Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Smart Device Ground Control Station Cyber Security Threat Model

Katrina Mansfield, Timothy Eveleigh, D.Sc., Thomas H. Holzer D. Sc., and Shahryar Sarkani, D. Sc.

School of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 20052

Email: kmansfi@gwu.edu, eveleigh@gwu.edu, holzert@gwu.edu, emseor2003@yahoo.com

Abstract - The Department of the Defense has transitioned smart devices into the battlefield as a portable hand-held unmanned aerial vehicle ground control station without adequate cyber security protections, putting critical mission data at risk to cyber security attacks. Industry has developed software apps for smart phones and tablets that allows soldiers to not only pilot unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) but to share and receive intelligence and reconnaissance videos and images remotely from the ground control station (GCS) or directly from the UAV. The Department of Defense has not developed a secure communication network that will support a large quantity of smart devices, nor certification, standards or policies for operation of secure smart devices. Therefore, mission critical information will be shared through unsecured, mobile and wireless networks and through unclassified, unsecure smart technology that are vulnerable to cyber security risks. Lack of security of the mobile and wireless networks and smart devices could result in the unintentional sharing of data as well as loss of control of the UAV to enemies. The Department of Defense has failed to develop a threat model and risk assessment to identify the cyber security threats and ensure the proper security countermeasures are in place. This paper will analyze the cyber security vulnerabilities within the communication links, smart devices hardware, specifically smart phones and tablets, and software applications to develop a risk model of the threat profile of the GCS networking hub. This model will help designers and users of the military and civilian UAV communities to understand the threat profile of the GCS networking hub to develop a secure communication network based upon the vulnerabilities identified for smart phones and tablets. Index Terms - unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber security, communication systems, risk analysis

I. INTRODUCTION

With the rapid advancement of technology and popularity in the consumer market, smart phones and tablets are changing the way we operate in the workplace and battlefield. The recent trend of bring-your-own-device to the workplace has presented many benefits in corporate america. Smart devices are changing how industry does business; smart devices and software applications are being utilized to increase productivity, mobility, collaboration, and business continuity. However the use of personal smart devices has also introduced many security vulnerabilities, allowing hackers to get easy access into companies’ networks and private data. This is the direct result of companies’ lack of security policies and measures to secure the devices connecting to their networks. The Department of Defense has been reluctant in the past to incorporate this new technology without the capability to

provide secure connection for classified communication. Use of mobile devices was limited to Blackberry devices as it was the only phone manufacturer cleared to have impact level 3 security accreditation for secure handling of sensitive data [5]. However, the Department of Defense has recently taken steps to incorporate smart phones and tablets into the workplace and battlefield to “keep the department’s workforce relevant in an era when information accessibility and cyber security play a critical role in mission success [24].” Implementation of smart devices in the workplace would allow personnel to access applications that are not currently accessible with the blackberry mobile phones. Military services have transitioned smart devices into the battlefield to provide additional enhanced capabilities and functions to soldiers in a single compact, handheld device to control multimillion dollar unmanned aerial vehicles in the war against terrorism. However, in effort to keep the technology relevant in the battlefield, the Department of Defense has failed to protect the assets from cyber security threats and vulnerabilities when neither the security threat assessments have been performed nor protections put in place. This paper will present a threat model for Android and Apple smart devices in their use as hand-held unmanned aerial vehicle ground control stations. The threat model will address four key components: interest and motive of attack, vulnerabilities in the smart device ground control station, cyber security threats, and mitigation steps to improve the security of the smart device ground control station.

II. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The Department of the Defense has transitioned smart devices into the battlefield as a portal hand-held unmanned aerial vehicle ground control station without adequate cyber security protections, which put critical mission data at risk to cyber attacks. The government is utilizing software applications on smart phones and tablets, which allows soldiers to not only pilot UAVs, but to share and receive intelligence and reconnaissance videos and images remotely from the smart device ground control station (GCS) or directly from the UAV to other mobile device users in the network. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) released the Strategic Plan 2013-2018 Version 1 document in September 2012. One of the key objectives in the document is to “Promote rapid delivery and utilization of secure mobile

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capability, leveraging commercial mobile technology to enable an agile deployment environment for new and innovative applications to support evolving Warfighter requirements [14].” DISA plans to meet this objective by accomplishing three goals: 1) establishing a wireless network to support unclassified and classified data, 2) establishing security standards and a certification process for mobile technology, and 3) providing a software application database available to users via mobile technology [14]. This plan is expected to be accomplished over the next the five years. However, the mobile technology for military missions has already been deployed in the battlefield without these goals being met allowing these devices to be exposed to cyber security vulnerabilities. In recent years, research has explored cyber security threats to the UAV and the traditional ground control station, but little research has been done to explore what additional cyber threats are introduced with the use of commercially available smart devices to pilot the UAV and monitor received data from the UAV and other network users. Much of the security technology and processes are currently being developed without doing a proper threat analysis of the smart device ground control station. Therefore, the use of inadequately secured devices in the battlefield yields a lot of system and mission risk. The consequences for utilizing unsecure devices could result in fatalities in the battlefield, UAV hijackings, and unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Cyber security attacks to the smart device ground control station are dangerous in the battlefield and the consequences of attacks are severe. The Department of Defense must complete a threat model and risk assessment to understand the threat environment and to ensure the proper security countermeasures are developed and implemented.

III. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE ATTACKS

Several cyber security attacks to UAVs have occurred over the years due to lack of security assessment and inadequate security countermeasures. The first publicly known attack to UAVs occurred in 2009, where Iraqi militants used a $26 dollar off the shelf SkyGabber software to intercept live video feeds from unsecured communication links used by the Predator drones [10]. In October 2011, keylogging malware was found in the Predator and Reaper ground control stations after connection to a removable hard drive. The virus spread to both classified and unclassified computers, fortunately the software did not interrupt UAV operations nor was sensitive information disclosed to unauthorized parties [30]. An U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel UAV was hijacked and captured by the Iranian government on the Afghanistan border in December 2012. The Iranian government was able to successful land the UAV to obtain sensitive data including the mission and maintenance data [35]. More recently, in July of 2012 the University of Texas partnered with the Department of Homeland Security to demonstrate the ability to hijack a military UAV using $1000 dollars worth of equipment to

spoof the global position system (GPS) and take complete control of the UAV [31].

IV. MOTIVATION FOR PORTABLE, SMART DEVICES IN THE BATTLEFIELD

Despite the enhanced security measures in BlackBerry smart devices, BlackBerry smart device users only make up 5% of the smart device market. Statistics show that 91.1% of the smart device market utilizes an Apple or Android smart device, with Android devices taking the lead in the consumer market. With the rapid advancement of smart technology and popularity of the devices, the Department of Defense announced its plan to procure Apple and Android smart devices for use in the battlefield [5]. Commercially available smart devices are at the forefront of technology and are reasonably price compared to the military ruggedized devices. Military specialized, ruggedized equipment often takes years to develop and costs more than ten times the cost of commercially available devices. In addition to the reduced cost to procure commercial smart devices, the popularity of Apple and Android smart devices in the consumer market equates to minimal usability training costs for soldiers who use these same devices in their personal lives. These smart devices have been tested across all military services for multiple purposes. The use of smart devices in the battlefield will require development of a secure communication network to manage and secure the smart devices, software apps, and a software app database that will allow soldiers to download the apps securely. The Department of Defense is reaching out to the defense industry to create a secure communications system to handle and secure up to 8 million Apple and Android smart devices [28]. Government agencies in conjunction with the defense industry are currently developing a secure software app database and military software apps battlefield apps.

V. UAV SMART DEVICE GROUND CONTROL STATION

UAVs have become significantly popular with the rapid advancements in sensor, communication, embedded control technology and the miniaturization of technology. Today, more than 50 countries have implemented UAVs into their military fleet; the United States alone operates more than 7,500 drones making up more than forty percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft. (Blackhurst, 2012) UAVs are predominantly used to support military missions for surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance missions. The UAV ground control station is critical to missions. It controls and monitors the UAV from a location in or near the battlefield and it is the central node of communication. The GCS receives information that is collected from the UAV, processes the data, and provides the data to other users in the network. Stationary GCSs are often expensive, comprised of extensive hardware and personal computer workstation setup within a portable trailer for larger UAVs. The GCS requires a pilot to maneuver the UAV and a payload operator to operate

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the computer systems, gather intelligence and forward intelligence from the UAV to other end users in the battlefield. Small unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) are typically controlled and monitored using a portable ground control station; that consists of a hand controller, a ruggedized laptop, RF transceiver unit, and a controller box. An operator using the hand controller maneuvers the SUAV with the streaming video from the SUAV’s camera, and another operator uses the laptop to gather and analyze intelligence data and disseminates to other end users in the battle field [25]. The ground control station must have secure communication links between the UAV and the GCS and also between the GCS and the end users in the battlefield network.

Figure 1. Smart Device GCS Network The Department of Defense has taken the functionality of a traditional ground control station and miniaturized it into a mobile, portable smart device using software apps to provide real-time avionics flight display, navigation systems, system health monitoring and prognostics display, graphical images and position mapping, and inward data processing. The smart device must also allow soldiers to maneuver and view UAV cameras to find target and enemies and share video data along with location and time to other soldiers to make quick decisions regarding targets. Smart device GCSs present major constraints; the display of all of the required information on a miniature screen is almost impossible but workarounds are feasible, and the use of a smart device does not allow for a secondary or back up data link between the smart device and the UAV or other end node users [13].

VI. THREAT MODEL

Developing a threat model of the UAV smart device GCS is important, it identifies the security threats within the smart device GCS network and the countermeasures for prevention. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the designated authority for developing information security standards and guidelines under the Federal Information Security Management Act, Public Law 107-347. NIST’s definition of threat modeling involves identifying resources of interest and the feasible threats, vulnerabilities, and security controls related to these resources, then quantifying the

likelihood of successful attacks and their impacts, and finally analyzing this information to determine where security controls need to be improved or added [39]. Using NIST’s definition of threat modeling, the proposed threat model will identify four key components: interest and motive of attack, possible entry points of attack in the smart device ground control station, cyber security vulnerabilities, and mitigation steps to improve the security of the smart device ground control station. BlackBerry smart devices are the only smart devices that currently meet the Federal Information Processing Standards certification, and therefore have been deemed acceptable for use by the US government and therefore will not be analyzed in the threat model. The threat model will focus on the cyber security vulnerabilities in Apple and Android smart devices for application of an UAV ground control station.

A. Interest and Motive of Attack

The goal of attack to the smart device ground control station are to 1) disrupt the operation of the device to prevent control of the UAV, 2) gain control of the smart device ground control station to control the UAV and 3) gain access to data useful to the attacker. Successful attack requires breach of at least one of the information security objectives: confidentiality, integrity or availability. A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of transmitted and stored data [33]. One of the most common threats to confidentiality is eavesdropping to a communication network. UAVs are predominantly used to support military missions for surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance missions; loss of confidentiality could put the mission at risk and endanger lives soldiers. A loss of integrity is the intentional or unintentional changes to transmitted and stored data. Malware is often used to modify software without the user’s knowledge to gain access to sensitive information or even potentially gain full control of the ground control station remotely. A loss of availability is the loss of the ability to access resources using mobile devices whenever needed [39]. The communication network can be disrupted with a jamming device, making the capability of the communication network unavailable to the ground control station and other end notes in the GCS network hub.

B. Vulnerabilities

The UAV ground control station is critical to missions as it is the central node of communication for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data. The GCS is not only used to pilot the UAVs but it also receives images, videos, and data from the UAV payloads and disseminates the information to ground troops and other agencies. If the attacker can gain control, disable or disrupt the service of the smart device ground control station then the attacker can prevent completion of the mission. Successful attack to the ground control station can occur through hardware, software (operating system and software applications), and the communication network. The section below describes the

Smart Device GCS

Smart Device Field Unit

Portable Cellular Tower

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vulnerabilities and threats to the smart device UAV ground control station.

1) Hardware Vulnerabilities

Resources, also known as sensors, within the smart device such as the camera, accelerometer, microphone, and GPS can contain sensitive information that could be used by the attacker to monitor, tap, or identify the location of the end user. These vulnerabilities can be introduced through malware software that entered through other software vulnerabilities in the operating system or software applications identified below, and through supply chain cyber security risks. Supply chain cyber security risks are introduced by hostile agents that purposefully install spyware in information technology systems or alter circuitry with malicious firmware that are later sold to government and big businesses [9]. Once the electronic components are connected to the network, the enemy can easily gain access to the network or even worse gain control of the electronic device to spy or cause harm. Many supply companies are transnational and mergers with other companies make it virtually impossible to adopt corporate ownership or control supply chain security. Threats to the smart device ground control station hardware include battery exhaustion, flooding, surveillance, and USB attacks. Battery exhaustion attacks cause the battery to discharge faster than normally to kill the smart device and ultimately prevent the soldier from controlling the UAV or dissemination of information. Flooding attacks disables the smart device by overloading the device with numerous text messages or incoming calls, preventing the soldier from controlling the UAV or providing or receiving information with the network. Surveillance attacks utilizes smart device resources/sensors remotely to monitor communication and soldier movement, allowing the attacker to identify the location of the solider maneuvering the UAV and other soldiers nearby placing them in danger of physical attack. Lastly, USB attacks take advantage of synchronization and data backup of the smart device done with an USB connection; the USB connection can transfer malware software into the network and allow visibility and access into the network.

2) Software Vulnerabilities

Apple iOS is a propriety operating system that is developed and distributed by Apple. All changes and updates to the software are directly administered from Apple to the end users to enhance the security of the smart devices. However Apple smart devices can be “jailbroken,” whereby restrictions and security measures can be removed to allow users to customize the device and install software applications at their discretion. All software applications that run on the Apple iOS operating system are required to meet Apple specifications and must be digitally signed by the approved developers. Software applications can only be distributed through the Apple store.

Google Android is the most popular operating system with the least security measures. Android is an open operating system, whereby the software code is publicly available to allow customization and modifications to meet the needs of the various smart device types and communication carriers. The open operating system has resulted in many variations of Android smart phones and devices whereby different carriers with identical phones may have different variations of the operating system software. Software updates is a tedious process whereby some phones may receive the updates while others may not. Google updates are pushed to the end users at the discretion of carrier and third party application developers; depending on the complexity and time to make and test the modifications to tailor to their devices the carrier or third party software app developer may refuse to push the update to the end user increasing vulnerability to the smart devices. Android software applications must be digitally signed by the developer responsible for its behavior. Software apps can be distributed through Google Play and through third party application marketplaces. Google Android allows anyone to submit apps for download within Google Play without any testing for quality or security, which introduces cyber security vulnerabilities easily into the software database and Android devices. The mobile operating system is the heart of the smart device, controlling the hardware resources and the software applications. Infiltration into the operating system allows the attacker to gain full control of all the hardware resources and the software applications. Control of the operating system will allow the attacker to manipulate the hardware resources and make the smart device a monitoring device to capture images and video, tap and record conversations, view sensitive information and gain the location of the targeted individuals. The software apps are crucial to the functionality of the smart device ground control station, providing real-time avionics flight display, navigation systems, system health monitoring and prognostics display, graphical images and position mapping, and inward data processing to control and operate the UAV. Successful attack to the software apps could allow the attacker to gain control of the UAV functionality and access data gathered from the UAV putting targeted individuals in physical harm. The operating system of mobile devices mimics the operating system of a personal computer, therefore security threats often seen within personal computers are now being seen within smart devices such as malware. Malware can be used to disrupt, gather sensitive information or gain control of the device. Common malware found in smart devices include Trojan horse, botnet, worm, key loggers and rootkits. Malware can also be implemented into software applications to gain access to the operating system software. Other threats to the software include phishing and data leakage. Phishing attacks masquerades the hacker as a trusted party in the network to gain access to sensitive information, this

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information can lead to data leakage whereby unauthorized transmission of sensitive data occurs.

3) Communication Network Vulnerabilities

Operation of the smart device ground control station will require a communication network to be in place. In tactical military environment most wireless network are established with a stationary base station or movable base station, a high bandwidth wired network backbone. In battlefield environment, the stationary base station is an attractive target and highly vulnerable to attack. Destruction of the stationary base station will result in disruption to the communication network. When this occurs, soldiers will create their own wireless network or utilize commercial networks to continue communication that may not be on a secure wireless network and introduce vulnerabilities into the communications network, attached devices and missions they support. Attacks to the communication network can disrupt the connection between the UAV and the smart device ground control station and prevent operation and control of the UAV, as well as dissemination of information between other end users in the GCS network hub preventing mission completion. Attacks to the network and devices can also result in unintentional sharing of information to unauthorized parties resulting in information collected from UAV surveillance being used to counter attack soldiers in the battlefield. Threats to the communication network include network eavesdropping, spoofing, denial of service and jamming. Network eavesdropping or sniffing captures and decodes packets as transmitted over the network. Spoofing allows the attacker or software to masquerade using false data to gain access to the network. Denial of service or network congestion overloads a link or node in the GCS hub network with an extensive amount of data to reduce the quality of network performance or cause denial of service. Lastly, a jamming device can disrupt the communication between the smart device GCS and UAV as well as other components in the network, therefore preventing control of the UAV and the dissemination of information within the network hub. TABLE I. SMART DEVICE GROUND CONTROL STATION THREATS

C. Mitigation Techniques

Security mechanisms for securing the smart device ground control station must be implemented based upon type of smart device used. The differentiations between the Android and Apple operating systems and variations of Android code and devices make it impossible to define a one solution fits all approach to security. As previously noted, Apple iOS is a propriety operating system whereby all changes and updates to the software is directly administered from Apple to the end users to enhance the security of the smart devices. Therefore modifications by the user to the Apple iOS operating system is not a solution. Add-on applications by Apple will be required to enhance the security of the device. Android is an open operating system, security for Android devices can be enhanced through system modification, system add-ons, and add-on applications [17]. However, software solutions will have to be developed based on the Android device, since all Android devices are customized to fit device type and carrier.

1) Hardware Security

Threats to the ground control station smart device hardware are mainly caused by malware introduced by internal and external factors. The internal factors include the software operating system and software apps, this can be mitigated with access control and resource management. Access control limits access to resources (such as the camera, GPS, microphone, etc), services, and/or processes from malicious software applications. Software applications often accesses hardware resources within the smart device beyond what is required for operation of the app, increasing vulnerability or threat to the smart device GCS. Access control will only allow the app to tap into the minimum resources needed. Resource management monitors the availability and the state of the resources to meet the needs of the users operation. Operation of any resources not required for current operation will alert the user that the smart device may be compromised. Other internal factors are to supply chain risks whereby electronic components used to build the hardware may be provided with malware from foreign suppliers. Fuzz testing is a method testing that is used to determine if there are security vulnerabilities in software. Although fuzz testing can be used to detect malware in foreign hardware components, malware is often hard to detect and therefore the fuzz testing will not guarantee detection of all malware [9]. External factors include connection external to devices and physical access to the device. Malware can be stored on USB and external hard drives. Connection to the smart device hardware could introduce cyber threats to the ground control station. The hardware can be protected using anti-virus software, which will immediately detect and remove malicious malware. Enemies can easily gain physical access to the smart device ground control station in a dangerous battlefield environment; a soldier under heavy fire may lose, drop or even damage the device and leave it behind in a life and death situation. The device can then be tampered and analyzed to gain access to sensitive information stored in the memory.

Confidentiality Integrity Availability

Battery Exhaustion X

Flooding X X

Surveillance X X

USB X X

Malware X X X

Phising X X

Data Leakage X

Eavesdropping X

Spoofing X X

Denial of Service X

Jamming X

Vulnerabilities ThreatSecurity Objectives

Hardware

Software

Communication Network

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Security mechanisms such as authentication, encryption and remote wipe can be used to protect unauthorized access to classified and sensitive information. Authentication limits access and privileges to authorized parties and detects and prevents access to unauthorized parties. This can be achieved with passwords and screen lock codes, however use of these mechanisms can hinder quick response and performance of soldiers using the devices in the battlefield. Encryption encodes data to prevent disclosure of sensitive or classified data to unauthorized parties. Encryption can protect data at rest (i.e. files, memory, USB flash drives, etc) when physical security fails. Although encryption is ideal for battlefield environments, encryption can impact performance of the device, drain the battery and restrict operational use of the smart device GCS [44]. Remote wipe allows the smart device GCS to be commanded remotely to reset or erase stored data if the device were to be found in an unauthorized user’s possession. However, the security mechanism can be avoided by removing the battery or memory card prior to receiving the remote wipe command.

2) Application and Operating Software Security

Malicious malware is the most common threat found in the operating system software and software applications. Malware could have major consequences if the malware isn’t detected immediately. The smart device GCS can be protected using antivirus and firewall software. Antivirus software can prevent, detect, and remove malware from software applications and the operating system software. A firewall can be used to prevent unauthorized access to and from the smart device GCS, as well as, prevent access to unauthorized, untrusted wireless networks. Although the smart devices will be used primarily as an UAV ground control station, soldiers may be tempted to access personal email and social networks, and even contact family and friends via phone or text messages in their free time introducing threats such as spam and phishing. Spam filters can be used to prevent receipt of spam from unwanted parties via multimedia message service, text messaging, emails, and calls. Software applications have been created to provide functionalities to the smart device to mimic the functionality and data required for a traditional UAV ground control station. Software apps downloaded to the smart device are an easy target to cyber security attacks and therefore must be protected with security mechanisms such as app certification or signature and pre-testing. Application signatures should be used to ensure that the software is from a trusted source and has not been tampered. Pre-testing the software apps ensures that only secure apps are uploaded into the software app database, by detecting malicious malware prior to use in the battlefield. Vulnerabilities to both the software operating system and software apps can be mitigated by providing regular updates to the operating system and software applications. Software updates ensures that software fixes to vulnerabilities found in

the software are incorporated into the device and are operating securely.

3) Network Security

Many attacks to the UAV smart device ground control station are a result of deficiencies in the network security. Flooding, jamming, and denial of service attacks can be mitigated with bandwidth allocation. Bandwidth allocation sets the bandwidth usage limits for the smart device to prevent excessive connection request attacks. Eavesdropping and data leakage can be prevented with a secure encrypted network. Encryption encodes data to prevent disclosure of sensitive data to unauthorized parties. Encryption can protect data in transit via shared networks. The UAV ground control station software will require access to the network, but other software apps that may support the military operations may not require consistent access to the network. Software apps can be managed with filters to adjust the bandwidth availability to software applications as needed to balance network resources and reduce network attacks to software apps. Availability of the network to support numerous smart devices on an encrypted, wireless network in a remote environment is a major obstacle. The technology currently being used is out of date and is the first target in a battlefield. Soldiers may be required to tap into commercial, unsecured networks to operate software applications. Other potential options include using satellite communication however, satellite communication links are extremely expensive to use.

VII. CONCLUSION This paper has explored the government’s motivation to transition smart devices into the battlefield as a portable, hand-held UAV ground control station and the security vulnerabilities that have been introduced from the lack of security assessment. A threat model was developed to analyze the threat profile of the UAV smart device GCS; focusing on vulnerabilities within the smart devices hardware, the software, and the communication network. In summary, threats to the hardware are mainly introduced through physical connection to tampered devices, and malware from software applications and network connections. The smart device hardware resources can be manipulated by malware to monitor soldiers’ communication and movement. The software operating system and software applications are crucial to the functionality of the UAV smart device GCS. If the software isn’t properly protected from malware threats the consequences could be significant. The operating system must be protected with regular updates and antivirus software. Software applications must be tested for vulnerabilities and updated regularly to ensure security. The communication network is major area of vulnerability, deficiencies in this area can lead to many of the attacks identified within software and hardware vulnerabilities. Availability of the network is also a major concern for battlefield operations in remote locations and is easily one of the biggest targets in the field.

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