Urban Chances in Brazil - Cities Report: Guarulhos, Salvador and ...

CITY REPORT

JULY 2013

Urban Chances in Brazil

City Reports Guarulhos, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro

By Adrian Gurza Lavalle, John Sydenstricker, Júlia Andrade, Denise Vitale, Einar Bratheim, Adriane Batata

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Table of ContentsTable of Contents

1. Overview:GovernanceandSustainabilityinBrazilianCities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

2. MainUrbanGrowthStrategies–TheRoleofMega-ProjectsinBrazilianCities . .. .. .. .. .. . 4

2.1GuarulhosGrowthandtheVárzeadoTietêPark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.2RiodeJaneiroGrowthandthePortoMaravilha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

2.3SalvadorGrowthandtheRegenerationPlanfortheOldDowntown . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

3. AddressingUrbanInequality:FocusonSub-StandardSettlements. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14

3.1TheMunicipalityofRioJaneiro . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..16

3.2TheMunicipalityofSalvador. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..20

3.3TheMunicipalityofGuarulhos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

4. WaterGovernanceandClimateChangeIssuesinGuarulhos. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23

4.1MajorWaterRelatedClimateVulnerabilitiesandDisastersinGuarulhos. . . . . . . . . . . .24

4.2WaterAvailabilityandWaterandClimateGovernanceinCity. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..25

4.3PVTMega-Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

5. SpatialKnowledgeManagement:SpatialPerspectivesandParticipationinKnowledgeProduction,ExchangeandUse? . . . . . . 27

5.1GuarulhosSpatialKnowledgeManagement . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28

5.2KnowledgeProductionandParticipatoryBudgetinGuarulhos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

6. TheRoleofVenuesofParticipationintheCityDemocraticGovernance. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..31

6.1GuarulhosStructureofParticipatoryGovernanceandRulingParties . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

6.2Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

6.3ParticipatoryBudgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

6.4SalvadorStructureofParticipatoryGovernanceandRulingParties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

6.5RiodeJaneiroStructureofParticipatoryGovernanceandRulingParties. . . . . . . . . . . .37

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

ThemainbasicfeaturesofBraziliangovernanceatcitylevelaresetbysomecharacteristicsofBrazilianfederalism,andthosefeaturesvariesacrosspoliciesandcontingentlyupon sate level and municipal level institutionalarrangementwithinthosepolicies.AdistinctivepeculiarityofBrazilianfederalismisthatthe1988Constitutiongavethe country’s municipalities the status of autonomousentities within the federation. In other words, whilefederalism isusuallydefinedbyadual relationbetweenstateandfederallevelsofgovernment,Brazilpossessesatripartite relation between autonomous entities: thefederation, states andmunicipalities. Themunicipalities

1 ThefirstauthorisgratefultotheInstituteforEuropeanStudies and the Centre for the Study of DemocraticInstitutions,bothfromUniversityofBritishColumbia,forinstitutionalsupportwhilewritingthisreport.Heisalsograteful for the financial support grantedby SãoPauloResearchFoundation(FAPESP),grant#2012/18439-6.

acquiredadegreeofpoliticalimportanceunprecedentedinnationalhistory:theirnumberleaptfrom3,991in1980to5,561in2001;overthesameperiod,theirshareoftaxrevenueobtainedbythethreelevelsofgovernmentrosefrom8.6%to16.09%;andtheyalsosawanexpansionintheircapacityforimplementingpolicies,especiallyintheareaofsocialpolicies.

That scenariowould deceivingly suggest that citieshaveroomforagencybecauseofstrongfederalismandtherelationofthelaterwithdecentralization.Howeverprecisely the opposite has happened in Brazil: thepredominanttendencyisforthestreamliningofpoliciesintothesamemoldsbycentralgovernment,whichthenare implemented at municipal by contracts betweenmunicipalitiesandcentralgovernment.Thisderivesfromthe way in which the institutional mechanisms weredesigned to coordinate inter-governmental relations.The basic mechanism behind this confluence is the

CityGrowthandtheSustainabilityChallengeComparingFastGrowingCitiesinGrowingEconomies

Urban Chances in Brazil

City Reports Guarulhos, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro

ByAdrianGurzaLavalle1,JohnSydenstricker,JúliaAndrade,DeniseVitale,EinarBratheim,AdrianeBatata

Fullteamofresearchers:EduardoSombini,JessicaVoigt,JoãoCarlosCarvalhasesdosSantosMonteiro,LizandraSerafim,OsmanyPortodeOliveira,TimoBarthollAnaCarolina

Christovão,ValériaPinheiro,KatianeLuciaZape

Overview: Governance and Sustainability in Brazilian Cities1

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runbystatelevelownedcompaniesprovidingservicestomunicipalities. Often, those companies are partiallyownedbyprivateinvestors.

Nomacro-regional,metropolitan or other territorialdistrictabovemunicipal levelplayamajorrole inBrazil,althoughthereareanincreasingnumberinter-municipalconsortia. Nowadays there are 56metropolitan regionslegally created and recognized either by federal or satelevel laws, but they do not have legal faculties, neitherresourceful collegiate bodies.With some variation, thatholds true for the three cities analyzed in this report,namelySãoPaulo,SalvadorandRiodeJaneiro,whichareatthecoreofthreemetropolitanregions.Thus,planningoccursmainlywithinmunicipalboundariesoratstateorfederal levels. In the last two decades, inter-municipalconsortiahavegrown, and theyamount tohundreds inbasichealth,urbandevelopment,butinciteswithmorethan500,000inhabitants,likeSãoPaulo,RioandSalvador,theyarerare(Prates2010).

conditional transfer of funds from the federalgovernment: in otherwords, the latter conditions thetransfer of funds on themunicipality agreeing to andimplementing policies designed entirely within thiscontext.Hencefiscalandadministrativedecentralizationat municipal level are combined with a strongcentralizationofdecision-makingpowersatthefederalexecutivelevel.

Duetopoliticalandfiscaldecentralization,combinedwithrecentralizationinpolicydecision-making,Braziliancitieshaveincreaseditsroleindeliveringservices.Thatrolevariesbetweencitiesacrosspolicysectorandentailsdifferentgovernanceinstitutionalarrangementsbetweenfederal, state and municipal levels. Policy obligationsbetweenfederallevelsaresetby1988Constitution,andwhenitcomestosharedobligationsbetweenstateandmunicipal levels, room for different governancearrangementincrease.Policieswithbigscaleeconomies,suchassewage,housingandwatersupply,normallyare

Paulo’s dormitory cities, with a “natural” vocation todevelopgrowthstrategiessuitedtoservingSãoPaulo’scityneeds.Thisisstillthecaseandmega-projects,evenwhenlinkedtomega-events,asinthecaseoftheamplificationofGuarulhosInternationalAirportfortheworldcoup,doesnotplacethecityitselfintheinternationalmarket,neitherintend to elevated the city to the select group ofworld‘loved’cities.Inthissense,Guarulhos’chosencaseismoretelling.TheTheVárzeadoTietêPark(PVT)mega-project,accordingly,isnotrelatedtoaglobalevent,andwillheavilybenefit real state stakeholders, although they have notbeenamainactor.Moreprecisely, the (PVT)Projectnotonly isnotrelatedtoglobalevents,butneithertodirectforeign investmentoranycitygrowthstrategybasedoninternationalizationofGuarulhos,butrathertometropolitanphenomena such as seasonal floods, traditional housingprecariousness of Sao Paulo’s east lowlands, seriousproblemsofcartrafficandrealstatespeculation.Becauseitisametropolitanstatedriveninter-municipalproject,PVTwasnot conceived as city centered growth strategy andGuarulhos’ City Hall has little room for shaping theimplementationof theproject asahole. Interestingly, itreinforces Guarulhos consolidated strategy of growththroughintegratingitseconomyandinfrastructuretoSão

Urban growth strategies depend o both factors,performance of national economy within the worldeconomy,andtheoptionsavailabletoeachcityformediumandlongtermstrategicplanning.Relayingonmega-projectsasdriversofcitygrowthisnotnew,butthecharacteristicsofsuchprojectschangealongtimedependingonthesametwo factors. During the industrialization years and theimport substitutionmodel, big investments in industryparks,orinfrastructureservicestoindustryandtradewerecommon,andpromisingurbanstrategies.Whatseemsnewtoday is the context of national stableGDP growth andbooming international visibility of Brazil, and, above all,thatmega-projectshaveshiftedfromindustrytoservices,frominternalmarketorconnectingnationalaninternationalmarketstoplacingthecityitself,withitsownsstrategy,ininternationalmarkets, and fromnationalistic ideologicalframes invoked for pulling together resources to globalmega-events “unique” opportunities. That shift is notequallyavailabletoallcities.

Guarulhos,RiotheJaneiroandSalvadorhashaddifferentpositioninnationalandregionaleconomyandnowpursuedifferent growth strategies relaying differently onmega-projects. Guarulhos evolved historically as one of São

Main Urban Growth Strategies – The Role of Mega-Projects in Brazilian Cities2

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Pauloeconomicdynamics.Themetropolitannatureoftheprojectmakesstatelevelpoliticscrucialandhelpstoexplainboth the small role played by participation, evenwhenGuarulhosGovernmentiswellknowforitscommitmenttofosterparticipatoryvenues,andthelackoflocalmobilizationaroundPVT.Shiftingfromitsoriginalconceptionbasedoncommunity development to an ecologically appealingframe,theprojectispresenteddiscursivelyatstatelevelasamatteropublicgoodandexemplarinstanceofanewpathtakenby authorities towards greendevelopment, hidingconflictingaspectsofit.

However, inthecaseofRiotheJaneiroandSalvador,investmentsrelatedtomega-projectshavebeenmadetoimprovethe“systemoffixedassets,”thatis,urbanfacilitiesattractivetointernationaltourism(museums,conventioncentres)andlargeiconsthatenhanceidentityandprestigethanks to architectural monuments designed by majorinternational names. Rio de Janeiro has a strong anddiversifiedeconomy,withinwhichtourismandtheeconomyof image(marketizecitybeautyforcultural industry)areimportant pieces, but not the central engines of localeconomy. Porto Maravilha mega-project (PMV) clearlyrepresentsastrategyofgrowththatfitsboth,tourismandimageeconomy,andpromotingthematglobalscale.Sincede1980sRiodeJaneiroCityHallinvestedinthatdirection(i.e.ascendingintherankingofworldclassdestinationsforleisureandbusiness),butonlyduringthelastdecadethestrategytookoffwithPMP.Besidesthenationaleconomicalfactors, mentioned in the introduction, real statespeculationandpoliticalalignmentbetweenfederal,stateandmunicipalgovernmentlevels,successfulbidstohosttheOlympicsin2016andthefinaloftheworldcoupwerethemaincatalystsforcateringresources,buildingalliancesandshapingfavorablepublicopinion.Thus,mega-eventsappearsnotonlyasanopportunityforprofitorinternationalprojection, but as a discursive legitimizing device thatjustifytemporarysuspensionofurbanregulationfor“getthings done” timely. This is the main symbolic frame,followedbygrowththroughtourismand jobsforpeoplelivingaroundPMP.Hereagain,butatsub-municipallevel,mega-project borders – a public-private partnership –mismatched the sub-municipalborders for claimmakingandprotest.Thischallengessocialmobilization.However,asPMPtakesplaceatmunicipallevel,andtherehasbencreatedaPortCommunityForumForum.

SalvadoreconomyispoorerandlesdiversifiedthanRiodeJaneiro’seconomy.Infact,itisheavilyconcentratedinservices.Notsurprisingly,theRegenerationPlanfortheOldDowntown (RPOD) mega-project focuses on tourism,lookingtokeeptheattractivenessofthecityvis-à-visresortsdevelopment along Bahia’s coast,which are dimmed todrained away tourism fromSalvador. Themain asset for

fostering tourism in thecity is thearchitecturalhistoricalheritageconcentratedinhistoricaldowntownorPelourinho.Thismakesabigdifference:downtowndecayhasproducedalonglistofpublicinterventionssincethe1960s,withanequally long record of forced evictions andno concernsaboutthesocialeffectsofsuchinterventionsthoughtjustasheritagepreservingpolicies.RPODmega-projectispartofthathistory,butinordertocleardifferentiateitformpastpolicies, an unseen emphasis on participation and socialaspectsashousinghasbeenincorporated,atlestnominally,to theproject.Themainbeneficiariesof theprojectare,however,tourismrelatedservicesandreal-statesectors.

Inabroaderperspective,Brazil’sinclusionintheglobaleconomy was historically linked to the exportation ofprimary goods. From the 1970s onwards the country’srange of exports becamemore diverse as it started tocompete in the international market of manufacturedgoods.However,the1980sweremarkedbytheexhaustionofthegrowthmodelbasedonimportsubstitution,whichled in turn toeconomic instability,negativeevolutionofGDP and hyperinflation and its effect of paralyzing theeconomydraggedon intothefirstyearsofthefollowingdecade.DuringFernandoHenriqueCardosogovernment(1995-1998; 1999-2002) the agenda for structuraladjustmentoftheStateandliberalizationoftheeconomytook off. The two FHC mandates were successful instabilizing the economy (controlling inflation) and inconsolidating the administrative capacity and politicalrunningoftheState.Howevereconomicgrowthwaslowinthedecadefrom1995to2004withtheBrazilianeconomygrowingbyanaverageofjust2.4%(IPEA2008).InthetwomandatesoftheLulagovernment(2003-2006;2007-2010)theeconomybenefittedfromreformsundertakenbyhispredecessorandwassubjecttomacro-economicpoliciesthat, at least during the firstmandate,maintained theapproachadoptedbytheFHCgovernment.Howevernotonlywastheeconomy’sperformance–judgedintermsofgrowth,labormarket,tradebalanceandsoon–considerablyhigher,thegovernment’seconomicpolicywasclearlynon-liberalandevendevelopmentalistinsomeareas.Intermsofeconomicperformance,growthinGDP,whichhadbeenmediocreduringtheFHCgovernment,oscillatedbetweenratesof3.2and6.1undertheLulagovernmentfrom2004to 2008 (Barbosa & Souza 2010). The economy’s goodperformance during Lula’s deteriorated during DilmaRoussefmandate(anaverageof1.8GDPbetween2011and2012),butitisstillpositive.

Overall,thelast17yearsgrantedastableandpositivenational economic performance and it is against thisbackdropofstability,positiveexpectationsandinternationalrecognitionofeconomicsuccessamidstglobalcrisesthatthe current strategies of city growth were built. More

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2.MainUrbanGrowthStrategies–TheRoleofMega-ProjectsinBrazilianCities

specifically,while the initiatives to ‘revitalize,’ ‘renovate’and‘regenerate’metsomeobstaclesduringthelastdecadeof thetwentiethcentury, in the2000sthissituationwaslargely transformed. Firstly in the political settingwhenfrom2003thefederalgovernmentinstitutedtheMinistryofCitiesinanattempttoconnectthesector-basedactions.Actors are emergingwithin the administrative structurecapableofcreatingmechanismsthatregulateandcreatecontributionstowardstheinvestmentsthathavehistoricallyalways coincided with the interests of big business.Secondly, Brazilian government, fearing that the globalrecession could harm the national economy, investedoverwhelmingly in the civil construction sector. The civilconstruction industry possesses a higher capacity tomobilize thananyother sectorof thenational economysince itaffects the labormarketdirectlyat itsbase (civilconstruction workers), as well as stimulating a lengthyproductivechainofprimaryproducts(iron,cement,steel).Finally, Brazil hadwon the right tohost the twobiggestinternational events, which attract huge financialinvestments.The2014WorldCup,whichwilltakeplacein14Braziliancities,andthe2016OlympicGamesinthecityof Rio de Janeiro, and that justify today numerousinvestments, expropriations, reforms, legislative changesandsoon.

2.1 Guarulhos Growth and the Várzea do Tietê Park

GuarulhosisthesecondlargestcityoftheStateofSãoPaulo, housing 1.28million inhabitants in 2010. Being arelevant industrial city, Guarulhos is among the richestBraziliancities,standingbetweenthe6thand10thpositioninBrazilianrankingsduringthelastdecade.ThemainfactorbehindGuarulhos’s economic importance is its strategicpositioninrelationtothestatecapitalSãoPaulo.Recenteconomic growth in the city is primarily derived fromindustrialsectorssuchasmanufacturingheavymachinery,electrical appliances, automobiles, plasticmaterials andrubber.ThecityhasthesecondlargestGDPintheSaoPauloMetropolitan Region (SPMR), accumulating aroundUS$15.7 billion,which represents a per capita GDP of US$12,730.77basedon the2005population counting.1 Thisfigure places Guarulhos in 9th position in the nationalranking,highereventhanthecityofSalvadorandotherstatecapitals,witharelativeshareof1.03%ofthesector’stotal in Brazil. Guarulhos occupies a leading position intermsofoverseastrade,notonlywithinthestateofSãoPauloand itsrespectiveMetropolitanRegion,butwithin

1 IBGE(datareferringto2007).Bywayofcomparison,theGDPofSãoPaulocorrespondstoR$319billion.

thecountryasawhole.Thisisduetothecity’sproximitytooneofthecountry’slargestroadnetworks,aswellastheportofSantos–thelargestinSouthAmerica–and,aboveall, Cumbica airport, which has the largest number ofinternationalflightsinthecountry.

The PVT is a mega-project involving eight differentmunicipalities: São Paulo, Guarulhos, Itaquaquecetuba,Poá, Suzano, Mogi das Cruzes, Biritiba Mirim andSalesópolis,asshowninImage1.TheprojectcreatingthePVT– announcedby the SãoPaulo state government in2009 as “the world’s largest linear park” – is officiallyincorporatedintothewatermanagementpoliciesfortheSPMR. The body responsible for its execution is theDepartment ofWater and Electricity (DAEE) of the SãoPaulostategovernment.However it isalsoconnectedtocomplex urban planning questions such as informalsettlementsandselectivelandappreciationinareasofthemetropolitanregion.

Thecreationoftheparkmaycontributetoasignificantsocio-spatial reconfigurationoftheeasternsectorof theSPMR,anareahistoricallyoccupiedbytheworkingclassesand known for its infrastructural problems and lack ofurbanfacilities.Thepatternofsocio-spatialsegregationofthe metropolitan region, in which the eastern zonetraditionallyappearsasaspacewithahighconcentrationofpoverty,datesbacktothestartofthetwentiethcentury.DuringthisfirstperiodofacceleratedurbanexpansionofSãoPaulo,higherincomegroupsbegantorelocatetotheareasouthwestofthecentrewherethenewluxuryhousingdevelopments were concentrated. The eastern region,separatedfromthehistoriccentrebytheseasonalfloodlandsurrounding the Tamanduateí river,was ignored by thelarge property developers and primarily occupied byindustries centred around the railway and workersettlements,followedlaterbylowincomehousing.

This ‘separation’ between the central area and thedistricts that later became classified as ‘peripheral’wasreproducedcontinuallythroughoutthetwentiethcentury.It is in this sector of the metropolitan region that theVárzeas do Tietê Park is being implanted, a zonecharacterized by intense urbanization and low qualityhousing.Mostoftheareasurroundingtheparkisoccupiedby low income housing developments, several of themirregular, including land invasions and favelas. There arefew green or institutional areas. Around the highways(Presidente Dutra andHélio Schmidt) there are a largenumber of industrial plants and supply and distributioncentres.TheImage2showsthedistributionofvulnerablesettlementsintheeasternzoneofSãoPaulomunicipality.Intheneighbouringmunicipalities,thelevelsofirregularityandprecariousnessareevenhigher

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Image 1: TheVárzeasdoTietêPark

Image 2: SaoPaulo’sVulnerableSettlementsandVárzeasdoTietêPark

UrbanizedareaoftheSPmetropolitanregion(inorange)andareadesignatedfortheimplantationoftheVárzeasdoTietêPark(ingreen).Source:DAEE.

Irregularhousing(orange),favelas(yellow),centres(blue)inthedistrictsofErmelinoMatarazzo,SãoMiguel,ItaimPaulista,ItaqueraandGuaianases,easternzoneofSãoPaulo.AreaoftheVárzeasdoTietêParktothenorth,ontheborderwithGuarulhos.Source:HabiSP

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Theoriginsofprojectcanbetracedbackto1976,whentheDepartment ofWater and Electricity (DAEE), a stategovernmentcompanyresponsibleformanagingthestate’swaterresources,begantoworkonaprojectforstraighteningtheriverupstreamofthePenhadam,intheeastzoneofSãoPaulo.HowevertheproposalwasabandonedandtheideaemergedofpreservingtheremainingfloodlandoftheTietêalongthisstretch.Thecreationofanecologicalparkthereforebegantobediscussed,spanningfromthedenselyoccupiedareainSãoPaulo(Penha)tothemunicipalityofSalesópolis,wheretheriverrises,andpassingbyGuarulhos.TheimplantationofalandscapingprojectwasalsoproposedfortheentirecourseoftheTietêinthemetropolitanregion,fromthespringstoSantanadoParnaíba,totalling86km.Effortsweremadetoimprovethelandscapethroughtheplantingofgrassandtrees.Inthestillunoccupiedareastothewestandeast, the strategywas to createparksandleisurezones.

As a result, the ecological park in the east zonewasdevised to preserve the floodable areas of the river,avoidingthesamekindofoccupationfoundalongtheotherstretches of river and allowing water retention duringperiodsofhighwaterlevelswiththeaimofregulatingtheflowontheriver’suppercourse,reducingfloodingontheMarginalTietêexpressway.Aswellasthishydraulicrole,theparkwasconceivedasthemaingreenandleisureareaintheeasternzone,otherwiselackinginopenspaces,withvarious support nucleuses planned over the course ofimplantingtheproject.In1976,thecreationoftheTietêEcologicalPark(PET)involvedtheexpropriationoflandforthe installationofthefirstnucleus(EngenheiroGoulart).That same year the architect Ruy Ohtakewas hired tocoordinate the landscape project for thewhole park. In1979,theIlhadoTamboréleisurecomplexwasinauguratedin Barueri and the Engenheiro Goulart nucleus wascompletedin1982.Thelatternucleusalonereceivesmorethan60,000visitorseveryweekend.

Duringthe1980s,however,muchofthefundingplannedforthepark’simplementationwassuspended.Thehydraulicworks projected for the area were completed, but theexpropriationoflandsaroundtheriverfortheimplantationof leisure complexeswas interrupted,meaning that theparkwasunabletobeimplantedinfull.Duringthisdecade,the processes of peripheralization and favela growthintensifiedintheTietêfloodlandsintheeasternzone.Themainpublicinitiativeinthisperiod–thedeclarationoftheVárzeasdoTietêEnvironmentalPreservationArea(EPA)bystatelaw5.598in1987–wasincapableofrespondingtotheproblem.IndeedmanyofthedistrictsthattodayfindthemselveswithintheperimeteroftheVárzeasdoTietêPark and that are being threatened by removal werecreatedduringthesecondhalfofthe1980s.

Inthe1990swiththeworseningoffloods,boththestategovernment and the São Paulo City Council began toimplementworkstoalleviatetheproblem.TheCityCouncilimplanted the first artificial lakes (piscinões or “bigswimming pools”), functioning as rainwater storagereservoirs)between1994and1998.TheDAEE,foritspart,presented the Master Plan for Macro-Drainage of theUpper Tietê Hydrographic Basin (PDMAT) in December1999,backedbyvarioushydrologicalstudiesthatlookedtosolvethemetropolitanregion’sfloodingproblemsby2020.Thisaiminmind,twomainstrategieswereadopted:1.theconstructionofartificiallakesinthesub-basinheadwaterregionsinordertoretainpartofthevolumeofrainwaterduringthemostcriticalperiodsoftheyear;2.wideningoftheTietêchannel,intowhichallthebasin’swaterdrains,increasingtheflowandreducingflooding.Thefundingforthewideningof theTietê channel came from the JapanBankforInternationalCooperation(JBIC).

Finally the PVT Project took of as an ecologicalcompensationinduringthelastdecade,asanecologicalcompensationforanotherpublicmega-project.Atthestartof2009,thestategovernmentpresentedamega-projectforwideningthelanesoftheMarginalTietêexpressway–aprojectthatbecameknownastheNovaMarginal.Theroadwideningworks,undertakenwithoutpublicdiscussion inthepre-electoral period andheavily criticized, created asemi-expresswaysection,increasingthenumberoflanesfrom7to10alongmostoftheroute.Inorderforthenewlanestobebuilt,thepermeableareaofthevergeshadtobeeliminated.Anareaequivalentto19footballpitcheswasimpermeabilizedfortheconstructionofthenewlanes.Asa result the mega-project was obliged to pay a largeenvironmental compensation. The environmentalcompensationestablishedbytheMunicipalEnvironmentandSustainableDevelopmentCouncil(CADES)ofSãoPauloCity Council stipulated that the trees from the avenue’sverges(vegetationthathadbeenplantedyearsearlierbythestategovernmentitself)shouldbereplanted,combinedwiththeplantingof147,000newseedlingsinthedistrictsborderingtheexpressway,aswellasinvestmentsincreatingtheVárzeasdoTietêPark.ThisisthecontextinwhichtheparkwasannouncedinJuly2009.

TherearepersuasiveevidencesthattheprojectdohavemadeitswaystotheprioritiesofSãoPauloGovernmentandhavesupportforitsimplementation.InOctober2008,prioreventothefinalizationofthe landscapingproject,thestategovernmentsubmittedaproposallettertotheExternalFinancingCommissionoftheMinistryofPlanning,Budgets andManagement, requesting authorization totakeoutaloanofUS$115millionfromtheInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IADB).Thisisastrongevidencethatthestategovernmenthadalreadytakentothedecisionto

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implement PVT Project. Besides that, inMay 2009 theDAEEsignedanagreementwithDERSA(thestatecompanyresponsibleforwideningtheMarginalTietêexpressway)forexecutingasectionoftheparkroadandcyclewayandtheplantingof63,000seedlingsinthemunicipalityofSãoPaulo, actions that form part of the environmentalcompensationforthework.Moreover,inJune2009workon the Jacuí nucleuswas begun. This involves anotherenvironmental compensation initiative for a large roadconstruction.Thefirst15kmoftheparkroadandcyclewaywerealsostarted.Thepublicpresentationoftheproject,however, was only held on the 20th July 2009. In aceremonyintheTietêEcologicalPark,thestategovernorJoséSerrasignedaprotocolofintentwiththemayorsfromthe8municipalitiesinvolved.

The biggest difficulty involved in implementing theprojectisclearanceofthearea.Itisestimatedthatmorethan 5,000 families will be evicted from their homes.However there is no public policy offering a securealternativeforthisimpoverishedpopulationtodaylivingontheshoresoftheTietê.WhatthestategovernmentandSãoPauloCityCouncilhavebeenbargainingistheprovisionofahousingsubsidyworthapproximatelyUS$150.Howeverinpracticethisdevicedoesnotworksincetherentalmarketishighlysusceptibleandwhendemandincreasesabruptly,thepriceschargedrisesharply.Whatcanbeobservedsofaristhatfamilieswhohavereceivedthebenefitareunableto rent another home with this amount and end upreturning to their old homes. This situation has been

worsening for four years (since 2009)when a series ofheavyfloodsbegantodestroylowincomedistrictsintheregionof JardimPantanal (JardimRomano,ChácaraTrêsMeninas, Vila Itaim andVila Any in themunicipality ofGuarulhos). Thewater floods the homes long before itstartsrainingandremainsinhomesandstreetsformonthswithouthelpforthcomingfromthepublicauthorities.

Althoughtheparkisnotincludedassuchintoanyhigh-profilepolicyfortheurbanmarketingofSãoPaulorothermetropolitanmunicipalitiesasGuarulhos,thegovernmentaldiscourseabouttheprojectclearlyconnectstoeffortsforspreadingapositiveimageofthemetropolitanregion.Heretheprojectemploystherhetoricofmodernizingtheregion,combinedwith preservation of the environment: at thesymboliclevelthereisanattempttoprojectthemetropolisasanareaundergoingconstantdevelopment(wherethelarge highway construction projects appear as themainemblemofthisprocess)butthatsimultaneouslypreservesenvironmentallysensitiveareasandinvestsinthecreationofgreenspacesandparks.Twoelementsarealsopresenthere: the emphasis given on improving the population’s“qualityoflife”(thenewgreenareasoftheparkappearinghereasabreathingspaceforthedenselyoccupiedcityandrelieffromtherapidpaceofdailylife)andalsotheattempttoshowthatthe“errorsofthepast”havebeenovercomeand,atthestartofthe21stcentury,theurbanizationofSãoPaulo is guided by a new paradigm in which the citydialogueswith the ‘environment’ rather than competingwithit(‘respect’fortheriver’sfloodland,occupiedbythe

Image 3: FloodinVilaAny,Guarulhos

WomenwalkinVilaAnyholdingagascontainerduring2010flood

Source:SaraSantos2010.http://vilaanyemfoco.blogspot.ca/2010/08/o-antes-o-depois-e-o-agora.html

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roadsysteminearlierdecades,isnowthecontemporarysignalofthisnewrelation).

Interestingly,analyzingtheoriginalprojectforcreatingthe park (from the 1970s), we can note that a moresocially engaged proposal existed back then. Theinterdisciplinaryteamatthetimeconceivedtheparkasalargegreenarea,butalsoasanaxisofpublicfacilitiesandservices. The nucleuseswere conceived as communitycentresthatwouldencouragesocialinteractionintheseperipheraldistricts.Theleisureareaswerelocatednextto libraries, auditoriums, museums, environmentaleducationcentres,meetingspacesandsoon.Hencetheproject from this period included a very strong localdimension, even though it had emerged from ametropolitanpolicyforwatermanagement.

Participationhasplayedaminorroleatmunicipalityandstatelevels.GuarulhosCityHallconductedapublichearing,buttherearenoreportsofanyformofpopularparticipationorevenaccesstoinformationforthegroupsdirectly affected at state level. As local government iscommittedtoparticipation(seesection6),ahearingwasorganized,butnorcommunitylocalleaderscouldrecallit or express clear information about the PVT or thehearing,neither–itisreasonabletoassume–CityHallcoulddoanythingwiththeoutcomes,provideitwantto.The way in which the state government has beenconductingtheimplantationoftheparkhascomeundercriticismfromdiversesectorsofcivilsociety.Since2009professionalassociations, specialists,environmentalistsand socialmovement leaders and leaders of residentsassociations have been denouncing the government’slack of transparency in elaborating the project andimplantingthepark,andeventheuseofscaretacticsonpoorlocalinhabitants,forcingthemtoacceptinadequatecompensationforeviction.IndeedtheDAEEnevermadepublic the landscaping project and the other technicalstudies that supported the creation of the park,contributinglittleforthegeneralpublictogainaccesstogovernment information. Neither did it hold any opensessions to discuss the content and strategies forimplanting the park, such as public hearings in theaffectedmunicipalities.TheDAEEpresentedthegeneraloutline of the project in a small number of hearings,alwaysconvokedbyotherinstitutions(suchastheStateLegislativeAssembly)andmadeafewpresentationstocommunityleaders.Themainpointofdisputeconcerningtheprojectisthequestionoftheevictions(“involuntaryrelocations”) from favelas and irregular housingdevelopments, aswell as the alternative housing thatshouldbeofferedtotheseresidents.

2.2 Rio de Janeiro Growth and the Porto Maravilha

ThecapitaloftheStateofRiodeJaneiroisconsideredthesecondbiggestmetropolisinBrazil,behindSãoPaulo.RiodeJaneiroisthemostwell-knownBraziliancityabroad,due to its touristic attractions. Indeed it is the maininternational tourismdestination in Brazil. The so called‘marvelous city,’ as well as possessing a vibrant touristindustry, benefits from what we could call the imageeconomy, as it provides the setting formany of Brazil’slarge-scale film productions and even a number ofinternational films. It hosts Rede Globo, the country’slargest Brazilian television network. However, the city’seconomyishighlydiverse.Thecityisanimportanteconomicandfinancialcenter,holdingthesecondlargestGDPinthecountry,equivalenttoUS$79.9billion,exceededonlybySãoPaulo.2RiodeJaneiro’economyiscomplexandisbasedinpartonastrongservicessector,placingitaclosesecondtothecityofSãoPaulo.Atthesametime,theindustrialsectorisalsoinfluential,placingthecityinthirdpositioninthenationalrankingforthesector.TheRioindustrialsectorincludestwolargeBraziliancompaniesintheoilandminingareas,namelyPetrobrásandValedoRioDocerespectively.Thecityhavehighconcentrationofoff-shoreoildepositsandroyaltiespaidmonthlybycompaniesextractingoilareastableincomesource.Finally,thecityisaswellthesecondlargesthubofresearchanddevelopmentinBrazil.

Althoughmega-projectsrelatedtomega-eventsarejustpiecewithinadiversifiedcityeconomy,PMPclearlybelongstotheimageeconomygrowthstrategy.ForcenturiesRiodeJaneiro’sdockareawasoneofthemainLatinAmericanseaports.Inthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,therelocationofthecountry’seconomicnucleustothestateof São Paulo and the technological transformations inmaritimetransportationledtoadeclineintheregion’sportactivity.Over the last one hundred years port activitieswererelocatedelsewhere, localpopulationdeclinedandportdistrictsbecame‘islands’disconnectedfromtherestofthecity.Adeclinefosteredbypublicinvestmentwhichtransformed the docklands into an important highwaycorridor linking different parts of Rio de Janeiro’smetropolitanregion.Downhighway,theportzonebecameconsolidatedasahousingspaceforlow-incomepopulation,whomakeuseoftheeconomicvacuumandrelativelylowlandvaluestomeettheirhousingneeds.

Sincethenthisspacehasbeentypifiedasa‘decayed’and ‘rundown’ zone by the public authorities and themedia,aseriesoffailed‘revitalization’projectshavebeen

2 IBGE(datareferringto2007).Bywayofcomparison,theGDPofSãoPaulocorrespondstoR$319billion.

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elaboratedovertheyears.TheoriginsofPMPcanberacedback to the 1980s, when city of Rio de Janeiro wentthroughanintenseperiodofeconomicdecline–followingthepathofnationaleconomy–,paralleledbyaworseningoftheso-called‘urbanproblems’:anincreaseintheratesofviolence,favelagrowthandinformality.Fromthe1990onwards, one of the responses to this “urban crisis”involvedastrategybasedonurbanentrepreneurshipandcitymarketingsearchingforaprominentposition intheglobal city ranking as means to achieved intra-urbancompetitiveness, and promoting economic and socialdevelopment.In1993waslaunchedtheStrategicPlanforthe City of Rio de Janeiro, elaborated by the CatalanconsultancyfirminvolvedinBarcelona’ssuccessfulbidforhostingOlympicgames.Followingthesamelogic,CityHallinstalledRioTeleport, inaugurated in1995;developedaproposal to construct a branch of the GuggenheimMuseumin2001;bidandfailedtohostthe2004OlympicGames;andworkedoutasuccessfulcandidacytohostthe2007PanAmericanGames.

The PMP success stems from the conjunction ofopportunitiesorcombinationofatleastfourfactors.First,thealignmentbetweenmunicipal,stateandfederallevelauthorities.SinceBrazil’sreturntodemocracyinthe1980s,thepartyalliancesattheselevelsnevercoincidedpoliticallyinRiodeJaneiro.Thisconfluenceofinterestsonlybecamepossiblein2009whenEduardoPaeswaselectedcitymayor,supportedbyPresidentLulaandtheStateGovernorSérgioCabral. This alignment between the three governmentlevelswasessentialtodesigningthepoliticalandfinancialstrategies needed to support the numerous urbaninvestmentsunderwayinthecity,includingtherevitalizationof theportzone.Second,LulaandDilmaRoussefstrongfinancialstimulustohousingconstruction inresponsetothe recent world crisis. This opportunity was equallywelcomedbynationalandinternationalrealstateinvestors.Thismomentisalliedwithtwoscalesofinterest.Ononehand,ininternationalcontexts,investmentinthepropertysectorispresentedasasafealternativeduringtheperiodofcrisis.Ontheotherhand,atnationallevel,thefactthathousingloansarewidelyavailablemeantthattheBrazilianpropertymarkethasexperiencedanunprecedentedboom.Third,inRiodeJaneiro,wherethereisascarcityoflandinwealthyareas,causinganastronomicalriseinlandvalues,thePPMwashighlywelcomedbytherealstatemarket.Thedistricts of the city’s South Zone lack available land fordevelopingnewhousingprojects.Thereisalackofavailableland,too,inthecity’scentralbusinessdistrict(CBD),ahighrateofoccupationofcommercialbuildings(over90%).Lastbutdefinitivelynotleast,thesuccessfulbidtohostthe2016OlympicGamesandtoactasthebaseforthe2014FIFAWorldCup.Theneedtocaterforthesefestivitiesinvolvesenormouspublicandprivateinvestmentsintheconstruction

or reformof sporting facilities, transport networks (theconstructionofanewmetrolineandaseriesofexpressbuscorridors),newhotelstomeettheshortfallof8,000rooms,andsoon.

Theprojectcoversacontinuousareaof5millionsquaremetres,3includingthreeentiredistricts–Saúde,GamboaandSantoCristo–andsectorsofthreeotherdistricts–São Cristóvão, Centro and Cidade Nova. The residentpopulationisaround30,000people,mostlylow-incomefamilies.4 Anumberof facilitieswill bebuiltwithin theperimeterofthePPMthatwillattendtheOlympicGames:the “officials’ village” and the “non-accredited mediavillage,”totallingtwothousandapartments.5Inadditiontothesefacilities,theprojectincludestheconstructionoftwohotelswith500roomseach,plusaconventioncentre,threenewpierseachwithacapacityforsixcruiseshipsto dock, two first class global museums, office andresidentialbuildings,educationalestablishments,leisureand entertainment business, service sector companies,numerous amenities and several acute territorialinterventions on poor neighbourhoods and irregularsettlementsaroundPMParea.

ThePPMaimstotransformRiodeJaneiro’sportzoneover the course of the next two decades. In the shortperiod of three years since the project’s launch,manytransformations can already be observed. The urbanlandscape is being profoundly transformed, the localtraffic altered, streets closed for construction work,circulationofheavydutyvehiclesandentirestreetblockscovered in scaffolding and tarpaulins. But thetransformations that call our attention relate to theimpactsthatareaffectingprimarilylow-incomefamilieslivingintheregion’sfavelas,slumtenementsandhomelesscamps.We should highlight the fact that, despite theofficial discourse, the project’s initiatives are mostlydisconnectedfromthesocialrealityoftheportdistrictsandarebeing implemented inanauthoritarianmannerwithoutdialoguewiththepopulation.

Since2010,therehavebeenaseriesofevictionsandremovals perpetrated by the municipal governmentfollowing the expropriation of run-down buildings or

3 Bywayof comparison, thisarea is twice thesizeof theemblematic revitalization project for Porto Madero inBuenosAires(Argentina).

4 TheHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI)fortheportdistrictsis0.775,oneof thecity’s lowest, ranking twenty-fourthamongthe32administrativeregions.

5 In2017,aftertheOlympicGames,theseapartmentswillbeput on salewith first preference given tomunicipalpublicemployees.

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occupiedbylow-incomefamilies,clearingthewayfortheconstructionofnewresidentialunitsenabledbythePNAthroughthefundingreceivedfromthefederalMCMV(MyHome My Life) program (Image 4). Two settlementsspeciallyaffectedareMorrodaProvidênciaandMorrodaConceiçãodistricts.Theformer istheoldestfavela inRJandtheinitialprojectwasintendtoremovealmosthalfofthehouses.Somebuildingshavealreadybeendemolishedandmany others have beenmarked with spray paint,indicating future interventionby theMunicipalHousingDepartment.Ourinterviewswithresidentsshowthattheapprehension and uncertainty over the future of theirhomesisintensifiedbythelackoftransparencyfromtheCityCouncilinreleasinginformationonthedevelopmentof the program. In Morro da Providência district, thegentrificationalsoincludedestheconstructionofacablecarsystemwiththreestations,whichboardingstationwasbuilt occupying all the space of the only public squareavailabletotheinhabitantofMorrodaProvidência.Infact,theconstructionoftheMorrodaProvidênciacablecarledtooneoftheprincipalpointsoftensionbetweenresidentsand the promoters of the project: the demolition ofAmérico Brum Square, considered the main space forcommunitysocialization.Constructedmorethanacenturyagoandmaintainedbytheresidents.

MorrodaConceiçãoisoccupiedmainlybymiddleclassliving in well-preserved historical buildings. Thisneighbourhoodwas considered by the City Council as a‘relic’ofoldRioamidthephysicalandsocial‘decay’oftheotherportdistricts.Under theauspicesof thePPM, theMorro da Conceição has once again been deemed as aspacewithatourist‘vocation.’Theexpectationisforthe

revitalizedcolonial-stylehousestoprovidethelocationfornewbars,restaurantsandartists’studios.Programsaimedat the ‘revitalization’ of this space are creating anenvironment favourable to the advance of real estatecapital investments in the region. Thus in Morro daConceição,as‘charming’and‘historic’districtfullofartists,art galleries and fashionablebars, the rise in real estatevaluesisalreadybeenfeltbyresidentswhoreportincreasesinpropertysalespricesandrents.

ManyresidentsaroundPMPabouttalktheircontentmentonhearingtheproposalsfor ‘improvements’reported inthemedia after the announcement of the project. In acontextwhere themajority of thepopulationhas a lowincomelevel,thepromiseofjobcreationandimprovementsinthequalityoflifewasgreetedenthusiastically.Howeverthenumberoflocalresidentsemployedintheconstructionwork is low compared to the total. The series of“employmentcounters,”createdaspartoftheCitizenPortoMaravilhaproject,wouldgivepreferencetohiringresidentsfromtheregionbut,accordingtothoseresponsiblefortheproject, the low qualification level of the prospectiveworkersisanimpediment.Anotherdemonstrationofthegapbetweentheproject’sactionsandtherealityoflocalresidentscanbefoundintheproposedtransportprojects.The track-way of the LRV planned for the port zonecorrespondspreciselytotheneedsforboostingrealestatecapitalwiththeroutechosenprimarilyincludingtheareasaroundtheprojectedtouristattractions.

Social participation in the project is practically non-existentandthefewmeetingsheldwiththeresidentsweremerely informative. With the aim of opposing this

Image 4: MorodaProvidênciaEvictions

25 and 26 -BuildingsdemolishedintheMorrodaProvidênciadistrict.MiraCentralCollective2010

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steamroller,thePortCommunityForum(FCP)wascreatedasaspace for localpeople todebateanddemandtheirrights,formedbyresidentsfromtheregion,studentsanduniversitylecturers,supportedbythecollaborationoftheNGOFase.Otherparticipantsincluderepresentativesfromthesambaschoolswhoareaffectedbytheproject.InMay2011,theFCPproducedthe“ReportonRightsViolationsandDemands,” denouncing the actions of the PPM. InOctober2011theforumissuedaseconddocument,the“TechnicalReportonRiskAreasinProvidênciaandPedraLisa.”Elaboratedwith thehelpofvoluntary technicians,thereportdemystifies thetechnical reportproducedbytheCityCouncil,whicharguestheneedforremovalofhalfof the houses existing in the two favelas. The scenariopresentedintheFCP’sreportisrepresentativeofwhathasbeenhappeningatvariouspoints inRiode Janeiro,notonly within the perimeter of the PPM. The transportinfrastructure works and the construction of sportsfacilitiesforthemega-eventstobeheldoverthecomingyearsarewipingoutentirecommunities,reinforcingthetraditionalelitistandauthoritarianpatternofsegregationofthecity’surbanspace.

2.3 Salvador Growth and the Regeneration Plan for the Old Downtown

Salvador, the capital city of the State of Bahia, is anational metropolis with 2.676.606 Inhabitants (2010Census), being the most densely inhabited city in theNortheast region, the third most populous in Brazil.Salvadoristheeconomiccenterofthestate,andalsoanexportingharbor,anindustrialcenter,andatouristcenter.The city of Salvador’s economy is relatively strong ifwecompareitwithotherBraziliancapitals,itsGDPpercapitaranks Salvador in position eighth among the country’scapitals.Salvador’sGDPisresponsiblefor1/4ofthestate’stotalproduction.6Salvador’seconomy is concentrated inparticular in the service sector,which alone representsaround 70% of Salvador’s economic activity.7 AlthoughSalvadorisbehindcitieslikeSãoPauloandRiodeJaneiro,itsservicesectorismoresignificantthanthatofGuarulhos.Bahiastate’sserviceindustryisconcentratedinthecapital,duetothelargenumberofcompaniesbasedthereandtheconstantflowoftourismandculturaleventsthatenhancethecity’sdynamism.Theindustrialsectorproducesaround12%ofGDP.

6 Datafor2007.Source:SEI-GovernmentofBahia.

7 BahianOfficeofEconomicandSocialStudies(SEI).

DuetoSalvadoreconomicprofile,itisexpectablethatgrowstrategiesrevolvearoundservices,asisthecaseofRegenerationPlanfortheOldDowntown.TheoriginsofRPOD can be traced back to the 1970, although thepreservationofdowntownarchitecturalheritageisolder.Duringthefirstdecadesofthe20thcentury,thecentralregionofSalvadorbecameincreasinglyoccupiedbytheworkingclassespreciselyata timewhenurbangrowthwasvalorizingnewareasofthecity.Inthe1930sthecoreof historic downtown called Pelourinho was alreadyinhabited by a low-income population similar to theprocess that had occurred in the port region of Rio deJaneiro. Both central and port regions became thedestination for poor sectors of the population,dockworkersandprostitutes.Inthe1960stherewasanattempt by members of UNESCO and some BrazilianleaderstoorganizedamissionforpreservingandvalorizingBrazil’shistoricalheritage.In1966theFrenchconsultantMichel Parent led UNESCO’s mission whose findingsbecameknownastheParentReport.Asaresultofthisprocess,theArtisticandCulturalHeritageFoundationofBahia was created in 1967 to direct the project ofrestoring,conservinganddivulgingthestate’sheritage.Inthisperiodthemainstayof theprojectwasalreadythetourism and culture pairing. The housing questionwascompletelyabsentfromtheproject.Thesameyear,mayorAntonioCarlosMagalhães(ACM)fundedaSocioeconomicSurvey of the Pelourinho, ad six years letter, now asgovernoroftheStateofBahia,launchedadevelopmentplanfortheregion.In1984IPHANlisted80hectaresandthefollowingyear,in1985,UNESCOlistedthearchitecturalcomplexofthePelourinhoasaHumanHeritageSite,thelargest colonial legacy in Latin America and the largestbaroquelegacyoutsideofEurope.Finally, inthe1990s,ACM, in his third termas state governor, launched theRegenerationPlanfortheOldDowntownofSalvador,thistimewithvisiblesocialandspatialconsequences.

Thehistoricalcentrethathadprimarilybeenusedforhousing over those decades began to be the focus of aregenerationpolicyaimedprimarilyattourismwithpoliciesdirectedtowardsculturalandleisurefacilities.Theplanwasdivided into seven stages corresponding to separateintervention areas. The main point of attack was theoccupation of the rundown townhouses. Three kinds ofsolutionswere offered to the residents. Compensation,definitiverelocationandtemporaryrelocation.Accordingtoofficialdata,inthefirststage(1992-1993)399familieswerepaidcompensation,26familiesrelocatedand79smallbusinessesclosedandpaidcompensation. Inthesecondstage(1992-1993)176familieswerecompensatedand16relocated,plus18smallbusinesseswereclosedandpaidcompensation.Inthethirdstage(1992–1994)374familieswerepaidcompensationand58smallbusinessesclosed,

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whilenofamilieswererelocated.Inthefourthstage1,018familieswerepaidcompensation(officialdatafromIPAC/Cander 1995). Some years later Ana Fernandes (2006)provided data on the remaining stages. The fifth stage(1996)saw67familiespaidcompensation,whiledataforthe sixth stage (1997 – 2006) is non-existent and theprocessparalyzedforyears.However,intheseventhstage(2006), according to Ana Fernandes, more than 1,054familieswereremovedfromtheterritory.

The physical and legal violence became notorioussincethefamilies lackedanykindofforumwheretheycould complain of the small amount of compensationpaid.Therewasalsonomechanismformonitoringthefateoftheevictedfamilies.TheyprobablywenttooccupytheBaixadoSapateiroandRocinha,areasthatarenowthefocusofpoliciesoftheOldCentreofSalvador(CAS)plan.Only 9% of the overall set of reformed buildingswereassignedtohousing(Fernandes&Gomes1995:48).Most of the buildings now restored by the stategovernment have been leased as hotels, bars andrestaurants (Financial Times, 09/09/1993). In thiscomplex process begun in 2002, the Association ofResidents and Friends of the Old Centre helped drawpublicattentiontotheviolencetakingplace.Thatsameyear theBahianStatePublicProsecutor’sOffice filedacivil lawsuitwitharequest forapreliminary injunctionagainst the State government andCONDER, describingtherelocationprocessas“socialsterilization.”TheIADBMonumentaProgramitselfsuspendedthepaymentsfortheseventhstageuntiltheconflictsareresolved.

As the history of public intervention in Pelourinholargelyentaileda recordof conflicts, segregationandaprocess of gentrification in which 2,909 families wereexpelledfromthissmallareacalledthePelourinho,anewUrban Project for the citywas launch in 2009, namelyIntegrated Participatory Regeneration Plan for theOld

CentreofSalvador.Thenameitselfisrevealer:Attemptingtoconstructanimagedistinctfromtheprecedingpolicies,theplanadoptedaparticipatorymethodologywiththeorganizationofThematicForumsthatfunctionedduringall stagesof theplanningprocess. Thiswork continueduntil the completion of the plan. However during theimplantation of the actions, it appears that thiscoordination work lost its impetus. The participatorymethodology adoptedwas developed by the programInternationalSiteontheRegenerationofHistoricCentresin Latin America and the Caribbean. The project isproposed by the ReferenceOffice of theOld Centre ofSalvadorandformspartoftheso-calledSeventhStageofthe Pelourinho Recuperation Plan and is closelycoordinatedwithnewfederalgovernmentprogramssuchastheHistoricalCitiesPACof2009.

In17months(06/2008to12/2009)fourmeetingsoftheThematicForumswereheld,attendedbyaround600people representing civil society, the public authorityand theprivatesector.Entities likeAMACH,UFBAandotherswereonlyincludedintheexecutivegroupduringthe Second Thematic Forum. The discussion processresulted in the establishment of 14 action guidelines,copingwithabroaderrangeofissuesthanthepreviouspolicies,forexample,stimulationofeconomicactivitiesandcompetitiveness,andtocommercialdistrictaswell;preservation of the hillside area and facades adrevitalization of seafront; incentives towards housingand institutionaluse,aswellas improvingservices forlowerincomepopulation; improvementoftheculturalspaces and monuments; supporting culture ascomponentortourism;improvingsecurityandoptimizingenvironmental conditions. In all events the biggestchallengeforthecurrentRegenerationPlanfortheOldCentreofSalvadoristosetupafinancialfundandcreateadevelopmentplantocaterforthosevisiting,workingandlivinginthecentre.

TheoriginsoftheBraziliansocialprotectionsystemarelocated in the 1930´s when the federal governmentstructurednationalpoliciesoflabor,socialsecurity,health,housing and sanitation, organized with centralized andauthoritarianfeatures.Thenextmomentofstrongincreaseofsocialpolicies,however,correspondedtothereturnto

authoritarianruleafter1964.Sincethereturntodemocracyinthe1980´s,themainpolicysystemswererestructured,underinfluenceofcriticismsaboutthemilitarypolicies,aswell as the pressure of social movements during thatdecade.The1988Constitutiongrantedseveralnewrightsaswellasproposedthestrengtheningofsocialparticipation

Addressing Urban Inequality: Focus on Sub-Standard Settlements3

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and of policy decentralization towards state but alsomunicipalgovernments.Theseformalgrantingofrightsinthelawwasfollowedbyseveralimportantpolicyreformsduringthe1990´s,althoughwithverydifferentpacesandcontents.Urbanpoliciesremainedmainlylocalandwerethe only ones to receive a clear neoliberal treatmentduring theCardosoadministration (1995/2002),but thepresence of the federal government tended toincrease in housing and sanitation during the Lulaadministration(2003/2010).

ThealmostcompletelackoflandmanagementpoliciesandthealmosttotalabsenceoflandpolicyinBraziliancitiesbetweenthe1950sand1970sestablishedenduringpatternsofresidentialsegregation,constitutingwhathasbeencalledaBrazilianmetropolitanmodel.Inthisurbanconfiguration,highandmiddleclassesliveincentralareaswell-equippedand poor people live in remote areas depopulated ofamenities, economic activities and public facilities, withincreasinginsecurityasonemovestowardtheedgesoftown(Santos and Bronstein, 1978). The outcome of thoseprocesses was the prevalence of wide-open spaces ofinformalityandillegalityinBraziliancities,besideshousingand urban precariousness that affected a considerableportionofthepopulation.Totraditionalprecarioussolutionstothepoorsuchastheslumtenement,prevailingsincetheearlydecadesofthetwentiethcenturyinwhatarenowthecentral areasof our cities,were added the expansionoffavelas and the emergence and spread of irregularsettlementsduring the industrializationandurbanizationsperiod,most of them segregated andexpose to extremeenvironmentalandurbanvulnerability(Kowarick,2009).

DuringLula’sgovernment,thecreationoftheMinistryofCitiesrepresentedthereturnofthefederalgovernmenttothesector.AfterthecreationoftheMinistry,asignificantproportionofthoseinnovativeinitiativeswereincorporatedintofederalpolicies,organizedtoencouragelocalcapacity,eitherbydirectinduction,eitherbytheincentivesproducedbythefederalhousingpoliciesguidelines.ThemainhousingprogramsimplementedbythefederalgovernmentinBrazilnowadays are the “PAC – Programa de Aceleração doCrescimento” (Program to Accelerate Growth) and the“MinhaCasaMinhaVida”(MyHouse,MyLife).

Aiming at restoring theeconomic infrastructureof thecountryandreinforcingarecentcycleofintenseeconomicgrowth,thePAC integratedasetofdevelopmentprojectsintoasinglelabelin2006.Intheareaofhousing,theprogramestimatedtheapplicationofavolumeofU$S609.51millions8intheperiod2007/2010,orU$S15.2billionperyear,coming

8 Theequivalentof06.3billionBrazilianReais(R$).CommercialDollarExchangeRateonSeptember1,2010:R$1,744.

fromvarioussources,aswellasanotherU$S22.9billionforthesameperiodforsanitation,whichalsoimpactthehousingandurbanprecariousness.Accordingtotheofficialforecastduringtheformulationoftheprogram,fourmillionfamilieswouldbebenefitbytheseinvestments.

The Program My House, My Life, in turn, added asignificantvolumeofresourcesfortheconstructionofnewunits tobeproducedbyanewdrawof implementation,different from the current programs of the sector. Thisambitiousprogramlaunchedin2008aimsatbuildingonemillionhouses for familieswith incomesof less than10minimumwagesmonthly, but the initiative also aims atreinforcing the economic activity and helping the jobcreation. The program implementation involved thepresentationofprojects toanationalpublicbank (CaixaEconômica Federal) to obtain funding directly by thecontractors (and in conjunctionwithmunicipal or stategovernmentsorcivil society).The localgovernmentsareresponsibletodealwiththelandissue.Thistypeofdesignwas intended to ensure a rapid response in terms ofproposalsandimplementation,whichwouldbedifficultifit were allowed a greater role for state and localgovernments.Themaindesigninnovationconsideringthedistributive perspective, however,was the prediction ofhigh subsidies for families with incomes up to threeminimumwages(U$S799,89)andmoderateallowanceforfamilieswith incomes between three and sixminimumwages(U$S799,89-U$S2,790.00).

RiodeJaneiro,SalvadorandGuarulhosfitthenationalpattern described above. In all the three cities lack ofplanning and housing policies produced irregularsettlements, territorial segregationandunequalaccesstourbanamenitiesandbasicpublicservices.AsshowninFigure1,morethanhalfofthemainBraziliancapitalshave lowernumbersof irregularsettlements. InRiodeJaneiro and Salvador one fifth of the households arebased in irregular settlements, while Guarulhos hasbetterfigures(16.54%).Thenewfederalpoliciestowardshousing within PAC has produced interesting results,mixingmoreresourcesforlowincomehousingwithnewtrendofexclusionandsegregationbecauseofthemega-projects also financed with PAC money. In Salvador,resourcesfromPACtopreservetheheritageofhistoriccitiesarefosteringRPOD.InRiofederalsupporthasbeenmoregenerousandinabroaderrangeofpoliciestobackPan-American andOlympic games, the confederationscoup and, obviously, the World Coup. A new andsuccessfulpolicyofsecuritywasimplementedwiththeso-calledPacificationUnities,andresourcesformMCMVcan be used for offering houses to evicted populationformthemega-projectssoundings.Althoughinternationalfoundingfordevelopmentisthemainsourceofresources

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3.AddressingUrbanInequality:FocusonSub-StandardSettlements

for PVTmega-project, the amplification of GuarulhosAirportusedfederalresourcesandimpliedevictionsformJardim Novo Portugal as well. In Rio and Guarulhos,mobilizationsandsocialorganizationfacedthechallengesof extremely uneven power scales. As mega-projectsmobilizesfairamountsofresources,involvecoalitionsofbiginterestsanddemandtheactiveparticipationoflocalgovernments among themain or asmain stakeholder,localcommunitiesareunlikelytoovercomethenegativeimplications of those projects. Of course, someterritoriallybasedassociationshavebeenmoreeffectivethan others, speciallywhen they have some favorableconditions as property rights over their plots, but stilltheyseemstoneedabroadrangeofurbanalliancesandtheframingoftheprojectsasgoodforthecity,uniqueopportunities, technically robust works eroding thepossibilitiesforsuchalliances.

3.1 The Municipality of Rio Janeiro

According to the data provided by the 2010 Censusconducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography andStatistics(IBGE),22%ofRiodeJaneiro’spopulationlivein‘subnormalsettlements’orslumareas–thefavelas.Inthe

entiremetropolitanregionthereare1,702,073peoplelivinginslumareas,whichshowsthehighconcentrationoffavelasinthecityofRiodeJaneiro.However,notallthehouseholdsinthefavelasarepoor,andtherearemanyclustersofpoorhouseholdslocatedoutsidethefavelas.ThemunicipalityofRio the Janeiro belongs to the fifth quintile in terms ofprecarioushousing,butisfarofbeingamongtheworstinthestateofRio.AsshowninFigure2,whileRiohas21.78%householdsbasedinprecarioussettlements,thefigureforTanguáismorethantwotimesbigger(43.87%).

Urbanpovertyisspreadoutinthewholemetropolitanarea of Rio de Janeiro. Different tomost cities, Rio deJaneiropresentsacloseproximitybetweenrichandpoorneighborhoods.Historically,thefavelasoriginatedonthesteephillsides(morros)thatareacommonaspectofRiode Janeiro’s topography. The difficulties to build properinfra-structureonthoseareasmadethemlessappealingforthedevelopmentofrealestateprojects.Gradually,thecontrastbetweenpoorandtherichareasofthecitywaspopularlyconsolidatedinthedichotomy‘favelaxasfalto’(slumvspavement)-inareferencetothefactthatmostslumsdidnothavepaved(asfalted)streets.

Despite the fact that slums are present virtuallyeverywhereinRiodeJaneiro,itispossibletodistinguishaspatial organization of socio-economic conditions in the

Figure 1: PrecariousSettlements:MainCapitalsandGuarulhos

Municipality Households in substandard census

tracksa

Households in precarious census

tracksb

Substandard + precarious households

% of households in precarious

settlements

Recife 34492 31836 66328 17.64%

Fortaleza 82956 60949 143905 27.36%

Salvador 61059 72937 133996 20.59%

Guarulhos 41,124 5,849 46,973 16.54%

PortoAlegre 37480 21415 58895 13.58%

Manaus 39220 45313 84533 26.02%

Curitiba 37559 19602 57161 12.13%

BeloHorizonte 66777 35579 102356 16.29%

Brasília 7372 10597 17969 3.40%

Rio de Janeiro 306609 85796 392405 21.78%

SãoPaulo 227234 143722 370956 12.55%

a)CensustracksmadeoffavelasaccordingtoIBGEclassification.b)Censustrackwithlowvaluesinqualityofhouseholdandbasicurbanservices,accordingEduardoMarques(2008).

Source:CEM,2011andIBGE,DemographicCensus,2000.

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city.Thetraditionallyrichareasinwhichupperandmiddleclasseslivearethesouthzone(ZonaSulwithe.g.Botafogo,Copacabana, Ipanema),thebeachareaofthewestzone(ZonaOestewithe.g.SãoConradoandBarradeTijuca),andareas of the north zones (Zona Norte) close to thedowntown(e.g.VilaIsabelandTijuca).Theinlandpartsofthe west zone, areas of the north zone far away fromdowntown,andtheBaixadaFluminensearetypicallyareasinwhichlowermiddleclassesandpoorfamilieslive.

Lookingatthehistoryoftheurbandevelopmentofthecity, the favelas were an organic result of the patchyurbanizationprocessofthecity.Followingtheconsolidationof new middle-class neighborhoods, the favelas wereprovidersofcheapandnear-byavailablelaborforce.Theinhabitantsoffavelaswouldhavedifferenttypesofmenialjobs in richer areas (from housemaids and cooks todoormen,waiters,andmanyothers),whileconvenientlylivingclosetotheiremployers.Asaresult,wagescouldbekept relatively low and investments in infra-structure inotherareasofthecityindefinitelypostponed.

Recent public policies have emphasized favelaurbanizationorin-siturehabilitation,inordertoenhance

“integration”ofthefavelasintothecity.ItisthecaseoftheMultirõesprojectdevelopedinthe1980sbystategovernorBrizola; Project Favela-Bairro created by former mayorCésarMaia in the 1990s; “PACMoradia” – the housingcomponentofthefederalprogramPACcreatedbyLulainthe 2000s; finallyMorar Carioca, the currentmunicipaladministration’sprogram.

Nevertheless,thewordremoval(‘remoção’),whichwasbroadlyusedduringmilitarydictatorship,isagainbackintheagenda.Powerfulgroupssupport this typeofpolicy,including government leaders, major businessmen,dominantmediaaswellasmembersofmiddleandupperclass.Theydefendtheso-calledintegrationprinciple.Intheopinionofsomecivilsocietyleaders,thisrulingcoalitionwantstheintegrationofthefavelaterritories,butnotofthe favela residents. Inhabitantsof the favelas inRiodeJaneirohavefoundvariouswaysofdefendingthemselvesagainstremovalsandtakingpartinlocaldecision-making.Several residents’ associations have been revitalized, asdemonstrated in Vila Autódromo. In addition they haveinventedmanynewspacesofparticipationandcontestation:People’s forums, committees and councils have beencreatedovertheyears-inthisstudytheexamplesarethe

Figure 2: PrecariousSettlements:Riodejaniero


tracksa


tracksb

Substandard + precarious

householdsc


settlements

Tanguá 0 2,773 2,773 43.87%

Guapimirim 0 2,125 2,125 23.02%

Japeri 14 6,726 6,740 29.32%

Seropédica 0 4,839 4,839 28.51%

Queimados 319 8,279 8,598 25.79%

Magé 4,708 7,280 11,988 21.66%

Teresópolis 9,293 1,068 10,361 29.70%

Itaguaí 786 5,561 6,347 28.95%

BelfordRoxo 541 30,167 30,708 25.25%

Macaé 5,926 1,615 7,541 20.87%

DuquedeCaxias 16,037 29,649 45,686 20.85%

RiodeJaneiro 306,609 85,796 392,405 21.78%

a)Includesallmunicipalitieswithhighlevelofprecarioussettlements(>20%).b)CensustracksmadeoffavelasaccordingtoIBGEclassification.c)Censustrackwithlowvaluesinqualityofhouseholdandbasicurbanservices,accordingtoEduardoMarques(2008).


17


ManguinhosSocialForum,theCommunityForumof thePort(FórumComunitariodoPorto)andthenewResident’sCommittee inMorrodaProvidência.Despitedifficulties,these communities created bodies through which theycoulddiscussandparticipateinurbanpolitics.Thenetworkaddressing the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016OlympicGames,ComitéPopulardaCopaedasOlimpíadas,isanexample.

Whilesomeresidentsinthefocusedsettlementshaveobjections against adopting the sometimes derogatoryterm favela in their case,9 they share three maincharacteristics:Firstly,theirpopulationsaremuchpoorerthantheiruppermiddleclassneighborhoods.Secondly,thepropertyandtenurerightsoftheirresidentshavenotbeendulyrecognizedbythepublicauthorities.Thesettlementshaveatmostasemi-legalstatus.Thereislittleornoregularurban infra-structure, secured by the public authorities.Thustheyarewhatwedefineas‘sub-standardsettlements’,reflecting the deep socio-spatial inequality in the city.Thirdly, recent government programs and decisionsintervene directly into the daily life and future of thesettlements, implying removaland/or resettlement foralarge part of the residents. These interventions havesparked social mobilizations within and around thesettlements,andthemobilizationsarethemainreasonsforthembeingselectedforthisstudy.

MorrodaProvidência,thefirstfavelaofRiodeJaneiro,locatedinthecentralpartandhistoricaldowntownofthecity. It has been indirectly affected by the large urbanrenewalprogram for theoldportareaof the city,PortoMaravilha,whichislinkedtothedevelopmentplansforthe2016OlympicGames(SeeFigure3).Theperiodfrom2010hasbeenmarkedby theurban renewalprogramfor theportarea,PortoMaravilhaandthecross-cityprogramtourbanize the favelas, the Morar Carioca program. Theresidents have organized protests against what theyperceiveaslackofademocratic-participatoryprocessandaneglectoftheirconstitutionalrights.Theyhavecriticizedtheinvestmentprofileofthepublicinterventionsand,inparticular,themaneuverstorelocatedwellers.Commissionshave been set up by the residents and by the citygovernment,alike,inordertohandlethedisagreements.However, bymid-2012 the publicworks had proceededwithout any active consent of the community.Communications and negotiations between the citygovernment and the residents have not producedconsensual decisions, and the community has lacked anassociationwhichcouldlegitimatelyunitethosethreatened

9 The resident of the Vila Autódromo, the third case,emphasizethattheirsettlementisandhasneverbeenafavela(slum).

byevictionswiththeotherresidents.Therehavebeensignsof resignation, individual exits from the area and socialdemobilization.Nevertheless,keyactivistsstayonwitharelativelysecurefutureinthearea,andacertainsegmentofthecommunitykeepsmobilized.Therun-uptothelocalelectionsinOctober2012producedcertainnewconcessionsand promises from the city government. Thus, the finaloutcomesofthisfavela-governmentencounterremaintobe seen. Yet,Morro da Providência provides a case ofunevensocialmobilizationwithdefeatsaswellasgainsforthecitizensofthesettlement.

ManguinhosisalargeanddenselypopulatedareaintheNorthernZoneofthecity(SeeFigure3).Theareaconsistsof a cluster (conjunto) of 16 neighboring favelas witharound50,000inhabitantsandwithquitedistinctwaysofhowtheywereinitiatedandthendeveloped.Whenitwasknowninyear2007thatManguinhoswouldbeincludedintheProgramfortheAccelerationofGrowth(PAC),anewcycleofmobilizationswasinitiated.Withtheannouncementoftheproject,socialagentsalreadyactiveinManguinhosjoinedwithresidentstoformtheManguinhosSocialForum,which“...cameupbringingtogetherdiversesegmentsoflocal social actors (neighborhood associations, religiousleaders, socio-cultural groups and organizations,communitarianuniversitypreparationclasses,educationalprogramsforteenagersandadults,amongothercollectiveactors)intheformofweeklymeetingswithanaverageof50 participants per meeting.” (Madureira et al 2009unpublished).Theyclaimedademocraticimplementationprocessofthelarge-scaleurbandevelopmentproject.

VilaAutódromohoweverdiffersfromthetwofirstcases.The community of Vila Autódromo is located in theJacarepaguáneighborhoodinthewesternzoneofthecity.ItisclosetoBarradaTijuca,oneoftheprincipalmunicipalvectors of urban expansion over the last decades (SeeFigure 3). The small community is enclosed by theAmbassador Abelardo Bueno and the Salvador AllendeAvenues,theJacarepaguálakeandtheAutodrome-racetracks for automobiles. The principal justifications forremovalthroughouttheyearshavevaried,buttheyhaveallbeendisapprovedbythe local inhabitantsassistedbytheStatePublicDefender.10Thesettlementpassedthroughaprocessoflandregularizationinthe1990swhichgrantedlandtitlestonumerousresidents.Thisprovidedthemwithessentialassetsinthestruggleslateron.Newargumentsemergedtojustifytheremovalofthecommunity.11Theyinclude:thedangerofnaturaldisastersduetotheproximity

10 Interview26-04-2012withamemberoftheneighborhoodassociationofVilaAutódromo,whoshowedthenotificationgiventotheCOIinMay2011.

11 Interview,op.cit.

18

tothelagoonandtheriskofflooding;theneedoftheareafor theconstructionofequipment for thePanAmericangamesin2007;in2010,theneedtobuildamediacenterforthe2016OlympicGames.Lateritwasarguedthatthesettlement had to be demolished because of theconstruction of the Olympic Park, in spite of the planspointingonlytotheareawheretheracetrackisinstalledtodayandnottheVilaAutódromo.ThentheargumentwasthatonehadtocreateaperimeterofsecuritynexttotheOlympicPark,asifthecommunity,whichdoesnothaveanyissueswithdrug trafficking, represents a danger in itself.Mostrecentlythequestionofremovalhascomeupbecauseof the constructionof the Trans-Olympic highway,whichdoesnotnecessarilyneedtopassthroughthesettlement.Thislargeamountofjustifications,thathaveallbeenprovenillegitimate, juststrengthensthehypothesisthatpowerfulsectorsoftherealestatecapitalhaveinterestsinthearea.

Eachcasedepictsthehistoryofthesettlementaswellastheastherecentencounterbetweengovernmentandresidents.InVilaAutódromotheunityofactionhasbeenstrong all theway, and the residents have been able torespond to any new approach by the governmentwith

adequate forms and levels ofmobilization.Unlikewhatusually happens to slum dwellers in the city of Rio deJaneiro,theresidentsofVilaAutódromohavetitlestotheland and are recognized as right holders. Hence, therelationship that has developedwith the government isdifferent from that of other favelas. InManguinhos theunity of action has beenweak, and after 2009 a steadydeclineofsocialmobilizationhasbeenobserved.Thesocialmobilizationscarriedoutbylocalactorsandresidentsfromthebeginningsawlittlechancetofindwaysofinfluencingthe trajectory andmodalities of implementation of theongoing of the mega project. The Manguinhos SocialForumwas in its formation and durability a success intermsofbasemobilization,yet intermsof itsgoalsandpurposesitsufferedagreatdefeat.MorrodaProvidênciaprovidesanintermediatecase,ofunevenmobilization:theunity of action has been weak, but there have beenrepeatedsurgesofhighmobilizationbythedwellersmostdirectlyaffectedbygovernment interventions.Althoughthe residents as a collective lost the first round, acombination of politicization and judicialization of thestrugglehavestrengthenedthebargainingpositionoftheparticular residents threatened by relocation. In a

Figure 3: DistributionoffavelasinRiodeJaneiroandselectedsettlements

19


longitudinal perspective, one can suggest at least twodifferentinterpretationsoftherecentencounterbetweenpublicauthoritiesandpoorcommunities.

Inallcasesitispossibletoobservehowtheframingoftheprojectsmakeshardertoovercomethechallengesforsocialorganization.Thetyrannyoftimeortheopportunitycosts of events and projects thatmay appear once in alifetime. The tyranny of science or a “health” andenvironmentprotection”discoursesthatplacesfavelasanditsinhabitantsonthesideoftherisksinthisequation.

3.2 The Municipality of Salvador

Thedatapresentedbythe2010IBGECensusrevealaSalvadorfarfromtheparadisiacalsettingthatinspiredsomany songsandpoems. Its693.3km2ofnaturalbeautyhave given way to the kinds of social and economicproblemsthattormentthemajorBraziliancitiesasaresultof the demographic influx of people in search of betteropportunities and development. Today Salvador is thecountry’sthirdmostpopulacecity,afteronlySãoPauloandRiodeJaneiro,withanestimatedpopulationof2,675,656,

according to the 2010 IBGE Census. Accompanying thenational trend, Salvador’s largest demographicconcentrationisinthe25to39yearagegroupwith28.7%,followedbythe40-59yearagegroupwith23.9%,meaningthatmorethanhalfthecity’spopulationisadult.

In termsofmonthly income levels, the IBGEreportedthatSalvadorworkershaveanaverageincomehigherthanthoseworkingininlandregionsofthestate.HoweverpaylevelsinSalvadorarelowercomparedtoothercapitalslikeSãoPaulo,Riode Janeiro,BeloHorizonte,Curitiba, JoãoPessoa and Recife. It is alsoworth noting that Salvadorpossessesthehighestlevelsofinequalityintermsofthedifference in averagemonthly incomeof thewhite andblackpopulations.Althoughthemajorityofthepopulationisclassifiedasblackorbrown,whiteworkerspossessanincomelevel3.2timeshigherthanblackworkers.

Turningtothoseaspectsoftheurbaninfrastructurethathelp contextualize the quality of the population’s livingconditions, Salvador ismore or less in linewith averagenationallevelsforitemssuchasstreetlightinganduncollectedwasteinpublicspaces.Itshowsbetterthanaveragelevelsintermsofsewage,pavinganddrains,butunsatisfactorylevels,belowthenationalaverage,forquestionssuchasaccessibility,afforestationandcurbs,asshownbelow.

Figure 4: PrecariousSettlements:Salvador


tracksa


tracksb


householdsc


settlements

Itaparica 0 1,857 1,857 38.30%

Candeias 562 4,281 4,843 28.57%

VeraCruz 0 3,546 3,546 49.23%

Diasd'Ávila 0 4,867 4,867 45.93%

Ilhéus 9,711 2,738 12,449 30.42%

Itabuna 0 18,621 18,621 37.45%

LaurodeFreitas 1,914 4,230 6,144 22.04%

SimõesFilho 111 5,320 5,431 27.69%

SãoFranciscodoConde 0 3,081 3,081 60.21%

Camaçari 1,797 15,209 17,006 43.15%

Salvador 61,059 72,937 133,996 20.59%



20

HoweveratthesametimeasSalvadorpresentsurbancharacteristics thatmatch or even exceed the nationalindices, it combines localities with living conditions asdisparateasthoseofEuropeandAfrica.DespitebeingthethirdlargestBraziliancityandthecentreofthecountry’ssixth largest metropolitan region, historically it haspresented high levels of poverty and socioeconomicinequality,whichmake the scenario facedbyurbanandsocialpolicybothcomplexandchallenging.AccordingtotheIBGE’sMapofPovertyandInequality(2003),theindexofpoverty levels in themunicipality is35.76%while theGiniinequalityindexis0.49.IntherankingoftheMunicipalHuman Development Index published by the UNDP,Salvador occupies 480th placewith an IDH-M of 0.805(2000). Despite this figures, Salvador ranks better indifferentsocialindicatorswithinthestateofBahia.Asforhousing,Figure4showsSalvadoristhelestworstofBahiamunicipalities,thatis,isthefirstofthelastquintileintermsofhouseholdsinprecarioussettlements.

Precarioussettlementsalsoentailanunequalpatternofsocio, racial and spatial occupation. While the coastaldistrictswashedbytheBayofAllSaintsandtheAtlanticOcean,areinhabitedbyamiddle,upper-middleandupperclasspopulation,themoreinlandregionisinhabitedbythepopulationoccupied in activities classified aspopularorlower-popular. Thepatternof territorial occupationmayalso be verified by the variations in land values asdeterminedforthepurposesoflandtaxpayments(IPTU).Intheareascorrespondingtoupperclassorupper-middleclassoccupation,landvaluesareoverR$100.00persquaremetre,whileintheareasofpopularoccupation,landvaluesfalltohalfofthisamount(Carvalho&Pereira2008:92-93).Anotheressentialaspectofthesocialpatternofoccupationof the territory is the relationbetween thehighervalueareasandracialdistribution.Historicallymarkedbyalargeblackinfluence,accordingtothe2010IBGECensus,18.9%ofSalvador’sresidentsdeclaredthemselveswhite,27.8%blackand51.7%brown.Fromtheviewpointofoccupationandsocialstructure,thewhitepopulationispredominantin the darker blue areas (the districts of Barra, Graça,Vitória,RioVermelho,PitubaandCostaAzul),classifiedasupper and upper-middle, while the black and brownpopulationprimarilyoccupytheotherdistrictsofthecitywithalowersocioeconomicstandard.

ThecityisinternationallyknownforitsHistoricalCenter(CHS),arearegisteredbytheInstituteofNationalHistoricalandArtisticHeritage-IPHANin1984,namedPoligonalandrecognizedbyUNESCOasaWorldHeritageSitein1985.ItispartoftheTraditionalCentreofSalvador,beingsituatedin the portion of the city known as Uptown. This areacorresponds to the founding nucleus, where, in theseventeenth century, began the construction of major

buildings in the city such as churches, manor houses,monuments and colonial buildings of Pelourinho, withinvestmentsoflargelandowners(BragaandSantos,2009).

Asshowninsection2,inhistoricdowntowntherehasbeennumerousgovernmentinterventionsthattried,sincethe60s,to protect the architectural site of degradation. Theseinterventionswere implementedbydifferent governmentbodies,differentideologiesandweremanipulatedindifferentways is regarding the timeperiod, the focusof action,ordialoguewiththelocalcommunity.Asaconsequenceofthelastinterventionsformde1990s,itisworthnotingthattheOldCentreofSalvadorsufferedasmallchange:Whilein1991theregion’sdominantsocio-spatialtypologywasthe‘middle’category,in2000thesameregionbecameclassifiedas‘upper-middle,’attractingresidentswithanintellectualandartisticprofile(Carvalho&Pereira:2008:90-91).

Thedifferentgovernmentinterventionshadasacentralpoint of action the development of tourism and therecoveryofculturalandleisureequipment,replacingtheprofilehousing.Tomakethispossibleasignificantnumberoffamilieswereremovedfromtheirhomes,andinsomecasesrelocatedandcompensatedwithvaluesthatdidnotcovered even the cost of thematerial, that is, withouttaking onto account the price of land. This relocationprocesswas called by theprosecution in a Lawsuit filedagainstthestategovernmentas“socialcleaning.”

Thedevelopmentmodeladoptedbytheplan,actionsandinstrumentsforitsimplementationledtoaseriesofconflictswith the population. It is a history of physical and legalviolencebecausebesides evictions, families didnot haveforumswheretheycouldcomplainofthelowvaluesoftheindemnitiesandlackoftransparencyofgovernmentactions.Onlyin2002itwasformedtheAssociationofResidentsandFriendsoftheHistoricCenter–AMACH,whichhelpedtogivevisibility to actions of violence and disrespect to whichresidentsofthefocalareasofrecoverywerebeingsubject.

The struggle of the residents of the Old Centre ofSalvador still continues.While some seek justice in thevalue paid for the houses, others fight for the right tocontinuelivinginthatplace.However,theideaofusingthespaceforhousingdoesnotseemtobeapriorityfortheState,fordespitehavingagreedwiththeconstructionofaffordablehousingintheareaandhaveobtainedfundingforit,sofarhasfailedtocomeupwiththebuilding,thoughthe research reveals that recent governments havedemonstratedgreaterconcerntohearthelocalpopulation,by the constitution of participatory and deliberativemeetings. Still, the main problem remains in theimplementation of the decisions, especially regardingactionsrelatedtohousing.

21


3.3 The Municipality of Guarulhos

BecauseofitsproximitytoSãoPauloandthelowcostoflandintheofficialrealestatemarket,aswellasamassiveclandestinemarket,Guarulhoswasaprimedestinationforimmigration,givingrisetoanimmenseurbanperipherywithinhabitantslivinginadverseconditionsandveryprecariousaccesstopublicservices.Therehavebeendifferentwavesofmigration inGuarulhos.Andat thebeginningof the20thCentury,internationalpoorimmigrantscomingmainlyfromJapanandItalyfoundcheaplandinGuarulhosforfarmingandsettlingdowntheirfamiliesfarawayfromthesubjectiontothebigcoffee landlords.Therefore, in1912,Guarulhoshad2050foreignersoutof7000inhabitants(Santos2006).Fromthefiftiestotheeighties,poorpeasantsnorth-easterninternal immigrants increased exponentially and the cityleapedformthirtythousandinhabitantstomorethanseventhousand.Nonetheless, IBGEdata in Figure5 shows thatGuarulhoshas lesser precarious settlements thanRiodeJaneiroorSalvador.Ifthesamecriterionofselectioniskept–choosingonlymunicipalitieswithhighlevelsofprecarioussettlements–Guarulhoswouldnotappearinthefigure.

InGuarulhostherearenotmobilizationaroundthePVTmega-project, although the risk of eviction may be a

concerninspecifictimesandplacesforsomepeoplelivingalongthefloodlandsoftheriver.However,theeconomicimportance of the municipality – its GDP ranking itseconomyin13thplaceinBrazil–andthebigpopulationlivingonitsoutskirtshaveadetermininginfluenceonthesocialhistoryofsocialmobilizationmunicipality’spolitics.There isadisputefortheorganizationof thepopulationand its participation in close connectionwith the partypoliticalsysteminthecontextofaweakcivilsociety.

ThemunicipalityofGuarulhoshastraditionallybeenrunby centre-right political parties. Since 1988 it has beengovernedbythePMDB(threeadministrations)andthePDT(one administration), considered centre and centre-rightpartiesrespectively.Since2001thecityhasbeengovernedbyPT (theWorkersParty), consideredcentre-lefton theBrazilianpoliticalspectrum.PThasbeentransformingintothedominantpolitical force in the cityover the last tenyears with an agenda of participation and fightingcorruption – a particularly prominent issue in themunicipality due to the corruption scandals under thepreviousadministrations.Asaresult,centre-rightpartieshavelostgroundovertheperiod.

BoththePMDBandthePTinvestedinmobilizationandparticipationoflow-incomepopulation.Duringitstermof

Figure 5: PrecariousSettlements:SãoPaulo


tracksa


tracksb


householdsc


settlements

Juquitiba 0 1,038 1,038 23.16%

Bertioga 1,552 100 1,652 19.61%

FranciscoMorato 0 14,007 14,007 41.27%

MonteMor 0 2,128 2,128 23.53%

ItapecericadaSerra 755 6,353 7,108 21.30%

Itaquaquecetuba 144 19,443 19,587 28.46%

Guarujá 21,889 2,886 24,775 34.41%

Cubatão 9,116 4,870 13,986 46.63%

Diadema 21,977 198 22,175 22.60%

SãoBernardodoCampo 37,368 2,055 39,423 20.27%

Guarulhos 41,124 5,849 46,973 16.54%



22

office, the PMDB createdMunicipal Councils and builtcloserrelationswiththecommunity.Fieldresearchrevealedstrong links with the Tupinambá region whereneighbourhood associations are present with a longtraditionofcommunityaction;associationsthataretodayespecially active in delivering milk and vegetables andpromoting literacy projects. In the region we alsoencounteredthestrongpresenceofafamilyoflandownersfrom Guarulhos, whose name is often associated withJarbasTupinambá.Partofthedistrictgrewfollowingtheillegal occupation of lands belonging to the Tupinambáfamily,whichmadeadealwiththeinhabitantsandratherthanaskingforarepossessionorder,grantedpartofthelands to the occupants. The PMDBwas present in theregion through the former mayor, Pascoal Thomeu.Interviewsconfirmedhimtobeahighlycharismaticpoliticalfigure and councillors close to him contributed to theformationofaconstituencyintheregion,associatedwithhispoliticalnetwork.

PT’s entry into Guarulhos also involved an intenseinvestment in mobilizations and participation. The EloiPietá administration not only increased the number ofcouncilsbutalsomaintainedand improvedParticipatoryBudgeting in the city and invested in organizing newneighborhoodassociations,therebyaddingimpetustotheinstitutionalizationofparticipatoryspacesandmobilizingthe population around the participatory governancestructure.WedetectedvariouslocalizedexamplesofcloserelationsbetweengrassrootsleadersandPT,especiallyintheMarcosFreireandPimentasregions,bothassociatedwithstrongparticipationinPB.

RelationsbetweenthePMDBandPTinGuarulhosareinserted ina complexdynamicof territorialdispute forgrassroots support. The relationsbuilt betweenPTandlocal leaderswere consolidated in those regionswherethe PMDB grassroots network of neighbourhoodassociations,linkedtoPascoalThomeu,wasabsent:thatis, on the extreme outskirts of Pimentas and thus ofGuarulhos. Interestingly, the interviews revealed thedifficulties and unwillingness of neighbourhoodassociations leadersembeddedwithinthePMDBsocio-partisan network to influencemunicipal public policiestrough councils and PB, while those neighbourhoodassociationsleaderslinkedtoPTemphasizedthefacilitywith which their participation in PB enabled them toachieveresultsintermsofpublicpoliciesimplementedbythemunicipality.

Insum,aftertransitiontodemocracy,themunicipalitywas governed by the by the Brazilian DemocraticMovementParty(PMDB),whichmadewidespreaduseofpopularmobilization.Afterlengthypolitical investment,alsoinvolvingextensivepopularmobilization,PTdefeatedthe PMBD and has governed over the last fourthadministrations.Whileingovernmentbothpartiesmadeadvancesfosteringgrassrootslevelsocialmobilizationbyorganizing neighborhood associations and in theinstitutionalization of participation aswell, albeitwithdifferent political styles. Today the municipality hasbecomeabenchmarkduetoitsinnovativeandambitiousexperience in Participatory Budgeting (PB), its role ascoordinator of the national PB network and thediversificationofitscouncils.

Water Governance and Climate Change Issues in Guarulhos4

Asstatedinthe introductiontothisreport, inBrazil,metropolitanregionsdonothaveametropolitanauthoritywithrulingpowerovermunicipalitiesformingeachmetroregion. Due to complexity and severity of issuesconfrontedbythemetroregionsaswellasinstitutionaltransaction costs between various public spheres,economicsectors,andsocietyatlarge,urbangovernanceisquitechallenginginthosejurisdictions.TheSPMRisnotthat different, although good intentions and efforts inbuilding the legal basis for a metropolitan planningauthority have been under discussion for about fortyyears.Inthepastyear,anewinitiativeformetropolitan

planning has been put forward by the state governorcalledRegionalDevelopmentCouncil.12

Thepromulgationof the1988Constitutionhasmaderoomforanurbanreformprocessatthemunicipallevel,includingthe2001CityStatuteandcreatingtheMinistryofCitiesandtheNationalCouncilofCitiesin2003.Althoughextremelyslow,andmanytimesonpaper,thisprocessledtoformallyandexplicitlyrecognizingthe“righttothecity”

12 http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=215129

23

4.WaterGovernanceandClimateChangeIssuesinGuarulhos

http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=215129

http://www.saopaulo.sp.gov.br/spnoticias/lenoticia.php?id=215129

and“thesocialfunctionofpropertyandofthecity”asameansforempoweringcitizens,promotinginclusiveurbanpolicies,andreachingouttoallcitizens,inparticularlythemost vulnerable groups. The City Statute acknowledgedmunicipal power and mandate for planning urbandevelopment and legislating over land and propertymarketstargetingsocial inclusivenessandenvironmentalsustainability. Municipalities with more than 20,000inhabitantsareenforcedtodevelopmasterplanscoveringbroadandmorelocallydefinedurbanpoliciestoberevisedperiodically.Otherlegalinstrumentsputforwardregulatepublic-private partnerships (2004) and inter-municipalconsortia(2005)(Fernandes,2007).

In 2004, Guarulhos concluded its master plan. Theprevious onewas from1971 and since then no seriousefforthadbeenmadetocomprehensivelyupdateit.Theinitiativeisrelatedwiththepresenceinofficeofaleftwingparty(PT)forthefirsttimeIGuarulhoselectoralhistory.Asit`llbeshowninsectionsfiveandsix,thishaveabigimpactin local democratic governance and the use of publicinformation by ordinary citizens. For this endeavor,GuarulhosbroughtintoplayInstitutoPolis,anindependentleft-wing urban planning think-tank from Sao Paulo tofacilitate theprocess. Themajoraccomplishmentof thisplanwastosetamunicipalmacro-zoningstrategywithfivemajor zones defining the broader terms for municipaldevelopment, environmental protection and socialresponsibility (Figure 2). During 2012, the municipalgovernmentdevelopedawholeprogramincludingexpertmeetings and public consultation for preparing a newmasterplan,reorientingthemajorissuesandguidelinessetin2004andaddressingnewdevelopmentssincethen.Withreelectionofthecitymayor,thisnewmaterplanisexpectedto be release to the public by mid 2013. Despite thefavorable conditions for developing a green agenda onwater related issues, the metropolitan scope of watermanagementandthebigcoastofinfra-structureinvestmentimposesseriousconstrainsformunicipaldecisionmaking.

4.1 Major Water Related Climate Vulnerabilities and Disasters in Guarulhos

Guarulhosischallengedbyseverewaterproblemssuchas landslides and floods aswell aswater availability forhumanconsumptionandappropriatesanitationtreatment.GuarulhosisnotanexceptionwithintheSPMR.EstimatesshowthatthemajorityofproblemsrelatedtowaterrelatedclimatevulnerabilitiesintheSPMRdirectlyaffects30%ofthepopulation,includingalmostthreemillionpeopleliving

inprecariousorsubstandardsettlements.(Nobre,Young,Saldiva,Marengo,AlvesJr.,Silva,andLombardo2010).Thepopulationthatisvulnerabletowater-relatedrisksisalsoexposedtootherthreats,turningitintothemostvulnerablegroupingeneral.

Although it isnotfrequentlyperceivedbythegeneralpublic and even educated citizens, Guarulhos runssignificant risks, including landslides, floods, landcontamination in industrial zones, and technologicalaccidents. Altitude difference vary approximately 800meterswithin themunicipality ranging from thehighestpointItaberaba(1,422m)intheCantareirahills(North)tothelowlandsoftheJaguariRiver(660m)atthebordersofthemunicipalitiesofGuarulhos,SantaIsabelandArujaandthe Tiete River (South). Landslides and problems withhillsidesisanimportantissuemanlyintheNorthportionofGuarulhos,withafewadditionalscatteredpoints.Thoseproblems are particularly noticed in substandardsettlements located in areas with high declivity slopeswhicharetechnicallyinappropriateforhousing

Overalllandslidesandfloodingaretoagreatextenttheresult of long-timeunregulated landuse combinedwithissuessuchasurbandrainage,highlyaffectedbysealingofgroundsurfacesandoccupationofeasilyfloodedlowlandareas.Theysignificantlyaffectthepopulationthatresidesin illegal occupation and precarious settlement, alsoincluding,inmostcases,deforestationandinappropriatedischargeofsolidwaste.Manyoftheseproblemsarefoundinconservationareasprotectedbylaw,whichshouldnotbe occupied, such as high declivity slopes, hill tops,floodplainareas,andtrailsalongthewaterwaysandspringsaccordingtotheDrainageMasterPlan(SAAE,2008).Amongtheseareasprotectedbylaw,twoimportantConservationUnits(CU)standout:theNúcleoCabuçu,locatedinsidetheCantareiraStateParknorthofGuarulhos,andstripsoftheTietêFloodplainsAreaforEnvironmentalProtection(APAdo Tietê) in the south of Guarulhos. These CU’s aresupposed to comply and serve as areas for regulatinginundations and minimizing temporary flooding inurbanizedareasnear theTietê riverbetweenGuarulhosandthemunicipalityofSãoPaulo.

Theseareas include the regionsofPimentasand Itaimwithdistrictsthathavebeenheavilyaffectedbyflooding.Themostextremecaseoccurredduringtherainyseasonof2009-2010(December-January)inthedistrictsofJardimIzildinha,inGuarulhos,andJardimRomano,inSãoPaulo.Thelatterdistrictwasfloodedforalmostamonth.Inordertoremediatethis particular flooding problem, themunicipality of SaoPaulobuiltoneofthose largepoolsanddams,whichhassignificantlycontrolledtheproblemattheSaoPauloborderbut increasing flooding risk for Guarulhos. The major

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construction right in theborderwithGuarulhoswasbuiltwithnoagreementsbetweenthetwomunicipalities.Notein Image 5 that while the dam protects the Sao Pauloneighborhood,itconducestheoverflowbacktoGuarulhos.

4.2 Water Availability and Water and Climate Governance in City

Theconcentrationofproductiveactivitiesandpopulationin theSPMR tends toputpressureon theavailabilityofwaterresources.Besidesanincreaseinwaterdemandfordifferent purposes (industrial, residential, agricultural),therearesignificantvolumesofimproperlycollectedandtreatedeffluentsthatenduppollutingthewatercoursesaswellas inappropriatewastedischargecontaminating thesoilorcarriedtowaterstreams.

In2007-2008water consumptiondemand in theAltoTietêriverbasin,whichincludesGuarulhos,thecityofSao

Paulo and other 34 municipalities in the SPMG, wasestimatedat158%to176%ofitscapacity(SMA/CPLASãoPaulo2011).Thisexcessivedemandisfurtheraggravatedby the low water quality in the basin that is alreadycompromisedwithhighlevelsofwaterpollution.Anotherimpactfactorforwater is irregularoccupationofspringsthat, adding towater pollution due to the discharge ofsewageandsolidresidues,alsoworsensrisksofsiltationatrivermargins,floods,andlandslides.

InGuarulhos,waterandsewageservicesforresidentialand industrial demands are provided by a municipalcompany, SAAE.Themajorexception is the InternationalGuarulhosAirport that has its ownwater supply systembasedondeepgroundwaterwells.Thismightchange,asthenewadministrationnowrunbyaprivateconsortium (tillSeptember,2012itwasrunbyafederalagency)isdiscussingwithSAAEanagreement for service supply.Thismove isseenby SAAE as awelcomeopportunity and challenge:opportunity,as finallyoneof themajorconsumerscouldjointhemunicipalsystemmakingroomfornewinvestmentsand challenge as its demands are high and would putpressureonasystemalreadyworkingaboveitscapacity.

Image 5: DamontheTieteRiverbetweenGuarulhosandSaoPaulo

Source:http://mural.blogfolha.uol.com.br/2012/12/06/apos-3-anos-jardim-romano-relembra-enchente-que-durou-meses/

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4.WaterGovernanceandClimateChangeIssuesinGuarulhos

Asforgovernance,whilewatergovernanceisverymuchwithinthepublicmunicipalagenda,climategovernanceperseisquiteabsent.Specificandexplicitreferencetoclimatechangerelatedissuesareseldomanddiscussedataverygeneralorabstract level. Itbecomesmoreconcreteanddown to earth mainly in response to emergency or aseasonal catastrophe.With a few exceptions, once theevent is over and/or remediated (mostof the timesnotsolvedorappropriatelydealtwith),itbecomessecondaryoroverseenbypublicofficials.

Watergovernance inGuarulhos isquitecomplexas itinvolves public spheres with different geographicjurisdictionsandanarrayoflocal,municipal,andstatelevelstakeholders. In1991,theStateofSaoPaulo,createditsState Policy forWater Resources, establishing the StateSystem of Management of Water Resources, whichprecededthecorrespondingfederallegislationsanctionedin1997.Withinthestateandfederalsystems,thewaterbasinisconsideredtheterritorialunitformanagementofwater resources. It focuses on technical definitions andunderstandingsconcerningthedrainageareaofthemainriveranditseffluents,comprisingaManagementUnitforWater Resources (MUWR). The decision-making board,formedbytheCommitteeoftheHydrographicBasin(CHB),isanimportantmanagementandplanninginstrument.TheCommitteeisatripartitecollegialbody(state,municipalities,andcivilsocietyatlarge),whichallowsthegovernanceofwaterresourcestobeemployedinaverybroadsenseandrepresentsanarenafordebates,propositions,anddecisionsat the basin level. Theoretically, the committees extendparticipationofstakeholdersandintegrationofactionstothe localmanagement level, serving as communicationchannelsbetweendecision-makersatvariouslevels

ThestateofSãoPauloisdividedinto22MUWRand21CBHand the SPMR (39municipalities) is almost entirelywithintheAltoTieteriverbasin(36municipalitiesincludingthe city of Sao Paulo). Due to the socio-environmentaldiversity, the territorial extension and the complexity ofissuesandchallengesformonitoringandmanagingtheAltoTiete river basin, its CHB was subdivided into five subbasins/subcommittees. The municipality of São Pauloparticipatesinallofthosesub-committeesandGuarulhosand other eight municipalities are within the Tiete-Cabeceiras(upstream)subcommittee(1,694km2).

As amajor player in the sub basin, Guarulhos prettymuchsetsthetoneoftheregionalagendathatoperateswithinthesubbasin(9municipalities)butalsochallenges,asmuchaspossible,thecityofSaoPaulo.Inthisregard,Guarulhosisnotalone,beingingeneralsupportedbyothermunicipalities that are extremely urbanized (95-100%),integrate the economic belt around Guarulhos (Aruja,

Itaquaquecetuba,Poa,FerrazdeVasconcelos,andSuzano),andaredirectlyimpactedbythepressureandsizeofthecityofSaoPaulo.Within this context, it is interesting tonotethatdiscoursesandsharedviewshighlightsubbasin’spotentials and environmental services. Among thosepotentialsandservices,areextensiveareasofforestandunderspringprotectionthatarequiteuniqueandextremelyimportant for water provision for the metro region.Stakeholders, in particular municipal officials, call fordevelopingmechanismsforshowcasingthosefeaturesandbettervaluingandevenchargingforenvironmentalservicesprovidedforthemetropolitanregionat large.Moreover,accordingtostakeholders,initiativesandresourcesshouldbechanneledfordevelopingplansforpublicinvestmentsand economic activities such as ecotourism, combiningconservation,promotionoflocalcultureandtraditions,andlocaldynamism.Theoretically,theTieteParkcouldservethose purposes, in addition to controlling for flooding.However, so farhasnotbeen thecaseandaccording tomunicipal authorities and locals it is far away as aprospectivescenario.

In regards to participation of civil society at large inissues concerningwater related issues,wouldnotbeanoverstatement to say that it is seldom and not broadlyrepresented (various sectors, neighborhood, socialmovement,etc.).Theirpresenceandactionisverymuchlocalizedandvoicedincaseofemergenciesbutnotseenthroughoutfollow-upondaily/ordinaryissues.Amongthemorethan30municipalcouncils, createdsince themid-1980s by municipal laws, the Council for EnvironmentDefense was created in 1985 along with the one ineducation (the first two). Twenty years later (2005), theCouncil on Water Resources was created. It is quiteremarkablethatbetween2005and2010thesetwocouncilsare among the less active and productive oneswith nonormativeactsissued(decrees,announcement,resolution,etc)(Lavalleetal2011).

4.3 PVT Mega-ProjectAlthoughbignewsandceremoniesabout thepark in

2010, the projected park remains a black box. Localauthoritiescomplainaboutlackofinformationabouttheproject, little to say none participation and inclusion ofmunicipalities but Sao Paulo, and no significant signs ofinvestments and resource allocation to develop andimplement thepark.Guarulhosandothermunicipalitiesnotonlydonot feel aspartof theprojectbuthave thefeeling as significantly neglected.As aGuarulhos officialstated“Guarulhosfacesthebackoftheparkalthoughwesharetheriver;eventoaccesstheparkwehavetogoto

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The trajectoryofGIS inBrazilwas informed inmanywaysbyalargermovementfordevelopingICT-GISsystemsfor public policy that started inmid 1960s.Within theworsetime(restrictionofpoliticalandcivilrights,accesstoinformation,anddisappearanceofactivists)duringthemilitary dictatorship (1964-1979), in 1967 theNationalCommissiononCartography (CONCAR)was created. Itsmandate was to set the basic guidelines for BrazilianCartography. Interesting enough, the late 1960s wereright before the Federal Government launched a veryambitious national development plan for the wholecountryframedwithinamilitarygeopoliticalplatformandwidely promoted. With democratization in Brazil,increasingimportanceofsocialmovementsinthenationalsceneandglobalization,newelementswereincorporatedinto this process of data producing andmanagement,includingspatialinformation.

In2010,theNationalSpatialDataInfrastructure(INDE)wasofficiallylaunchedbythefederalgovernmentwiththemandate of being “the integrated body of technologies;policies;mechanismsandproceduresforcoordinatingandmonitoring; standards and agreements necessary forfacilitating and normalizing generation, storage, access,sharing, dissemination and use of federal, state andmunicipal geospatial data.” (www.inde.gov.br). TheBrazilian Geospatial Data Depository (DBDG) wasimplementedtointegratevariouspublicdatasourcesandtheportal“SigBrasil”designedasaplatformforprovidingaccess todataanddatadissemination, followingsimple,fast,comprehensiveandintegratedproceduresaccessibletonon-expertaudiences.ThePortal“SIGBrasil”isrunningbut initiativesaretaking longertobefully implemented.The key drivers of those initiatives have been tomakepublicdataavailableontheInternetandtomakeiteasilyaccessible as instruments for public planning, generalinformationandaccountability.Most informationon theInternetundertheseinitiativesisnotnecessarilyexplicitlyspatialorisprovidedinvariousnestedspatialscales.

TheBrazilianInstituteforGeographyandStatistics(IBGE,nationalcensusbureau)hasactedasanimportantportalfor disseminating a variety of socioeconomic anddemographic data, as well as layers with territorialboundaries(censustract,district,municipality,state,majorregionandcountry)allowingformappinganddisplayingina GIS environment. DATASUS (www.datasus.gov.br), acomprehensivesystemintegratingseveralsubsystemsfordataonhealthat large for thewholecountryatvariousscaleshassignificantlycontributedtosettingstandardsfordata collection, data quality, data storage and datadissemination, which have positively other federalministriesanddepartments.

EMPLASA (www.emplasa.sp.gov.br), the Sao PauloMetropolitan Planning Company, that is under the StateSecretary for Metropolitan Development and hasrepresentativesatCONCAR,isanimportantdepositoryforgeospatialdatainthestateofSaoPaulo.ItsdatadepositoryhasbeenmainlyusedforEMPLASA’sownworkontheareaknownasthePaulistaMacroMetropolis(MMP)includingthefourmetropolitanregionsinthestate:1)SaoPaulo,2)Campinas,3)SantistaCoastalZoneand4)ParaibaValleyandNorthCoast. Sinceapproximately2007-08,EMPLASAhaslaunchedsome initiatives in regards todata sharingwithmunicipalitiesintheSaoPauloMetropolitanRegion(SPMR).

Forsoftwaredevelopmentandplatforms,asageneralguidelineGuarulhoshasfollowedthefederalorientationpushingforprivilegingfreeand/oropensourcesoftwareforgeneraladministrativepurposes.However,thereareexceptionsandcorporatesoftwarehasbeenadoptedinsome areas due to performance, integration, securityand cross-communication between platforms. Forinstance,serversatthedatacenteratDITrunundertheOracle platform formanaging databases and this alsostructuresthewholeCorporateGeoinitiativementionedabove,whileARCGISisthemajorGISsoftwareintheGISdivision.ThereisnosurveyonGISsoftwarebeingused

Spatial Knowledge Management: Spatial Perspectives and Participation in Knowledge Production, Exchange and Use?

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SaoPauloasthereisnoentrancethroughGuarulhos.Sowhat’s thepoint?This isnotapark forourcityandourpeople.”Infact,asfaraswecouldassessthereisnotanimpactassessmentstudyofthepark.Otherauthoritiesare

notthatvocal,butalsostatetheirdoubtsaboutlongrunimpactsoftheparktominimizewaterrelatedproblems,asmeanstoreallyovercomethemareoutofthepicture;thesituationistoocomplex.

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5.SpatialKnowledgeManagement

inthemunicipaladministrationinGuarulhos.Asfaraswewereabletoidentified,municipaldepartmentsuseavarietyofGISsoftware.Thishasverymuchtoduewithpersonal preferences, adherence to “cultural”preferencesofdisciplinesorfieldsandthedecentralizedprocessandtimingforincorporatingGISintotheworkingenvironmentinGuarulhos.

Although this broader context and issuesmentionedabove have informed the ICT-GIS-based knowledgemanagementinGuarulhos,initiativesandprogramshaveverymuch been carried out independently by the localgovernment.Thisalsorelatestofunding,asonlyalimitednumberofprogramshavebeenfundedbyfederalresources.The municipal government has made a significantinvestmentineasingassesstoinformationforordinaryandloweducated citizens,which includemakingmoreuser-friendlyWeb portals and interfaces as well as creatingInternetpublickioskswithfreeaccesstocomputersinlowincomeneighborhoods.However,asfaraswecouldassess,processesforproducingspatialknowledgethroughcitizenparticipation are seldom or not at all present. Ourassessment,althoughmorefieldresearchisneeded,isthatthe spatial information culture andmapping is still verymuchacodifieddiscourseandpracticethathasnotreachedoutor“positivelycontaminated”ordinarycitizens.

5.1 Guarulhos Spatial Knowledge Management

ThecreationoftheGISdivisioninGuarulhosgoesbacktothemid1990s,whenaprivatecompanywashiredtodevelop its firstdigitalcartographicdatabase (1993)andthe SisGeo (Georeferenced Information System forGuarulhos) was formally created within the MunicipalSecretary of Urban Planning (1997). From a traditionalbureaudevotedtoproducingmapsandplottingtofulfilldemands of various municipal departments, mainlyplanning,thedivisionexpandedtoincludetwomajorareas:1)geospatialdataproductionand2)datauseandplanning.In2004,thegeospatialdataproducingareamovedtotheDepartmentforInformationSystemsandTelecommunication(DIT),directlyconnectedtotheMayor’sCabinet.ThenewlycreatedGISdivisionwithinDIThadthemandatetodevelopandimplementageospatialinfrastructure(data,tools,andprotocols)forthemunicipalityasawhole.Withinthisnewframework, in 2006 theWebGeo portal (http://webgeo.guarulhos.sp.gov.br/webgeo/index.php)waslaunchedandsince2012theCorporateGeoPlatform(GeoCorporativo)isbeing development. The CorporateGeo, aims to providecorporate-based information and data coveringadministrative,socioeconomic,culturalandenvironmental

issues, just to namea few. Thebasic goal is to create asecuredataenvironment,minimizeeffortsandmaximizeresults, improve data quality, provide added-valuegeospatial products (maps, indicators, metrics) andmaintain an up-to-date datawarehouse that is able tosupply most of the increasing demands. Efficiency,transparency, participation, and inclusiveness are thecorollariesinformingthisprocess.

Nowadays, the Secretary of Urban Development/Planning,alongwithFinanceandGovernment,constitutesthecorebodyofpoliticalpowerandthedecision-makingprocessatthelocallevelinthemajorityofmunicipalitiesand Guarulhos is not an exception. Therefore, theSecretaryofUrbanDevelopment/Planningisakeyactorinsettingthebasisforplanningandgovernance,includingknowledgemanagement.

In2001,theLaborParty(PT)electedforthefirsttimethe citymayor and since then has been in power. ThecurrenttermofthePTmayorwillendin2016.Fromtheoutset, PT officials in Guarulhos brought into office aworkingphilosophyanchoredinthreeprinciples:1)citizenparticipation; 2) consider the whole city and not onlydowntownandmiddleclassareas),givingprioritytotheperipheryand3)administrativemodernization.ThiswasanovelapproachsinceGuarulhoshadbeengovernedbyatraditionaloligarchyfordecades.

Prioritizingcitizenparticipationandtheperipherymeantthatplanningcouldno longerbe restricted to theofficeplaceanddrawingtable.ItneededtoincludeavarietyofstakeholdersandknowtherealityinseveralneighborhoodsintheperipheralzonesofGuarulhos.Therewasaneedforinformation,datagatheringandbetterunderstandingtheprocessesatworkthatwereshapingGuarulhos.TheGISdepartmentwascentralinthisprocess.

BeingUrbanDevelopment/Planning homeof theGISdepartmentinitsearlystagesbackinthe1990s,itisnotsurprising that knowledge management has gained acorporate dimension and the current GeoCorporatePlatformisforeseenaskeyforplanning.TheGISdivisionhasacentral role in theCorporateGeoplatformandhaspushedforintegration,alsoallowingdepartmentstoretainsome control on uploading and sharing data aswell asdevelopingspecificindicatorsforpolicymonitoring.RatherthanbeinganITprojectperse,theGeoCorporatePlatformhas been framed and foreseen as a broad informationmanagementprojectwithdirectbenefitsandaddedvaluefor professionals implementing and monitoring publicpolicy,includingurbanplanning.ThisrepresentsashiftintheplanningmentalityandwaytorunpublicbusinessinGuarulhos. In a general sense, this shift is triggering

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significantchangesinregardtoinvolvingactorsandtheirroleindataproductionanduse.

Expertknowledgeandcodifiedknowledgearethecoreof knowledge production and management in urbanPlanninginGuarulhos.Thisisevenmorethecaseforspatialorgeo-referenceddata/information.TheonlyexceptionofthisistheParticipatoryBudgetOfficeordepartment(OP).Amongthehandfullofdepartmentsanalyzedinourfirstfieldreport,theOPofficeistheonethatmostdirectlydealswith various forms of knowledgemaking a genuine andorchestrated effort to integrate different forms ofknowledgesuchastacitandexpert/codifiedandmanagerial.TheOPOfficehasbeenveryeffectiveintranslatingexpertandtechnicallanguageintoformatsandordinarylanguagethatiseasilyunderstandablebylesseducatedcitizens.Also,theirmandateandwholephilosophyisroutedoncreatingparticipatory spaces in a way that no other municipaldepartmentisabletodo.Bringingtechnicaldepartmentstodirectlyinteractwithcitizensandexplainprojectsunderdevelopment has sensitized various departments to theimportance of reaching out to the ordinary citizen andprovidingsolidinformation.Onegoodexample,withintheDepartment for Information Systems andTelecommunication (DIT), is the ongoing initiative forcreating platforms, interfaces and tools for datamanagement, flow and display on the Internet. Thesedevelopmentshaveaverystrongfocusonprovinguser-friendlyinterfacesmainlyforlesseducatedpeoplewiththemaingoalbeingofferingwideaccesstoinformationandbasicservicesinlesscomplicatedandbureaucraticmeans.

“Tecnologia Cidadã” (Citizen Technology) and “+ Fácil”(Easier)are twosuch interfaceswithbigger fonts,manydrawings andmore direct and simple languagewithoutjargonsandtechnicalterms(Figure6)

These interfacesarebasicallyagovernment tocitizen(G2C)informationflowratherthanacomprehensiveflowestablishing dialogues and exchange including citizen togovernment(C2G)andcitizentocitizen(C2C)exchanges.However, public officials report that even being just aportionofinformationexchange,theseportalshaveeasedordinary citizen’s daily lives in very significant means.Moreover, and perhapsmore importantly, these portalshavestartedtobreakbarriersandprovidemissedlinksforbuilding communication channels between citizens andpublicofficialsandthemunicipalbureaucracyatlarge.Forthegeospatialdatacultureinparticular,theWebGeoportallaunched in 2006 by the municipality and previouslyreferred, was an importantmilestone in launching andstrengtheningthiscultureamongofficialsanddepartments.Oncethesitewasrunning,municipaldepartmentsstartedusingitslowlybutsteadilyandtheybecamemoreinterestedandinvolvedinprovidingdatafortheportal.

Important for our interest in urban governance andflows of knowledge is a particular outcome.Having thisintegrated database is providing tools and means toestablish better informed conversations among publicofficials from various departments and outside thesecretaryboundaries.Also,ithasimproveddialogueandexchange with the private sector and professional

Figure 6: PrecariousSettlements:SãoPaulo

Source: www.tecnologiacidada.com.br.Visited,Mai2013.

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5.SpatialKnowledgeManagement

associationswithvestedinterestsinzoning,development,planning and investment. The recently signed privateconcessionformanagingtheinternationalairportforthenext 30 years and public-private partnerships fortransportation network crossing Guarulhos are twopotentialareastobuildupontheserecentdevelopments.

As far as our research on Guarulhos has developed,there are several initiatives on knowledge (and spatialknowledge)building,increasinguseandexchangebutnotthatmuch in contestation.Considering thepotentialsofknowledgebuilding,useandexchangeandcontestationforbuildingastronggovernanceculturetowardssustainabilityand inclusiveness, there isa longwaytogoto fully takeadvantage of developments under way and embracedemandsandchallenges.Isworthtolookatoneareasthatarea of particular interest to our research: theOffice ofParticipatoryBudget.

5.2 Knowledge Production and Participatory Budget in Guarulhos

Theparticipatorybudgetwasfullyincorporatedintothemunicipal agenda in 2001 with election of the first PTmayor.Duringthefirstthreeyearsofthenewadministration,the OPwas conducted as an annual process, includingbetween 7 to 8 thousand participants in neighborhoodplenarysessions(8.279,in2001;7.183,in2002;7.516,in2003).ThepoliticalfeaturesofOPareexaminedinthenextsection,whileherewelookattheknowledgeproductionfor enhancing participation. After comprehensiveevaluationconducted in2004 - theadministrationcouldnot handle and even more effectively respond to thedemandspresentedintheannualplenariesandordinarycitizens did not understand the way the municipalgovernment was organized and how it worked – theadministrationdecidedtoinvestinaneducationproject/building a knowledge culture and have plenary sessionseverysecondyear.

Recognizingthatthemunicipalityhadlimitedexperienceand resources to implement such educational project, in2005-6anindependentinstitutewashiredtoprovidetheneededexpertise.ApartnershipbetweenthemunicipalityandtheInstitutoPauloFreire(http://www.paulofreire.org/)

wasestablished.Themajoraimofthispartnershipwastodevelopaprocessforcontinuingeducation,inthebroadsense,ofdelegatesandcounselorsoftheOPinGuarulhos.Duringthepast7-8years, therehasbeenacontinuouseffortinthisdirectionandalthougheducationalprocessesneed long-term investmentandtimetomature, resultshavebeenveryencouraging.Trainingsonspecificissuesofpublicandlocaladministration(openbids,inspection,budget,fiscalcontrol,settingpriorities,projectapproval,etc) have been conducted. According to theOP office,participants reportabetterunderstandingofhow localadministrationworksandwhataresomeofthecomplexsteps involved in the decision-making processes andpolicyimplementation.

Althoughthe23OPzonesarepreciselydefinedandcanbe spatially identified, use and integration of spatialinformationintothedailyroutineandoperationsoftheOPofficeisstillmarginal.Asfarwewereabletoassess,thereisnoGISuser/dataproduceraspartoftheOPofficestaff.Neitheristhereuseofmapsforconveyinginformation.Theinformationflowisprettymuchrestrictedtomeansbasedonoral tradition (meetings anddiscussions) andwrittenreports.Thiscurrentstatuscouldbepartiallyexplainedbythelackofaspatialculturebyofficialsandtheimportanceoforallanguageamongsocialmovements’leadersandlesseducatedpeople, including illiterate individuals,which isthemajoraudiencerelatedtotheOPoffice.TheWebisanimportant platform to inform aboutmeeting schedules,particularlyduringthebiannualcycleofplenarymeetingsin the 23 regions. It is not clear howmuch theweb isactually used by local communities. Theword ofmouthremains a very important dissemination strategy amongsocialmovements.

The current scenario on use of spatial information islikelytochangeinthecomingfuture.Ontheonehand,theOPofficeisbeingincreasinglyinvolvedwithmorecomplexissues,demandingaccesstovarioussourcesofinformationanddataintegration.Ontheother,thereisaconsolidatedunderstandingamongtheOPcoordinationandstaff,thatthegreat challengeandopportunity isbasedon sharinginformation. As an official stressed in an interview,“information has to reach people, because when thishappens and we provide information with quality, theordinarycitizenbuildsunderstandingandevenifshe/heisstill critical, thecriticism isbasedonknowledgeandnotsimple political preferences or empty of content asfrequentlyseenandexperienced.”

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From the 1990s onwards and, initially, thanks to theinternational diffusion of the experience of ParticipatoryBudgeting (PB), and the growing interest of the aidcommunityinthedevelopmentofparticipatorygovernance,Brazilbecameabenchmarkasa laboratoryof innovativeexperiences designed to promote participation (Oliveira2010). The first generation of participatory democraticinnovations,associatedwithPBandtheexpansionoftheWorkers’Party(PartidodosTrabalhadores:PT)atmunicipallevel,gavewaytogradualregulationof1988Constitutionparticipatorymandateinsodefinedstrategicpolicysectorsand, consequently, to the implementation of PolicyManagement Councils (hereinafter Councils) throughoutBrazil. Furthermore, over the administrations of Lulagovernment, other participatory innovations came toprominence:National Conferences for themaking up ofreformagendas and the definition of policy priorities indifferent policy communities; Master Plans for urbanplanning, and Multi-year Plans for defining budgetarypriorities,tomentionjustexperienceswithaconsiderabledegree of national coverage. In parallel, and after theexhaustion of the pro-market and State restructuringreforms,theinternationalaidcommunityfordevelopmentbegantoproducenewsetsofrecommendationsfocusedontheprovisionofpublicservicestomostneedypopulation(Houtzager, Yoshi, Gurza Lavalle 2008), privilegingparticipationasthevocalizationoflocaldemandsandtheright to play an active role in improving such services.Democraticgovernancegainedvisibilitynotonlythroughitsassociationwiththeideaof‘voice’withitherecommendationsofservicedeliveryreform,butalsowiththeideasof‘socialcapital,’ ‘social accountability,’ ‘ownership,’ ‘co-responsibility’,‘devolution’and‘empowerment’.Againstthebackground of this double national and internationalconfluence, the interest generated abroad by Brazil isunsurprising. In thewordsof JohnGaventa,aprominentand influential researcher and intellectual in thedevelopmentstudiescommunity,today“Brazilisamodelofparticipationfortheworld”(NDAC2012).

ThemostnotablefeatureofparticipationinBrazilisitsdegree of institutionalization, accentuated to the pointthatparticipationtodaycomprisesanactivedimensionoftheBrazilianState,makingitimperativetoconceiveotherconceptssuchas“participatoryinstitutions”or“structureofparticipatorygovernance”(Avritzer2008;GurzaLavalle,Oliveira,Serafim2011).Inthe1960sto1980s,participationexpressedthecriticismsofsocialactorsandasectorsof

academiaconcerningthelackofinclusioninthecountry’spolitical institutions and economic growth, as well asexpressingademandforeffectiveself-determinationvis-à-vis political parties and various political brokers.Gradually, in the years following Brazil’s transition todemocracy, participation became incorporated into thelegal language of the State and attained levels ofinstitutionalizationneverachievedbefore,notonlyinthehistoryofthecountrybutalsoinotherdemocracies(GurzaLavalle2011a).Somefiguressufficetogiveanideaofthescale of this institutionalization: there are around than30,000 councils in Brazil’s 5,564 municipalities and,consequently,thereareseveraltensofthousandsofcivilsocietycouncilmembersparticipatinginthedefinitionandoversightofpublicpolicies;thestructureofthecouncilsistotally federalized, in other words they function atmunicipal, state and federal levels; the more than 70National Conferences held during the Lula governmentalso involvedmunicipal and state level conferences aspreparatoryphasesforthoseatnationallevel.

Thus in the fieldof studiesofparticipation itbecameincreasingly accepted that any understanding ofparticipatorydemocracy inBrazil requiresexamining theparticipatory institutions as a whole, that is, as a newinstitutional layer of the Brazilian State and not just inrelationtoaspecificparticipatoryinstanceoraparticularpolicysector.Theliteratureshiftedthetermsofthedebate,promotinganewresearchagendanotonparticipationperse,butonparticipatoryinstitutionsandthechallengesofexaminingthemasawhole,i.e.asaninstitutionalstructureofparticipatorygovernance(Avritzer2008;Pires2011,VazePires2011;GurzaLavalle,Rodrigues,Greghi2012).

The development of the institutional structure ofparticipatory governance in Guarulhos shows that thedevelopment of participatory governance and itspermeability to poor population’s demands is stronglyrelatedtothewayinwhichsuchdevelopmentfitsintothedisputesbetweentherulingpoliticalpartiesandintothepredominantmodalitiesofpoliticalmediationthatthesepartieshaveestablishedovertimeinresponsetoboththedemandsoforganizedlocalassociationsandtheirelectoralconstituencies.Werecordaprogressiveinstitutionalizationof participatory bodies, a process associatedwithwell-knownmacrofactors,suchastheadvanceintheregulationofnationallaws,andwithseveralinducementsfromfederallevel.Howevertherolethattheseinstitutionsperformin

The Role of Venues of Participation in the City Democratic Governance6

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6.TheRoleofVenuesofParticipationintheCityDemocraticGovernance

thestrategyofthemainpoliticalpartiesdisputingatlocalgovernmentlevelhasproventobecrucial.Onthispoint,thefindingsaretwo-fold:ontheonehand,weobservetheincorporationofparticipatoryinstitutionsintotheday-to-dayoperationofthemunicipalgovernment,theprevalenceofstablepatternsofdecisionswithincouncilsovertimeandtheinterestofthelocalexecutivepowerintheoperationofparticipatoryinstitutions,albeitwithdistinctemphasesaccording to theparty inpower;on theotherhand, thestructure of participatory governance and the stimulusgiventopopularorganizationandparticipationperformakeyroleinthepoliticalstrategiesofthePMDBandPT.

Social embeddednes of the participatory institutionswithintheimmenseurbanperipheryofGuarulhosandthelocal actors and citizens living (orworking) there runs isdivided.Suchembeddednessrunsprimarilythoughsocio-partisan networks and of party loyalties mobilized byneighbourhoodassociationsandissue-orientedcommunityentities during the implementation of policies and thedefinitionofrecipients.Therefore,participatoryinstitutionspermeability to social demands is selective acrossmicroterritorial lines and the recruitment of local collectiveactors as mediators of citizens living in OPientas poorneighbourhoods.Duetotheirinstitutionaldesigns,PBandthecouncilsareresponsivetodifferentsocialsectors,justas the intermediaries between the outlying urbanpopulationandtheseparticipatoryinstitutionsalsodiffer:poorer groups, with demands stemming from theiroccupationofthemunicipality’speripheryandfrequentlymediatedbyneighbourhoodassociationsandtheirleaders,aremorelikelytobeawareoffandconnectedtoPB;while(only) comparatively less vulnerable groupswith issue-oriented claims more easily link to the themes of thecouncilsandaremorelikelytobemediatedbycommunityassociations. Inboth cases,when it comes to theurbanperipheryanditsresidents,thedemandsexpressed,andthe associations and leaders who intermediate thepopulation’s relationswith participatory institutions, arechannelled through mobilization circuits organized bysocio-partisannetworks.

6.1 Guarulhos Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

ThemunicipalityofGuarulhoshastraditionallybeenrunby centre-right political parties. Since 1988 it has beengovernedbythePMDB(threeadministrations)andthePDT(one administration), which are considered centre andcentre-right parties respectively. Since 2001 the city has

been governed by PT (the Workers Party), consideredcenter-leftontheBrazilianpoliticalspectrum.PThasbeentransformingintothedominantforceinthecityoverthelasttenyearswithanagendaofparticipationandfightingcorruption – a particularly prominent issue in themunicipality due to the corruption scandals under thepreviousadministrations.Asaresult,center-rightpartieshavelostgroundovertheperiod.

Inour researchwe focusedon themunicipal councils(councils) and participatory budgeting (PB). At the locallevelcouncilsareasrelevantasPBandplayasignificantrole in Brazil’s decentralized participatory structure. The1988 Constitution enshrined the Brazilian State’scommitment to citizen participation. The constitutionmade citizen participationmandatory in strategic areas.The process of formulating the provisions of the newconstitutionusedcouncilsastheinstitutionalmechanismfor enabling the organization of citizen participation inpublicpoliciesatallthreelevelsofthefederation,intheareasofeducation,healthcare,socialassistance,andchildandyouthrights(Tatagiba2004,2002b).Accordingtothemost reliable survey available, in 2001 therewere 5426municipalhealthcouncils,5178socialassistancecouncils,4036childandyouthrightscouncilsand4072educationcouncilsinmostpartsofthecountry(IBGE2001).

Participatory Budgeting,whose flagship experience isthatofPortoAlegre,begunin1989bytheWorkers’Party(PT),andformspartofthesetofdemocraticinnovationsproducedinBrazil.InGuarulhosPBisoneofPT’strademarks,above all due to its innovative nature,whose advancesweremadeduringtheEloiPietágovernment.Infact,PBinGuarulhoswasenhancedbytheuseofdigitaltechnology.PB isdeveloped ina two-yearcycle, incontrast toothercitieswhichemulatethePortoAlegremodelanditsannualcycle.Duringtheplenarysessions,anoverallassessmentof the city’s public policies, aswell as the demands ofGuarulhos’s residents, are broadcast directly on a largescreensothatalltheparticipantscanfollowproceedings.Furthermorethevotingsystemiselectronic,whichspeedsupandenhancescitizenparticipation.Digitalmanagementis outsourced to a company specializing in events anddigital participation. TheGuarulhosmodel of PB is nowbecominganinternationalbenchmark.

WhenPTarrivedingovernmentledbyEloiPietà,ITwasfacedwithachallenge.Infactthepreviousgovernmenthadleftbehindatarnishedimageofthepublicadministrationfollowingaseriesofcorruptionscandals.Additionallythegovernmentselectedoverthecourseofthe1990shadwonover some important regions of Pimentas, such as thealreadymentioned Tupinambá. The challenge extended,therefore, not only to restoring the political image of

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Guarulhos,butalsoofpenetratingterritoriallytoconsolidatetheparty’selectoralsupport.PT’sagendaputemphasisonparticipationasawayofchangingtherepertoireofintereststobemobilized.PBwasanimportantinstrumenttowardsthis end, along with the creation of councils and thestrengtheningoftheactivitiesofthosealreadyinoperation(cf.Anti-NarcoticsCouncil).Theentryintomicro-territorieslikePimentasneighbourhoodswasimportantforthepartyto consolidate its electoral base. Someof thePB councilmembers(hereaftercouncillors)effectivelypresentastrongaffinitywith PT. Councillors are important agents for thegovernment since, aside from performing the role ofcontrolling public administration and budgets, anddeliberatingonthelatter,theyalsomobilizethelocalcitizensand grassroots associations to participate in theplenarysessionsandinformthepopulationaboutthegovernment’sactivitiesaswell.Councillorsalsoserveasareferencepointforthedistricts(alocalgovernmentadministrativedivision).In otherwords, in certain cases they function as subtleextensionsoflocalgovernmentintothemoreoutlyingareas.

6.2 Councils InGuarulhos,thereisaprogressiveinstitutionalization

ofthecouncilsassociatedwiththefederallegislation,asinthe case of theHealth, SocialWelfare, Child and Youth,FUNDEB (Basic Education Fund), ‘Bolsa Família’ (FamilyAllowance)and ‘ZeroHunger’ councils.Howeverwecan

alsonotethestronginfluenceofthelocalpoliticsandthemunicipal government’s initiative in creating councils.EspeciallywiththearrivalofthePTadministrationswithadeclaredcommitmenttoestablishaparticipatoryoversightandinputsinthemanagementofvarioussocialpolicies,wecanobservethecreationandreactivationofcouncilsfor rights and the inclusion of particular sectors of thepopulation (Elderly, Northeastern Community, RacialEquality, Employment and Income Generation, DigitalInclusion,Women’s Policy). This initiative of establishingparticipatory channels is also visible in the pioneeringinstitutionalizationoftheUrbanDevelopmentcouncilthat,eventhoughdefinedbytheCityStatute(2001),failedtoobtainimmediateorenmasseadherencefromthemajorityof Brazilian municipalities. As shown in Graph 1, thiscouncilsareactiveadhavebeenproducingafairamountordecisionsduringthePTyears.

Becauseoftheirpolicysectorprofile,councilsarenotnatural channels for forwarding the kinds of demandstypicalofneighbourhoodassociations, thereforethere islackofknowledgeofthecouncilsaschannelsforscalingupdemandsamongneighbourhoodassociationsand,asonemayexpect,citizensareevenlesawareofthosechannels.However, councils do are known by issue orientedcommunityassociationsanddoandhavesomepresencethroughthisassociationsatneighbourhoodterritoriallevel.Thesecommunityassociationspress thecouncils for theresourcesneededtocarryouttheirproposalsinthefieldofculture,education,childcare,etc.

Source: CEBRAPC2SCensusonadministrativeactsissuedbycouncilsinGuarulhos

Graph I:Numbersofactsissuedbymunicipalcouncils

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Therelationsbetween local leadersandcouncils runsthroughsocio-partisannetworks.Althoughthemediationofsocio-partisannetworksisclearerintheworkingofPB,theyalsoplayaroleinlinkingcouncilstoneighbourhoodleveldemandandpolitics.Thecouncillorstendtolookforthosespacesthatengageincommunityactivities.This isespeciallythecaseduringpre-electoralperiods.Inaddition,relations inevitably become established betweencommunityleadersandpoliticiansovertime.

6.3 Participatory Budgeting The Participatory Budgeting assemblies involving the

largest number of participants are the regional plenarysessions,which,inGuarulhos,takeplaceeverytwoyears.Ontheseoccasionsthecitymayorvisitstheregions,alongwithateamfromthecitycouncilthatincludessecretaries,councillors,PBofficersandsometimesdeputiesfromthecity.Theplenarysessionsareprecededbyapreparatoryphase, generally beginning a fewdays prior to the dateplannedfortheevent.This iswhenthe‘representatives’performacrucialrole.Neighbourhoodassociations’leadersandothergrassrootsleaders,aswellasmunicipallegislativerepresentatives and councilmembersmobilize the localresidentsandacityhallcarwithaloudspeakercirculatesintheregionannouncingthedateandtimeoftheplenarysession.Spaceisgivenforinhabitantstospeakandeachpersonhastherighttomakeademandforpublicpolicythatwillbevotedonwithintheregionandlatercompetewithotherwinningdemandsfromotherregions.

PT’sadministrationnotonly introducedanewformofimplementingPBinthecitywithabiannualcycle,italso invested in new technology to make PB moredynamic,includingelectronicvotingandaplasmascreenallowing all participants to follow the assembly’sproceedingsclosely.Citizensaregivenawristbandwiththe name of their neighbourhood district, a foldercontaininginformationaboutPB,theworkscarriedoutoverthelastfewyears,andaleafletwiththePBrulesofprocedure.Allcitizensmustregister.Duringtheplenarysessions, citizens share their concernsand issueswithothercitizens.Howeverthechoiceofpoliciesdemandedcanbeasurprisesincetheydependonnumberofvotesto be selected. Priormobilization is very important inorder toensureparticipation,aswellas tocoordinateinterests, organize voting and keeping voters in theplenary till the end, when demand are elected .Coordination of votes is usually articulated by localleaderships. Sometimes political representatives, suchas councillors andparty activists, enter thegrassroots

communities topromoteandmobilizeparticipation inPBassembliesoraskforpoliticalsupport.

ParticipatoryBudgetingbroughtpositiveeffectsforthecityintwosenses:externalandinternal.PT’sadministrationinGuarulhoswith its innovations and investment in PBturnedthisparticipatorygovernancepolicyintoakindofshowcaseforthecity.OnonehandGuarulhosbecamethesecondcoordinatoroftheBrazilianParticipatoryBudgetingNetwork.Ontheotherhand,theGuarulhosInternationalRelationsDepartmentparadesPBasPT’s flagship in thecity,systematicallyhighlightingitsbenefits.PBdoesindeedpresent interesting qualities, such as increasingtransparencyinthebudgetaryprocess,accountabilityandeffectiveinvestments,basedontheprincipleofsociety’sinvolvementandparticipation.MoreoverPBisanimportantinstrumentintermsofhighlightingrecurrentproblemsinthemoreoutlyingdistricts(suchasfloodsandlandslides)andpresentingthemmorequicklytothegovernmentwithbetter information from the ground. From a politicalviewpoint,PBallowslocalleadersgreateraccesstopoliticalpostsinthemunicipalitysinceitseventsandprocessescanserveasaspaceforlearningaboutpoliticalrepresentationin particular and political activity in general (DeMelloRomão 2011). The PB council members and delegatesbenefitmostfromthepoliticaladvantagesbroughtbythepolicy of participatory governance. The quality of theexperience inGuarulhos can be understood due to theintroductionofhightechnologyintheparticipatoryprocessand in the trainingof councilmembers,whichoccurs inpartnership with the Paulo Freire Institute, an NGOspecializedinpopulareducation,hiredbyGuarulhosCityHallformobilizingandtrainingPBparticipants.

However, some neighbourhood and grassrootsassociationsand thepeople they intermediatewith theCityHall fail tobenefit fromtheadvantagesofPBsincetheyhavedifficultiesinbeingincludedand/orlittleinterestin participating.We found this cases belong to PMDB’ssocio-partisan network, as opposed to PT networks. AnexampleistheMaraAssociation,anetworktraditionallyassociatedwiththePascoalThomeupoliticalgroup,whosemembers find it very difficult to distribute milk andvegetables,andemphasizesthegovernment’slackofanyrealinterestinhelpingthem.Onthecontrary,thebenefitsaccrue inthosenetworksclosest tothePTgovernment.TheSítioSãoFranciscoprovidesaclearexampleonthispoint,sincethecloseworkwithPBintheregionenablesitsresidentstotransmitdemandsdirectlytotheCityHall.The Sítio’s neighbourhood associationwas founded bysuggestion andwith support of PT’s administration. Nowonder,theleaderofthisassociationwasveryactiveinmobilizingpeopleforPBplenary.

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6.4 Salvador Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

Salvador’spoliticalhistorydiffersgreatlyfromthoseofGuarulhos andRio de Janeiro. The politics of Bahiawashistoricallyshapedbytheroleoftheregionaloligarchies,opposed to modernization and responsible for thereproduction of a hierarchical and authoritarian culture.Theprocessofsocialmodernizationtookplaceinabelatedandconservativewayfromthe1970sonwards,presidedover by ‘Carlism,’ a term referring to the power of theoligarchies as epitomized and led by the truculent andcharismaticAntonioCarlosMagalhães,themostdominantpoliticalforceinthestate,whoremainedinpowerfor40years(Avritzer2007;PereiradoNascimento2008).

Inthe1960sand70s,partieslikethePCBandthePCdoB,bothcommunists,operatinginclandestinefashionunderthemilitary dictatorship, played an important role in theorganizationofthestudentmovement.Thesepartiesandthestudentmovement,withthesupportofsectorsofthechurch,becameakeypoliticalforceinoppositiontoCarlism,includingduringtheelectoraldisputesinthe1980sandlater.

There is a considerable degree of associativism inSalvador,butalowlevelofparticipationinpublicpolices(Avritzer2007).AsBaiocchiandCorrado(2007)pointout,manyorganizationshaveaprofileofethnicassociativism,demanding public policies in various fields, frequentlyassociated with affirmative actions, but in most caseswithout involving or associating themselveswithwideractions for promoting citizen participation in the city ofSalvador.Theseorganizationsfocustheiractivitytoalargeextentonseekingimprovementsinthelivingconditionsoftheirtargetpublic,veryoftenmakinguseofcontactsanddirect influence on councillors and other politicalrepresentativesaffiliatedtospecificparties.Themembersof these groups live in vulnerable conditions, whichcontributestoreducingtheirsocialmobilization(PereiradoNascimento2008:146-148).

The social and economic problems of Salvador havecontributedtothecreationofmanynonprofitorganizations.During the last five centuries one can find records ofdifferent associative forms ranging from the traditionalphilanthropicorganizationstothemodernOSCIPs,whosegoals is to help others in different causes. According toinformation from the Ministry of Justice, Salvador hascurrently82civilsocietyorganizationsinthepublicinterest- and 138OSCIP federal public utility entities. However,accordingtoasurveyconductedbytheOfficeofReferenceofOldTown,whichwasbasedon09differentsourcesof

dataextraction,thisnumberismuchhigher,totalizing628nonprofitsorganizationslegallyconstitutedsituatedjustintheOldCenterofSalvador.Dispitethehighfigures,thereisalackofdialogueamongtheseorganizations.Inthesamesurvey,onethirdofthe250entitiesthatwereinterviewedsaidthattheyignoreotherorganizationswithinthesamecommunity.Thereisnotthebuildingofnetworksinordertoacttogetherforthesamecauses.

At the same time local government has shown littleopenness tocitizenparticipation.Asmentionedearlier,themunicipaladministrationsinSalvador, likethoseforthe State of Bahia, have been shaped by Carlism and,during some periods, by anti-Carlism. Initiatives forimplementing participatory practices took place in thelatteradministrations.

In 1992 an anti-Carlist governmentwas electedwithLídicedaMata,aleft-wingpoliticalleaderthenaffiliatedto the PSDB, asmayor. According to Boschi (1999) thepolitical context was one of low administrativedecentralization, the divergence and dissociation of thelocal administration from state and federal plans, andconjuncturalfactorsthatmadethecoalitiongovernmentextremelydiverseinmakeup,leadingtoitseventualbreakup.TheuniqueadministrativeconditionsduringtheLídicedaMattagovernment(1993-1996),theauthorsuggests,makethecaseespeciallyrich intermsof identifyingthelimits and possibilities of urban governance. Lídice daMatta’sadministrationwasmarkedbytheoppositionofACM, then state governor, and his use of themedia todisqualifythemunicipalgovernment,aswellasblockingfundingtothemunicipality,andtherupturebetweenthelocalandnationalPSDBoverthecoalitionwiththePFLinthenationalelections.Inaddition,Boschi(1999)highlightsthefactthatthecoalitiongovernmentwasformedby9parties, which made any cohesive political practicedifficult. This led to a relative isolation of the city hall,whichmadeitdifficulttomobilizesocietyinthedecision-makingprocessasameansofovercomingclientelism.Theimplementationofparticipatoryspaceswasinsufficienttoalter this deeply embeddeddynamic. The situationwascompoundedbythesmallamountoftimeperiodavailableforassemblingthegovernment,which,theauthorstates,“didnotfavourtheestablishmentofadetailedprogramofpolitical action, in the phases prior to office, or thedefinitionofastrategyforconnectingthedifferentsector-basedactions.Henceplanningdidnotfigureasapoliticalcomponent of programmed actions for the newgovernment”(Boschi1999).

TherewasanattempttoimplementPBundertheLídicedaMataadministration(1993-1996)andlaterduringtheJoãoHenrique government (2005-2008),we can note a

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fairlylukewarmcommitmentfromboththegovernmentstoparticipatoryadministration.WhilethelackofinternalcohesionofthemunicipaladministrationandthepoliticalpressureofCarlismatstatelevelcomplicatedtheprocessundertheLídicegovernment,thewithdrawalofPTfromitscoalitionwiththeJoãoHenriqueadministrationaftertwoyearsofgovernmentledtothecompleteabandonmentofPB.Inthiscontextofavagueandflimsypoliticalwill,theinstitutional designwas also contaminated, establishingoperational dynamicsbasedon the logicof thepossiblerather than following the more sophisticated designsexemplifiedbysuccessfulexperiencesinothermetropolises,suchasPortoAlegreandBeloHorizonte.Finallytheshortlifeofbothinitiativespreventedthemfromlastingbeyondthe administration in question or benefit fromprogressmadethroughthematuringoftheprocess.

With the failure of the Lídice administration, ACMelectedhis successor,Antonio Imbassahyof thePFL, fortwo consecutiveperiodsof office (1997-2004).His eightyears of government “weremarked by authoritarianismand the suppression of, or intervention in, public policycouncils, such as the environment and health councils”(PereiradoNascimento2008:125).

In2004theanti-Carlistfrontwonthemunicipalelectionled by João Henrique Carneiro of the PDT in a broadcoalitioninvolvingpartiesfromvariouspartsofthepoliticalspectrum, including PT. Its electionwas inspired by theexpectationamongsocialmovements,enthusedbythePTgovernmentatfederallevel,thattherewouldbechangesinthegovernment’srelationwithcivilsociety,democratizingthepublicadministrationthroughParticipatoryBudgeting,the strengthening of public policy councils, adoption ofmeasuresfordirectparticipationinthediscussionofthecity’s development through public hearings, and so on.Between2005and2007,theJoãoHenriquegovernmentheldpublicmeetingsandhearingstopresentanddiscussthemesofinteresttotheauthorities,aswellasreactivatingandcreatingpublicpolicycouncilsandreactivatingPB.

DuringthetwoyearsofPBinSalvador,between2005and2007,theterritorialdivisionofthecitywasbasedonRegional Administrations, each ofwhich had to indicatefourinvestmentpriorities“relatingtostructuralworksandwithinthefinancialpossibilitiesofthecityhall.”TherewasnoallocationofaspecificpercentageofinvestmentstoPB,leavingitupto“eachDepartment,accordingtoitsbudget,to give priority to PB.” After the choice of four regionalpriorities,theelecteddelegatesparticipatedintheBuzuPB–atourorganizedbyCityHallforthedelegatestovisitthedifferentregionsofthecity–tolearnaboutthedemandsoftheotherregionsinsitu.

After the visits, the priorities were defined with anemphasisoninfra-structure(70%),health(17%)andsocialwelfare (13%).Among the infrastructuraldemandswerethoseforroadsurfacing(40%),slopecontention(30%),andmicro andmacro drainage projects (25%) (PMS, 2005).However despite the choice of priorities and theparticipation of 6,675 people in the regional plenarysessions,in2006thePBwasmarkedbyasignificantdegreeoffrustration,sinceveryfewofthedemandedactionswereactually implemented. The 2006 plenary sessionswerelimitedtoexplanationsfromtheExecutiveofwhytheworkshadnotbeenrealized.Newprioritieswerenotchosenuntilthoseselectedin2005wereimplemented.

TheexperienceofPBintheJoãoHenriqueadministrationisidentifiedasconsultativeinnaturebyBatistaandSilva(2007)andlastedforjusttwoyears.JoãoHenriqueCarneirowas re-elected in 2008 by the PMDB, and one of itscampaignpromiseswastoexpandpopularparticipationinhealthcare.Howeverthestanceinvolvedlittleopeningtothe participation of society, expressed in the refusal toinducttheCityCouncil,introducedbylawin2004.

AsurveyconductedbyVitaleandZape(2012)foundthatSalvadorhasthirtymunicipalcouncils institutionalizedofwhichatleasttwentyareactive.Amongtheseinstitutionssome are also present in several Brazilianmunicipalitiessuchasthecouncilofsocialcareandthecouncilofchildandyouth,but therearealsootherswhichaddressverypeculiardemandsofthemunicipality.ThisisthecaseoftheDeliberative Council of theMunicipal Fund for HumanDevelopmentandEducationalInclusionofWomenAfricanDescendent and the City Council of Carnival and otherpopularfestivals.

However, Salvador emerges as a city marked by anauthoritarian and clientelist political culture with thehistorical dominance of an oligarchy, combined with areasonabledegreeofethnicandculture-basedassociativismlittle focused on public policies, and two attempts toimplement participatory government that wereunsuccessfulforavarietyoffactors,includingabsenceofpoliticalwill,institutionallimits,localpoliticaldisputesandalowlevelofsocialsupportorembeddedness.Thisbriefaccount also reveals the fragility of the PB institutionaldesign.Aspectssuchastheimprecisionofthepercentageof investments to the defined by the population, thedelegation to departments to ensure priority in the PBworks,theabsenceofredistributivecriteriatoensuretheinversionofprioritiesandthefailuretoexecutedemandsindicatedahighlyprecariousscenariointermsofthelikelysuccessoftheexperience.

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6.5 Rio de Janeiro Structure of Participatory Governance and Ruling Parties

RiodeJaneiro’shistoryismarkedbysocialinequalities,perceptibleintheforminwhichthecityisoccupiedwithfavelas,whichspreadoverthehillscoveringtheregion.Inthewakeofadisorderedandunequalprocessofoccupation,RiodeJaneiro’sassociativetraditionischaracterizedbyacommunitariancultureinwhichtheresidentsassociations,the most prominent such entities in the city, havetraditionallyworkedtosolveproblemsatthemicro-locallevel of the neighbourhoods. These organizations areassociatedinFederationsthatworktodrawtheattentionof the local authorities and public opinion to the issuesfacedbythesecommunities,suchasthelackofaccesstobasicpublicservices,andplayedanimportantroleinsocialmobilizationtowardspoliticalparticipation.

Inthe1980s,astheelectoralbasesoftheWorkers’Party(PT)andtheBrazilianSocialistParty(PSB)wereformed,aset of favela neighbourhood and resident associationsenteredintopartypoliticsandproposalslikeparticipatorybudgetinggainedacceptanceamongpopularmovements(Deminicis2009).However,accordingtothelatterauthor,the development of institutional participation excludedpoorersectionsofthepopulation,especiallyinacontextof party disputeswith national repercussions, involvinglargeeconomic interestsandpartyorganizationsatstateandnationallevel.

Intheperiodafterthereturntodemocracyin1985,theRiodeJaneiromunicipaladministrationwasoccupiedbycentre-rightandrightwingparties,stronglyassociatedwiththenationalbusinesssector,themostprominentbeingthePFL.CésarMaiawasmayorinthe1993-1996administration,firstrepresentingthePMDBandlaterthePFL,implementinganeoliberalreformprojectformodernizingtheStateandcity.Hisgovernmentundertookthedecentralizationofthecity’sadministrationwiththecreationofsubprefectures.Histermofofficewasmarkedbylargehighwayandurban

infrastructureprojects.Thisagendawascontinuedbyhissuccessor,LuizPauloConde,from1996-1999,andin2001CesarMaia returned as citymayor for twomore terms(until 2008), representing the PFL. In the 2001-2004administrationhecreatedaveryshort-livedParticipatoryBudgeting processwith an exclusively technicalmakeupandlittleimpactinthecity.RiodeJaneirocityiscurrentlyrunbythePMDBwithEduardoPaesasmayor.

TheCésarMaiaadministration(2001-2004),alliedtothediscourses and practices of ‘good governance’ (Cardoso2009),implementedaParticipatoryBudgetingexperimentrelatedtotheCity’sStrategicPlanin2002,which,aswellas being incipient, was never continued. According toCardoso (2009), the PB processwas constructedwith alimitedpublicdialogueandpoliticizationof thedebates,andwassubordinatedtothecoordinationofthecityhall’sofficers.Moreovertherewasjustasingleroundofplenarysessions,in2002,withthecompositionofasetofproposalsfrom which some would be picked for the followingbudgets. Today Rio City Hall runs the ‘Transparent Rio’consultationsystem,whichallowscitizens toaccompanythebudgetexecutionofthemunicipalgovernment’sorgansandprograms,without,though,anyactiveparticipationinthedefinitionormonitoringofthepublicbudget.

The exclusivist nature of Rio’s politics is expressed ininstitutional participation, which, according to SantosJunior(2000),hasbeenlimitedtoleaderswithhigherlevelsofschoolingandtechnicalcapacity.Theauthorobservesthat theassociativecultureandcurrentdynamicofcivicparticipation “co-existwith the political apathy of largesections of the population, producing the culture ofinstitutionalhybridity (polyarchical institutionscoexistingwithinformality,clientelismandanabsenceofrights).”

InRiodeJaneiro,therefore,wehaveareasonablywellorganized civil societywith some level of political partyinvolvement,butisolatedfromthelocalpoliticaldisputeby the very dynamic of party disputes and the lack ofopenness of the municipal government to inclusiveparticipatorypractices.

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