Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

1/39

http://usj.sagepub.com/Urban Studies

http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/0042098009103853

2009 46: 1003Urban StudGraeme Evans

Creative Cities, Creative Spaces and Urban Policy

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Urban Studies Journal Foundation

can be found at:Urban StudiesAdditional services and information for

http://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://usj.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.refs.htmlCitations:

What is This?

- Apr 16, 2009Version of Record>>

by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from by guest on October 1, 2013usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.urbanstudiesfoundation.org/http://www.urbanstudiesfoundation.org/http://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://usj.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.refs.htmlhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.refs.htmlhttp://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.full.pdfhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.full.pdfhttp://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtmlhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.full.pdfhttp://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003.refs.htmlhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://usj.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://usj.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://www.urbanstudiesfoundation.org/http://www.sagepublications.com/http://usj.sagepub.com/content/46/5-6/1003http://usj.sagepub.com/

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

2/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

3/39

1004 GRAEME EVANS

and quantification of the cultural-creative-knowledge economy traces this process interms of policy discourses since the 1980s.

A detailed critique of the survey of policy,

literature and case studies is then presented.This draws on an international comparativestudy conducted over a three-year period,including primary interviews and site visits,which focused on creative spaces in so-calledcreative cities.1 This provides an analysis ofthe geographical coverage and city-regionconcentration, but also examples from emerg-ing cities using the cultural and creative

economy as a regional growth strategy forthe first time. This analysis considers the scaleand scope of the new economy clusters thathave been favoured in these ostensibly cityand regional strategic plans. The growthimperative is then discussed as it has beenused to drive policy intervention and sectoralprioritisation of the creative economy. Thisis manifested in both employment and GDPcontribution to city and national economies,

but also in the extent of creative class pre-sence in primarily central-city and city fringe(former industrial) areas. The creative sectorsidentified for support in these policy andinvestment plans are further analysed in termsof city cultural and economic prospects andwider economic development and cultural(policy) strategies. A summary of interventiontypes is then discussed, including enterprisesupport, property- and area-based initiativeswhich, again, are common to many city plans,irrespective of their origin. An example of a12-year creative industries policy programmeis used to demonstrate the emphasis on start-up and SMEsusing social regenerationand local economy rationalesat the cost oflarger creative sectors which make up thedominant creative/knowledge economy andclusters, and which account for the growth

performance which is claimed as the basisfor further public-sector intervention. Theconclusion draws attention to the paradoxesand methodological issues that such policy

analysis raises, notably the dependency oncontinued public intervention and subsidyin a new economy with such hope valueattached and given the expansive spread of

the creative industries, its panacea status. Inthis sense, both cluster and growth theoriesand models are being applied without evi-dence to support their relevance or the scale atwhich they can be sustainable. This is in con-trast to the creative spaces that are the subjectof regeneration, which are highly localised.

New Wine in Old Bottles

New industry formations, the new, post-Fordist economy, new growth theory andpost-industrial urban landscapesthesenow-familiar coinages suggest a break fromthe past both in terms of employment, pro-duction and spatial practices, and in urbanpolicy responses that seek to capture, retainand brand the creative spacewhether city,district, quarter or scene (Lange, 2005). How-

ever, the continuity and change evident inpublic policy applied to the creative andknowledge economies are also embedded inpast practice, industrial economic models andtraditional interventions. Production hasemerged and evolved often incrementally fromcrafts, light industrial and mixed-use areasand premises, and still today comprises pre-industrial cultural activity notably performingand visual arts, festivals, crafts and designer-making, and associated live-work, as well asindustrial and institutional agglomerationin sectors such as film and media, highereducation and manufacturingfor example,design, furniture, fashion and textiles. Thisencompasses both micro and larger firms inadvanced producer services and a range ofnew media and associated technology andcontent production (Evans, 2004). The micro-

enterprise economy, making up over 90 percent of all firms in post-industrial cities, ishowever, only a very partial representationof the new urban economy. In relation to

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

4/39

CREATIVE CITIES AND URBAN POLICY 1005

small-firm clusters that supposedly drive thecreative economy from below (Amin, 1997),small-firm (1040 employees) performancein the introduction of innovation is only

63 per cent of large firms in both industrialand services sectors in Europe,2 whilst micro-enterprises typically employing under fivepeople, contribute only a third of total em-ployment and a value-added of little morethan half of medium and larger-sized firms(Foord, 2009).

The role of major commercial, publicand international enterprises in markets/

client portfoliosand governments, city andnational, in direct and indirect subsidytogether provide a more complete and tellingpicture of the new economy. This raises ques-tions of the sustainability of creative clusterand SME-driven growth as a panacea for cityand sub-regional economies (Pratt, 2004;Mommaas, 2004; Markusen and Schrock,2005). A raft of public funding, includingnational, European (EU) and development

aid, supports enterprise, workspace and inter-mediary development agencies as well aseducation and training programmes, andadministers direct grant and other schemesto these ostensibly economic clusters. AsSimmie observes

The cluster idea has taken many academicsand policy-makers by storm. It has becomethe accepted wisdom more quickly than

any other major idea in the field in recentyears at the expense of previous explan-ations and lacking in relevant empirical evi-dence (Simmie, 2006, p. 184).

This suggests the need for both qualitativeresearch and more robust and relevant data(Wolfe and Gertler, 2004), as well as improve-ment of urban comparative theory, the im-provement of the design of research projects

and the quality of measurements (Dentersand Mossberger, 2006, p. 566). Classifying,measuring and comparing the hybrid neweconomy is therefore one challenge which

exercises researchers (Pratt, 1998, p. 2004)and policy-makers alike3one reason forthe seduction of indices, league tables andbenchmarks that are widely used and cited in

international and national ranking exercises(OECD, 2006) and which in turn fuel thepolicy imperatives to improve performanceand achieve creative, knowledge and intelli-gent city status (PWC, 2005). These includeFloridas Creative Class Indices, ICICs CurrentCompetitiveness Index, AnholtGMIs CityBrands Index, GaWCs Global City Index4 andthe European Innovation and Euro Creativity

Scoreboards, amongst many others.Policy Transfer and Emulation

Creative cityand spacepromotion istherefore a global phenomenon as quasi-scientific policy rationalesheavily reliantupon proxies but light on theory (Pawson,2006) or hard evidence (Evans, 2005)areadopted in cities and states seeking to claimtheir share of the knowledge economy and

cultural city ranking (GLA, 2008). These initi-atives are largely made up of new scienceand technology applications: bio/medical/life science, micro-technology, digital designand manufacturing, and a pick and mixselection of cultural and creative industries.The balance struck between these two instrategic policies and plans reflects the relativestrengths and comparative advantage inscience/knowledge infrastructure that acountry and its university/R&D/industryhubs possess, physically and virtually; howfar it can attract such advanced production;and how far its focus is more realisticallydueto its legacy and state of economic develop-ment and geopolitical positionon heritageand the pre-industrial cultural economy(Zallo, 1988). Exemplar university hubs includeSilicon Valley (Stanford); Route 128 Boston

(MIT, Harvard), Silicon Fen (Cambridge) andart and design institutions in London andNew York, with advanced production alsoassociated with emergent regional cities such

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

5/39

1006 GRAEME EVANS

as Bangalore, Dublin and Singapore. The

heritage/culture-based visitor economy is

the most geographically widespread policy

prioritynot surprisingly, having the lowest

entry costs and skills requirementsfromSt Petersburg to Johannesburg. This confla-

tion of culture and tourism industries is also

fuelled by international agency promotion

and aid programmes (UNESCO, UNCTAD

and World Bank, Evans, 2001b).

Intervention, in the form of public policy

programmes and investment incentives in

this field, is a prime example of evidence-

based policy formulation (Solesbury, 2002).In practice, this manifests itself in rapid

(fast; Peck, 2005) urban policy emulation

linked to competitive city strategies. The use

of secondary evidence and rationales, in

effect imported as a proxy for endogenous

knowledge and resources, is a particular

feature of this global policy and advocacy

movement. I call this a movement since

policy and practice are widely promoted

nationally and internationally through spe-

cialist intermediaries, gurus (Gibson and

Klocker, 2004) and centres (government,

think-tanks, cultural, university-based), as

well as government and agency-sponsored

exchange through interlocal policy net-

works (Peck, 2005, p. 767) of conferences,

symposia and roadshows.5 Socio-political

networks are also active through international

organisationsfor example, Barcelonasleadership the culture group of the 40-city

Organisation of Cities of Europe (Balaguer,

2005). The use of comparative analysis, and

the nature of evidence and advocacy, war-

rant comment here, since these directly influ-

ence the dissemination of new economy and

creative space discourses.

Comparative Analysis

Presenting policy analysis in this international

comparative context, framed by fragile macro-

and micro-economic data and assumptions

and political (social, cultural) imperatives,

must be conditional on both the rationale for

intervention in the new economy, as well as

the quality of the evidence itself and under-

lying theory and process (Pawson, 2006;Solesbury, 2002). Thus, whilst the policy con-

vergence and transferance are evident, and

localised models of policy formulation and

intervention appear similarincluding built

forms and brand themes (science city, cre-

ative city, culture cityEvans, 2003)local

conditions and variations such as the his-

torical, social and cultural identities, govern-

ance, geographies/scales, should be equallyconsidered in order to avoid falling into a

reductive trap of universality at the cost of

understanding the particular (Wallerstein,

1991, p. 92).6 This is a broader issue for com-

parative urban studies generally (Denters

and Mossberger, 2006)for example, regime

theories (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stoker

and Mossberger, 1994), cluster and growth

theories (Cooke, 2002; Porter, 2000), path

dependency (David, 2000), symbolic and cul-

tural theory (habitus of location; Lee, 1997)

and the study of particular urban processes

such as regeneration in its particular physical

formwaterfronts, cultural flagships and

mega-events (Evans, 2005).

Versions of these grand and not-so-grand

theories are used to justify the promotion

and to seek explanations of the new creative

economy and its growth prospects and per-formance. Comparative analysis is also a fam-

iliar treatment of these global phenomena,

as with the new economy in post-industrial

cities. In contrast to the rich or thick case

study, the comparative is therefore at risk of

a thin and one-dimensional description of

what are obviously complexities with plural

not universal causations (Pickvance, 2001). As

Harrison advises, the study of urban policyrequires addressing a number of wicked

problems (2000; after Rittel and Webber,

1973). An urban policy or process may exhibit

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

6/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

7/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

8/39


This is reflected in creative industries eco-

nomic mapping exercises (DCMS, 1998,

2001) that count an antique market trader,

but exclude a dance teacher (Evans, 1999).

Thus the creative industries, as defined andwidely replicated, are now seen to comprise

those industries that have their origin in indi-vidual creativity, skill and talent and whichhave the potential for wealth and job creationthrough the generation and exploitation ofintellectual property (DCMS, 1998/2001, p. 5).

This universal, capitalistic measure also

reflects the shift from culture, and culturalindustries as instruments of the nation-state

(such as broadcasting, arts and heritage),

to the more global creative industries

(Cunningham, 2002). In this sense, they are

more open to trade and exchange, in contrast

to protectionist and utilitarian national cul-

ture, thereby positioning the creative indus-

tries at the crossroads between the arts,

business and technology (UNCTAD, 2004).

However, it should be remembered that the

economic importance and contribution of

the Arts to national and regional economies

had been introduced as long ago as the late

1970s in North America and from the mid

1980s in Europe (Evans, 2001a, p. 140). This

included city-regions (Toronto, Ontario;

Liverpool, Merseyside; Port of New York/New

Jersey; Greater London) that extended the

largely subsidised arts, museums and asso-ciated cultural tourism sectors and the arising

job and income multipliers, to the emerging

cultural industries. These formed the growth

base for the early cultural industries strat-

egies that were to be adopted in many of

these same cities and which others followed.

The association between quality of life, amen-

ities and inward investment/firm relocation

was also established in these early studies(Myerscough, 1988),9 this has resurfaced in

the work of Florida (2002) and other creative

city advocates (Landry, 2000; Nichols Clark,

2004) who emphasise the value of tolerant,

open and vibrant places attracting and

retaining the new creative and knowledge

workers (Drucker, 1999 and see Storper and

Manville, 2006, and Nichols Clark, 2004, onthe amenity city). This more recent widening

of the cultural and creative industries to a

knowledge economy incorporating the arts,

has therefore been facilitated by this earlier

seminal economic argument, or turn, where

previously the exchange value and economic

impact of the arts had been both denied

and resisted (Abbing, 2002; Becker, 1976;

Bourdieu, 1993; Adorno, 1991).

International Survey of CreativeIndustries Policies

In order to assess the extent of policy for-

mations and rationales, a literature search

including a call for policy documents,

strategies, publications and reports via city

government, economic, cultural departments,

agencies and other networkswas under-

taken during 200507 and updated in 200708.

The extensive body of advocacy material was

largely discounted unless underpinned by

some evidence in terms of research and/or

data, although even here, the frequent refer-

ences to exemplars and models, notably

notions of the creative class, culture-led regen-

eration and the digital-knowledge society,

reflect the extent of the zeitgeistand policytransfer market. The line between advocacy,

campaigning, political and policy formu-

lation is therefore blurring, with the former

frequently featuring the latter as meta-

evidence (Pawson, 2006) to justify policy and

resource decisions. Interviews were also car-

ried out with representatives from economic,

culture, information and communications

ministries and agencies (and combinations/variants of these portfolios) at city/region

and in some cases national and international

levelsEU, UNESCO, UNCTAD. Interviews

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

9/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

10/39


DMEBA, 2003). Familiar cultural capital andcreative city exemplars were also the mostactive in both the range and depth of cre-ative industries strategies which were also

more integrated with city development andregeneration plans, notably Barcelona (byfar the most active in this sense and themost cited by othersfrom Montreal andMadeira), followed by San Francisco/SiliconValley, Los Angeles and New York. However,St Petersburg produced more cases than itsUS counterparts, due in part by its partici-pation in several European cultural and

creative industries programmes which sti-mulated policy actions. This also applied toreunifying Berlin and other German city/lander, and also to Cape Town, Durban andJohannesburg, South Africas three creativecity hubs. Here, culture-based regenerationprojects and sectoral initiatives in film andfashion have been identified as part of city-regional economic development and arearegeneration (for example, Newtown and

Mandela Bridge, Johannesburg).In several regions, joint city initiatives

sought to capitalise on a diverse range ofindustry strengths and growth sectors, withina national or regional/state enterprise frame-work, such as Portland-to-Seattle (10 cities);Scotland (6 cities), Berlin/Pottsdam/Babels-burg/Brandenburg, Core Cities (6 Englishcities) and creative city twinning by SydneyMelbourneToronto; ManchesterSheffield;and Creative London with Creative Toronto.Thus, while major cities with highly concen-trated creative production, institutional andconsumption levels and policy sophisticationlead, this focus and phenomenon are becom-ing widespread and are being adopted and,in some cases adapted in smaller cities (Jayneand Bell, 2006), towns and nationsbothestablished and emergent. This is reflected

in particular in the creative sector and artform focus which feature in such policies(see Table 3) and a more cognate approach tocultural and economic policy. Even here,

however, national and regional policy im-peratives and rationales are evident andtake-up is uneven. In some cases, there istension between national and city creative

policy priorities, such as in Denmark andCopenhagen, where cluster and nationalsectoral programmes both duplicate andconflict with city-regional creative industrystrategies (Evans, 2008, p. 10). As Jayne sum-marises in the case of England

Implementation of a creative-industriesagenda at the regional level in the UK is atbest patchy a lack of strategic planning,

best-practice models, and empirical researchto guide policy-makers (Jayne, 2005, p. 537).

This might come as a surprise in view of theextent of policy coverage and the importancegiven to creative city and industry advocacyand supporting evidence. However, this isalso an example of the meta-analysis de-veloped in dominant urban cognitive-culturaleconomies (Scott, 2008, p. 766) applied

inappropriately in terms of the scale andcapacity of towns and cities with few of theconditions required to develop and sustain asignificant and competitive creative economy,apart from local cultural quarter and small-firm clusters.

The sectoral approach, where several cre-ative industry sectors or clusters are prioritisedfor support, can be distinguished from themacroeconomic approach taken by someother cities, which cite the general creativeindustries as a whole, or knowledge and sci-ence city clusters where the emphasis is oninfrastructure and generic content industries,typically associated with software/high-tech and related biomedical/health and lifesciences university hubs. Those cities andregions using culture and creativity as an eco-nomic development tool for the first time (as

opposed to cultural and social development),more closely ally their cultural heritage andarts with the cultural industries, placing im-portance on indigenous and local culture,

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

11/39

1012 GRAEME EVANS

and its protection from the IPR regime andthe threat of commodification through un-controlled globalisation and world trade.Not surprisingly, these examples are drawn

from cities in developing regions, with theinfluence and policy framework coming fromUNCTAD (2004) and other internationaldevelopment agencies, such as UNESCOsCreative Cities Network (2005). These agenciesare able to articulate (and validate) the globalculture and world creative industries meta-themes. There are also tensions evident be-tween city-regional authorities who promote

creative and knowledge city status througheconomic-led cultural policy and local auth-orities and municipalities who are wedded tocultural development and access objectivesfor their arts and cultural policy and pro-grammes.11 This includes some mid-WestUS cities who characterise their creative econ-omy in cultural heritage rather than creativeclass terms.

The majority of policies in this field

emanate from cities and city-regions witha minority (less than 10 per cent) solely atnational level, particularly in smaller nation-states (such as islands), including city-statesand satellites such as Singapore, HongKong and Taiwan. As an indication of theinterest shown to the creative and knowledgesectors in the development agenda, WorldBank, UNCTAD and regional policy andresearch initiatives have also featured in thissurveyfor example, from South American,Asian and east European regional policyand international programmes. Developingcountry and city interest is also driven bya response to, or rather a defence from, thedeleterious impacts of free world trade, inparticular legislation such as the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services (GATS)including producer and creative services

and intellectual ideas (patents, copyrightand IPR). Following the introduction ofGATS in 1993, lesser developed countries hadalready opened up over 50 per cent of their

communications and 100 per cent of theirtourism sectors to external competition (Pageand Davenport, 1994). At the same time, thesedeveloping economies look to exploit the

opportunities of their lower-cost advantagesin cultural goods production, such as textiles,electronic components and printing, andfrom the perceived market in the growingknowledge economy, including health sci-ence and back-office services, as well as fromexploiting their own cultural and creativeassets and indigenous heritage (for example,Bollywood, cultural tourism, crafts, fair trade;

see Evans and Cleverdon, 2000). World Bankinterest in this sector not surprisingly followsthe global trade regime

Products and output that is protectable underintellectual property law. The most significantcreative industries are software, multimedia,video games, industrial design, fashion, pub-lishing and research and development (WorldBank, 2003).

Developing countries, as well as some provin-cial states elsewhere (like the US) distinguish,however, between the creative industries thatderive value from copyright and distributingcreative content and the cultural industriesthat generate creative content in a local cul-tural context through literary, visual andperforming arts. Cultural industries thususe creativity, cultural knowledge and intel-lectual property to produce products andservices with social and cultural meaning(UNCTAD, 2004).

Scale of New Economy Clusters

The scale of creative economy clusters con-sidered in many of these strategies is, however,indeterminate, political administration-defined or targeted at development areasand zones. In a few cases, they formed part

of, or were linked to, spatial strategies andplans, particularly regeneration zones andnodesfor example, Barcelonas new exten-sion, Londons 10 creative hubs (Figure 2)

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

12/39


and Malaysias digital corridors and theKuala Lumpur hub. In contrast to estab-lished regional industrial clusters, these neweconomic areas were highly localised

neighbourhood and cultural districtand,in some cases, sub-regional in scope wheremultiple or polycentric clusters and networkswere evident. Very few were genuinely regionalin scale, often in established manufacturingsectors. With the exception of small states,such as Singapore and Taiwan, national-levelstrategies, as opposed to general economicpolicies, were rare, but emerging in some

geographically peripheral areas, notably inScandinavia, Scotland and New Zealand,prioritising digital content, media/film/TVsectors. Transnational and economic clusterstended to be evident only in existing globalindustry sectors such as film/media andrelated sectorsfor instance, in Californiaand in Denmark/ south Sweden (Oresund,Medicon Valley)and in strong regions notdirectly exhibiting new economy clusters,

but rather, established cultural productionactivity such as furniture, textiles and ICT/multimedia technopoles in Rhine-Ruhr,northern Italy, Ile de France and Munich-Bayern. Wider city-regional growth andscales of cluster operation therefore presentthe more robust contemporary economicmodelfor example, south-east Englandsgrowth in creative industries employment ishigher than London alone, with the rest ofsouthern England (ROSE, excluding London)accounting for 37 per cent of UK creative em-ployment compared with 30 per cent inLondon (GLA Economics, 2006b, p. 13). Thisis in contrast to more localised inner urbancentres that are the attention of sub-regionalpolicies and regeneration intervention, andnew economy cluster promotion. Here, em-ployment and population growth are taking

place, but this is relatively small in absoluteterms and in many cases is both fragile andtransient (Nathan, 2005; Nathan and Urwin,2005).

As well as scale, the stage in the cycle ofcluster development is another way of evalu-ating strength and sustainability. In businesscluster analysis, the stages of development

are identified as embryonic, established,mature and declining, based on levels of em-ployment and output, the depth of interfirmlinkages and the significance and reach ofbusiness and consumer markets.12 Creativeindustries clusters are found to be embryonicin many conventional business cluster evalu-ations (Evans and Foord, 2006b). However,from this survey it is evident that most desig-

nated creative clusters are not conventionalbusiness clusters and additional factors arecritical to their development and form, not-ably local area regeneration, conservation/heritage, cultural tourism and related visitoreconomies. Most identified clusters are emer-gent and still dependent on public expend-iture for subsidy (of premises and core staff),procurement and promotionand critically,on larger firms and institutions for clients.

They are also predominantly neighbourhoodand small area in scopeeven where theyform part of city sub-regions, they appear toexhibit poor connectivity in terms of labourmarket movement and markets (Evans et al.,2005; Foord, 2009).

Creative core. Semantics and epistemologyare also a particular issue in this field, giventhe artsculturecreative-knowledge con-tinuum and cross-cultural interpretations(Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). In particular,the shift from the arts, heritage and culturalindustries towards (but not universally) thecreative industriesand from the culturaland creative city to the wider knowledge cityand the spatial representation in culturalquarters, creative clusters, media parks andscience cities (Cooke and Lazeretti, 2008).

Since the lens through which policy is beingassessed here is primarily an economic devel-opment onealbeit with major non-economicexternalities attachedthis has required

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

13/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

14/39


and underused industrial buildings forworkspace conversion. Other examplesinclude Birminghams Jewellery Quarter,Salfords MediaCityUK, Copenhagens 10Creative Zones (Evans, 2008), GlasgowsMerchant Quarter and Digital Media City,and Amsterdams Westergasfabriek district(Evans et al., 2005). However, cluster andinnovation growth require connectivity withestablished producers and intermediaries,and with markets and consumers/visitorsfrom a wider area, but the propinquity thatengenders innovation spillovers and know-ledge exchange is also absent from theselocalised creative hubs. Their potential to cre-ate employment within the creative industriesthemselves lacks credibility and hard evi-

dence. From the perspective of the UK MediaCity model

unless demand factors are met, there may beovercapacity of the wrong type of premises

Figure 1. Creative industries firms in Greater London

Source: Foord (2009).

Figure 2. Creative hubs in Greater London

Source: London Development Agency (2005).

Potential for economic and employmentgrowth in these new areas often relies on a

small number of local actors and hubsauniversity or specialist art/design collegeor programme, cultural venues and someretail activity as a basis for a visitor economy,

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

15/39

1016 GRAEME EVANS

and the wrong mix of occupiersthere is nohard evidence that outputs and outcomes willbe achievedbuilding-based approaches maybe overly concerned with that nation/region

neglecting wider markets and networking(Ramage, 2008, p. 152).

In Londons City Fringe (hub), public invest-ment in jewellery, fashion and productdesign has targeted the highly skilled andentrepreneurs in locations that are not linkedwith or open to the sub-regions more deprivedareas and unemployed residents whose skilland cultural capital base have little or nothing

to offer these sectors (and vice versa). More-over, existing activity and sites, such as textilesproduction and wholesaling, which haveserved this sub-regional community, havealso suffered from rising rents and propertyregeneration (including from higher-valuecreative services), as well as from cheaperimports (compare with Poblenou, Barcelona).Employment growth, fted in the 1990s(Table 2) has since proved more fragile in the

creative industries that have been prioritisedin these economic policies (see later), par-ticularly in residual cultural production.Public-sector interventions to encourage eco-nomic development and growth are thereforenot contributing to the social regenerationobjectives, even though these are explicitrationales for public investment and politicalsupport for such policies, as in this case (CFP,

2004; Bagwell, 2008).In Europe and the US, for example, thedownturn in creative industries employmentbetween 2000 and 2004 is attributed tothe business cycle (in London; see GLA,2006b), the fallout from the dotcom crash(in the US and Europe) and to reductions inconsumer and public-sector spending, (inBerlin; see Evans and Witting, 2006). Creative-sector contraction also exceeded that of other

sectorsfor example, in Zurich, where em-ployment declined by 7.8 per cent (200105)in the creative sector, compared with 5.4 percent in financial services and 3.7 per cent for

the region as a whole (Soendermann andWeckerle, 2008). This questions the growthstory underlying public investment andintervention, but also raises another factor

emerging from the new economythat ofjobless growth. Whilst creative-sector employ-ment has faltered and declined in key centresin recent years, for example, in the UK, theNetherlands and the US (DCMS, 2005; MEA,2006; Americans for the Arts, 2005), the num-ber of creative industryfirms has increasedboth micro-enterprises and larger firmswhere, as a result of mergers, acquisitions and

out-sourcing, overall employment has de-creased. This may presage a second wave ofstructural adjustmentfollowing the earlierfall-out from new technology, low-cost im-ports and institutional rationalisation; forexample, through independent and offshoreproduction, in labour-intensive sectors suchas printing and publishing, music, IT, fash-ion and textiles, broadcasting and alliedequipment supplya case of creative de-

struction (Schumpeter, 1942). Job lossesin creative occupations (rather than largerfirms) appear to be occurring in cities suchas Amsterdam, Berlin and London, amongstthe celebrated, footloose creative class (GLA,2006b; Evans, 2006a). In reality, it appearsthat consumers and corporate and public-sector budgets are the variable factor, withclose correlation between spending in somesectors (such as advertising and financialservices) and the creative economy (graphicdesign, film and printing) (GLA, 2006a).Despite the advocacy, causal links betweencreative clusters (milieu and producers) andimproved innovation and competitiveness,have proved to be elusive (Simmie, 2001, 2006;DTI, 2004; MEA, 2006).

The importance of consumption in sus-tainable new economies, although apparent

(Fine and Leopold, 1993; Scott, 2001), receivesleast attention in either policy or research, incontrast to the emphasis on production andinfrastructure (Figure 3). This is despite its

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

16/39


critical importance in terms of internationalmarkets and networks, and in cluster andnew economy models (Porter, 1995; Simmie,2004, 2006; Krugman, 1991). Exceptions are

tourism and branding (Figure 3); however,these are generally perceived as competitivecity and place-making strategies, rather thangiving attention to the visitor economy andrelated services required to actually supportand grow these activities. In this case, con-sumers actually visit the places of production,including cultural quarters and attractions,an increasing number of which coincide

with existing cultural production quarters,including residential and live-work areas.However, it is clear that these are judged andcelebrated by their proponents in cultural,heritage and local endogenous terms suchas property and local trade (Jayne and Bell,2004), rather than in macroeconomic mar-ket terms. In practice, however, exogenousgrowth is represented by international hotel,restaurant and retail chains and related prop-

erty investment in areas undergoing culture-led regeneration (Evans, 2005; Hutton, 2008),resulting in high levels of economic leakageand local disbenefits.

Crowding-out is also not a binary publicprivate, newold economy phenomenonbut, within the creative economy itself, shiftsbetween sectors and higher-value land useand capitalisation can be seen to damage theexisting cultural infrastructure and economy(Evans, 2005; Hutton, 2008). In one of the mostextreme cases and a symbol of the dotcomgoldrush, the South of the Market (SoMa) areaof San Francisco saw an influx of over 200companies within a 2-square-mile radius ofSouth Park

We were experiencing the highest residentialeviction rates in the country, entire blocks werebeing completely evicted Rents simply

got way too high. A lot of creative peoplearchitects, engineers, and graphic designersmoved out of the area entirely. They were partof the culture of the city, and now theyre gone

(Berger, 2002, p. 71; see also Evans, 2005;Solnit and Schwartzenberg, 2000).

This pattern is also occurring in more estab-

lished cultural production quarters anddistricts in Londons city fringe (see Pratton Hoxton, in this Special Issue) and in eastLondon as the London 2012 Olympic re-development takes effect; in gentrifyingBarcelona (El Born, Raval and Poblenou; seeCasellas and Pallares-Baraba, in this SpecialIssue); and Mitte and Kreuzberg, Berlin(Lange, 2005; McRobbie, 2004; Evans andWitting, 2006). The displacement cycle ofManhattan artists/studios first highlightedin Zukins Loft Living(1988; Rosler, 1994) is anow-familiar post-industrial city phenom-enon (Evans, 2001a) and live-work artistswho relocated to Brooklyn and Williamsburgare now experiencing the same residentialproperty pressures (Schuerman, 2007), whilstdistribution and production activity in thegarment and printing industries are being

increasingly marginalised and crowded out oftheir core city locations (Keegan and Kleiman,2005; Rantisi, 2002; and see Indergaard onLower Manhattan,in this Special Issue).

Another observation in these creative citiesis thatdespite small levels of populationgrowth in some inner-city areas which hadbeen in long-term declinedue to a combin-ation of new migrants, key workers andloft-dwellers (Nathan and Urwin, 2005)

higher population, housing and employ-ment growth are taking place in the outermetropolitan areas (Evans and Witting, 2006).For instance, in Barcelona, employmentgrowth in the decade between 1991 and2001 in knowledge sectors (culture andinformation, arts and entertainment) wastwo to four times higher in the outer metro-politan area than in the city itself (Lasuen

and Baro, 2005). The exemplar compact cityis outgrowing its creative core, with mostresidents now commuting out of their areafor work (Evans, 2006b).

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

17/39

1018 GRAEME EVANS

City Growth13

The prime catalyst for the identificationand promotion of creative industries andwider knowledge industries has been their

growth performance and potential duringthe 1990s and into the new century. Critically,these underpin policy interventions andare typically measured in terms of threequantitative indicators: employment; theproportion contributed to national and re-gional economies gross domestic product(percentage of GDP); and gross value-added(GVA), normally measured as sales/turnover

per employee (Table 2). City growth is there-fore measured in terms of absolute job andwealth creation, and in comparison with theeconomy as a whole and, importantly, relativeto other industrial sectors. This is a significantand symbolic shift, since the creative andknowledge sectors are now commonly citedalongside mainstream industrial sectors innational (and more so) and in city-regionaleconomic strategies, and in international

regional area and global trade forecasts (Evansand Foord, 2006b).

The World Bank (2003), for instance, esti-mated that the combined creative industriesrepresented 7 per cent of employment andannual growth rates of 10 per cent between2000 and 2005 (UNCTAD, 2004; Wu, 2005)and these rates are widely quoted in nationaland regional policies. In Europe (EU25 mem-

bers), the cultural and creative sector is con-servatively estimated at 2.5 per cent of allemployed (KEA, 2006). Until now, thesesectors and their precursor cultural industrieshave been of minority economic value andof primarily parochial interest, being moreconcerned with local cultural clusters anddistricts, or allied with established activitysuch as tourism and the contribution ofdesign in manufacturing (such as textiles)

and producer services (such as architecture).In global city rankings, only single sectorssuch as media and advertising feature interms of their dominant share of international

trade and headquarter activity (Taylor, 2005),

rather than as a cultural industry or part of a

wider cluster. World city ranking exercises hadbegun to incorporate cultural and creative

competitiveness into their comparisons inthe early 1990s (Comedia, 1991; LPAC, 1991),again with reference to the earlier economic

impact of the arts studies and quality of place

advantages for otherwise footloose industrylocation.

These also introduced the notion of the

competitive advantages of the cosmopolitancity through its multilingual and multicultural

diasporas bridging the advanced producerservices economies with those of the emergingmarkets (Sassen, 1996; Sassen and Roost, 1999;

Fukuyama, 1995) and which today drive both

the growth prospects, especially from Chinaand India, and competition within the creat-

ive and knowledge economy itself. Links are

anticipated as a result of synergies betweenthe large and micro firm, such as two-way

innovation spillovers between the street and

corporate headquarters and therefore be-tween consumption and production (Thrift,

2006; Marx, 1973) through new consumption

and product modes and media. For example,in music, digital media, food and fashion:

from catwalk to high street, and through city

place-branding. Together, these present thecontemporary take on the creative city and a

national design-led, knowledge society, but

also one which can be made tangible and vis-ible in production and consumption spaces

(Pratt, 2000; Hutton, 2000, 2008). These are

therefore the target of city economic and regen-eration policy and promotional programmes,

including trade shows, showcasing and festi-

vals simultaneously celebrating and marketinga citys cultural offer and tradein fashion,

furniture, design, IT/games and music, etc.

(Evans, 2007; GLA, 2008).

Against a backdrop of continuing manu-facturing decline and fragile or saturated

financial services and property sectors in the1990spreceded by Asian economic crises

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

18/39


and recessions in the Westthe new econ-omy had also been seen to outstrip sluggishnational and city economies and other sec-tors, with impressive growth rates and the

promise of further growth (Table 2). Thisis a heady prospect for regional economicdevelopment and policy-makers who seekto reposition and secure growth in a com-petitive post-industrial world. Size thereforematters in industrial economic strategies andreporting. The first challenge in analysingand critiquing this growth and policy imper-ative is the hybrid and selective nature of what

constitutes the creative and now knowledge(or information) economies, as distinct sec-tors and sub-sectors with production and/orconsumption linkagessupply chain, innov-ation, marketsand that might be the subjectof public policy intervention and investment.This therefore rests not only on the growthpotential in both existing/resurgent indus-tries, and on attracting the creative class inorder to encourage innovation and attract FDI

and tourism trade, but also on the evidenceof market failure to justify specific publicinterventions and to achieve this growthpotential in order to improve efficiency of themarket (GLA, 2006a), thereby: leading theway for other sectors by positioning creativity,innovation and flexible business practices atthe heart of economic change (NESTA, 2003,p. 4). Again growth is envisaged, not just interms of the narrow economic/employmentmeasure, but in terms of distributive andsocial benefitssocial inclusion, unemploy-ment, area regenerationand even in culturalbenefits which endow the creative industrieswith reaching the parts of urban communitiesthat other activities cannot, or can no longer,reach (Evans, 2005; Landry, 2000).

Table 2 summarises the employment andgrowth rates attributed to a selected group

of cultural and creative industries at inter-national, regional and national levels, togetherwith the creative cities that have also focusedon these sectors. These economic indicators

are repeatedly cited to support policies andstrategies, including their performanceagainst the national economy as a whole andother industrial sectors. Where available,

the definition used and the source of thesecreative clusters are noted, including wherethe concept and classification14 have beenbased on external models. The most citedsource arises from the creative mappingexercise carried out by the UK governmentsCulture Ministry (DCMS) in 1998, repeatedin 2001 and refined further in terms of a cul-tural and creative industries product chain

system (CIPS; see Pratt, 2004; DCMS, 2004).Although widely acknowledged, othercountries and cities have amended and sup-plemented the coverage of sub-sectors,particularly in IT/computing/software, non-specified content (IPR/copyright) industriesand, in some cases, the retention of culturalactivity which was largely excluded by theDCMSi.e. the subsidised/mixed-economyarts sector.

Whilst revealing convergence and vari-ations in sectoral descriptions, the employ-ment rates cited in these policies and strategiesare significant, particularly at city level. How-ever, in most cases they are still relativelysmallless than 10 per cent and in many casesless than 5 per cent of city employment andGDP (Copenhagen and Vienna are notableexceptions as big cities in small countries of5.5 million to 8 million population each). Itis thegrowth rates recorded and forecast thatsignal the importance attached to what arean aggregate of small (and small-firm) sub-sectors of the creative and knowledge econ-omy, applied to a very low base figure. Thus,whilst design and creative industry firmsshow much faster growth than other sectorsof the economy, this is still a very small sectorin absolute terms. What has exaggerated the

importance of the creative economy has beenthe conflation of a range of disconnectedcreative occupations in employment notdirectly associated with cultural or creative

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

19/39

1020 GRAEME EVANS

Table

2.

Economiccontributionandgrowthincreativeindustries,asdefined

Countryand

city

Percentageof

totalemployment

[percentageGDP]

GDP

oremploymentgrowth

(timeperiod)andtarget

Sectoraldefinition

Austria

5%/9%ofallfirms

[1.8%GDP]

2.8%

GDP(19992003);Growth

targe

tof14000firms/45000jobsby

2010

Culturalheritage,performing

arts,audio-visualenterprise,visualarts,

publishing,interdisciplinarya

ctivities

cf.c

lassificationsystems:Australia(ANZSIC),NACE(Austria),CIPS

(UKDCMS,2004;Pratt,2004)

Vienna

14%

6%

Denmark

12%[7%private

sector]

Emp

loyment29%(199298);2.35%

(19972000)

Fashion,visualarts,music,bo

oks,t

heatre,radio/TV,printmedia,

architecture,design,fi

lm/video,advertising,edutainment,con

tent

production,events,culturalin

stitutions,tourism,toys/amusementand

sportindustries

(ExperienceEconomy)

Copenhagen

16%

Finland

4%[3.1%GDP]

11.1%GDP(19992003)

Culturalindustries/economy

activitiesofawholespectrum

ofarts,p

lus

magazineandbookpublishingaswellasentertainmentelectronics

cf.Europeancomparatorcities/city-regions(Helsinki)

Helsinki

8.5%[9%GDP]

France

3.5%[3.4%GDP]

7.1%

GDP(19992003)

NomenclaturedActivitiesFra

naises

(culturaleconomy;Scott,2000)

Paris

6.3%

5%

(199297)

Ireland

2%

4e

mploymentand6revenue

(softwareIndustry)(19952002)

Focusondigitalcontentindustriesanimation,fi

lm,broadc

asting,

interactivemedia,webdesign,music,graphicdesign

cf.NorthernIrelandandScotlandsclusterdefinitionandente

rprise

approach

Dublin

3.1%

Germany

3%[2.5%GDP]

6.6%

GDP(19992003)

Artmarket,literature,printandpublishing,architecture,a

dve

rtising,

audiovisualsector,softwarean

dtelecommunications,musicsector,

performingartsandentertainment

cf.c

lassificationsystem:NACE

,andDCMSandVienna

Berlin

8%

7%(

19982002);(6.6%2002/03)

Netherlands

2%[2.73.2%GDP]Crea

tiveoccupations34%

(19962004);50%inbigfivecities

Creativebusinesssectorsenco

mpasstheartsandculturalheritage,media

andentertainment,aswellascreativebusinessservices(B2B),design,

architecture,computergames

andadvertising

Amsterdam

6.9%[4.1%GDP]

5.7%

(19962002);decline200305

Rotterdam

3.2%

8%(

19962003)

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

20/39


Scotland

5.71%

4.8%

(19992001)

DCMSdefinition(above)pluscomputing;threeclustersprioritised:

digitalmedia;music.film/TV

cf.CIPSandDCMS(UK)

Glasgow

7%

22%

(19992001);growthtarget

10%

perannum

Spain

1%[Catalonia]

[2.3%GDP]

9%G

DP(19992003)

Knowledgesectors:informationandculturalindustries:publishing,film

andvideo,recording,radio,TV,Internet,telecoms;profession

alscientific

andtechnicalservicesarchit

ects,engineers,information,ma

rketing,

humanresources,publicrelations,publicservices;arts,entertainmentand

recreationperformingarts,artists,museumsandhistorican

dheritage

institutions,amusementsand

gambling

Advertising,architecture,visualarts,design,fi

lmandvideo,so

ftwareand

multimedia,music,performin

garts,publishingandTVandR

adio

cf.DCMS

Barcelona

5.58%

8%G

DP;growthtargettodouble%

GDP

by2010

Switzerland

Music,books,art,design,crafts,press,broadcasting,architecture,

performingarts,software/gam

es

NOGA,c

f.NACE

Zurich

7.5%

4.9%(city),7.8%(metrocanton

regio

n)(200105)

UK

4.35%;7%of

allfirms[6.8%

GDP/7.3%GVA]

9%(

19972001);6%(19972003)

Advertising,architecture,arta

ndantiquesmarket,crafts,design,designer

fashion,fi

lmandvideo,intera

ctiveleisuresoftware,music,theperforming

arts,publishing,softwareand

computer(DCMS)

cf.CreativeIndustryProductionSystem(CIPS)andRegional

Cultural

DataFramework(DCMS,200

4)

Digital/ICTsectorinGreaterManchester

ICT,fi

lm,TV,newmedia,prin

tandpublishing

London

8%

CIPS

29%/5%perannum

(19952000);growthtarget:jobs

40%,GDP52%,GVA22%(200410

)

Manchester,

NWRegion

3.5%

2.5%

Emp

loyment40%growth

(19982002);47%increaseinGVA

Cardiff

3.5%

Emp

loyment53.7%growth

(19912005)

Canada

3.1%

Visualandperformingarts,literature,musicandsoundrecording,

advertising,design,digitalmedia,fi

lmandTV,publishing,software,

broadcasting

Super-creativecore-education,training,library,arts,design,

entertainment,sportsandmedia

Toronto

4.4%

6%(

19912004);3overalljob

grow

th

Montreal

5.1%

2.4%

perannum(19902000)

(Continued)

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

21/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

22/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

23/39

1024 GRAEME EVANS

Figure 3. Policy rationales

prime measurefollowed by Infrastructure(transport, ICT), Regeneration, Tourism/events and branding, Education and trainingincluding talent generation and support.Social/access and Heritagefeatured least inthe reasons and benefits claimed for creativeindustry policies. Where they were the targetof interventionin developing countries andre-emergent east Europethis was in termsof retaining cultural identity, diversity andheritage in a reaction to what was perceived asthe litism and divisive nature of the creativeclass and the threat of commodification fromIPR/copyright regimes. In these cases, thecreative district and quality of life benefitswere to be available to all. However, the socialinclusion imperative was commonly allied

with the economic and employment growthprospects offered by the new economy, withinitiatives and public programmes supportingskills, training and enterprise support for

underrepresented groups in the creative andknowledge sectors.

A stark fact in the exemplar creative cities andlocal clusters, however, is the coincidence ofeconomic and social inequality. For example,Floridas Inequality Index (2003), based onthe gap between high- and low-income resid-ents, ranked creative cities such as SanFrancisco, New York, Los Angeles and Bostonhigh on this index, likewise London. A similarconclusion was reached in the UK TradeMinistrys assessment of the creative class:Openness is highly associated with levelsof inequality (DTI, 2004, p. 14). A majority ofNew Yorks designated creative and culturalindustry workers originated from outside thestate (Americans for the Arts, 2005), whilst

the proportion of Black and ethnic minorityworkers employed in Londons creative sectoris only half of their share of the city populationas a whole (Evans, 2006a). The proportion of

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

24/39


Asians working in Londons music industryhas also declined in recent years, despite tar-geted policy programmes (LDA, 2003; Evans,2006a), questioning the cosmopolitan com-

petitive advantage argument, or at least, thedistributory benefits that supposedly ensuefrom innovation spillovers and employmentopportunities in the creative industries.

From this perspective, exemplars of theknowledge cluster look less appealingforexample, Silicon Valley, California. Whilst itscollaborative and competitive edge is lessrelated to traditional community and family

structuressuch as in polycentric productioncrafts clusters in EmiliaRomagna, northernItaly (Lane, 1998)innovation is enabled bya different form of imported (social) capitalin terms of tacit knowledge transfer (Batheltet al., 2004), the distribution of risk-reductionin uncertainty (Cohen and Fields, 1999;Saxenian, 1994) and what Saxenian (2002)refers to as the brain gain. However, witha large migrant population in the county

(37 per cent foreign-born), including first- andsecond-generation Hispanic (25 per cent ofthe population) and Vietnamese, who servicethis knowledge economy, Silicon Valley firmsare not strong supporters of either the com-munity or cultural programmes generallyand remain in industrial parks on the cityfringe. Most are new firmsexceptions beingthe long-established Hewlett Packard and themore recent Google with mid-West foundersand a transient and different set of migrantworkers (for example, from south-east Asia).This plug-n-play place, ranking high onFloridas Tolerance andInequality indices,is judged to be neither socially cohesive nor avibrantin fact a dullplace in which to live(Kriedler, 2005). A further irony is the digitaldivide in access and ownership of ICTinCalifornia, Latino young people are half as

likely to have computer access at home:36 per cent compared with 77 per cent ofUS-born non-Latinos (Fairlie et al., 2006).Cultural policy initiatives here have focused

on arts education in schools, rather thanculture-led regeneration. However, in keepingwith elsewhere in North America, the culturalflagship continues to be favoured and receives

most attention and resourcesfor example,in California itself, with the Yerba BuenaCenter for the Arts (San Francisco), MOCA(Los Angeles) and SJMA (San Jose), as wellas in Toronto (C$billion dollar babies) andNew York (Brooklyn Academy of Music, newart museum redevelopments at MOMA,Manhattan, and Dia, New Jersey) (Gertleret al., 2006a, 2006b).

Creative Sectors

Table 3 summarises the creative sectors thatare the subject of the policy and strategyinterventions reviewed. These were self-definedin each case, reflecting cultural systems (forexample, arts and cultural policy and funding)and the sectoral/cluster priorities and the depthof policy analysis undertaken. This appears torest on the extent to which the creative and

related sectors (for example, fashion) andsub-sectors (for example, designer fashion)selected for intervention and investment werebased on existing capacity, or on aspirationaland global growth prospects and technologytransfer. This aggregation of creative sectorsfeaturing in strategic policies and plans alsocombines cities and regions at differingstages in sectoral and creative industry policymaturity.

Film/TV is thereforesurprisingly as anold cultural industrythe most frequentlysupported sector, followed by the genericArtsnormally performing and visual artslinked to the visitor economy and culture-ledregeneration. The next sectors to be prior-itised include Music, Media and design,Architecture, Fashion, then to a lesser extent,Publishing, ICT, Cultural tourism, Crafts and,

lastly, Advertising. Production-based sectorsthat had been the larger employers in termsof firm size and total number of jobs withinthe cultural industriesnotably textiles in

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

25/39

1026 GRAEME EVANS

well as structural changes in the industry,public and private, such as digital, cable andInternet TV and deregulation. Some sectorscontinue to be afforded protection from com-

petition under GATS and UNESCO culturalexception agreementsfor example, audio-visual and film. ICT/technology includingsoftware (leisure games) on the other handare surprisingly less commonly cited as a pri-ority sector in these public policies. However,digital media and other creative practices in-creasingly incorporate technological appli-cations and interfaces, notably in film/TV

and music, and in materialsfor example,technical textiles, laser cutting and rapid pro-totyping in product and architectural design.The creative product is therefore still identifiedwith, rather than the creative technologicalprocess itself.

Creative Clusters or Sectors?

The collective nouns used to identify these eco-nomic activities are also applied interchange-

ably, which confuses the notion of a clusteras both a geographical and an economic con-cept (Malmberg and Power, 2006). In manycases, these refer to co-location/proximity, notto viable economic clusters. Industry, sectorand cluster therefore refer to various group-ings in policy statements and strategies. Ata regional level, both industry and clusterare usedfor example, in Scotland, 14 keyindustrygroups are listed, one of which isdigital and media industries (others includetextiles, tourism and microelectronics). Thecreative industries strategy is then detailedin terms ofclusters, prioritising digital media,film/TV and music which are distributed acrossthe key regional cities, the largestGlasgowand EdinburghSilicon Glen, and Dundee,formerly known for its jam, jute and jour-nalism, but now trading on producing an

early computer game success, Grand TheftAuto, as well as biotech and university R&Dfacilities. In less than five years, this universityhas doubled in size. The Scottish film industry

fashion; printing in publishing; and audio-visual services and manufacturinghavebeen usurped in these policy priorities by de-sign and media activity. Film/TV encompassboth industrial, state and commercial sectoractivity, as well as aspects of new digital

media, which explain its high occurence.This includes cities attracting film locationand supporting production investment as alow-cost alternative to prime studio and loca-tions. For example Pragues streets displaceVictorian London (Evans, 2007); Vancouverand Toronto undercut Hollywood; modern-isation and diversification of existing studioand production complexes can be found in,for example, post-unification Berlin andthe Babelsburg region (Kratke, 2002; Evansand Witting, 2006); and the hi-tech digitalproduction facility such as Lucas Films hasrelocated its digital animation facility toSingapore. Transitional and emergent statesalso use cultural production in sectors such asfilm/TV and traditional arts and heritage toreassert or promote the cultural identity of thenew nation-state or ethnic group (for example,

eastern Europe, Catalonia, South Africa).Art form and cultural practice also influence

this sectoral trendfor example, the growthin animation (linked to digital graphics)as

Table 3. Creative sector

Sector Percentage

Film/TV/animation 15

Arts 14Music 13

Media 12

Design 9

Architecture 7

Fashion 6

Publishing 6

ICT/tech 6

Tourism 4

Crafts/jewellery 4

Advertising 4Total 100

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

26/39


is also influenced by the quota system requir-ing (through public licence obligation) regionalproduction commissioning by TV companies,such as the BBC and Channel 4. In North

West England, Greater Manchester identifiesservice, public and knowledge-based sectors,with Manchester its designated Science Cityand Knowledge Capital. The latter sector isrepresented by several key sub-sectors: biotech/health, digital industries, a separate creativeindustries sub-sector, and environmental ser-vices. Within these regional strategies, the roleof the public sector (including higher educa-

tion) is significant in employment, investmentand policy terms, rather than the businesscluster-led economic development associatedwith Porters growth theory. Where specificindustry links to growth policy are evident,these still draw on public institutional collab-oration and investmentfor example, theKulturo incubator complex in Turku, westFinland, supported by Nokia and a Finnishinnovation fund and start-up programme;

and film, fashion and design industry (forexample, automotive) joint ventures inCalifornias higher education/R&D sectors.

Creative industries highlighted for sup-port therefore reflect either the national trad-ition and focus on cultural consumption/reception and art form, or the productionprocess, technology and media. In the moredeveloped strategies at city-region level, cre-ative clusters are prioritised often targetingthe ubiquitous design, generic or sectoral(for example, fashion, furniture/interiors),digital media (including film/TV/animation,graphics) and artsspecific sectors asso-ciated with cultural rather than economiccapital, such as music in Glasgow, performingarts in Singapore and visual arts in Berlin.This represents in one sense a compromisebetween creative/knowledge economic

growth policy and residual cultural policy,but rationalised also in economic terms. Forexample, Singapores positioning as GlobalCity of the Arts and investment in major

cultural facilities (Chang, 2000) as well asconservation/heritage districts (Ho, in thisSpecial Issue); Scotlands live music and festi-val tradition linked to its tourism strategy;

and the role of visual and public art and de-sign in city and higher education renewal suchas in Barcelona, Berlin and Helsinki througharchitecture, art market/galleries and a univer-sity campus, together with associated housingdevelopment.

Where cities promote creative industriesthat are not currently reflected in their eco-nomic and employment profile and market

share, the risk may be high. This is the case inBarcelonas backing of its80 million digitalmedia campus (@22) in the industrial districtof Poblenou (Casellas and Pallares-Barbera,in this Special Issue). Fulfilling regenerationand city expansion objectives post-1992Olympics, the citys strength in architecture,product design and visual arts is at odds withthis particular version of the new economy andwith local community sentiments (Kriznik,

2004). Evidence of an oversupply of designgraduates in Barcelona (Evans, 2006b), as inLondon and New York, is perhaps an earlywarning, particularly since the citys art anddesign university is relocating all of its currentsix campus facilities to the site as part of thismassive development (Lopez, 2005). This ismirrored in London with the relocation of thelargest college of the University of the Arts tothe Kings Cross/St Pancras railway lands de-velopment. Another example is the Orestadextension to Copenhagen, with a linear arrayof modern architectural offices and retailblocks, new schools and housing, and therelocated Technology University and Danishbroadcasting facility. Here, the retro-fittingof cultural animation and activity more asso-ciated with run-down buildings and areasis sought by the developers who now admit

that: smooth planning of infrastructure doesnot do the trick of creating real life in newbuilt dwellings (iBYEN.dk; in Evans, 2008).Intervention is therefore needed to attract

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

27/39

1028 GRAEME EVANS

artists and other creatives to settle and work

there by allowing them to use selected pre-

mises without charge in return for their con-

tribution to the animation of the area through

public performances and workshops. Wherecampus-based R&D activity is co-located

with established production and incubation

facilities, the potential synergies between art,

design and science appear more robustfor

example, Media City, Eagle Yard Adlershof,

Berlin (Humboldt University) and Torontos

Medical and Related Science centre (MaRS),

a joint hospital/health trust, university and city/

provincial government initiative. How theselarge institutional complexes will relate to and

seek access from creative micro-enterprises

and individuals is, however, unclear and, as

yet, untested. Moreover, the majority of public

programmes are directed at organisations

not creative entrepreneurs. As Hall docu-

mented at length (1998), successful culture

cities manage to retain their creativity only by

constantly renewing themselves. Or rather,

cities dont do that; their people do. But they

only do so in a particular creative (or innov-

ative) mileu (Hall, 2005, p. 5).

Types of Intervention

Analysis of these policies and strategic plans

groups creative economic initiatives into one

of six broad categories. These encompass,

in order of priority and frequency: property;

business support services; grants and loans;fiscal/tax schemes; and infrastructure

physical and soft. Soft infrastructure includes

ICT (i.e. fast broadband), education and

training and the support of networks and

marketing. For a fuller exposition of these,

together with examples from policy and pro-

gramme interventions, see Evans et al. (2005)

and Foord (2009) and Gertler et al. (2006a,

2006b, 2006c). These intervention types arenot exclusivethe more developed strategies,

often based on a 10-year plan (as in Amsterdam,

Barcelona, London and Singapore) combine

or integrate several of thesebut they provide

a profile of the main trajectories of interven-

tion and the mechanisms being used to

promote and support creative cities and econ-

omies. This notion that the creative industriesare different from other economic sectors

and industrial processes has led to the creation

of specialist creative or cultural industries

development agencies (CIDAs) and enter-

prise support programmes, as well as facilities

such as incubators and managed workspaces.

However, as the policy analysis confirms, the

mechanisms used follow traditional forms.

Many of these are familiar types of economicdevelopment intervention, often directed at

start-ups or SMEs, indicating both the simil-

arity of enterprise needs across sectors and

perhaps a lack of understanding of what dif-

ference creativity (in product and/or process)

makes to an enterprise or local economy. A

frustration felt by public economic develop-

ment officers and agencies interviewed is the

antithetical approach to growth by start-up

and even established young entrepreneurs

in the creative field, which creates a dispersion

of fragile and transient micro/sole-trader

enterprises that do not conform to business

growth models or modes of intervention

(Balaguer, 2005; Evans, 2008; NESTA, 2003).

This is also of concern in inner-city regener-

ation where positively impacting on work-

lessness and improving employability and

skills are prime policy objectives and rationalesfor public investment. If the new creative

economy is unable (or unwilling) to generate

employment or spend on support services

locally, this formula is obviously flawed.

The CIDA model also reflects a lack of faith

and trust in traditional enterprise agencies,

such as chambers of commerce, which neither

reflect the age and lifestyle profile of creative

entrepreneurs, nor possess the understandingrequired to support the new IPR, design and

experience-led knowledge economy and its

fluid human, financial and cultural capital

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

28/39


formation (NESTA, 2006). These arms-length

intermediary agencies are still largely controlled

and financed by city and regional government,

and act as the focus for policy promotion and

implementation, for example, the BarcelonaCulture Institute (ICB), the UK regional CIDAs,

Design Singapore and the Danish Design

Centre. Industry associations may have min-

ority representation on these organisations

and their policy and funding programmes,

but their main activity is that of promotional

events (such as fashion weeks, design fairs)

and networking, rather than in mainstream

enterprise development and investment pro-grammes; these activities are also highly

subsidised by city authorities, including the

promotion of creative business clusters

(Bagwell, 2008). However, in cities where

the creative industries are viewed as either a

sub-sector of the knowledge industries, or

just one element in economic development,

this role tends to be retained within city and

inward investment departmentsfor ex-

ample, in Berlin, Manchester, Helsinki and

Riga. In England, this role is increasingly taken

by regional development agencies (RDAs),

but within a dirigiste national policy and

funding framework.

Intervention in practice. An example of

sustained support for the creative industries

and how these interventions work in practice,

is provided by an evaluation of Europeanregional development (ERDF) programmes

targeting this sector over a 12-year period

in London (EKOS, 2006). This is also a case of

convergence and pragmatic alignment of

European, national, regional and sub-regional

policy interests, manifested at a very local level.

London had developed its creative industries

policy from the mid 1980s under the then

Greater London Council (GLC, 1985) andwhich had survived several political regimes,

to be re-energised in 2004 by the new Mayoral

Creative Industries Commission and a new

delivery unit of the regional economic devel-

opment agency (Creative London; LDA, 2003).

Regional support of this sector formed part

of European Regional Development Funding

(Objective 2) targeted at assistance areas,for which several districts qualified in the

early 1990s (as northern and other areas of

the UK, Ireland and southern Europe had

already done; see Evans and Foord, 2000).

Three successive rounds (199496, 199799,

200006) totalling 143 millon of EU and

national funding were allocated to a variety of

creative industry projects. Nearly 80 per cent

of this was directed to city-fringe/inner eastLondon areas (hubs; see Figure 2)the prime

regeneration zone and recipient of successive

urban regeneration programme investment

since the 1980s (including the inner London

Docklands). Most projects were delivered by

the third sector (for example, CIDAs), not

by public or private/industry organisations.

The spread of projects comprised 50 per cent

business advice and community support,

30 per cent accommodation, 10 per cent com-

munity and cultural facilities, 8 per cent train-

ing and only 1 per cent business finance.

What is significant about these types of

initiative in relation to the new economy, is

that they have been directed predominantly at

supporting start-up and SME creative enter-

prises, with only a very few directed at the

expansion and growth of established creative

firms, or at higher-level interventions (for ex-ample, innovation, advanced technology) and

even fewer at fostering business-to-business

markets beyond the creative industries

where the higher growth potential lies through

convergence and content innovation.15 The

impact on firm performanceturnover, em-

ployment, innovationsuggests that those

with the highest take-up of support (i.e.

training, business advice) exhibit the poorestgrowth and improvement (Foord, 2008),

with subsidised workspace used as shelter

for uneconomic firms. However, incubator

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

29/39

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

30/39


as alcohol, live entertainment and dancingvenuesleaving the once-self-sufficientRave (dance/music), artists squats (pre-loftdwellers), art and street markets and inde-

pendent retailers (such as booksellers), togentrification and rent-seeking processes.Capturing this particular shift from use valueto exchange value is therefore representedin the production/consumption spaces thatbring the symbolic and city economy togetherglocally. The creative quarters of cities his-torically have emerged organically fromcultural producer and fringe workshop areas

with lower land/rents and looser controls,such as licensing, planning and policingfrom craft guilds in the City of London andthe bohemian quarters in Paris and New York(Wilson, 2003; Wedd, 2001; Evans, 2001a),to the garages of Silicon Valley and squatsof Berlin today (Shaw, 2005). Recreatingand accelerating the new economy throughtechnocratic planning, regeneration andpolicy intervention have, however, required

rapid learning by governments and investorsthat relies on evidence and policy modelsto minimise risk, justify resource allocationand secure the economic advantages andreturns that the knowledge society supposedlyoffers.

Talking-up and conflating the creativeinto knowledge economies and occupationsas illustrated through this policy analysis,is increasingly problematic and counter-productiveas the rationales and evidencebecome strained and an economic downturntakes effect, unevenly. This weakens the cred-ibility within government economic andinvestor communities (DCMS, 2006; NESTA,2006), as this version of the new economy isseen to produce hollow promises for residentcommunities and enterprises. It is these localactors (stakeholders) who supposedly drive

city economic renewal and growth, throughbusiness enterprise-led clusters (Bagwell,2008; Porter, 2000); however, non-local publicand larger institutions control the policy

and investment and regeneration agendas.This is also at odds with industrial and tradenetworks which cling to their sectoral asso-ciations, specialisms and marketsin film/

TV, architecture, publishing, product design,hotels and theatres, etc.and associatedvocational training and business supportneeds; these do not easily translate to area-based economic development and clusterconcepts and models. As Jayne points outfrom the UK perspective

Current creative-industries policy is overlydominated by an inadequate cluster agenda

(and its evidential base) that fails to elaboratefully how the creative industries operate and fails to account for the ways in whichpeople consume products and services (Jayne,2005, p. 554).

In terms of urban policy, viewing both microand meta-critiques together in context andin terms of the linkages between local andpolitical economiesand between large

firms, institutions and local economies andenterprisesmight therefore be seen as amore valuable contribution to the discourseand requisite methodologies; less so, yet morecluster concepts and explanatory creativeoccupation (class) and industry (employment)configurations. It is the interpretation andimpact of policy models that arguably providethe fine-grain understanding of how the neweconomy is translated in these urban creativespaces and knowledge cities, including howfar they are indeed new and economic

A creative city cannot be founded like acathedral in the desert: it needs to be linkedto and be part of an existing cultural envir-onment. We need to appreciate complexinterdependencies, and not simply use one toexploit the other (Pratt, 2008, p. 35).

From this comparative perspective, noveltyin policy responsesbetween creative indus-try and urban policy and between cultural andeconomic policyis still lacking in imagination

7/27/2019 Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

31/39

1032 GRAEME EVANS

and is over-reliant upon unproven (or non-

transferable) models of intervention and

employment growth. This is most apparent

from this survey in the confusion between

regional (including transborder) industry-based economic policy and cluster-based

approaches and sectoral interventionsand

urban policy directed at area and community-

based social and economic regeneration. This

fundamental weakness can be traced to the

fragile foundations on which the creative

industry and associated creative city growth

predictions have been based and on fuzzy

notions of creative class, innovation andcluster processes and benefits. Policy transfer

in this case has also been accelerated by the

lack of alternative strategies and sustainable

growth options in these post-industrial cities,

attracted by the celebrated exemplars and

visions of a digital city utopia. The more

favoured policy trend of place-making, on

the other hand, may need to consider both

distinctiveness and integration within the

city and wider region in terms of accessibility,

connectivity and cultural development, if the

current phase of inner-city regeneration is to

have much resonance with the cultural and

creative economy itself, in its new and old

forms and functionswhere

local policy builds on the historically developed

unique particularities of the city and considers

the creative sector in relation to the broader

urban economy rather than as distinctive

clusters (Trip and Romein, 2009, p. 216).

Notes

1. The research originated in a study commis-sioned by the London Development Agency(Creative London) and Metropolitan Torontoand Ontario provincial governments (Cultureand Economic Development ministries), led

by the author and Meric Gertler, Universityof Toronto. This was supplemented by par-ticipation in an OECD Territorial Review ofCopenhagen (2008).

2. See Eurostat (2007). Micro-enterprises employ-ing under 10 persons (most creative enterprisesemploy less than 5 ) are not included in thesurvey, which therefore overstates small-firm

innovation in this sector.3. According to the Cultural Ministry in theUK

The classifications used by internationalconvention for official statistics do notaccurately reflect the structure of the CreativeIndustries. As such it is difficult to capturethe full extent of the activity in the CreativeIndustries (DCMS, 2005, p. 1).

Likewise, in Europe: statistical tools are not

appropriate and available statistics are scarce.Statistical tools do not enable the cultural andcreative sector to be captured properly (KEA,2006, p. 4). This has fuelled and given licenseto a confusing range of estimates, statisticalreworking and industry/occupation groupingsused by agencies and researchers seeking toexpand or target particular elements of the cre-ative and knowledge economy and attributedemployment.

4. Globalisation and World Cities Study Groupand Network (www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/).

5. Cultural observatoriesnational (Europe) andregional cultural consortia (RCOs, England);international networks, for example, UNESCOCreative Cities, EU-CIRCLE; Creative Clustersnetwork (www.creativeclusters.co.uk); theCompetitiveness Institute (ICIC, Harvard, US;Barcelona, Spain); the Knowledge Foundation(Sweden); cultural think-tanksComedia/DEMOS, Institite for Public Policy Research,

Work Foundation; and the Urban Age road-showLondon School of Economics/DeutscheBank (London, New York, Shanghai, Beijing,Jo

Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40

Documents

Transcript of Urban Stud-2009-Evans-1003-40