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SNOHOMISH COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY - CIVIL DIVISION

Robert J. Drewel Bldg., 8th Floor, M/S 504 3000 Rockefeller Ave

EVERETT, WASHINGTON 98201-4060 (425)388-6330/FAX: (425)388-6333

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEF’S MOT.DIRECTING PL. TO CEASE ABUSE & FOR SANCTIONS (USDC 14-235-RAJ) - 1

The Honorable Richard A. Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

ANNE BLOCK, Plaintiff,

vs. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, a Washington County and Municipal Government; et al., Defendants.

NO. 14-CV-235-RAJ COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO CEASE ABUSIVE CONDUCT AND COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

NOTED FOR MOTION: AUGUST 8, 2014

I. REPLY

Snohomish County Defendants have moved the Court for an order granting relief from

Plaintiff’s abusive practices, sanctions, and attorney fees. Plaintiff belatedly filed a Response,

which should be stricken. Even if considered, the Response misapprehends the point of County

Defendants’ Motions. County Defendants do not seek to interfere with Plaintiff’s rights and/or

hinder Plaintiff’s ability to pursue any activity. Rather, within the scope of this lawsuit, County

Defendants merely seek the Court’s assistance in ensuring that Plaintiff observes basic

standards of professionalism and demonstrates respect for the administration of justice and this

Case 2:14-cv-00235-RAJ Document 58 Filed 08/08/14 of 8

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Court. The Court should impose appropriate sanctions, including the attorney fees and costs of

bringing this motion, as a result of Plaintiff’s egregious behavior in this litigation.

II. ARGUMENT

1. Plaintiff’s Response should be stricken because it was untimely filed and does not comply with the applicable evidentiary rules. Plaintiff’s Response should be stricken. County Defendants filed their Motion on July

23, 2014, and noted it for August 8, 2014. Dkt. #40. Plaintiff was required to file her Response

no later than August 4, 2014. See LCR 7(d)(3). Plaintiff belatedly filed her Response on

August 6, 2014, two days after the deadline. Dkt. #56.

County Defendants’ Reply is due on the noting date. This Court’s rules provide the

moving party four court days to prepare and file its Reply to the non-moving party’s Response.

LCR 7(d)(3). As a result of Plaintiff’s untimely filing, County Defendants are prejudiced by the

shortened time to prepare and file their Reply. See LCR 7(g). Additionally, even assuming no

prejudice, Plaintiff’s conduct has demonstrated she has little concern for the Court’s rules

and/or orders and suggests Plaintiff will simply continue to fashion her own rules for litigation

unless she is held accountable.

County Defendants also object to, and move to strike, various facts asserted in Plaintiff’s

Response and Plaintiff’s exhibits. Plaintiff makes various factual assertions, including claims

that defendant Crystal Hill-Pennington “was engaged in the unlawful practice of law” and that

Defendant John Pennington used a friend to “trump-up criminal charges” against Plaintiff. Dkt.

#56, p. 2: 10-11; 20-21 These factual statements of Plaintiff are not based on Plaintiff’s

personal knowledge. Additionally, such statements are not supported by affidavit, declaration,

or other admissible evidence. LCR 7(g). As such, these factual assertions of Plaintiff are


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inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 (definition of hearsay); Fed. R. Evid. 802 (rule against

hearsay); Fed. R. Evid. 602 (requirement of personal knowledge); Fed. R. Evid. 603 (oath or

affirmation to testify truthfully). Further, Plaintiff has not authenticated any of the exhibits to

her Response, and they are inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 901 (authenticating or identifying

evidence). Similarly, Plaintiff’s denial of accosting counsel for Defendants is unsupported.

2. Plaintiff does not have a First Amendment rights to commit criminal acts and/or harass and threaten opposing counsel. Plaintiff’s Response’s focus appears to be an allegation that the County Defendants

seek to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or rights to request records under

Washington’s Public Records Act, RCW 42.56. Plaintiff cites cases interpreting various

federal constitutional provisions and jurisprudence, including the First Amendment. Plaintiff

also mentions Washington’s Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525, discussed by Plaintiff in a

motion ordered stricken by the Court. Dkt. # 56, pp. 3-10; see also Dkt. # 44.

Plaintiff misapprehends the County Defendants’ motion. County Defendants do not

seek to abridge Plaintiff’s First Amendment or other rights. County Defendants do not seek to

hinder the ability of Plaintiff, a “staunch open government advocate,” to seek public records

from the County under Washington State’s Public Records Act, RCW 42.56. Dkt. #56, p. 1:

21. County Defendants do not seek to restrain what pieces Plaintiff, an “investigative

journalist/blogger,” puts in the book she is writing or posts on her website, The Gold Bar

Reporter.1 Id. Nor do County Defendants seek to limit Plaintiff’s right to pursue judicial

redress or associate with whichever organizations she chooses.

1 Plaintiff asserts her writings on the Gold Bar Reporter are not defamatory because they are true. For purposes of this motion only, County Defendants do not take a position on whether any postings on the Gold Bar Reporter, including the few referenced in County Defendants’ Motion or supporting Declarations, are defamatory.


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To the contrary, the County Defendants merely seek to have Plaintiff conduct herself in

this litigation in an appropriate professional manner, without harassing or threatening counsel

or represented parties. Additionally, because Plaintiff’s conduct to date has been so egregious

– notwithstanding counsel for County Defendants’ attempts to resolve issues with Plaintiff –

County Defendants seek sanctions, to include the costs and fees associated with bringing this

motion. County Defendants seek relief only as a result of Plaintiff’s conduct as a litigant in

this case, not for any exercise by Plaintiff of any lawful right. Plaintiff’s contention County

Defendants’ Motions somehow affects her basic freedoms has no merit.

3. Plaintiff’s claim she is no longer an attorney is immaterial. Plaintiff claims she “resigned from the WSBA” and that counsel for County Defendants

“attempts to mislead this Court into believing that Plaintiff is a WSBA attorney.” Dkt. #56, p.

1: 21-22; p. 3: 16-17. Plaintiff also points out she has been suspended from practice by the

Washington State Bar Association. Dkt. #56, p. 4: 8-9. Plaintiff’s argument apparently is that

Plaintiff is therefore not bound by any rules whatsoever, including the rules of this Court.

Plaintiff’s argument has no merit.

No doubt this Court has seen pro se litigants whose ability to follow the court rules

(and comply with court orders) is hampered by poor education, the absence of legal training,

and/or other constraints or circumstances that might explain (if not excuse) their conduct.

Plaintiff, however, is a law school graduate who was admitted to the Washington State Bar

Association in 2006. Plaintiff has litigated this and other cases. She is well educated on the

rules of professional conduct and the rules that govern the court. She knows or should know

what is expected of her. She knows or should know that serially contacting represented


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defendants, harassing and threatening opposing counsel, and name-calling is not an acceptable

way of conducting oneself in litigation. Plaintiff’s argument is like a driver whose driver’s

license is suspended or revoked arguing that he does not have to follow the rules of the road

and therefore cannot receive a traffic citation. Simply put, the argument is nonsense.

Indeed, under the circumstances of this case, where Plaintiff has knowledge of the

Court’s expectations, whether Plaintiff is an attorney or not is immaterial. See, e.g., Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2008) (district court properly considered pro se plaintiff’s

litigation history “to counter her argument that she deserves special treatment because of her

pro se status”); Phillips v. KIRO–TV, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1323 (W.D. Wash. 2011)

(although plaintiff was pro se, his “litany of excuses” did not constitute excusable neglect for

filing overlong and untimely opposition to motion to dismiss where plaintiff was a law school

graduate, “very capable in legal research and writing,” and had demonstrated “a lack of regard

for rules and deadlines, even when the Court set a date certain for his opposition”).

Further, even if Plaintiff had never attended law school, been admitted to a state bar,

and practiced as an attorney, she would still be required to follow the law. See, e.g., McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980 (1993) (“we have never suggested that

procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by

those who proceed without counsel.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes

omitted); Bias, 508 F.3d at 1212, 1219 (“The hazards which beset a layman when he seeks to

represent himself are obvious. He who proceeds pro se with full knowledge and understanding

of the risks does so with no greater rights than a litigant represented by a lawyer[.]”).


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4. Plaintiff’s egregious conduct has continued to escalate. Plaintiff responded to the filing of County Defendants’ Motions with more threats,

harassment, and attempts to intimidate. On July 24, 2014, after County Defendants filed their

Motions, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to counsel for County Defendants, wherein Plaintiff

threatened, “Either strike your frivolous motions or I will and [sic] file an Anti-SLAPP Motion

seeking max. penalties and fees.” Second Reay Decl., ¶ 3. Plaintiff gave counsel for County

Defendants “one business day” to comply. Id.

Plaintiff also continues to attempt to intimidate defendants and counsel in this case

through targeted public records requests to the County. On July 25, 2014, Plaintiff requested

email communication sent to or received by Diana Rose, a defendant in this lawsuit. Second

Jones Decl., ¶ 4. On August 1, 2014, the Gold Bar Reporter requested email communication

with counsel for Aaron Reardon and Jon Rudicil. Id., ¶ 5. On August 5, 2014, Plaintiff’s

associate Noel Frederick requested counsel for County Defendants’ phone records from July,

2014; the next day, August 6, 2014, Mr. Frederick requested “ALL phone records which relate

to Diana Rose.” Id., ¶¶ 6,7.

This behavior is consistent with Plaintiff’s ex parte contact with the Court, see dkt. #54,

and with Plaintiff’s previous behavior. This behavior warrants further judicial action.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court should grant County Defendants’ Motions and the relief sought therein,

including monetary sanctions and attorney fees in an amount to be determined.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of August, 2014.

MARK K. ROE


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Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney By: __/s/ Sean D. Reay________________ SEAN D. REAY, WSBA No. 33622 Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office Attorney for Snohomish County Defendants Email: [email protected]


mailto:[email protected]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on August 8, 2014, I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing Reply in Support of Motion Seeking Relief from Plaintiff’s Abusive Practices and Sanctions with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

1. Plaintiff, Anne Block, at the e-mail registered with the Court for ECF filing/service; 2. Shannon Ragonesi; 3. Patrick McMahon; 4. Michael Kenyon and Ann Marie Soto;

/s/ Peggy Fowler________________ Peggy Fowler, Legal Assistant to Sean Reay Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office

Attorney for Snohomish County Defendants


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