenfresh meaning to mobility and maneuverability of groundunits. It provides the Army with a whole new order oftactical options and responses -- an ability to leapfrogthe enemy, to land troops in intact units ready for ianmed-iate combat, to exploit a suituation by instant shuttlingof forces within a battle zone, to grz duate the principleof surprise to a new level, to render rapid self-supportby using organic aircraft for logistical purposes, to strikedeep in the enemy' s rear, and to withdraw rapidly. Theseare capabilities that are eminently suited to the fluidity of

* guerrilla warfare, as the 1st Cavalry demonstrated soquickly and effectively in Viet-Nam. (Ref 14, pp 41-42)

CORG-M-365 95

Limitations

One of the pressiu,, problems which confronted the airmobile division inthe field was the matter of artillery fire support. There was the problem ofweight and transportation. To form the airmobile artillery battalions, stan-dard infantry division 105mm howitzer battalions had been converted. Theyhad been reduced in size, and organic trucks, light vehicles, and all heavyequipment had been eliminated. Crew shields and other non-functionalparts were removed from the M-1 howitzer of World War II for a radicalreduction in weight. At its final weight the 105mm howitzer, with its nine-man crew and 100 rounds of ammunition, was a standard combat load forthe Chinook helicopter.

* But the airmobile division required more than light artillery support.Since medium artillery (155mm) was too heavy, an aerial artillery battalionwas organized as substitute. The battalion used 2. 75-inch aerial rocketsmounted in 12 UH-1B helicopters (the famous "Gunships" of Vietnam). Thefollowing extract discusses one of the major problems the airmobile artilleryfaced.

Upon arrival in Vietnam, the first task of the artillerywas to provide fire support for the security of the divisionbase. Mortar, rocket, or recoilless rifle attacks were ofparticular concern because these could be expected at nightwhen target location is most difficult. A detailed map andaerial reconnaissance was conducted to locate possibleenemy firing positions. Based on this data, a harassingand interdiction program was planned and fired duringhours of darkness. (Ref 47, p 5)

In Vietnam, artillery is extremely vulnerable to infiltration. Infantryunits are assigned to protect each battery position in the area. Artillerypieces are airlifted to hills and other areas where terrain features are anobstruction. Infantry battalion headquarters and the reserve unit aregenerally located near these areas. Artillerymen, as well as infantrymen,man the perimeter defenses.

Because of the special terrain of Vietnam and the fluid battle lines there,friendly artillery support in combat can constitute a hazard. Attacking unitsmove toward a single objective and, as they converge, there is always thepossibility of "short-round" casualties. The airmobile division, more thanany other division, must have precise information on the exact location ofall friendly units at all times. To obviate "friendly errors," battalion firedirection centers are located within the brigade command post. Further, rigidfire lines are observed by all units--infantry and airmobile gunships alike.

Airmobile Versus Airborne

General Kinnard, an expert in both airborne and airmobile warfare,makes the case for airborne by citing the characteristics that make itsuperior to the airmobile divisional concept. Among these are:

o If sufficient air transports are available, more troops can bedeployed in a given area quicker by parachute drop than by any other means.The real value here is tactical surprise, which is essential in many combatsituations,

96 CORG-M-365

TABLE VI. MAJOR US AIRBORNE ASSAULTS

Unit Dates Place Type of ActionWORLD WAR II - EUROPE

5o"lg9h Prchl Inf On 8 NOv 42 dren N Afrtic First American utaof airborne trooips

S(J9vh Pichf Int On 15 NOv 42 YOuais Lin. Saint. Contact French troopsTunisia and proceed T., attack~~~ It~llhn ifOPc"PI e Gaftee •

5091h PrciM tot nri Nov 42 Find Pai. 0emolition action.Tunisia Intontr contact with

Italian troops

82nd A,,boine DOn 9 10 Jul 43 Gela. Trapanp. First large wat.

"and Palermo, night airborne slaulltS In

82nd Airborne Div 14 Sept 43 Salerno. Italy RalnfOtlcamant tohotd beachh ead

:09th Prcht let a" 14 Swpt 43 Avellino. italy Attacked 75- milesbehind enemy iees

5041h PIchl lnt Rengt 14 Sept 43 Altsevall. Italy Reinforce Salerno beachhead

82nd Airbo.rre Doiv 56 Jun 44 Normandy. Franc Disruopt Nazi cornmunicationssort supply

t0tsl A,rborne Oiv 5-6 Jun 44 Normandy. France Seize ctuoseavly. diltupt

t;gz, communications

Fi,rst Arboine 15 Avg 44 Southern France Spearhead invnaion; Task Force'

8l2nd A,tborne Oiv 17 Sept 44 N.:regen. Holiand Seize and hold htghway

bridge acrossiv Mils River

It Glove arnd Weal tAvn,4rat N.tntegen

101,t Arborne i; 17 Sept 44 Eindhovln. Holland Seize four highway andraitway bridges overA& River and WrlliamnVaart Canal et Vechel.

leareo ,dge at StOedenrode. teozeEinchoven and Wridget;

171h ArbOrne Div 24 Mar 45 Across the Rhine at Start of the rush toWewln Berlin

" iUncts InCludecd 517th Prcht tot

Regt. 460th Prcht FId Arty on, 463rd Prcht FId Ally on.50.th Prcht Int Bi. 551st Picht Inf Br. 550th Glider tnf So. and 596th Abn Engr Sn

WORLD WAR II - PACIFIC

503rd Pr-hl lIf Regi 5 Sept 43 L[ie. Saltarvoa. Cul oft rote ofNe- Guanea 20,000 fleeing

Jeosenobe50J~d PrCht Inf Regt 3 Jul 44 Nol~mf.0, sI$tld capturef::'I

airdrometI lth Aiorrrvne 0- 3 Faeb 45 Tegaytay. Luton I nveston of

South Lutlon503,d Prcht Int Regt 16 Fer 45 Corregidor Istand, Destroy enemy guns

P I from the rear1 1

th Airborne Div 23 Feb 45 Los Banos Camp. Raided Prison camp.Ltdon freeing 2,146

American civilians

11th Ar•botne Dv 25 Jun 45 LuZon Parachute etsoultplus first Use ofgliders in Pacitic

KOREAN WAR theater

187th Abn Regi 20 Oct 50'J Skchov- Designed to traCrbt 7t SuChon, North Kro-en troops

r N Korea

187th Abv Relt 23 Mar 51 Mu.san N, Delay Chinesre soldiers

Crtbt Tm S Korea rtreating from Seoua

VIETNAMESE WARI 73rd Abn Sde (Sep) 22 Feb 67 Via, Zone C Search and destroy

:'rssbon during OperationSJunction City

Source: Armed Forces Journal November 1968

CORG-M-365 97

I ?

* Extended range of the airmobile division is nowhere near as greatas that of the airborne division (Table VI). Although the airmobile divisionis better suited for day-to-day operation, it does not have the strategicreach capability. Specifically, this means a transoceanic, intercontinentaldeployment ability. Recent movement of troops has proven that the air-borne division possesses this important capability.

0 The commander in the field who has both airborne and airmobiledivisions available could use the airmobile division's transport to augmenta limited cargo and personnel carrying ability and capacity.

Since the requirements of a future war would make airborne troopsessential, airborne units will continue to be part of the divisional structureof the Army. However, when economies are to be effected the cost-consciousbudget makers and planners wifl Lbe faced with facts such as these: an air-borne division costs about 180 million dollars; an airmobile division, with itshighly specialized helicopter transport, costs about 410 million dollars; thestandard ROAD infantry division costs approximately 240 million dollars.But in the long run:

In terms of 5-year operating costs, the airbornedivision is also cheaper: $630-million, compared withabout $980-millon for an airmobile division, and$850-million for the infantry division.

[However, there is much less difference in therelative costs of full "division forces" -- whichinclude non-divisional units needed to sustain eachdivision in combat. For an airmobile division, theinitial and 5-year division force costs come to about$2,790-million, versus $2,610-million for an infantryforce and $2,410-million for an airborne force.]

[The small cost differences tend to supportGeneral Kinnard's view that the value of airborneforces depends more on relative effectiveness thanon cost.]

Expanding on this point, General Kinnard notedthat, for practical purposes, the use of support airliftfrom other units has made all U.S. Army divisions inVietnam airinobile. (Ref 48, p 13)

The effect airmobile operations will have on the airborne division inthe US Army is uncertain. Some feel that the airborne division is obsolete.Others, involved in airmobile operations, are strongly in favor of retainingthe airborne division on the Army' s rolls. But one paratroop officer believesthat the parachute is "headed for the museum, along with the glider and thehorse." In its 1964 roster of divisions and units, the Army had

... over two and one third airborne divisions(82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions; the 173rd

98 CORG-M-365

Fa

Airborne Brigade; one battalion of the 508th 1Airborne, 193rd Infantry Brigade; and two battalionsof the 509th, 8th Infantry Division). Today, theArmy has just slightly more than one and one thirdairborne divisions (the 82nd; the 173rd Brigade;the two battalions of the 509th; and one companyin the 193rd Brigade).

Except for one operation-the 173rd jumpinto the Song Ba valley - the United States hasconducted no combat airborne operations inVietnam. In Korea, there were only two suchoperations.

In contrast, there have been literallythousands of helicopter operations in Vietnam.Almost all successful.

The arrival of the helicopter really has beenthe determining factor in the decline of the airborne,one officer told The JOURNAL. "It isn't that theairborne concept is in itself outmoded, ' he said,"it's just that the helicopters - at least in Vietnam --

have been doing the same job a lot better. " (Ref 48, p 12)

MIobility, in the area of transport capabilities, is the real crux of theproblem of airborne versus airmobile or helicopter-borne troop units.

Given the problem of how to transport combat

troops from one location to another, what is the best 5way to do it? For most short-range operations,Leven the most diehard paratroop enthusiast concedes,the helicopter is the answer. Troops are lessvulnerable when brought in by helicopter, and theyarrive ready for immediate combat. Airborne troops =often are widely dispersed over a large area afterlanding, are sometimes separated from their heavyequipment, and frequently must spend much precioustime regrouping before being ready for combat.(Ref 48, p 12)

Major General John Norton, who replaced General Kinnard as commandinggeneral of the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) in Vietnam, is both an airborne -qualified officer and rated Army pilot, and a former member of the HcwzeBoard. He discusses the possibility of the airborne forces being disbandedbecause of their lessening importance in modern warfare.

"You've got to have a curtain amount of 'tacticalreach' , ' he said, "'that we just don't have with today' sairmobile units. To gain a lodgement in so manystrategic areas of the world, you've got to make a

SCORG-M-365I I 99

combat assault. You've got to hit the ground running,and fighting. Airborne troops have always had thisreach. Don't forget that the fellows who jumped hitoNorth Africa staged that drop all the way out of England.Helicopters just don' t have this kind of reach-not yet.

"What could make more sense, " Norton asked,

"than to exploit the strategic reach of the Air ForceTroo -arrier units and use the full ferry range of Armyhelicopters to reconstitute an airmobile or air cavalryforce after it' s hit the ground in an airborne assault?This is the most versatile threat we could pose against

any enemy.

" The worst thing about our World War II drops,he said, "was that, once we hit the ground, we werejust straight infantry-no artillery, no real tacticalmobility. If we didn't land right on the objective,if we couldn't exploit our surprise within hours, wedissipated our biggest potential.

"When you jump into a place like Vietnam, " hopointed out, " the enemy can just watch you. The VCwaits until he's ready to fight. You need air mobilityto go out and find him. The Germans were different:when we jumped, they fought. " (Ref.•9, pp 14-15)

Outlook For The Future

Electronics

Historically, military organization is a product of developments inweaponry and the resulting tactical doctrine. Russell D. O'Neal, AssistantSecretary of the Army for Research and Development under PresidentJohnson, has discussed the role of electronics in military operations. Theinfluence of electronics on tactics will play an important part in presentand future military organizations.

"It can influence-is influencing-the tactics ofthe battlefield.

"Previous wars have been simplisticaJly describedas wars of inventory, of logistics, of masses of forces.Sheer weight and bulk of supplies and ammunitioncould tip the balance toward victory even with forceratios close to unity. In Vietnam, mass is clearlynot enough," O' Neal said.

What might really be needed to win, he suggested,is the application of what he termed "exquisite precision"on a fleeting, concealed enemy.

"Electronic detection devices and sensors are

100 CORG-M-365

I

t?

helping to bring about a tactical revolution," the Army' sR&D chief said, "by providing the means for alerting usS~to the presence and where-abouts of an enemy before he •gets within firing range and for pinpointing his location

when he does fire.

O' Neal explained that the defensive optionsavailable to the battlefield commander are really quitefew in number. If he has adequate warning, he canmaneuver to avoid enemy fire or, if he is able, shootfirst. lie may place his troops behind a heavy shield-armor. Because such options or trades exist in allcombat situations, he reasoned, electaronics somedaymay serve in place of armor. Just as the Sentinelradar system detects and tracks ballistic missileswith such precision that defense missiles can be Ilaunched and guided to intercept incoming warheads,the battlefield commander may one day " shoot downone bullet with another, " O'Neal prophesied.

"Today," he said, "we encumber personnelcarriers and tanks with heavy bottom armor todefeat mines. Our experience with the chemicalsniffer prompts me to believe that the eighties maybring devices that will literally smell out and pointout explosives and spare us the need for armor.(Ref 50, p 34)

The ROAD Division

The ROAD concept of divisional organization will probably be in usefor some time to come because of its inherent flexibility. To date, it isthu most flexible divisional orgr.nization ever fielded by the United States

Army. Pizer comments on the elasticity of the ROAD division:

The ROAD concept is likely to remain valid for a 4long time to come- -its longevity a result of its lackof rigidity. Three different types of ROAD divisionsin combat in Viet-Nam- -infantry, airmobile, andairborne- -have proved well suited to the demandsplaced upon them. Within the elastic framework ofthe ROAD division, the Army planners can add,subtract, or alter units to place proper emphasis onnew developments in weaponry, in materiel andequipment, and in tactics. The ROAD structure_.holds things together in a neai package, but it has"give where it counts. (Ref 14, p 42)

The requirement for the standard infantry division exists on a continuingbasis. The soldier who moves on foot across country with pack, rations, Paw' weapon has not been relegated to the past, Despite the advent of the

CORG-M-365 101

,

most advanced modes of delivery upon the battlefield, there is a time fornmrching, ciimbing, and crawling. These activities the soldier in thestandard infantry division can do under any climatic and environmentalcondition. These basic qualifications for the soldier of any type infantrydivi ',n remain constants of the soldier' s profession of arms.

, present era appears to he a rare period in history where tacticshavw .Irost caug! up with the weaponry of war. The one great exceptionis, of course, the tactics of nuclear warfare, Inasmuch as such a war hasnever been fought, patterns of performance have not been established. Cur-reatly, speculation must suffice in this particular situation--a6 tU tacticsand organizational format for the infantr- divisian and its subordinate units.The marriage of the infantry diviSioD with its weapons to the helicopter hasachieved an optimum of fire and movement. The evulution of the helicopteras a weapons system vehicle is an advance in mobility and firepower, thelike of which has never been witnessed in warfare. What it portends for theorganibation of the infantry division of the remaining decades of the twentieth-- ,.',ry•cannot be assessed at this time.

102 (:COIG-M-I 65

APPENDIX A

TASK ASSIGNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMANDFO 'T 8FLVOIR. VIRGINIA 22060

CDCRE-0 1 April 1968

(AMENDED COPY)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORG

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 9-68, Evolution of the Army Division

I. The Commanding General requests that you perform a historical studywithin the scope of your contract for calendar year 1968.

2. Title: Evolution of the Army Division from the IN II Triangular toPENTOMIC, ROCID, and to ROAD Organizations.

3. Objective and Scope: To show the evolution of combat, combat supportand combat service support organization of the division. The needs for

special purpose divisions such as mountain, armored, and airborne, their"nrgsnization Pnd !method of opezz~ion will be documented. Varying methodsused by the divisions to establish task forces, combat teams, battlegroups, or other type organization for combat will be arrayed. Advantagesand disadvantages of divisional organization will be discussed and evalu-ated. The study will explore all elements of the division, emphasizingthe problems encountered in combat which were attributable to, or inherent

to, the type organization.

4. Administration:

a. The study will be piesented to the Commanding General in the formof a CORG memorandum.

b. Project Officer. Mr. Jean Keith, HQ USACDC, 41144.

c. Direct coordination with the Institute of Combined Arms andSupport is authorized.

5. Correlation: This project is assigned Action Control Number 12021.

6. This task must be completed by 31 March 1969.

CORG-M-365 103

CDCRE -0 1 April 1968SUBJECT: Task Assignment 9-68, Evolution of the Army Division

7. ReqUest you analyze your resources, indicate your acceprance andprovide the following information:

a. Estimated technical man-mouths.

b. CORG Project Number

jc. CORG Project Supervisor.

i ROBERT W. TROSTLI'C, USChief, Operations Research

Support Divi sion

Copy furnished:

Mr. J. Keith, Dir, Plans

cc: Mr. BernensMr. LaVallee

; .r. W ll la m pMr. Moore

CO7RG AccountingDirector's Accounting

Task Assignment File (Orig)FoluF ¢__ _ _

104 C , .

I

APPENDIX B

EVOLUTION OF SPAN OF CONTROL - 1777 TO ROAD

Thro. ghout military history, the span of control problem has plaguedthe military commander in the camp and in the field. The number of sub-ordinates a commander car. effectively control in combat has never been -

definitely established; in the past it has varied according to the situation.Estimates by the military theorists and commanders of the past have rangedfrom three to ten. The span of control has a considerable effect on theoperations of the commander. Ideally, the commander only commands hisprincipal subordinate unit commanders. For example, under the ROADconcept, the general commands the brigade commanders and they, in turn,command a varying number of battalion commanders. The span of controlin the battalion becomes a matter of the command of three, or four companycommanders. In the company, the span of control involves the number oflieutenants (platoon commanders) and, in the platoon, the number of squads.Within the squad the two fire team leaders are commanded by the squadleader. In emergencies, the squad leader (with the loss of his team leaders)may possess a span of control of seven or eight. The latter is the mostimportant span of control situation in the division because the squad' sprimary mission is to close with the enemy. Appendix B traces the develop-mcnts in the Span of Control from 1777 to the present.

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APPENDIX C

TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY DIVISION - 1 December 1936

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CO R( -M -365 111

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APPENDIX L) Y

THE GENERAL BOARDUNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

APO 408

CONFERENCE

ON

THE INFANTRY DIVSION

Bad Nauheim, Germany, 20 November 1945.

Source: App 15 to Reference 26

112 CORG-M -3•5

uINtrnS

OF

CONFERENCE C4I THE INFANTRY DIVISION

Grand Hotol, Bad Nauheim, Germany, 20 November 1945

OFFICERS PRrSENT

General G. S. PATTON, JR.Lieutenant GenLral G. KEYrSMajo' General L. C. ALLEN

Major General H. R. GAYMajor General E. S. HUGHES

Major General H. L. MCBRIDEMajor Gencral U. M. ROB!I.TSON

Brigadier General C. H. ARALSTR.COBrigadier General J. D. BALKER

Brigadier General G. H. DAVIDSONBrigadier General 3. A. HOLLYBrigadier General R. G. MOSESBrigadier General C. E. RYAN

Colonel IV. S. BIDDLEColonel R. 0. FORD

Colonel B. FL'3UHOLMENColonel L. H. GPIN, JR.ColonelJ. A. EEINTGES

Colonel J. C. MACDONALDColonel T. H. MADDOCKSColonel H. B. MARGWSONColonel E. H. IICD-:IELColene] L. C. VCGARRColonel I. M. CSLTH

Colonel C. T. SCHMIDTC•-oncl T. A. SEELY

Colondl C. r. VLI; lAY, JR.Lieutenant Colonel S. G. BROIN, JR.

Lieutenant Coloncl J. G. FELBERLicutenwnt Coloncl J. A. LENIS

Lieutenant Coloncl J. H. VC-1TGOC4Y, JR.Lieutenant Colci)cl I. B. RICF./D3, JR.

Chaplain (Captaln) G. G. FINLZ.

Bri-gadie'r G,ýný,--a -. F. }KIPLIR

Colonn.l D. :. B..ILEYColoncl T. ý,. BROC.'Cclcnl S. G. CC:TEYColcn~l F. .C-ilT2

LiEutinant Colon•c E. G. BZTaJLicutcn•nrt ColonLI F. }i. C'TX.UL

LiLiuitEnant Colcndl U. R. C-nE3Lieutena-.t Cclcr.nl S. G. FRIES

LieutenaLt Coloncl H. B. ST. CLAIRLiLutenant Colonel L. .1. WEIT-=LY

CORG-M-365 Ii:;

Conference ooened at 0930. 20 NOV 1945

Gen PATTON:0 %hen we asked you gentlemen to attend this conference it was witui

the expectation that there would be about 15 or 17 visiting mem-

bers but for various reasons some were unable to attend. However,

we still. have enough of you, end also of ourselves, to consider

the proposed infantry division. It should be pointed out that

the infantry division here proposed is not the exclusive product

of The General Board. It is an algebraic sum, so to speak, of

the ideas of all the numerous people - some hundreds - who havebeen questioned on the subject.

There are two points that I would like personally to call to

your attention. The first one is this: We must figure what we

do to the enemy cn tUe basis of what the enemy does to us, remem-

bering that the casualty figures are based on wounded and not deadbecause we have no way of finding out how the dead were killed.

The infantry component of the division, which is 65.9% of the total

personnel, inflicts on the enemy by means of small arms, automaticweapons, mortars and hand grenades approximately 37% of the casual-

ties. in order to inflict 37% of the casualties the infantry

sustains 92% of the total casualties in the division. The artil-

lery, which comprises 15% of the division, inflicts on the enemy

47% of the total casualties for which iteays but 2%. However,

we have to qualify this statement because in practically all di-

visional ooerations the division is supported by a large amount

of corps and army artillery. In the armored division of which 29%

is infantry, 15.4% artillery and 20.5% armor, the infantry casual-

ties amount to 65% of the total casualties of the division. The

artillery casualties, totaling 4.7%, little more than double those

of the artillery in the infantry division. Tank casualties are

25%. This may or may not indicate whether armor serves infantry.

This is one phase of the subject which I arrived at independently.

You will notice the proposed organization is pretty heavy in-tanks.

This organization was arrivd at with the data I gave you.

My second point is: Americans as a race are the most adopt

in the use of machinery of any people on earth and they are the

most adopt In the construction of machines on a mass production

basis. This suggests to my mind the fact that we should exploit

to the utmost our ability in the use of mechanical aids both on

the ground and in the air. But we must remember that if the next

war is delaycd, as we hope it will bc for scvLral years, perhaps

25, it is probable that vcry few of the %ueapons on this chart will

be used. So this division on which we arc working is only the

datum plane from which further dcwlopments must be carried on.

Gcn KIBLFRs@(Gen Kibler gave an orientation on the mission of the committee

and explained the procedure used by the committee in arriving

at its recommendations. A considerable number of experienced

combat leaders vere consulted in person; also a written question-

naire was sent out to other combat leaders ranging in rank from

lieutenant generals to majors. In addition, full advantage was

teken of reference materials available. He stated further that the

ceamdttee itself was composed of experienced combat personnel.

Gen Kibler then explained the procedure to be followed in

conducting e.O conference. Colonel Conley, *who was in immediate

charge of the committee, would explain the proposed division in

114 CORG-M-365

detvil giving the rcreone for chpnges made. Den libler rcquestudthat rl 1 questions be withh. Id until Colonel Conley coml wed histeaF, ct which time the meetlng vwuld be open for discussion,

Co l CCJ..r:;y

G(Ccloncl Conley grve r dotrilecA ex•pLcntlon of the orgnnli-.tAon ofthe propneed infantry divilion explrining thi reasns fot r-i1 recor--tc.red changes. A lrrge chart on the wull showirg the organilation

o' the various units of the lvivion woe referred to in outliningChe new d.eiaton. Seceral nther chrpyts were dilpleyed shnwing com-

prrIsons in rrmament tnd personnel between the old rnd proposeddlvietons.)

DI SCUSS1loll

(Noto: The following !e not n,:eeerorily A vcrbptim trcseorivtionof v'hr. wre enid by vrrtoo: iniltvIdujle at the conference. Sons

discussion .me omitted. However, the conseasae of tne meeting

regardilng specifiC Tuestions diecussed is cerrectly shown.)

Gen 11BLR*Are there r..y questions to be clrIfiee? We do not went to diecuse

the nros end cone but wrnt to cler.r up points the.t need cli-ify!ng.

Gen PA! ION1.Whaint reconnriessnnce, if rmy, is there in the nroored regiment?

Li Col FRIESz

EJuet the reconn'risernce plrtoons thrt they hpd before, incrersed byfive men in etch plrtoon.

Gen KEXES: SOAre the 105's truck-drfw', or eelf-nropelle4O

Col CO.1zEY:2 Truck-darnwn

Oon lscRRIDZ:DIe the nnti-r-ircrnft artilllry self--roo-3led?

Gen KI..$L:e Yes.

(Conference edjourned for five nr.utee cnd reconvenel Ct 10l05.)

3en XI:LI. !milow I am going to rsk specific questions on which I would like

y'ur viewe. Our firet one !n: Is thc her-" mrchlnc -er, , ne-c8iLry

in the ho-vy waerpons co,•_rny of the infnntry bftitlion?

Col YcOUi.R:NIt definitely Is. but we need e better one. I do not think we

should -lioe the mobility of tra.-t gun no scuse us to throw it out.I h-ie ceen It used to stop rttfcke v.hel other things Could not be

used. Most definitely we should Vceep it.

Gen PAZ-TO11:SHere you ever aeen It used to mrke en ettpck?

Col kcGARRtSTes, at Antic. It dil wonderful work. Couldn't do it with P

light michine gun.

Gen FgRZKiON:8I personelly don't c-gree thot the honvy mpobhlne gun is neceserry

ec an orgrnic pprt of the h-evy weepone cope--ny. nerticulcrly in

CORG-A-M-365 115

I!i

the attack. I believe we can meet the requirements by carryingheavy machine guns as a part of the organic battalion load in re-serve to be euployed only in defensive situationa. You can puteight machine guns in one truck. In eleven months of operationswith the Second Division, I never used a heavy machine gun foroverhead fire, so far as I know.

Col HEINTOES s* 1 concur with Colonel UcOarr. The men who operate the weapons

prefer the heavy machine gun as the light machine gun barrels burnup too easily. It is capable of more sustained fire. We used itquite often in the attack, oven In Sicily and going over the moun-tains in southern Italy. However, we do need light machine gunswhen we are making fast moves or going over rough terrain.

Gen KEYES aSThe point iat Do you rant more supporting fire? If the heavy

machine gun is too heavy, you want another weapon. Sometimes theheavy gun is better than the light. As General Patton brought out,we ahould not wed ourselves to a weapon right now. There will beimprovements. I don' t know how you can say "yes" or "no" to thisquestion. It depends on Yhere the man is. The smart solution isto equip companies with both types of weapons rather than to choosedefinitely the light or the heavy.

Gen PATTON:IWith the weapons on hand, I agree with General Keyes for adopting

both. Money is no object. I wish that war could be less bloody.It costs about $40,000 for a man to get killed. If we can keephim from getting killed by a few extra dollars, it is a cheap ex-penditure. I personally am more responsible for the development ofthe light machine gun than any other person. The tripod on theheavy machine gun does not have sufficient flexibility. If you uselighter material, you can make just as good a tripod. I would liketo ask some people who know more - at what ranges were heavy ma-

chine guns used?

Col McCARR:EAbout 200-500 yards.

Gen PATTON:lWhat I was trying to bring out is: The heavy tripod which I think

weighs 52 pounds was built for extreme accuracy at these ranges.We could put a heavy machine gun on a lighter tripod, because atthat range the light machine gun is accurate enough.

Col OSETH:IDiscussing tripods, the present one won't do. The present machine

guns are a litLle bit outmoded. We need a dual purpose machinegun with fire power of the heavy and the mobility of the light inone weapon.

Col NeGARRsl We need a liquid type of coolor, and I would like to sea it in-

provod to give it sustained fire power.

Gen XBEUR IENW can't do away with the heavy machino gun, but it should be im-proved. I talm it that that is the consensus of this mooting.

(All agreed. )

Now the next poir.t - Can the heavy weapons company be climinatcd?

CORG-M-365'5

Gen RCBFRTSCI4s*yca . I think so. Due to wide frc-ntoges, it waa quite hahbitkual

to spread heav7 weapons like nachine puns very widely. Ry nrt

brine up the weapons plat-on cof the r'fle crmneny by adding a

tonDo of light rAthine guns and do ansy with the heavy r.chlre

gun company entirelyi There art very few bQttalicn coro.endera"who eculd not prefer four rifle c-rourenie with a good weapoms

p.atcon in cac,; ns.peny to the hr-sent orgnnizaticn. I wouldnot give My heavy ,ort,,rs to the rifle coepaiy but would keep

them in the battalton headouarterw company.

Cen XIPLERsUYCu would assign isac'Ane guna down to the rifle comrpenyi

Gen ROBFRT5;Ct$

§j Poujd.

Col ELINTF.S s* We sh 'u-ld taint-.In a ho.avi wrap.nS c-,mpray and eath man should be

identified vith one roepcn only, although he sheuld be fnmllinr

With them all.

Ger hcFtT.Cl; z* hat. percentg-e cf fire rncwr did you develop fret,, your Infantry

weapons in attacks?

Col McGARRS0 6~c applied oujr autofatic rcaponn 95 percent of the time, some0ticea

100 percent.

Gen R .. TSCNT•-

0I don't believc rc-s- that; 5? pvrcent to EQ p rcrnt of total firepcwcr wrs used4

Ccl LCeGATUR,O•y answer was ba.sed on autrci, tic weapons.

Gen RCKBERTSCNs

61 never failed to be lmrresed is I •ent fret rear to frcnt, I

would see this mEss of 8 rtillery and t rnk destroyers and rcg-

rental and battalion headquartcrs. At trr front lints a seqll

nune-r of men wee carrying tie ittack. There verr about 1100

men in the as9qault ele-lent. They' tcrk 9 p.-rcect cf the crasual-

ties. In an irdantry division, thty c-ir:' your battle. They are

the people who get you forward. W& need rnre of trhe. I bellevein w, eaFonP but I also want mcrc infi ntry. I want a lot more in-

fautry.

Gcn h•YFS•@The percentage of casualtiea is very high there. 'ihy not put that

extra into weapons or seo( thing oth r than that group?

Gen RCB % CN:* ecause 1 'ýant thrn for support and r, serve units, rnich I ncv-r

had in eleven moncha of c-T•bat. I ncvtr had encugh to dc the job.

I think ve were wrong in nrking no ermriolons for rotating the

units in the front line. This was rnccasary so that we could

build up eunugh depth in the units. Wo ;uat providh that rotation.

Gen PATTCN4wThat's -a p.ronal vrcw. As an infantry unit is now composed, the

rifle-mun Pct killed getting the light cachin guns and 60 o eo:'-

CORIG-M-365 117

I

Crsn PATTON (CONTf':tars forward which in turn get the artillery forward forfighting. That's the way we fight now. Personally, I'm in favorof trying to find less bloody ways of fighting.

Gen GAY:UWould you recommend another regiment of infantry?

Gen ROBER9SON:S1 wouldn' It think bAdly of that.

Gon GAY:E1 would go along witt. that.

Gen ROBERTSON:NEvory division commander will tcll you the same story. He couldn't

rota.to his units.

Gon KIBLER:61 bcliuve that the majority is in favor of retaining the heavy

weapons company. Do you agree with the retention of the anti-tankcomprny, as now proposed, armed with nine modium tanks, or wouldyou prefer a medium tank comppny, complete, organic in the infantryregiment in lieu of the nnti-tank comp-anyl

Col McGARRsNI would liko to see the anti-tank weapon improved. It should have

lighior armor and more spoed, if possible, for the anti-tank mis-sion. I don't believe it is necessary to have a tank coprpp'ny%jith a rogimient, It is better used in a division sot-.lp sad canbe throim in 'ihore nooded.

Gon KIBLERt8Do you want an anti-tank company and modium tanks also?

Col MoGARRsWYoa, I wrvt thue in pl.too of the 57't at present in the anti-tank

ooupctny. I would also like to have two battalions of tanks°'irththu division whioh could be attached to tho regiments.

Qon ROBEIfl'SONsIl would profor three bnttalions in the division and tako both anti-ta-nb •nd cannon companios out of the rogimonts. This uoild provide

oere sustained pover. You hnwo the some number of tanks but undercentralized control. My orgwiization would be throo tank batta:lions-no tanks in the regiment - and food them up as noedod.

Gen McBRIDE:GAre we planning an armored or infantry division?

Gen PATTON:WApropos of General McBride's statement, are we building an armored

or infantry division? In my opion, there is very little differ-ence between them except one very fundamental one. In an infantrydivision the purpose of supporting weapons - primarily tanks - isto get the infantry forward. In an armored division, the purposeof the infantry is to break the tanks loose.

Gen KIBLER:IIHow many agree with General Robertson that the anti-tank and cannon

companies should be eliminated and replaced by tanks in the divisionechelon?

118 CORG-M-365

Col KEINTGES,

01 do not rtree with Generel Rnbertson. I rm a littlo z'rdical onthis, but I have my enti-tvank coprpny orgpnlzed with bazookns anndI used it as a bazooko comprny.

Gen OBRTlSON:MI contemplote the bazooka defense, but I don't think the vnti-tvnk V

company is necessary.

Gen McPRIDE:SWhy heve two different tank units - rne trnk and one rinti-trnk?Aren't they both the sar.e?

Col McCARR:

EYes, they nre the st~me, but it is bette- t) hove mobile guns rRenti-tanIc defense.

(A brief diocussion followed.)

Col McGARR:EGeneral Patton is right. We should have something light, like

a weasel, upon which we could put our recoilless artillery.There is need for getting clo:c-in support. The answer is lightervehicles with a recoilless weapon mounted on them, let's keep theassault gun while making the transition.

Gen ROBERTSON:MWhy keep the anti-tank company in the infantry regiment pending the

development of a heavier weapon to take its place? Just to keepan anti-tank company or cannon company so that we will have acompany to place a weapon later is fundamentally wrong. We shouldnever keep a unit intact for use of future development of weapons.

Gen KEYES:MI don't agree, becalie if vnti do not retain the organizatiol, you

will never get your weapon developed. You must visualize thatyou are going to have it in order for you to plan for personnelrequirements. That's where we ran into such a snag on replace-ments.

Gen KIXLER:Olt seems that the majority do not wrnt r tink unit or6rnic in the 4

infentry regiment to r~plnce the rnti-trnk comuriny. All seem toagree thrt the beet enti-trnk wenpon todry is the medium tnck,It therefore seems to be the consennus of this roeting thrt the 'rnti-trenk company should be elimlnpted fron enh infantry regimentErad three tank componiea should be added to the trnk regiment atdivision level. Are there Pny who dissent from this solution?

(Only one officer di:seanted.)

That disposes of the rnti-tnk tommar~ny. I will now rlk the nextqueot.en. Do you rrrem with the orrnnizrtion Pnd nrmrment (sixrnscult Cuns) propooed for the cnnmon conprny? If not, whrt do yourecommend?

GCn McaRIDE:NWhrt is the purpose of the psenult ,un company?

Co! CO.LMY:MDIrect rupnort of the Infrntry. The crinnon cempnny wee orgnnized

orif-nnlly to ortipfy the desire on the nort of the infrntry forio-rdlnte clone rurp~rt when needed. Thr artillery btttrlion inthe renr is r fire unit, rnd it is indesirrble to parcol out onebettery.

COR G-M-365 119

Col CONLEY (OONTD):mIn addition thoy do not like to send a whole battalion to do alittle job; alio the infantry noods nn accompanying gun.

Con MoBRIDE,8Don't you think that goes back to ¶orld War I when wo wore sus-

picious of artillory support? There is nothing that the cannonconpany can do that the organic artillery can' t do as walls

Con BMWTREYos, it star+od in tho first World War when there was a dorand from

tho front lina for accompanying guns. At that particular tino wedid not have a system of operation and firo-diroction that we nowhave; also it was true that the infantry did not got the supportfrom its artillery that it should have gotten. The cannon companymust have an armored vehicle capable of dircot fire. Its place iswith the infantry. Personally, I bolieve that you probably needan assault woapon.

Can ROBZRTSONsElf you want direct fiio, her? about your supporting tanks? You

are duplicating yourself aso it is now.

Con flcBRID:iTraining is one thing, coordination is another. With due respect

for the infantry, they can't train cannon companies.

Col McGARR:Wew had a superb cannon company. T7e trained now man that came in.I still think we should have :somothing to fill in tho gap for 'speedwhen communications give out;. We lost a lot of artillery observersand radios.

Con PATTON:.EYou lose cormmunication when they got wet at river crossings and

landings.

Con KEYES: .ETlith, an' incroaso in tank battalions, can't you then got that im-

mediato support from the tanks that are attached to you?

Col McOGARRSEWe could if they could got thoro fast enough.

Gon ROBERTSON:91s there anything a cannon company can do that a 105mm can't do?

Col McOGARR:UNothing oxcept that itts more timely if the artillery is not

functioning, General.

Col HRINTCESs8l want the cannon company.

Con KIBLERt

IHow many think we should have a cannon company?

(The majority voted in favor.)

Con KIBLER:UIs the present assault gun the best weapon vo have now?

120 CORG-M-365

Col MoGARR tmYos, but no want somothing bettor.

Col HElNT7-S;mThoso little guns could go anyplace I wanted thon. to go.

Gon KIBLERFm11 that woapon is the main woapon, do we need a snallor vioapon for

r:Lvor crossings and landings, and what should it be?

Gen McBRIDE:EThat Jeep-rocket would be ideal. I have only secn it in the ,novi4s.

Gen 'KIBLER:nIt seems the majority bolioves we should rotain tho eannon ocmpony

but that it should bo oquipped with a bettor woapon. For theprosont, is the assault gun aoooptablel

(Tho mtrjority agreed.)

Gon KIBLER:*That concludos the cannon eorpany problem.

Conference recessed at 1200 for lunehocn.

Conforonco rosunod at 1330.

Gon KIBLER:NAs to the tank question, it appears that the majority boliovos we

should have a throo-battalion rogiment, oliminating tho anti-tankcompany. It is my understanding that is the consc.-ua of thomeeting now.

(Cll ngrood.)

Gon KIBLERsNTho next quostion concorna the artillory. Is thoro any dissontion

from the proposod artillory sot-up, adding one battalion of 155amhowitzers?

Cen PATTON:31low do you want those guns moved, McBride?

Gen McBRIDE:, alight artillery, self-propelled. I want to know on( thing that

a towed gun can do better than a self-propelled pun?

Cen BALMER:UPieces that are supporting a division of this typi ... st follow the

infantry. They must go places where self-propelloci will not go.When you put the Infantry across the river you have to have a bigbridge to get the heavy stuff across, but you can put the lighterstuff up faster. We have most of the weight on the side of towedartillery. My reasnos are these: towed ihn been able to do every-thing that is required by the infantry division. You can concealand dig in the towed piece much easier. The M-7 self-propelledgun will not fire high-angle-fire and is difficult to conceal.The infantry division does not move as far or ns fast as the ar-mu.ed division. The organization Is the same: thvee lights andtwo mediums. There are the reasons behind it.

Gen McBRIDE:9I don', find mnny reasons there. low are you going to put infan-

CORG-M-365 121

try across? The "rtillcry cin shoot n lot firthor across. You

don't, outside of a few areas, have to worry about concealment.

You can conceal anything in Europe. The only place where towed

vehicles are better is on icy roads. I don't see any advantage inthe towed weapon.

Gen PATTONt

U Another point - and my imagination may be too vivid. In the next

war owing to the certainty of the proximity fuze, I do not believe

that any gun or any other weapon which sits to fight can be with-

out head cover. I personally questioned the jurdor officers in

the 5th Infantry Division who were unanimously in favor of self-

propelled guns.

Gen McBRIDEt0The 4th Division had both. Universally everyone regretted the

time they turned in the self-propelled for towed guns.

Col HEINTGFS:0l would like one battalion of 105's self-propelled and the rest

towed.

Gen KIBI!AtGThe majority of this meeting seems to favor self-propelled artil-

lery.

Col MACDONALDt01 think that is the answer. I am personally in favor of self-

propelled artillery, but I am no authority.

CGn ROB12MTSONsi": Am on t0A fonee mn this question. I tYmnt somo information on

self-propelled. My experience with my own tanks was that on all

long moves - 250 miles or so - the tank battalions got through

only 50%, but the artillery all got through. The maintenance

problem must be licked better than it has been.

Geni PATTONteWc also have a medium maintenance company !?hich we didn't have

before.

Ceal McBRIDFsUYou are adding to the maintenance of the division when you put

so many half-tracks on the vehicles.

Cen PATTCN:mOt isn't an awful lot. How many guns are there?

Gen McBRIDEsN Fifty-four guns in three battalions.

Gen ROB RTSONSml would be in favor of it myself outside of the maintenance factor.

Can KEYTSSOWe must expect development and improvements in maintenance factors.

Gen RCBTRTSLNt*I -. ould like to raise a further question on the artillery set-up.

You put a 155s* battalion in there on the basis that everything

that was always used with the division should be organic. Is that

correctl

122 CORG-M-365

ren KIBLURNThit iz one of the frottors considered.

Gcn ROBERTSON:mActual)y I don't think T can remember the time when I didn't have

tY;n additional battalions of 155's cupporting me from corps. Whyshouldn't wo have three battalions of 155's?

(,en PATTONsU Thore is another argument which is very revolutionary and I only

bring it for-lard to give another viewpoint. Owing to the very low

casualties in artil>cry in comparison with infantry, I am not surethere should be any artillery in the infantry division - certainlynot mediums.

Gen KIBLFRt"UThe majority opinion of the committee aeems to favor the one e7tra

battalion of 155mm howitzers. Is there anybody here who feels weshould have more artillery?

(All vere satisfied.)

Gen Kr.YES%NI would like to hear from the experts why the 155rm howitzer should

not also be self-propelled. Aren't the advantages the sarmo? Mostof General McBride's discuseion simply answered the objections tothe towed. What are the advantages of having self-propelled 155mmhowitzers?

Gen GAYs01Hw about the ability to fire?

Gen McBRIDE:EThat's exactly tho case. We don't know anything about It. I think

it would be heavier than the 105.

Lt Col BROWN!iThe 105 is limited to 45-dcgroe elevation. I don't know about the

155.

Gem PATTON•1The 155 can have the samc elevation.

Gon GAYslOux problem is to recoimond a proposed inf.ntry division based on

experience in this theatcr. No one of us oas had any exporience

with 155mm howitzors, self-propellod.

Con KEYES i8lDo we want self-propelled artillery as a result of experience?

Gen KIBLER$EWe have had no experience with self-propelled 155's.

Gen PATTON:lI recommend th,.t if the ballistic quality of the 155mm howitzcr

self-propelled gun is not inferior to the towed 155 horitzor, then

it should be adopted.

(All agreed.)

Gen PATTON:W'I'hat is the rumber of guns in a battery of 155's?

C G 3123;: CORG-M-365

Gon B13CR,0 Four. Solf-propollod would bo six.

Gon McBRIDE:.'Thy not havo six towod piocos?

Gon BAI.ER:8 Most poeplo would rathor have four pieces towed than six piecos

&olfrpropollol.

(Somo discussion followod.)

Gen KIBLERsElt is a quostion of the six-gun battery now. It appoars to bo the

consensus of this mooting that we should have it. Is there anybodywho dissents from that view?

(No dissent.)

Gen KIBLER:mOur next question is in rolation to anti-aircraft artillery. Do

you prefer one battalion assigned or a regiment of t!7o battalions?

0ol BAILE9!UTho stody of anti-aircraft :rtillory for the futuro might bo

dalled wandering into a roaln of fantasy. We have typos of w~oaponswhich the enemy usod in this war that nero or loss portond thetrend of the future. There are going to bo supersonic missiles ofall typos like tho V-I and V-2. no had occasion to visit the Brit-ish experinontal station whore thoy are experimenting with capturedV-2s, and they are very enthusiastic about the future of them.An increase in their accuracy and the damage that can bo inflictedcan be oxpectod. We have reason to believe that the V-1 type ofpilotless aircraft (PAC) will be used extensively in range andtheir effectiveness will be increased. They will be used as muchagainst front-line troops no they wore in roar areas. Jot-propol'-lo'l planes wore doveloped to quite a hijph level at the clocc of thewar to a speed of 600 rilos per hour, but speeds have increasedsinco than. They will bo increased to as rach as 1,000 miles perhour. Our studios show that we do have to t!%ko this into consid-oration. The V-2 wont at a speed of 3,000 miles por hour. Wehave no weapon that can combat it. Lots of our woapons in thefutiro still have to be developed. Anothor thing, that boars onthis picture is radar. Radar vi"s -eovolopod for 75m. guns. InOctober of last year, they had small radar which was used viithsmallor caliber automatic weapons. The 75mn gur wo fooe is theone typo of -.oapon to replace the 40ra gun. Tho English foulul itvery offoectiveo, and we made good use of it in this war* It is tnolargest weapon that can use a pozit fuze. The rarar, howovor, didhave sme deficioncios. They are developing infra-rod dotootinginstruments which will repldco radar eventually. It will olininatomany of the things that we hanv found wrong with radars

I think that we have to temper the conclusions that wo rmka fromthis war with caution for the simple reason that the Gonwons had1700 planes and the Allies 11 300 on D-Day. It was a seven toone superiority in the air. Tha conclusions we draw from this warare not the ones that wo should use because we must oxpoct to goagainst an enemy in the next war who will have parity in tho air.The anti-aircraft with all of the numerous typos of woapons wohave hod has made us the Jack of all trades and the master of nottoo many4. We have omne out trying to standnrdizo our oquipxontand weapons and trying to olinminnto some of them.

124 CORG-M-365

Col BAILEY (00tD)UThis is what we have evolved, two typos of rogimentsl (one)

a rginont of two battalions of 90rm guns, mobile; (two) a rogi-nont of two battalions of automatio weapons, four batterios each.Typo of woaponf in an automatic regiment, we will have a 75mrautomatic cannon or a full-track low armored vehiolo, solf-pro-polled. no will have a quad-mount 20m gun to replace the prosent501n gun. 77o will have two battalions of four batteries eachand in each battalion, 3ý full-track self-propelled armored 75's.In t1o present autonntic weapons battalion, there Peo 32-401s and32 quad-mounts, oithor towed or half-tracks. They were out downboforo the Normandy invasion by 16. Our regiment will hove 64-75's (SP) anA 64-20mm quad-mounts. During the Battle of the Bulge,they did not have onough anti-aircraft and had to call back to ComZ for more. Some that came up were semi-mobile. Wo fool all our

eoapons should bo useful in any sort of an emergency,. 4nthorthing, gontlomon, I would like to point out the fact that nhon ani:ifantry livision has had rough action for a while, it Must have arest and moves to a roar area. They did in the Ninth Army. Theanti-aircraft provided protection for them when they were thereand thero was no rest at all for the anti-aircraft gunners. Ifenemy air action wore stronqQr the people up front would havecracked. Fiild artillery will havc another battalion and wm rustprotect the artillory. If we are to have four batteries of anti-aircraft to five battalions of field artillery, how can we do it?

Gen P;TTONt*Solf-propoeIol armored guns do not need anti-aircraft protection.

The self-propelled gun removes the necessity of covering it,

Col BAILEY:MTho regiment T7o hope to have in the infantry division has approx-

inatoly 1400 nmn. I want to impress on you the tremendous firePower this unit would have, /.11 of you in divisions certainlymalo use of anti-aircraft for ground missions.

Gon KIBLUR:ETho committoe felt that re really had not clearly established

roquironents for anti-aircraft in this theater, owing to the smallsoplo of air opposition. TTo did inherit experience from the Modi-terranoan Thoator whore there was air opposition and one battalionper division was about what seemed to be required there. Such do-mnnds for additional anti-aircraft in the European Theater of Oper-ations as existed may have boon influenced by lack of field artil-lery Ammunition. The committee realizes that planes will fly fast-or and faster but felt that inprovomont in anti-aircraft night keeppace with this. Would you prefer a regiment of two battalions?Those in favor of a regiment raise your hand.

(None fnvorod it.)

Gen KIBLERtEDo you agree with the organic assignment of an engineer roginont

of two battalions to tho division?

Gon K-EYIS:01 don't see any reason for it. It's just a case of taking engi-

nears and assigning them organically to the regimen..

Col HEINTGES,NEnginoors should be specialists. T7e don't want them up front;

there will be too many casualties.

CORG-M-365 125

Gen KIBLEsr Does anybody want engineers organic in the infantry relm(nnt?

(None favored it.)

Gen McBRIDE:E1 didn't find a groat deficiency of engineers. I would like to

see a battalion of four companies instead of three working com-panies so thAt I could have an extra company when running intoroads whore there is mining or demolition to be done. I didn'tobject to corps engineers working in my arcs. I had a lot of engi-neer work but we did not use the prisoner of war labor that wasavailable,

Gon DAVIDSON:EThe engineers were placed in support of division, not attached.

When we put a cornany of engineers with each regimental combatteam, we got little engineer work out of them. The division engi-neers lost flexibility because of their spread among the threeregimental combat tears.

Gen KIYES:UYou need the engineers and you don't have enough of them. With

all this extra armor, cta., yea will hive to augzent the one bat-talion of engineers. I personally think we need more engincerethan we have noew.

Gen McBRIDEht~ 81 prefer to give th, engineers to army and attach them when necae-sary.

Col McGARR:EThe necessity of engineers varies with the terrain.

Gen McBRIDE:NI would like to see four ocmranies in one battalion.

Gen GAY:* Exporience proves that we need three cngineer buttaliers for

each divisicn. Our question then is whether two of those bai-talions should be in division and one in the corps, or one in thedivision and two In the corps.

Gen K1IBLER!MAre there any other vicws? I will ask you to irdicxitt if you

are in favor of the tao-battilicn regiment.

(The mijrity voted in favor.)

Gen KIBLE•s*Will the incorporation of a tank regiment and engineer regiment

result in n proper balance with respect to the infantry strengthof the infantry division? In. ether words, have we put in anyelements cut of proportion to the iniantry strength?

Gen ROBTATSOt:*Ycu certainly have. What you want is infantry in depth which

this organization does not provide.

Cen McBRIDE:ilt only hivcs you width if ycu add more infantry.

126 CORG-M-365

Gen ROBEUTSOts8 During the war we had to put replaeoventd into the line immediate-

ly. What we shculd have done with these men was to keep them in areinforcement battalion. You have got to have somewhere behind youacme men who are trained and ready to Step up as platoon leaders.

Col McGARR-81 would like one behind my regiment to use for what it is meant

to be used for - replacement.

Sen ROBERTSCNM

MlI you put that reinforcement (replacement) battalion behind eachregiment you will not have a combat battalion,

Gen PA'P•TtsMlou don't have to limit the size of the replacerent battalion we

have shown in the proposed infantry division. The replacementsecos in there and the returnees go in there too.

Gen RCBERTSON !

ulr.0 your battle exhaustion cases go in thete. It is a fact thatfront-line unitb fought under-strength. We must do sorething aboutthat. You can't expect the Infantry to carry on sustained actionday after day, Wtek after week, under any such organitatior likethat.

GOen ALLf*Of course, there ras a general shcrtage of replacements in this

war. No matter how many replacement battalions you might have hadthere were not e.-,ough men to put in them.

Gen ROBETSMflsNYou have got to hav' some system in your organization to let you

intsgrite the men into your crganitetiLon. t is fundamentallywrong to replace nen on the front lincS. It is unfair.

Gen PAITTMUit's •urder.

(At this point tnere was come discussion cf the possibility of

providing a fourth platoon in each rifle coipany.)

3en KIBLE sMI would like to determine who Is in favor of one reinforcement

battalien in a division as we have it. Please indic.te by raistng

your hand.

(Majority wjs in fevor.)

Gen KI IM s•Who prefer& four platoons in a rifle company?

(None in favor,)

Gen KIBLERs1The meeting is now open for any other discussion.

Col B'L)DI.E81 invito further consideration of the cavalry element of the di-

vision. This troop (pointing to chart) is a greot •aorovonentover the former troop.. In the first place, the platoon is stronger

and ha3 within it a Small rifle element ready to fight on the

CORG-M-365 127

Co K EDDL (wCOM I)greLen). There are four of those platoons. Finall.y the whole troopis ccr-aniol by a rn'nr. The reason is that a captain, we found,does net have enough r!.:k eal. prestige to r.,ko Mis cpinions felt.in adJitlon that troop -ins l.finitoly ineffective In eccitat. Ins-me casos it r-As reinforted osnil mo into a task force, ibis or-ga.icatiLn -as proposo-'. by a sub-conrittoe wcrkinfg onr. rehaniz2',cavalry. It ras the consensus that a dqua-ren was not wotudl, butthat a strcnger troop fas wanted; hornoverp there Is sorýc ainerity"Who fools there shoulY be a squadtron. The squadrcn 170 reccmretnl

..as three ca•.alry troops as in ny chart without the extra ple-

toens as-2r"itncut those sup•prting platoons. (Explains chart rndca.ils Colonel ?;acdonald, a troop corander.)

Col KZcXONznDU1 feel v-ry str1r.gly that the present roco•nnissance troop was net

able tc perform thN missions tc ohich it was aosipnei. 27c ha" toreinfcrce thon.. Th.y just 'A! not have the fighting pcI7wer to lothoso lots. With troops of that kizn a, only a captain in cor-rraa, n ne woro not able to build up ron -4th experience enough incavalry to provide ren with tactical ability to lo thze ct.' Ireco.-rern: a squadlrcr. wtth lieutenant colcnon cor:.on ''ing. I don'tthink thmt a cavalry squadron is too large. The present organiZa-*Jon, I think, 1-9 nthirn2 but a con-promise. Yau have no' in-crcas-

ed the fighting strength of the troop, but as 'da chart shoe!s,just a'sC a littlo.

Gan KL• BLER:Uls thero any further discussion?

Con L'.c B?JDE'.:

ut go for extra cavalry instoad of tho ether things we h-ve edod.neroQ,- eror, cavalry roccnn, iss.rn,e•.

C-on KIBZR:

Etihat nould a squadron consist of?

COcl BIDLE:*(colonol Bidalio here explains the chart.) This is a. squn'ro,

within a rooioont. It -eoos nat have a service elenent ,Alich would

be rýed to hoa.quartoers. There -.All be threo cavalry troo.s,adviied into three cavalry platoons. Alsc a rifle troop crga.n-izcs into throa rifle platoons an : a mortar platcon. (colonolBPi-llo prolucos a•c thor chart showing the cavalry platoon ann'.explains it.)

Gon R•OERTSON:GEl7 about taking the rooonnmicsar.ce elocont from the livision and

patting it in theo corps? Woe roust either have non in. the divisionor nozo nt all. Cornsicleration should be given to having a group

in the corps and putting th.en in front of the division when thesituation arises.

GCn McBRICE:01 disapree with the preo~ss that you only nead them when the

situation ariea-s.

Gen RBERTSGNSElf you can roach back in corps anxi pull out a squa-ron ean1 group,

isn't this oi1le type unit that you can call for when needlod ennd nothave all the tire? I would rather have nothing than just a troopbecause it isn't enough to e-o the job.

128 CORG-M-365

"I

Gen GAY.*L't's ask Macdcnald about that,

U From the time I tock ocnmimnd of a group until the end of the war,there was5 nevtr a minu'.e when may squadron was net in use by thecorps. The group I hnd was never a ncr,,al envalry group~. Thedemand for cavealry squadrons was nevter met. I think we need theeall the time.

Gen PATrC,4@I would like to ask three questions which are off the subjeott

first, has anybody ev.~r seon a gun sling used for shooting Inaction? We can save much money and leather If we do~n't make thesling. Second, has anyone ever sceon a eight Set in combat? Ihave asked a number of officers and they have never seen a eightset. We make an instrument thit nobody uses. Third, we did agreat deal of night fighting end fighting in early morning andsnow - is the peepaight the proper eight for thet kird of fight-I ng?

(Scme discussion followed.)

Gler ROBERTSOtNia We nust tcaIoh a mAn the possibilities of a weapon and give him

confidence in it.

Gee PATTON&*I see no sense in eights beyond 300) yiriae. Is there objectionto having cli ý:aapona which shoot projectiles-mortars, cannons,etc. - use the same nomenclature and system rf lIr~ing7

'len McBRIEDEsE7bere's not only no objection but it's important.

Gen KII3Li7~IsTo come back to the subject, I believc you fool that there should

be a cavAlry squadron in the division, as on the chin., Anybodydissent?

(No dissents)

Any other points to dioouoss

Gen IeBRIDEs* How about rqdar compa~ies and anti-mortar people?

Gen SAjIYMsknti-alrorsft artillery have most of the radar. Piece ridardetection in the division *ind not in the corps.

(No further discussion.)

Gen PA'TIV.1%EI would like to thank both the visiting officers and [Bombers otThe Board for the remarkable Intelligence shown. Also for the veryhard work which has been put Intw the study and I wish to reiteratethit this study is not a result of The Board, but the result of alarge znwtber of people mentioncd on these pages. It goes down toincluding captains and majors.

The conference adjourned 3t 1.600,

SCUR G-M -365 129

TIlE GENERAL BOARD

United Slates Forces, Evrveean Theater

SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAIRE Till INIANTRY DIVISION"

MAJOR

QUESTIONNAIRE GENERALS BRIGADIEII LT COLONELS COMBINED(INCLUDES GENERALS COLONCELS & MAJORS TOTALSILLt Gn.e _

(some of Important ques;tonsIncluded on questionnaire) YES NO YES NU YES NO YES NO YES NO

I. -Should position of Asst C•vComdr be eliminated? 3 13 4 4 8 18 0 12 15 4f

2. What should be ranks of DTv 9 - Lt Cot 6 - Lt Col 14 - Lt Col 7 - Lt Col 36 - LI ColGeneral Staff? 2 - Col 2 - G-3 Col 10 - G-3 Cot 5 - G-3 Col 1) - G-3 Lot

5 - G-3 Col 2 - G-4 Col 2 - G-4 Cot 4 - G-4 Cot2 - Col

3. What sze armored units hould -Tk On 5 - OneTk an 6-Tk hn 5 -OneTA Bn I-TkCoeaRe'tbeorganic In the in( Div' 4 -Tk Regt i -Two TkBn lI - TA Reqt 5- One Tk Reg! 23 - Tk Bn

2 - Ik Bn1Co I -Tk Co I - Tk BnICj 2 - Tk Co I0- Tk BntCoea Regi ea ReqE ea Regj ea Req! ea Regt

3-Tk Bn I-Ti Bn 4-T1Co I-TkhBnCo 4-TAInea Reqt ea Reqt ea Reqt ea ReT ea Ragi

20 - Tk Regl

& Should Cannon Co be elIminatedfrom Inl Regl? Io 5 4 4 9 14 5 B 24 31

5. Should the 4. 2-In. Cml Mortarreplace the 8lmm Mortar in Hy'Jpns Co? 3 12 1 6 2 ?0 4 9 10 41

6. Should a 4.2-In. Cml Mortar Cobe organic In Inf ReqT? 9 6 5 2 1? 6 t0 3 41 11

1. Should an AAA Bn be organic In

In! Div? 12 4 7 1 21 2 9 4 49 1!

S. Should a Tank Destroyer Bn ISPIbe organic :n the Inf aiv? 9 6 7 1 16 10 10 3 42 20

9. Should a Tk or TO Co ISP) be 9 6 3 4 20 4 10 3 42 1?sub•tituted for the AT Co In Regis? 16 - Tk Cot 11 - Tk Col I(l - Tk Col 16 - Tk Cot 132 - T1 CoT

1I - To Cot IJ - To Col 14 - To Cot IlO - To Col

I0. What Should be the size 31 DivMIlitary Police units? 15 - Co I - Co 19 - Co 6 - Co 41 - Co

I -IOn 2- Sn 3 - Bn

T Should organic transportsllon beassigned to motohlre the entireDIv? I 13 2 6 5 13 i 8 9 40

12. Should a Cavalry Squadron besubstituted for Div Recon Troop? 6 10 3 3 II 12 4 a 24 33

13. Should a OM Shower UnIk beorgani in the Inf Div? 9 1 4 3 24 2 12 I 49 1)

04. Should a Defense IMPI Piat be

organic In the In[ Beft? 12 4 7 0 19 6 9 4 41 14

15. Should each In Regq beauthorized a Band? 9 6 5 3 20 6 9 4 41 I1

16. What should be the strer,;h of 10 - 12 Men 4 - I? Men 13 - 12 Men 8 - 12 Men 35 - 12 Menthe Rifle squad? 2 - 13 Men I -1 Men 5 - 13 Men 2 13-Men l1- 13Men

1 13 Men 2 - 8 Men 2 - 8 Men

17. Should the rank of the D v Arty 10 6 4 2 21 4 9 A 4A 16and Int Regi CO's be IV same' 7 1- B.G.I Q - B.G. 1 1i1 - B.G.1 (4 - B.G.I 126 - B.S.Wh3t? 13 Col. 1 12 - Col. I (7 Col. 1 15 - Co.l.

I&. Should LMG be substittjtiý for BARIn the Ri'le squad? 3 9 0 2 2 9 4

19. Do you recommend any c'.anqes inthe tactical role ot Inf DI.,? 0 14 I0 6 0 21 0 I1 J 54

130 CORG-M-365

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Armored Division, Organic Composition

I March 15 '"It 24 Jao1942 1943 1945

Entire [1ielot ,. 10,027 10.670I rolon HadqUnrt~rs 1J5 1jj 74Nq A Hq Co. OoMlbet 0.rmnand A: ii U 2H q & Hq 00. Coombt Conmmnd .1 .Hq. Reserve Command ad_

Armored Co.mpooemtI 4 949 21 IS 2.I Armored Regiment., each: 2.424

Hq a Hq Conmpay 172Reonr.lanc.o Company 202B•evl ce Company 191

Madetenanee Company 1i1Tank Battalion (Medium) (tOl To99

Hq A Hq Company Is,Tank Company iMedlumnllyrosI 149

Task Battalton 41pght) 473Hq & Hq Company 143Tank Company Itq ht) (thro) 110

3 Tank Ballttlono. each 729 700Hq A Hq Company 147 140Bervice Compa ry IlSO 11Tank Company (Medium) lttros) 122 17Tank Company (LightI 97 94

lnbnttry Component .... L003 1.911Armored Infantry Rqlmeot 2. 389

Nq 4 Hq Company 136Service Company I151

Arm ored Infan try Sm. t 10r ") 700 1.001 990Hq & Hq Company 105 "73 1IS

Ser-ico Compano 75 71Mile Comnp.ya (lbre.) 178 251 251

Artillery Component 2.127 " 1.62CHq lXvlalon Artillery 21 soArmored Field Artillery

BAtallon lithroe) 709 634 610Hq A Hq Battery 173 111 100Sernice o ttery 102 93 89Firing Battery .hrela 129 110 10S

Auelllary U"llto IJl LIU 2L31D1ol>l1 " Hq Compycy 111 139 115DIVIYalon Pr •lce Company 160Band 08 59Wga" Company 2006 302 293ReonaelmetAnce Battitlon 9721 936 804nglneer W , talIon 1. 114 693 610lvhlaton Trains 1.946 1,373 1.310

Hq & "q Company 19 103 99MaIntenance Battalion 472 742 732

0lIly Batt,.lion 414Medical bttta.lon 902 417 400

MI Military Police Platoon al 87

Attachted MadcnI A !Attached CtplawIn I4 .

Prlncipal Equlpma tMadton fark, 232 199 lo9LIEnt Tanks 151 77 771060-..m Heit tezre aelf-propellad 54 14 04Cal. 30 Mahlblne 0.na 211 496 424cal: 10 Machine Gnen 193 404 3,2cal. 45 R]bnlchlne J lone 2,190 2.803 I, 82..Carbines I.042 1.298 .9,091cal. 30 Rifle. 1,820 2.0.3 I .40AntitA4 Rocket la•eh•chr 907 60 0C6.1rler,. Hllf-track 733 001 4IVehiclea. all type. (except boats

ad al, • r•el) 3.30 2. A53" 2.278

bource T/1 17 and alIled tabtle& 4of above datea,

Iflelonlc~al SectionRee•d'r tarsArmy Oroed Force.

Source: R. R. Palmer, Study Number 8, Army Ground Forces, 1946

142 CORG-M -36--

APPENDLX E

INFANTRY DIVISION - 1950 (KOREA)

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SEcrioN III

EQUIPMENTFor equIpment of components or thla division, see section III of Table of Or.ganizatlon and Squipment Indicated In column 3, under section II of this table.

-'(AO 820.3 (29 Nov 50))

By OJ)ER OF THE BE/CI&LARY O THE AL4MY:

OMrCJAL: J. LAWTON COLLINSEDWARD F.W.'•..L Chtef of Staff, United States ArmylMajor General, I'S,The Adjutant (Gen,,,.-

An requested on DA AGO Form 12.

A

SCORG-MX-365 169I

, !

APPENDIX F

INFANTRY BATTALION TOE (ROAD)

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APPENDIX H{

THE 27th DIVISION TASK FORCE

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192 CORG-M-3 65 -

I

LITE RATURE CITED

1. R, F. Weigley, Hirtory of the United States Arjla, Th. M:Acnmill.,nCompany, New York, 19•1I.

2. "Evolution of the lifantry Division (MD), " Military Review, Vol XL,No. 3, translated from article by AlfonsL ýon Trompousky, June 1960.

3. Maurice de Saxe, Reverieb on the Art of War, The Military SeivePublishing Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 1944.

4. du Teil, Manocvres d'Infantri pcjir Resister a la Cavilerie,et IPAttaguer avec Succes, J. B. Collignon, Metz, France, 1782.

5. M. Dmjue McCarthy, "The Corps of the Army," 1Military Review,Vol XLV, No. 5, May 1965.

6. Antoine. H. Jomini, The Summ, ry of the Art of Wars, Military cervicePublishing C--mpany, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1932.

7. Silas Casey, Infantry Tactics, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Tiew York,1862.

8. Army Lineage Book, Vol II, Infan_., United States Department of theArmy, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1953.

9. United States Army Regalations of 1863, United States GovernmentPrinting, Office, Washington, 1863.

10. Francois V. A. de Charal, The American Army in the War of thcSecession, G. A. Spooner, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1894.

11. W. A. Ganoe, The Historyof the United States Army, D. Appletonand Co., N,4ew York, 1924.

12. Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, Duke University Press,Durham, North Carolina, 1959.

1b. J. F. C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization, Londov, 1932.

14. Vernon Pizer, Te Unitzd States Army, Frederick A. Praeger,New York, 1967.

15. John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, Stokes andCompany, New York 1931.

16. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Weapons and Equipment Evolution and ItsInfluence Upon Organization and Tactics in the American Army from1775-1963, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory, undatei., unpublished draft.

17. L. Van L. Naisawald, The US Infantry Division, Changing Conceptsin Organization 1900-1939, The John Hopkins University, OperationsResearch '-)fice, ORO-S-239, Silver Spring, Maryland, 7 March 1952.

18. Jim Dain Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War, Stackpole and Co.,Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1964.

CORG-M-365 193

I

19. Bruce Jacobs, Soldiers - The Fightipg_Divisions of the Regular Army,W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, n.d.

20. History and the Role of Armor, Command and General Staff College,Ft. Kaox, Kentucky, 1965.

21. Virgil Ney, The Evolution of the Armored Infantry Rifle Squad,Technical Operations, Inc., Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, CORG-M-198,19 March 1965.

22. Kent R. Greenfield, et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,US Army in World War II, Department of the Army, Office of theChief of Military History, Washington, 1947.

23. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor, Praeger, New York, 1960.

24. Bill I. Wiley, The Building and Training of the Infantry Division, ArmyGround Forces, Historical Section, Study No. 12, 1946.

25. The Army Almanac, Department of the Army, Washington, 1950.

26. Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the InfantryDivision, General Board Report, United States Forces, EuropeanTheater, Study No. 15, n.d.

27. James G. Westover, Combat Support in Korea, Combat Forces Press,Washington, 1955.

28. Roy E. Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, Charles E. TuttleCo., Rutland, Vermont, 1960.

29. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur 1941-1951,McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954.

30. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, Harper, New York, 1956.

31. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Doubleday and Company,New York, 1967.

32. Walter G. Herm',s, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Department of theArmy, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1966.

33. Willard Pearson, "Support Command or Trains Organization for theDivision, " Military Review, United States Command and GeneralStaff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, January 1963.

34. James M. Snyder, "ROAD Division Command Staff Relationships,"Militrya Review, United States Command and General Staff College,Ft. Leaveuworth, Kansas, January 1963.

35. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7G, Infantry Division,Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 March 1966.

36. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-42G, Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, Infantry Division Brgd, Headquarters,Department of the Army, 31 March 1966.

194 CORG-M-365

i

37. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-15G, Infantay Battalion,Infantry Division, Headquarters, Department of the Army,31 March 1966.

38. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7-48G, Rifle Company,Infantry Battalion, Infantry Divisio_ Headquarters, Departmentof the Army, 31 March 1966.

39. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 37G. Infantry Division(Mechanized), Headquarters, L"partment of the Army, 31 March 1966.

40. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17G, Armored Division,Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 March 1966.

41. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-35G. Tank Battalion,Armored Division Headquarters, Department of the Army,31 March 1966.

42. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-36G, Headquarters andHeadquarters Company, Tank Battalior, Armored Division,Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 March 1966.

43. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 17-37G, Tank Company,Tank Battalion, Armored Division, Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, 31 March 1966.

44. Sidney B. Berry, Jr., "Observations of a Brigade Commander,Military Review, United States Command and General Staff College,Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1968.

45. K. R. Lamison and John W. Wike, "Combat Arms Regimental System,"Army Information Digest, September 1964. f

46. "1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Created, " Army Information Digest,August 1965.

47. Lloyd J. Picou, "Airmobile Division Artillery Support, " MilitaReview, United States Command and General Staff College,Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1968.

48. James Hlessman and B. F. Schemmer, "The Airborne: Obsolete?",Armed Forces Journal, 9 November 1968.

49. James Hessman and B. F. Schemmer, "A Paratrooper's View,"Armed Forces Journal, 9 Novembe; 1968.

50. Walter Andrews, "Electronics Will Provide the Armor of the Eighties,"Armed Forces Journal, 14 December 1968.

CORG--M-365 195

ii

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Alexander, Field Marshal, Earl of Tunis, The Alexander Memoirs,McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1963.

Ambrose, S. F., Upton and the Army, Louisiana State University Press,Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1964.

Anders, Curt, Fighting Generals, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1965.

Andrzejewski, Stanislaw, Military Organization and Society, Routledge andKegan Paul Ltd., London, 1954.

Ayling, Keith, They Fly to Fight, D. Appleton-Century Co., New York,1944.

Azan, Paul, The Warfare of Today, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York,1918.

Bach, Christian Albert and Henry Noble Hall, The Fourth Division, ItsServices, and Achievements in the World War Gathered from theRecords of the Division Country Life Press, Garden City, New York,1920.

Benoist-Mechin, Jacques (translated by Peter Wiles), Sixty Days that Shookthe West, The Fall of France: 1940, G. P. Putnam' s Sons, New York,1963.

Benwell, Harry A., History of the Yankee Division, Cornhill Co., Boston,1919.

Bernard, C. J. and Bacon, Eugene H., American Military Policy: ItsDevelopment Since 1775, The Stackpole Company, Harrisbucg, Pen-nsylvania, (2nd ed.), 1961.

Bird, Harrison, March to Saratoga, General Burgovne and the AmericanCampaign, 1777. Oxford University Press, New York, 196,.

Blumenaon, Martin, Kasserine Pass Houghton Mifflin Co., Bostcn, 1967.

, The Gamble That Failed, J. B. Lippincott, Co.,Philadelphia, 1963.

1962.____, The Duel for France, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston,1962.

Bradley, Omar N., A Soldier's Story, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1951.

B:adley, F. X., Paratrooper, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg,Penasylvania, 1966.

Brereton, Louis H., The Brereton Diaries, Wiiiiam Morrow and Co.,New York, 1946.

Briggs, Richard A., Black Hawks Over the Danube, the History of the 86thInfantry Division in World War II, Western Recorder, Louisville,Kentucky, 1954.

196 CORG-M-365

Bryant, Arthur, The Turn of the Tide - 1939-1943, Doubleday and Company,Inc., Garden City, New York, 1957.

Butterfield, L. H. (ed.), Adams Family Correspondence, Belknap Pressof Harvard, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963.

Byrnes, Laurence G. (ed.), Historj. of the 94th Infantry Division in WorldWar 11, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, 1948.

Carlisle, John M., Red Arrow Men - Stories About the 32nd Division on theVilla Verde, Arnold-Powers Inc., Detroit, 1945.

Carter, Joseph, The History of the 14th Armored Division, Albert LoveEnterprises, Atlanta, 1946.

Carver, Michael, E Alamein, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1962.

Chastaine, Ben Hur, Story of the 36th: The Experiences of the 36th Divisionin the World War, Harlow Publishing Co., Oklahoma City, 1920.

Clark, Mark, Calculated Risk, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1950.

, From the Danube to the Yalu Harper and Brothers, New Yuik,1954. F

Coffman, Edward M., The War to End Ail Wars, Oxford University Press,

New York, 1968.

Coggins, Jack, The Fighting Man, Doubleday and Company, Inc., GardenCity, New York, 1966.

Cole, Ralph D., Howells, W. C., The Thirty-Seventh Division ir, the WorldWar, 1917-1918, Thirty-Seventh Division Veterans Associations,Columbus, Ohio, 1926-1929.

Cronau, Rudolf, The Army of the American Revolution and Its Organizer,Rudolf Cronau, New York, 1923.

Cronin, Francis D., Under the Southern Cross: The Saga of the AmericanDivision, Combat Forces Press, Washington, 1951.

Cutchins, John Abraham, History of the Twenty-Ninth "Blue and Gray,"1917-1919, McCalla and Co., Inc., Philadelphia, 1921.

Davidson, Orlando R., Williams, J. Carl, and Kahl, Joseph A., The Deadeyes,The Story of the 95th Infantry Division. Infantry Journal Press,Washington, 1947.

Dean, William F., General Dean' s Story, Viking Press, New York, 1954.

Delaney, John Paul, The B)ue Devils in Italy: A History of the 88th InfantyDivision in World War II, Infantry Journal Press, W'ashington, 1947.

Delmer, Sefton. Black Boomerang, The Viking Press, New York, 1962.

Demuth, Henry C., Report on the Battle of Guadalcanal, Field ArtillerySchool, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 1943.

CORG-M-365. 197

Dickman, Joseph Theodore, The Great Crusade, A Narrative of the WorldWar D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1927.

Dolcater, Max W., et al., 3rd Infantry Division in Korea, Toppan PrintingCo., Ltd., Tokyo, 1953.

Downey, Fairfax, Indian Fighting Ar-my, Scribner and Sons, New York, 1941.

Dupuy, R. Ernest, St. Vith - Lion in the Way - The 106th Infantry Divisionin World War II, Infantry Journal Press, Washington, 1944.

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Gray, David, "Our Future Infantry," Ar__y, Vol 17, No. 12, December 1967.

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208 CORG-M-365

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Hamlett, Barksdale, "The Army of 1970," Army Information Digest,

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Henkin, Daniel Z., "Army Censors General's ROAD Division Criticism,"Army Nay Air Force Journal and Register May 16, 1964.

Hilsman, William J., "The Design and Operation of an Automated Command

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Hollis, Charles H., "This is a Road Brigade, Where You Must Stay LooseBut Not Limp, " ArEmy, April 1963.

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Ladd, Harley W., "The ROAD Engineer, " Military Engineer, November-

December 1963.

Lee, Eugene, "Logistics in the New ROAD Division," Review, March-April1962.

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McKinney, John B., "The Army' s Minature AT&T, " Military Review,November 1968.

Miewald, Robert D., "Military Managers, ' Military Review, July 1967.

Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, "The Simple or the Complex, " Military Review,April 1964.

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Moore, Michael, "Improvement of Armor Employment in Vietnam, " Armor,September-October 1966.

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"New ' Old Ironsides' and ' Hell on Wheels' Divisions Pack PowerfulWallop; Fort Hood Elements Deployed to Europe; ROAD ReorganizationDescribed, " Army Navy Air Force Journal, February 17, 1962.

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Picou, Lloyd, Jr., "Operation Steel Horse," Military Review, October 1967.

210 CORG-M-365

Plattner, C. M., "Airmobile Concept Proves Effectiveness in GuerrillaFight, " Aviation Week, 10 January 1966.

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Rathbun, Frank F., "On the Road to ROAD, " Infantry, May-June 1963.

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Schnable, James F., "Ridgway in Korea, " Military Review, March 1964.

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"The 3d Infantry Division Crosses the Meurthe, " Military Review,February 1947.

"Third US Infantry Division in Italy, " Military Review, June 1944.

Tully, Robert B., "Mobility on the Battlefield, " Military Review, December1967.

Tyson, Charles M., "Mobility Without Wheels, Wings, or Blades,"Military Review, April 1967.

CORG-M-365 211

* Waggener, Edward L., "Brigade Trains in the ROAD Division," Armor,March-April 1964.

Webb, George S., Jr., "More Cavalry for the Infantry Division, " MilitaryReview, January 1969.

Weller, Jac, "The U.S. Army in Vietnam: A Survey of Aims, Operations,and Weapons, Particularly of Small Infantry Units, " The Army Quarterly,n.d.

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Wing, Rex D., "ROAD to COSTAR, " Ordnance, July-August 1965.

Woods, Thomas G., "Who Rides Shotgun?" Military Review, December 1966.

Woolley, John E., "The Next Step on the ROAD, " Armor, July-August 1964.

Wright, M. J. W. and Nazareth, J., "Two Views on the Principles of War,"Military Review, February 1961.

* Wyman, Willard G., "Quicknest Way to Get There Is to Go in Search of aMobility Differential, " Army, 1962.

Zeigler, Robert P., "Mechanized Fighting Vehicle, " Military Review,July 1966.

Official Publications

American Military History, 1607-1953, Department of the Army, Washington,ROTCM 145-20, July 1956.

American Military History 1607-1958, Department of the Army, Washington,July 1959.

Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, June-November1950, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History,

SWashington, 1961.

Ariny Almanac, Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,1959.

The Army Ground Forces - History of the Armored Force, US Army, Commandand Control Center, Historical Section, Study 27, 1946.

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Checklist for Staff Officers of Infantry Divisions, United States Commandand Genera) Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1942.

Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Department of theArmy, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, 1964.

212 CORG-M-365

, The Lorraine Campaign, Departmezt of the Army, Officeof The Chief of Military History, Washington, 1950.

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I

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CORG-M-365 213

I.

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214 CORG-M-365

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Upton, Emory, The Military Policy of the United States, Department of theArmy, Washington, 1917.

CORG-M-165 215

UNCLASSIFIED

DOCUW4NT CONTROL DATA - R & D h,-l."

i ,OR101"A~rl~s AkCTIVITrY ('qerporte MkuNW~) E I . OlP~ T GZC•JýRITY A115iFtICATf00d

AL Technical Operations, inc. UNCLASSIFIED

Combat Operations Research Group 1b. GRU

101 S. Whiting St., Alexandria, Virginia 22304 N

Ir. viqcOfur TITLE

Evolution of the US Army Division:i 1939 to 1968

4. cr0 gv 110T,3 (IV"p of repoirt and incwvaS dot".)Final Report

V AUTHOM111 (FleJeWt agae, i]dt*o Inftiol, maot ai.)

Virgil Ney

(I RPORTy ATI 786 I'OYAL NO. OF PAGEIS 7b, NO. OMa rs3

January 1969 215 50wa. CONrftACr Ot 0NANT NO. 4.. ONIGINAYORN6 REPORT NUW0rAI(*J

DAAG-05-67-C-O 54736. PROJETmc NO. CORG-M-365

CORG-M- 3(5 _____________________1. 5 OTHER NEPONT NOI) (Any odivenusberes ^s1 mii he oos#i.ed

A N/A10. OIT•i TION STATEMENT

Distribution of this document is unlimited.

i•. J)P'LUN•'ANy NOTVR ia. SPONSOMING MILtTARY ACTIVITY

"Project Officer HeadquartersMr. Jean Keith United States Army Conbat Developments Comms dDirectorate of Concept and Plans [Fort Bclvoir, Virginia 2EO60

J. ASITNACT

The division first appeared in the United States Aimy in the American Revolution.European military professionals established the divisional structure, which wasrefined during and after the French Revolution. The Napoleonic wars saw theinfantry division in all armies; the French influence on divisional structure has

always been strong.

The modern United States Army infantry division dates from World War I.

World War II and the Korean War were fought by divisions of about one-half thestrength of those of World War I. The division was triangular rather than square.

The "cold war" and the possibility of nuclear conflict forced the drastic reorganiza-tion of the US infantry division. kentomic, or ROCID, ROTAD, and finally ROADwere the new formats.

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S,.'•re l ls.,ncaw. '

UNCIASSIFIED

InfantryDiviaionOrganizat ionBrigadeRegiment.BattalionBattle GroupDivision BaseSupport GroupA irmobileMechanizet.ArmorAir borneHelicopterTankArmored Personnel Carrier

*CommuunicationsTacticsWe aponsR~ifleMachine Gun

Mortar

Bayonetrer.ade Launcher

CompanyTask ForceBattalion Landing TeamiBrigade Landing TeamCavalryMajor GeneralBrigadier GeneralBrigade CmowanderBattalion CoamatiderManeuver Bat'talionFire and MovementFlexible Response

u~LASTIEA--rca-rctf

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