University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van …...ruling on such issues at this time, and...
Transcript of University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van …...ruling on such issues at this time, and...
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, 'FUJIY~~ DqFFY & FUJIYAMA
JAMES , E-:/ DUFFY, JR. 775-0 LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI 3378-0 Suite 2700, Pauahi Tower Bishop Square 1001 Bishop Street Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813 Telephone No. 536-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
:.. .... . : . I, . . ~. ", ',; I
I, .. . '
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAI'I
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN ~FFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES 02 TPy.
OFFICE OF F-AWAIIAN .~FAIRS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI . I, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1 -10, ROE "NONPROFIT" CORPORATION 1-10, and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
---------------------------)
CIVIL NO . 94-0205-01 [Other Civil Action]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HEARING DATES / TIMES:
June 26, 1996 - 9:30 a.m. June 27, 1996 - 9:00 a.m.
Judge : The Honorable Daniel G. Heely
Trial: November 18, 1996
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS !'OR P.Zl.RTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 26, 1996 and June 27, 1996 the following
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable DANIEL G. HEELY:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996 ( "Duty Free Motion").
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, 'FUJIY~~ DqFFY & FUJIYAMA
JAMES , E-:/ DUFFY, JR. 775-0 LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI 3378-0 Suite 2700, Pauahi Tower Bishop Square 1001 Bishop Street Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813 Telephone No. 536-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
:.. .... . : . I, . . ~. ", ',; I
I, .. . '
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAI'I
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN ~FFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES 02 TPy.
OFFICE OF F-AWAIIAN .~FAIRS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI . I, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1 -10, ROE "NONPROFIT" CORPORATION 1-10, and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
---------------------------)
CIVIL NO . 94-0205-01 [Other Civil Action]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HEARING DATES / TIMES:
June 26, 1996 - 9:30 a.m. June 27, 1996 - 9:00 a.m.
Judge : The Honorable Daniel G. Heely
Trial: November 18, 1996
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS !'OR P.Zl.RTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 26, 1996 and June 27, 1996 the following
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable DANIEL G. HEELY:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996 ( "Duty Free Motion").
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, 'FUJIY~~ DqFFY & FUJIYAMA
JAMES , E-:/ DUFFY, JR. 775-0 LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI 3378-0 Suite 2700, Pauahi Tower Bishop Square 1001 Bishop Street Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813 Telephone No. 536-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
:.. .... . : . I, . . ~. ", ',; I
I, .. . '
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAI'I
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN ~FFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES 02 TPy.
OFFICE OF F-AWAIIAN .~FAIRS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI . I, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1 -10, ROE "NONPROFIT" CORPORATION 1-10, and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
---------------------------)
CIVIL NO . 94-0205-01 [Other Civil Action]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HEARING DATES / TIMES:
June 26, 1996 - 9:30 a.m. June 27, 1996 - 9:00 a.m.
Judge : The Honorable Daniel G. Heely
Trial: November 18, 1996
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS !'OR P.Zl.RTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 26, 1996 and June 27, 1996 the following
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable DANIEL G. HEELY:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996 ( "Duty Free Motion").
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/ ./
, 'FUJIY~~ DqFFY & FUJIYAMA
JAMES , E-:/ DUFFY, JR. 775-0 LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI 3378-0 Suite 2700, Pauahi Tower Bishop Square 1001 Bishop Street Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813 Telephone No. 536-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
:.. .... . : . I, . . ~. ", ',; I
I, .. . '
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAI'I
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN ~FFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES 02 TPy.
OFFICE OF F-AWAIIAN .~FAIRS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI . I, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1 -10, ROE "NONPROFIT" CORPORATION 1-10, and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
---------------------------)
CIVIL NO . 94-0205-01 [Other Civil Action]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HEARING DATES / TIMES:
June 26, 1996 - 9:30 a.m. June 27, 1996 - 9:00 a.m.
Judge : The Honorable Daniel G. Heely
Trial: November 18, 1996
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS !'OR P.Zl.RTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 26, 1996 and June 27, 1996 the following
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable DANIEL G. HEELY:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996 ( "Duty Free Motion").
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/ ./
, 'FUJIY~~ DqFFY & FUJIYAMA
JAMES , E-:/ DUFFY, JR. 775-0 LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI 3378-0 Suite 2700, Pauahi Tower Bishop Square 1001 Bishop Street Honolulu, Hawai'i 96813 Telephone No. 536-0802
Attorneys for Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS
:.. .... . : . I, . . ~. ", ',; I
I, .. . '
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
STATE OF HAWAI'I
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN ~FFAIRS and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES 02 TPy.
OFFICE OF F-AWAIIAN .~FAIRS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAI . I, JOHN DOES 1-10, JANE DOES 1-10, DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10, DOE CORPORATIONS 1 -10, ROE "NONPROFIT" CORPORATION 1-10, and ROE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10
Defendants.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
---------------------------)
CIVIL NO . 94-0205-01 [Other Civil Action]
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HEARING DATES / TIMES:
June 26, 1996 - 9:30 a.m. June 27, 1996 - 9:00 a.m.
Judge : The Honorable Daniel G. Heely
Trial: November 18, 1996
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS !'OR P.Zl.RTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On June 26, 1996 and June 27, 1996 the following
motions came on for hearing before the Honorable DANIEL G. HEELY:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996 ( "Duty Free Motion").
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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2.
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4.
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital, filed May 7, 1996 (nHospital Motionn ).
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996
( "Interest Motion ") . .
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And Development Corporation And Hawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996 (nHFDC Motiona ).
Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (hereinafter
"PlaintiffsU) being represented by attorneys James E. Duffy, Jr.
and Leslie E. Kobayashi, and Defendant STATE OF KAWAI'I
(hereinafter "the STATE") being represented by Deputy Attorneys
General Charlene M. Aina and Melissa L. Lewis, and the Court
having reviewed all memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in
connection with these motions, and the entire record and files
herein, and also having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel and being otherwise fully advised in'the premises, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter ItHRCpU) I summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See GECC
Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Haw. 5~6, 904 P.2d 630 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1995), aff'd in part, 80 Haw. 1~8, 905 P.2d 624 (1995).
HRCP Rule 56(c) also authorizes partial summary judgment on
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2.
3 .
4.
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital, filed May 7, 1996 (nHospital Motionn ).
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996
( "Interest Motion ") . .
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And Development Corporation And Hawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996 (nHFDC Motiona ).
Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (hereinafter
"PlaintiffsU) being represented by attorneys James E. Duffy, Jr.
and Leslie E. Kobayashi, and Defendant STATE OF KAWAI'I
(hereinafter "the STATE") being represented by Deputy Attorneys
General Charlene M. Aina and Melissa L. Lewis, and the Court
having reviewed all memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in
connection with these motions, and the entire record and files
herein, and also having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel and being otherwise fully advised in'the premises, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter ItHRCpU) I summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See GECC
Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Haw. 5~6, 904 P.2d 630 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1995), aff'd in part, 80 Haw. 1~8, 905 P.2d 624 (1995).
HRCP Rule 56(c) also authorizes partial summary judgment on
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2.
3 .
4.
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital, filed May 7, 1996 (nHospital Motionn ).
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996
( "Interest Motion ") . .
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And Development Corporation And Hawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996 (nHFDC Motiona ).
Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (hereinafter
"PlaintiffsU) being represented by attorneys James E. Duffy, Jr.
and Leslie E. Kobayashi, and Defendant STATE OF KAWAI'I
(hereinafter "the STATE") being represented by Deputy Attorneys
General Charlene M. Aina and Melissa L. Lewis, and the Court
having reviewed all memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in
connection with these motions, and the entire record and files
herein, and also having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel and being otherwise fully advised in'the premises, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter ItHRCpU) I summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See GECC
Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Haw. 5~6, 904 P.2d 630 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1995), aff'd in part, 80 Haw. 1~8, 905 P.2d 624 (1995).
HRCP Rule 56(c) also authorizes partial summary judgment on
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2.
3 .
4.
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital, filed May 7, 1996 (nHospital Motionn ).
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996
( "Interest Motion ") . .
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And Development Corporation And Hawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996 (nHFDC Motiona ).
Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (hereinafter
"PlaintiffsU) being represented by attorneys James E. Duffy, Jr.
and Leslie E. Kobayashi, and Defendant STATE OF KAWAI'I
(hereinafter "the STATE") being represented by Deputy Attorneys
General Charlene M. Aina and Melissa L. Lewis, and the Court
having reviewed all memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in
connection with these motions, and the entire record and files
herein, and also having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel and being otherwise fully advised in'the premises, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter ItHRCpU) I summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See GECC
Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Haw. 5~6, 904 P.2d 630 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1995), aff'd in part, 80 Haw. 1~8, 905 P.2d 624 (1995).
HRCP Rule 56(c) also authorizes partial summary judgment on
2
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2.
3 .
4.
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital, filed May 7, 1996 (nHospital Motionn ).
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996
( "Interest Motion ") . .
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And Development Corporation And Hawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996 (nHFDC Motiona ).
Plaintiffs OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (hereinafter
"PlaintiffsU) being represented by attorneys James E. Duffy, Jr.
and Leslie E. Kobayashi, and Defendant STATE OF KAWAI'I
(hereinafter "the STATE") being represented by Deputy Attorneys
General Charlene M. Aina and Melissa L. Lewis, and the Court
having reviewed all memoranda, affidavits and exhibits filed in
connection with these motions, and the entire record and files
herein, and also having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel and being otherwise fully advised in'the premises, the
Court finds and orders as follows:
STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter ItHRCpU) I summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See GECC
Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Haw. 5~6, 904 P.2d 630 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1995), aff'd in part, 80 Haw. 1~8, 905 P.2d 624 (1995).
HRCP Rule 56(c) also authorizes partial summary judgment on
2
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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issues of liability alone although there is· a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages. See also HRCP Rule 56(d).
DI:SCUSS:ION
Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56, the Court grants each of
Plaintiff's Motions For Partial Summary Judgment listed above.
The Court finds and concludes that, under Rule 56(c) of the
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and GECC Financial Corp. v.
Jaffarian, supra, there are no genuine issues of material fact
that would prohibit partial summary judgment and, clearly,
Plaintiff OHA is entitled to partial summary judgment concerning
the liability of the State for the revenues in question under
each of those motions.
In granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the Court does not reach issues relating to the
specific amounts being requested by Plaintiffs. The Court is not
ruling on such issues at this time, and each side will have its
opportunity to have a hearing or trial with respect to the
particular amounts involved, consistent with the pareial summary
judgments granted herein.
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered
all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and the
STATE in support of and in opposition to these Motions. The
Court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Upon annexation in 1898, the Republic of Hawai'i
"ceded ll lands to the United States which were returned to Hawai'i
upon its admission as a State in the United States subject to the
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issues of liability alone although there is· a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages. See also HRCP Rule 56(d).
DI:SCUSS:ION
Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56, the Court grants each of
Plaintiff's Motions For Partial Summary Judgment listed above.
The Court finds and concludes that, under Rule 56(c) of the
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and GECC Financial Corp. v.
Jaffarian, supra, there are no genuine issues of material fact
that would prohibit partial summary judgment and, clearly,
Plaintiff OHA is entitled to partial summary judgment concerning
the liability of the State for the revenues in question under
each of those motions.
In granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the Court does not reach issues relating to the
specific amounts being requested by Plaintiffs. The Court is not
ruling on such issues at this time, and each side will have its
opportunity to have a hearing or trial with respect to the
particular amounts involved, consistent with the pareial summary
judgments granted herein.
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered
all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and the
STATE in support of and in opposition to these Motions. The
Court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Upon annexation in 1898, the Republic of Hawai'i
"ceded ll lands to the United States which were returned to Hawai'i
upon its admission as a State in the United States subject to the
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issues of liability alone although there is· a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages. See also HRCP Rule 56(d).
DI:SCUSS:ION
Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56, the Court grants each of
Plaintiff's Motions For Partial Summary Judgment listed above.
The Court finds and concludes that, under Rule 56(c) of the
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and GECC Financial Corp. v.
Jaffarian, supra, there are no genuine issues of material fact
that would prohibit partial summary judgment and, clearly,
Plaintiff OHA is entitled to partial summary judgment concerning
the liability of the State for the revenues in question under
each of those motions.
In granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the Court does not reach issues relating to the
specific amounts being requested by Plaintiffs. The Court is not
ruling on such issues at this time, and each side will have its
opportunity to have a hearing or trial with respect to the
particular amounts involved, consistent with the pareial summary
judgments granted herein.
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered
all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and the
STATE in support of and in opposition to these Motions. The
Court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Upon annexation in 1898, the Republic of Hawai'i
"ceded ll lands to the United States which were returned to Hawai'i
upon its admission as a State in the United States subject to the
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issues of liability alone although there is· a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages. See also HRCP Rule 56(d).
DI:SCUSS:ION
Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56, the Court grants each of
Plaintiff's Motions For Partial Summary Judgment listed above.
The Court finds and concludes that, under Rule 56(c) of the
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and GECC Financial Corp. v.
Jaffarian, supra, there are no genuine issues of material fact
that would prohibit partial summary judgment and, clearly,
Plaintiff OHA is entitled to partial summary judgment concerning
the liability of the State for the revenues in question under
each of those motions.
In granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the Court does not reach issues relating to the
specific amounts being requested by Plaintiffs. The Court is not
ruling on such issues at this time, and each side will have its
opportunity to have a hearing or trial with respect to the
particular amounts involved, consistent with the pareial summary
judgments granted herein.
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered
all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and the
STATE in support of and in opposition to these Motions. The
Court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Upon annexation in 1898, the Republic of Hawai'i
"ceded ll lands to the United States which were returned to Hawai'i
upon its admission as a State in the United States subject to the
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issues of liability alone although there is· a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages. See also HRCP Rule 56(d).
DI:SCUSS:ION
Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56, the Court grants each of
Plaintiff's Motions For Partial Summary Judgment listed above.
The Court finds and concludes that, under Rule 56(c) of the
Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure and GECC Financial Corp. v.
Jaffarian, supra, there are no genuine issues of material fact
that would prohibit partial summary judgment and, clearly,
Plaintiff OHA is entitled to partial summary judgment concerning
the liability of the State for the revenues in question under
each of those motions.
In granting partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the Court does not reach issues relating to the
specific amounts being requested by Plaintiffs. The Court is not
ruling on such issues at this time, and each side will have its
opportunity to have a hearing or trial with respect to the
particular amounts involved, consistent with the pareial summary
judgments granted herein.
In the instant case, the Court has carefully considered
all of the evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiffs and the
STATE in support of and in opposition to these Motions. The
Court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Upon annexation in 1898, the Republic of Hawai'i
"ceded ll lands to the United States which were returned to Hawai'i
upon its admission as a State in the United States subject to the
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University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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provisions as see forth in the Admission Act, particularly at
Section S(f).
2. Section S(f) of the Admission Act states:
(f) The lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsection (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the supporc of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.
The Act does not state that the lands shall be ·ownedn by the
State of Hawai'i but says that these lands shall be ·held" by the
State of Hawai'i as a public trust.
3. Section S(f), subsection 2 of the Admission Act is
clear that ehe "beneficiaries of the public trust, among other
public beneficiaries, are the Native Hawaiians.
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provisions as see forth in the Admission Act, particularly at
Section S(f).
2. Section S(f) of the Admission Act states:
(f) The lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsection (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the supporc of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.
The Act does not state that the lands shall be ·ownedn by the
State of Hawai'i but says that these lands shall be ·held" by the
State of Hawai'i as a public trust.
3. Section S(f), subsection 2 of the Admission Act is
clear that ehe "beneficiaries of the public trust, among other
public beneficiaries, are the Native Hawaiians.
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provisions as see forth in the Admission Act, particularly at
Section S(f).
2. Section S(f) of the Admission Act states:
(f) The lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsection (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the supporc of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.
The Act does not state that the lands shall be ·ownedn by the
State of Hawai'i but says that these lands shall be ·held" by the
State of Hawai'i as a public trust.
3. Section S(f), subsection 2 of the Admission Act is
clear that ehe "beneficiaries of the public trust, among other
public beneficiaries, are the Native Hawaiians.
4
I I I I
• • • -• , • • 1
• • • •
provisions as see forth in the Admission Act, particularly at
Section S(f).
2. Section S(f) of the Admission Act states:
(f) The lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsection (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the supporc of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.
The Act does not state that the lands shall be ·ownedn by the
State of Hawai'i but says that these lands shall be ·held" by the
State of Hawai'i as a public trust.
3. Section S(f), subsection 2 of the Admission Act is
clear that ehe "beneficiaries of the public trust, among other
public beneficiaries, are the Native Hawaiians.
4
I I I I
• • • -• , • • 1
• • • •
provisions as see forth in the Admission Act, particularly at
Section S(f).
2. Section S(f) of the Admission Act states:
(f) The lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsection (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public use. Such lands, proceeds, and income shall be managed and disposed of for one or more of the foregoing purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said State may provide, and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. The schools and other educational institutions supported, in whole or in part out of such public trust shall forever remain under the exclusive control of said State; and no part of the proceeds or income from the lands granted under this Act shall be used for the supporc of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university.
The Act does not state that the lands shall be ·ownedn by the
State of Hawai'i but says that these lands shall be ·held" by the
State of Hawai'i as a public trust.
3. Section S(f), subsection 2 of the Admission Act is
clear that ehe "beneficiaries of the public trust, among other
public beneficiaries, are the Native Hawaiians.
4
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
• • • III
• • • • II
• III
• • • • •
4. Major constitutional and legislative provisions
have been reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Hawai.i state
legislature and the people of Hawai'i to ensure the protection of
the rights and interests of the Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries
of the public trust, in particular, at Article XII, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 273 of the 1980 Hawai'i
state legislature, and Chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes
("HRS") .
s. United States Senate Joint Resolution 19 adopted
by the United States Senate on January 21, 1993 ("Resolution")
specifically determined that the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Monarchy was illegal and that 1,800,000 acres of ceded lands were
part of the illegal overthrow and were improperly taken. The
Resolution points out that ~(t]he health and well-being of the
Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feeling and attachment to the land . . . (and] "that the Native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit
to future generations their ancestral territory and their
cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language and social
institutions."
6. HRS Section 5-7.5, the "Aloha Spirit" law, was
adopted by the Hawai"' i legislature in 1986, and states in
subsection (b):
In exerCising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant
5
• • • III
• • • • II
• III
• • • • •
4. Major constitutional and legislative provisions
have been reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Hawai.i state
legislature and the people of Hawai'i to ensure the protection of
the rights and interests of the Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries
of the public trust, in particular, at Article XII, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 273 of the 1980 Hawai'i
state legislature, and Chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes
("HRS") .
s. United States Senate Joint Resolution 19 adopted
by the United States Senate on January 21, 1993 ("Resolution")
specifically determined that the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Monarchy was illegal and that 1,800,000 acres of ceded lands were
part of the illegal overthrow and were improperly taken. The
Resolution points out that ~(t]he health and well-being of the
Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feeling and attachment to the land . . . (and] "that the Native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit
to future generations their ancestral territory and their
cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language and social
institutions."
6. HRS Section 5-7.5, the "Aloha Spirit" law, was
adopted by the Hawai"' i legislature in 1986, and states in
subsection (b):
In exerCising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant
5
• • • III
• • • • II
• III
• • • • •
4. Major constitutional and legislative provisions
have been reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Hawai.i state
legislature and the people of Hawai'i to ensure the protection of
the rights and interests of the Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries
of the public trust, in particular, at Article XII, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 273 of the 1980 Hawai'i
state legislature, and Chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes
("HRS") .
s. United States Senate Joint Resolution 19 adopted
by the United States Senate on January 21, 1993 ("Resolution")
specifically determined that the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Monarchy was illegal and that 1,800,000 acres of ceded lands were
part of the illegal overthrow and were improperly taken. The
Resolution points out that ~(t]he health and well-being of the
Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feeling and attachment to the land . . . (and] "that the Native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit
to future generations their ancestral territory and their
cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language and social
institutions."
6. HRS Section 5-7.5, the "Aloha Spirit" law, was
adopted by the Hawai"' i legislature in 1986, and states in
subsection (b):
In exerCising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant
5
• • • III
• • • • II
• III
• • • • •
4. Major constitutional and legislative provisions
have been reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Hawai.i state
legislature and the people of Hawai'i to ensure the protection of
the rights and interests of the Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries
of the public trust, in particular, at Article XII, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 273 of the 1980 Hawai'i
state legislature, and Chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes
("HRS") .
s. United States Senate Joint Resolution 19 adopted
by the United States Senate on January 21, 1993 ("Resolution")
specifically determined that the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Monarchy was illegal and that 1,800,000 acres of ceded lands were
part of the illegal overthrow and were improperly taken. The
Resolution points out that ~(t]he health and well-being of the
Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feeling and attachment to the land . . . (and] "that the Native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit
to future generations their ancestral territory and their
cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language and social
institutions."
6. HRS Section 5-7.5, the "Aloha Spirit" law, was
adopted by the Hawai"' i legislature in 1986, and states in
subsection (b):
In exerCising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant
5
• • • III
• • • • II
• III
• • • • •
4. Major constitutional and legislative provisions
have been reviewed, approved, and adopted by the Hawai.i state
legislature and the people of Hawai'i to ensure the protection of
the rights and interests of the Native Hawaiians as beneficiaries
of the public trust, in particular, at Article XII, Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution, Act 273 of the 1980 Hawai'i
state legislature, and Chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes
("HRS") .
s. United States Senate Joint Resolution 19 adopted
by the United States Senate on January 21, 1993 ("Resolution")
specifically determined that the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Monarchy was illegal and that 1,800,000 acres of ceded lands were
part of the illegal overthrow and were improperly taken. The
Resolution points out that ~(t]he health and well-being of the
Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep
feeling and attachment to the land . . . (and] "that the Native
Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit
to future generations their ancestral territory and their
cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and
traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language and social
institutions."
6. HRS Section 5-7.5, the "Aloha Spirit" law, was
adopted by the Hawai"' i legislature in 1986, and states in
subsection (b):
In exerCising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people, the legislature, governor, lieutenant
5
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
I
• • • I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
governor, executive officers, each department, the chief justice, associates justices and judges of the appellate, circuit and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the aloha spirit.
The legislature defined "aloha" in this statute at subsection (a)
as being: "Aloha means mutual regard and affection and extends
warmth and caring with no obligation in return, and aloha is the
essence of relationship in which each person is important to·
every other person for collective existence.- See also Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission,
79 Haw. 425, 450, 903 P.2d 1246,1271 (1995). The court is
hereby adopting these concepts and applying them in ruling on
these motions which directly relate to the well-being of native
Hawaiian people.
The Court also notes that the STATE relies heavily on
Act 304's (enacted by the Hawai'i legislature in 1990)
distinctions between "sovereign" and "proprietary" functions in
opposing these Motions. The Court concludes, however, that it
must liberally construe the "revenues" to which OHA is entitled,
and narrowly construe the exceptions and limitations to such
rtrevenues" that are not present in Section 5(£) of the Admission
Act of 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 and 6 (1959).
The Admission Act has the force and effect of
constitutional law. See Article XII, Section 4 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Therefore, the Admission Act "must be
construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the
people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting
6
I
• • • I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
governor, executive officers, each department, the chief justice, associates justices and judges of the appellate, circuit and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the aloha spirit.
The legislature defined "aloha" in this statute at subsection (a)
as being: "Aloha means mutual regard and affection and extends
warmth and caring with no obligation in return, and aloha is the
essence of relationship in which each person is important to·
every other person for collective existence.- See also Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission,
79 Haw. 425, 450, 903 P.2d 1246,1271 (1995). The court is
hereby adopting these concepts and applying them in ruling on
these motions which directly relate to the well-being of native
Hawaiian people.
The Court also notes that the STATE relies heavily on
Act 304's (enacted by the Hawai'i legislature in 1990)
distinctions between "sovereign" and "proprietary" functions in
opposing these Motions. The Court concludes, however, that it
must liberally construe the "revenues" to which OHA is entitled,
and narrowly construe the exceptions and limitations to such
rtrevenues" that are not present in Section 5(£) of the Admission
Act of 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 and 6 (1959).
The Admission Act has the force and effect of
constitutional law. See Article XII, Section 4 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Therefore, the Admission Act "must be
construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the
people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting
6
I
• • • I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
governor, executive officers, each department, the chief justice, associates justices and judges of the appellate, circuit and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the aloha spirit.
The legislature defined "aloha" in this statute at subsection (a)
as being: "Aloha means mutual regard and affection and extends
warmth and caring with no obligation in return, and aloha is the
essence of relationship in which each person is important to·
every other person for collective existence.- See also Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission,
79 Haw. 425, 450, 903 P.2d 1246,1271 (1995). The court is
hereby adopting these concepts and applying them in ruling on
these motions which directly relate to the well-being of native
Hawaiian people.
The Court also notes that the STATE relies heavily on
Act 304's (enacted by the Hawai'i legislature in 1990)
distinctions between "sovereign" and "proprietary" functions in
opposing these Motions. The Court concludes, however, that it
must liberally construe the "revenues" to which OHA is entitled,
and narrowly construe the exceptions and limitations to such
rtrevenues" that are not present in Section 5(£) of the Admission
Act of 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 and 6 (1959).
The Admission Act has the force and effect of
constitutional law. See Article XII, Section 4 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Therefore, the Admission Act "must be
construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the
people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting
6
I
• • • I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
governor, executive officers, each department, the chief justice, associates justices and judges of the appellate, circuit and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the aloha spirit.
The legislature defined "aloha" in this statute at subsection (a)
as being: "Aloha means mutual regard and affection and extends
warmth and caring with no obligation in return, and aloha is the
essence of relationship in which each person is important to·
every other person for collective existence.- See also Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission,
79 Haw. 425, 450, 903 P.2d 1246,1271 (1995). The court is
hereby adopting these concepts and applying them in ruling on
these motions which directly relate to the well-being of native
Hawaiian people.
The Court also notes that the STATE relies heavily on
Act 304's (enacted by the Hawai'i legislature in 1990)
distinctions between "sovereign" and "proprietary" functions in
opposing these Motions. The Court concludes, however, that it
must liberally construe the "revenues" to which OHA is entitled,
and narrowly construe the exceptions and limitations to such
rtrevenues" that are not present in Section 5(£) of the Admission
Act of 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 and 6 (1959).
The Admission Act has the force and effect of
constitutional law. See Article XII, Section 4 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Therefore, the Admission Act "must be
construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the
people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting
6
I
• • • I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
governor, executive officers, each department, the chief justice, associates justices and judges of the appellate, circuit and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the aloha spirit.
The legislature defined "aloha" in this statute at subsection (a)
as being: "Aloha means mutual regard and affection and extends
warmth and caring with no obligation in return, and aloha is the
essence of relationship in which each person is important to·
every other person for collective existence.- See also Public
Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission,
79 Haw. 425, 450, 903 P.2d 1246,1271 (1995). The court is
hereby adopting these concepts and applying them in ruling on
these motions which directly relate to the well-being of native
Hawaiian people.
The Court also notes that the STATE relies heavily on
Act 304's (enacted by the Hawai'i legislature in 1990)
distinctions between "sovereign" and "proprietary" functions in
opposing these Motions. The Court concludes, however, that it
must liberally construe the "revenues" to which OHA is entitled,
and narrowly construe the exceptions and limitations to such
rtrevenues" that are not present in Section 5(£) of the Admission
Act of 1959, Public Law 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 and 6 (1959).
The Admission Act has the force and effect of
constitutional law. See Article XII, Section 4 of the Hawai'i
State Constitution. Therefore, the Admission Act "must be
construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the
people adopting it, and the fundamental principle in interpreting
6
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
I I I I II
• -• • II
• II
• • • • • ".
• •
a constitutional provision is to give effec~" to that intent."
Hirano v. Peabody, 81 Haw. 230, 232, 915 P.2d 704, 706 (~996)
{quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Haw. 157, 167, 890
P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995».
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature as gleaned primarily from
the statutory language. State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 7~S
P.2d 822 (1986). Section S(f} of the Admission Act provides the
following:
[tlhe lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians ....
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the Admission Act reflects the
constitutional intent to liberally construe 11 revenues . " The use
of the words "proceeds n and 11 income therefrom" demonstrate that
Congress intended that all revenues derived from ceded lands be
placed in public trust. Further, the language of the Admission
Act does not explicitly state that "proceeds l1 be limited by
geographical location. If Congress intended to limit what
proceeds and income were to be held in public trust, it would not
have drafted this statute so broadly. Accordingly, the Admission
Act mandates a liberal construction of "revenues. R
7
EXlliAB.AC2S& aCA .AiMa = .2&£&£ _we .Zt&EJiSS&£&&£ &&1&JA&ZJ$li'
I I I I II
• -• • II
• II
• • • • • ".
• •
a constitutional provision is to give effec~" to that intent."
Hirano v. Peabody, 81 Haw. 230, 232, 915 P.2d 704, 706 (~996)
{quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Haw. 157, 167, 890
P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995».
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature as gleaned primarily from
the statutory language. State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 7~S
P.2d 822 (1986). Section S(f} of the Admission Act provides the
following:
[tlhe lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians ....
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the Admission Act reflects the
constitutional intent to liberally construe 11 revenues . " The use
of the words "proceeds n and 11 income therefrom" demonstrate that
Congress intended that all revenues derived from ceded lands be
placed in public trust. Further, the language of the Admission
Act does not explicitly state that "proceeds l1 be limited by
geographical location. If Congress intended to limit what
proceeds and income were to be held in public trust, it would not
have drafted this statute so broadly. Accordingly, the Admission
Act mandates a liberal construction of "revenues. R
7
EXlliAB.AC2S& aCA .AiMa = .2&£&£ _we .Zt&EJiSS&£&&£ &&1&JA&ZJ$li'
I I I I II
• -• • II
• II
• • • • • ".
• •
a constitutional provision is to give effec~" to that intent."
Hirano v. Peabody, 81 Haw. 230, 232, 915 P.2d 704, 706 (~996)
{quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Haw. 157, 167, 890
P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995».
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature as gleaned primarily from
the statutory language. State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 7~S
P.2d 822 (1986). Section S(f} of the Admission Act provides the
following:
[tlhe lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians ....
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the Admission Act reflects the
constitutional intent to liberally construe 11 revenues . " The use
of the words "proceeds n and 11 income therefrom" demonstrate that
Congress intended that all revenues derived from ceded lands be
placed in public trust. Further, the language of the Admission
Act does not explicitly state that "proceeds l1 be limited by
geographical location. If Congress intended to limit what
proceeds and income were to be held in public trust, it would not
have drafted this statute so broadly. Accordingly, the Admission
Act mandates a liberal construction of "revenues. R
7
EXlliAB.AC2S& aCA .AiMa = .2&£&£ _we .Zt&EJiSS&£&&£ &&1&JA&ZJ$li'
I I I I II
• -• • II
• II
• • • • • ".
• •
a constitutional provision is to give effec~" to that intent."
Hirano v. Peabody, 81 Haw. 230, 232, 915 P.2d 704, 706 (~996)
{quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Haw. 157, 167, 890
P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995».
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature as gleaned primarily from
the statutory language. State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 7~S
P.2d 822 (1986). Section S(f} of the Admission Act provides the
following:
[tlhe lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians ....
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the Admission Act reflects the
constitutional intent to liberally construe 11 revenues . " The use
of the words "proceeds n and 11 income therefrom" demonstrate that
Congress intended that all revenues derived from ceded lands be
placed in public trust. Further, the language of the Admission
Act does not explicitly state that "proceeds l1 be limited by
geographical location. If Congress intended to limit what
proceeds and income were to be held in public trust, it would not
have drafted this statute so broadly. Accordingly, the Admission
Act mandates a liberal construction of "revenues. R
7
EXlliAB.AC2S& aCA .AiMa = .2&£&£ _we .Zt&EJiSS&£&&£ &&1&JA&ZJ$li'
I I I I II
• -• • II
• II
• • • • • ".
• •
a constitutional provision is to give effec~" to that intent."
Hirano v. Peabody, 81 Haw. 230, 232, 915 P.2d 704, 706 (~996)
{quoting Convention Center Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Haw. 157, 167, 890
P.2d 1197, 1207 (1995».
The guiding principle of statutory construction is to
ascertain the intent of the legislature as gleaned primarily from
the statutory language. State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw. App. 173, 7~S
P.2d 822 (1986). Section S(f} of the Admission Act provides the
following:
[tlhe lands granted to the State of Hawai'i by subsection (b) of this section and public lands retained by the United States under subsections (c) and (d) and later conveyed to the State under subsection (e), together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for the support of the public schools and other public educational institutions, for the betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians ....
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the Admission Act reflects the
constitutional intent to liberally construe 11 revenues . " The use
of the words "proceeds n and 11 income therefrom" demonstrate that
Congress intended that all revenues derived from ceded lands be
placed in public trust. Further, the language of the Admission
Act does not explicitly state that "proceeds l1 be limited by
geographical location. If Congress intended to limit what
proceeds and income were to be held in public trust, it would not
have drafted this statute so broadly. Accordingly, the Admission
Act mandates a liberal construction of "revenues. R
7
EXlliAB.AC2S& aCA .AiMa = .2&£&£ _we .Zt&EJiSS&£&&£ &&1&JA&ZJ$li' University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
• • • • • • • • -• • • II
• • • • •
In turn, Act 304 is a remedial statute, because it was
enacted to effectuate the intent and spirit of the Admission Act .
The purpose of Act 304, as set forth in House Bill No. 2896, is
to:
(c]larify the basis for determining the revenue due to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) for the betterment of Native Hawaiians under the provisions of the State Constitution and chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
House Bill No. 2896 indicates that Act 304 was further intended as:
(a]n important first step in addressing the concerns and needs of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. With the confusion cleared up over what constitutes the public land trust and revenue derived therefrom, OHA will be in a position to significantly increase its efforts on behalf of Native Hawaiians.
~ Standing Comm. Rep. No. 3073, 1990 Senate Journal at 1252-
1253; Standing Comm. Rep. No. 648-90, 1990 House Journal at 1082.
It is clear that Act 304 is a remedial statute, because
it attempted to clarify what constituted the public trust and the
basis for determining the revenue due to OHA in order to carry
out the purpose of the Admission Act. As a remedial statute, Act
304'9 definition of nrevenue" should be construed broadly to
include all revenues that were intended in the Admission Act.
Significantly, the Admission Act makes no distinction
between sovereign functions and proprietary functions for
purposes of the public trust. Since the Admission Act makes no
distinction between sovereign functions and proprietary functions
for purposes of the public trust, the Court concludes that it
must broadly construe revenues in effectuating the public trust
8
• • • • • • • • -• • • II
• • • • •
In turn, Act 304 is a remedial statute, because it was
enacted to effectuate the intent and spirit of the Admission Act .
The purpose of Act 304, as set forth in House Bill No. 2896, is
to:
(c]larify the basis for determining the revenue due to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) for the betterment of Native Hawaiians under the provisions of the State Constitution and chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
House Bill No. 2896 indicates that Act 304 was further intended as:
(a]n important first step in addressing the concerns and needs of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. With the confusion cleared up over what constitutes the public land trust and revenue derived therefrom, OHA will be in a position to significantly increase its efforts on behalf of Native Hawaiians.
~ Standing Comm. Rep. No. 3073, 1990 Senate Journal at 1252-
1253; Standing Comm. Rep. No. 648-90, 1990 House Journal at 1082.
It is clear that Act 304 is a remedial statute, because
it attempted to clarify what constituted the public trust and the
basis for determining the revenue due to OHA in order to carry
out the purpose of the Admission Act. As a remedial statute, Act
304'9 definition of nrevenue" should be construed broadly to
include all revenues that were intended in the Admission Act.
Significantly, the Admission Act makes no distinction
between sovereign functions and proprietary functions for
purposes of the public trust. Since the Admission Act makes no
distinction between sovereign functions and proprietary functions
for purposes of the public trust, the Court concludes that it
must broadly construe revenues in effectuating the public trust
8
• • • • • • • • -• • • II
• • • • •
In turn, Act 304 is a remedial statute, because it was
enacted to effectuate the intent and spirit of the Admission Act .
The purpose of Act 304, as set forth in House Bill No. 2896, is
to:
(c]larify the basis for determining the revenue due to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) for the betterment of Native Hawaiians under the provisions of the State Constitution and chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
House Bill No. 2896 indicates that Act 304 was further intended as:
(a]n important first step in addressing the concerns and needs of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. With the confusion cleared up over what constitutes the public land trust and revenue derived therefrom, OHA will be in a position to significantly increase its efforts on behalf of Native Hawaiians.
~ Standing Comm. Rep. No. 3073, 1990 Senate Journal at 1252-
1253; Standing Comm. Rep. No. 648-90, 1990 House Journal at 1082.
It is clear that Act 304 is a remedial statute, because
it attempted to clarify what constituted the public trust and the
basis for determining the revenue due to OHA in order to carry
out the purpose of the Admission Act. As a remedial statute, Act
304'9 definition of nrevenue" should be construed broadly to
include all revenues that were intended in the Admission Act.
Significantly, the Admission Act makes no distinction
between sovereign functions and proprietary functions for
purposes of the public trust. Since the Admission Act makes no
distinction between sovereign functions and proprietary functions
for purposes of the public trust, the Court concludes that it
must broadly construe revenues in effectuating the public trust
8
• • • • • • • • -• • • II
• • • • •
In turn, Act 304 is a remedial statute, because it was
enacted to effectuate the intent and spirit of the Admission Act .
The purpose of Act 304, as set forth in House Bill No. 2896, is
to:
(c]larify the basis for determining the revenue due to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) for the betterment of Native Hawaiians under the provisions of the State Constitution and chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
House Bill No. 2896 indicates that Act 304 was further intended as:
(a]n important first step in addressing the concerns and needs of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. With the confusion cleared up over what constitutes the public land trust and revenue derived therefrom, OHA will be in a position to significantly increase its efforts on behalf of Native Hawaiians.
~ Standing Comm. Rep. No. 3073, 1990 Senate Journal at 1252-
1253; Standing Comm. Rep. No. 648-90, 1990 House Journal at 1082.
It is clear that Act 304 is a remedial statute, because
it attempted to clarify what constituted the public trust and the
basis for determining the revenue due to OHA in order to carry
out the purpose of the Admission Act. As a remedial statute, Act
304'9 definition of nrevenue" should be construed broadly to
include all revenues that were intended in the Admission Act.
Significantly, the Admission Act makes no distinction
between sovereign functions and proprietary functions for
purposes of the public trust. Since the Admission Act makes no
distinction between sovereign functions and proprietary functions
for purposes of the public trust, the Court concludes that it
must broadly construe revenues in effectuating the public trust
8
• • • • • • • • -• • • II
• • • • •
In turn, Act 304 is a remedial statute, because it was
enacted to effectuate the intent and spirit of the Admission Act .
The purpose of Act 304, as set forth in House Bill No. 2896, is
to:
(c]larify the basis for determining the revenue due to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) for the betterment of Native Hawaiians under the provisions of the State Constitution and chapter 10, Hawai'i Revised Statutes.
House Bill No. 2896 indicates that Act 304 was further intended as:
(a]n important first step in addressing the concerns and needs of Native Hawaiians and Hawaiians. With the confusion cleared up over what constitutes the public land trust and revenue derived therefrom, OHA will be in a position to significantly increase its efforts on behalf of Native Hawaiians.
~ Standing Comm. Rep. No. 3073, 1990 Senate Journal at 1252-
1253; Standing Comm. Rep. No. 648-90, 1990 House Journal at 1082.
It is clear that Act 304 is a remedial statute, because
it attempted to clarify what constituted the public trust and the
basis for determining the revenue due to OHA in order to carry
out the purpose of the Admission Act. As a remedial statute, Act
304'9 definition of nrevenue" should be construed broadly to
include all revenues that were intended in the Admission Act.
Significantly, the Admission Act makes no distinction
between sovereign functions and proprietary functions for
purposes of the public trust. Since the Admission Act makes no
distinction between sovereign functions and proprietary functions
for purposes of the public trust, the Court concludes that it
must broadly construe revenues in effectuating the public trust
8
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• I I I
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and narrowly construe any distinctions not contained in the
Admission Act. In other words, the court interprets these
statutes liberally with respect to the aspects of the statutes
that benefit the beneficiaries of the public trust. See State v.
Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied
sub nom, Hawaiian Homes Commission v. Aged Hawaiians, 116 S. Ct.
77 (1995); Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to
each of the Motions.
I. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Whether The R.evenues Pram The Waikiki Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed Hay 7, 1996.
In considering the issues raised in connection with the
Duty Free Motion, the Court notes that there is ng dispute that
(a) the Waikiki Duty Free shop is not located on Public Trust
Lands, (b) the STATE calculates the rents for the Airport Duty
Free concessions based on gross sales generated from both the
Airport shop and the Waikiki shop, (c) the Waikiki Duty Free shop
could not exist, as presently constituted, without the use of
facilities located at the Airport (i.e., delivery to the Airport
gate or to the aircraft)" and (d) the Airport concession agreement
between the State and the Duty Free operator gives the operator
the right to deliver goods sold at the.Waikiki Duty Free shop to,
the Airport.
9
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• I
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and narrowly construe any distinctions not contained in the
Admission Act. In other words, the court interprets these
statutes liberally with respect to the aspects of the statutes
that benefit the beneficiaries of the public trust. See State v.
Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied
sub nom, Hawaiian Homes Commission v. Aged Hawaiians, 116 S. Ct.
77 (1995); Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to
each of the Motions.
I. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Whether The R.evenues Pram The Waikiki Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed Hay 7, 1996.
In considering the issues raised in connection with the
Duty Free Motion, the Court notes that there is ng dispute that
(a) the Waikiki Duty Free shop is not located on Public Trust
Lands, (b) the STATE calculates the rents for the Airport Duty
Free concessions based on gross sales generated from both the
Airport shop and the Waikiki shop, (c) the Waikiki Duty Free shop
could not exist, as presently constituted, without the use of
facilities located at the Airport (i.e., delivery to the Airport
gate or to the aircraft)" and (d) the Airport concession agreement
between the State and the Duty Free operator gives the operator
the right to deliver goods sold at the.Waikiki Duty Free shop to,
the Airport.
9
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• I I I
• I
• • J
• •
and narrowly construe any distinctions not contained in the
Admission Act. In other words, the court interprets these
statutes liberally with respect to the aspects of the statutes
that benefit the beneficiaries of the public trust. See State v.
Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied
sub nom, Hawaiian Homes Commission v. Aged Hawaiians, 116 S. Ct.
77 (1995); Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to
each of the Motions.
I. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Whether The R.evenues Pram The Waikiki Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed Hay 7, 1996.
In considering the issues raised in connection with the
Duty Free Motion, the Court notes that there is ng dispute that
(a) the Waikiki Duty Free shop is not located on Public Trust
Lands, (b) the STATE calculates the rents for the Airport Duty
Free concessions based on gross sales generated from both the
Airport shop and the Waikiki shop, (c) the Waikiki Duty Free shop
could not exist, as presently constituted, without the use of
facilities located at the Airport (i.e., delivery to the Airport
gate or to the aircraft)" and (d) the Airport concession agreement
between the State and the Duty Free operator gives the operator
the right to deliver goods sold at the.Waikiki Duty Free shop to,
the Airport.
9
I
• • I I I II II
• I I I
• I
• • J
• •
and narrowly construe any distinctions not contained in the
Admission Act. In other words, the court interprets these
statutes liberally with respect to the aspects of the statutes
that benefit the beneficiaries of the public trust. See State v.
Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied
sub nom, Hawaiian Homes Commission v. Aged Hawaiians, 116 S. Ct.
77 (1995); Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to
each of the Motions.
I. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Whether The R.evenues Pram The Waikiki Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed Hay 7, 1996.
In considering the issues raised in connection with the
Duty Free Motion, the Court notes that there is ng dispute that
(a) the Waikiki Duty Free shop is not located on Public Trust
Lands, (b) the STATE calculates the rents for the Airport Duty
Free concessions based on gross sales generated from both the
Airport shop and the Waikiki shop, (c) the Waikiki Duty Free shop
could not exist, as presently constituted, without the use of
facilities located at the Airport (i.e., delivery to the Airport
gate or to the aircraft)" and (d) the Airport concession agreement
between the State and the Duty Free operator gives the operator
the right to deliver goods sold at the.Waikiki Duty Free shop to,
the Airport.
9
I
• • I I I II II
• I I I
• I
• • J
• •
and narrowly construe any distinctions not contained in the
Admission Act. In other words, the court interprets these
statutes liberally with respect to the aspects of the statutes
that benefit the beneficiaries of the public trust. See State v.
Jim, 80 Haw. 168, 907 P.2d 754 (1995); Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission, 78 Haw. 192, 891 P.2d 279 (1995), cert. denied
sub nom, Hawaiian Homes Commission v. Aged Hawaiians, 116 S. Ct.
77 (1995); Ahuna v Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327,
640 P.2d 1161 (1982).
With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to
each of the Motions.
I. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Whether The R.evenues Pram The Waikiki Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed Hay 7, 1996.
In considering the issues raised in connection with the
Duty Free Motion, the Court notes that there is ng dispute that
(a) the Waikiki Duty Free shop is not located on Public Trust
Lands, (b) the STATE calculates the rents for the Airport Duty
Free concessions based on gross sales generated from both the
Airport shop and the Waikiki shop, (c) the Waikiki Duty Free shop
could not exist, as presently constituted, without the use of
facilities located at the Airport (i.e., delivery to the Airport
gate or to the aircraft)" and (d) the Airport concession agreement
between the State and the Duty Free operator gives the operator
the right to deliver goods sold at the.Waikiki Duty Free shop to,
the Airport.
9
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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• • • • • I
• • • • j
j
•
In other words, the percentage rent the State charges
based on off-Airport gross sales is clearly rent or a fee for the
use of Airport facilities (i.e., the right to use Airport
facilities to deliver to the Airport), which facilitles are
located on Public Trust Lands.
Based upon the foregoing, and HRS Section lO-2 as
amended by Act 304 and other related provisions, the Court finds
and concludes that the State is required to pay OHA its pro rata
portion of all rents or fees collected by the State from the Duty
Free concessions at the State's airports, including rents based
upon gross sales generated from the Waikiki Duty Free shop.
These rents are clearly "revenues" as provided in the above-cited
law.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues Prom The Housing Pinance And Development Corporation And Kawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996.
The STATE's primary argument is based on the
proprietary/sovereign function distinction set forth in HRS
Section 10-2. However, the Court finds that:
(a) HRS Section lO-2 has a specific listing of
sovereign functions not to be included in the definition of
"revenues". The STATE's activities which are the subject of the
HFDC Motion are not specifically listed.
(b) More importantly, the Admission Act does not make
a similar distinction. While not addressing the issue of whether
10
I
• • • • I
• • • • • I
• • • • j
j
•
In other words, the percentage rent the State charges
based on off-Airport gross sales is clearly rent or a fee for the
use of Airport facilities (i.e., the right to use Airport
facilities to deliver to the Airport), which facilitles are
located on Public Trust Lands.
Based upon the foregoing, and HRS Section lO-2 as
amended by Act 304 and other related provisions, the Court finds
and concludes that the State is required to pay OHA its pro rata
portion of all rents or fees collected by the State from the Duty
Free concessions at the State's airports, including rents based
upon gross sales generated from the Waikiki Duty Free shop.
These rents are clearly "revenues" as provided in the above-cited
law.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues Prom The Housing Pinance And Development Corporation And Kawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996.
The STATE's primary argument is based on the
proprietary/sovereign function distinction set forth in HRS
Section 10-2. However, the Court finds that:
(a) HRS Section lO-2 has a specific listing of
sovereign functions not to be included in the definition of
"revenues". The STATE's activities which are the subject of the
HFDC Motion are not specifically listed.
(b) More importantly, the Admission Act does not make
a similar distinction. While not addressing the issue of whether
10
I
• • • • I
• • • • • I
• • • • j
j
•
In other words, the percentage rent the State charges
based on off-Airport gross sales is clearly rent or a fee for the
use of Airport facilities (i.e., the right to use Airport
facilities to deliver to the Airport), which facilitles are
located on Public Trust Lands.
Based upon the foregoing, and HRS Section lO-2 as
amended by Act 304 and other related provisions, the Court finds
and concludes that the State is required to pay OHA its pro rata
portion of all rents or fees collected by the State from the Duty
Free concessions at the State's airports, including rents based
upon gross sales generated from the Waikiki Duty Free shop.
These rents are clearly "revenues" as provided in the above-cited
law.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues Prom The Housing Pinance And Development Corporation And Kawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996.
The STATE's primary argument is based on the
proprietary/sovereign function distinction set forth in HRS
Section 10-2. However, the Court finds that:
(a) HRS Section lO-2 has a specific listing of
sovereign functions not to be included in the definition of
"revenues". The STATE's activities which are the subject of the
HFDC Motion are not specifically listed.
(b) More importantly, the Admission Act does not make
a similar distinction. While not addressing the issue of whether
10
I
• • • • I
• • • • • I
• • • • j
j
•
In other words, the percentage rent the State charges
based on off-Airport gross sales is clearly rent or a fee for the
use of Airport facilities (i.e., the right to use Airport
facilities to deliver to the Airport), which facilitles are
located on Public Trust Lands.
Based upon the foregoing, and HRS Section lO-2 as
amended by Act 304 and other related provisions, the Court finds
and concludes that the State is required to pay OHA its pro rata
portion of all rents or fees collected by the State from the Duty
Free concessions at the State's airports, including rents based
upon gross sales generated from the Waikiki Duty Free shop.
These rents are clearly "revenues" as provided in the above-cited
law.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues Prom The Housing Pinance And Development Corporation And Kawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996.
The STATE's primary argument is based on the
proprietary/sovereign function distinction set forth in HRS
Section 10-2. However, the Court finds that:
(a) HRS Section lO-2 has a specific listing of
sovereign functions not to be included in the definition of
"revenues". The STATE's activities which are the subject of the
HFDC Motion are not specifically listed.
(b) More importantly, the Admission Act does not make
a similar distinction. While not addressing the issue of whether
10
I
• • • • I
• • • • • I
• • • • j
j
•
In other words, the percentage rent the State charges
based on off-Airport gross sales is clearly rent or a fee for the
use of Airport facilities (i.e., the right to use Airport
facilities to deliver to the Airport), which facilitles are
located on Public Trust Lands.
Based upon the foregoing, and HRS Section lO-2 as
amended by Act 304 and other related provisions, the Court finds
and concludes that the State is required to pay OHA its pro rata
portion of all rents or fees collected by the State from the Duty
Free concessions at the State's airports, including rents based
upon gross sales generated from the Waikiki Duty Free shop.
These rents are clearly "revenues" as provided in the above-cited
law.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
II. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Revenues Prom The Housing Pinance And Development Corporation And Kawai'i Housing Authority, filed May 7, 1996.
The STATE's primary argument is based on the
proprietary/sovereign function distinction set forth in HRS
Section 10-2. However, the Court finds that:
(a) HRS Section lO-2 has a specific listing of
sovereign functions not to be included in the definition of
"revenues". The STATE's activities which are the subject of the
HFDC Motion are not specifically listed.
(b) More importantly, the Admission Act does not make
a similar distinction. While not addressing the issue of whether
10
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
I I I I I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the Admission Act or HRS Chapter 10 should control, the Court
finds that the activities excluded from the DRS Section lO-2
definition of "revenues" must be strictly construed. Given the
nature of the STATE's activities (which are carried out by
private individuals also), the Court finds such activities to be
proprietary in nature.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IJ:J:. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues Prom T.he Hilo Hospital,
filed May', 1996.
The Court refers to Section II set forth above since
the issues to be considered with respect to the Hospital Motion
are similar to those to be considered with respect to the HFDC
Motion.
The nincome" at issue here, comes from three sources:
(1) patient services fees, (2) cafeteria sales and (3) rental
income from Clinical Laboratories and Radiologic Associates,
lessees of the State at Hilo Hospital (collectively -Hilo
Hospital Income").
The Hilo Hospital Income is generated from proprietary
actions rather than through the exercise of sovereign functions
because courts in other jurisdictions have held that state
hospitals are proprietary, and not governmental nor ~overeign, in
function. Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County, 440
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994) ; Hershel v. University Hospital Foundation,
II
I I I I I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the Admission Act or HRS Chapter 10 should control, the Court
finds that the activities excluded from the DRS Section lO-2
definition of "revenues" must be strictly construed. Given the
nature of the STATE's activities (which are carried out by
private individuals also), the Court finds such activities to be
proprietary in nature.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IJ:J:. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues Prom T.he Hilo Hospital,
filed May', 1996.
The Court refers to Section II set forth above since
the issues to be considered with respect to the Hospital Motion
are similar to those to be considered with respect to the HFDC
Motion.
The nincome" at issue here, comes from three sources:
(1) patient services fees, (2) cafeteria sales and (3) rental
income from Clinical Laboratories and Radiologic Associates,
lessees of the State at Hilo Hospital (collectively -Hilo
Hospital Income").
The Hilo Hospital Income is generated from proprietary
actions rather than through the exercise of sovereign functions
because courts in other jurisdictions have held that state
hospitals are proprietary, and not governmental nor ~overeign, in
function. Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County, 440
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994) ; Hershel v. University Hospital Foundation,
II
I I I I I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the Admission Act or HRS Chapter 10 should control, the Court
finds that the activities excluded from the DRS Section lO-2
definition of "revenues" must be strictly construed. Given the
nature of the STATE's activities (which are carried out by
private individuals also), the Court finds such activities to be
proprietary in nature.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IJ:J:. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues Prom T.he Hilo Hospital,
filed May', 1996.
The Court refers to Section II set forth above since
the issues to be considered with respect to the Hospital Motion
are similar to those to be considered with respect to the HFDC
Motion.
The nincome" at issue here, comes from three sources:
(1) patient services fees, (2) cafeteria sales and (3) rental
income from Clinical Laboratories and Radiologic Associates,
lessees of the State at Hilo Hospital (collectively -Hilo
Hospital Income").
The Hilo Hospital Income is generated from proprietary
actions rather than through the exercise of sovereign functions
because courts in other jurisdictions have held that state
hospitals are proprietary, and not governmental nor ~overeign, in
function. Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County, 440
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994) ; Hershel v. University Hospital Foundation,
II
I I I I I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the Admission Act or HRS Chapter 10 should control, the Court
finds that the activities excluded from the DRS Section lO-2
definition of "revenues" must be strictly construed. Given the
nature of the STATE's activities (which are carried out by
private individuals also), the Court finds such activities to be
proprietary in nature.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IJ:J:. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues Prom T.he Hilo Hospital,
filed May', 1996.
The Court refers to Section II set forth above since
the issues to be considered with respect to the Hospital Motion
are similar to those to be considered with respect to the HFDC
Motion.
The nincome" at issue here, comes from three sources:
(1) patient services fees, (2) cafeteria sales and (3) rental
income from Clinical Laboratories and Radiologic Associates,
lessees of the State at Hilo Hospital (collectively -Hilo
Hospital Income").
The Hilo Hospital Income is generated from proprietary
actions rather than through the exercise of sovereign functions
because courts in other jurisdictions have held that state
hospitals are proprietary, and not governmental nor ~overeign, in
function. Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County, 440
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994) ; Hershel v. University Hospital Foundation,
II
I I I I I
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
the Admission Act or HRS Chapter 10 should control, the Court
finds that the activities excluded from the DRS Section lO-2
definition of "revenues" must be strictly construed. Given the
nature of the STATE's activities (which are carried out by
private individuals also), the Court finds such activities to be
proprietary in nature.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IJ:J:. Plaintiffs I Motion Por Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues Prom T.he Hilo Hospital,
filed May', 1996.
The Court refers to Section II set forth above since
the issues to be considered with respect to the Hospital Motion
are similar to those to be considered with respect to the HFDC
Motion.
The nincome" at issue here, comes from three sources:
(1) patient services fees, (2) cafeteria sales and (3) rental
income from Clinical Laboratories and Radiologic Associates,
lessees of the State at Hilo Hospital (collectively -Hilo
Hospital Income").
The Hilo Hospital Income is generated from proprietary
actions rather than through the exercise of sovereign functions
because courts in other jurisdictions have held that state
hospitals are proprietary, and not governmental nor ~overeign, in
function. Thomas v. Hospital Authority of Clarke County, 440
S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1994) ; Hershel v. University Hospital Foundation,
II
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
I I I I I , , I , III
• , , • , • I
• •
610 P.2d 237 (Okl. 1980); Sides v. Cabarrus·Memorial Hospital,
213 S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1975). As noted by the court in Thomas:
(T)hat the function of a hospital is not, in essence, a governmental function is made apparent by our holding in Richmond . County Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 184, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985), wherein we reiterated the holding in Bradfield v. Hosp. Authority of Musc:ogee County, supra, that there is no apparent reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate a hospital, either as lessee or owner, so as to promote, in. the same way as a hospital authority, the public health functions of government. As another jurisdiction has phrased it:
while it may be an appropriate goal or objective of government to establish a hospital authority, it does not follow that the daily operations of such a hospital authority constitute a governmental function. Governmental functions more properly refer to the tasks of governing. There is, for example, a governmental character to activities such as the collection of taxes or the operation of a court system. But the services of healing offered by a public hospital are not governmental functions. Lykins v. Peooles Community Hosoital, 3SS F.Supp. 52, S3 (E.D.Mich.1973).
Thomas, 440 S.E.2d at 197 n 6.
While the State characterizes Hilo Hospital as an
exercise of its sovereign functions because it is mandated by
statute to provide public health services, it cannot deny anyone
health services, and, it has not traditionally operated at a
profit, such activities are not the hallmarks of ·sovereign
functions." Rather, the better view of whether or not the
12
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• , , • , • I
• •
610 P.2d 237 (Okl. 1980); Sides v. Cabarrus·Memorial Hospital,
213 S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1975). As noted by the court in Thomas:
(T)hat the function of a hospital is not, in essence, a governmental function is made apparent by our holding in Richmond . County Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 184, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985), wherein we reiterated the holding in Bradfield v. Hosp. Authority of Musc:ogee County, supra, that there is no apparent reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate a hospital, either as lessee or owner, so as to promote, in. the same way as a hospital authority, the public health functions of government. As another jurisdiction has phrased it:
while it may be an appropriate goal or objective of government to establish a hospital authority, it does not follow that the daily operations of such a hospital authority constitute a governmental function. Governmental functions more properly refer to the tasks of governing. There is, for example, a governmental character to activities such as the collection of taxes or the operation of a court system. But the services of healing offered by a public hospital are not governmental functions. Lykins v. Peooles Community Hosoital, 3SS F.Supp. 52, S3 (E.D.Mich.1973).
Thomas, 440 S.E.2d at 197 n 6.
While the State characterizes Hilo Hospital as an
exercise of its sovereign functions because it is mandated by
statute to provide public health services, it cannot deny anyone
health services, and, it has not traditionally operated at a
profit, such activities are not the hallmarks of ·sovereign
functions." Rather, the better view of whether or not the
12
I I I I I , , I , III
• , , • , • I
• •
610 P.2d 237 (Okl. 1980); Sides v. Cabarrus·Memorial Hospital,
213 S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1975). As noted by the court in Thomas:
(T)hat the function of a hospital is not, in essence, a governmental function is made apparent by our holding in Richmond . County Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 184, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985), wherein we reiterated the holding in Bradfield v. Hosp. Authority of Musc:ogee County, supra, that there is no apparent reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate a hospital, either as lessee or owner, so as to promote, in. the same way as a hospital authority, the public health functions of government. As another jurisdiction has phrased it:
while it may be an appropriate goal or objective of government to establish a hospital authority, it does not follow that the daily operations of such a hospital authority constitute a governmental function. Governmental functions more properly refer to the tasks of governing. There is, for example, a governmental character to activities such as the collection of taxes or the operation of a court system. But the services of healing offered by a public hospital are not governmental functions. Lykins v. Peooles Community Hosoital, 3SS F.Supp. 52, S3 (E.D.Mich.1973).
Thomas, 440 S.E.2d at 197 n 6.
While the State characterizes Hilo Hospital as an
exercise of its sovereign functions because it is mandated by
statute to provide public health services, it cannot deny anyone
health services, and, it has not traditionally operated at a
profit, such activities are not the hallmarks of ·sovereign
functions." Rather, the better view of whether or not the
12
I I I I I , , I , III
• , , • , • I
• •
610 P.2d 237 (Okl. 1980); Sides v. Cabarrus·Memorial Hospital,
213 S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1975). As noted by the court in Thomas:
(T)hat the function of a hospital is not, in essence, a governmental function is made apparent by our holding in Richmond . County Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 184, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985), wherein we reiterated the holding in Bradfield v. Hosp. Authority of Musc:ogee County, supra, that there is no apparent reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate a hospital, either as lessee or owner, so as to promote, in. the same way as a hospital authority, the public health functions of government. As another jurisdiction has phrased it:
while it may be an appropriate goal or objective of government to establish a hospital authority, it does not follow that the daily operations of such a hospital authority constitute a governmental function. Governmental functions more properly refer to the tasks of governing. There is, for example, a governmental character to activities such as the collection of taxes or the operation of a court system. But the services of healing offered by a public hospital are not governmental functions. Lykins v. Peooles Community Hosoital, 3SS F.Supp. 52, S3 (E.D.Mich.1973).
Thomas, 440 S.E.2d at 197 n 6.
While the State characterizes Hilo Hospital as an
exercise of its sovereign functions because it is mandated by
statute to provide public health services, it cannot deny anyone
health services, and, it has not traditionally operated at a
profit, such activities are not the hallmarks of ·sovereign
functions." Rather, the better view of whether or not the
12
I I I I I , , I , III
• , , • , • I
• •
610 P.2d 237 (Okl. 1980); Sides v. Cabarrus·Memorial Hospital,
213 S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1975). As noted by the court in Thomas:
(T)hat the function of a hospital is not, in essence, a governmental function is made apparent by our holding in Richmond . County Hospital Authority v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 184, 336 S.E.2d 562 (1985), wherein we reiterated the holding in Bradfield v. Hosp. Authority of Musc:ogee County, supra, that there is no apparent reason why a suitable private corporation could not properly operate a hospital, either as lessee or owner, so as to promote, in. the same way as a hospital authority, the public health functions of government. As another jurisdiction has phrased it:
while it may be an appropriate goal or objective of government to establish a hospital authority, it does not follow that the daily operations of such a hospital authority constitute a governmental function. Governmental functions more properly refer to the tasks of governing. There is, for example, a governmental character to activities such as the collection of taxes or the operation of a court system. But the services of healing offered by a public hospital are not governmental functions. Lykins v. Peooles Community Hosoital, 3SS F.Supp. 52, S3 (E.D.Mich.1973).
Thomas, 440 S.E.2d at 197 n 6.
While the State characterizes Hilo Hospital as an
exercise of its sovereign functions because it is mandated by
statute to provide public health services, it cannot deny anyone
health services, and, it has not traditionally operated at a
profit, such activities are not the hallmarks of ·sovereign
functions." Rather, the better view of whether or not the
12
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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• j
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I
activity is an exercise of sovereign functions turns on whether
the activity is among "those historically performed by the
government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations. " Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital,·· 213 S. E. 3d
at 303 (citing Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150
9~9S4) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v.
Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (installation and
maintenance of traffic light signals)).
Whether or not the activity as a whole is profitable
should not be a factor in making the determination of whether it
is proprietary or sovereign:
In the case sub iudice. there is no doubt that the hospital derived some pecuniary benefits from its day to day operations. In fact, it is common knowledge that hospitals derive "substantial revenues" from daily room rents, nursing care, laboratory work, etc. This is a crucial fact under our decisions. "Our city and county hospitals make charges for some of their services based on market value rather than actual expense, so that net revenues are obtained even though in particular instances the activity of the hospital as a whole maY be nonprofitable.-R. Ligon, North Carolina Hospital Law, supra, at 160. (Emphasis supplied.) However, the fact that the operation as a whole is nonprofitable is not determinative as to whether the activity will be classified as proprietary o~ governmental.
Id. Here, as admitted by the State, Hilo Hospital has
historically made money (i.e., operated at a profit) although the
public hospital system as a whole has not .
The STATE admits that Act 304 does not exclude the Hilo
Hospital Income from the definition of "revenues# and that there
13
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• • • • -• I
• • • j
I
activity is an exercise of sovereign functions turns on whether
the activity is among "those historically performed by the
government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations. " Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital,·· 213 S. E. 3d
at 303 (citing Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150
9~9S4) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v.
Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (installation and
maintenance of traffic light signals)).
Whether or not the activity as a whole is profitable
should not be a factor in making the determination of whether it
is proprietary or sovereign:
In the case sub iudice. there is no doubt that the hospital derived some pecuniary benefits from its day to day operations. In fact, it is common knowledge that hospitals derive "substantial revenues" from daily room rents, nursing care, laboratory work, etc. This is a crucial fact under our decisions. "Our city and county hospitals make charges for some of their services based on market value rather than actual expense, so that net revenues are obtained even though in particular instances the activity of the hospital as a whole maY be nonprofitable.-R. Ligon, North Carolina Hospital Law, supra, at 160. (Emphasis supplied.) However, the fact that the operation as a whole is nonprofitable is not determinative as to whether the activity will be classified as proprietary o~ governmental.
Id. Here, as admitted by the State, Hilo Hospital has
historically made money (i.e., operated at a profit) although the
public hospital system as a whole has not .
The STATE admits that Act 304 does not exclude the Hilo
Hospital Income from the definition of "revenues# and that there
13
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• j
• • • • -• I
• • • j
I
activity is an exercise of sovereign functions turns on whether
the activity is among "those historically performed by the
government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations. " Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital,·· 213 S. E. 3d
at 303 (citing Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150
9~9S4) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v.
Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (installation and
maintenance of traffic light signals)).
Whether or not the activity as a whole is profitable
should not be a factor in making the determination of whether it
is proprietary or sovereign:
In the case sub iudice. there is no doubt that the hospital derived some pecuniary benefits from its day to day operations. In fact, it is common knowledge that hospitals derive "substantial revenues" from daily room rents, nursing care, laboratory work, etc. This is a crucial fact under our decisions. "Our city and county hospitals make charges for some of their services based on market value rather than actual expense, so that net revenues are obtained even though in particular instances the activity of the hospital as a whole maY be nonprofitable.-R. Ligon, North Carolina Hospital Law, supra, at 160. (Emphasis supplied.) However, the fact that the operation as a whole is nonprofitable is not determinative as to whether the activity will be classified as proprietary o~ governmental.
Id. Here, as admitted by the State, Hilo Hospital has
historically made money (i.e., operated at a profit) although the
public hospital system as a whole has not .
The STATE admits that Act 304 does not exclude the Hilo
Hospital Income from the definition of "revenues# and that there
13
• -• iI
• j
• • • • -• I
• • • j
I
activity is an exercise of sovereign functions turns on whether
the activity is among "those historically performed by the
government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations. " Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital,·· 213 S. E. 3d
at 303 (citing Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150
9~9S4) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v.
Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (installation and
maintenance of traffic light signals)).
Whether or not the activity as a whole is profitable
should not be a factor in making the determination of whether it
is proprietary or sovereign:
In the case sub iudice. there is no doubt that the hospital derived some pecuniary benefits from its day to day operations. In fact, it is common knowledge that hospitals derive "substantial revenues" from daily room rents, nursing care, laboratory work, etc. This is a crucial fact under our decisions. "Our city and county hospitals make charges for some of their services based on market value rather than actual expense, so that net revenues are obtained even though in particular instances the activity of the hospital as a whole maY be nonprofitable.-R. Ligon, North Carolina Hospital Law, supra, at 160. (Emphasis supplied.) However, the fact that the operation as a whole is nonprofitable is not determinative as to whether the activity will be classified as proprietary o~ governmental.
Id. Here, as admitted by the State, Hilo Hospital has
historically made money (i.e., operated at a profit) although the
public hospital system as a whole has not .
The STATE admits that Act 304 does not exclude the Hilo
Hospital Income from the definition of "revenues# and that there
13
• -• iI
• j
• • • • -• I
• • • j
I
activity is an exercise of sovereign functions turns on whether
the activity is among "those historically performed by the
government, and which are not ordinarily engaged in by private
corporations. " Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital,·· 213 S. E. 3d
at 303 (citing Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150
9~9S4) (erecting and maintaining a jail by a county); Hamilton v.
Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741, 78 S.E.2d 770 (1953) (installation and
maintenance of traffic light signals)).
Whether or not the activity as a whole is profitable
should not be a factor in making the determination of whether it
is proprietary or sovereign:
In the case sub iudice. there is no doubt that the hospital derived some pecuniary benefits from its day to day operations. In fact, it is common knowledge that hospitals derive "substantial revenues" from daily room rents, nursing care, laboratory work, etc. This is a crucial fact under our decisions. "Our city and county hospitals make charges for some of their services based on market value rather than actual expense, so that net revenues are obtained even though in particular instances the activity of the hospital as a whole maY be nonprofitable.-R. Ligon, North Carolina Hospital Law, supra, at 160. (Emphasis supplied.) However, the fact that the operation as a whole is nonprofitable is not determinative as to whether the activity will be classified as proprietary o~ governmental.
Id. Here, as admitted by the State, Hilo Hospital has
historically made money (i.e., operated at a profit) although the
public hospital system as a whole has not .
The STATE admits that Act 304 does not exclude the Hilo
Hospital Income from the definition of "revenues# and that there
13
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
are "differences of opinion as to what kinds of activity .
constitute 'sovereign' func~ions#. Testimony of the Governor,
State of Hawai'i on S.B. No. 1698 H.D. 3 Proposed at 3. 1
Where Hilo Hospital Income is not specifically excluded, Act 304
must be construed broadly to include such income as -revenuesR•
The court finds that this is clearly a proprietary rather than
sovereign exercise of power which does not shield the Hilo
Hospital Income from Act 304's definition of ftrevenues ft .
There being no genuine issue of fact, OHA is entitled
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May', 1996.
With respect to the Interest Motion, concerning the
interest that is claimed on any revenues which had not been paid
previously, but which are now being ordered to be paid pursuant
to the Court's earlier rulings on these motions, the Court finds
and concludes that the legislature clearly intended in Act 304
that interest be paid to Plaintiffs. Act 304 specifically
provides for interest of 6 percent for various revenues generated
from June 16, 1981 to June 17, 1982, and interest of 10 percent
for revenues generated thereafter.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law .
1 S.B. No. 1698, H.D. 3 Proposed attempted to amend §10-2 by including specific language that, among other things, -Moneys received by the departmen~ of health from the operations of . · . hospitals of its community hospital division .... - are excluded from the definition of ~revenuesn. Exhibit -Fw, S.B No . 1698, R.D. 3, a~tached hereto and incorporated by reference at 3.
14
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
are "differences of opinion as to what kinds of activity .
constitute 'sovereign' func~ions#. Testimony of the Governor,
State of Hawai'i on S.B. No. 1698 H.D. 3 Proposed at 3. 1
Where Hilo Hospital Income is not specifically excluded, Act 304
must be construed broadly to include such income as -revenuesR•
The court finds that this is clearly a proprietary rather than
sovereign exercise of power which does not shield the Hilo
Hospital Income from Act 304's definition of ftrevenues ft .
There being no genuine issue of fact, OHA is entitled
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May', 1996.
With respect to the Interest Motion, concerning the
interest that is claimed on any revenues which had not been paid
previously, but which are now being ordered to be paid pursuant
to the Court's earlier rulings on these motions, the Court finds
and concludes that the legislature clearly intended in Act 304
that interest be paid to Plaintiffs. Act 304 specifically
provides for interest of 6 percent for various revenues generated
from June 16, 1981 to June 17, 1982, and interest of 10 percent
for revenues generated thereafter.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law .
1 S.B. No. 1698, H.D. 3 Proposed attempted to amend §10-2 by including specific language that, among other things, -Moneys received by the departmen~ of health from the operations of . · . hospitals of its community hospital division .... - are excluded from the definition of ~revenuesn. Exhibit -Fw, S.B No . 1698, R.D. 3, a~tached hereto and incorporated by reference at 3.
14
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
are "differences of opinion as to what kinds of activity .
constitute 'sovereign' func~ions#. Testimony of the Governor,
State of Hawai'i on S.B. No. 1698 H.D. 3 Proposed at 3. 1
Where Hilo Hospital Income is not specifically excluded, Act 304
must be construed broadly to include such income as -revenuesR•
The court finds that this is clearly a proprietary rather than
sovereign exercise of power which does not shield the Hilo
Hospital Income from Act 304's definition of ftrevenues ft .
There being no genuine issue of fact, OHA is entitled
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May', 1996.
With respect to the Interest Motion, concerning the
interest that is claimed on any revenues which had not been paid
previously, but which are now being ordered to be paid pursuant
to the Court's earlier rulings on these motions, the Court finds
and concludes that the legislature clearly intended in Act 304
that interest be paid to Plaintiffs. Act 304 specifically
provides for interest of 6 percent for various revenues generated
from June 16, 1981 to June 17, 1982, and interest of 10 percent
for revenues generated thereafter.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law .
1 S.B. No. 1698, H.D. 3 Proposed attempted to amend §10-2 by including specific language that, among other things, -Moneys received by the departmen~ of health from the operations of . · . hospitals of its community hospital division .... - are excluded from the definition of ~revenuesn. Exhibit -Fw, S.B No . 1698, R.D. 3, a~tached hereto and incorporated by reference at 3.
14
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
are "differences of opinion as to what kinds of activity .
constitute 'sovereign' func~ions#. Testimony of the Governor,
State of Hawai'i on S.B. No. 1698 H.D. 3 Proposed at 3. 1
Where Hilo Hospital Income is not specifically excluded, Act 304
must be construed broadly to include such income as -revenuesR•
The court finds that this is clearly a proprietary rather than
sovereign exercise of power which does not shield the Hilo
Hospital Income from Act 304's definition of ftrevenues ft .
There being no genuine issue of fact, OHA is entitled
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May', 1996.
With respect to the Interest Motion, concerning the
interest that is claimed on any revenues which had not been paid
previously, but which are now being ordered to be paid pursuant
to the Court's earlier rulings on these motions, the Court finds
and concludes that the legislature clearly intended in Act 304
that interest be paid to Plaintiffs. Act 304 specifically
provides for interest of 6 percent for various revenues generated
from June 16, 1981 to June 17, 1982, and interest of 10 percent
for revenues generated thereafter.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law .
1 S.B. No. 1698, H.D. 3 Proposed attempted to amend §10-2 by including specific language that, among other things, -Moneys received by the departmen~ of health from the operations of . · . hospitals of its community hospital division .... - are excluded from the definition of ~revenuesn. Exhibit -Fw, S.B No . 1698, R.D. 3, a~tached hereto and incorporated by reference at 3.
14
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
are "differences of opinion as to what kinds of activity .
constitute 'sovereign' func~ions#. Testimony of the Governor,
State of Hawai'i on S.B. No. 1698 H.D. 3 Proposed at 3. 1
Where Hilo Hospital Income is not specifically excluded, Act 304
must be construed broadly to include such income as -revenuesR•
The court finds that this is clearly a proprietary rather than
sovereign exercise of power which does not shield the Hilo
Hospital Income from Act 304's definition of ftrevenues ft .
There being no genuine issue of fact, OHA is entitled
to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May', 1996.
With respect to the Interest Motion, concerning the
interest that is claimed on any revenues which had not been paid
previously, but which are now being ordered to be paid pursuant
to the Court's earlier rulings on these motions, the Court finds
and concludes that the legislature clearly intended in Act 304
that interest be paid to Plaintiffs. Act 304 specifically
provides for interest of 6 percent for various revenues generated
from June 16, 1981 to June 17, 1982, and interest of 10 percent
for revenues generated thereafter.
There being no genuine issue of material fact, OHA is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law .
1 S.B. No. 1698, H.D. 3 Proposed attempted to amend §10-2 by including specific language that, among other things, -Moneys received by the departmen~ of health from the operations of . · . hospitals of its community hospital division .... - are excluded from the definition of ~revenuesn. Exhibit -Fw, S.B No . 1698, R.D. 3, a~tached hereto and incorporated by reference at 3.
14
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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•
CONCLUSl:ON
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996, be and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary
judgment be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating
and declaring that all of the concession fees or
rentals ("Lease Payments") paid to the State
pursuant to Lease No. DOT-ASO-19, Lease No. DOT-A-
88-1, and Lease No. DOT-A-92-13 for the years 1980
through the present (dDuty Free Concession
Agreements") are revenues derived from the Public
Land Trust, including those payments which are
based on gross revenues from the duty free store
located in Waikiki, and the State is required to
pay Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all such
Lease Payments.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital,
filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is GRANTED and
partial summary judgment be and hereby is ENTERED,
adjudicating and declaring, that Hilo Hospital's
patient service income (net of any Medicare and
Medicaid payments), cafeteria income, rent
lS
-I I I I
-II I I I I I I I I 1
--I
•
CONCLUSl:ON
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996, be and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary
judgment be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating
and declaring that all of the concession fees or
rentals ("Lease Payments") paid to the State
pursuant to Lease No. DOT-ASO-19, Lease No. DOT-A-
88-1, and Lease No. DOT-A-92-13 for the years 1980
through the present (dDuty Free Concession
Agreements") are revenues derived from the Public
Land Trust, including those payments which are
based on gross revenues from the duty free store
located in Waikiki, and the State is required to
pay Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all such
Lease Payments.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital,
filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is GRANTED and
partial summary judgment be and hereby is ENTERED,
adjudicating and declaring, that Hilo Hospital's
patient service income (net of any Medicare and
Medicaid payments), cafeteria income, rent
lS
-I I I I
-II I I I I I I I I 1
--I
•
CONCLUSl:ON
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996, be and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary
judgment be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating
and declaring that all of the concession fees or
rentals ("Lease Payments") paid to the State
pursuant to Lease No. DOT-ASO-19, Lease No. DOT-A-
88-1, and Lease No. DOT-A-92-13 for the years 1980
through the present (dDuty Free Concession
Agreements") are revenues derived from the Public
Land Trust, including those payments which are
based on gross revenues from the duty free store
located in Waikiki, and the State is required to
pay Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all such
Lease Payments.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital,
filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is GRANTED and
partial summary judgment be and hereby is ENTERED,
adjudicating and declaring, that Hilo Hospital's
patient service income (net of any Medicare and
Medicaid payments), cafeteria income, rent
lS
-I I I I
-II I I I I I I I I 1
--I
•
CONCLUSl:ON
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996, be and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary
judgment be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating
and declaring that all of the concession fees or
rentals ("Lease Payments") paid to the State
pursuant to Lease No. DOT-ASO-19, Lease No. DOT-A-
88-1, and Lease No. DOT-A-92-13 for the years 1980
through the present (dDuty Free Concession
Agreements") are revenues derived from the Public
Land Trust, including those payments which are
based on gross revenues from the duty free store
located in Waikiki, and the State is required to
pay Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all such
Lease Payments.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital,
filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is GRANTED and
partial summary judgment be and hereby is ENTERED,
adjudicating and declaring, that Hilo Hospital's
patient service income (net of any Medicare and
Medicaid payments), cafeteria income, rent
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CONCLUSl:ON
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Whether The Revenues From The Waikiki
Duty Free Store Fall Within Act 304, filed May 7,
1996, be and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary
judgment be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating
and declaring that all of the concession fees or
rentals ("Lease Payments") paid to the State
pursuant to Lease No. DOT-ASO-19, Lease No. DOT-A-
88-1, and Lease No. DOT-A-92-13 for the years 1980
through the present (dDuty Free Concession
Agreements") are revenues derived from the Public
Land Trust, including those payments which are
based on gross revenues from the duty free store
located in Waikiki, and the State is required to
pay Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all such
Lease Payments.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Hilo Hospital,
filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is GRANTED and
partial summary judgment be and hereby is ENTERED,
adjudicating and declaring, that Hilo Hospital's
patient service income (net of any Medicare and
Medicaid payments), cafeteria income, rent
lS
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection
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received by the Hilo Hospital, and other
miscellaneous hospital income are revenues derived
from the Public Land Trust, and pursuant to the
Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all of such
income derived from the Hilo Hospital.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996 be
and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary judgment
be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating and
declaring that Act 304 includes interest income
earned from ceded land revenues which were owed to
OHA but never paid by the State, and pursuant to
the Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of the interest
income earned by the State from ceded land
revenues derived from the Public Land Trust •
4 . Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And
Development Corporation And Hawai.i Housing
Authority, filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is
GRANTED and partial summary judgment be ~nd hereby
is ENTERED, adjudicating and declaring that
payments received by the Housing Finance and
16
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• I
• • I
" .. •
received by the Hilo Hospital, and other
miscellaneous hospital income are revenues derived
from the Public Land Trust, and pursuant to the
Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all of such
income derived from the Hilo Hospital.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996 be
and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary judgment
be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating and
declaring that Act 304 includes interest income
earned from ceded land revenues which were owed to
OHA but never paid by the State, and pursuant to
the Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of the interest
income earned by the State from ceded land
revenues derived from the Public Land Trust •
4 . Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And
Development Corporation And Hawai.i Housing
Authority, filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is
GRANTED and partial summary judgment be ~nd hereby
is ENTERED, adjudicating and declaring that
payments received by the Housing Finance and
16
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• I
• • I
" .. •
received by the Hilo Hospital, and other
miscellaneous hospital income are revenues derived
from the Public Land Trust, and pursuant to the
Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all of such
income derived from the Hilo Hospital.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996 be
and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary judgment
be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating and
declaring that Act 304 includes interest income
earned from ceded land revenues which were owed to
OHA but never paid by the State, and pursuant to
the Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of the interest
income earned by the State from ceded land
revenues derived from the Public Land Trust •
4 . Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And
Development Corporation And Hawai.i Housing
Authority, filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is
GRANTED and partial summary judgment be ~nd hereby
is ENTERED, adjudicating and declaring that
payments received by the Housing Finance and
16
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II
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• I
• • I
" .. •
received by the Hilo Hospital, and other
miscellaneous hospital income are revenues derived
from the Public Land Trust, and pursuant to the
Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all of such
income derived from the Hilo Hospital.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996 be
and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary judgment
be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating and
declaring that Act 304 includes interest income
earned from ceded land revenues which were owed to
OHA but never paid by the State, and pursuant to
the Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of the interest
income earned by the State from ceded land
revenues derived from the Public Land Trust •
4 . Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And
Development Corporation And Hawai.i Housing
Authority, filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is
GRANTED and partial summary judgment be ~nd hereby
is ENTERED, adjudicating and declaring that
payments received by the Housing Finance and
16
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II
-• • • • • •• • • II
• I
• • I
" .. •
received by the Hilo Hospital, and other
miscellaneous hospital income are revenues derived
from the Public Land Trust, and pursuant to the
Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of all of such
income derived from the Hilo Hospital.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Interest Income, filed May 7, 1996 be
and hereby is GRANTED and partial summary judgment
be and hereby is ENTERED, adjudicating and
declaring that Act 304 includes interest income
earned from ceded land revenues which were owed to
OHA but never paid by the State, and pursuant to
the Admission Act, the State Constitution, and HRS
Section 10-2, the State is required to pay
Plaintiffs its pro rata share of the interest
income earned by the State from ceded land
revenues derived from the Public Land Trust •
4 . Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment On
The Issue Of Revenues From The Housing Finance And
Development Corporation And Hawai.i Housing
Authority, filed May 7, 1996 be and hereby is
GRANTED and partial summary judgment be ~nd hereby
is ENTERED, adjudicating and declaring that
payments received by the Housing Finance and
16
University of Hawaii School of Law Library - Jon Van Dyke Archives Collection