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Introduction: Arguing with Tradition in Native America

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PRINTED FROM CHICAGO SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright University ofChicago Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of asingle chapter of a monograph in CHSO for personal use (for details seehttp://www.chicago.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: UC - Berkeley Library; date: 11 September 2015

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ArguingwithTradition:TheLanguageofLawinHopiTribalCourtJustinB.Richland

Printpublicationdate:2008PrintISBN-13:9780226712932PublishedtoChicagoScholarshipOnline:March2013DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226712963.001.0001

Introduction:ArguingwithTraditioninNativeAmerica

DOI:10.7208/chicago/9780226712963.003.0001

AbstractandKeywords

Thisbookanalyzestraditionandcultureasdiscoursesinandofcontemporarytriballawbyconsideringthemicrodetailsofface-to-facecommunicationinonetriballegalcontext:thatofpropertyhearingsheldbeforetheHopiTribalCourt.Itarguesthatthecompleximbricationsoflanguage,culture,andlawconstitutetheemergent“edge”ofcontemporaryHopitribaljurisprudenceandthesocialmeaningsandeffectsgeneratedthere.ItsupportsthisclaimbyanalyzinghowlegalactorsworkupcontradictoryformulationsregardingthekindsoftalkthatarethepropermodesandobjectsofHopiTribecourtroomproceedings;howtheycallfororchallengecourtroomusesoftraditionbyinvokingnotionsofHopiculturaldifference,tradition,andclaimstotribalsovereignty.Itthusoffersafreshlookintothepoliticsofindigenoustraditionandculture.Thebookfocusesonthewaysinwhichtheideologies,metadiscourses,andmetapragmaticsthatconstitutethe“courtroomtalkaboutcourtroomtalk”constitutenotionsoftraditionandculturaldifferenceinwaysthatrevealmultiple,contradictory,evenparadoxicalmeaningsandconsequencesasthesequenceofHopicourtproceedingsunfolds.


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Keywords:tradition,culture,triballaw,property,courtproceedings,HopiTribalCourt,language,jurisprudence,sovereignty,HopiTribe

TheIroniesofIndigeneityIna2001property-disputehearingbeforetheHopiIndianTribalCourtinnortheasternArizona,aHopiwitnesstestifiedtotheactionsofheropponent,amaleclanrelative,againstwhomshehadaskedthecourttoissueaninjunction.Specifically,shewasaskingthecourttoorderhimtoceaseenteringaplotoflandnexttoherhomeinoneoftheHopis'twelvemesa-topvillages,whichsheclaimedbelongedtoher.Onthatcold,bright,Decemberdayinthehighdesert,thedraftymobilehomethathousedHopiCourtroom2hadnonethelessbecomeclosefromthefifteenorsoHopifamilymembers,judges,andattorneyswhofilledthecourtroomfortheinjunctionhearing.Thewomansatinasmallpaddedchairsetbeforethejudge'sdeskintheotherwiseunmarkedspacedesignatedasthe“witnessstand,”andtoldofaparticularlyharrowingencountershehadhadwithheropponent(alsopresentthatday)afewmonthsearlier.Speakingintoamicrophonethatfedintothecourt'srecordingsystem,thewitness'svoicequaveredassherecountedhowsheandhersisterfoundthemanonthedisputedpropertyin(p.2) themiddleofnight,dressedinblack,withhislonghairbrushedoverhisface.Whentheyconfrontedhim,herefusedtoidentifyhimselforspeakatall.

“AndIsaid,‘Whoisit?’”thewitnesssaidinEnglish.“Andhewasstillstandingthere.Hewasstandingthere.”MyHopiconsultantatthehearingexplainedthatthewomanwasdescribinghisattemptstointimidatethem:“He'stryingtoindicatetothemhehasthepowertocallthesesupernaturalstohelphim.”Asmyconsultantelaborated,“Ifhewasreallytryingtogetatthem,youknow,inthis—mentallyinthatway,youknow—hewouldn'tspeaktothem.Youknow,becausenoneofour—whenwehear—whenwehearthesescarystories,thescarypersonnevertalks.Theydon'tsayanything….Nottalkingisthekeytothiswholescarybusiness.”

Asthetestimonysuggests,therefusaltospeak,afailuretocommunicate,announcesacertainlimitofHopicommunity.InteractionmarksthishorizonofbelongingforHopipeopleandlocatesthepowers“outthere”thatthreatenitsdissolution.Interactiongroundscommunity,instantiatesit,(re)createsitinthecourseoflifeontheHopireservation.

Ofcourse,therearecertainironiesherethatalwayscharacterizethesemioticborderbetween“inside”and“out”andactsofsocioculturalaffiliationanddifferencing.Eveninhissilence,thismanisunderstoodasmakinghimselfknowntohisinterlocutors.Hisrefusaltospeakannounceshisdesiretobe“outside”theircommunity,toclaimthepowerattributedtothis“outsideness”overthose“inside,”butalsorevealsthathehasenough“insideness”toknowthatthisishowhissilencewillbeinterpreted.Inallthesewayshis“outside”isalsoverymuch“inside”theHopiepistemologiesandinterpretivepracticesthatservetomakesenseofhisactions.

Myconsultant'sreflectionssuggestthemanifoldwaysinwhichlanguageandideologies


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aboutlanguageareexplicitlyunderstoodbyHopisasmediatingtheconstitutionoftheircommunityinmultipleandcontradictoryways—simultaneouslyarticulatingandconfoundingthebordersofculturalcommonalityanddifference.Moreover,bymakingsuchclaimsincourt,theHopiwitnessrevealsherexpectationsthatthesepracticesandtheinside/outsidedialecticstheyindexshouldhavesignificanceinthecourtroomandconsequenceinHopijurisprudence.ThisistrueinthisinstanceeventhoughsherecountstheeventsinEnglish,achanneloftalkthat,throughothermetadiscursiveandmetapragmaticmaneuverings,becomesanotherregularlycontestedsitemarkingthe(p.3) ironicinside/outside“borderpolitics”ofculturaldifferencethatshapeHopijurisprudence.

Thisstudyarguesthatthesecompleximbricationsoflanguage,culture,andlawconstitutetheemergent“edge”ofcontemporaryHopitribaljurisprudenceandthesocialmeaningsandeffectsgeneratedthere.IsupportthisclaimbyanalyzinghowlegalactorsworkupcontradictoryformulationsregardingthekindsoftalkthatarethepropermodesandobjectsofHopicourtroomproceedings;howtheycallfororchallengecourtroomusesoftraditionbyinvokingnotionsofHopiculturaldifference,tradition,andclaimstotribalsovereignty.

Wethusgainafreshlookintothepoliticsofindigenoustraditionandculture,suggestingthatprevailinganthropologicaltheoriesthattreatclaimstoculturaldistinctivenessaseitherlibratoryorreifying,autochthonousorother-determined,eachtellonlypartofthestoryoftraditionandculture'senduringpoliticalandjuridicalsignificance.Thougheachoftheseperspectivesisaccuratetosomeextent,wegainamorenuancedviewwhenwepayattentiontothediscursive“microdetails”ofactualsocialpracticewheretalkoftraditionandculturaldifferenceisdeployedinwaysthatappearatonceidenticalandopposedbuttogetherconstitutethedialecticedgeofapoliticaleconomyofculturaldifferencethatemergesinthecourseofparticularsocioculturalevents.ThusIfocusonthewaysinwhichtheideologies,metadiscourses,andmetapragmaticsthatconstitutethe“courtroomtalkaboutcourtroomtalk”thatHopilegalactorsregularlyrelyuponconstitutenotionsoftraditionandculturaldifferenceinwaysthatrevealmultiple,contradictiory,evenparadoxicalmeaningsandconsequencesasthesequenceofHopitrialproceedingsunfolds.Thisyieldsamorecompleximageofthepoliticsofindigenousculture—onethatseesitasparticipatinginunstablelegalnarrativesthroughwhichtheeverydaypracticesofindigenousgovernanceandthesocialinstitutionsconstitutedbythosepracticesarenegotiated,challenged,effectuated,andultimatelybestunderstood.

NativeAmericanTribalLawandTraditionFromoutsidethespacesandplacesthatconstitute“IndianCountry”withinU.S.borders—thosegeographicalanddiscursivelociwherepeopleofAmericanIndiannationsengageeachotherastribalmembers(seee.g.,Biolsi2001,2004,2005;Nesper2002,2004,inpress;Miller2001;Pommersheim1995a)—thefortunesoftribalnations,likethoseofindigenous(p.4) peopleseverywhere(e.g.,DeanandLevi2003;Jung2003;Povinelli2002;Muehlebach2001;Anaya1996;Kymlicka1995),seemforeversusceptibletothecomplexandcontradictoryebbsandflowsofnonindigenouslegalregimesandthenon-


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Indianpublicsentimentsthatinformthem.AsevidentintheearliestarticulationsinU.S.lawofAmericanIndiantribalsovereigntiesas“domesticdependentnations,”tribesintheUnitedStateshavebeenparadoxicallyunderstoodasstillbearinganauthoritythatexistedpriortotheU.S.Constitution,yetissubjecttodaytotheactionsofafederalgovernmentthatclaims“sovereigntyanddominion”overthemascolonizedpeoples.As“wardstotheirguardian,”1tribalnationshavebeensubjecttodramaticterritorial,socioeconomic,anddemographictransformations(Biolsi2005;Wilkins2002;Thornton1987,2004;Debo1970)—mainlylosses,butalsosomerecentgains.Theseareatleastpartlyduetotheshiftingtrendsduringthelast220yearsinFederalIndianpoliciesandlaws,whichhavesometimesfavoredtribalassimilationandtermination,sometimesincreasedself-governance,andmostoftendoneboth.

Thus,duringthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,withthepassageandenforcementoftheGeneralAllotmentActof1887,2tribalnationsfacedsomeoftheirdarkestdays,asfederalagentsinterpretedthefederal-Indiantrustrelationshipasmandatingthedivisionandallotmentoftribalterritoriestoindividuallandholders,whileotherassimilationistpoliciesandlegislationcalledfortheremovalofIndianchildrentoEuro-American-runboardingschools(Meriam1928;DeloriaandLytle1984;Prucha1984;Nabokov1991).Thenin1934,withpassageoftheIndianReorganizationAct(IRA),3theeffortsofCommissionerJohnCollieroftheBureauofIndianAffairs(BIA)partiallyreversedthesetrends,callingforareinvestmentinthepossibilityoftribalself-government,withthestipulationthattribesberunaccordingtothegovernancenormsofAnglo-Americanrepresentativedemocracy(Debo1970;DeloriaandLytle1984;Wilkins2002).Theeffectsoftheseperiodsarestillfelttoday,insofarasmanytribesnolongerhaveanywhereneartheunifiedterritoriestheypossessedpriortoallotment,andmanytribalgovernmentstodaystilloperateonavisionofelectoralpoliticsandlawandorderfirstinitiatedundertheIRA(Pommersheim1995a;Porter1997a;Wilkins2002).Thisistruedespiteseveralmorepolicyshiftsintheinterveningyears,asthe1950ssaweffortstoterminatethespecialstatusoftribesinseveralstates,followedbyrepealsofthoseeffortsin(p.5) thelate1960sand1970sandtherenewedcallforsupportofIndiannationhoodandself-determination.4

Fromacertainperspectivethen,AmericanIndiannationsappearcaughtintheever-shiftingseasofFederalIndianLaw—abodyofnorms“characterizedbydoctrinalincoherence…[m]orethananyotherfieldoflaw”(Frickey1997:1754).AsThomasBiolsiexplains,“Indianlaw…isfundamentallyladenwithcontradiction…bestsummarizedasatensionbetweentheuniquenessanduniformity”discourseswithwhichitframestherightsofIndianpeoplesintheUnitedStatesasoscillatingbetweenlawsprotectingthealterityoftribesasnationsandthosepromotingtheassimilationofIndiansintotheU.S.nation-state(2002:14).

ButtribalmembersexpressadifferentsetofconcernsregardingthefortunesofIndiannations.Whilethepracticalinterestsofimprovingeconomicopportunity,abatingcrime,andotherwiseimprovingtheircommunities'healthandwelfareareofprimaryimportancetotribalpeoplesasmuchasanyoneelse,whatisdistinctiveisthedegreetowhichNative


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Americansviewsuchimprovementsashingingonthemaintenanceandfurtheranceoftheirculturalheritage.Leadingtribaljuristshavearguedforthelasttwodecadesthatifrealandlastingtribalsovereigntyistobemeaningfullyachieved,indigenousleadersmustdedicate“themselvestoconductingtheiraffairsinrelianceupontheirowntraditions”(Porter1997b:299).Arguingforwhattheycallthe“culturalsovereignty”oftribalnations,WallaceCoffeyandRebeccaTsosiesuggestthattherightoftribalpeoplestomaketheirownlawsandlivebythemisoriginaryinthem,suigeneris,andthatU.S.federalandstateactionslimitingorexpandingthatrightmerelyaffectitsoutermostedges(2001:191;seealsoTsosie2002).Forthesescholars,thediscoursesofculture,tradition,andcustombestexpressthisimpulse.CitingVineDeloria,CoffeyandTsosiewrite,“[T]raditionprovides‘thecriticalconstructivematerialuponwhichacommunityrebuildsitself.’Thus,onlybydelvingintotheinquiryofhowourAncestorssawtheworldcanwetrulyunderstandthesignificanceofourcommunitiesastheyarecurrentlyconstituted,appreciatingboththestrengthsandthecontinuitiesthatexist,aswellasthepathologiesthatdestroycommunity”(2001:199).Whatemergesfromthisnotionisaconceptualizationoftribalnationhoodthat,while“governedby‘FederalIndianLaw’…isnotdefinedbyFederalIndianLaw,butbythemoralvisionthathasalwaysguidedIndiannationsintheircollectiveexistenceasdistinctivepeoples”(191).

(p.6) Formanyofthesescholars,thedriveforculturalsovereigntymustbeledbytheoperationsoftribalcourtsandtheirjurisprudence.AccordingtoCareyN.Vincenti,formerchiefjusticeoftheJicarillaApacheTribe,“Therealbattleforthepreservationoftraditionalwaysoflifewillbefought…ontheboldpromontoryofguidinghumanvalues.Itisinthatbattlethattribalcourtswillbecomeindispensable”(Vincenti1995:137).Thiscallrepresentsinmanyrespectsaradicalshiftandreclamationoftribaljuridicalpractices,insofarasmanyofthelegalinstitutionsoperatingintribalcommunitieswerecreatedeitherbyorinresponsetofederaleffortstoimposeastyleofAnglo-AmericanlawandorderinIndianCountry(Pommersheim1995b;DeloriaandLytle1983).Fromthelatenineteenthcenturythroughthe1960s,CourtsofIndianOffensespresidedoverbyagentsoftheBIAortheirchosenrepresentativesconstitutedtheofficiallawandorderforawithprimaryjurisdictiontoresolvedisputesandimposepunishmentsontribalmembersresidinginmanyregionsofIndianCountry(DeloriaandLytle1983).Thesecourtsusuallyreliedonrulesandproceduresofadversarialjurisprudencetosuppressratherthanencouragethecustoms,traditions,andculturesofthetribalcommunitiestheycontrolled.Whilesuchcourtsstilloperateinsometribalcommunities,todaytheyaremorefirmlyunderthecontrolofthetribalnationsthemselves(CooterandFikentscher1998a,1998b;Pommersheim1995a).Manytribeshaveabolishedthesecourtsandpassedtriballegislationcreatingtheirownlegalsystems.Andthoughcontemporarytribalcourtsarenolongerinthebusinessofrepressinglocalcustoms,traditions,andculturalpractices,thevastmajoritystillrelyheavilyonrulesandproceduresinformedbytheadversarialpracticesofAnglo-Americanjurisprudence(Pommersheim1995a,1995b;Porter1997a;Barsh1999).

DespitethisradicalreversalandtheimportancethatmanynowclaimfortriballegalsystemsinarticulatingtribalsovereigntyanditsrelationtoU.S.domination,littlescholarly


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attentionhasfocusedontheactualstructures,practices,andideologiesthatcharacterizecontemporarytribalcourtsandtheirjurisprudence(butseeNesper,2007;RichlandandDeer2004;Miller2001;CooterandFikentscher1998;Pommersheim1995a).ThoughmanyarecallingforanincreasedinfusionoftribalcustomsandtraditionsintotheAnglo-styleproceduresoftribalcourts,orchallengingsuchclaims,feweffortshaveyetbeenmadetoexplorepreciselyhownotionsoftribalcustom,tradition,andculture,areinvoked(p.7) bytriballegalactorsintribalcourtroomproceedings(seeRichland2005,2007;Nesper2007).

Inthisstudy,IendeavortofillthisgapbyfollowingandelaboratingupontheprovocativeanalysesoftribalsovereigntyandtribalcourtoperationsofferedbyThomasBiolsi(2005)andLarryNesper(inpress),suggestinghowthe“concretereality”oftribalsovereigntyasamodeofAmericanIndianpoliticalconsciousnessandactionresidesonlypartlyinthe“official”actionsofanimaginedtribalnation-statealongthelinesofthe“modular,epistemic,universal”Euro-Americanmodel(Biolsi2005:241).BiolsiandNesperallowustoseehowtribalsovereigntyemergesasa“livedrealityofgraduated,‘quasi’or‘permeatedsovereignty’”inwhichthetensionsbetweennativeandnonnativepolitical-economicforcesshapetheeverydaydetailsthatconstitutetheemergent,oftenunstable,edgeofcontemporaryAmericanIndianlawandpolitics(245).

Relyingonthefundamentalpremiseoflegaldiscourseanalysisthat“languageislegalpower”(ConleyandO̓Barr1998:14),thecentralargumentofthisstudyisthatwecanonlyreachaproperunderstandingofnotionsofcustomandtraditionincontemporarytribaljurisprudencebyexploringtheminthecircumstancesoftheiruse,astheybothshapeandareshapedbythecourtroomtalkthatformsthecenterofcontemporarytriballaw.

InanefforttoofferalargerhistoricalandcontemporarycontextwithinwhichtounderstandthespecificclaimsImakeinthecoreofthisstudy,IfirstofferanaccountofthehistoryofAnglo-American-stylecourtsinIndianCountry,officiallyintroducedinthelate1800swiththecreationandoperationoffederallyrunCourtsofIndianOffenses.CreatedandcontrolledbytheBureauofIndianAffairs,andenforcingfederallaw,thesecourtssignificantlydiminishedtribalsovereigntyandsuppressedtribalrightstoself-determination,aswellasthecustoms,traditions,andpracticesthroughwhichthatself-determinationwaspursued.Remarkably,someofthesecourtscontinuetooperatetoday,thoughinmuchsmallernumbersthanintheirheydayaroundtheturnofthetwentiethcentury.Startinginthelate1960s,thecreationofcontemporarytribalcourtswashailedasanefforttoreturncontroloftriballegalaffairstotribalnationsthemselves,oftenbyreplacingtheCourtsofIndianOffensesthatoperatedintheirjurisdiction.However,thefactthatmanyoftoday'stribalcourtscontinuetooperateunderAnglo-Americanlawsandnotionsofadversarialjurisprudencehasledmany(p.8) tribaljuriststoarguethattheydonothingmorethanfurthercolonialpoliciesofassimilationinitiatedbytheCourtsofIndianOffenses.

Afterreviewingthishistory,Iturntoafullerdiscussionofdebatessurroundingthecallsforincreasedrelianceonnotionsoftribaltraditionandcustomincontemporarytribal


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courtpraxis.Despitetheratherstrongclaimsmadeonbothsidesofthisdebate,feweffortshavebeenmadetoexplorehowsuchnotionsemergeintheactualdiscoursesandinteractionsthatconstitutecontemporarytribalcourtproceedings.Iconcludebyoutliningtheremainingchaptersofthestudy,andhowtheyattempttorespondtothisgapintheethnographicrecord.IofferthreerelatedbutindependentforaysintothedetailsofHopicourtroominteractionsthatinvokenotionsofcustomandtradition,withaneyetowardexploringthecriticalsociolegalandpoliticaleconomiceffectsthatsuchnotionshavefortheHopilegalactorswhoconstructthem.

“Anglo”LawinIndianCountry:CourtsofIndianOffensesTheveryoriginsandintroductioninthelatenineteenthcenturyofAnglo-AmericanlegalsystemsinIndiancountryaredeeplyinformedbyanexplicitorientationtoandconcernwithtribalculturalpracticesandtraditionsandtheirrelationtothevaluesandpracticesoftheencroachingEuro-Americansociety.WhentheOfficeofIndianAffairs(OIA;latertheBureauofIndianAffairs)movedin1849fromtheDepartmentofWartotheDepartmentoftheInterior,thecivilianfederalagentswhoadministeredthetribescalledfortheinstitutionoflegalregimesthatcouldservethetwobasicgoalsoffederalIndiangovernanceatthetime—controlandassimilation—thatwerebelievedtobesufferingintheabsenceofmartialrule(DeloriaandLytle1983).BecausemilitaryoutpostswereoftenfarawayfromOIAfieldoffices,agentsarguedthatlawenforcementandadjudicatorypowerswerenecessarytofulfilleventheirmostbasicadministrativeduties,particularlyinthosevastregionsofIndianterritoryandtribalreservationswestoftheMississippi,whereopenandviolentconflictamongandbetweentribes,federalandstateauthorities,andothernon-Indianneighborswascommon.Pursuanttoreformistidealsofthetimethatcalledfortheeventualassimilationoftribalmembersintothesocioeconomicnorms,structures,andpracticesofAnglo-Americansociety,agentsbelievedthatsuchpolicieswouldbebestfurtheredbytheimpositionofalegalsystemontribalpeoplesthatwouldsimultaneouslyencouragesuch“Anglo”normsandpractices(p.9) anddiscouragethecontinuedrelianceontribalcustomsandtraditions(Hagan1966).

BeforecreatinganyofficialcourtstopresideovertribalreservationsandIndianterritories,OIAfieldagentshadrecoursetoavarietyofadhocstrategiesforenforcinglawandorder,astheywerechargedtodobythecommissionerofIndianaffairsandsecretaryoftheinterior(Pommersheim1995a).Insomeinstancesallegedcriminalsarrestedbyagencypoliceweresenttonearbyfederalcourtsforprosecution.Inrareinstances,tribalmemberswereallowedtochooseothertribalmemberstositasjudgesoninformalcourtsheldundertheaegisofagencyoffices.Butbyfarthemostcommonpracticewasforfederalagentsthemselves,ortheirchosentribalorAnglosubordinates,tositasjudgesoverdisputesandcriminalprosecutionsthatarosewithintheirjurisdiction.Thisbecameevenmorepracticableafter1878,whentheCommissionerofIndianAffairsinstructedfieldagentstoorganizelocalpoliceforcesmadeupofAngloandIndianofficers,becauseagentswouldregularlypickjudgefromtheseofficers(Hagan1966).

Thislatterpracticewaseventuallyformalizedinasetofrulespromulgatedby


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CommissionerofIndianAffairsHiramPriceandapprovedbySecretaryoftheInteriorH.M.Tellerin1883.Significantly,theauthoritytocreatethesecourtsappearstohavehadnoformallegalbasis,flowinginsteadfromthe“randomreformimpulse”ofSecretaryTeller(Pommersheim1995b:61).InalettertoCommissionerPrice,Tellerexpressedaconcernthatamongmanytribestherepersisted“certainoftheoldheathenishdances”andotherceremonialandtraditionalpracticesthathefeltwereboth“intended…tostimulatethewarlikepassions”andcontributetothegeneral“demoralizationoftheyoung”(AnnualReportofSecretaryTeller,1883:ser.2190,xi,citedinHagan1966:108).TheletterconcludedwitharequesttoPricetoprepareasetofrulestoassistinthecontroloftheseactivities.OnMarch30,Pricewroteback,suggestingthattopofficersineachtribalpoliceforcebeofficiallymadejudgesofCourtsofIndianOffensesundertheimmediateauthorityoftheagentinthefield,whoseorganizationandrules,iffollowed,would“accomplishtheultimateabolishmentoftheevilpractices”(letterfromHiramPricetoSecretaryTeller,March30,1883).Tellermusthaverespondedpositively,forinthesubsequentweeks,PriceproducedtheRulesforCourtsofIndianOffenses,whichTellerapprovedonApril10,1883(Pommersheim1995a).

ThusCourtsofIndianOffenseswerecreated,andtheruleswerecirculatedtofieldagents.Theserules,whichwerelatercodifiedinTitle25of(p.10) theCodeofFederalRegulations(hencethecommonreferencetothesecourtsas“CFR”courts),providedguidelinesforcourtorganizationandprocedure,andincludedashortcriminalandcivilcode.Agentsweredirectedtoselectjudgesfromamonganymeninthetribalpopulationwhowere“intelligent,honest,andupright”andnotpolygamists.5Severalproblemsaroseintheselectionandretentionofjudges.Onewasthelackofadequatepay,asCongressregularlyfailedtoappropriateadditionalfundsforthepaymentofIndianjurists,onlyinitiatingsuchfundingin1888,andeventhenatone-tenththesumrequestedbythecommissioner(Hagan1966:109,112).

Anotherproblemwasthecommonemergenceoffactionswithinmosttribalpopulationsatthetime.Agentscouldnotbecertainthatsomeonewhowaswillingtoactasjudgewouldhavetherespectofothertribalmembersoverwhomhewastopreside.Indeed,hisverywillingnesstoworksocloselywiththefieldagentwasoftenatacitsignalofhismarginalstatusamongmanyinhiscommunity.Ontheotherhand,manyfieldagentsfeltthatselectingajudgefromtherecognizedleadersofthetribewouldthwarttheassimilativegoalsoftheinstitution.AstheagentfortheSacandFoxesofIowaexplained,“ThisbandofIndiansiscontrolledbyabout10personswhohaveallthesay….Toselectjudgesfromamongthemwouldaccomplishnothing…[but]toselectjudgesfromoutsidethechieftainshipwouldbeanimpossibility”(AnnualReportofR.Lesser,1890,ser.2841,105,citedinHagan1966:113).Allofthissuggests,asDeloriaandLytle(1983)succinctlypointout,thattheseIndianjudges“servedatthepleasureoftheagent,notthecommunity”(114).

Thecourtsandtheirjudgesweregrantedgeneraljurisdictiontorule“uponallsuchquestionsasmaybepresentedto[them]forconsiderationbytheagent.”Prostitution,intoxicationandliquortrafficking,theft,andall“misdemeanors…towhichIndianswere


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party”weremadepunishableoffenses(Hagan1966:110).Andthoughthecourtswererecognizedashavingciviljurisdiction“thesameasthatofaJusticeofthePeaceintheStateorTerritorywheresuchacourtislocated”(RulesfortheCourtsofIndianOffenses,1892),criminaljurisdictionwasmuchmorelimited.Indeed,becauseofconcurrentdevelopmentsinCongressandthepassageoftheMajorCrimesActin1885,thecourtsdidnothavejurisdictionovercrimeslikemurder,kidnapping,andrape.6

Significantly,amongtheoffensesnamedintheruleswereparticipationinceremonialdances,polygamy,andothertraditionalpracticesthat“hadoriginallyarousedTeller'sire”(Hagan1966:110).Revisions(p.11) totherulesin1892furtherprovidedpunishmentforanyIndianwho“refuse[d]orneglect[ed]toadopthabitsofindustry,ortoengageincivilizedpursuitsoremployments”(120),revealingtheextenttowhichCFRcourtswereexplicitlydesignedtopromotetheassimilationgoalsofthefederalgovernment.

Intheiroperation,CFRcourtsseemedtorelyonrelativelyinformalprocedures.ThoughinstructedtorecruitclerkstomaintainadocketandotherwiseconformtostandardpracticesofAnglo-Americantrialpractice,thesecourts“continuedtoresembleonlyinbroadoutlinecourtproceduresofwhitecommunities.”Fewtrainedattorneyseitherworkedfororappearedinthesecourts,andofficialwrittenrecordswererarelykept.Someheraldedthevirtuesofsuchprocessesasformsofsimplejustice(“nolawyersperplexthejudges”),thoughothersexpressedconcernatthelackofformalitiesandthefailuretoattendtoprecedent(Hagan1966:119).

Thoughcongressionalappropriationswerealwaysstingyforthecourts,andthelegalfoundationsoftheircreationandoperationwerealwayssuspect,7bytheirpeakin1900,CourtsofIndianOffenseswereoperatingonroughlytwo-thirdsofthereservationsandterritoriesconstitutingIndianCountryatthetime(DeloriaandLytle1983).However,duringthetwentiethcenturythenumberofCFRcourtssignificantlydiminished,andtodayonlytwenty-onesuchcourtsarestillinoperation.

Thereasonsforthisdeclinearemanifold.Ironically,somecourtswereundoneshortlyaftertheircreationbytheveryassimilativepoliciesthatspurredsomeagentstoseetheneedforaspecificIndianlegalsysteminthefirstplace.BythetimethosepolicieswerecodifiedintheAllotmentActof1887,theyprovidedthatonceatribalreservationwasallottedanditsterritorydividedamongindividuallandholders,thoselandsandtheirowners(whowerealsotobemadeU.S.citizensbytheprocess)wouldbesubjecttothecivilandcriminaljurisdictionofthestateorterritoryinwhichtheyresided.TheresultwasthedissolutionofCFRcourtsinseveralregionsofIndiancountry(Hagan1966).

Othersweredissolvednotbecauseofallotmentbutbyitsrepudiation.AsreportscameinofthedetrimentscausedtoIndiansbythepoliciesoftheAllotmentAct(Meriam1928),anotherwaveofreformaroseintheBureauofIndianAffairs.HeadedatthetimebyCommissionerJohnCollier,thebureaureversedthedismantlingoftriballandsand,throughtheIndianReorganizationActof1934,calledforareturntotribalself-governancethatwould,intime,includearesumptionoftribalauthority(p.12) over


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Indianlegalmatters.8TheresultwasthedeathknellformanymoreCFRcourts,astribalcouncilsformedundertheIRApassedlegislationcreatingtribalcourtsthatreplacedthem,eithertakingovertheadministrationoftherulesandproceduresoutlinedintheCodeofFederalRegulationsoroperatingpursuanttoprinciplesandcodesoflawandorderpassedbythetribesthemselves(Newton1998).

TribalCourtsToday:AttheEdgeofTribalSovereigntyToday,ofthe562federallyrecognizedtribes,themajorityhavepassedtribalconstitutionspursuanttotheIRA.Approximately270ofthesetribeshaveworkingtribalcourts.Toreachthatpoint,tribesandtheirgovernmentsweatheredthestormsofyetanotherreversaloffederalpolicyin1953,whenPublicLaw83–280(18U.S.C.§1162,28U.S.C.§1360,25U.S.C.§1321–26)announcedthereturnofeffortstoterminatethesovereignstatusandfederalrecognitionoftribalnations,eradicatingcourtsinIndianCountryandsubjectingtribesentirelytostatecriminalandciviljurisdiction.Tribesinseveralstatesnamedinthislegislationwereterminatedbeforethepolicyendedinthelate1960s(Goldberg1997).Manytribes,however,werestillintact,andsomethatwereterminatedhavesincereversedtheirterminationandbecomefederallyrecognizedagain.WiththepassageoftheIndianCivilRightsActof1968andtheIndianSelf-DeterminationandEducationalAssistanceActof1975,9Congressannounceditscurrentpolicyofsupport(thoughagain,aswiththeIRA,undercertainassimilationistconditions)fortribesandtheirrightstoself-governance,includingtheestablishmentoftribalcourts.

Asmightbeexpected,theeffectsoftheseshiftsandtheuniquehistoryandculturalidentityofeachtribalnationhaveresultedincontemporarycourtsacrossIndianCountrythatexhibitabreathtakingdiversityintheirstructure,process,scopeofjurisdiction,andthekindsofnormstheyenactandmaintain.Atoneendofthespectrumisthelargeandwell-knownNavajojudicialsystem,inwhichseventeenNavajotrialjudgesappointedbytheTribalCouncilpresideintrialcourtsscatteredacrossthevariousdistrictsofthevastNavajoreservation.ThedecisionsofthesejudgesaresubjecttoappellatereviewbythreeSupremeCourtjusticeswhositinWindowRock,theNavajoNation'sseatoftribalgovernment.ProcedureintheseNavajocourtsisquitesimilartotheAnglo-Americanadversarialproceduresofstateandfederalcourts,albeitpursuantto(p.13) triballegislation,andtheyenjoyaquitegeneraljurisdiction(stillsubjecttofederalrestrictions)overavarietyofcriminalandcivilmattersthatemergeonthereservation,asoutlinedinNavajolegalcodes.Thesecourtsarecourtsofrecordandprecedent,andtheNavajoSupremeCourthasproducedaformidablebodyofcaselawthatisavailableinwrittenanddigitalformats,andthusreadilyaccessible(andreliedupon)bytriballegalprofessionalsandscholars(CooterandFikentscher1998a,1998b).

Othertribeshavecourtsthatareratherlimitedinscope,concernedprimarilywithmattersrelatedtoparticularaspectsoftribaloperations,suchasdisputesemergingfromtriballyownedgamingenterprisesorotheradministrativematters(Newton1998:e.g.,seetheGamingEnterpriseDivisionoftheMashantucketPequotCourtandtheColvilleTribalCourtreviewoftribalemploymentdisciplinaryproceedings).Stillothertribalcourtsemployprimarilynonadversarialdisputeresolution,relyinglessonlegalcodes,


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caselawprecedent,andlegalprofessionalstrainedinAnglo-Americanstylejurisprudencethanonlocalnotionsofauthorityandrelationalvaluesinaddressingconflictsthatariseamongtribalmembers(CooterandFikenstcher1998a,1998b).Finally,manycontemporarytriballegalsystemsincorporatemorethanoneofthesetypesofcourts,relyingonadversarialcourtstoaddresscertainelementsoftheirdocket,suchascriminalmattersorcivildisputesinvolvingnon-Indians,andrelyingonmorelocal,meditative-styledisputeresolutionforconflictsbetweentribalmembers.Forexample,theNavajohaveawell-known“Peacemakercourt”wherecertainmatters,suchasdisputesbetweenfamilymembersorissuesofpropertyinheritanceamongtribalmembers,areresolvedfollowingnonadversarialproceduresinformedbyNavajonotionsofjustice.

Despitesuchdiversity,juristsinvolvedwithtribalissuessharecommonconcerns.Perhapschiefamongthemarequestionsregardingtheroleoftribalcourtsinnavigatingtherelationshipbetweenfederaloversightoftribalsovereigntyandthedemandsofself-governance(Goldberg2003;Rosen2000;Newton1998;Frietag1997;Miller1997;Pommersheim1995a).FrankPommersheim,chiefjusticeoftheRosebudSiouxappellatecourt,capturesthisconcernwellwhenhewritesthattriballegalprofessionalsandtheirinstitutionswalk“theveryedgeoftribalsovereignty”caughtbetween“theyokedobjectivesoffederaldeferenceandtriballegitimacy”(Pommersheim1997a:97).TribalcourtsmustmeetAnglo-Americannormsofjusticetoassuagefederalconcernsregardingthe“legitimacy”oftribaljusticesystems(Barsh1999)yetstillgenerate(p.14)atribaljurisprudencethat“mustnotlosetouchwiththepeopleandtraditionsthatnourishthemfrombelow”(Pommersheim1995a:97).

Ontheonehand,thethreatoffurtherfederalencroachmentintowhatremainsoftribalsovereigntyseemsconstant.Officially,federalcourtreviewoftribalcourtauthorityremainsratherlimited,andgenerallythereisnoappealtofederalcourtsfromdecisionsmadebytribalcourts.Yetthereareotherwaysinwhichtheloomingpresenceoffederalauthorityisstronglyfeltintheeverydayoperationsoftribalcourts.LegislationliketheIndianCivilRightsActof1968,whichprovidesfederalreviewoftribalactionsonlyinthelimitedarenaofhabeascorpusproceedings(whenindividualsaredetainedbytribalauthorities),nonethelessexertsotherinfluences,mandatingthattribalgovernmentsrespectcertainindividualrightsoftribalmembers(includingdueprocessrequirementsintribalcourtthatcloselymirrornotionsfromtheU.S.BillofRights),andlimitingcriminalpunishmenttofinesofnomorethanfivethousanddollarsandnomorethanoneyearofincarcerationperviolation.Acomprehensiveanalysisofpublishedtribalcourtopinionsconcerningthedueprocessrightsoftribalmembersfoundthatthemajorityofthesedecisions,despitethediversityoftribalculturesandcommunitiesrepresented,sharedarathersimilarapplicationofAnglo-styledueprocessconcerns(Frietag1997).

Furthermore,recentdecisionsbytheU.S.SupremeCourthavesignificantlynarrowedtribalcourtjurisdiction,primarilyovernon-IndiansengagedinactivitieswithinIndiancountry.CaseslikeOliphantv.SuquamishIndianTribe,holdingthattribalcourtshavenocriminaljurisdictionovernon-Indiansontriballands,andalineofcasesincludingStrate


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v.A-1Contractors,Shirleyv.AtkinsonTradingPost,andNevadav.Hicks,whichcurtailtheciviljurisdictionoftribalcourtsovernon-Indiansonreservationlands,allestablishdramaticinroadsintothesovereignpowersoftribestomaintainlawandorderontheirlands.10

TheseeminglyunfetteredplenarypowerofCongresstoabrogatetreatyrights,theFederalIndiantrustrelationship,andotherelementsofFederalIndianlawthatworktosecuretribalsovereignty,maketheimmediatefutureoftherightoftribalself-governanceseemratherdimtosome.Atleastonetribalchairman,aformertribaljudge,hassuggestedthattheserecentlinesofSupremeCourtcaselawmaysignaltheendoftheself-determinationeraoffederalIndianpolicy(CliffordMarshall,personalcommunication).

(p.15) ManyscholarsbelievethatthisthreatmaybecompellingmanytribaljuriststorelyonlegalprinciplesandpracticesthatmirrorAnglo-Americannotionsofjurisprudence(Goldberg2003;Porter1997a;Pommersheim1995b).AsNellNewtonwrites,“Inconsciousorunconsciousanticipationtothepossibilityoffederalinterferencewithtribalauthority,manytribalcourtsoperateasnearlyexactreplicasofstatecourts….thisstrategyisunderstandable…[for]tribaljudgesadjudicatewithakindofSwordofDamoclesovertheirheads”(1998:294).ThisisakintowhatLauraNaderhascalledthe“harmonyideology”or“coercedharmony”(1990)thatpervadesthelocaljusticesystemsofpeoplescaughtincolonialregimes.NewtonthussuggeststhattheuseofAnglo-AmericanproceduralandsubstantivelawinthelegalsystemsoftribesliketheOneidaandMashantucketPequotarisesfromanefforttostaveofffurtherfederalencroachmentbydisplayingtheirabilitytoensuretheapplicationofdueprocess,theruleoflaw,andotherfundamentalprinciplesofAnglo-Americanjurisprudence(Newton1998).

Whilescholarsandjuristsconcernedwithfederal-tribalrelationsfretovertheseinroads,asecondconcernemerges,mostly(thoughnotexclusively)amongtriballegalactorsandscholarswhoarealsotribalmembers,regardingtheextenttowhichtribalcourtsshouldrelyontribalnotionsofcustom,tradition,andcultureintheproductionoftheircontemporaryjurisprudence(Tsosie2002;CoffeyandTsosie2001;Porter1997b;Cruz1997;Vincenti1995).Theconcernislargelythattoneglecttheuniqueculturalandlegalheritageoftribalcommunitiestodaywouldbetoaccomplishthefederalgoalofassimilatingtribesandhammerthefinalnailinthecoffinoftribalsovereignty.AsSenecalegalscholarRobertPorterwrites,“Thelongerthatnativepeopledeviatefromorganicnotionsoftribaljustice…theclosertheywillbetolosingtheirdistinctidentities.WithoutapersuasivejustificationtodistinguishIndiansfromotherAmericans,itseemsinevitablethatextinction—asperceivedbyAmericansocietyandmaybeevenbytheIndiansthemselves—willoccur”(1997b:238–39).

Yetatthesametimethattheyvaluetheuseofcustomandtradition,manytribaljuristsrecognizethatintroducinglocalnotionsofcustomandtraditionintoacontemporarytribaljurisprudencethatbearstheheavymarkofAnglo-Americaninfluenceisneithersimplenorstraightforward(Tso1989;Zion1987,2000).Pommersheimwarnsthat“triballegalcultures…donotreflectpre-Columbiantribalstandardsand(p.16) norms….The


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processofdecolonizationcanneverleadbacktoaprecolonizedsociety”(Pommersheim1995a:99).

Forsome,theproblemsarepragmatic.JimZion,reflectingonhisworkinCree,Pima,Navajo,andBlackfeetcourts,explainsthatthedifficultiesof“findingIndianCommonLaw”are“sometimesduetolanguageproblems,sometimestothatfactthatmanyIndiansdonotspeakoftheircommonlawinarticulatedlegalnorms,andsometimestoconstraintscreatedbynon-Indianthinkingpatterns”(Zion1987:125;seealsoZion2000;Hunter1999).

Othershowever,arelessquicktopresumethatnotionsofcustomandtraditionareautomaticallyvaluabletocontemporarytriballegalprocesses.Thesescholarsseeproblemsinthedegreetowhichmisrecognitionoflocalcustomsandtraditions—eitherassomebodyoftimelessprinciplesthatmustbeadheredtodespitesocialandpoliticalchange(Miller2001;Barsh1999)oraslegalrepresentationsnotfaithfulenoughto“actualtribalpasts”—isaboutpoliticalpowerplays,constitutinga“modeofresistancetoallthatWesternlegalculturerepresents”(Joh2000:125;seealsoMiller2001)ratherthananyrealarticulationoflocalvaluesandpractices.Assuch,custom,tradition,andculturearenotions“tooproblematic”toconstituteafoundationfortribaljurisprudenceinsofarastheyseemtoinvoketroubling“questionsofauthenticity,legitimacy,andessentialism,”moresuitabletothearenasofpoliticsthanlaw(Joh2000:120).

Whatevertheperspectiveontheplaceofcustomsandtraditionintheirtriballaw,evenacursoryreviewofthecontemporaryliteratureontribalcourtsrevealsthat,fortoday'stribaljurists,thequestionconcerningtherelationshipbetweennormsofAnglo-Americanlegalprocedureandtheiruniquetriballegalheritageistheirfundamentaljurisprudentialconcern.Atfirstglance,wemightseemtobebackwherewestarted,insofarasthisquestionsoundsratherfamiliarinrelationtotheissuesinformingthedevelopmentandoperationofCourtsofIndianOffensesattheendofthenineteenthcentury.

Butthiswouldbemistaken.Thefactthattribalmembersandemployeesratherthanfederalagentsareposingthesequestionssuggeststhattheyarenowpursuingtheseissuesinwaysthatcallforaradicalreclamationbytribalnationsofthelegalinstrumentalitiesandinstitutionsoriginallyusedtodominatethem.AndthoughsomeworryaloudaboutthelastingdetrimentsofhavingdriftedtooclosetotheScyllaofAnglo-styleadversarialjurisprudence(Cruz1997;Porter1997b;Melton1995)(p.17) ortheCharybdisofcustomandtradition(Miller2001;Joh2000),othersviewthehorizonoftribalcourtsinmuchmorepositiveterms.Pommersheimisagaineloquentonthispoint:“Theriprapcreatedbytheseforcesprovidesanopportunityfortribalcourtstoforgeauniquejurisprudencefromthevariedmaterialscreatedbytheravagesofcolonialismandthepersistenceofatribalcommitmenttotraditionalculturalvalues”(Pommersheim1995b:99).

TheDearthofEthnographiesofTribalCourtsDespitethecentralityoftheseconcerns,verylittlescholarshiphasexploredhowtherelationshipbetweenAnglo-Americanandtriballegalstructures,norms,andpractices


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emergesintheactualoperationsofcontemporarytribalcourtjurisprudence.Ingeneral,triballawremainsaratheroverlookedarenaincontemporaryU.S.legalscholarship.EventhestudyofwhatisoftencalledIndianlawfocusespredominantlyontheshiftingtrendsoffederallawandpolicyregardingtribalnations,andtheconsiderationofthenormsandpracticesoftribaljusticethatappeartherearemostoftenviewedthroughthelensofU.S.executive,congressional,andSupremeCourtaction.

Withinthenascentfieldoftriballegalscholarship,whichhasonlyenjoyedsomevisibilitysincetheearly1990s,theapproachtotribaljurisprudencehasbeenlargelydoctrinaloranecdotal.Studiescoveringtribaljurisprudenceeitherfollowthetraditionalmodeoflegalscholarshipthatanalyzespublishedcourtopinionsandtriballegislation(e.g.,Barsh1999;Atwood1999;Newton1998;McCarthy1998;Valencia-Webber1994)ormakemoretheoreticalcontributions(e.g.,Tsosie2002;CoffeyandTsosie2001;Cruz1997,2001;Porter1997a;Pommersheim1995a;Melton1995).

Onlyahandfulofpublishedworkshaveattemptedanyethnographicstudyoftribalcourts(Nesper2007;Miller2001;CooterandFikenstcher1998a,1998b).Alldealexpresslywiththeroleofnotionsofcustomandtraditionincontemporarytribalcourtjurisprudence,suggestingagainthecentralityofthisissuetotriballegalscholarship.Significantly,onlyNesper'sanalysisofdisputesovernaturalresourcesbeforetheLacDuFlambeauOjibwetribalcourtdealsinanyconcretewaywiththeactualdetailsofcourtroominteraction.Nesper'sworkiscompelling,particularlyhisanalysesofthewaysinwhichtriballayadvocates—tribalmemberswithtrainingacquiredoff-reservationinsemiprofessional(p.18) legaladvocacywhoremaincommittedtotheirOjibweidentities—constitutea“mediatingclassoflegalpractitioners”(Nesper2007:681)whoseeffortstonavigatethetensionsbetweennativeandnonnativediscoursesoflawandtraditionexemplifyhowthe“quasi,”“permeated”tribalsovereigntyforwhichBiolsi(2005)argueselsewherealsoemergesintheeverydaypracticesofcontemporaryOjibwejurisprudence.Thisisprovocativeresearch,whichinitiatesalineofanalysisincontemporarytriballawthatthisstudyshares.

Inotherethnographicresearchontribalcourts,includingthemorecomprehensivestudiesofMiller(2001)andCooterandFikenstcher(1998a,1998b),itisinterestingtonotethesidesthattheirauthorstakeinthe“authenticity”debatessurroundingtheroleoftraditionandcustomincontemporarytribaljurisprudence.AndwhiletheyoffervaluableinsightsintotheoperationsofAmericanIndiantriballawandtherolesofcustomandtraditionthere,wecanextendandperhapsreconciletheirlessonsbyananalyticapproachthatconsidershowtriballegalandothercommunityactorsactivelyco-constructnotionsoftraditionintheface-to-faceinteractionsthatconstitutetribalcourtroomactivity.

BruceG.Miller'sTheProblemofJustice(2001)isacomparativeethnographicandhistoricanalysisofwhathecallsthe“justicepractices”ofthreeCoastSalishcommunitiesintheUnitedStatesandCanada,includingthetribalcourtoftheUpperSkagittribeofWashingtonState.Acentralthemeofhisstudyisthat“therearesignificantproblemsconcerningthedegreetowhichwhatiscalledtraditionalpracticecanbebroughtintothe


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present”andthatsucheffortsarebeleagueredbyamisrecognitionof“whattraditionallawandpracticemighthavebeen”(5,emphasisinoriginal).Assuch,theylacka“dueregardfortherelationsofpower”(6)thatinformtheirexpressionincontemporaryjuridicopoliticalpracticetoday.HefurtherarguesthattheinclusionofthesenotionsinthecontemporarytriballegalsystemofCoastSalishpeoplesrevealstheextenttowhichtheyare“largelyoutwardlooking,”focusinglessontheactualvaluesandpracticesofcontemporarytribalmembersthanon“managingrelationswiththedominantsocietythatfocusconservativelyonapurportedperiodofharmonypriortocontactandtheestablishmentoftreatiesandreservations”(11).AsMillerexplains,relianceonsuchnotions,“undermine[s]thecapacityoftribalgovernancetorecognizediversityandcommunitymembers'senseoffair,justparticipationintheirowngovernance”(6).

(p.19) Significantly,Miller'sstudyoffersimportantcontributionsbybothlocatingandhistoricizingtheflowsofsociopoliticalpowerandauthorityastheymovethroughthediscoursesoftraditionincontemporarytribalcourtpraxis.Thus,oneofthemainsourceshecitesforthearticulationofnotionsofcustomandtraditionincontemporaryUpperSkagittribaljurisprudenceisanintertribalreportontraditionaljusticepracticesamongtheUpperSkagitandothertribesinthearea.Thestudy,whichincludeshistoricalresearch,interviewswithelders,andobservationsofdisputes,isinteresting,claimsMiller,“notjustforitsefforttorecordjusticeideology,butbecauseititselfbecamepartofthecurrentdiscourseaboutjustice”intheUpperSkagitandotherCoastSalishtribes(Miller2001:110).Millerarguesthat“currentpoliticsofjustice…arebothreflectedandalteredbythe…study”(111).

MillergoesintodetailconcerninghowthestudymisrecognizesthehistoricalandethnographicrecordofpastjusticepracticesamongtheCoastSalish,revealingtheextenttowhichdoctrinalrepresentationsoftraditionamongtheUpperSkagitrepresenta“conservativeviewoftriballife”asa“harmonysociety”thatelidesacontentiouspastofoppression,violence,andsocialconflict.Furthermore,hesuggestshoweffortstoforwardtheseimagesofcustomandtraditioncontributetoanideologyofjusticeamongtheUpperSkagitthatnaturalizesthepowerofcertainfactionsinthecommunity,namely,thosethatclaimcertain“traditional”positionsofauthoritywhileignoringthecontemporaryneedsandissuesfacingothertribalmembers.

WhereMillermightgofurtherisinrevealingtheimplicationsofsuchrepresentationsoftraditionforthepracticesthatconstitutetheeverydayoperationsofthecontemporaryUpperSkagitlegalsystem.Thus,forexample,hesayslittleabouthowthisstudyorotherrepresentationsanddiscoursesoftraditionalUpperSkagitjusticepracticesgenerallyemergeintribalcourtproceedings—eitherinthewrittenororalargumentsofpartiesbeforethecourt,orinthestatements,rulings,anddecisionsmadebyUpperSkagitjustices,orinthetacitlyaccepted,unspokenoperationsoftheUpperSkagitcourtprocess.MillermightbecorrectaboutthemisrecognitionthatoccursintheidealizedrepresentationsofUpperSkagitlegaltraditionsinthestudyheanalyzes.Buthisanalysesofthelegaleffectsoftheserepresentationscouldbenefitfromadditionalattentiontothetalkandinteractionthroughwhichtribalmembersnegotiatetheconstructionoftradition


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intheactualpracticesoftheircontemporarytriballaw.

(p.20) Theothersemi-ethnographicstudyofcontemporaryAmericanIndiantribalcourts,“IndianCommonLaw:TheRoleofCustominAmericanIndianTribalCourts(Parts1and2),”bylegalscholarsRobertD.CooterandWolfgangFikentscher(1998a,1998b),isvaluableforitscomprehensivecollectionofcommentaryfromtribaljuristsallacrossIndianCountryconcerningthevalueofcustomandtraditionintheircontemporaryjurisprudence.Thestudy,whichrelieslargelyoninterviewswithtribaljudgesanddoctrinalresearchonthirty-sevendifferenttribalnationsintheUnitedStates,isalsoimportantasasurveyofthestructuresandideologiesthatshapeandcontributetotriballegalsystemstoday,includingtheinfluenceofnotionsofAnglo-styleadversarialandtraditionaldisputeresolutiononcontemporarytribalcourtprocedures.

Theauthorsrevealhowsometribaljudgesrelyprimarilyonthefederalrulesofcivilprocedureasamodelforoutliningcourtroomprocedure,includingtheexaminationandcross-examinationofwitnessesandotherevidentiaryprocedures,whileotherjudgesexplicitlyfollowdifferentprocedures,“inanefforttoadaptproceduretolocalneeds”(CooterandFikentscher1998a:325).TheydescribehowajudgefromthePojoaquePuebloTribalCourt,whileallowingtheappearanceoflegalprofessionalstorepresenttribalclients,andaffordingsomeelementsofanadversarialproceeding,nonethelessexplicitlyinformsallpartiestothehearingthathemaychoosetoquestionpartiesandtheirwitnessesandthathewillallowtheadmissionofhearsayevidence.JudgeslikethisoneexplainedthatcertainfreedomsfromformalAnglo-styleproceduralruleswerenecessary“tomakethelegalprocesscongenialtoIndians”(326).Theauthorsexplainthatsuchinformalitiesarenecessarybecausetheyallowjudgestofollowmore“traditionallines”ofdisputeresolutionthatfocus,theyclaim,on“repairingarelationship”andrequire“goingdeeperintothedispute”thannormallyallowedbyfederalrulesofprocedure,which“narrowthedisputetothespecificwrongdoingallegedbytheplaintiff”(1998a:324).

Butagain,whiletheauthorsofthisstudyconcludethat“fairnessandefficiencyfavoracloseralignmentoflawwithcustominthetribes”(CooterandFikentscher1998b:563),theirunderstandingofwhatconstitutestribalcustomsandtraditionsincontemporarytriballegaloperationsisbasedprimarilyonthedecontextualizedrepresentationsoftribaltraditionsthatcomefromtheirinterviewswithtribaljudgesorpriorethnographicstudies.Thus,whiletheyaccuratelycapturetheideologies(p.21) thatinformthesejurists'understandingoftradition'splaceintheirtriballegalpraxis,theirfindingswouldhavebeenmoreilluminatingiftheyhadbeenabletoexplorehowsuchrepresentationscompareto,oreveninformhow,discoursesoftraditionareconstructedintheflowsofcontemporarytriballegalpractices.Inthissense,theauthorsriskassertingreifiedandvalorizednotionsofcustomandtraditioninpreciselythewaysthatMillerfindssoproblematic.Thatis,theyriskarguingfortheprimacyofnotionsoftraditionincontemporarytriballawwithoutconsideringhowsuchnotionsareemployedinactualtriballegalpracticesorthepoliticaleconomythatthosepracticesinformandlegitimize.

Iwouldarguethatwhilebothofthesestudiesofferimportantinsightsintotherolesthat


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notionsofcustom,tradition,andcultureplayincontemporarytriballegalsystems,theirperpetuationofthedividebetweenademonizationandvalorizationofthatrolemightberesolvedbyanalytictechniquesthatcapturehowsuchnotionsareinvokedintheinteractionaldetailsofcontemporarytribaljurisprudence.

Indeed,thefieldoftriballegalstudygenerallyisinformedbyalargelystructuralisttheoreticalorientationtotribaljurisprudence.Thenotionsoftriballaw,politics,culture,andtraditioninsuchanorientationareimaginedaswhole,homogenoussystemsthatoperateinandontheworldinwaysthatimpingeonbutremainmostlyunaffectedbytheactionsofparticulartribalmembersinparticularjuridicalcontexts.11Thelessonsoftheethnographyofcommunication(Duranti1994;Philips1988,1992,1998;Hirsch1998),conversationanalysis(AtkinsonandDrew1979;HeritageandDrew1992;Matoesian2001),practicetheory(Bourdieu1977),andotherdiscourseandpractice-centeredapproaches(Danet1980;ConleyandO̓Barr1998;Falk-Moore1978;ComaroffandRoberts1981)thathaveinformedotherarenasofsociolegalandpoliticalstudyhavebeenlargelyoverlookedinthestudyofcontemporaryAmericanIndiantriballaw.Thuswelackknowledgeoftheinteractionsofthosetribalpeopleswhoareengagedwithandcontributetotheconstructionoftheseinstitutionsatthemomentsoftheirmaking,aswellasaproperconsiderationofthepoliticalimplicationsoftheircontributions.Missingisthemeasureofhumanagencythat,whilenecessarilyshapedbythenatureofpreexistingmaterial,political,andsemioticsystems,nonethelessaccruestotribalsocialactorsatparticularmomentsoftribalsociallifewhentheyconfronteachotherinsociopoliticalways.

(p.22) TheApproachandAimsofThisStudyTalkandinteractionaresocialphenomenathatstraddlethestructure/practicedivideinwaysthatarecrucialtoinquiryintotribalcourtpractices.AsdeSaussure(1985)andChomsky(1965)longagopointedout,alllanguagesareregulatedbyasyntagmaticandparadigmaticstructure—rulesofgrammarandsyntax—thatexistsandpersistsbeyondthecognitionandactionofanyparticularspeakersandshapeshowsuchspeakerstalkandact(andactthroughtalk).Atthesametime,asotherscholarshaveshown,speakersandinterlocutorsemploylanguageinspecificcontextsofactualusageanddiscourseinmultipleandcomplexwaysthathavesociopoliticalforceinandcontributetotheconstitutionoftheirworldanditssocialsystems—includingthoseoflaw,tradition,culture,andevenlanguageitself.Language,then—or,moreprecisely,talk,understoodascommunicationandmetacommunicativepractices—constitutesanimportantsiteforexploringhowsocialactors,includingmarginalizedsocialgroupslikesomanyAmericanIndiantribalpeoples,bothengagewiththeinstitutionsandsocialsystemsthatstructuretheirlivesandtakethemupatparticularsocialmoments,contributingtothe(re)constitutionofthosesystemsinwaysthathavepowerfulsocialeffects.

Consequently,thisstudyanalyzestraditionandcultureasdiscoursesinandofcontemporarytriballawbyconsideringthemicrodetailsofface-to-facecommunicationinonetriballegalcontext:thatofpropertyhearingsheldbeforetheHopiTribalCourt.Theanalysesthatfollowrelyontheoriesandmethodologiesthatdrawfromseveralarenasof


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legalscholarshipandlinguisticanthropologicalinquiry,includinglegaldiscourseanalysis(Eades1996,2000;ConleyandO̓Barr1998,1990;Philips1998;Hirsch1998;Matoesian1995,1998;2001;Mertz1994;Drew1992;Danet1980),studiesoflanguageideologyandmetadiscourse(BaumanandBriggs2000;Kroskrity2000;Schieffelin,Woolard,andKroskrity1998;Briggs1993),studiesoflegalsemiotics,pragmatics,andmetapragmatics(Peirce1956;Kevelson1988,1990;Silverstein1993,1998,2003),legalnarrativity(AmsterdamandBruner2000;Jackson1988;Cover1992;White1985),andnarrativeinteraction(OchsandCapps2001;Ochs,Smith,andTaylor1996;CappsandOchs1995).

ApplyinginsightsgainedfromtheseliteraturestomyownethnographicfieldworkandarchivalresearchontheHopiTribalCourt,thisstudycentersonthreeanalysesthatrevealhoweffortsamongHopilegal(p.23) actorstoachieveadjudicatorylegitimacybasedonAnglo-AmericanversusHopitraditionalnotionsofpowerandauthorityaffectthemicrodetailsofHopitribalcourtroominteractions,contributecentrallytothemeaning-makingeffortsthatundergirdthoseinteractions,andbecomethesitesofconsiderablecontestationbetweendifferentlysituatedtriballegalactors.

Thus,byconsideringthecommunicativeresourcesandcontextsbyandthroughwhichHopisocialactorsinvoke,accept,orchallengenotionsoftraditionandAnglo-Americanjurisprudenceandtheirarticulationintheircontemporarylegalprocesses,theanalysesinthisstudysubsumequestionsofwhattradition“is”underthemoregeneralquestionsofwhattradition“does”and“means”forthetribalactorswhoengageeachotherintheselegalcontexts.Thisstudythussuggeststhatstrikingabalancebetweentribalnotionsoflawandtradition—notablyincludingmomentswheretraditionisconstructedbydifferentlysituatedHopilegalactorsinmultipleandevencontradictoryorientationstoperceivedAnglo-Americanlegalpractices—isanongoingnegotiationforHopilegalactorsthatnotonlyreachesthefinestdetailsofHopitribalcourtpraxisbutiscentraltothewaysinwhichHopipeopleconstitutetheirtribaljurisprudence,itssociopoliticalforce,andthetriballivesthatitaffects.Myhopeisthatthisstudywillservebothasacallforincreasedattentiontothemicrodetailsofthesociolegalinteractionsthatcontributetocontemporarytriballegalcontextsandasamodelforothersuchendeavors.

AnOutlineofThisStudyThreerelatedapproachesconstitutethecoreofthisstudy,eachofwhichshedsdifferentlightontheforms,processes,andsocioculturalforceofnotionsoftraditionandAnglo-AmericanlawininteractionsbeforetheHopiTribalCourt.

Chapter2setsthestagefortheseanalysesbyprovidingsomecontextconcerningthehistoryofAnglo-American-stylejurisprudenceamongtheHopis,aswellasdescribingthephysicalsettings,legislation,andpersonnelthatinformtheinstitutionaloperationofcontemporaryHopiTribalCourtproceedings.Chapter2alsoprovidesadescriptionofmydata;mymethodologiesforcollectingit,includingparticipantobservationandaudiorecordingsofproperty-disputeproceedingsbeforetheHopicourt;archivalresearch;andinterviewswithHopicourtpersonnel,includingtheHopijudges.

(p.24) ThefirstofthreedetailedanalysesofHopihearinginteractionsbeginsinchapter


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3,whichbuildsontheemerginglinguisticanthropologicalstudyoflanguageideologies,metadiscourses,andmetapragmatics(BaumanandBriggs2000;Kroskrity2000;Schieffelin,Woolard,Kroskrity1998;Briggs1993;Silverstein1993,2003)inordertorevealtheinteractionalpracticesbywhichlegalactorsparticipatinginHopipropertydisputesexplicitlyandimplicitlyconstructnotionsofHopitraditionandAnglo-Americanlaw,aswellastheepistemologicaldemandsthattheyclaimeachmakesonhowdisputeinformation“must”betoldincourt.Ithenarguethatsuchideologiesandmetadiscoursesarecentraltotheeffortsofthesetriballegalactorstoauthorizeandchallengetheirclaimstothecontestedmaterialandsymbolicresourcesthataretheheartofthesedisputeproceedings.

InChapter4IconsidertheconfrontationsofHopilegalactorsthroughdiscoursesofHopitraditionandAnglo-Americanlawinasecondhearing.Ifocusonthedegreetowhichtheyrevealnotjustconflictsbutoutrightparadoxesandironiesoflanguage,culturaldifference,andlawinHopijurisprudence.Iproceedtoconsiderthecentralityofparadoxtolegalsemiosis(Kevelson1990),pragmatics(Peirce1955),andthemetapragmatic(Silverstein1993,1998,2003)“talkabouttalk”wherebyactorsframecourtdiscourseinshiftingrelationstoHopiculturaldistinctivenessandsovereignty,exemplifyinghowlanguagemediatestheculturalpoliticsofHopilaw.Ithusargueforareconsiderationoftheusualbinariesofindigenousidentity—whereclaimstoculturaldistinctivenessareeitherlibratoryorreifying,autochthonousorother-determined—suggestingthatamorecompletepictureofculturalpoliticsemergesfromtakingtheseantinomiestogetherastheironicdialecticsconstitutingtheemergentedgeofindigenousgovernancetoday.

Chapter5linksupwithandexpandstheanalysesofchapters3and4inauniqueway,joiningconsiderationsofthedetailsofHopicourtroominteractionwiththeoriesoflegalnarrativity(AmsterdamandBruner2000;Jackson1988;Cover1992;White1985)viarecentanthropologicalstudiesofnarrativeinteraction(Ochs,Smith,andTaylor1996;OchsandCapps2001;Mattingly1998;CappsandOchs1995).IanalyzeathirdHopihearinginteraction,examininghowtheveryoperationsofHopiTribalCourtproceedingsandthewholeoftriballawinstantiatedthereinareconstitutedbyHopilegalactorsthroughnarrativeinteractionsthatallowthearticulationofbothAnglo-stylenotionsoflegalprocessandHopinotionsoftradition.DespitethedegreetowhichHopiTribalCourt(p.25) proceduresappeartobedominatedbyAnglo-AmericanrulesandareinitiatedpursuanttoAnglo-Americanjuridicalnormsthatcallfortheadversarialpursuitof“rule-oriented”legaltruths,theanalysesinthischapterrevealhowHopilitigantsworktoco-narratethesettingsoftheirdisputeclaimsasinformedby“truths”groundedin“relational”notionsofHopitraditionthatare“outside”Anglo-stylelaw.Indoingso,theyarealsonegotiatingtheveryoperationsoftheHopicourtroomproceedingswithwhichtheyareengaged.TheresultistheproductionofHopihearingnarratives,andamacrosociologicalstoryofHopilawtheyinstantiate,thatareinformedtotheircorebyauniqueadmixtureofAnglo-styleandHopitraditionalnormsandprocessesofdispute.

Chapter6concludesthestudybyreviewingtrendsinsociolegaltreatmentsofthepolitics


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ofnativetraditionandculturaldifferenceandtheroleofsuchpoliticsintherepresentationofindigenouspeoplesandtheirstatusassovereignnations.Isuggesthowthetheoriesandmethodsemployedinthisstudyprovidenewwaysforthinkingabouttraditionandculturaldifference,particularlyasitinformscontemporaryindigenouslaw,politics,andsociety.Onlythroughthecontinuedpursuitofresearchintotraditionandcultureunderstoodinthisway,Iargue,canwegainapracticalunderstandingofthecomplexcircumstancesthatconfronttribalnationsandtheirmemberstodayastheyworktomake,andmakesenseof,theirlawsandthehumanlivesthatarecaughtupwiththem.

Finally,Iofferabriefnoteabouttherepresentationsofcourtroomdiscoursethatappearinsubsequentchapters.Theportionsoftranscriptprovidedinthisandtheremainingchaptersemployseveralconventionstypicaloflinguisticanthropologicalandotherdiscourseanalyticstudies(seeDuranti1997).Thus,namesofspeakersoccurintheleftcolumn,andHopiutterancesarerepresentedfirstinHopi,usinganorthographyfromBureauofAppliedResearchinAnthropology,HopìikwaLavàytutuveni:AHopiDictionaryofThirdMesaDialect(Tucson:UniversityofArizonaPress,1997).Utterancesarerepresentedoneclauseperline,witheachclausethentranslatedtwice,firstwithamorpheme-by-morphemetranslationandthenwithalooserEnglishgloss,whichappearsinitalics.Portionsinboldmarktheformsexplicitlydiscussedinthechapter.Alsonotethefollowingadditionalconventions:

001:Linenumbersdivideinteractionaldiscoursesinaphrase-by-phraseprogression,allowingforinterlineartranscription.

(p.26) HAB:MarkstheHopihabitualaspectsuffix-ngwu.

SUBCL:MarksHopiparticlesthatareusedinutterancestoconnectsubordinateclausestosuperordinateclauses.

Ints:MarksHopiparticlesthatareusedasmodifiersthatintensifytheirobjectforms.

CntrFct:MarksaHopiparticle,–as,thatisemployedincounterfacutalstatements.

–:Adashindicatesthatspeechwassuddenlycutoffduringoraftertheprecedingword.

?:Aquestionmarkindicatesamarkedrisingpitch.

.:Aperiodindicatesamarkedfallingpitch.

[]:Bracketsmarktheonsetofportionsofutterancethatarespokeninoverlapwithothertalk.Theoverlappingportionsoftalkareplacedimmediatelyaboveorbeloweachotheronthepage.

():Parenthesesthatencloseutterancesindicatedoubtabouttheaccuracyofthe


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enclosedmaterials.Parenthesesthatenclosequestionmarks(??)indicatethatsomethingwassaidatthatpoint,butitisnotclearenoughtotranscribe.

=:Theequalssignindicatesspeechthatislinkedtosubsequenttalkbythesamespeakerthathadtobesplitfortranscriptclarity.

CAPS:Fullcapitalsindicateincreasedvolume(asin“shouting”ontheInternet).

italics:Italicizedspeechindicatesemphasisofsomesort,includingslowedspeechandpronunciation.Itisalsoused,asnotedabove,forlinesthatgiveidiomatic,“loose”versionsofEnglishutterancestranslatedliterallyfromHopi.

———:AnextendeddashindicatesomissionofanameforthepurposesofprotectingtheidentityofpeopleorcommunitiesnamedinHopicourtproceedingsortexts.

(h):Thisindicatesanaudiblebreathwhilespeaking,asinthecaseoflaughterorcrying.

Notes:

(1).CherokeeNationv.Georgia30U.S.1,17,19(1831).

(2).U.S.Code25(1887),§§331–33).

(3).U.S.Code25(1934),§§461–62,464–79).

(4).Noristhisback-and-forthappearlikelytoendsoon.ThisisevenmoreevidentinthearenaofIndiangamingandthesocioeconomicandpoliticalsuccessthatatleastsometribalnationshavefinallycarvedoutforthemselves—gainsthatinitiallywonbacking(oratleastnonintervention)fromFederalcaselaw,legislation,andevenstate-levelandlocalnon-Indiansentiment(see,e.g.,Californiav.CabazonBandofIndians,480U.S.483[1975];IndianGamingRegulatoryAct,U.S.Code25(1988),§§2701–21).Notlongafterthesegains,however,Indiannationsexperiencedconsiderablefederalandnon-Indianpublicbacklash,suchasthatexpressedinarecentspecialreportinTime(BartlettandSteele2002)andonthecampaigntrailintheCaliforniagubernatorialrecallelectionof2003,wherenon-IndiansclaimedtouncovertheillsandunfairpracticesimposedonIndianandnon-Indiancommunitiesbytheseenterprisesandcalledforfederalandstatelegislaturestoforcerestructuringoftribalnationgamingpractices(seealsoCornelletal.1998)

(5).Thegender-specificsenseofmenisintended,sincefieldagentsalmostinvariablychoseIndianmentofilljudicialpostsinamannerthatoftenignoredtheleadershiprolesaccordedtowomeninthetribalcommunitiesoverwhichthosecourtspresided.

(6).Atvirtuallythesametimeasthecourtswerebeingcreated,theSupremeCourtdecisioninthecaseExParteCrowDog(109U.S.556[1883])waspublished,whichheldthatfederalcourtslackedjurisdictiontotryandpunishaSiouxIndianwhohadkilled


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anotherSiouxinIndiancountry.Lessthantwoyearslater,CongresswouldpasstheMajorCrimesAct(U.S.Code18(1885),§1153),whichgaveexclusivejurisdictiontoU.S.federalcourtstotryIndiansaccusedofsevennamed“major”crimes(lateramendedtoten),includingmurder,rape,kidnapping,andincest.

(7).IndeedinU.S.v.Clapox,35F.575(D.C.Ore.1888),theonlyU.S.casetoadjudicatethelegalityofCFRcourts,theFederalcircuitcourtinOregonexplicitlydescribestheprimaryfunctionofCourtsofIndianOffensesnotintermsoftheimplementationandregulationoflawandorderbutas“mereeducationalanddisciplinaryinstrumentalitiesbywhichtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesisendeavoringtoimproveandelevatetheconditionofthesedependenttribes.”

(8).Inmanyways,fromtoday'sperspective,theIRAappearstohavefurthereditsownassimilativegoals—thetribalgovernanceproposedbytheIRAcalledfortribestopassconstitutionsandconvenerepresentativetribalcouncilswhoseactionswereoftensubjecttoapprovalbythesecretaryoftheinterior(Wilkins2002;Newton1998).YetthenotionthattheeverydaygovernanceoftribalnationsshouldrestinthehandsoftribalmembersthemselveswasafootholdinthefederalrecognitionoftribalsovereigntythattribeswouldrelyoninthedevelopmentoftheircontemporarytribalgovernmentsinwayslikelyneveranticipatedbyCollierandotherauthorsoftheIRA.Sowhiletheseoriginaltribalconstitutionsdidnotregularlyrecognizeanyseparationofgovernancepowers,letalonethecreationoftribalcourts(Newton1998),tribeshavenonethelessinterpretedtheirpowersundersuchconstitutionstoallowforthepromulgationoftriballegalsystems.

(9).U.S.Code25(1968),§§1301–3;U.S.Code25(1975),§§1451–53.

(10).Oliphantv.SuquamishIndianTribe,435U.S.191(1978);Stratev.A-1Contractors,520U.S.438,117S.Ct.1404(1997);Shirleyv.AtkinsonTradingPost,532U.S.645(2001);Nevadav.Hicks,533U.S.353,121S.Ct.2304(2001).

(11).Inthecaseofcritiquesofcontemporarytribaltraditionsas“invented,”theideaisthatsuchinventionsreplacean“authentic”traditionandculturethatwasoncewholeandhomogenousbuthassincebeenlost(seechapter6).

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