US-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-81: New ......the U.S.-Cuban impasse, and of Cold War...

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 185

Editor’s Note: The Cold War be-tween the United States and the SovietUnion ended years ago, but it thrivesin two places: on the Korean peninsula,where communist North confronts capi-talist South across the 38th parallel ina tense armed standoff; and between theUnited States and Cuba, where FidelCastro remains in charge almost fourdecades after the revolution he led cameto power in 1959—still passionatelycommitted to socialism and still thenemesis of Washington, which refusesto recognize and regularly lambasts hisgovernment. Even as such Cold Warlandmarks as the Bay of Pigs and Cu-ban Missile Crisis recede into history,relations remain as problematic as ever,and as likely to become entangled inU.S. domestic politics. Presidents fromKennedy to Clinton have maintained aneconomic embargo on and refused toestablish diplomatic relations with theCastro regime, and given at least rhe-torical support to a Cuban emigre com-munity in the United States that openlycalls for its overthrow. Havana, in turn,has regularly denounced Washington asan imperialist bully seeking to strangle,subvert, and topple the Cuban revolu-tion.

The past year (1996) providedample evidence that Cold War-era ac-rimony continues to flourish across thenarrow straits separating Cuba andFlorida, as exemplified by the enact-ment in the United States of the “Helms-Burton Amendment” (a controversiallaw, sharply criticized in Europe, de-signed to punish firms or individualsdoing business with Cuba); the fatalshooting-down by a Cuban air forcefighter of a plane piloted by a U.S.-based anti-Castro Cuban emigre group;and fervent anti-Castro declarations byboth major presidential candidates intheir election campaigns.

The translated East-bloc docu-ments below, dealing with U.S.-Cubanrelations during the Cold War period

US-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-81:New Evidence from Communist Archives

of 1976-1981, thus constitute a sourceof potentially valuable insights both forhistorians and for analysts of currentand future interactions between Wash-ington and Havana. Although schol-ars (with few exceptions) still lack ac-cess to Cuban archives which might al-low a more accurate and perceptive re-construction of Cuban decisions, poli-cies, and motives, the opening of otherarchives in the former communist worldoffer new opportunities to probe whatwas happening on “the other side” ofthe U.S.-Cuban impasse, and of ColdWar events in which Cuba played a part.Elsewhere in this issue of the CWIHPBulletin, for example, appear transla-tions of Russian on the 1962 CubanMissile Crisis and Russian and EastGerman documents on the 1977-78Horn of Africa events (as well as a rareinstance of Cuban archival documentsthat have emerged, in this case relat-ing to Havana’s policies in Africa ob-tained by Prof. Piero Gleijeses).

All but one of the documents thatfollow were obtained from the Russianarchives in connection with the“Carter-Brezhnev Project,” a series oforal history conferences on U.S.-Sovietrelations and the collapse of detente inthe mid-1970s organized by the Centerfor Foreign Policy Development atBrown University in cooperation withthe National Security Archive, the ColdWar International History Project, andother academic and archival partner in-stitutions. These documents, obtainedfrom the Center for the Storage of Con-temporary Documention (TsKhSD) (thearchival repository for records of theformer Central Committee of the Com-munist Party of the Soviet Union from1952-1991) and the Archive of thePresident of the Russian Federation(APRF), both in Moscow, include:

* a background report on Cuban-American relations, 1976-1979, pre-pared by the Soviet Embassy in Havanain the spring of 1979;

* a record of a June 1979 conver-sation between the Soviet ambassadorto Cuba and Fidel Castro regarding therecently-held Vienna summit betweenJimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev;

* documents on the September1979 “Cuban brigade” controversy, inwhich a political furor erupted in theUnited States over reports that a Sovietmilitary brigade was stationed in Cuba;although the flap died down after it be-came evident that the Soviet force wasa residual presence dating from the af-termath of the Cuban Missile Crisisrather than a newly-deployed “combat”force (as some alleged), the episodeside-tracked Congressional consider-ation of ratification of the just-signedSALT II treaty and exacerbated Sovietmistrust of the Carter administration;

* a December 1979 analysis ofcurrent trends in U.S.-Cuban relationsprivately presented to the Soviet ambas-sador in Havana by the head of the re-sponsible department of the CubanCommunist Party Central Committee;

* the transcript (provided by theCubans to the Soviet Embassy in Ha-vana) of a secret November 1981 meet-ing in Mexico City between U.S. Secre-tary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., andCuban Vice President Carlos R.Rodriguez.

Of the Russian documents printedhere, perhaps the Haig-Rodriguez tran-script is the most surprising given theReagan Administration’s combativepublic stance toward Cuba at the time(when Haig, hinting at military action,said Washington should “go to thesource” to stop Cuban support of left-ist insurrections in Latin America). Intheir meeting, kept secret at the time,Haig and Rodriguez discussed currenttensions in bilateral relations and alsoreviewed past disputes, such as the Cu-ban interventions in the Angola andEthiopia crises examined elsewhere inthis Bulletin. The Haig-Rodriguez en-counter constituted a rare discussion

186 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

between senior officials of the two coun-tries, and is all the more remarkable inthat it occurred precisely at a momentof acute tension between them. Alas,the accuracy of this Russian transcriptand other details concerning the meet-ing are difficult to ascertain at the mo-ment, since records on this meeting ap-parently remain secret in both the U.S.and Cuban archives.

Presenting commentaries on theRussian documents noted above are twoscholars who have authored numerousworks on U.S.-Cuban relations: PeterKornbluh, Senior Analyst and Direc-tor of the Cuba Documentation Projectat the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and de-classified documents repository locatedat George Washington University inWashington, DC; and Jorge I.Dominguez, Dillon Professor of Inter-national Affairs and Director of theCenter for International Affairs atHarvard University and author of To

Make a World Safe for Revolution:Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1979).

In addition to the Russian docu-ments, the translated materials includean excerpt from the East German tran-script of a May 1980 summit meetingin Havana between Castro and theleader of the Socialist Unity Party ofGermany (SED), Erich Honecker, inwhich Castro presents his version of the“brigade” controversy of the previousautumn and other aspects of East-Westrelations. This excerpt, as well as aCastro-Honecker conversation in EastBerlin in April 1977 also excerpted inthis issue of the Bulletin, are from alarger collection of records ofHonecker-Castro conversations be-tween 1972 and 1989 obtained from theSED archives in Berlin by Christian F.Ostermann, a doctoral candidate atHamburg University currently based atthe National Security Archive, who hasalso joined the Cold War International

History Project as Associate Director.Ostermann plans to analyze and presentadditional translated selections fromthe Honecker-Castro conversations ina future CWIHP publication.

Both the Russian and East Germandocuments were obtained and trans-lated via the collective efforts of theCFPD, the National Security Archive,and CWIHP. They and other declassi-fied U.S. and East-bloc documents ob-tained by the Carter-Brezhnev Projectare available for research at the Na-tional Security Archive, Gelman Li-brary, 7th floor, 2130 H St. NW, Wash-ington, D.C. 20037; e-mail:[email protected]; tel.(202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005.The collection is part of the Russian andEast-bloc Archival Documents Data-base (READD), maintained by theArchive and CWIHP. READD hopes toinclude Cuban documents if and whenthe archives in Havana become acces-sible to scholars.—James G. Hershberg

USSR Embassy in Cuba, “Informa-tional Letter on Contemporary Cuban-

American Relations,” 26 April 1979

EMBASSY OF THE USSRTO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

TOP SECRETCopy No. 4

Ser. No. 22326 April 1979

INFORMATIONAL LETTERON CONTEMPORARYCUBAN-

AMERICAN RELATIONS

Havana1979

The process of relaxation in Cuban-American relations, which was abruptly in-terrupted in 1976, commenced anew withthe election of Jimmy Carter as president ofthe USA. The new American administration,by all appearances, is counting on the re-sults of normalization in relations and ex-pansion of trade with Cuba to restore cer-tain positions in the economy and turn thecountry’s difficulties to its own advantage.In this regard the question continues to sur-face regarding the possibilities inhering ina prospective “break” between Cuba and theUSSR.

A large influence in the change ofCarter’s policies has been contributed by an

influential group of individuals in his closecircle ([U.S. Ambassador to the United Na-tions] A. Young, [Democratic Senator fromSouth Dakota] G. McGovern and others),who believe that the normalization of rela-tions represents greater opportunities for theUnited States to neutralize the policies ofCuba toward Africa and Latin America.

As part of the new approach, theAmericans have come out with official pro-nouncements about their readiness to com-mence discussions with Cuba on the prob-lems existing between the two countries“without preliminary conditions.” TheCarter administration has also taken practi-cal steps to reduce tensions in relations.Flights over Cuban territory by reconnais-sance aircraft have been terminated; severalmeasures have been undertaken to bring ahalt to terrorist activity of Cuban revolution-aries on USA territory; and the prohibitionof travel to Cuba has been relaxed. USAauthorities have begun to warn the Cubansabout hostile activities being planned byCuban emigres, and a number of their par-ticipants have been arrested and prosecutedin the American courts.

The Cuban government has adopted await-and-see attitude, although in general ithas reacted positively to these USA gestures.In a series of public statements, and also inthe course of meetings with American sena-tors and congressmen arriving in Havanaduring this period, Fidel Castro has indicated

the readiness of Cuba in principle to improverelations with the United States, and as amandatory condition has put forward thedemand for an end to the economic block-ade.

In early 1977, both countries undertookpractical steps toward the goal of improv-ing relations. In March, at the initiative ofthe Americans, the first direct negotiationsat the level of deputy foreign ministers sincethe interruption of diplomatic relations tookplace in New York. In April, in Havana,agreements were signed concerning fishingrights within the 200-mile zone along withpreliminary agreements on delimitation ofthe maritime economic zone. At the initia-tive of the Americans, interest sections havebeen opened in the embassy of Switzerlandin Havana and the Republic of Czechoslo-vakia in Washington. American citizenswith families living in Cuba have beengranted the right for their families to visitthe United States.

In late 1977, the policy of Cuba in Af-rica, in particular its international assistanceto Ethiopia, put the brakes on the process ofnormalizing relations with the USA. How-ever, in spite of threatening pronouncementsin the press and from an array of congress-men concerning the Cuban military presencein Ethiopia, the USA administration re-frained from exerting serious pressure onHavana and attempted to preserve the con-ditions for dialogue. In December 1977, at


the behest of Carter, Representatives F.Richmond and R. Nolan visited Cuba andexpressed to Castro the president’s concernin connection with the “growing Cuban in-tervention” in Ethiopia. In February 1978,the Mexican Minister of Foreign AffairsS[antiago]. Roel Garcia, secretly visited hereat the instructions of President L[opez].Portillo and conveyed to Castro an oralmessage from [U.S.] Vice President [Walter]Mondale expressing the concern of theAmerican government about the presenceof Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Through theintercession of Portillo, the position of prin-ciple held by Cuba on this question wascommunicated to Carter. It was representedthat, in the case of necessity, the Cuban mili-tary specialists located in Ethiopia wouldtake part in military operations only on theterritory of that country.

In May 1978, during the course of thewell-known events in the Zairian provinceof Shaba, which the Americans attributedto the Cuban presence in Africa, Fidel Castromet with the head of the American InterestsSection in Havana, L[yle]. Lane, andthrough him transmitted to Carter an oralmessage in which he emphasized that Cuba“has no ties whatsoever” to the events inShaba.

The USA government attempted to di-minish the tensions arising in relations be-tween the two countries during late 1978 inconnection with the propaganda campaignin the USA centering around the issue overthe supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters toCuba. In Havana, during a closed meetingbetween Fidel Castro and representatives ofthe Carter administration, the latter at-tempted to justify the resumption of flightsover Cuba by USA reconnaissance aircrafton the grounds that the appearance of theMiG-23’s had provoked significant anxietyin the United States and that the presidenthad been forced to adopt a “position whichwould permit him to assure the Americanpeople that everything was being done toensure the security of the country.” TheAmericans also declared that the training ofnaval forces takingplace off the Cubancoast was being carried out in the traditionalregion and was not being directed againstCuba. The Cuban side took this explana-tion under advisement.

Notwithstanding the developmentsoutlined above, a certain amount of progresscontinued in connection with several spe-cific questions regarding bilateral relations.In late 1977, in connection with the expira-tion of the temporary agreement on the de-limitation of the maritime economic zone,the Americans proposed to conduct newnegotiations. In December an agreement

was struck that conclusively strengthenedthe maritime boundaries between the twocountries. In January 1978, an agreementwas reached between the coast guards of thetwo countries calling for the rendering ofassistance to vessels in distress in the Straitsof Florida, common efforts against the traf-ficking of narcotics, and a halt to terroristactivity by Cuban counterrevolutionaries onUSA territory.

The Cubans were permitted to openaccounts in American banks, which wasnecessary, in part, for normal operation ofthe Cuban Interests Section in Washington,which was also granted the right to transmitconsular payments to Havana. Cuban emi-gres, living on USA territory, were permit-ted to send their relatives in Cuba up to 500dollars every three months. American tour-ists visiting Cuba received the right to bringback into the United States goods having avalue of up to $100 per person.

In response to these “gestures” fromthe Carter administration, the Cuban gov-ernment freed three Americans who wereserving sentences for espionage activity (outof eight). Readiness was declared to favor-ably examine the question concerning theremaining Americans being detained underthe condition that the USA, for its part,would release the Puerto Rican freedomfighters Lolita Lebron and her three com-rades [imprisoned for involvement in a No-vember 1950 assassination attempt againstPresident Harry Truman]. American citizenswith families located here were returning tothe United States (in all about 250 individu-als); and persons having dual citizenshipwere permitted to leave.

A policy of dialogue continued be-tween the parties. Exchanges of opinionson a wide variety of issues concerning bi-lateral relations took place among contactsat various levels, including those duringclosed meetings in Atlanta (USA) in Augustand in Cuernavaca (Mexico) in October1978. In this connection the Americans em-phasized that the principal impediment tofull normalization of relations was the Cu-ban military presence in Africa. From theirpart they undertook efforts to exert pressureon Cuba in this regard, and to obtain at leasta partial withdrawal of Cuban forces fromAngola and Ethiopia. In this connection,official representatives of the American ad-ministration declared in closed meetings thatif Cuba sincerely desired an improvementin relations, then it must make “positivesteps” in the areas of “vital interest” to theUSA located in Africa and Puerto Rico. Forexample, to begin with, the withdrawal offorces from Angola and Ethiopia would leadto a readiness by the USA to examine the

question of lifting the ban on the sale ofmedicine and certain types of equipment forthe nickel industry. They pointed out thatthe presence of Cuban forces in Africa andthe possibility of their intervention in Zim-babwe and Namibia was causing anxiety inthe USA and preventing the president fromreaching a decision in respect to the eco-nomic blockade. The Americans attemptedto attain assurances that Cuba would notintervene militarily in Zimbabwe andNamibia, and exhorted Cuba to supportWestern plans for a “peaceful settlement”of those problems.

In response to the Americans it wasfirmly declared that Cuba would not imposeany preliminary conditions on the normal-ization of relations with the USA but wouldnot back down on questions of principle re-lating to its foreign policy. It was furtheremphasized that the solidarity of Cuba withAfrican and other countries, and the inter-nationalist assistance rendered by it toAngola and Ethiopia, could not be the sub-ject for negotiations with the USA. “We willwithdraw our forces from there,” Castrostated in discussions with the Americans,“when conditions of peace and security areachieved there. And this will be done onthe basis of agreement with the governmentsof those countries, and not as the result ofpressure exerted by the USA.”

It was indicated further that Cuba didnot oppose a peaceful political settlementto the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia,but that it refused to bind itself in connec-tion with its future policy in that region,considering that the racist regimes mightundertake such provocations and aggressiveactions against Angola as would “demand aresponse.” At the same time it was empha-sized that Cuba adhered to a constructiveposition and consistently therewith was infavor of a peaceful settlement to conflicts,including those arising among African coun-tries. As an example, they pointed to theefforts previously undertaken by the Cubansto attain a peaceful resolution to the con-flict between Somalia and Ethiopia, and theassistance rendered by them in support ofan improvement in relations betweenAngola and Zaire.

In the course of meetings with officialrepresentatives of the Carter administration,Castro emphasized that the principal impedi-ment to the normalization of relations wasthe economic blockade and the presence ofthe American base at Guantanamo. Hestressed that Cuba regarded as highly im-moral the policy of utilizing a blockade asan “instrument of pressure and impositionof demands.” It was stated to the Americansthat the problems of Africa and Puerto Rico


ade continues to be maintained essentiallyin its entirety. The prohibition on exportsof American goods, imports of Cuban prod-ucts, issuance of commercial and financialcredits to Cuba by governments and privatefinancial institutions, and activity by banksof the USA and other countries containingAmerican capital, accounts and dollars, con-tinues in force.

At the same time, the USA has beenforced to implement modifications in thoseaspects of its policy which had related totrade with Cuba by foreign countries. Theministries of finance, trade and state depart-ment have been permitted to issue licensesfor transactions concluded with Cuba bycompanies of those countries which are con-trolled by American monopolies. They areable to export nonstrategic materials andimport Cuban products. Exports to Cubaof goods from third countries containing upto 20% in components of American manu-facture are also permitted.

On the other hand, subsidiaries ofAmerican monopolies located in third coun-tries are not permitted to maintain accountswith Cuba in American dollars, to issue itcredit for a period of more than one year, orto transfer technology.

In sum, according to data of the USAInterests Section in Havana, from October1975 through January 1979 the USA Com-merce Department has issued licenses tosubsidiaries of American firms in third coun-tries for the export of nonstrategic materi-als in the amount of 450 million dollars, al-though not all applications for export li-censes have been realized, and the share ofgoods directly produced in the USA is notgreater than 5-6%.

Licenses have been granted for suchproducts as electric motors, industrial scales,tractors, light and heavy automotive equip-ment, equipment for the paper industry,pharmaceuticals, florescent lamps, herbi-cides, locomotives, textile machines, boil-ers, etc. Exports of navigational systems,computers, communications, electrical dis-tribution equipment, construction machin-ery, electronic experimental equipment andso forth, are prohibited. Up to 50% of ap-plications for the issuance of licenses havebeen granted to subsidiaries of Americancompanies located in Canada and Argentina.

It should be bome in mind that a lift-ing of the economic blockade would notautomatically result in the development oftrade between the two countries. Cubawould first of all have to comply with theprovisions of the USA Trade Act of 1974requiring it to guarantee the right to emi-grate from the country and to conclude bi-lateral trade agreements. Failing this it will

not be granted most favored nation tradingstatus, nor will it be eligible for credits fromthe Export-Import Bank or the USA Com-mercial Credit Corporation. Without suchstatus, products for Cuban export will besubject to high customs tariffs (for example,cigars at $4.50 per pound plus 25% of theirvalue).

The USA has attempted to apply theprovisions of the embargo to imports ofCuban nickel by Japan, Italy, and France.These governments have been informed thatthe USA will not permit the import of spe-cial steels using Cuban nickel. At the sametime, in the course of Cuban-American con-tacts in 1977-78, according to data providedby “Business International Cooperation,”five leading USA nickel companies an-nounced their interest in cooperation withCuba after the lifting of the economic block-ade in the sphere of nickel production andtrade.

A new and recent significant step inCuban-American relations is the decision ofthe Cuban government to release more thanthree thousand political detainees (not lessthan 400 persons per month) on the condi-tion that they go to the United States; and topermit the departure of Cubans wishing toreunite with their families abroad and visitsby Cuban emigres to their relatives. Thisdecision, adopted on the basis of a compre-hensive analysis of the domestic situationregarding emigration, marks a fundamentalreexamination of the previous policy on thatquestion. At the negotiations which tookplace in Havana in November and Decem-ber of 1978 with representatives of the Cu-ban emigre community, Castro confirmedthis decision and emphasized that up to 500political detainees will be released eachmonth. However, implementation will de-pend in the final analysis on a decision bythe USA to admit them into the country.

In a closed meeting with representa-tives of the American administration in late1978, Castro stated that the “primary fac-tor” making possible the adoption of thesedecisions was the policy of the Carter ad-ministration, which had “ceased to encour-age terrorist and subversive activity and in-tervention in the internal affairs of Cuba.”This, in his words, had created a new envi-ronment, making possible a new approachto the emigration issue.

The United States turned out to be to-tally unprepared for Cuba’s proposal, whichscored a serious moral and political victory- the American administration was deprivedof its trump card consisting of the supposedviolation of human rights. The USA wasconfronted by the need for a response to theCuban initiative. Moreover, the American

were not related to the economic blockadeand that Cuba would not conduct negotia-tions on those questions in exchange for itslifting. “Cuba,” Castro emphasized, “is notChina and is not Egypt. It has nothing incommon with those countries which can bepressured or bought.”

All the same, in the course of thesecontacts with the Cuban side an obviousdegree of flexibility was demonstrated. Areadiness was declared to include, in thegeneral discussion of normalizing relations,as a condition to the lifting of the economicblockade, the issue of compensation for thenationalized property of Americans, claimsfor which were calculated at 1.8 billion dol-lars (considering interest at 6% for 18 years,that sum will almost double). The Ameri-cans were apprised that Cuba, in turn, hascounterclaims for losses resulting from theeconomic blockade, and that only on thisbasis could negotiations on that theme beconducted.

The Cuban leadership has stimulatedinterest on the part of certain business circlesin the USA in studying the possibilities offuture trade and economic ties. The organi-zation “Business International” conducteda seminar in Havana with the participationof leaders of major corporations from theUSA, Japan, and several West Europeancountries. It was made particularly appar-ent that the participants wielded broad in-fluence in USA political circles and were ina position to exert pressure on Congressnecessary from Cuba’s perspective.

In late 1977, Cuban Minister of For-eign Trade M[anuel]. Fernandez visited theUSA at the invitation of the Council on East-West Trade. He attended a conference inWashington in which the leaders of morethan 80 USA trade and industrial firms andrepresentatives of the Commerce Depart-ment and State Department participated.The minister announced that in the event theeconomic blockade were lifted, Cuban-American trade could reach several hundredmillion dollars per year. Cuba would beinterested in acquiring USA grain, feedstockresources, medicines, chemical products,light and heavy metals, construction mate-rials, turnkey factories, miscellaneousequipment and other goods.

Groups of American business leadersand businessmen from the states of NewYork, California, and elsewhere, have vis-ited Havana. The Cubans believe that thereare American companies who are seriouslyinterested in the conduct of business inCuba. These companies are even preparedto waive their claims for compensation oftheir nationalized property.

Notwithstanding, the economic block-


administration was subjected to strong pres-sure from representatives of the Cuban emi-gre community. Under the circumstances,the USA officially announced that it wouldaccept all of the political detainees (up to3,500 individuals), to be released at the rateof 400 persons per month, together with theirfamilies. In order to examine this problem,special commissions from the USA JusticeDepartment came to Havana. In October1978, the first group of political detaineesand their families departed for the USA. ThisMarch, the Americans introduced a newsimplified procedure for the issuance of vi-sas to political detainees in order to facili-tate the conditions for the admission into theUSA of up to 400 persons every month.

In the beginning of this year, Cubanemigres began to arrive on visits to theirrelatives. According to accounts of friends,the number of such persons in 1979 willexceed 100,000 individuals. During the firstthree months of this year around 20,000Cuban emigres have arrived.

The Cuban leadership understands theneed to intensify its ideological work in thecountry relating to the new policy in con-nection with emigration. This question oc-cupied an important role in presentations byCastro at the recent Seventh Plenum of theCentral Committee of the party and at a na-tional conference of party leaders last Feb-ruary. In accordance with conclusionsreached by the Division of RevolutionaryOrientation of the Central Committee of theparty, measures have been worked out toneutralize the negative influence from amassive arrival of emigres for meetings withtheir relatives. Party organizations at alllevels have been authorized to explain to theworkers the basis for the present policy inrelation to the Cuban emigre community.

Cuban-American contacts haveachieved a definite development in thespheres of culture, science, and sport. Theimprovement of these contacts is serving asone of the methods for achieving a mutualunderstanding between the two countries,as well as an additional source for the re-ceipt of hard currency. Thus, on the com-mercial front, the National Ballet of Cubacompleted an extended tour of the USA in1978. Its performances in Washington andNew York were attended by around 100,000spectators. The director of the ballet, A.Alonso, was elected as an honorary foreignmember of the John F. Kennedy Center forthe Performing Arts. Her essay on Cubanballet was published in the USA.

Last year and again this year, the mu-sical groups “Iraqueres,” “Moncada,”“Manguardi,” “Los Papines,” and “Aragon”toured in the United States, along with the

composer-performers A. Brouver, S.Rodriguez, P. Milyanez, and the singers T.Martinez, E. Burke and others.

American artists and choreographersparticipated in the Sixth International Bal-let Festival in Havana. Last March, in thelarge concert hall here named after KarlMarx, three joint concerts by American andCuban musicians and singers were held.They were attended by members of the Po-litburo of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party of Cuba C. R. Rodriguezand A. Hart, and by member of the Secre-tariat of the Central Committee of the partyA. Peres Effera.

Cuban Minister of Culture A. Hart haddiscussions in Havana with the vice presi-dent of the firm “Columbia BroadcastingSystems” about the possibility of releasinga recording of Cuban music in the USA.

In 1978, 35 film critics were invitedfrom the USA. Based on their examinationof Cuban films and meetings with col-leagues, they published a series of positivematerials in the American press about Cu-ban cinematography. This ensured the suc-cess of the Cuban Film Week, organized inWashington, New York, San Francisco,Chicago, and Los Angeles, which was at-tended by a delegation of cinematographersunder the leadership of the director S.Alvarez. It met with leading representativesof the American cinema, as well as univer-sity students and professors.

An American rental company is nowacquiring Cuban films for display in cinemahouses and on television. The journal “Cu-ban Cinema” will be re-published in Englishin the United States. In 1978, 16 Americanfilms were purchased through an interme-diary firm in Italy.

The first high school contacts havebeen established. Late last year, a delega-tion headed by Minister of Higher Educa-tion F. Vecino visited the United States. Itvisited eight universities and met with theirdeans, the Assistant Secretary of Health,Education and Welfare, and a number ofsenators. At the invitation of F. Vecino,teachers from the Universities of Pittsburgh,Massachusetts and Minnesota this year vis-ited Havana University and Central Univer-sity, as well as polytechnic and agriculturalinstitutes. An exchange of small groups ofstudents for training in agricultural special-ties has been proposed. The son of SenatorMcGovern is currently enrolled at the Uni-versity of Havana.

Several contacts between scientific in-stitutions are being worked out. Thus, theNational Center for Scientific Studies is nowreceiving informational materials. TheAmerican side is offering Cuba assistance

in studying the application of solar energyfor the cooling of industrial and residentialbuildings.

Last March, at the invitation of theMinister of Public Health H. G. Mundis, theUSA Assistant Secretary of Health, Educa-tion and Welfare, USA Surgeon General H.Richmond, was here. At a press conferencehe announced that he was favorably im-pressed by the development of public healthin Cuba, especially the low rate of infantmortality and the degree of attention directedto health care among the adolescent popu-lation. During the course of negotiations,the Cuban side sounded out the possibilityof purchasing pharmaceutical supplies in theUSA. H. Richmond was received by FidelCastro. Under the auspices of UNESCO,several Cuban medics are receiving on-the-job training in the USA.

An exchange of literature is takingplace between Casa de las Americas in Ha-vana and New York, nongovernmental or-ganizations involved in cultural ties withLatin American countries. This year, theVice President of the Cuban Institute ofPeople’s Friendship (ICAP) J. Gayardo vis-ited the USA for negotiations with Casa delas Americas in New York over the organi-zation of informational work at the localcommunity level relating to real life circum-stances in Cuba.

In April of this year, at the invitationof ICAP, for the eleventh time, 130 progres-sive young Americans visited Cuba as mem-bers of the “Venceremos” brigade, to be-come acquainted with the country and toparticipate in the sugar harvest.

Traditional annual Cuban-Americanboxing matches have been started up. Thisyear American athletes participated in in-ternational meets in Havana in classical andfree form competitions. It is expected thatthey will participate in the BrothersBarientos international light athletic tourna-ment.

An examination of the development inCuban-American contacts permits the con-clusion that the Cuban leadership is main-taining a firm position on the issue of nor-malizing relations with the USA, decisivelyrejecting attempts by the Americans to ex-ert pressure on Cuba, and that Cuba will notyield on matters of principle relating to itsdomestic and foreign policy as a form of“payment” for the normalization of rela-tions.

The Cuban leadership understands aswell the negative consequences in the do-mestic ideological realm and the interna-tional arena that would be brought about bya full normalization of relations with theUnited States.


In this connection it may be assumedthat contacts with the USA on a variety oflevels, particularly in the spheres of cultural,scientific, and athletic ties, will continue andexpand. Both sides are expressing interestin preserving the level of contacts alreadyattained and in making further progress.

Considering the importance of the is-sue of Cuban-American relations in the con-text of the present and future interests of theSoviet Union and the countries of the so-cialist bloc, and the desirability and neces-sity of receiving information about it fromthe Cubans, it would appear appropriate andfitting to continue an exchange of opinionswith our Cuban friends on this problem, uti-lizing for this purpose joint visits and meet-ings of governmental and party leaders aswell as responsible employees of the For-eign Ministries of the USSR and Cuba.

It is evident that special attentionshould be directed to an analysis of the con-ditions being put forward by the Americanadministration for the normalization of re-lations with Cuba.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO CUBA

/s/ V.VOROTNIKOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 828, ll. 1-13; translation by the Carter-BrezhnevProject; copy on file at National SecurityArchive.]

Soviet Ambassador to Cuba V.I.Vorotnikov, Memorandum of Conversa-

tion with Fidel Castro, 25 June 1979

From diary of V.I. VorotnikovTOP SECRET

Copy No. 4Ser. No. 3264 July 1979

Record of Conferencewith First Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party ofCuba and Chairman of the State Council

and Council of Ministersof the Republic of Cuba,

Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz

25 June 1979

We received a visit today from F.Castro at my request. Pursuant to instruc-tions, I reported to him the results of themeeting and negotiations in Vienna betweenSecretary General of the Central Commit-tee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Pre-sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSRComrade L.I. Brezhnev, and USA President

Jimmy Carter.1. Having listened closely to me,

Castro expressed his gratitude for the infor-mation “which,” he said, “is extremely im-portant and interesting, and represents a syn-thesis of the Soviet Union’s appraisal of thepoints of the Vienna conference which, judg-ing from its achievements, was a convinc-ing success of Soviet foreign policy and per-sonally for Comrade L.I Brezhnev. I willsend a congratulatory telegram to ComradeBrezhnev, the text of which will also bepublished in the national press,” Castrostated.

As the discussion continued, Castrotouched upon the events taking place inNicaragua and the results of the latest con-ference of the OAS [Organization of Ameri-can States] in Washington, which he de-scribed as the latest in a serious of cripplingdefeats suffered by American imperialismin the Western hemisphere. In his words,that meeting of the OAS demonstrated withcomplete clarity that today ever more LatinAmerican countries are exhibiting “disobe-dience” to the demands of the United States.He pointed out further that these issues willbe the subject of discussion tomorrow dur-ing his meeting in Havana with the presi-dent of Venezuela [Luis Herrera Campins].“I am certain,” Castro declared, “that theAmericans will not dare to intervene uni-laterally in the affairs of Nicaragua, and thatSomoza will eventually be required toleave.”

2. At his own initiative, Castro raisedthe issue of a member of the Secretariat ofthe Central Committee of the CommunistParty of Cuba, Comrade R. Valdes Vivo,recently removed from his duties, who hadfailed to discharge the functions entrustedto him and was unable to correctly and pre-cisely fulfill his assigned task in a recenttrip to a number of African countries.

“We assigned him a single and essen-tial task - to inform several African leadersthat we would be unable to render militaryassistance to them, and instead Valdes be-came distracted in the disposition of otherproblems which he did not have the author-ity to discuss. And this resulted in damageto our activities, and raised a host of doubtsand false rumors not only among our So-viet friends, but among the Africans aswell,” said Castro. “We discussed the per-formance of Vivo extensively and acknowl-edged all of his past services, but we wereunable to excuse his lack of discipline anddisobedience in the execution of such im-portant and sensitive assignments. This wasthe only correct decision. We have now ap-pointed Jesus Montane Ordonez to the postof Manager of the General Division of In-

ternational Relations, an experienced, testedcomrade, a serious, disciplined, thoughtfuland, at the same time, personable indi-vidual,” Castro explained.

From my part, in accordance with in-structions previously conveyed, I once againassured him that, in Moscow, the activitiesof the Cuban government in Africa are re-garded with complete confidence and that,in connection with the Rhodesian questionand other issues, it is considered that theUSSR and Cuba are acting in conformityand with a unity of purpose.

3. At the conclusion of the discussion,Castro informed me that the sugar harvestwas almost complete but that, apparently,as a result of heavy rains, they would notsucceed in reaping in this harvest theplanned eight million tons of sugar. “Therewill be somewhere around 7.9 million tonsor slightly more,” he noted. Touching onthe matter of the supply of Cuban sugar tothe USSR and the delay already allowed forin that connection, Castro said, “I have dis-cussed this matter with C.R. Rodriguez (whoinformed me about the letter from ComradeI.B. Arkhipov and your conversation withhim), and with other Cuban comrades, andI am aware of your difficulty with the sup-ply of sugar. We are doing everything wecan,” he said, “to stop the interruption andcure the shortfall in the July sugar supply,perhaps to some extent in August, but mostlikely a portion of the supplies (approxi-mately 80 thousand tons) will be delayeduntil December.” In this connection Castroemphasized several times that they will notpermit a similar situation to recur.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSRTO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

/s/ V. VOROTNIKOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 833, ll. 40-42.]

Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Vorotnikov,Memorandum of Conversation with

Raul Castro, 1 September 1979

From the journal of TOP SECRETVorotnikov, V.I. Copy No. 3

Original No. 39313 September 1979

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONwith the second secretary of the CC CP of

Cuba, deputy chairman of the StateCouncil and Council of Ministers,

minister of FAR [Revolutionary ArmedForces] of the Republic of Cuba

Raul Castro


1 September 1979

On September 1 Raul Castro visited theembassy. He anxiously described the ex-tensive Western, primarily American, anti-Cuban media campaign, timed to coincidewith the VIth conference of the heads ofstates and governments of non-alignedcountries. The theme of the increased So-viet military presence in Cuba and the sta-tioning there of ground troops was particu-larly exaggerated. What is being referredto specifically is an infantry brigade num-bering 3,000 soldiers. In recent days Ameri-can officials have supported this campaign.R. Castro noted the statement by the StateDepartment spokesman Hodding Carter inwhich he dwelled on the supposedly “recentdiscovery of Soviet combat units in Cuba,”and demands by Senators Stone and Churchto conduct an investigation into the ques-tion of the Soviet military presence on theisland. Furthermore, R. Castro recountedthat on September 1 Wayne Smith, the newhead of the USA Interest Section in Havanavisited the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs. In his conversation with the deputyminister of foreign affairs of Cuba,P[elegrin]. Torras, he stated that he was au-thorized to convey the Americangovernment’s “concern” about the “evi-dence” of the presence in Cuba of a brigadeof Soviet troops. P. Torras replied that theCuban side would not accept this line ofquestioning and that American diplomats arefully aware - although the USA fails to un-derstand it - that Cuba is a sovereign stateand should be addressed as such, or else itwill be impossible to achieve mutual under-standing between the two countries. W.Smith hastened to explain that he receivedinstructions only to communicate “concern”and did not require an answer to his state-ment. He added that the State Departmentconsidered it inappropriate to react to thestatements by Senators Stone and [IdahoDem. Frank] Church through bilateral dip-lomatic channels, without recourse to pub-lic debate. The American diplomat also ex-pressed his regret that his first meeting withP. Torras took place on this unpleasant oc-casion.

In connection with these actions by theUSA and considering that this questioncould emerge at any moment at the Confer-ence of the NAM [non-aligned movement],F. Castro authorized R. Castro to come toan agreement with the Soviet side on a pos-sible reply. The Cuban leaders proposed thefollowing reply: “For the past 17 years asymbolic Soviet combat unit, created as atraining center where Soviet military spe-cialists train officers of the FAR [Revolu-

tionary Armed Forces] to use and maintainnew military equipment, has indeed been lo-cated in Cuba.” R. Castro emphasized thatthey proposed this version out of principledconvictions and experience with previousconfrontations with Americans regarding theSoviet military presence on the island, andconsider that we should not camouflage thereal state of affairs but, at the same time,should not make a concession to the Ameri-cans, who could easily interpret attempts tonegate the presence of a training center onCuba as a repudiation by Cuba and theUSSR of their right to create such a centerand send necessary military personnel there.R. Castro added that the Americans haveknown about this brigade for a long timeand that he was struck by the cynicism withwhich they affirm that it was “recently” de-tected. He also noted that they had no doubtsthat the VI conference of the NAM in Ha-vana was one of the domestic and foreignpolicy reasons for the outbreak of the anti-Cuban campaign.

He further described the proceedingsof the meeting of the foreign affairs minis-ters of the countries of the NAM. On Sep-tember 1, by the end of the session, theagenda for the Conference of heads of statesand governments was practically approved.The inclusion on the agenda of the problemof Western Sahara was the only point onwhich there was serious discussion. Therepresentative from Morocco spoke againstthe inclusion of this topic on the agendabecause he contended that this was a colo-nial issue, which had been decided underthe auspices of the UN a long time ago, andin consequence of which an agreement withSpain et al. had been signed. Some coun-tries supported him, however, they were inthe minority; of the 31 delegations speak-ing out on this topic, only four urged thatWestern Sahara not be included on theagenda for the summit conference.

R. Castro considered the dinner givenby F. Castro in honor of [Yugoslav leader]J.B. Tito on August 30 to be strictly a for-mality. The negotiations which took placebetween F. Castro and J.B. Tito on the nextday, however, were useful in his view. TheNon-Aligned Movement was unable toachieve mutual understanding on many is-sues, and on the issue of Kampuchea eachleader merely stated his point of view. Atthe same time J.B. Tito’s effort to avoid openconfrontation with Cuba and other socialistcountries was noticeable and the generaltenor of the discussion was rather calm. Ina private conversation with F. Castro, theYugoslav leader tried to convince him thatYugoslavia’s policies could not be consid-ered anti-Soviet at all, and, in particular,

stated that he did not allow anti-Soviet booksto be published in Yugoslavia, assuming heknew of their content in advance.

R. Castro also said that J. Tito’s entou-rage, particularly, [Yugoslav Foreign Min-ister Milos] Minic, was noticeably more“cocky” in his approach to Cuba and theUSSR, than he (Tito) himself. During thenegotiations Minic tried to outdo Tito andgive his own answer or make his own at-tempt to interpret Tito’s words. Thus, forexample, Tito agreed to publish a jointYugoslav-Cuban communique in the press,but then Minic started saying that this wouldbe difficult to accomplish, and as a result itwas never drafted.

J. Tito also meet with [Ethiopianleader] H. Mengistu. The latter openlyposed a whole series of questions aboutYugoslavia’s policy towards the NAM; how-ever, Tito evaded direct answers to them andtalked his way around them with generalarguments and appeals to maintain the unityof the Movement.

It still remains undecided whether ornot J.B. Tito will speak at the opening cer-emony of the Conference of heads of statesand governments or during the working ses-sion. Yugoslavia claims that, since he is theonly founder of the Movement who is stillliving, he should speak at the opening of theConference. However, irrespective of howthis will be decided, J. Tito will speak inany case, in all likelihood after F. Castro.

During the visit of the Minister of De-fense of Nicaragua to the USSR, R. Castroemphasized again that improving militarycooperation is not an issue, and that theyonly intend to influence BernardinoL[arios]. Montiel on political and educa-tional issues. R. Castro related that at onetime F. Castro had advised the Sandinistasto appoint one of the former Somoza offic-ers who went over to the revolutionary sideas minister of defense. The front’s leader-ship selected B.L. Montiel who gives theimpression of an honest and candid indi-vidual, but who does not have any fixedpolitical positions. He is mostly “for show”;the army is being built without his knowl-edge and all real power in this area belongsto the commander-in-chief of the people’sSandinista army, Humberto Ortega. B.L.Montiel senses this and tried to send in hisresignation. To prevent his resignation andgive him the appearance of authority, theleaders of the FSLN (Sandinista NationalLiberation Front) organized a trip to Cubafor the minister and asked for the coopera-tion of the Cubans in the organization of tripsfor B.L. Montiel to other countries. The firstreaction of the Cuban friends was that itwould not be appropriate for him to travel


either to the GDR or to the USSR. Theysaid this to H. Ortega. He answered that heshares their fears, but explained Montiel cur-rent situation and said that he was alreadypromised trips to Cuba, Arab states, andEurope, and once again affirmed that whatwas proposed was only an unofficial, pri-vate, exclusively “informational” visit. Af-ter this second request by H. Ortega, con-sidering that they themselves suggested tothe Sandinistas that they make the formerSomoza officer defense minister, the Cubanleaders decided to turn to the Soviet side onthis matter.

R. Castro also commented that theNicaraguan foreign minister, MiguelD’Escoto, who was also in Cuba, was aformer Jesuit priest, but apparently one of asmall number of “red priests” in LatinAmerica. He is educated and has a grasp ofmany issues, but his political views cannotbe called clear and well-founded. However,he has conducted himself very well at thesession of the OAS on Nicaragua and nowat the conference of ministers of foreign af-fairs of the NAM in Havana. His appoint-ment to the position of minister of foreignaffairs of the FSLN also followed the ad-vice of F. Castro to include several priestsin the government. The minister of cultureis a second priest in the government.

I thanked R. Castro for the informa-tion he conveyed.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

(V. Vorotnikov)

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 833, ll. 63-67; trans. by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

Minutes of CPSU CC PolitburoMeeting, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)

Top SecretOnly copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO

27 September 1979

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kosygin,A.N., Suslov,M.A., Ustinov, D.F.,Chernenko, K.Y., Demichev, P.N.,Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S.,Tikhonov, N.A.,Gorbachev, M.S., Dolgikh,V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Kapitonov, I.V.,Rusakov, K.V.

[. . .] 5. About a response to the President of

the USA regarding the issue of the Sovietmilitary personnel in Cuba

BREZHNEV. Last night Carter onceagain appealed to us via the hot line regard-ing the issue of the story they have dreamedup about the presence of our military bri-gade in Cuba. There is nothing new in themessage. We informed Com. Gromyko,who is conducting negotiations with Vance,about that.

Today com. Gromyko sent a roughdraft of a response to that telegram.

I think that we must assign the samecommission to urgently and attentively re-view, and if necessary, rework this draft,after which, as Com. Gromyko suggests,having agreed with Fidel, we will send ourresponse to Washington, to Carter.

The comrades are familiar, evidently,with the draft. The telegram was distrib-uted.

KOSYGIN. I agree with the draft re-sponse, but with a minor editorial correc-tion. I would strike three [sic—trans.]words: “...and to be ruled by cold reason.”

BREZHNEV. Comrades Aleksandrov,A.M. and Ponomarev, B.N. also have cor-rections.

ALEKSANDROV. I would like tosuggest beginning the text of the letter withthe following: “First of all, I must openlytell you, Mr. President, that we are extremelysurprised by the openly hostile to the So-viet Union campaign which has beenlaunched in the USA with the active par-ticipation of the Administration, for whichthe United States has absolutely no real rea-sons and no legal basis. It seems to us thatthe only result of the swelling of this artifi-cially created campaign can be a real loss tothe relations between our countries and tothe stability of the peace, the importance ofwhich we discussed in Vienna.”

BREZHNEV. Com. Ponomarev, B.N.also supports this proposal.

If the comrades have no other remarks,then let us approve the text of this letter tak-ing into account the proposed correctionsand send it for agreement with Com. Castro.And if no remarks arrive from Com. Castro,then it follows that we should send the let-ter to Carter via the hot line.

RUSAKOV. Perhaps it is necessary toassign the MFA to prepare a text of infor-mation on this issue for the leadership ofthe brother parties of the socialist countries,with the exception of Romania.

BREZHNEV. If there are no more re-marks, let us accept such a resolution.

ALL. We are agreed.

[Source: APRF, f. 3. op. 120, d. 42, ll. 335,

339-40; translation by Mark Doctoroff.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 27September 1979, with Brezhnev-Carter

Hotline Correspondence

Proletariats of all countries, unite!Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEETOP SECRET

No.P169/V

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko,Suslov, Ustinov,Ponomarev, Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 169 of CC CPSUPolitburo session of 27 September 1979

About a response to the President of theUSA regarding the issue of the Soviet mili-tary personnel in Cuba

1. Approve the draft of Com.Brezhnev, L.I.’s response to the Presidentof the USA J. Carter on the given issue (at-tachment 1). Send this response after coor-dinating it with Com. F. Castro. Transmitthe response via the direct line Moscow-Washington.

2. Affirm the draft instructions to theSoviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment2).

3. Assign the MFA USSR and the[General] Department CC CPSU to preparea draft of information for the leadership ofthe fraternal parties of the Socialist coun-tries (except Romania) taking into accountCom. Gromyko’s conversations with C.Vance in New York and in accord with theexchange of opinions which has taken placein the Politburo, and submit it to the CCCPSU.

CC CPSU SECRETARY15-ke ob

[attachment 1]

Re: Point V, Prot. No. 169Top Secret

Attachment 1

Dear Mr. President,

My colleagues and I have familiarizedourselves with your appeal.

First of all, I must openly tell you, Mr.President, that we are extremely surprised


by the openly hostile to the Soviet Unioncampaign which has been launched in theUSA with the active participation of theAdministration, for which the United Stateshas absolutely no real reasons and no legalbasis. It seems to us that the only result ofthe swelling of this artificially created cam-paign can turn out to be a real loss to therelations between our countries and to thestability of the peace, the importance ofwhich we discussed in Vienna. We are sorrythat despite it all you maintain the made upversion of the Soviet military unit which issupposedly located in Cuba.

My advice to you: drop this version.We have a military training center in Cuba,which has existed there for more than 17years. It carries out its training functions inaccord with an agreement with the Cubangovernment. It does nothing more and cando nothing more. You can be entirely calmabout that. In a conversation with A.A.Gromyko, Secretary of State C. Vance, him-self, also remarked that the Soviet Union haddone nothing which contradicts the 1962agreement, and the Soviet military person-nel which is stationed on Cuba does notpresent any sort of threat to the UnitedStates.

(I repeat, there is a military trainingcenter in Cuba; it will exist. We do not haveany intention of changing its status as sucha center. We are informing you of this inorder to show good will, since this entireissue relates entirely and exclusively to thecompetence of two sovereign states — theSoviet Union and Cuba.)

[Along the margins of the above para-graph the following is written: “Conditional,taking into account the possible opinions ofF. Castro.”]

But if that which is going on now inthe United States around this issue is an at-tempt which is motivated by some otherconsiderations, then we can only express ourregret about that.

It seems to us that any sort of otherthoughts should recede before the signifi-cance of the Soviet-American relations, inwhich now the important place is occupiedthe Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Arms(SALT-2).

Let us, Mr. President, proceed from theresults of the exchange of opinions on thekey issues of Soviet-American relations andproblems of world politics which we had inVienna and which I value highly.

In general, Mr. President, I wanted totell you one thing: it makes sense to removethis artificially contrived issue without spoil-ing the atmosphere, showing restraint andconsideration.

I think that such an approach would

correspond to our mutual interests.

With respect.L. BREZHNEV

27 September 1979

[attachment 2]

Top Secret

HIGH STATE MATTER

01USSR/USA251448E-P.1-

Dear Mr. President,

I am sending this message, sincerelyhoping that you and your colleagues willfavorably regard the constructive proposalsaimed at resolving the new problem whichhas arisen in the relations between us, whichSecretary Vance made to Minister Gromyko.The presence in Cuba of a brigade of Soviettroops, which we consider to be combattroops, causes deep and serious concern anthe part of the American government andAmerican society. This concern was notcaused artificially. The quickest possibleresolution of this problem by mutual agree-ment will prevent the unfavorable develop-ment of our mutual relations and will allowboth our countries to continue the course to-ward which we are striving—to broaden thebounds of American-Soviet cooperation.

Mr. President, both you and I haveworked intensively— you longer than I—to achieve an agreement on SALT-2. Itwould be a tragedy for our countries if thiswork for peace would be today threatenedas a result of the fact that both our govern-ments could not resolve the problem whichhas caused on one side a feeling of deepconcern.

On parting in Vienna, we agreed toopenly inform each other when necessary,and I am writing to you specifically in thespirit of that openness and our common ad-herence to the establishment of more stablemutual relations.

Sincerely,Jimmy Carter

His Excellency James E. CarterPresident of the United States of America

The White House, Washington

LINES OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION,KREMLIN COMMITTEE of STATE SE-CURITY OF THE USSR

TRANSLATIONCopy of Issue No. 93/2 of No 1

25 September 1979

ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENTCOMMUNICATIONS TRANSLATEDPagesSpecial Center for Lines of Direct Commu-nication in the Kremlin6:25 P.M.2Telephone numbers: PATS 44-82TRANSLATOR [illegible]

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 89, d. 69, ll. 128-30134-45; translation by M. Doctoroff.]

Conversation between Soviet Ambassa-dor to Cuba A.S. Seletskii and JoseAntonio Arbesu, Head of the USA

sector of the Cuban Communist PartyCentral Committee, 27 December 1979

FROM THE JOURNAL SECRETOF SELETSKII A.S. Copy No. 3

Issue No. 2 “03” January 1980

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONwith the head of the U.S. sector

of the Americas Department of the CC ofthe Communist Party of Cuba Jose

Antonio Arbesu

27 December 1979

In the conversation at the CC of theCommunist Party of Cuba J.A. Arbesu pre-sented some considerations concerning cur-rent Cuban-American relations.

The USA policy in the question of nor-malization of relations with Cuba is deter-mined by two main factors: their military-strategic interests, and the domestic situa-tion, said Arbesu. At the same time, fromthe military-strategic point of view, there aretwo policy lines in the USA leadership now:the line of the National Security Council,and the line of the State Department. Thus,Brzezinski thinks that Cuba, “as a result ofits economic dependence on the SovietUnion,” does not have its own foreignpolicy, that it is a “Soviet satellite”, and thattherefore, there is no sense in talking toCuba. All the questions concerning, for ex-ample, the Cuban actions in Africa or inCentral America should be discussed withthe Soviet Union so that it would “put theneeded pressure on Cuba.”

The USA State Department takes a dif-ferent approach in relation to Cuba. Theybelieve that in spite of all those things, thequestions concerning Cuba should be dis-cussed with Cuba itself, not with the USSR.


In the last several months Brzezinskiline took over in the American leadership,said Arbesu; and that had a negative effectnot only on USA-Cuban relations but alsoon their policy to Latin America in general.The USA instigated the well-known“microcrisis” concerning the presence of theSoviet military training center in Cuba, re-newed reconnaissance flights over our ter-ritory, conducted provocative maneuvers ontheir base at Guantanamo and naval exer-cises near our coasts. All this led to the situ-ation where now we have reached “the low-est point in our relations with the USA sinceCarter became President in 1977,” men-tioned Arbesu.

At the same time the State Departmentdoes not want to close the door completely,and has shown an interest in maintaining ourcontacts. American congressmen, business-men, university professors continue to visitCuba, though in smaller numbers, and ourcultural and sports contacts continue. TheState Department, mentioned my interlocu-tor, agreed to conclude an agreement be-tween the coast guards of our two countries,and allowed our aircraft to fly to the USA,mostly to transport members of the Cubancommunity for visits with their relatives inCuba. The Americans were supposed toratify the agreement on fishing before theend of this year. However, since the USACongress is currently in recess, the agree-ment would probably be approved by theUSA government with the subsequent rati-fication by the Senate.

The “gestures” made by the Americanside toward Cuba earlier remain in force,said Arbesu. Thus, our Interest Section inWashington was allowed to have accountsin American banks, which is necessary forits normal functioning, and to transfer theconsular fees to Havana. Cuban citizens re-siding in the United States still have a rightto transfer $500 to their relatives in Cubaevery three months. American tourists areallowed to bring Cuban goods valued up to$250 into the United States. We consider allthis, reiterated Arbesu, as a sign of the StateDepartment’s desire to maintain a certain,although minimal, level of relations as abasis for their future improvement when thecircumstances become more favorable.

Arbesu pointed out that since Decem-ber 1978 the American side no longershowed the initiative to conduct “closedmeetings” with the Cubans, during whichin the past they exchanged opinions on abroad spectrum of international, especiallyAfrican and Latin American, problems. Itis apparent, said Arbesu, that the Carter ad-ministration is now more than convincedthat we would not make any concessions in

the principled issues of our policy in Africaand in other regions of the globe, especiallyin the circumstances when the economicblockade of Cuba is being maintained in itsfullest form. However, Arbesu mentioned,the Americans show some interest in a dia-logue with our Interest Section in Washing-ton, though it has a certain situational char-acter. For example, when the “microcrisis”concerning the presence of the Soviet mili-tary specialists in Cuba came up, they dis-cussed it with our representatives at the In-terest Section.

The American side also tried to putpressure on us in the question of Nicaragua,said Arbesu. However, they did not makeany official statements in that regard. Be-sides, it is not in Carter’s interest to raisethis issue because his political opponentscould exploit it. If Carter claims that Cubainterferes in Nicaraguan affairs, it wouldgive a reason for his opponents to blame himfor not giving the necessary support toSomoza; and this is not in his interest.

Arbesu said that the question of liftingthe American economic blockage of Cubaremains frozen, and is not on the agendanow. He mentioned that it might be reason-able to expect that when the USA Congressgathers in session, it would make a decisiongranting us licenses for purchase of somepharmaceutical products and drugs in theUSA. Therefore, now we can speak aboutonly a partial lifting of the economic block-ade, emphasized my interlocutor.

Arbesu said that as far as he knew, theAmericans did not in any form raise thequestion of Cuba joining the Treaty ofTlatelolco [in which Latin American coun-tries agreed to make the region a nuclear-free zone], or the Non-proliferation Treaty.Besides, he said, the USA is well informedabout our position in those questions.

No doubt, said Arbesu, the beginningelectoral campaign in the USA will havemore and more influence on their policytoward us. The recent “microcrisis” couldbe explained by Carter’s desire to show him-self as a “strongman,” who can be “tough”when USA interests are at stake. He wantedto remove the accusations presented by hisopponents who blame him for his “weak-ness.”

Besides, mentioned Arbesu, we believethat the so-called “expansionism” will beone of the themes of this electoral campaignin the USA. It will mean primarily the So-viet Union, and its actions in Africa, for ex-ample, and it will certainly touch upon usas well.

The electoral campaign which has be-gun in the USA also led many Senators andCongressmen, who always stood for im-

proving relations with Cuba, not to speakabout it publicly. Senator G. McGovern hasto exercise caution now because the state inwhich he will run for reelection [South Da-kota] is well known for its conservative elec-torate. The same could be said about Sena-tor Church [of Idaho]. Other “young Sena-tors [Representatives],” like, for example,F. Richmond, and R. Nolan, even thoughthey are not up for re-election this time, pre-fer not to mention the question of normal-ization of relations with Cuba now.

In regards to who the winner will be,said Arbesu, in our opinion it is still too earlyto make predictions. For example, we do notexclude the possibility of J. Carter winningthe election. At the same time, E. Kennedywould be able to ensure more governorshipsand seats in Congress for Democrats. Weshould not discount the possibility of thevictory of the former CIA Director G. Busheither.

Regarding the Republicans, mentionedArbesu, governor Reagan has more chancesfor success than [John] Connally.

In a nutshell, said Arbesu in conclu-sion, we believe that until the elections anda new President is in the White House, evenif that is J. Carter again, we should not ex-pect any significant steps for improving re-lations with Cuba from the American ad-ministration. After the elections a lot willdepend on the evolution of the internationalsituation in general. For example, on howthe events unfold in Iran and in CentralAmerica. For the USA now Iran representsone of the main problems.

ADVISER AT THE EMBASSY OF THEUSSR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

/s/ A. SELETSKII

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 642, ll. 18-21; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

Transcript of Conversation betweenCuban Premier Fidel Castro and East

German leader Erich Honecker,Havana, 25 May 1980 (excerpt)

(uncorrected)

Minutes ofthe official talks between the SecretaryGeneral of the SED Central Committee

and chairman of the State Council,Comrade Erich Honecker and the First

Secretary of the Central Committee of theCuban Communist Party, the chairman of

the State Council and the Council ofMinisters of the Republic of Cuba, FidelCastro Ruz at the Palace of Revolution in


Havana

Wednesday, 28 May 1980(Beginning: 9:45 a.m.)

Fidel Castro: Dear Comrade ErichHonecker! Dear German comrades!

Your visit, dear Comrade Honecker,has long been on our agenda, long before itcame to the problems of the recent past, longbefore the military maneuvers [scheduled bythe U.S. at its Guantanamo Bay naval basefor May, but cancelled--ed.]. But now it hasa special meaning that your visit is takingplace right now, at a time of increased ac-tivity of the USA and the other enemies ofour revolution.

Hostility and aggression, of course, didnot come all of a sudden, but there are rea-sons for this: the liberty of Ethiopia, eventsin Nicaragua, the situation in CentralAmerica; then there was the conference ofthe nonaligned countries [in Havana in Sep-tember 1979], and agression gradually in-creases in this whole situation. During theconference of the nonaligned countries, theywere very angry and started a maliciouscampaign. At that time, they discussed theissue of the Soviet brigade, exactly at thetime of the conference of the nonalignedcountries. We corresponded with the Sovietcomrades regarding this issue. We took theview that this should be called a brigade.But when we explained all that to the So-viet Union, it was called a study center. Ofcourse, the Soviet comrades did not want toaggravate the international situation anyfurther, and since SALT II still had to bediscussed in the Senate, there was no otheroption than calling it a “study center.” Thus,the brigade was called study center no. 12.Once this had been said, we had to stick tothat term.

I have expressed this in a special wayon the USA-TV and in the USA-press: whatyou call a brigade and we call a study cen-ter is something that we have had for 17years now.

This unit came here after the October[1962] Crisis. Actually, we strongly resisteda total withdrawal of troops. Finally, wemanaged to have one brigade stay with us,and for 17 years, this brigade has been here.These troops were not included in the agree-ments following the October Crisis. The Oc-tober Crisis affected the missiles, the bomb-ers, and the nuclear weapons, but not thetroops. When the brigade stayed with us, noagreements were concluded.

In any event, we always would haveliked to see these troops called a brigade forone reason: we must not relinquish our rightto have Soviet brigades here. We did not

relinquish that right. If we call this a studycenter for moral reasons, then we relinquishthe right to have a brigade. At the May 1demonstrations, I said that we have got studycenter no. 12, but that we would like to havenumbers 13, 14, 15. But the malicious cam-paign started with that brigade. All USApresidents knew that we have a brigade here.One can hide a pen, but not an entire bri-gade with tanks, guns, with 2,000 to 3,000men. Everyone knows this. The CIA triesto find out whether the soldiers have a brideor not. They want to know everything. Theyknew about the presence of this brigade, andfor 15 years, they treated this as a secret,the issue has never been discussed.

When the October Crisis started theywere not bothered by the fact that we had abrigade here. No president has raised thisissue, neither Kennedy nor Johnson, neitherNixon nor Ford. But now, the current presi-dent does.

The Americans themselves believe thatthe president has made a mistake to discussthis question just at the same time when theSenate was supposed to discuss SALT II andthe conference of the nonaligned countrieswas taking place, with the intention, ofcourse, of bringing Cuba into a difficult le-gal situation, to portray it as a country witha Soviet military base, because they took upthe issue and produced a big scandal, a verybig scandal. This caused damage to SALTII and led to a tense climate, the pretext tocreate an operational military command nearCuba. In reality, it is an intervention forcethat they have created just after this prob-lem. It is also possible that Carter thoughtthat, under such strong pressure, the Sovietcomrades would be forced to withdraw thesetroops. That’s what they thought. PerhapsCarter hoped to achieve a political success.

The Soviet comrades made it clearright from the beginning that they are notwilling to discuss the issue, that these troopswould not be withdrawn. In the end, it wasa disaster for Carter. But this was part of theescalation of threats.

Then, there were the spy planes overCuban territory. The most recent event wasthe organization of a naval exercise, includ-ing a landing in Guantanamo military base.Actually, they have taken a step back be-cause of the great mobilization of themasses. We announced to organize massrallies all over the country. The issue ofMariel existed before. We already had or-ganized the April 19 mass rallies and afterthat, they took a step back. They canceledthe landing exercise in the military base, andeven signaled that they were ready to nego-tiate a suspension of the Mariel exercise.

That was on April 29, about 48 hours

before May 1. Once they had said that, Ithought they were ready to suspend the ex-ercise. I told my comrades they might ex-plain that we were going to respond on May1 or 2. Yet on April 30, at night, during thefirst hours of May 1, before the mass rallywe organized against the military exercise,at this point they proclaimed the suspensionof the exercise. The very same day! This isthe first time that they set up something likethis on such a big scale, and they have sus-pended it without any conditions. The planeshaven’t been flying over our country forseveral weeks. Mariel and the issue of theUSA interests section here is giving them abig headache now. There are 380 counter-revolutionaries. This is the situation. Theywant to negotiate. But what they are inter-ested in is to resolve these two issues.

We are saying that this has to be dis-cussed globally. And just at that time Com-rade Honecker’s visit takes place, and there-fore it is of great importance for us.

The Mexican government, too, hasadopted a friendly attitude towards us. Re-cently, the Mexican president announcedthat he would visit Cuba, too. [Jose] Lopez-Portillo is going to visit our country on July28. He announced the visit almost threemonths in advance, in the midst of this tensesituation. Clearly, this has political impli-cations.

The Mexican press also behaved well.And Mexico’s attitude in general was a posi-tive one. When Lopez-Portillo visits us, wewill give him a great reception. We willchoose roughly the same route that you havetaken. Usually, we don’t take choose a longroute but a much shorter one. It is an ex-ception that we chose such a long route. Ithink the last visit for which we organizedsuch a big trip was [Algerian leader Houari]Boumediene’s; we also did it for Brezhnev.

Moreover, the state security is veryworried during such big visits. Lots ofpeople have to be deployed because there isalways a potential risk. I suppose this is thesame in the GDR as it is here in Cuba. Weare located in immediate proximity to theUSA, and it is always possible that some-one will infiltrate. Hence, such a trip is al-ways potentially dangerous.

This is the time at which you have ar-rived, Comrade Honecker, this is why thisvisit is of special importance for us, and wefeel very honored. I am convinced that thisvisit will contribute to the future develop-ment of the relations of the two countries.The people are very excited about this visitand there is great satisfaction with it.

Erich Honecker:Comrade Fidel, please let me convey


the warmest salutes [die herzlichenKampfesgruesse] from the CC of the Ger-man Socialist Unity Party, the State Coun-cil, the Council of Ministers, and the peopleof the German Democratic Republic to you,the members of your delegation, and theparty and state leadership.

We are very pleased to have the op-portunity to visit revolutionary Cuba, theAmerican island of liberty, at the presenttime because we know - as you have alreadypointed out - that this visit has special im-portance. First, this visit takes place at a timewhen the USA apparently is trying to in-crease tensions at the international level. Inthis context, it goes without saying that themeasures the USA has taken against Cubain the Caribbean are of particular impor-tance. It is obvious that this USA exercisehas been drawn up according to a long-termplan. It has become clear that detente, whichhas its primary basis in Europe, does theimperialist circles no good.

In the meantime, the Americans notonly have been kicked out of Vietnam, butthe Vietnamese also managed to counterChina’s aggression. In addition, the Ameri-cans had to leave Iran because of the Ira-nian people’s revolution. Of course, this anuncomfortable matter for the USA’s politi-cal elites; since the stake is not only the oil,which does not belong to the American im-perialists, but also an outpost at the south-ern border of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, there were the events wecould witness on our trips through Africa,such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique,Ethiopia, South Yemen. We had meetingswith the South African national liberationmovement, with SWAPO [the SouthwestAfrican People’s Organization], with theANC [African National Congress], and alsowith the Organization for African Unity inAddis Ababa. The OAU Secretary General,[Edem] Kodjo - in presence of all Africanambassadors - presented me a copy of theOAU charter and gave a speech of anti-im-perialist, anti-colonialist, and anti-racistcharacter. He expressed strong solidaritywith the socialist German Democratic Re-public and thanked us. It became clear thatAfrica - and not only the socialist countries- is heading off for new shores, which arenot those of imperialism.

The scheme of Camp David, whichbasically did not solve any problem concern-ing the Middle East, was declared doomedto failure. Except for Egypt, all countries -including Saudi Arabia - are against theCamp David agreement. The resolution ofthe Near East conflict is dashed by Israel’simperialist stance, which is strongly backedby USA monopolies.

The situation in the Caribbean has tobe seen in this context. The USA, albeit veryreluctantly, would have tolerated Cuba,since they understand that because of thethen-concluded agreement, the Soviet Unionstands behind Cuba. They know that thewhole socialist community stands behindCuba, that behind the slogan “Hands offCuba!” stands the power of socialism.

Through the powerful manifestation ofrevolutionary Cuba within the last coupleof weeks, the mobilization of the Cubanpeople, they felt that the revolutionary re-gime and the government of Cuba led byFidel Castro are very solid.

I completely agree with Fidel Castro:they feel that Cuba is not alone, that it isvirtually the lighthouse of socialism inAmerica, that it provides a stimulus for theanti-imperialist revolution in Latin America.They had to swallow the fact that Cuba isrevolutionary, but Nicaragua came as a greatsurprise to them. As we all know, events inNicaragua did not fall out of the blue, andthey felt that the Nicaraguan revolutionar-ies had the moral and material support ofCuba. Add to this the events in El Salvador.

The USA imperialists have a stronginterest that all is quiet in their “backyard.”But there is a new revolutionary wave inLatin America. As Comrade Fidel rightlypointed out: Kennedy kept quiet about theso-called Soviet brigade, as did Johnson,Nixon, and Ford. In the beginning, Carterdid not feel like broadcasting it. However,we have seen that there are powerful ele-ments within USA imperialism that don’tlike detente at all. They reached the conclu-sion that cooperation with the Soviet Unionbenefits the socialist movement in Europeand Asia and the national liberation move-ments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.For a long time, they have been preparing ablow against the policy of detente, in orderto go over to a policy of confrontation

It is not yet clear whether they will takethe crucial step, that is, the step from con-frontation to war; because a military attackon Cuba means world war, as does a mili-tary attack on the GDR. They know that theSoviet Union, after the forced Americanwithdrawal from Iran, did not permit themto compensate through the occupation of Af-ghanistan or the strengthening of USA in-fluence there. Thus a situation was createdthat is reflected by various actions and inthe development that Comrade Fidel Castrohas pointed out.

The US-Americans aim at increasingtensions on the international level. Certainelements have an interest to dramatize thesituation, to make it seem as if the outbreakof World War III is imminent. We have seen

that they can’t ignore the power of the So-viet Union and its allies. For the first timeever, war would be carried to directly to theUSA. In the past, the USA has always sentmerely an expeditionary corps across theOcean when the war was almost over. Nowthey must reckon that a war with nuclearweapons also affects the USA.

The big fuss they make about Afghani-stan is of the same nature as the inventionof the Soviet brigade in Cuba just at the timeof the conference of the nonaligned coun-tries [and] the ratification of SALT II. For along time, the most aggressive circles withinthe USA have been preparing their strikeagainst the policy of detente, against peace,because they want to tip the global balanceof power in their favor. They want to coun-teract the further strengthening of Real So-cialism, the development of national libera-tion movements in Africa and LatinAmerica, the development of communistand workers’ parties within the capitalistcountries, and their mass impact in thestruggle against the attempts of the bour-geoisie to pass on the burden of crisis to theworking people.

In fact, this can be discerned directlyfrom recent political events. They are knownto Comrade Fidel and the other comrades.Recently, at the session of the Political Ad-visory Commitee of the Warsaw Pact coun-tries in the Polish capital, we have exam-ined this situation. On the basis of ComradeBrezhnev’s fundamental speech, his assess-ment of the present and future internationalsituation, the declaration drew concrete con-clusions. You know that declaration. In myspeech in Warsaw, I have pointed out thatthe current attempt to further heighten in-ternational tensions results from the mount-ing crisis within the capitalist countries,which leads some imperialist elements to re-gard war as their last resort. Whether thecountries of Real Socialism and the massesall over the world are going to allow for this,however, is a different question.

We have to note the fact that theVladivostok agreements [of December 1974between Brezhnev and Ford regarding aframework for SALT II] were not kept byCarter. Comrade Fidel already mentionedthat despite prolonged negotiations and thesignatures of Vienna, SALT II has not beenratified by the U.S. Congress and Senate.

Furthermore, we must note that, againstthe will of world public opinion and that ofmany NATO member states, the 1978NATO Council Meeting in Washington hasadopted the NATO long-term program,which envisions yearly increases in militaryexpenditures until 1990. At a time whenwhat matters is adding a military dimension,


i.e. disarmament, to detente, they haveadopted the long-term defense program, inspite of opposing resolutions passed by theUN.

NATO’s [December] 1979 Brusselsmissile deployment decisions [to deploymedium and intermediate range missiles inWest Germany and elsewhere in WesternEurope] are a provocative step. At the sametime when disarmament is on the globalagenda and Carter, at the signing of SALTII in Vienna, talks about the existence of arough balance of military power on the glo-bal level, they raise an outcry over an al-leged Soviet threat and pass this defenseprogram in Brussels.

Basically, the production of newAmerican intermediate nuclear forces andtheir deployment in Western Europe is anattempt to undermine the results of SALTII. They want to offset the fact that Sovietmissiles can reach the USA. This is sup-posed to be achieved through thedepolyment of American intermediate-range(nuclear) missiles having a range beyondMoscow up to the Urals. While it takes 20to 30 minutes for the missiles that are de-ployed in the USA to reach the Soviet Union,they only need 5 minutes when deployed inthe Federal Republic, Belgium, and GreatBritain, except for the so-called wing mis-siles [Fluegelraketen], which would alsoviolate the neutrality of such states as Swe-den.

Hence, this a large scale, long-term at-tempt to tip in favor of American imperial-ism the rough balance of military power thatcurrently exists in the world. This is sup-posed to put pressure on the Soviet Unionand the socialist countries, including Cuba,on countries like Nicaragua, and others, andon the national liberation movement. Theywant to foster anything that leads to an alli-ance of the USA, Japan, China, and, if pos-sible, the FRG, too, against Real Socialismand the national liberation movement. Forus, a very interesting aspect is that Chinasupports the so-called reunification of Ger-many, i.e. the elimination of the GDR.

It is necessary to recognize this situa-tion. On the other hand, the situation cer-tainly is not like the reactionary imperialistcircles would have it. Of course, Real So-cialism is strong enough to defy the USA.It is perfectly possible to shatter the USAimperialism’s attempt to conduct a large-scale offensive against the socialist coun-tries and the national liberation movement.

In this context, we regard socialistCuba, the American island of liberty, as play-ing a very important role. Our country’s citi-zens, the citizens of the Soviet Union, andthose of all socialist countries, see it as a

banner that is waved by the Cuban peopleunder the leadership of its communist partyand that of Fidel Castro.

Likewise, our struggle, too, the GDR’sand the CSFR’s [Czechoslovak SocialistFederal Republic’s] struggle, is a banner forall peace-loving people in the world, sincewe don’t allow imperialism to take any stepagainst our borders. I am mentioning theCSFR because, together with us, it is fight-ing in the front line.

In the aftermath of [the 1975 East-Westaccords at] Helsinki, the West German im-perialists have attempted to build up a fifthcolumn in the German Democratic Repub-lic. To this end, they adressed not only coun-terrevolutionary elements, which, of course,still exist in our country, too, but also thereactionary, the unsteady, and the uncertain.All this took place under the slogan of hu-man rights.

They placed their hopes in the Protes-tant and the Catholic Church, which have8.5 and 2.5 million members, respectively.These churches and their bishops were sup-posed to act in our country as guerillas ofthe West. With the help of the 6,000 West-ern citizens, who, as a result of the interna-tional recognition of the GDR and the en-suing establishment of Western embassies,came to our country, they undertook sub-versive activities. The American, the Fed-eral German, and other embassies estab-lished contacts with our artistic intelligen-tsia in particular. One million copies of aso-called manifesto against the GDR partyand state leadership have been published,allegedly written by leading SED function-aries. Under the slogan of human rights, ithas been tried to set up committees for the“protection of human rights” and the “pro-tection of workers’ rights.”

Various elements have been given theopportunity to use the FRG’s TV and radioto influence the GDR. All around the clock,24 hours a day, 35 FRG radio stations arebroadcasting political commentaries. Thethree Western TV channels were also usedfor interviews with certain authors and otherGDR people, which were conducted “on be-half of the SED against the SED leadership.”On behalf of socialism in the GDR, theyspoke out against the SED’s alleged dog-matism. They disguised themselves as so-cialists, but all their efforts were in vain.

In May of last year, our republic heldmunicipal elections. There were mass ral-lies all over the country, where all issueswere discussed. More than 99 percent of thecitizens voted for the candidates of the na-tional front, despite the fact that the West-ern media had asked the people either notto vote at all or to vote against these candi-

dates.In Berlin, we organized a big rally of

the GDR’s youth. 700,000 FDJ [Free Ger-man Youth] members marched up. This lefteven the Western correspondents flabber-gasted. After all, there are only 1.2 millionpeople living in the capital. 700,000 FDJmembers marched into Berlin and domi-nated the city at the time.

(Fidel Castro: From all over the coun-try?)

Yes, from all over the country.(Fidel Castro: How were they

accomodated?)In tents, in schools, in apartments, or

in other peoples’ homes. This was a big cam-paign. They didn’t have much time to sleep,but they all had a place to stay. Some fami-lies hosted up to 7 teenagers. The familyslept in the kitchen, so that the FDJ mem-bers could sleep in the bed and living-rooms.There was huge attendance. We never hadhad something like this before.

During these four days, the Westernjournalists were not subjected to any restric-tions in their interviews. Moreover, some200,000 people from the Federal Republicand West Berlin came to the capital to dis-cuss with the FDJ members. In any case,none of them managed to report somethingnegative. They were surprised that this youthis different from what they thought.

Along a wide front, we prepared forthe 30th anniversary of the GDR [in Octo-ber 1979]. 250,000 young people marchedin Berlin. Comrades Brezhnev, [Polishleader Edward] Gierek, [Czechoslovakleader Gustav] Husak, [Bulgarian leaderTodor] Zhivkov, [Hungarian leader JanosKadar], [Mongolian leader J.] Zedenbal, andothers were there. In any case, we gave ouradversary such a thrashing that he last allhis interest in continuing his shameless pro-paganda against the GDR with the same fe-rocity as before.

At this time, the Chancellor of theFRG, Helmut Schmidt, requested a meet-ing. This means that while adhering to theirrevanchist attitude towards the GDR, theywere forced to accept that socialism has asolid basis in our country.

Then, at the transition from 1979 to1980, there was the heightening of interna-tional tensions.

(Fidel Castro: One question before wecontinue. In which month did this march-ing up of the 700,000 young people takeplace?)

This was in May 1979, and in Octo-ber, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary,there were 250,000. The demonstration inMay, at Whitsun, was the big response toour adversary’s campaign which claimed


that the GDR youth does not support theregime. Since then, they keep quiet or saythat it has to be admitted that the enthusi-asm was not organized.

Then, dear Comrade Fidel Castro anddear Cuban Comrades, there was the appar-ent heightening of international tensions inlate 1979 / early 1980. We have reacted withgreat level-headedness to this situation. OnJanuary 9 we had a reception for the diplo-matic corps. There, I expressed the GDR’shope that it would be possible to reduce in-ternational tensions because there is no al-ternative to the policy of peaceful coexist-ence. Only the American ambassador didnot attend the reception since our politburoand the Council of Ministers had made astatement in support of the entry of a lim-ited contingent of Soviet troops into Af-ghanistan following the Afghangovernment’s request. A couple of days laterwe had a hare-hunt for the diplomats.

We have continued our policy of so-cialist buildup with great popular support,and I expressed to Chancellor HelmutSchmidt my readiness to meet him for a talkin 1980.

They all were surprised that the GDR,together with the Soviet Union and the othersocialist countries, reacted so calmly toCarter’s confrontational course. Indeed, thecitizens of our republic stand firmly behindthe policy of the party and the government,which is directed against Carter’s confron-tational course and stands up for peacefulcoexistence and international cooperation.We have activated our ministerial exchangewith the FRG, but also with Belgium, theNetherlands, France, and Austria. While onehas to proceed from the assumption that theWestern governments, particularly with re-spect to the boycott of the Olympic Games[in Moscow in summer 1980], will show acertain class solidarity with the USA, theystill hesitate to identify entirely with thehardened policy of the USA administration.

Thus, it came to the meeting [on May19 in Warsaw] between Leonid Brezhnevand Giscard d’Estaing, about which you areprobably informed. Finally, there was thelong delayed meeting [on May 16 in Vienna]between the new Secretary of State in theCarter administration, [Edward S.] Muskie,and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Comrade[Andrei] Gromyko. Today, the GDR news-papers report that on June 30 and July 1 theChancellor of the Federal Republic of Ger-many, Helmut Schmidt, is going to meetwith Comrade Brezhnev in Moscow.

During my stay in Belgrade, on theoccasion of Tito’s funeral [8 May 1980], Ihad talks with several statesmen.

Many expressed the desire to talk to

me. Of course, the first meeting I had waswith Comrade Brezhnev, who, after hishealth cure is back on the world stage in fullhealth. Old comrades-in-arms and friendssat together the night and talked about cur-rent issues. I had meetings with [Indianleader] Indira Gandhi and various other per-sonalities, which I don’t want to go into atthis moment, and with Helmut Schmidt, too.

Two issues were central. The first is-sue was that, because of our commitment tonever again let a war start from German soil,one has to resist the Carter course of con-frontation. We thus discussed the necessityto supplement the political dimension ofdetente with detente in the military field, notto support, but to counteract the unpredict-able policy of Carter.

The second issue was the boycott ofthe Olympics. I said that it is an insult tothe Soviet Union and to Comrade Brezhnevpersonally, if the athletes of the FederalRepublic are prevented from participatingat the Olympic Games in Moscow. Schmidttold me that he is under heavy pressure fromthe USA. Moreover, he said that this wasthe “mildest reaction” to the “invasion,” the“intervention” of the Soviet Union in Af-ghanistan as he put it.

I said: Mr. Schmidt, what you call an“intervention” in Afghanistan is no interven-tion at all. On this issue, we apparently havediffering points of view. You used to bedefense minister and you know exactly thatafter the Americans got kicked out of Iran,they now try to gain a foothold in Afghani-stan—through external aggression, as acompensation for the weakening of theirposition in Iran, so to speak. Hence, theSoviet Union simply had to respond to therequests that Afghanistan already had voicedseveral times before by sending a limitedcontingent of troops to that country. As soonas Afghanistan’s neighbors ensure non-in-terference in Afghan domestic affairs andthe stopping of the external aggression, guar-anteed by the USA, the Soviet Union, per-haps France as well, as soon as the Afghangovernment declares that the Soviet troopcontingents can be withdrawn or reduced,the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistanwill begin. I pointed out that Fidel Castro,as chairman of the nonaligned movement,has made a similar proposal.

Schmidt did not want to see it this way.He told me: Mr. Honecker, have you seenthe maps of the Soviet invasion? I said: Ialso have maps, but this is irrelevant; stop-ping the external aggression is the crucialissue.

Then I had to go to the meeting withComrade [Zambian President Kenneth]Kaunda, and Schmidt asked me: When are

we going to meet in the GDR? I answered:First, go to Moscow to Comrade Brezhnev,then we can meet in the GDR.

That’s how we parted, and we bothfound that this was a useful meeting. Cer-tainly, this meeting has a certain impact onthe situation in Europe, because the FederalRepublic has some influence on its west-ern, northern, and southern allies. Of course,we don’t believe that we are the center ofthe world, the normalization of GDR-FRGrelations, however, certainly is of great im-portance for detente in Europe. It helps torestrain the belligerence of the USA. Afterall, the Federal Republic of Germany is thesecond strongest power within NATO.

The events in the Caribbean, and es-pecially the anti-Cuban campaign of theUSA and the Western media are related tothe heightening of international tensions. Inthis context, our visit, which had beenplanned for a long time, indeed carries greatinternational importance. This view hasbeen expressed yesterday by the “Pravda”and this morning by the “NeuesDeutschland.” They wrote that, especiallyin the present situation, the solidarity withrevolutionary Cuba shown by the SovietUnion and its allies, including the GDR, isof great importance. In the GDR, we havestarted a big solidarity campaign under theslogan: “Hands off Cuba! - Stop the Amerianeconomic embargo against Cuba! - Stop theespionage flights! - Give up the USA mili-tary base in Guantanamo!” I was pleased tohear that the espionage flights are currentlybeing suspended.

Under these conditions, Comrade Fi-del Castro, we renew the fraternal solidar-ity and our comradeship in arms betweenthe GDR and revolutionary Cuba. We areaware that we are fighting in the front line,but we know there are strong reserves inbehind. On this basis, we look with opti-mism into the future and will develop ourbilateral relationship further.

I apologize for having talked so exten-sively about the international situation, butI was prompted by your statements on theseissues.

Fidel Castro:What Comrade Honecker has told us

is very interesting. We have listened withgreat attention. The international situationis of vital importance for us; because itsaggravation means increasing dangers forCuba.

As I have already pointed before, theYankees have been very angry with us forsome time and they toy with the idea of howto get back at us, especially after events inAngola and Ethiopia. In our contacts, they


insisted on a troop withdrawal from Angolaand Ethiopia. We always replied that we arenot on any account going to discuss this is-sue with them. We refused to talk about it.This was one of their most pressing de-mands.

Another demand relates to our solidar-ity with Puerto Rico’s independence; and itis virtually a tradition of the revolution toshow solidarity, to give support, if there is astruggle for the liberation and independenceof Puerto Rico.

This was before the revolution inGrenada, a small country. This has impor-tant implications in the Caribbean, wherethere is instability after the success of revo-lution in Nicaragua [words unintelligible-ed.] the difficulties in Central America.

For some time they have been hopingthat we would make a mistake, so that theycan teach us a lesson, as they put it. Thuswe must act with great caution on all theseissues.

It is not our fault that there are revolu-tions. We are [not] responsible for what hap-pens in El Salvador. This is a phenomenonthat has developed over time. Except for theexample that Cuba gives, and to give anexample is always best, because solidarity,too, plays a big role. These political phe-nomena, however, arise virtually as naturalevents, because the people no longer acceptsuch a situation. When such a revolution-ary situation emerges in these countries, theninevitably this leads to tensions. Thus, withthe revolution, of course, there are tensions.In Afghanistan, too, with the revolution,there were tensions, and the new situationin Iran, the revolution, has produced tensionsin that region. We take an interest in whathappens in the Caribbean, but also whathappens in all other areas of the globe, whathappens in Afghanistan.

Some Yankees, some groups of forceswithin the intelligentsia, are developing theargument, the strategy, that, when a crisisunfolds in one part of the globe, in Iran orAfghanistan, in the Indian Ocean or any-where else in the world, then the USA hasto respond [against] Cuba. They have saidthat quite frankly. If they have some clashwith the Soviet Union in a part of the globewhere the balance of power is unfavorablefor the USA, then they should respond in aplace where the balance of power is favor-able for the USA. Because one should notthink that only a global conflict is possible.A world conflict is the most severe. Thedecisions are of tremendous importance andthey are dramatic ones. However, the realprospects for a conflict, not a general con-flict, but a local one, are much greater.

In this sense, it doesn’t matter to us in

which part of the globe it happens. It willaffect us. This is why the failure of detenteis of special importance to us, of very spe-cial importance. First, because detente elimi-nates the possibility of a global conflict, butat the same time eliminates the possibilityof local conflicts and also the opportunitiesfor repression and attacks on the liberationmovement.

Of course, detente has numerous ad-vantages, particularly if it involves disarma-ment and a lowering of military spending.This is virtually the only way to give theThird World more resources for their devel-opment. This is why the policy of the ColdWar, of arms races, is a catastrophe for allcountries, but particularly for our country,given its geographic position. However [itis a catastrophe for Cuba], not only becauseof this position, but also as a developingcountry, and it is not only political and mili-tary effects, but also economic ones in LatinAmerica. The Cold War can trigger a spe-cial effect. This allows the USA to bettercontrol certain wavering governments andto conduct a policy towards the whole lib-eration movement that suits them. This hurtsthe revolutionary movement all over theworld, but especially in Latin America; be-cause the Yankees believe that LatinAmerica is their back yard. The USA hasan interest in what happens in Asia, whathappens in Europe, in Portugal, and so on,but they have a much stronger interest inwhat happens in Latin America, in the revo-lutionary changes in Latin America. Particu-larly in a Cold War situation, an interven-tion becomes more likely. This is why, forus, the issue of changing the current courseand of finding the way back to detente, ifpossible, is of tremendous importance.

Erich Honecker:There are some new aspects. We got

information about the meeting betweenComrade Brezhnev and Giscard d’Estaing.This meeting came as a complete surpriseto the USA.

Even if one takes into account the ex-istence of a certain class solidarity betweenFrance and USA imperialism, this talk be-tween Comrade Brezhnev and Giscardd’Estaing still suggests that France intendsto pursue a policy independent from theUSA and is not willing to support the hard-ened, Cold War, course of the USA. Giscardd’Estaing explained that France will notsupport the USA’s economic sanctionsagainst the Soviet Union, that its athleteswill go to Moscow, and that France does notwant the FRG to become the leading powerin Western Europe. France, Giscardd’Estaing said, has an interest in the further

existence of a divided Germany as an im-portant element of the European balance ofpower. With respect to the issue of Afghani-stan, France wants a political, but not a mili-tary solution, and this goes for Afghanistanas well as for Iran. By and large, this is auseful element, since it limits the chancesof the USA to revive the Cold War with allits ferocity.

In this context, the conversation thatthe new American Secretary of State,Muskie, had with Comrade Gromyko is in-teresting, too. Muskie presented himself asthe man who wants to be the number one inU.S. foreign policy. He did not mentionBrzezinski’s name, but he said: I am inde-pendent from the President’s entourage. Mr.Gromyko, let us discuss the issue of Af-ghanistan and sort it out.

Comrade Gromyko replied: We sentour limited contingent of troops to Afghani-stan only after there was interference inAfghanistan’s domestic affairs, when therewas the danger that you would get a foot-hold in Afghanistan after you got kicked outof Iran. Comrade Gromyko added, as dis-cussed in Moscow, that Afghanistan is noth-ing but a pretext for the USA to heighteninternational tensions. This means, this wasa result of long-planned steps taken by theUSA.

Comrade Gromyko went on saying:Give up the boycott, so that your athletescan come to the Olympic Games. It is a sym-bol of your attempts to stir up the Cold War.Also, this contradicts your statement, Mr.Muskie, that you want a healthy interna-tional climate. Muskie said this could notbe changed, the President has taken his de-cision. Thereupon, Comrade Gromyko ex-plained that the President already haschanged his mind so many times, perhapshe could do it again in this case. Muskie re-plied that this would not be possible.

In concluding, Muskie said that hewould inform his President. ComradeGromyko could proceed from the assump-tion that he, Muskie, has been Secretary ofState for 20 days while Gromyko has beenin office for 20 years. However, he wouldlike to say that the USA wants a normaliza-tion of the situation between the USA andthe Soviet Union.

No one knows whether this was onlydiplomatic maneuvering or not. The ratifi-cation of SALT II played an important rolein the conversation. According to Muskie,it is not impossible that, after the elections,the situation might change. The conversa-tion has demonstrated that the USA doeswell understand the implications of the ag-gravation of the international situation.

Fidel Castro has pointed out that the


international situation leads to Cold War,also leads to an increased danger of localconflicts, including the Caribbean. On theother hand, the peoples’ revolutionary move-ments have examples in the form of othercountries, as Cuba here in Latin America;but they are objectively determined. If a sub-jective factor is added to that, then suchwelcome events as in Nicaragua take place.Of course, the USA now endeavors to pre-vent a second Nicaragua in El Salvador, andtheir actions in South Korea also demon-strate their determination to defend the sta-tus quo. On the other hand, there are suchevents as those mentioned by Comrade Fi-del Castro, e.g. Grenada in the Caribbean.

As far as the African region is con-cerned, you are under heavy pressure of theUSA because of your military operations inAngola and Ethiopia. But we are sitting inthe same boat, even though we don’t haveany troops there. We only have technicalexperts there. The USA is very curious aboutwhat the GDR does in Africa, be it in Angolaor Ethiopia, in Zambia or Mozambique,Namibia or South Africa. We have a lot ofcadres there who are active in various fields,and we train cadres for them. This is whythe USA is currently tightening its policytowards the GDR. Above all, they bring theirinfluence to bear on the banks in order tohurt us, in order to create economic prob-lems in the GDR.

However, our economy is sound, wehave enough allies. In addition to the So-viet Union and the other socialist countries,there are also imperialist monoplies thatwant to trade with us. For example, we areexpanding our economic relations withFrance, Italy, Scandinavia, and Belgium.After this visit, Comrade Mittag will go toMexico. This year or next, President Portilloplans to visit the GDR.

We have met the Cuban comrades inAngola and Ethiopia. I would like to thankyou, Comrade Castro and the other com-rades for the extensive security measuresthat you have provided; a whole Cubanbatallion in Luanda.

Fidel Castro: Yes, I remember. Weasked our comrades there to provide com-prehensive support for Comrade Honecker’strip.

Erich Honecker: We felt this supporteverywhere, and I would like to thank youon behalf of our delegation and of our re-public as a whole.

Fidel Castro: I believe it was a verygood initiative of the GDR’s party and gov-ernment to send such a delegation to Africa.It supports the liberation movement and isvery beneficial for us. It is very importantto develop the GDR’s cooperation with these

countries, and we are very happy about that.Among the socialist countries in EasternEurope the GDR is the country that paysgreatest attention to Africa. When I talkabout the socialist countries in Eastern Eu-rope, I would like to exclude the SovietUnion. Because for a long time it has madea lot of efforts in this area. I am convincedthat the African countries greatly appreci-ate the cooperation of the Soviet Union andthe GDR. This is important; because if theGDR does not go there, others will go, whohave different intentions, who want to cul-tivate relations in order to moderate devel-opments. I am thinking of the Yugoslavs.They want to exert influence in a sensewhich is not the most positive. This is whythe GDR’s presence helps us a lot to main-tain the most radical positions.

Erich Honecker: The speech you gavebefore our State Council [in April 1977] isstill ringing in our ears. This was after yourtrip to Africa. Since then we have increasedour engagement there.

Fidel Castro: This is very important forall of us, for the whole revolutionary move-ment. The Ethiopian comrades are veryhappy that you want to supply a cement fac-tory. We have promised to help them to putup the cement factory. But the contributionto sustaining the radical spirit in these coun-tries, in Ethiopia, in Angola and Zambia, inMadagascar has to be added to that, and isvery beneficial for us within the frameworkof the nonaligned movement.

The great success of the VIth summitconference [of nonaligned countries in Ha-vana in September 1979] nonwithstanding,the radical countries are in the minority, butwe were able to win them over on the mostimportant issues, and thereby to isolate thecountries with reactionary positions; be-cause there actually were very significantdisagreements at the nonaligned conference.

The situation in Afghanistan has causeda lot of problems for us, particularly withregard to the Third World. We remained inthe absolute minority. The imperialists ex-ploited this issue. At that time, we werefighting for the Security Council, and wegained some 90 votes. Colombia was a ma-jor obstacle for us, they got 50 votes then.We would not have backed off but wouldhave continued the elections, however, be-cause of the events in Afghanistan, we hadto talk to the Mexicans and to give up theidea. It would have been nonsense, manyvotes would have been lost, and this did alot of harm to the nonaligned movement,because the number of progressive, radicalcountries still is very limited. There is amiddle group, though, which can be wonover on some issues.

Of course, the situation has aggravated,for several months already, and also alreadybefore events in Afghanistan. The events inAfghanistan basically are a pretext for car-rying through the boycott and all these mea-sures. This started after the confirmation ofSALT.

You mentioned Carter’s words inVienna; however, when Carter came backto the USA, he gave a speech before Con-gress and used quite sharp words with re-spect to Cuba. In this speech he explainedto the public that he had told Brezhnev thatCuban adventurism in the Caribbean con-stituted an obstacle to detente and peace. Heexpressed fairly wicked intentions towardus, and basically accused us of constitutingan obstacle to detente, an obstacle for therelations between the USA and the SovietUnion.

He basically asked the Soviet Unionto control us. Just at this time, we wanted tohave some contact, because the revolutionin Nicaragua had reached its final phase, andthey wanted to talk to us. We refused to talkto them and, after Carter’s speech beforeCongress, we cancelled a meeting they hadscheduled.

The worst in all of this was the policyof preparing certain armaments. The deci-sion to deploy 570 missiles is a very seriousissue. I agree with you that this deploymentupsets the balance of power. If Europe de-ploys an additional number of missilesagainst the Soviet Union, then this is achange in the correlation of forces. Thereare no missiles close to the USA. We canunderstand this situation very well, becausewe experienced the October Crisis. Whenthe missiles were deployed here, the Yan-kees disagreed, and they almost provoked aworld war precisely because the missiles thatwere deployed in Cuba could have reachedthe USA within a couple of minutes. Thiswould have annulled the entire warning sys-tem and all time calculations. The Yankeesdidn’t agree at all with the installation ofsuch missiles. We had 52 missiles here, butthey are talking about 570 intermediaterange missiles against the Soviet Union, andthe Soviet Union’s long range missiles donot have that range, the USA’s intermediaterange missiles in Europe, however, canreach the Soviet Union; this is a traumaticsituation.

Erich Honecker: Helmut Schmidt toldme at our meeting: Mr. Honecker, we areafraid, this is why we agreed with that mis-sile decision; because the Soviet Union gotthese SS-20 missiles, as you call them, andthey are aimed at us, the Federal Republic.I replied: Mr. Schmidt, if you are afraid ofthe missiles, then you should have been


afraid before the decision, because the mis-siles that can reach you in the Federal Re-public are not at issue here at all. The groupof the Soviet armed forces has got them, andthe NPA [National People’s Army of EastGermany] has got them, too. We can de-stroy Bonn with missiles at any time, or eventhe whole Federal Republic. The missiles,however, that you want to deploy, they aresupposed to reach up to the Urals. The USAthereby achieves superiority over the SovietUnion in terms of missiles. These are theissues at stake and not the Federal Repub-lic.

The USA wants to turn Western Eu-rope into an anti-Soviet missile carrier, andthey want to shift the risk to Western Eu-rope. Thereby, they shift the military bal-ance, and we will not allow that to happen.This means that now we must have defensesystems against missiles that can reach uswithin 5 minutes. This necessitates greatarmaments efforts.

At the VIth conference of the non-aligned countries, you said that armamentsshould be reduced and that a $500 millionfund should be created. However, if now,following the Brussels decision, these mis-siles are built, there will be no detente inthe military field. Then we have to musterall means in order to increase our defenseefforts. We will not allow a military imbal-ance to the disadvantage of the socialistcountries. Your comparison is a very goodone. The USA has made a big fuss about 50missiles at the time of the October crisis.Now they want to want to deploy 570 mis-siles right on the Soviet Union’s doorstep.After the elimination of their Iranian basesand facilities, they now try the same in Af-ghanistan. Moreover, there are their activi-ties in Turkey.

The aggravation of the internationalsituation thus is intertwined with the height-ened crisis in the Caribbean, the USA’s back-yard, so to speak. But the USA is not goingto succeed.

Fidel Castro: I would like to add thefollowing story. In the resolution of the Oc-tober crisis, the USA has pledged to with-draw the missiles from Turkey and Italy.They have done that. In a certain sense, theirplans [to deploy missiles in Western Europe]are illegitimate and violate the October cri-sis agreements. This has not been publicized,but [former Soviet leader Nikita S.]Khruschev has shown me the letters, the let-ters related to the agreements. This was atacit pledge to withdraw the missiles there.They were of a different kind than today’s;however, they, too, could reach the SovietUnion.

Erich Honecker: Then they relocated

the missiles to submarines, to ships. It isknown that exactly at the peak, if you cansay so, of the USA’s plans against Cuba, theSoviet Union has pointed to this agreement.Comrade Gromyko did the same whentalked to Muskie. This is how all this is in-tertwined with each other.

Fidel Castro: I believe Brussels is themost serious step they have taken.

What you said with regard to Muskie,we think that he has certain ideas. Somepolitical circles in the USA take the viewthat to chose Muskie for that function was asmart move; because what one got to knowabout Muskie was that he is a liberal, not anaggressive man. He has no bad reputation.There is no doubt that he has been appointedSecretary of State just at a point when Carterfeels weak. I think he has made some de-mands. Among other things, he said that heis independent, and that he will not beBrzezinski’s tool but a true Secretary ofState. There have always been disagree-ments between Vance and Brzezinski. Ev-ery time they sent a contact group to us orto Panama, or to Costa Rica, this group con-sisted of two men. The first belonged to theState Department, the other to the NationalSecurity Council. At any rate, I am of theopinion that Muskie will pursue a policy ofdefending his positions against Brzezinski,and he will claim authority.

Erich Honecker: This is why he saidhe is responsible for foreign policy.

Fidel Castro: He can exert a positiveinfluence. Vance has exerted a positive in-fluence. The policy of missile buildup isBrzezinski’s. The policy of allying withChina against the Soviet Union isBrzezinski’s. He traveled to China, he hadpictures taken of himself at the border.

Erich Honecker: He had a picture takenof himself at the [Pakistani] border withAfghanistan, with a machine gun in hishand.

Fidel Castro: Yes, he is a cunning devil.Erich Honecker: This policy is danger-

ous, but he won’t succeed. However, it cancost us a lot.

One has to say that resistance againstthis policy is beginning to show in WesternEurope. It’s true, they bow before the USAand they have seriously supported the mis-sile decision, e.g. the FRG. However, wehad conversations in the Netherlands, inBelgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and France.The leading politicians of these countriesdon’t want a Third World war.

We are in contact with the folks of bigFRG companies, the chemical industry,Mannesmann, and others. They all opposethe boycott, too. It is very interesting thateven the Federal Republic’s protestant

church, together with and on suggestion ofthe GDR’s church, has issued a statementagainst the Carter policy.

Fidel Castro; Is it correct, that you haveso many Protestants in your country? Arethey indeed religious?

Erich Honecker: They are churchmembers, and of course they are religious,otherwise they were not members. I had con-versations with the bishops. This was thefirst time ever in the history of the GDR.They said: We don’t want to be partisans ofthe West. We are GDR citizens. The mem-bers of our congregation work for social-ism. We conceive of ourselves as a churchwithin socialism. I couldn’t say anythingagainst that. The vast majority of the peoplefeel attached to their state, to socialism, andthe leaders of the church are smart, they takethat fact into account. They exert an influ-ence on the churches in the Federal Repub-lic and in the USA. At the World Council ofChurches, they have introduced a resolutioncalling for the continuation of detente anddisarmament. It has been presented to thegovernments of all countries. The Protes-tant churches of the GDR and the USA haveissued a common statement calling for thecontinuation of detente. Hence, certainchanges become apparent here.

Of course, the church does not want tojoin together with us completely. This isevident, they can’t do that. However, it isstill better to have a church that is loyal tothe socialist state than one that works againstit.

In the USA, too, there are quite a lot ofpeople who oppose the policy of confronta-tion, otherwise Vance would not have hadto go. He was against the military adven-ture in Iran. What you said about Muskieconfirms our information that Muskie in-deed wants to act more independently. Wehave to exploit that.

Fidel Castro: I believe that a lot ofpeople understand that the third world warwould also be the last.

Concerning the boycott of the Olym-pic Games, a many people believe that theUSA’s non-participation increases the oth-ers’ chances at the Games a lot.

Erich Honecker: With respect to thechances of preventing a third world war, weare optimistic, even though you never knowwhat some lunatics will get up to.

Regarding the Olympic Games, thereare some people in our country who thinkthat the USA does not send its athletes toMoscow because it is afraid that they wouldagain lose against the GDR’s athletes as wasthe case in Montreal [in 1976].

(12:25 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.: Lunch Break)


Erich Honecker: As for the moviewe’ve just seen, I have already asked if wecan get it for our TV.

Fidel Castro: In less than four weekswe have organized three big rallies, the lastof them being the one for your arrival yes-terday.

Erich Honecker: This huge manifesta-tion has already been covered by our TVyesterday, as will be today’s negotiations;everything in color. Millions of GDR citi-zens are watching this. 80 percent of thepeople have a TV-set.

Fidel Castro: Hence, there are muchmore viewers than there are Catholics andProtestants.

Erich Honecker: These are loyal citi-zens as well.

Fidel Castro: If we said that we haveCatholics, then we could talk about millionsof Catholics who are baptized. Yet actu-ally, nobody becomes involved with thechurch. Our relations with the church arenot that bad. In the early days of the revo-lution it was necessary to make some priestsleave the country, to expel them; becauseCatholicism was the faith of the rich. 60%of the people were farmers, and on the coun-tryside there was not a single church. Inother Latin American countries they do ex-ist. Once a year, priests visit the villages tobaptize the people, but they lack a religiouseducation, they were only educated in thebig landowners’ private schools. Therefore,religion did not exert a particularly stronghold on the people. Nevertheless, we arevery careful in our relations with the church,especially given the situation in LatinAmerica, not to admit that the revolution isopposed to the church. In addition, we havetalked a lot about the Christians’ closenessto the Marxists, and said that Jesus wasChristian.

Erich Honecker: The Sermon on theMount says something along these lines, too.

Fidel Castro: There are many priestswith a revolutionary attitude in LatinAmerica. We think this is of great impor-tance.

Erich Honecker: We also integrated alot of them into the National Front. At theelections, they call upon the people to votefor the candidates of the National Front.

I come from a miners’ town. The ma-jority of the people was Catholic. There wasa street where 80% of the people living therevoted for the KPD [the Communist Party ofGermany].

After 1945, we had Priest Kleinschmidtin the GDR, who was responsible for all ofMecklenburg, and we had priests on theNational Front’s National Council. We had

a bishop, Bishop Mitzenheim, responsiblefor Thuringia. He was awarded the NationalMedal of Honor in gold for his contributionto the building up of our republic. We thusapproach the issue of cooperation betweenChristians and Marxists in the same man-ner.

Fidel Castro:The archbishop of Salva-dor [Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero,assassinated on 24 March 1980] was anapostle of the poor, of the revolution. TheCIA killed him. He exercised strong resis-tance and cried out against repression. Thechurch in Salvador has a very revolution-ary attitude, and this is of great importancefor Latin America as a whole. In Jamaica, Imet with church representatives, as I did inChile in 1972. I talked a lot about the alli-ance between Christians and Marxists. Thisis no tactical alliance, but a strategic one.

I mentioned Jamaica. Jamaica cur-rently faces a very difficult situation, aboveall for economic reasons, particularly be-cause of the oil price. They produce baux-ite. The oil price has increased 15 times,the price of bauxite only two times. [Ja-maican leader Michael] Manley is a veryable man, but he has got some problems.

The opposition party is influenced bythe CIA, and they do all that they can inorder to destabilize and overthrow the gov-ernment. Now we have to see how theseproblems can be solved. It is a very dramaticsituation that shows certain similarities tothe situation in Chile at the time. We givethem any kind of support they request. Yetsometimes they act like the Chileans at thetime.

Erich Honecker: Every people has tolearn by experience.

Fidel Castro: They simply are toodemocratic—Comrade Honecker, the flooris yours now.

Erich Honecker: I’ve already taken upa lot of time.

Fidel Castro: You have much more totell than I do. To sum up, I would like tosay the following:

It is our party’s belief that our relationswith the GDR are very good ones. We arevery satisfied with how this relationship hasdeveloped, and we are very grateful to theGDR. You are virtually the first country withwhich we have concluded the coordinationof the five-year plan. In our view, all issueshave been settled to our satisfaction, and thishelps us a lot. Our discussions with the oth-ers have not yet been concluded.

As for the political issues, we fullyagree. I believe that there still are a lot ofpossibilities to develop our cooperation inthe economic and political field. But thingsare going well. This is what I wanted to say

regarding political issues in general.I suppose there is not much I need to

tell you about our own problems; during ourconversations we return to that topic timeand again. Yesterday I have already talkeda little bit about our difficulties. And thereare shortcomings, too. But we fight againstthese shortcomings to get rid of them.

With regard to the implementation ofthe planning and management system for theeconomy we have made some progress. Wehave been working on that for years, andcurrently we do a lot to improve efficiency.

We had some difficulties in meeting thegoals of the five-year plan. The five-yearplan will not be fulfilled, but we will never-theless make significant progress. The ce-ment factory we are going to open tomor-row is one example. With this five-year plan,we face problems in the world market. Un-fortunately, our economy is highly depen-dent on international trade, on trade with theWestern countries. We have to buy someproducts from the Western countries, par-ticularly food, e.g. milk. We do a lot in or-der not to be dependent on the West. Wehave agreements with the GDR concerningthe production of powdered milk. As a re-sult, we will no longer depend on Canada,France, and other Western countries, at leastnot to such a high degree, the dependencewill be reduced.

There are also many chemicals, e.g.pesticides, herbicides, where we are depen-dent on Switzerland and the FRG, becausethe socialist countries have not yet devel-oped such chemicals. Unfortunately, thereis no hope that the GDR will develop suchproducts in the foreseeable future. We alsomust buy a lot of equipment from the West-ern countries. It will be the same for you.Above all, the issue is raw materials, manysorts of raw materials, and spare parts. Insum, a significant part of our trade dependson relations with the West.

In addition, the prices of sugar andnickel were low for some years. This year,the price of sugar has increased. The worldprice of sugar will probably very good nextyear, and this helps us a lot in dealing withthese difficulties.

However, there are other problems aswell. We had some obscure plagues recently.We believe that these plagues were causedby sabotage.

First, there was a fungal disease in ourtobacco plantations. This year, 90% of ourtobacco production were destroyed, and wehad to import tobacco. Fortunately, there arechemicals that are well-suited for fightingthis sort of fungus. We have made a strongeffort and we got the necessary amount fornext year. Therefore, we believe that we will


have solved the problem by next year; be-cause this plague has brought us into a verydifficult situation. Other countries were hurt,too. In Jamaica, the whole tobacco produc-tion has been destroyed, in Canada, too, andperhaps the USA will be affected as well.It’s blue mould [Blauschimmel].

On our sugar plantations we also had avery serious plague, but it affected only onetype. 30% of our sugar plantations have beenplanted with this type of sugar. This led to aloss of some 1 million tons of sugar. We fightagainst this plague by replacing this type ofsugar with another one, a new type, whichis resistant against this disease.

Then there is the African swine fever,which we are fighting successfully. Thisswine fever is practically under control. Itis strange, though, three plagues all at thesame time.

A couple of days ago a plane overflewour country and dropped a gelatin-like, liq-uid substance containing a fungus; quiteclever, in microscopically small capsules.Currently, we are conducting research on theissue. These things were dropped in a widthof 25 kilometers. We haven’t publicized any-thing yet, because we are still in the processof conducting research. We have asked theSoviet comrades for help. But we still needmore facts.

This is very disquieting, however, sincethese could be symptoms of bacteriologicalwarfare. These chemicals are highly devel-oped. The material that has been used doesnot come from a small group of counterrevo-lutionaries, it belongs to a highly developedindustry. Now we don’t know who has donethis. We know for sure that we are dealingwith fungi, a type of fungus that could dam-age the sugar. We are doing the relevant testsbefore we publicize something. The drop-ping took place 12 to 14 days ago. But wedon’t have all elements available yet. Per-haps this is psychological warfare?

Furthermore, there are various signs ofsabotage. A couple of weeks ago a very se-rious act of sabotage occurred. A day-nurs-ery in a high-rise was set on fire. This firewas very dangerous, because there were 570children in the nursery at this point. By amiracle, all children were saved.

A few days later, the same thing hap-pened to a old people’s home in Jamaica.150 old women died. Image what wouldhave happened here if 100 children had died!Maybe the people would have killed therogue. The people might have killed some10,000 of these guys, but then the problemwould have gotten out of hands; because wehave to run a visible campaign with the partyand the mass organizations in order to keepthe people calm. They want to strike back,

and we are at pains to calm the people down.If 150 children had died, then we would havewitnessed serious acts of revenge. And ap-parently this was the intention.

Three days ago a special school wasset on fire, a dangerous incident, too.

Yesterday a small rum factory was setalight. Hence, there is sabotage, and this ei-ther could have been planned by the CIA orinstigated by the radio stations of the USAand the venomous pirate radio stations. Al-together, these acts are typical of the CIA’swar of nerves. Therefore, we will have totake more drastic measures and send somepeople before the firing squad. These are ter-rible things. Our main concern is that theyuse bacteriological means against theeconomy.

Our problem is that we are heavily de-pendent on agriculture. Our exports dependon agriculture. Agriculture suffers fromnatural plagues, such as droughts. However,there are also these artificial plagues, andnow we struggle with this kind of difficul-ties.

Nevertheless, the morale is good. Wehave practically formulated the next five-year plan already. It is not a very ambitiousone, but a modest, a realistic plan, that hasbeen calculated cautiously, on the basis oflow world prices. If the situation improves,we will try to fulfill the plan.

We now coordinate the plans with theother socialist countries. We are preparingfor the II Party congress. It will be charac-terized by a fighting spirit.

The party has grown, perhaps a littlebit more than we desired, because we im-proved very restrictive criteria, always insearch for excellence. Recently we tried toincrease the number of workers in the party.Our comrades also work in services, intelli-gence, the ministry of the interior, the mili-tary. We also had a special campaign aimedat increasing the percentage of workers.Currently the party has 400,000 membersand candidates. At the time of the I. Partycongress, there were 150,000 members andcandidates. The youth organization has450,000 members, and it has a restrictivecharacter, too. We will stick to this policybecause we look not so much for quantitybut for quality. The party is very unified,the people are very unified. All the peoplewho are sitting here are comrades, all revo-lutionaries are comrades, and even the rogueis ready to fight. The people who are nowleaving our country and go to the USA, whoare no revolutionaries at all, have a revolu-tionary mentality. They are rebels. Theyrefuse to obey orders. They will give theUSA a big headache, although they are en-emies of the revolution.

There are two very interesting phenom-ena. They all believe what the revolution-ary government says, and second, they havethe methods of the revolution, a revolution-ary style.

This is strange. The Yankees concen-trate them in bases, and there they organizethe revolt. They don’t obey any orders. Withthese rogues they have imported rogues witha revolutionary style. In comparison, theother emigrants in the USA are calm, butthe Cuban people raise all sorts of outcries.

Hence, this is the situation. The Westdoes not really understand this. 90 % of thepeople are steadfast and agree with the revo-lution, 10 % are against the revolution, butthe latter are militant. The West does notreally understand this phenomenon. Thiswill remain the same for 30 or 40 years, aslong as we have the USA on our doorstep.There will always be a small minority. I amtotally convinced of that, we must not haveany illusions about it.

Therefore, every country where thereis a regime change means increased secu-rity for our revolution. Each additional revo-lution makes us stronger because we gainallies. For 20 years, we have been isolated,on our own, now there are already three ofus in the region: Grenada, Nicaragua, andCuba. Moreover, there are friendly states,such as Panama and Jamaica, for example;some countries that have developed a posi-tive attitude towards us compared to the timeof our isolation, when not a single countryhad a friendly attitude towards us. Mexicoonly entertained formal relations with us,but no relations of a friendly nature. Thissituation has changed a lot.

Mexico’s position is a very interestingone; since after the discovery of the huge(crude) oil resources, its economic situationhas changed, its power has grown. The de-pendence on the USA has been decreased.

However, at the same time, this engen-ders a danger, because the USA demand thatMexico supplies them with 4,000 barrels of(crude) oil every day in order to solve theirenergy problems. The Mexicans are afraidof the USA. They don’t want to follow theUSA’s oil policy, but maintain a limited po-sition that corresponds to the country’s de-velopment needs in order to simultaneouslyexpand the markets. But Mexico plays animportant role in this area of the globe, avery important role, since it has got the eco-nomic power because of the oil. Hence, at-tention should be paid to Mexico. LopezPortillo, the Mexican president, has a goodattitude, a brave position, he is open-minded,and this should be taken into account.

Argentina and Brazil are in a differentsituation. These countries are much more


dependent on the USA. Brazil seeks to in-crease its independence. Without any doubt,this is a very reasonable government, butthe situation is different from that in Mexico.Mexico can be seen more as an ally, as afriend.

The Yankees have asked the Mexicansto do them some service here, in order tosolve their problems with us. We told theMexicans that we would agree, if the goalis to solve all problems at the same time,not only those that are of interest to the USA.They Mexicans said that they agree withthat.

When the Mexicans, the Yankees, andwe sit at a table, the relation will be two toone on some issues. The Mexicans haveinvited representatives from Panama, andwe have said that it is better to have moreLatin Americans. Maybe it is better for usif the Mexicans participate in these talks.Therefore we agreed. We don’t know whatis going to happen and where it is going tohappen because the Yankees are quite con-strained in their actions because of the cam-paign. Before the elections, Carter mustmake no concessions at all. Therefore, thesituation is not going to change before theelections. On no account, can we help Cartersolve his own problems. What guaranteesis Carter going to give us? And what if heloses the elections? They don’t talk aboutAngola and Ethiopia any more, now theytalk about solving the problem in the USA’sinterests section which is full of counter-revolutionaries, and in Iran, they demandtheir hostages. They were afraid that ourpeople would attack the consulate. Beforeour demonstration, they were very con-cerned, and Mariel is the second issue thatthey are very concerned about.

There, we are the ones who issue theexit visas. They are afraid of Latin America,of the people from Haiti, Mexico, and thenext problem is the hijacked plane. Theyare interested in agreements and they areconcerned about that.

However, they always find somethingnew. At the time, they talked about subver-sion in Latin America, now there are newissues. In this pre-election period, it is verydifficult for them to make concessions.Hence, we remain at the present point aslong as the elections have not taken place.

This was a broad outline of the currentsituation. We will provide further informa-tion about Cuba, but these were the mainissues.

Erich Honecker: Comrade FidelCastro, thank you for your explanations. Itis quite obvious that there are no issues be-tween us that need further discussion.

As far as we know, the communique

has been prepared. All questions have beensettled, and we have expressed our opinionson international issues.

We consider the conclusion of thetreaty on friendship and cooperation veryimportant.

(Fidel Castro: This is our first treaty.)The people of the German Democratic

Republic will be delighted when they learnabout it, and it is certain that this will re-ceive great attention; just as our stay herealready receives great international atten-tion. The conclusion of this treaty will out-line all that what we, even more so than be-fore, will have to live up to in our mutualcooperation.

Despite all agreement with regard toeconomic and other issues, there will be awhole string of additional possibilities todevelop the cooperation of two countriesthat are so much joined together in friend-ship as are the German Democratic Repub-lic and the Republic of Cuba.

We in the GDR follow with great plea-sure with how much energy you implementthe decisions taken at the Ist Party congressof the Communist Party. We follow withdeep sympathy your efforts concerning thepreparation of the IInd Party congress, aboutwhich you have just informed us.

The remarks you made in the contextof the Party congress regarding the effec-tiveness and quality of your work are veryfamiliar concerns for us. We, too, devoteincreasing attention to these issues given theconditions of our development. Moreover,in our activities we proceed from the as-sumption that revolutionary Cuba com-mands great authority and conducts a veryactive, principled foreign policy in full ac-cordance with the Soviet Union and thecountries of the socialist community whilecertainly taking into consideration yourcountry’s specific situation.

It is obvious that in the preparation ofyour IInd Party congress you are concernedwith a whole string of issues that we alsohave to deal with in preparing for our XthParty congress. Recently our Central Com-mittee held its 12th conference. Supple-menting the Politburo’s report on the orga-nization of our Xth Party congress, I held aspeech there. The Xth Party congress hasbeen scheduled for 11-16 April 1981. Wepublicized the agenda and at the same timewe announced that motions to be consid-ered by the Party congress have to be pro-posed before the end of March. In the con-text of the summoning of our Xth Party con-gress the entire country will engage in agreat debate about the future shaping of theGerman Democratic Republic’s developedsocialist society. Of course, this will be re-

lated to the continuing carrying through ofthe GDR’s foreign policy.

As far as foreign policy is concerned,the problems are quite obvious. The coop-eration with the Soviet Union is the corner-stone of our foreign policy. We coordinateour foreign policy with the socialist brothernations. Concerning foreign policy, thereis agreement as to the basic issues, the issueof the further consolidation of the unity andindivisibility of the community of socialistcountries, the issue of defending theachievements of detente, its supplementingwith arms reductions, and active support fornational liberation movements. In this pro-cess, we pay great attention to the develop-ment of the nonaligned countries aboutwhich Comrade Fidel Castro has informedus in the context of the Havana conferenceand the subsequent events.

Although all these issues concerningthe future development of our foreign policyare understood, the citizens of the GDR cer-tainly face a lot of problems. World eventsare highly complex, so that the Party has tobe very active in this area; this all the moreso since the enemy seeks to deceive thepeople through the mass media and to dis-guise its aggressive policies, particularly thatof the USA. We have created a solid basisregarding these issues. The comrades noware increasingly capable of thinking forthemselves and clarifying these issues indialogue with the people.

In January of this year we held big talkswith our party’s first district secretaries (1.Kreissekretaere) under consultation of thelocal government secretaries (Sekretaere derBezirksleitungen).

Fidel Castro: How many districts arethere in your country?

Erich Honecker:There are 136 districts(Kreise), but also a whole string of indus-trial districts. Altogether there were 600comrades present there. At this meeting, weassessed the class struggle between social-ism and imperialism and its implications forthe work of our party. One can note the dif-ferences between the various imperialistcountries, but the basic conflict still is theone between socialism and imperialism.The imperialists are quite united in theirstruggle against socialism, they only dis-agree with regard to method.

We also evaluated the development ofthe national liberation movement and therole of the Communist and workers’ move-ments in the developed capitalist countries.It was a broad range of international issues,which are mainly ideological issues, andissues concerning the future shaping of thedeveloped socialist society. For example,we discussed the question how to continue


our dynamic economic policy underchanged international economic conditionsin combination with the execution of oursocio-political program. These questions arecertainly not only of theoretical importance;above all they concern the masses and hencethe Party.

We believe that we can compensate forthe changed international economic condi-tions, which find expression in increasingprices, in inflationary tendencies, throughhigher labor productivity. You know our de-velopment, therefore I don’t have to go intodetail. The main problem we face is to com-bine the advantages of the socialist socialorder with the scientific-technical revolu-tion. This means, among other things, es-pecially a more efficient management ofnatural resources. We have great suppliesof brown coal in our country. Within theframework of the plan, we are currentlymaking it our task to extract 300 million tonsof brown coal a year instead of the 240 mil-lion tons we have produced in the past. Ofcourse this is a huge task, since it involvesthe opening of new coal mines.

Fidel Castro: How many kilocaloriesdoes coal have?

Erich Honecker: 2,000 to 3,000, it var-ies. However, given the increase in worldprices, this is a very important natural re-source.

Fidel Castro: How many tons of browncoal are necessary to substitute 1 ton of oil?I am talking about the type of brown coalthat you produce.

Erich Honecker: Practically, we usebrown coal for our carbochemical industry.Relatedly, it is the source material for vari-ous raw materials, plastics, rubber (elas-tomers?), for the production of gas. We justhave opened a new factory near Buna. NearLeuna we then saw the old plant, whichworks in the field of carbochemistry. Thenew one works on the basis of oil. Initially,we intended to abandon carbochemistrybecause at that time oil was cheaper thanbrown coal. We wanted to switch com-pletely to petrochemistry. But now we aredeveloping a stronger carbochemical indus-try, and the new plant produces 100,000 tonsof PVC per year on the basis of brown coal,rock salt, and lime. This leads me alreadyto the answer to your question. 4 tons ofbrown coal are neccessary to substitute oneton of oil. However, this is not the crucialissue. Crucial is the fact that we have browncoal, but not oil. This is why we now sup-port brown coal and develop thecarbochemical industry to produce plasticsand rubber. The second way of exploitingbrown coal consists of using it as a sourceof energy. Currently our grid has a capacity

of 18,000 megawatts, on the basis of browncoal in fact.

Fidel Castro: This is eight to nine timesas much energy as we produce. So, 60 mil-lion tons of brown coal produce the same as15 nilllion tons of oil. This is more thanwhat Romania produces.

Erich Honecker: I have picked this ex-ample because, under the changed interna-tional economic circumstances, for us as acountry lacking in raw materials it is cer-tainly more effective to use brown coal forcarbochemistry, for coke, town gas. This isa crucial component of the GDR’s economicpower.

Fidel Castro: But 300 million tons ofcoal are the same as 75 million tons of oil.

Erich Honecker: At any rate, we don’thave the oil, but we have the brown coal.We import 20 million tons of oil per year,which we use primarily for chemical pro-cesses. In addition, we import 4 billion cu-bic meters of natural gas, and we produce 8billion cubic meters ourselves. However,our domestically produced gas has a lowcalorie content - ca. 2,000. We use this kindof gas mainly for process energy because itis less well suited for chemical processes.

Hence, the first principle is to use ourown raw materials more efficiently for thedevelopment of our economy. These are,as mentioned before, brown coal; moreover,the earths for the porcelain industry, whichexperiences a rapid development, both chinaand porcelain for technical use actually. Wehave the earths for developing the glass in-dustry - we were presented the thermopanesin the Palast, but glass is mainly used forhouse building. We have great deposits ofpotash. We produce around 3.2 million tonsannually, part of it gets exported. In recentyears we have increased production by 1million tons. We also have supplies of ura-nium, and it is known that uranium-miningis strongly developed. The uranium is minedby a German-Soviet company. Uranium canbe used for peaceful and for non-peacefulpurposes.

This is already it as far as our own sup-plies are concerned. We have to import oil,gas, ore for our metallurgy, various metals,precious metals for the metallurgy, sheetsteel, etc. All these questions of improvingefficiency and quality, with which the partyis concerned in its entire work, played a rolein the discussions with the first district sec-retaries, not only regarding better exploita-tion of these raw materials, but, relatedly,for a more efficient development of certainpace-setting industries. The production andprocessing of brown coal are certainly pace-setting for the development of our economy.

Fidel Castro: How long are the supplies

going to last?Erich Honecker: Until the year 2000

and beyond. Supplies for the next 30 yearsare ascertained. We don’t have to worryabout that. Our greatest worries concern theraw materials that we don’t have such as oiland gas, gold, silver, nickel, wood, etc.

Fidel Castro: Why do you need gold?Erich Honecker: For microelectronics,

for example. Of course the processing ofthese raw materials is pace-setting, but es-pecially the development of microelectron-ics. At this year’s Leipzig spring fair, thevisitors were very surprised by the triumphof microelectronics in a several of theGDR’s industries, e.g. in machine tool en-gineering, where it plays a very importantrole in the context of automating entire pro-duction processes, in the car industry,through the use of industrial robots, in therolling mill industry, certainly in measure-ment technology, in the gadget industry, inship and crane building. In our republic,almost every industry witnesses the trium-phant march of microelectronics. This isnecessary since 95 to 99 percent of the in-crease in industrial production is supposedto be achieved through increasing labor pro-ductivity.

Fidel Castro: Microelectronics andhigher productivity will make up for theworkers that you are lacking.

Erich Honecker: Indeed, we are sav-ing 300 million man-hours per year becauseof technological improvements and the sci-entific management techniques. In one yearwe saved 167,000 workers simply by in-creasing labor productivity. Despite the cri-sis of the capitalist world market, despitethe price increases national income on av-erage grew by 4% annually within theCOMECON, industrial production by 5 to5.5%. Overall net income grew by 4%,those of workers and employees by 4.7%.Retail sales are up by 4% on average. Thiscould only be achieved because of the divi-sion of labor within the COMECON, espe-cially with the Soviet Union, and the strongincrease in the productivity of the workingpeople of the GDR.

Now I’d like to tell you how we man-aged to achieve such an increase in laborproductivity. This is possible because wehave a standardized socialist system of edu-cation; almost every child of our people goesto kindergarten, all attend the 10-class poly-technic secondary school. This not onlyleads to a higher level of general education,but creates a better basis for professionaltraining as well. The best get sent to the uni-versities and technical colleges.

Since the German Democratic Repub-lic came into existence 1.4 million skilled


workers have graduated from the universi-ties and technical colleges. Without the highlevel of education among workers, withoutthe good professional training for everyone,without the fact that under the worker andpeasant power 1.4 million people attendeduniversities and technical colleges such aneconomic and hence social development ofthe GDR would not have been possible.This is the reason why the GDR belongs tothe ten most powerful industrial countries.Stalin’s slogan: “The cadres take all deci-sions.” still holds true. This is the only wayto develop the various branches of oureconomy: electrical engineering/electronics,metallurgy, scientific equipment-building,the shipyard industry, mechanical engineer-ing, the chemical and the optical industry,etc., of course the ceramics industry as well.

When you are planning your IInd Partycongress—and you mentioned that the ce-ment factory with an output of 1.6 milliontons of cement per year will play an impor-tant role, it is the biggest cement factory inLatin America, and many new factories havebeen built in Cuba—our experience hasbeen, and this is all I can speak of, that onehas to educate the cadres and rely on them.The issue is not only discipline at work andmaking full use of working hours, but alsoto achieve a balance between the scientific-technical cadres and the cadres with goodprofessional training, who know their trade,who are loyal politically and skilled work-ers as well. This is the secret that allowsthe GDR to defend the position that it hasgained.

We discussed all these issues at themeeting with the district secretaries andexplained that only through the further dy-namic development of the GDR’s economywe can ensure our social policy and the com-prehensive strengthening of the GDRagainst attacks by our imperialist enemies.This is the case simply because here peoplehave the tendency to compare. For them,socialism has to be more attractive than capi-talism. Since you can get three of the FRG’sTV channels here, but only two of the GDR,the actual situation is decisive.

The last ten years have witnessed thebiggest housing program ever in the historyof our country. Between 1971 and 1976 wehave built or modernized 603,000 apart-ments. This is the final year of the 1976-1980 five-year plan, and in compliance withthe decision of the IXth Party congress wewill have built or modernized 750,000 apart-ments, 510,000 of them with the help ofapartment factories; of course this is a hugehousing program since, for every newhousehold, the equipment, i.e. floor cover-ing, drapes, furniture, etc. has to be added.

Fidel Castro: Where do you get thewood for the furniture from?

Erich Honecker: We fell 7 million cu-bic meters of solid timber per year ourselves,the forestry ministry wants to increase theoutput to 8 million. The rest of the woodare imports, particularly from the SovietUnion. But we do not only use wood. Forthe furniture, we increasingly use plastics,rubber, etc. We make chipboards from woodshavings and import chipboards. Sometimesthe furniture looks as if it was made fromoak or birch or walnut, or even from Afri-can walnut, from precious woods. Yet ac-tually it is film produced in our factories thatgives that impression. Our Party printeriesproduce film, and this wood has proven tobe of higher quality than natural wood.Various corrosives have been used for test-ing. The material lasts.

The housing program is the centerpieceof our social policy. Moreover, we are inthe process of introducing gradually the 40-hour workweek while retaining the 5-dayworkweek. We have increased minimumvacation from 15 and 18 to 21 days, we havetaken special measures concerning the pro-tection and support for mother and child andthe family. We have increased the paid leavefor mothers for the first child to six months,it used to be six weeks, and to one year forthe second child.

Fidel Castro: This country will becomea real anthill.

Erich Honecker: See, Fidel, you mustproceed from the conditions in your coun-try, we from those in ours. We are buildingsocialism under different conditions. Iwouldn’t mention this at all if the develop-ment of our peace-oriented foreign policyand anti-imperialist solidarity weren’tclosely related to the issue of the furthershaping of the developed socialist societyand intellectual-cultural life.

At the same time we have to set asideconsiderable resources not only for interna-tional solidarity with the peoples of Africa,Asia, and Latin America, etc., but also forour defense, the development of the NationalPeople’s Army, the army, the air force, andthe navy. It is known that our army is hardlysmall, and it is equipped with the wholerange of state-of-the-art weaponry withwhich the Soviet troops in the GDR areequipped, too.

We explained all these tasks openlybefore the Party and at the same time said:if we fulfill them we will be able to keepthe prices for basic consumption goods,rents, and services stable. All this is workedthrough by the Party, discussed with thepeople.

I can say that this year we are noting a

great improvement concerning qualitativeeconomic indicators, especially with regardto the increase in labor productivity. Thisleads me to our Xth Party congress. We havediscussed political-ideological issues, wehave explained openly the basic economicissues that have to be mastered. We havedecided that what matters is to consolidateand gradually expand our social achieve-ments. Now it is up to the Party and thepeople to fulfill these tasks.

Because of the results we already havein hand we are very optimistic. My speechbefore the first district secretaries was readout to 150,000 party activists, and then theseissues were discussed within the entire Party.Each basic organization has an action planfor realizing the political-ideological, eco-nomic, and cultural goals.

In the economic field the workingpeople of more than 120 combines havemade it their task to bring an additional 2 to3 daily productions to the plan, with thesame amount of raw materials and other in-puts if possible.

We have 16.9 million citizens in ourrepublic. Following the principle of indi-vidual selection, which says that the bestshould belong to the Party, we have 2.1 mil-lion members and candidates. 56% of themare workers. For the first time in the Party’shistory 20% belong to the scientific-techni-cal intelligentsia. This means more than450,000 scientists, technicians, graduates ofthe universities and technical colleges areParty members. This enables the Party tofulfill the tasks explained before. Accord-ing to a decision taken at the 12th sessionof the Central Committee, for every 800members there will be an elected delegate.

We are deeply convinced that in con-nection with the open discussion within theParty surrounding the Party congress, withthe help of the dialogue between the Partymembers and the entire citizenry, in the year1980 the conditions for formulating at theParty congress another program for the de-velopment of the GDR until the year 1985will be created. Here we envision an aver-age annual increase in labor productivity of4% for the years 1981 to 1985, and of 5%per year in industrial production. The fig-ures for income, net income, retail sales, forinvestment, housing, and other social pro-grams will correspond to that.

We thus fight for the realization of ourParty program, adopted at the IXth Partycongress, by setting ourselves the goal offurther shaping the developed socialist so-ciety and creating the conditions for agradual transition to communism.

I apologize if my explanations havebeen too extensive. There were some ques-


tions, which perhaps can be answered laterin more detail. These questions concernproblems in the development of the GDR.Just like the comradeship between the Cu-ban Communist Party and the German So-cialist Unity Party is the centerpiece of ourfriendship, the Party is the decisive force inyour country. It couldn’t be otherwise. Wethus create the basis for the further devel-opment of the relations between the Ger-man Democratic Republic and socialistCuba.

Fidel Castro: We have a CommunistParty, but haven’t built socialism yet; youhave a Socialist Unity Party and are alreadybuilding Communism.

Erich Honecker: This is the dialectic.Moreover, this is always connected withwhat you have said before. There are dif-ferent ways to Communism. The importantthing is to actually pursue these paths. Thenit is no longer decisive how the party callsitself. All of us who are sitting here comefrom the German Communist Party (KPD),from the Communist youth organization.Through the unification of Social Democratsand Communists we became the GermanSocialist Unity Party. Now we have alreadydeveloped so far that we think of Commu-nism. You first thought of Communism andcalled your party Communist Party.

Fidel Castro: It’s Karl Marx’s fault. Ihave listened carefully to your explanationsbecause we can still benefit more from theGDR’s experience. That’s what I was think-ing of when you talked about the system ofeducation. With respect to some things theconditions in your country are different fromthose in ours. There are some issues wherewe can use your experience. We have tomake an effort in that regard.

In the realm of professional trainingthere is still a lot of room for improvement.

Our situation, though, is very differentfrom yours. Let us compare just a few fig-ures. You produce nine times as much elec-tricity as we do, and you consume 16 timesas much wood. These are only two ex-amples. We face severe constraints concern-ing raw materials and have no energysources, neither gas nor oil. We don’t evenhave wood. We are asking the Soviet com-rades to establish a Cuban colony in Siberiafor the production of wood.

Erich Honecker: You can get it. TheBulgarians are there. We also got an invita-tion, but we are lacking workers.

Fidel Castro: You should transfer thisinvitation to us.

Erich Honecker: Agreed.Fidel Castro: Then we make the deal

together. In the Soviet Union, people thinkthat the Cubans can’t work in Siberia be-

cause of the cold. But thousands of Cubansare in the South of Angola, in the trenches,for months. Why shouldn’t they be able towork in Siberia? I am convinced that theycan work there, and we are having discus-sions along these lines with ComradeBaibakov and various personalities in theSoviet Union. However, they doubt that wecan stand the cold.

Erich Honecker: If we can stand theheat, why shouldn’t you be able to stand thecold?

Fidel Castro: There are remote areas,where they kept prisoners, but that doesn’tmatter.

Erich Honecker: There are vast areas,and we got such an offer, too. We couldn’taccept it for the reasons mentioned before.Therefore we have a well-developed forestry[sector]. Unfortunately, you don’t, for ob-jective reasons, and what we can’t get, wehave to substitute through chemistry. Yetwhat it does not produce are the silicon chipsfor microelectronics, the microprocessors.

Fidel Castro: We have silicon.Erich Honecker: We have silicon en

masse. We control the whole silicon chainwith the help of our scientists. We have pro-duced the multispectrum camera at Zeiss.When Comrade [Gunter] Mittag metSchmidt [on 17 April 1980 in Bonn], heclaimed that our camera was better than theAmerican one. We are not modest as far asour productive capabilities are concerned.However, apart from that, what is actuallycrucial are the cadres.

Fidel Castro: Where do you producethat camera?

Erich Honecker: In Jena. But inDresden, the industry is very powerful, andthe institute for microelectronics is locatedthere.

I have yet to fulfill an honorable task.On behalf of our Party’s Central Commit-tee, the Council of State, and the Council ofMinisters, I would like to invite a party andgovernment delegation of the Republic ofCuba under the leadership of Comrade Fi-del Castro to visit the German DemocraticRepublic. Our people would be pleased ifFidel visited the GDR.

Fidel Castro: The next time, I will bemore experienced and thus able to makebetter use of my stay with all what I havelearned now about microelectronics. I won’tgo hunting wild pigs, won’t go to Rostock,but visit the factories instead. Halle is a verynice area, it has young cities, sports facili-ties, a new swimming bath, a very good winetavern, and a very big enterprise, Leuna.There I saw the militia branches, this is avery interesting spot for visitors. I alwaysthink of Halle. It was very nice there. In

Dresden, I had a chance to see the marksleft by the war. I was told, however, thateverything has been removed. I think thatthis was a mistake. One should have leftone devastated district as it was.

I am pleased to accept your invitationto visit the GDR.

(End of the official talks: 6:35 p.m.)

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien undMassorganisationen der ehemaligen DDRim Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY 30 J IV 2/201/1365; obtained by C.F. Ostermann;translation for CWIHP by Ostermann andHolger Schmidt.]

Transcript of Meeting between U.S.Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig,Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos

Rafael Rodriguez, Mexico City,23 November 1981

Embassy of USSR TOP SECRETto Republic of Cuba Copy No.__

Ser. No. 5448 December 1981

CC CPSU

Attached please find a stenographicrecord received by the Soviet Ambassadorfrom C. R. Rodriguez of his conference withU.S. Secretary of State Alexander A. Haigwhich took place in Mexico City on 23 No-vember of this year.

Attachment: original in Spanish, 38pages, and translation consisting of 26pages; this address only.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

/s/ V. VOROTNIKOV

[attachment]

Translated from Spanish

CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY CHAIR-MAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OFTHE REPUBLIC OF CUBA CARLOSRAFAEL RODRIGUEZ WITH U.S.

SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDERHAIG, IN MEXICO,

23 NOVEMBER 1981“YEAR OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY

OF VICTORY AT PLAYA GIRON”

(Stenographic record, State Council)

Carlos R. Rodriguez. [Mexican For-eign Minister] Jorge [Castaneda], why don’t


you stay with us a while? I’d like to makesome introductory remarks.

Jorge Castaneda. Okay.Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just one more

minute (spoken in English). Can you sitwith us for a little while?

Jorge Castaneda. Of course.Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just a second

(spoken in English).It seems to me necessary and fitting

that we express the thanks of the Cubangovernment to the government of Mexicofor the kind intentions it has displayed inmaking the conduct of this meeting possible.

When the government of Mexico com-municated this suggestion to us, we imme-diately expressed our agreement. Indeed,this was a difficult moment, inasmuch as,in the entire period of our revolution, wehave never encountered such a torrent ofaccusations and threats against our country,and besides that we knew that our counter-part would be the Secretary of State, one ofthe very most active exponents of this trend,Mr. Haig himself. Notwithstanding, we con-sider that this meeting comports with theprinciples to which we have adhered sincethe moment of victory of the Cuban Revo-lution and its ascendance to power.

We have never refused to engage indialogue. We have always considered thatdialogue must take place in conditions ofequality and mutual respect, and, for ourpart, we approach dialogue in the light ofrespect for principles which, from our pointof view, are not subject to debate.

We have had contacts with the Ameri-can government over the course of theseyears: contact with the Ford administration,and the Carter administration, on parallellevels. There were moments of rapproche-ment. And then circumstances arose whichcut short that rapprochement.

In our message to the government ofMexico, we wanted to say that, from ourside, we are in complete accord with theideas expressed yesterday by PresidentLopez-Portillo, who called for an end to theverbal terrorism which has been widely uti-lized by both sides in the recent past, andfor a beginning to the process of detente.

From our standpoint, within the frame-work of these principles to which we ad-here, we consider that this is possible, andwith these intentions we have come to thismeeting, which has not been easy, at whichdiscussion will take place over the resolu-tion of problems that have deteriorated tothe brink of confrontation, but which, in ouropinion, can find a solution that is accept-able not only for bilateral relations, but forrelations in all of this region, provided thatboth sides will demonstrate respect for each

other and the rights of each.Alexander Haig. I applaud you for

your outstanding introduction. For the pastsome time I have been following your pre-eminent career.

I also am very grateful to PresidentLopez Portillo for the invitation, which hemade several months ago to PresidentReagan, to function as a party assisting inthese negotiations.

Jorge Castaneda. As a messenger.Alexander Haig. We don’t have an ad-

equate expression for “assisting party” andtherefore, if you prefer, one may say “mes-senger” or “bridge.”

(Jorge Castaneda leaves the room).In Washington, we consider that this is

a very fitting occasion for our meeting, be-cause, indeed, we are going through a criti-cal moment in the history of these twenty-odd difficult years. The only course opento us leads to the requirement that we makea choice. In any event, we believe that it isessential to conduct negotiations betweenthe two governments prior to proceeding fur-ther.

Prior to the commencement of thismeeting, I already expressed to Jorge ourappreciation for this constructive initiative,which has made it possible to discuss ourcircumstances and, beginning with this, ourfirst meeting, to forge ahead in an examina-tion of the questions which are a cause ofconcern to both countries.

I’m very grateful that you have comefrom a long distance to this unofficial, se-cret meeting. From our side, we intend tohold it secret.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. That is consis-tent with our wishes. We have decided todo the same.

Alexander Haig. I have been involvedwith these problems for a greater portion ofmy time that you might suppose. In the be-ginning, I started working in Washingtonunder President John Kennedy. After theso-called missile crisis I was an assistant toCyrus Vance and well remember those dif-ficult days which followed upon that crisis,and the actions taken by each side againstthe other which, in the final analysis, broughtto you, instead of potentially dangerous con-sequences, a period of relative tranquility.Then, beginning in 1975-76, for various rea-sons, matters began to go very poorly andhave continued to deteriorate. And now wehave come to a crossroads which, by all in-dications, even by a most modest appraisal,may be described as dangerous.

Looking at our relations in all of theirmanifestations during the course of the pasttwenty years makes it evident to me that thedifficulties, the beginning to which occurred

in 1975 under my former colleagues Fordand Kissinger, and also the domestic situa-tion in the United States created under theinfluence of Vietnam and the Watergatescandal - that it was these, and not only or-dinary geopolitical reasons, that formed thebasis for a process of continual worseningin relations and growing repercussions,which I regard as very dangerous factors inthe cause of international peace.

At that time, I was located abroad, butnevertheless discussed the question in de-tail with Kissinger and Ford. At that timethey were not in a position to achieve a gen-eral consensus in the United States with re-gard to support of a policy that they consid-ered correct at that moment. Subsequently,the Ford presidency dialectically reflectedthe spiritual condition of the Americanpeople after the Vietnam War and Watergate.

All that has changed now. Now anydisposition of forces gives rise to a counter-measure. That is what has happened in thiscase. These days our national spirit has sig-nificantly strengthened, allowing the attain-ment of unprecedented levels of military ex-penditures, and simultaneously creating areadiness to come to terms with limitationsin the social and economic sphere. Thatspirit is developing into an ever greatergrowth of the desire to come to a solutionof international conflicts which the Ameri-can people regard as a threat to peace.

In that which concerns the UnitedStates and Cuba, it seems to me, in essence,that we never had any tensions as a result ofethnic or spiritual conflicts. To the contrary.Historically, Americans and Cubans werevery close and had good relations, relationsbased on mutual respect. However, due toobjective reality - founded or unfounded -the people of the United States regard thechain of events as a challenge to their vitalnational interests, as intervention. This situ-ation has come about during an extendedcourse of time, beginning in 1975 and con-tinuing right up to this day. First Angola,then Ethiopia, South Yemen, the threat toNorth Yemen, and in all of this Cuba hasplayed a role.

Beginning in 1978, we have seen a re-newal in our hemisphere of actions charac-teristic of the beginning of the 1960s. Thesehave been regarded by the people as an un-acceptable intervention from the point ofview of the interests of the United States.That is what it was like in the 1960s. In thebeginning of the 1970s there came a periodof calm. Then an increase in tensions be-gan anew. In our subjective assessment, allthis does not differ so significantly fromrelations with the Soviet Union and Sovietactions.


After the missile crisis, we wentthrough a long period of tensions. The situ-ation improved at the end of 1969, even inspite of the conflict in Vietnam and the roleof the Soviet Union in that conflict, whichwas major, candidly speaking, major. I waslocated there at that time and believe thatAmericans came to the conclusion that mat-ters in that situation were handled improp-erly. That was an attempt to resolve a prob-lem arising exclusively out of conceptionsof a struggle for so-called social justice be-tween two parts of Vietnam, at the same timeas it was necessary to approach the prob-lem from the point of view of relations be-tween the superpowers who, in essence,made the war possible. Americans drewfrom this the conclusion that domestic [in-ternal? indiginous?--ed.] forces should cre-ate the conditions - either by peaceful meansor through the shedding of blood - to pro-vide for their future. Just operating exclu-sively on their own resources - well-foundedor otherwise - they can express their con-cerns and the state of mutual relationsamong the people. I can say that the UnitedStates adheres to exactly this position in re-lation to Central America.

I do not believe that President Reaganhas some kind of preconceived notion re-garding the social system in Cuba. Thismust be determined by the people of Cuba.

Our capability for coexistence, not-withstanding ideological conflicts, is mani-fested most graphically in relations withother Communist regimes: China, Yugosla-via and the growing number of countries inEastern Europe. Notwithstanding all of theSoviet rhetoric to the contrary, the problemis not here. In other words, in their judg-ment about everything, they ascribe our dif-ficulties with you to ideological dissatisfac-tion on the part of the United States in rela-tion to the political system in Cuba.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. It is good thatwe are here together (spoken in English).

Alexander Haig. I was saying that weare looking at the relationship between theglobal activity of the Soviet Union and thelocal activity of Cuba.

We are capable of arithmetic and knowthat one third of your resources are providedby the Soviet Union: everything that relatesto transportation, equipment, materials, allof the assets and means necessary for suste-nance of the Cuban economy.

On the other hand, in 1975 we werewitnesses to a situation which subjectivelyled us to conclude that the Soviet leader-ship assessed the changes which took placein our country as changes of a geopoliticalcharacter - I am talking about Watergate andthe war in Vietnam. This was abundantly

clear in the widening of activity in Africa,Southeast Asia, and in Northwest and West-ern Asia. In this manner, there exists a ten-dency - correct or mistaken - to believe thatan agreement exists between Moscow andHavana in connection with various interna-tional activities, at least a tacit one, if notexplicit. All this has created a mood in theUnited States which brought Mr. Reagan topower.

We are closely following public opin-ion polls, and I can assure you that the moodof the people in the United States is defi-nitely militating toward a change in our re-lations with Cuba, a change that is not posi-tive for Cuba, but which regards Cuba as athreat. I assume that there is room here forsome subjective misstatement, but this is thefact of the matter.

I suppose that any leader comes topower having certain fixed opinions aboutthings, and President Reagan is no excep-tion. Maybe he will turn out to be an ex-ception, if you consider the recent past, andhis understanding of how to fulfill his mis-sion. But I can assure you, that he is a manof peace, a man who wants to relieve thepeople from the burden of armaments, a manwho does not oppose social transformations.His approach to the conflicts at the CancunConference, and his initiative in connectionwith the basic direction of developments inthe Caribbean Basin, should serve as a ref-erence point. Pursuant to his instructions, Ihave met with the leaders of Eastern Eu-rope and representatives of the Angolan re-gime. In my opinion, all of this attests tothe fact that we are talking not about ideol-ogy, but about a geopolitical problem. Andspecifically, due to this understanding, he isready to pursue matters to the most danger-ous line. In recent months he has been oc-cupied with an examination of this problem.We are thoroughly familiar with the realityof Cuba in the area of security, economicsand defense. We understand well the vul-nerability of Cuba. We have discussed thisproblem with the Soviet Union for a longtime. They understand perfectly well themeaning of these discussions and are awareof the limitations on activities, transgressionof which could lead to confrontation be-tween the superpowers, for which we areprepared.

At the same time, we have analyzedwith great care the needs of Cuba, in thesense of its hopes for the future. It seems tous that the Cuban people have suffered agreat deal from sacrifices imposed fromabroad. We believe that the possibility stillexists for a normalization of its relations notonly with the United States, but with all ofthis hemisphere.

You are aware, Mr. Minister, that in thedeveloping countries of the so-called “ThirdWorld,” there are many leaders who todayare turning away from the Soviet Union’sarms, its technical assistance, and trade withit, from participation in economic relations,where the reward is measured on a scale ofsacrifice. You yourselves suffer from thisreality and have a right to participate in in-ternational trade, including trade with theUnited States. I know that President Reaganconsiders trade with Cuba a possibility. Wemust discuss this in the atmosphere of mu-tual respect to which you referred, whichmust be the goal of an independent peace,and to do this it is necessary to account forgeopolitical reality.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Thank you verymuch.

I have listed with great interest to theexposition of principals laid forth by theesteemed Secretary of State. At the outset Iwill speak to two points. First of all, to yourwords about the position of Reagan on thequestion of bilateral relations with Cuba andits common position on the problem of peaceand problems confronting humanity today.

We have keenly felt the danger of theapproach to this problem by Reagan and hisgroup of leaders from an ideological pointof view. Speaking candidly, in the publicpronouncements, first and foremost ofReagan, we perceive a great ideologicalcontent. And we have been greatly surprisedby its manifestation in the declarations ofthe Secretary of State as well. And we havebeen surprised more than once because,judging from information received fromprominent European leaders, we had gaineda different impression about the positionsof Mr. Haig on international questions,which we had considered to be more prag-matic. That does not mean that they are notbased on principle, only that they are morepragmatic, not so much determined by theinfluence of ideology.

What we have heard gives us cause forreflection.

The second element that I consider tobe important inheres in the treatment of themutual feelings of the people of the UnitedStates and Cuba. I am fully in accord withthat.

Despite 22 years of continuous sharpexchanges, there is no anti-American senti-ment in Cuba. It does not exist among thepeople, and we, the leaders, similarly do notrule with anti-American sentiments. We cansay this absolutely categorically. This isseen in the course of any meetings of Ameri-cans with our people, irrespective of theirposts and positions.

I am satisfied with the opportunity -


after the words just spoken by the Secretaryof State - to attribute the current intensifi-cation of our conflicts to geopolitical rea-sons. And I would hope to possess all ofthe necessary eloquence, within the shorttime available to us, in order to attempt toprove that the geopolitical reality is not whatit is made out to be in this case.

I am aware that the Secretary of Stateis a great lover of philosophy. Thus, even inthe seventeenth century, since the time ofHume, it has been considered proven thatthe factual appearance of “B” following theappearance of “A” does not signify that “A”necessarily is the cause of the appearanceof “B.” I will attempt, in the briefest of fash-ion, in order to avoid tiring you, to describeour interpretation of events, beginning in1975.

We became involved in Angola with-out the slightest wish to establish our mili-tary presence there. Speaking of militarypresence, I have in mind the presence ofregular troops. In sending the first 150people to Angola, we had absolutely no con-ception of what would become of the eventsin that country. This I can state to you un-equivocally.

We had long maintained our ties withthe MPLA [Popular Movement for the Lib-eration of Angola] in its struggle againstPortuguese colonialism. President[Agostinho] Neto requested our assistancein the preparation of groups which led toorganization of the Angolan army. With thisaim we dispatched 150 persons in threeschools: one located in the south, the otherin the northeast, and the third aroundLuanda. The subsequent development ofevents ensued as follows: suddenly we re-ceived news from Neto that they had beenattacked by forces from Zaire and troops ofHolden Roberto from the north, and bySouth Africa from the south.

I can assure you unequivocally, inas-much as I played a direct role in this matter,that when the decision to dispatch Cubanforces into Angola was made, we commu-nicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union.We were not even aware of its point of viewon that account. And we had absolutely noidea of the number of troops that it wouldbe necessary to send. In this manner, thefirst group was dispatched when the forcesin the southern theater advanced more than400, almost 500 kilometers from theNamibian border, approaching Lobito andBenguela, and the forces of Zaire were lo-cated 30 kilometers from Luanda. In thissituation we sent at first not regular troops,but rather groups of commandos.

It is true that subsequently an agree-ment was reached between Cuba and the So-

viet Union regarding the activity of theforces, inasmuch as the Soviet Union al-ready had an obligation to Angola to supplyarms and it became necessary to speed upits implementation. As a result, we reachedan agreement, and we don’t deny this, un-der which the Soviet Union proceeded todispatch certain types of weapons, and wesent people who were capable of using them.

And thus it was. When we became in-volved in the events in Angola, we had ab-solutely no concept of the geopolitical con-ceptions about the importance of Angola inlight of the interests of the Soviet Union.We saw in Angola a friendly country, a groupof revolutionaries struggling against colo-nialism, against South Africa, and embarkedon all of this.

And then Ethipia stepped to the frontof the line. How did all of this happen there?

We established relations with Ethiopiaat the request of Somalia. We had main-tained no diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, andwe harbored serious doubts in relation to theprocess that was taking place in that coun-try. At the time, the leader of the revolutionwas not Mengistu. Power was in the handsof Teferi Bante. And I was personally as-signed to establish contact in Colombo [SriLanka], where I headed the Cuban delega-tion at a conference of the heads of state andgovernments of the non-aligned countries[in August 1976], to establish contact withTeferi Bante and Ali Bukarom, at that timeVice President of Somalia, for the purposeof attempting to reconcile them amongthemselves, which turned out to be impos-sible because of the refusal of Teferi Bante.

Subsequently, Vice President [of So-malia Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar, simul-taneously occupying the post of Minister ofDefense of Somalia, came to Cuba. I wasin charge of the preliminary negotiationswith him. In their course he addressed him-self with a request for military assistancefrom Cuba for an attack on Ethiopia, claim-ing that that country represented the great-est danger to socialism in North Africa. Atthat moment we had no idea that our troopswould ever end up in Ethiopia. We had agroup in Somalia, which was rendering as-sistance in the creation of a militia, and theSoviet Union had armed forces in Somaliaand was utilizing the Somali port of Berberaas a base for its navy. This is how the closecooperation with Somalia came about.

Samantar had a discussion with Fideland Raul Castro, who counseled in favor ofrestraint and the conduct of negotiations.

During his visit to Africa [in March1977], Fidel Castro met first with Siad Barreand then in Ethiopia with Mengistu, andagreed with them to conduct a historic meet-

ing in Aden. That meeting was attended byMengistu and his assistants, Siad Barre andhis assistants, Ali Rubayi, who at that timewas the president of [South] Yemen, FattahIsmail and Ali Nasir, who is now the presi-dent of South Yemen, and Cuba was repre-sented by Fidel Castro and myself. Fidelworked - and when I say Fidel, it is becausehe was at the center of that meeting - from10:00 p.m. to 7:00 in the morning, trying toachieve a consensus among the parties.However, this proved impossible to attain,because Siad Barre unequivocally rejectedall of the suggestions presented at the meet-ing. While the meeting did not lead to anagreement, nevertheless Siad Barre prom-ised not to attack Ethiopia. And then, whenSiad Barre attacked Ethiopia, we consideredourselves obligated to Mengistu, whom wehad persuaded to attend the peace confer-ence which had taken place in Aden.

One fine day, all of this will come tolight. You can believe me or not, but someday this will be common knowledge.

The outward geopolitical character ofthese events is completely at odds with theessence of the true facts. I had the privilegeto accompany Fidel Castro at the time ofhis meetings with the leadership of the So-viet Union. These were attended byBrezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, who had justreturned from Africa, Gromyko, andRusakov. And it was we who insistentlyurged the need to render military assistanceto Ethiopia. This was the situation, to bedistinguished from that in Angola, becausein this case preliminary negotiations weretaking place. But in these negotiations it wasFidel Castro himself who first advocatedmilitary assistance. History will bring allof this to light.

I did not understand what was saidabout Yemen, because our forces have neverbeen there. Subsequently we spoke aboutNicaragua, where the same is occurring.

In [South] Yemen, with the assistanceof a small number of specialists, we helpedto organize the militia. In this connection Ican assure you that if the war, which Yemenbegan, did not turn into an extended warbetween the North and the South, this wasmainly owing to the position of Cuba, whichnot only played no role in it, but which cat-egorically and completely opposed the war,and the current position of the command-ing army of Yemen, which surrendered allof its positions . . . was in large part con-nected with these events. [ellipsis in origi-nal--ed.]

In this fashion, it would be desirable,that in connection with this everythingshould be entirely clear - I am interested firstand foremost in the logic of the develop-


ment of events, namely, the logic.Let us turn now to Latin America,

where, as you say, beginning in 1975, therehas been a return to events characteristic ofthe 1960’s.

As you indicate, there was a tranquilperiod in relations between the United Statesand Cuba. I would say, as you did, that thistranquil period was interrupted by the eventsin Angola. I believe that this was connectedto the pride of Secretary of State Kissinger,who had his own plan for a solution forAngola, which did not include the govern-ment of Agostinho Neto[:] this is aptly de-scribed by [ex-CIA officer John] Stockwellin his book [In Search of Enemies], whichnobody could deny and Kissinger, havingmaintained ties with us, from that momentbecame our most sworn enemy.

The administration of Carter came topower and brought to life a prolonged anddifficult process. We believe that the prin-cipal actors in the Carter administration un-derstood the gist of events in Angola, butthat, unfortunately, the information of theCIA about Shaba was completely mistaken.

On the very day [25 May 1978] whenI was to meet, and did meet with CyrusVance in New York, one hour beforehandPresident Carter delivered a speech in Chi-cago, in which he laid on us the responsi-bility for the events in Shaba, in relation towhich we had not the slightest connectionand in respect to which we even conductedserious discussions with our Angolanfriends, warning them about the danger ofplacing the forces of the Shaba gendarme atthe border. That ruined everything.

And then came Nicaragua.I suggest to you, Mr. Secretary of State,

that you would be committing a serious er-ror in allowing a geopolitical mirage to im-pel you toward a mistaken interpretation. Iwanted to note, for example, that the mis-take in Shaba had a most negative result.Beginning in 1976, quietly, saying nothingto anybody, and without any pressure on us,we began to pull our people out of Angola,inasmuch as we considered that more ofthem were located there than was necessaryto ensure minimal security for that countryduring the period in which we were orga-nizing their armed forces. The events inShaba forced Neto to address us with a des-perate request, not only to refrain from re-moving personnel, but to return a portionof those personnel that we had already re-moved. For this reason, we now have morepeople in Angola than were there in 1976.

As for Central America. It is not onlywe who say that it would be a mistake toconceive of that which has happening nowin Central America as a result of external

subversive activity; even such moderategovernment leaders as Lopez-Portillo arecompletely open in their adherence to thisview. I believe that he knows [VenezuelanPresident] Carlos Andres Perez. I believethat Carlos Andres Perez is a right-wingSocial Democrat and holds to the same as-sessment. All who, during the course ofmany years, have engaged in analysis of thecircumstances in Central America, all who,during the course of many years have stud-ied it, have come to the opinion that this situ-ation is inflammable, naturally inflammable.

The circumstances of the struggleagainst Somoza gave rise to these events.We helped the Sandinista front in every waythat we could, with all of the means that wewere able to deploy. But we were not theonly ones who helped them. You know thatthere were several governments in LatinAmerica who helped them substantiallymore than we did. Thus, this was a situa-tion, which was regarded by Latin Americaas a fatal tumor which it was necessary toremove.

We are close friends with theSandinistas. [But] It would be a seriousmistake to believe that the Sandinistas relyon the advice that we give them. On thecontrary, they have a very clear concept ofthat which they are required to do.

We believe that the Sandinistas are in-clined to preserve in Nicaragua a pluralisticsystem. It is known that several of theSandinistas want to carry out a revolutionthat is deeper than that which exists at themoment. This is a fact. And we alwaysspeak the truth as we understand it. I be-lieve that they understand perfectly well thatit will be difficult and undesirable to hastenthe process of intensifying the revolution. Ibelieve it is correct what you said yesterdaybefore your departure from Washington, tothe effect that the possibility of negotiationswith the Sandinistas is not to be excluded,although I am disturbed by your pronounce-ment, which bore the resemblance of a threatdirected at Nicaragua, that time is runningshort. I distinctly regret your making thatstatement, and we can exchange our opin-ions on that score.

We are rendering and will continue torender to Nicaragua our solidarity and sup-port, inasmuch as we consider this our obli-gation and our right. We have no intention,regardless of the consequences, to refuse thesolidarity which we consider to be right. Ibelieve that Cuba is not in the slightest de-gree interfering in Nicaragua. We have there2,759 people, of which 2,045 are teachers,240 are technicians, 159 are doctors, and 66are nurses. We have no forces in Nicara-gua. We have there several dozen military

advisors of various categories, renderingassistance in the organization of the armedforces and training of the Nicaraguan army.That is all that we have there.

When we hear the repeated pronounce-ments of the esteemed Secretary of Stateabout our dispatch of 500-600 soldiers toNicaragua, and the statements of other lead-ers in the United States to the effect that wehave there 3,000 military instructors, all ofthis seems truly absurd to us, inasmuch as,it seems to me, we are in a position to knowwhat we have there. We are prepared topublish a list of those 500 persons, who wentthere on the day when [U.S. columnistsRoland] Evans and [Robert] Novak wrotethat in the course of two days, 500 Cubansarrived; we can state their names, the placewhere they lived in Cuba, and the placewhere they were teaching in Cuba. We cantell you the places, where they are teachingnow. We can publish the names and placesof employment of the 2,700 Cubans locatedin Nicaragua. And this will be easy to verify.It is true that we have there 2,759 persons.This is true. But it can be easily and univer-sally verified, that there are no [Cuban] sol-diers in Nicaragua.

It surprises us to hear talk that Cubahas sent arms, which Nicaragua has receivedfor its defense, and that such arms are fun-neled through Cuba. I have even heard dec-larations from Mr. Haig himself on thisscore. If the intelligence services of theUnited States speak of this, then they speakof what they do not know, for it would beeasy for them to verify whence these arma-ments came, how they were delivered, onwhat they arrived, in what manner they werefollowed, and not one of them came throughCuba.

Naturally, we are not inclined to dis-close the source from which they came andhow they arrived, but we know that the CIAknows how they arrived, in what manner,from where, and how many. So why do theysay that it came from Cuba; why do theyinsist that Cuba is involved in this[?] Cubais in agreement with the concept that Nica-ragua should be armed. Nicaragua has madeit completely clear to us, and we share theiropinion, that they are arming themselves notbecause they are next to Honduras, not be-cause they may suffer an attack from ElSalvador, and not because Guatemala mightparticipate in an attack against them, but fora combination of these factors, in additionto the threat from the United States. Thismuch is clear. You tell me. I know, that[State Department official Thomas] Endershas stated to the Nicaraguans, that it is ab-surd for them to arm themselves, inasmuchas the United States can destroy all of it in


the course of a very short period of time.This is true, this is true, it is for sure. How-ever, not one self-respecting small countrywill reconcile to a demand that it admit toits own destruction without putting up afight. I think it is necessary to understandthis. I think that it should be understood.

El Salvador.We do not have there, Mr. Haig, we do

not have there any troops, nor any militaryadvisors, and we say this to you with thesame clarity with which we have spoken toother leaders from different parts of theworld. We have declared this and are readyto prove it. We would request to be showneven one instance of an appearance there ofthese fabled Cuban troops. In those placeswhere Cuban troops are located, they areuniversally recognized, and in El Salvadorthey are nowhere to be found, inasmuch asthere are no Cuban troops, and no Cubanmilitary advisors there.

We are explaining all of this out of adesire to prevent a dramatic confrontationunder circumstances in which it is possibleto attain a mutual understanding by meansof negotiations. When we say that we arenot supplying armed forces to this or an-other part of the world, we say this not be-cause it would be a violation of the moralprinciples of Cuba or somehow unlawful.There is one confirmed fact: the UnitedStates has troops in various parts of theworld. President Reagan has admitted thatthe USA is rendering support to Afghancounter-revolutionaries located in Pakistan.He has publicly declared this.

Not long ago the administration forcedCongress to repeal the “Clark Amendment”on the grounds that it wanted a free handfor the purpose of rendering assistance to[UNITA leader Jonas] Savimbi and otherforces operating against the government ofAngola. Frankly speaking, we do not un-derstand why the United States, merely be-cause it happens to be, at the present time,one of the most powerful states, can have aright which we, being a small country, donot have. I believe that it is irrational to holdsuch a position. That is our principal point[iskhodnaia tochka], to which we will ad-here.

Thus, I have attempted with consider-able specificity to prove the absence of geo-political reasons. We could say the follow-ing: What does the “White Book” say? The“White Book” contains certain truths, andcertain lies, as well as certain data about thesupposed ties between the revolutionarieswho are struggling in El Salvador againstthe right-wing junta, and the Soviet Union.And what is evident from this: the fact thatthe Soviet Union has absolutely no desire

to involve itself. I am acquainted with col-leagues who are noted there. These col-leagues exist and are carrying out their ob-ligations. But these colleagues have nopower, they are not authorized to bestow thename of the Soviet Union, not one iota. Itis clearly visible, that the Soviet Union inno way wants to be entangled in anythingwhich is seen to be a revolutionary processin which it does not desire to participate.

I would like to tell you something inaddition to this. Certain American leadersare always expressing the opinion that theSoviet Union acted as a hostile influencebetween the United States and Cuba, that itfermented in Cuba hostile feelings towardsthe United States. I could tell you that theopposite is true. Many of the conflicts thatwe have had with the Soviet Union wereoccasioned by the acts, words, and positionsof Cuba, which did not correspond with theintentions of the Soviet Union in this por-tion of the world. I believe that nothingworries the Soviet Union more than thecourse of developments in the situation inCentral America and the Caribbean Basin,which could become a new element in theconflict between the United States and theSoviet Union. I believe that when Mr. Haigand Mr. Reagan have the opportunity to con-sult with Fidel Castro, he will tell them aboutthis in greater detail than I can, because, al-though I have attended many meetings, nev-ertheless, no one could speak about thisproblem more than he.

Such are the facts.And what about our position in rela-

tion to the events in El Salvador? At thepresent time we are in favor of a politicalsolution. A political solution which, natu-rally, we understand to be more or less en-compassed in the plan which was announcedyesterday by President Lopez-Portillo: thepossibility of convening a Founding Assem-bly, but with the participation of all theforces involved in the conflict, including theRevolutionary-Democratic Front and theFront for the National Liberation ofFarabundo Marti. Such is the position ofCuba.

We are prepared for any compromisein this direction, a compromise in which, aswe understand it, the other parties will alsobe committed, including the United States.We must all take these obligations uponourselves. We can discuss the extent of ourparticipation in all of this. In this connec-tion our intentions were communicated byComrade Fidel Castro to President LopezPortillo, to the Deputy Chairman of the So-cialist International Vishnevsky, to the chair-man of the Liberal Democratic Party ofCanada [Edward] Broadbent, communi-

cated in a letter to [Canadian Prime Minis-ter Pierre Elliot] Trudeau during the courseof an exchange of correspondence with him.In this I repeat that for which we are pre-pared.

You touched upon our difficulties andour vulnerability. This is true. We are vul-nerable, and our people has suffered a greatdeal from the American blockade. You callthis an embargo. We consider ourselves tobe blockaded by the United States. We havesuffered physically. Our hospitals at timeshave been without medicine. We have suf-fered economically. Three days ago I re-ceived a communication from London, inwhich it was indicated that several compa-nies, due to pressure from the Americans,had difficulty obtaining nickel. The Japa-nese have repeatedly stated to us, that ow-ing to American pressure, they cannot de-velop economic relations with us to the ex-tent that they would like to achieve.

We well understand, and Fidel Castrohas spoken about this, that if we could im-prove relations with the United States, thenour conditions would be better. The veryfact of having the United States as a poten-tial market, located several miles from us,would ease our problems. We would haveaccess to technology that is currently inac-cessible to us, we would have access to fi-nancing which we do not have, and we be-lieve that this is desirable and possible. ButI would like for you to understand our pointof view, that we do not intend, for the pur-pose of achieving that, to sacrifice thatwhich we considerto be our primary prin-ciples. Of course, you have not told me,that we must sacrifice them. But I wouldlike to discuss this question as it arises fromthe concepts of the current administrationof the United States. As we understand thismatter, we are not being requested to be anally of the United States or to conform withthe social system that exists there. We donot like the social system in the UnitedStates. But, naturally, that is the social sys-tem of the United States, and the Americanpeople are entitled to decide what they mustdo. In view of all these realities, it followsthat we should examine the following prin-ciples:

First, the sovereignty of Cuba - the in-alienable right, being understood to includeterritorial sovereignty, including the base atGuantanamo; we have the right to trade withthe entire world, including the United States.

Second: we have a right to solidaritywith the countries of the “Third World,” andin particular, with the countries of LatinAmerica.

Third: our friendship with the SovietUnion. We are friends of the Soviet Union,


close friends. We reject any suggestion thatwe are an agent of the Soviet Union in anypart of the world. I have explained to youthe nature of our position on this issue. Wenot only have real feelings for the SovietUnion, cemented in a common ideology, butalso we have received significant assistancefrom the Soviet Union for our own eco-nomic development. Naturally, with thatassistance alone we cannot develop ourcountry as quickly as necessary and as wewould like to. However, we do not believethat such assistance is incompatible with theestablishment of normalized relations be-tween the United States and Cuba.

Alexander Haig. Mr. Rodriguez, I be-lieve this has been a very fruitful exchange.I am certain that you will forgive me, if I donot agree with all of this logic. Severalmonths ago our intervention prevented aserious clash between your forces locatedin Angola and the South Africans. But thenext time it is possible that we will not havesuch success in stopping their movementwith the assistance of our influence.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I would saythat our forces are located far away fromthem, and that it was not merely your inter-vention, but our restraint.

Alexander Haig. I know that. I amaware of that. But they would have ad-vanced further to your bases, and we stoppedit. We knew nothing about their operationsor about when they would commence. Butthe fact that they appeared served as a sourceof information for them concerning the op-erations of SWAPO [the Southwest AfricanPeople’s Organization]. They even captureda Soviet prisoner, who has not stopped talk-ing to this moment about how he was cap-tured, about the scale of activity and coor-dination of activities in Angola. He did notexclude anything from his observations.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But that was nota Cuban prisoner. Correct?

Alexander Haig. Correct. We knewwhere the Cuban armed forces were located,and we also know, that it would be highlydesirable, if Cuba would pull out of Angola.This would help Angola, it would help Cuba,and it would assist in the resolution of theissue over the independence of Namibia andnormalization of conditions. This is some-thing that I have discussed with the Sovi-ets, the Angolans, and the governments ofthe “Front Line,” and there is an ever grow-ing opinion, that this is the very thing whichyou must do.

And moreover, as concerns the eventswhich you described, and the activity of theCIA, I can assure you, that they are in pos-session of information about military aircraftwhich has been supplied by you to other

countries. I could furnish you with infor-mation about these things which, perhaps,are taking place without the knowledge ofsome members of the government. That canhappen. It has happened at times even inour country, not very often, but in certaininstances.

We believe that the presence of Cubain Nicaragua constitutes a threat to the con-tinent, and in addition, we believe that theactivity of Nicaragua in El Salvador like-wise constitutes a serious threat. I can as-sure you categorically that we are in pos-session of comprehensive proof of such in-volvement. There isn’t the slightest bit ofdoubt about it. It’s a fact. We have photo-graphs, documents, minutes of interroga-tions and “confirmations” by those interro-gated. For this reason, I cannot agree withthat which you are telling me. I am not say-ing that you have no right to say it. Youhave every right to say what you want to,but we also have a right to draw our ownconclusions from the events as we see them.We have proof, and we are telling you aboutit.

Unfortunately, the time has come,when the rhetorical debate between theUnited States and Cuba will not solve theproblem, and, on the contrary, there is anarray of areas in which the sovereignty ofCuba is not in the slightest bit implicated.However, Cuba is exporting revolution andbloodshed on the continent.

We know what you write, we knowwhat you defend, we know what you aretalking about, and we believe that it consti-tutes a threat to peace and stability, and wecannot see it in any other light, inasmuch aswe are talking about objective reality.

You complained about the embargo.We have not had an effective embargo, butwe can impose one on sugar, on the produc-tion of all the products which you use toobtain hard currency. However, we don’twant to do that, we don’t want to have anyother complications. I must inform you ofthis. You speak of solidarity with theSandinistas. I believe that you would ren-der to them the greatest form of solidarity,if you would bring the Cubans home, andsay to the Sandinistas that they should es-tablish an order that does not violate therights...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Return doctors?Teachers? Return three thousand Cubanswho...

Alexander Haig. We have a very goodaccount of the doctors, teachers, Angolanveterans and military advisers, their titles,names and past activity.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. It would be in-teresting to take a look at it.

Alexander Haig. I can assure you thatthe benign picture that you have painteddoes not conform to reality. I’m not sayingthat you don’t have a significant number ofteachers there, but they are teaching yourphilosophy to Nicaraguan children, just asthey tried to do in Chile. However, we donot agree that you have the right to do that.The Nicaraguans have the right to teach theirpeople what they believe in. You are deeplyinvolved in the Sandinista revolutionarymovement, and we suggest that this createsa great risk for us all: for the Cubans, forthe hemisphere, and for Nicaragua. We be-lieve that Cuba should reexamine this. No-body is asking Cuba to humiliate itself; weare not talking about that. We are talkingabout the conditions of ever increasingbloodshed in Central America.

We believe that the only solution forEl Salvador is to allow the Salvadoranpeople themselves to decide their own fate,that is, by means of the electoral process, inwhich all sides should participate. A Legis-lative Assembly would be created, in whichthe political process would conform com-pletely with the will of the people. But wecannot consent to Nicaragua’s interveningin El Salvador under the mask of solidarityor any other revolutionary ruse, as it hasbeen doing for quite some time. And yourpresence there, your assistance, facilitatesthis. Just as day follows night, this is theobjective reality.

I have no doubts about the facts whichyou have marshalled with respect to Shabaor the situation in Ethiopia. However, thequestion arises, on what basis do Cubanforces continue to be located in Angola, per-forming various functions, and in Ethio-pia[?] Why do the regimes want this? I amaddressing a serious question to you, not inrespect to Ethiopia, but about the situationin Angola.

You say that you are not involved inSouth Yemen, but I can tell you, that we havecounted large and small aircraft, which haveflown from Ethiopia to South Yemen, andwe have heard radio broadcasts...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. And did you seeCubans as well?

Alexander Haig. We have interceptedradio broadcasts in the Spanish language. Ihave read them every day. And if it wasn’tyou, then it was Ethiopians that speak Span-ish remarkably well. And for this reason, Iam telling you, that all of this activity, be itwithin the framework of geopolitics or oth-erwise, has convinced the Americans that ithas a geopolitical connection.

Consequently, we must find a solution,if we are interested in peace and stability inthe immediate future, we must find a solu-


tion to these problems. Otherwise, we willbe required to pursue a different course,which, I believe, after my discussions withyou here, would not be desirable for you. Iknow that the United States also does notwant this, but it is prepared, after many yearsof not being in a position to take any mea-sures, is ready to take them very quickly.Therefore, I am speaking to you of the needto immediately find a solution. I can assureyou, that these solutions would not impingethe honor, sovereignty, or integrity of Cubaor the Cuban people. Nobody wants that.That would be foolish. And it is an objec-tive fact, that it would be much easier toachieve this by force, but that is not our in-tention. However, frankly speaking, webelieve that time is slipping away.

We have not disclosed to the Ameri-can public our data or the information thatis available to us. You have seen the “WhiteBook,” but we have another fifty of them.We have volumes, records of radio broad-casts, data from technical reconnaissance,we have photographs.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. A good factoryfor “White Books.”

Alexander Haig. It’s just the first chap-ter.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I understandthat you have a good factory for “WhiteBooks.”

Alexander Haig. Notwithstanding, thePresident does not want to do this, althoughhe is prepared to do it and very soon. Thiswould incite great enmity, and would stirup emotions even more. I insist that youtake seriously what I have told you, and onan assessment that any sound-mindedAmerican will be compelled to make in theface of the events I have described. Thisdoes not mean that your involvement hasnot been exactly as you have described it;however, we regard this as a serious threatto our vital interests and the interests ofpeace and stability in the hemisphere.

If you share my opinion that stabilityand peace are desirable in the hemisphere,then you can work out a solution that doesnot compromise your dignity. How couldthis be accomplished so that nobody evenasked you about that? I have already saidthat it would be necessary to extol the firm-ness of Cuba and its spirit of self-sacrifice.However, the basic problem in this matterremains the same, about which we are en-gaged today in the whole world: peacefulchanges in the framework of acceptable le-gality, and not through bloodshed, arms, andnot by the means of instigating terrorism andrevolution.

And so, if the Cuban Revolution hasmatured to this point, then that is fine. If

that is not the case, then we are on a pathtoward confrontation, and soon. I know thatthis sounds like rhetoric, but believe me, Ihave examined and reexamined many docu-ments, detailed reconnaissance data, thecontent of negotiations conducted in all partsof the word; much of may be inexact, and Iam certain that there is inexactness in the“White Book,” and it could not be other-wise. It has to do with reconnaissance andintercepted documents which, for the mostpart, we have examined in Colombia, wherethe involvement of the Cubans was signifi-cant, and we did not raise the question aboutColombia...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Let’s talk aboutthat as well...

Alexander Haig. Your involvementwas significant...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Not as signifi-cant as it was said to be.

Alexander Haig. ...but significantenough to raise problems. And this is oc-curring also in Guatemala...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. If you will per-mit me, I will address that later.

Alexander Haig. ...fine, what I am say-ing is, that we must find a solution andquickly.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. What solution?Alexander Haig. There must be a so-

lution, because nobody gave Cuba the di-vine right to interfere in the internal affairsof the countries in this hemisphere, regard-less of what arguments may be advanced tojustify it. You know that today we have 34military advisors in El Salvador. And howmany does Cuba have in Nicaragua?

Carlos R. Rodriguez. We have therenot many more advisors, not many more.

Alexander Haig. We are in possessionof intelligence, and you are correct when yousay that there are many independent forcesin Nicaragua. And they tell us every daywhat is happening there every day. Andwhat is happening is unacceptable. Regard-less of the manner in which you describe it,regardless of what seems to you subjectivelyas moderation, it cannot be accepted. Anxi-ety exists in the countries of this hemisphere.There was a time when Cuba held verysound positions in the non-aligned world.However, issues have now arisen concern-ing its involvement. It is essential that wecome to a mutual understanding, otherwisethe results may be very serious. And we arenot talking about the intervention of Ameri-can forces against Nicaragua, we are notgoing to do that. However, we can find noexplanation for an army of 50,000 men anda militia of 200,000 men. There is no justi-fication for that.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Why not?

Alexander Haig. Fine, as countriesthey have the right to do this, but if theychoose this course, then they must pay theprice for that choice. And this gives rise toanxiety in all of the countries in the region,and they are bound to oppose it. This con-stitutes a danger. Wherein lies the neces-sity for this? I have no information to sug-gest that any country wants to invade Nica-ragua. If you have in mind a handful ofSomoza supporters, who are engaged insmuggling in Honduras and who do not evenhave arms, the government of Honduras hasannounced that it is attempting to relocatethem to another place in order to avoid anypretext for an invasion. And that effort hasalready been underway for a period of sev-eral months. I say to you in complete can-dor, that time is slipping away from us.

For this very reason, as you are aware,the Mexicans proposed this approach. Ihave studied all of the negotiations that tookplace during the time of the Carter adminis-tration, and they were nothing but a seriesof delaying tactics, in order to prevent anyprogress. And nothing was achieved by that,not a thing. We do not want to establishthat kind of a dialogue, you don’t want that,and we don’t want it. If you are prepared tospeak seriously, we are also prepared. Butwe are in need of a prepared context for dis-cussions and some kind of sign from yourside that results will be achieved.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Inasmuch as wehave little time, I will try to be brief, laconic,and objective.

First, you have insisted upon the needfor a solution and have expressed the inter-est of the United States in a solution in whichthere would be no humiliation of Cuba orthreat to the sovereignty of Cuba. We areprepared to search for a solution, and wemust come to an agreement at another timeabout what steps to take, because this in-volves not only the United States and Cuba,but also the other countries of the region,and the revolutionary forces with their owncriteria and points of view. We believe thatMexico could be a uniting link in this mat-ter. We could conduct an even more directexchange of opinions.

Alexander Haig. Let’s maintain con-tact directly, without intermediaries, as wehave done in the past. We could send ourambassador with special authority, General[Vernon] Walters, to Havana. We can meet,in turn, in Havana and New York, because,in my view, we must commence a dialogueimmediately.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. I believe that thisis important, and we are ready to do it. Inaddition to this I would like to introduce sev-eral clarifications, because certain misun-


derstandings can arise.I do not want at this time to commence

a discussion about the facts, although atsome point we can also discuss whetherthere or not there is falsification. WhenGeneral Walters comes to Cuba, I think thatit is important for him to bring with him asmuch data as possible in order to examine itfor the purpose of interpreting these facts.

I remember that the “Bay of Pigs” wasbrought about by information from peoplelocated in Cuba that led the CIA to a mis-taken conclusion. As regards your referenceto aircraft, I can tell you, that everybodyknows what is taking place in Cuba. Wehave no factions in the government. Wehave a division of labor. However, the mem-bers of the Politburo know everything thatthe military is doing. And I can assure youthat you are telling me things with which Icannot in the slightest bit agree, franklyspeaking, not in the slightest degree. AboutAngola, about Ethiopia. They ask, why arewe still located there[?] Because they wantus there, and the same in Angola. If, as aresult of what is happening there now (wealready know about the results of the meet-ing of the contact group, about the decisionof the foreign ministers of Africa, we seethat there is an opportunity to achieve a con-sensus on Namibia, and that there are vis-ible signs of progress), if as a result of asolution to the Namibia issue the Angolansallow us to withdraw our forces, then weare ready to leave there. There is no doubtabout this whatsoever. But I am concernedby the fact that we have in Angola not onlyseveral thousand soldiers, several tens ofthousands of soldiers, but also several thou-sand construction workers and civilians.

And the information that you arespreading about Nicaragua is a completefalsification. We can discuss all of this withGeneral Walters in detail in the course ofseveral days. We can discuss this, and wecan give you all of the details that are ofinterest to you, because we do not want aconfrontation to arise because of a mistake.

We are also prepared for a confronta-tion. We know that such a confrontation willbe traumatic for our people. We have nodoubt about this. But neither are we afraidof a confrontation. What we fear is an un-necessary confrontation, in which, as a re-sult of errors by both sides, as a result of anabsence of contacts, thousands of Americansand hundreds of thousands of Cubans willperish. This worries us. And I am worriedby other elements of interpretation which, Ibelieve, we must discuss. If necessary, I canon any day leave for New York and orga-nize a different, more detailed meeting. Butseveral of your personal interpretations

which, as you say, are also consistent withthe interpretations of the President of theUnited States, cause me great anxiety. Forexample, I do not believe that the UnitedStates has any right to interfere in mattersrelated to the presence of Cuban teachers inNicaragua. This, and what they are teach-ing, is a question for the Nicaraguan gov-ernment to decide. I can assure you, thatthese are elementary school teachers whocan hardly teach Marxist-Leninism. I don’tknow whether you have ever attempted toread any books about Marxist-Leninism, butit would be very difficult for our 2,700 teach-ers to teach Marxist-Leninism to little Indi-ans. However, we believe that only the gov-ernment of Nicaragua, and no other, mustdecide whether or not they need our teach-ers. I am convinced of this, because I havehad enough discussions with the Nicaraguanleadership and I have also spoken with Fi-del, and I know from other discussions, atwhich I have been present, that the Nicara-guans do not have the slightest desire or in-terest to intrude in Honduras. They under-stand perfectly well that this would leadthem into a confrontation with the UnitedStates, and there would be nothing worsefor Nicaragua, than to be pulled into a con-frontation with the United States.

We can and must continue our discus-sion about all these things. You say that timeis slipping away from us. Let us use it tothe maximum extent. I want to say onething: Cuba never lies, and Fidel never lies.That which we say, we can prove. I havestated to you what we are prepared to do,where we can achieve a consensus, andwhere we cannot achieve a consensus.When we say “We are obligated to do it,”we are obligated.

You spoke of Colombia. You do notknow how these members of M-19 endedup in Cuba. [Colombian] President [Julio-Cesar] Turbay [Ayala] had a telephone con-versation with me in which he requested me- requested me! - that we accept in Cubamembers of M-19, inasmuch as they hadseized a group of ambassadors in the em-bassy of the Dominican Republic. As a re-sult, they came to Cuba. They were in Cuba,they underwent preparation, just as thou-sands of others who come to Cuba. AnyLatin American who comes to Cuba - mem-ber of the intelligentsia, poet, military per-son - wants us to teach him to use firearms.And we have taught thousands. That is true.And we never conceal the truth, but we havehad nothing in common with the training ofthe group that infiltrated Colombia, and hadnothing to do with its arming. The coun-tries who have spoken about this are fullyaware of who trained them, who gave them

weapons, and who organized them. I canassure you that Fidel Castro exerted effortsto prevent this adventurism, not for the sakeof the government of Turbay, but for the sakeof the fate of those young people that weknew would be killed. This was an ill-con-ceived adventure.

However, as to why Cuba trained themen of M-19. At our initiative, an agree-ment was reached with [Colombian] Presi-dent Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, when hecame to power, when he again recognizedCuba: we agreed not to help, in any way,any one partisan group, and we fulfilled thatagreement. You can ask Alfonso Lopezabout this. And we adhered to this underthe government of Turbay. And only afterthe government of Turbay assumed a hos-tile position in the United Nations, whichwe, in a geopolitical sense, interpreted as aprovocation directed by the United States,only then did we consider ourselves dis-charged from that agreement.

There is no obligation that we havetaken upon ourselves with any country,group or government, that we have failed tohonor. This should be clear to the UnitedStates.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 84, d. 584, ll. 1-27; translation by Bruce McDonald; docu-ment obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Projectand on file at National Security Archive.]

RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performedin the Russian archives may contractwith scholars at the Russian Center “Ar-chival Conversation at the HistoricalArchives Institute (HAI) of the RussianState University for the Humanities inMoscow. For further informationplease direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov;Historical Archives Institute (HAI);Russian State University for the Hu-manities; Moscow, Russian Federation;fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964-3534; tel.: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095)925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiriesregarding possible collaboration for re-search in Russian archives to:

Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian; Di-rector, Institute of Universal History;Leninsky prospekt 32a; 117334 Mos-cow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095)938-2288; tel: (7-095) 938-1009


COMMENTARIES

CUBA AS SUPERPOWER:HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979

by Jorge I. Dominquez

In 1979, Cuba behaved as if it werea superpower. Tens of thousands of Cu-ban troops were stationed in Angola andEthiopia, and hundreds of other Cubanmilitary advisers, trainers, and addi-tional troops were posted to other coun-tries across the seas. Cuba had interna-tional programs assisting about threedozen countries in Africa, LatinAmerica, the Middle East, and South-east Asia; many of these programs re-quired the overseas deployment of Cu-ban personnel, while others providedtraining in Cuba itself for over 20,000foreigners. In part for these reasons (andnotwithstanding Havana’s tight alliancewith the Soviet Union), Cuba had beenelected chairman of the NonalignedMovement—at the time a significant or-ganization of African, Asian, LatinAmerican, and Caribbean countries—and it hosted its sixth summit in Ha-vana in September 1979.

Cuba was also the Soviet Union’sonly truly reliable military ally in theCold War, and the Cuban armed forcesproved to be the only communist armycapable of fighting effectively in dis-tant locales for objectives at best remotefrom the “cause” of the defense of thehomeland. From the mid–1970s to theend of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cubantroops served abroad. In any given year,relative to its population, Cuba hadmore troops posted overseas every yearthan the United States had posted inVietnam at the peak of its engagementin that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, theCuban armed forces were able to ac-complish three times on African soil (inAngola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethio-pia in 1978) what the United Statescould not do in Vietnam and what theSoviet Union could not do in Afghani-stan: Cuban troops won the wars theywent to fight.

Nearly two decades later, this ac-count reads like a fantasy, for Cuba’sgovernment today is struggling to sur-vive, all its troops have been repatriated,

and its concessional foreign aid pro-grams have ended. The Soviet Unionno longer exists, and the Russian Fed-eration is unable and unwilling to pro-vide Cuba with the funding and othersupport that permitted the latter to be-have as if it were a superpower.

The declassified documents fromthe Soviet archives, which this note ac-companies, are drawn mainly from theyear 1979; even the document that datesfrom 1981 focuses principally on eventsthat had taken place at the end of the1970s. None of the documents breaksmajor new ground;1 the basic issuesthese documents discuss have been partof the public record for some time. Butthe documents do shed interesting lighton a variety of questions, the most im-portant of which is the nature of the So-viet–Cuban relationship at what turnedout to be the apex of their joint influ-ence in world affairs.

In the summer of 1979, the UnitedStates (re-)discovered the presence ofa Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. Thatbrigade had been left in Cuba since the1962 missile crisis consistent with thesame “trip-wire” concept that had ledthe United States to keep troops in Eu-rope. In each case, the forward forcesposted by the respective superpowerwere deemed insufficient to stop an all-out invasion by the other superpower,but the presence of those forward forceshad deterrent value: if an invasion wereto occur, both superpowers would beimmediately and automatically lockedin war. As it turned out, some time inthe late 1960s the U.S. government losttrack of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; itwas found only as a result of intensi-fied intelligence monitoring of Cuba inthe late 1970s.

The attached documents for Sep-tember 1979 discuss the Soviet and Cu-ban response to the new U.S. challenge.The issue for the two governments wasto decide how honest they should be intheir response to the United States. Withauthorization from President FidelCastro, on September 1 Armed ForcesMinister General Raúl Castro sought anagreement with the Soviet Union on thecontent and style of the reply. GeneralCastro’s preferred formulation was:“For the past 17 years a symbolic So-

viet combat unit, created as a trainingcenter where Soviet military specialiststrain officers of the [Cuban armedforces] to use and maintain new mili-tary equipment, has indeed been locatedin Cuba.” He recalled Cuba’s “experi-ence with previous confrontations withAmericans regarding the Soviet militarypresence on the island” and emphasizedthat “we should not camouflage the realstate of affairs.” Certainly, he empha-sized, there should be no attempt “tonegate the presence of a training centeron Cuba” because that would be inter-preted “as a repudiation by Cuba andthe USSR of their right to create such acenter and send the necessary militarypersonnel” to Cuba.

In fact, as the subsequent docu-ments indicate, the Soviets chose tocamouflage. Their response to theUnited States acknowledged the pres-ence of a “military training center” butdid not acknowledge that it was a “com-bat unit,” contrary to Cuba’s preference.In 1979, the Cuban leadership behavedas good believers in democratic central-ism. Fidel Castro’s own reassurances tothe United States emphasized that it wasa military training center, with no ref-erence to a “combat unit”—echoing theSoviet position exactly.2 Only in Sep-tember 1991, when the Russian Federa-tion government announced its decisionto withdraw the combat brigade fromCuba, did Havana publicly vent its an-ger that the Soviets had rejected Cuba’sadvice in 1979.

Cuba believed that the Soviet po-sition in 1979 retreated from the prin-ciple that both governments had theright to agree to station a Soviet com-bat unit in Cuba. Cuba was closer to themark. The settlement of the 1979 crisisin fact modified the series of under-standings begun in 1962 that hadevolved over time. For the first timethose mutual understandings extendedto conventional forces. Also for the firsttime, the Soviets accepted a limitationon the presence of their military person-nel in Cuba, pledging (27 September1979 document) that “We do not haveany intention of changing its status as[a military training] center.” In effect,this minicrisis was settled through a uni-


lateral Soviet concession to the UnitedStates.

Other important areas of disagree-ment between the Soviets and the Cu-bans become evident in the minutes ofthe 23 November 1981 meeting be-tween Cuban Vice-President CarlosRafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary ofState Alexander Haig.3 The text makesit clear that the talks were not success-ful. Nonetheless, the minutes show aperhaps surprisingly accommodatingopening gambit from Haig, followed byhis lack of understanding of one keypoint that Rodríguez was communicat-ing. Haig’s principal concern was theclose connection between Cuba and theSoviet Union in backing Cuban over-seas operations. Rodríguez kept tellingHaig, in effect, that it was fine for theUnited States to blame Cuba but, please,do not blame the USSR.!

Rodríguez first asserts: “I can as-sure you unequivocally, inasmuch as Iplayed a direct role in this matter, thatwhen the decision to dispatch Cubanforces into Angola was made [in 1975],we communicated nothing about it tothe Soviet Union. We were not evenaware of its point of view on that ac-count.” Next, Rodríguez discusses theEthiopian war (1977–78): “I had theprivilege to accompany Fidel Castro atthe time of his meetings with the lead-ership of the Soviet Union. . . . And itwas we who insistently urged the needto render military assistance to Ethio-pia. This was the situation, to be distin-guished from that in Angola, becausein this case preliminary negotiationswere taking place. But in these nego-tiations it was Fidel Castro himself whofirst advocated military assistance.” Fi-nally, Rodríguez turned to the troublesin Central America: “Certain Americanleaders are always expressing the opin-ion that the Soviet Union acted as ahostile influence between the UnitedStates and Cuba, that it fermented inCuba hostile feelings toward the UnitedStates. I could tell you that the oppositeis true. Many of the conflicts that wehave had with the Soviet Union wereoccasioned by the acts, words, and po-sitions of Cuba, which did not corre-spond with the intentions of the SovietUnion in this portion of the world.”

These three statements are quiteconsistent with everything that had beenknown about the nature of Cuban-So-viet relations in general, and specificallyon these issues. The only exception isthat Rodríguez claims a larger role forCuban initiative in making the decisionto enter the Ethiopian-Somali war onEthiopia’s side, whereas scholars hadbelieved that the Soviets had had a con-siderably greater impact in making thatoriginal decision. The key point thatHaig, and others, missed is that theUSSR. had a restraining effect on Cubain the late 1970s, and that serious dif-ferences occurred between the SovietUnion and Cuba because the latter wasmuch more militant. To be sure, Cubacould not have conducted such a far–ranging foreign policy were it not forthe massive Soviet political, economic,and military backing, and on this cen-tral issue Haig was right to challengeRodríguez.

The attached documents also fea-ture other interesting aspects of Soviet–Cuban relations. For one, they demon-strate a thorough and competent knowl-edge of Cuban affairs and policies bySoviet embassy officials. They show avery close communication between thetwo governments on large and small is-sues that concern them. The minutes ofthe Soviet Politburo meetings under-score the importance Soviet leaders ac-corded to securing Fidel Castro’s agree-ment on the proposed joint course—even if Castro’s views did not prevailin the end.

The documents also shed light onthe role of several key Cuban officials,some of whom remain important play-ers in contemporary Cuba. Rodríguezwas long a thoughtful and cosmopoli-tan influence at the peak of the Cubangovernment, and his encounter withHaig—though ultimately unsuccess-ful—confirms his reputation for states-manship. José Antonio Arbesú has beenfor many years a senior Cuban govern-ment and communist party decisionmaker and analyst with broad respon-sibilities for U.S.–Cuban relations; the27 December 1979 document illustrateshis broad competence in analyzing U.S.affairs. Raúl Valdés Vivó has repeatedlybeen given high responsibility by Cu-

ban government officials, and has re-peatedly produced nefarious results.The 4 July 1979 document cites FidelCastro’s judgment that Valdés Vivó“failed to discharge the functions en-trusted to him and was unable correctlyand precisely to fulfill his assigned taskin a recent trip to a number of Africancountries.” Valdés Vivó “raised a hostof doubts and false rumors not onlyamong our Soviet friends, but amongthe Africans as well.” In 1996, ValdésVivó, then heading the School of Po-litical Science at the University of Ha-vana, took the lead in launching an as-sault on the highest-quality semi–au-tonomous Cuban research think-tanks,intolerantly and dogmatically criticiz-ing their research on Cuba.4

The documents conclude with atimeless statement about Cuba’s ap-proach to international affairs. Thoughnot always honored, it remains an im-portant signpost for governments thatmust still deal with Fidel Castro’s gov-ernment: “There is no obligation thatwe have taken upon ourselves with anycountry, group, or government that wehave failed to honor.”

1 I have written about these issues in Jorge I.

Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu-

tion: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1979).2 Castro’s remarks in Granma Weekly Review, 7

October 1979, 2.3 For Haig’s account, see his Caveat: Realism,

Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York:

Macmillan, 1984), 130–137.4 For an example of his writings on general Cu-

ban affairs in recent times, see Raúl Valdés Vivó,

“¿Sociedad civil o gato por liebre,” Granma, 4

January 1996, 2.

******

A “Moment of Rapprochement”:The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks

by Peter Kornbluh

The United States “will go to thesource” to stop Havana’s alleged exportof revolution in Central America, Sec-retary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.dramatically warned Fidel Castro’sCuba shortly after Ronald Reagan took


office. On 23 November 1981, Haigdid just that, sitting down for a secretmeeting with Cuban Vice-PresidentCarlos Rafael Rodriguez in MexicoCity to discuss the issues that dividedthe United States and Cuba.

Of all the American presidential ad-ministrations that have dealt with FidelCastro since 1959, Reagan’s seemed theleast likely to engage in a dialogue withCuba’s communist government; and ofall the hardline officials in the ReaganAdministration, Alexander Haigseemed the most unlikely choice forsuch a mission. “I want to go afterCuba,” Haig told his then deputy Rob-ert McFarlane in early 1981 as he de-manded a plan for U.S. military pres-sure against Castro. As McFarlane re-ported in his memoirs, “it was as thoughHaig had come into office thinking,‘Where can we make a quick win?’ andjudged that place to be Cuba.”1

For that reason, the Haig-Rodriguez talks stand as an extraordi-nary episode of U.S.-Cuban diplomacyat the height of the Cold War in theWestern Hemisphere.

Extreme secrecy surrounded prepa-rations for the talks: Reagan and Haigkept most of the U.S. government outof the loop; an unmarked car was usedto ferry Haig from the U.S. Embassy tothe private home of Mexican ForeignMinister Jorge Castaneda; and Haig andRodriguez agreed this would be an “un-official, secret meeting.” Yet it quicklyleaked to the Spanish magazine El Pais,and then to the Mexican and U.S. press.In a televised interview with CBS Newsin January 1982, Reagan admitted thatsuch a meeting had, in fact, occurred.2

Moreover, since the 1984 publica-tion of Haig’s memoirs,3 historianshave had a U.S. version of the Mexicomeeting. Haig’s rendition of events, andhis summary of the substance of thetalks, generally comports to the Cubanversion printed in this issue of the Bul-letin (although it omits discussion ofhow the secret meeting came to occurin the first place). This Cuban tran-script—originally in Spanish, translatedinto Russian, obtained by scholars fromthe Russian archives and now translatedinto English—provides new details, aswell as the flavor of the discussion and

insights into the style and personalitiesof the two diplomats involved.

The Mexican government was si-multaneously intermediary, mediator,and catalyst for the Haig-Rodriguezmeeting. Alarmed by the Cold Warrhetoric emating from the Reagan Ad-ministration—much of it from Haighimself—in 1981 the government ofPresident Jose Lopez-Portillo sought tomitigate the growing potential for U.S.intervention in Central America and theCaribbean by urging dialogue insteadof what the Cubans described as “ver-bal terrorism.” In an effort to preemptfuture hostilities, Mexican Foreign Min-ister Jorge Castaneda called for “aceasefire of silence.” “Mexico,” he of-fered, “is prepared to serve as a bridge,as a communicator, between its friendsand neighbors.”4

Lopez-Portillo’s major opportunityto promote an agenda of negotiationscame at the North-South Summit heldat the Mexican resort of Cancun in Oc-tober 1981. Cuba had been involved inthe preparatory meetings for the sum-mit, and Mexican officials hoped thegathering of world leaders might pro-vide an opportunity for a “discreet”meeting between Castro and Reagan.But, according to one of the conferenceorganizers, Andres Rozental (nowMexican ambassador to Great Britain),U.S. officials balked when they learnedCastro was scheduled to attend. “If Fi-del came, Reagan wouldn’t,” Rozentalrecalls being told. Although Mexicohad long resisted U.S. pressure to iso-late Cuba, Lopez-Portillo was forced tocall Castro and essentially disinvite him.“Castro understood immediately,”Rozental remembers, “and graciouslyagreed not to make it an issue.”5

Instead of the summit, Lopez-Portillo invited the Cuban leader to aprivate meeting on the island ofCozumel in July. The two talked abouta potential U.S.-Cuban dialogue.Through Mexico, Castro passed themessage that he was willing to discussall outstanding issues with Washington.

Haig and other administrationhardliners, however, forcefully opposedtalks with Cuba as anathema to a strat-egy of raising Castro’s level of anxietythrough verbal threats and U.S. military

maneuvers in the Caribbean. “Therecould be no talk about normalization,no relief of the pressure, no conversa-tions on any subject except the returnto Havana of the Cuban criminals [fromthe Mariel boatlift] and the terminationof Cuba’s interventionism,” Haig wrotein his memoirs.6

During the limousine ride to the air-port with Reagan after the Cancun sum-mit, however, Lopez-Portillo andCastaneda put their appeal directly tothe president of the United States. Ac-cording to one Mexican official, Lopez-Portillo essentially called in his chips:he asked Reagan to return Mexico’s fa-vor of disinviting Castro to Cancun byauthorizing a U.S. emissary to meet se-cretly with Cuba’s vice president laterin the year. Reagan readily agreed, andsubsequently directed Haig to undertakethis mission when the opportunity arosein November.

The meeting took place in the spa-cious home of foreign ministerCastaneda, located in a suburb ofMexico City. According to a memberof Castaneda’s family, the Mexican for-eign minister introduced the two pro-tagonists to each other in his library, andthen left them to talk privately, aidedonly by a Cuban translator.

The house, according to familymembers, had no secret taping system.Yet, the Top Secret 38-page transcriptof the discussion, which Vice PresidentRodriguez provided in Spanish to theSoviet ambassador to Havana in De-cember 1981, suggests that the meet-ing may in fact have been recorded—perhaps by the Cuban interpreter. In anyevent, the existence of an apparentlyverbatim record allows historians tochart the issues, diplomatic positions,and tenor of the discussion.

The central issue on Haig’s agendawas Cuba’s alleged role in supportingthe Sandinista government in Nicara-gua and funneling aid to the El Salva-doran guerrillas. Drawing on what hecalled “volumes, records of radio broad-casts, data from technical reconnais-sance ... photographs,” Haig chargedthat Cuba, in “tacit agreement” with theSoviets, was fueling revolution in Cen-tral America. “We regard this as a seri-ous threat to our vital interests and the


interests of peace and stability in thehemisphere,” he stated.

In response, Rodriguez spent con-siderable time and detail attempting torefute the U.S. “evidence” of Cuban in-volvement in revolutionary movementsfrom Central America to Africa. “I amaware that the Secretary of State is agreat lover of philosophy,” he said toHaig, noting that

Since the time of Hume, it has beenconsidered proven that the factualappearance of ‘B’ following the ap-pearance of ‘A’ does not signifythat ‘A’ necessarily is the cause ofthe appearance of ‘B’.

The U.S. had a “mistaken interpre-tation” of Cuba’s role in Nicaragua andEl Salvador, Rodriguez asserted, whichhe blamed on CIA distortion of intelli-gence. In response, Haig reasserted thatthe U.S. possessed “proof” that Cubawas “exporting revolution and blood-shed on the continent.” DismissingRodriguez’s lengthy version of worldevents since 1975, Haig declared: “I canassure you that the benign picture thatyou have painted does not conform toreality.”

Notwithstanding the acrimoniousdisagreement on the nature of Cuba’srole abroad, the Haig-Rodriguez discus-sions did produce a surprising commit-ment toward coexistence. Unlike theDemocratic Clinton Administration—which a decade later would demand thatCuba democratize as a prerequisite fornormalizing relations—Haig made itclear that Washington took a realpolitikposition on Cuba’s internal political set-up. “I do not believe that PresidentReagan has some kind of preconceivednotion regarding the social system inCuba,” Haig stated. “This must be de-termined by the people of Cuba.” Laterin the conversation Haig noted that“President Reagan considers trade withCuba a possibility.” While dismissingpast “moments of rapprochement” as “aseries of delaying tactics” on the partof the Cubans, Haig stated that “if youare prepared to talk seriously, we arealso prepared.”

According to the transcript,Rodriguez and Haig agreed that Mexico“could be a uniting link in this matter”

of continuing talks, and that conduct-ing “an even more direct exchange ofopinions” would be desirable. Haig, athis own initiative, suggested that spe-cial U.S. envoy General Vernon Waltersvisit Havana for additional talks. “Wecan meet, in turn, in Havana and NewYork, because, in my view, we mustcommence a dialogue immediately,”Haig is recorded as saying at the closeof the meeting. “I believe that this isimportant, and we are ready to do it,”replied Rodriguez.

In the immediate aftermath of thismeeting, both the Mexican interlocutorsand the Cubans believed that a positivestep had been taken toward dialoguebetween Washington and Havana. “Wehad accomplished what we wanted—to get them together,” recalled AndresRozental. Face-to-face, the Cubansfound Haig to be far more level-headed,respectful, and reasonable than his vit-riolic Cold War rhetoric had led themto expect. In Rodriguez’s opinion,shared later with Mexican officials,Haig was “neither crazy nor stupid, buta reasonably intelligent, experiencedperson with whom conversation waspossible.” Rodriguez was said to be im-pressed that Haig was willing to sendWalters—an official of “great author-ity, close to President Reagan”—as anenvoy to continue the talks, and that theSecretary of State had emphasized theneed to make a supreme effort to settleissues through “la via pacifica”—thepeaceful road.

Haig, on the other hand, appears tohave interpreted the meeting as evi-dence that U.S. pressure on Castro wasworking. “Clearly the Cubans werevery anxious. They had read the signsof a new American policy.”7 Haig re-turned to Washington to push, again, fora blockade. Walters did make a secrettrip to Havana in March 1982—Mexi-can officials contributed once again tothe arrangements—and spent five hoursconferring with Castro and Rodriguezon Central America. But nothing con-crete came of the talks.

In the end, as Ambassador Rozentalputs it, the Mexican initiative was a“failure in getting anything going” be-tween the United States and Cuba.Moreover, U.S. military involvement in

the Central America conflict escalateddramatically in the months and yearsthat followed, and for most of the de-cade, Nicaragua and El Salvador werewracked with the violence and blood-shed that Mexico had hoped could beavoided if the Reagan Administrationand Castro’s government could achievea modus vivendi.

Yet, the fact that the Haig-Rodriguez talks occurred at all may wellhave mitigated against the further de-velopment of the even more overtly bel-licose U.S. policy toward Cuba thatHaig, among others, initially sought.The talks also set the stage for negotia-tions between Washington and Havanaover immigration that took place in1984. At the very least, the U.S.-Cubameeting in Mexico demonstrated that a“moment of rapprochement”—a civil,rational high-level dialogue— was pos-sible, even at a peak of acrimony in bi-lateral relations.

1 McFarlane recalled that Haig wanted to “closeCastro down,” and directed McFarlane to “get ev-eryone together and give me a plan for doing it.”McFarlane writes that when he came up with anoptions paper that pointed out the practical draw-backs of blockading Cuba or other types of un-provoked hostility, Secretary Haig harshly repri-manded him. “Six weeks ago I asked you to getbusy and find a way to go to the source in Cuba.What you’ve given me is bureaucratic pap. . . .Give me something I can take to the President sothat he can show a substantial gain during his firstyear in office. I want something solid, not somecookie-pushing piece of junk.” Eventually,McFarlane reports, calmer heads prevailed andthe Reagan Administration decided to stick to theagreements on Cuba worked out with the Sovietsduring the Cuban missile crisis. See RobertMcFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadell &Davies, 1991), 177-181.2 See “Reagan Says Haig Met Key Cuban,” NewYork Times, 28 January 1982. State Departmentofficials, according to the story, “described them-selves as ‘quite surprised’ that the President hadsaid what he did. They still insisted they knew ofno such meeting.”3 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism,Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York:Macmillan, 1984), 133-136.4 Quoted in Morris J. Blachman, William M.Leogrande, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, eds, Con-fronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacyin Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1986),276.5 Author’s telephone interview with Rozental,October 1996.6 Haig, Caveat, 133.7 Haig, Caveat, 136.

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