University of California SAN DIEGO - EconomicsDesmond Ang UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Media:...

University of California

SAN DIEGO

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Placement Packet:

2017-18 Job Market Candidates

September 2017

September 2017

Dear Colleague,

The purpose of this letter is to introduce our 2017-18 Job Market candidates to you. Each of the candidates

listed below has either completed requirements for their PhD or is expected to do so by the end of the

current academic year. The candidates are listed in alphabetical order and I have included a copy of each

candidate’s CV. In addition to the material contained in this letter, the Job Market Webpage has links to

the personal websites of the candidates, which contain additional information and possibly more current

CV’s. All candidates expect to be available for interviews at the AEA meetings in Philadelphia in January

2018.

The candidates along with their fields are:

Ang, Desmond Primary: Labor Economics, Political Economy

Secondary: Behavioral Economics

Ding, Xuan Primary: Game Theory, Finance, Industrial Organization

Dossani, Asad Primary: Finance

Secondary: Econometrics, Macroeconomics

Giffin, Erin Primary: Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics/Economics

and Psychology, Experimental Economics

Heydari, Pedram Primary: Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics

Secondary: Network Economics, Game Theory

Johnson, Grant Primary: Public Finance, Political Economy

Secondary: Macroeconomics

Liu, Chen Primary: International Economics

Secondary: Labor Economics

Panassié, Yann Primary: Applied Microeconomics, Behavioral Economics,

Environmental Economics

Romero, Mauricio Primary: Development, Public Economics

Secondary: Environmental and Applied Econometrics

Sun, Zhenting Primary: Microeconometrics, Econometric Theory

http://economics.ucsd.edu/graduate-program/job-market/index.html

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~deang/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~x3ding/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~x3ding/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~adossani/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~egiffin/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~peheydar/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~g4johnso/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~chl110/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~ypanassi/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~mtromero/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~zhs004/

Vera-Cossio, Diego Primary: Development Economics

Secondary: Labor Economics

Wang, Xiaxin Primary: Public Finance, Taxation

Secondary: Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics,

Development Economics

If you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me, or the advisor of the

candidate in question. Advisor contact information can be found on the CV’s that follow, as well as on

the candidates’ websites.

Sincerely,

Julie B. Cullen

Professor

Placement Director

[email protected]

858-822-2056

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~dveracos/

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~xiw105/

mailto:[email protected]

Desmond Ang

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Placement Director Julie Cullen (858) 822-2056 [email protected]

Placement Coordinator Cathy Pugh (858) 534-1867 [email protected]

CONTACT INFORMATION

Department of Economics

University of California, San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive

La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

Phone:

Fax:

Email:

Website:

(703) 498-9559

(858) 534-7040

[email protected]

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~deang

EDUCATION

PhD Candidate in Economics, University of California, San Diego, expected completion 6/2018

Committee: James Andreoni (co-chair), Gordon Dahl (co-chair), Prashant Bharadwaj, Julian Betts,

James Fowler, Seth Hill

BA, Economics and Asian Studies, Dartmouth College, magna cum laude, 2008

REFERENCES

James Andreoni, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 534-3832

Gordon Dahl, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 822-0644

Prashant Bharadwaj, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 822-6760

Ian Larkin, University of California, Los Angeles, [email protected], (310) 825-5484

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Labor Economics, Political Economy, Behavioral Economics

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

Research Associate, Prof. Ian Larkin, Harvard Business School, 2010-2013

Visiting Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Ash Center, 2011

Short-Term Consultant, World Bank, Jakarta, 2010

Paganucci Fellow, Tuck School of Business, 2007

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS

University of California, President’s Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2017-Present

University of California, San Diego, Clive Granger Research Fellowship, 2017-Present

National Science Foundation, Graduate Research Fellow, 2015-Present

University of California, San Diego, Frontiers of Innovation Scholar, 2016-2017

University of California, San Diego, Summer Graduate Research Fellow, 2014-2016

Dartmouth College, Reynolds Scholar, 2011

U.S. State Department, Fulbright Scholar, 2010

WORKING PAPERS

“The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students” (job market paper)

While roughly a thousand individuals are killed by American law enforcement each year, little is known

about how local communities respond to acts of police violence. Examining detailed administrative and




http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~deang





Desmond Ang


address data for over 700,000 Los Angeles public high school students from 2002 to 2016, I employ a

difference-in-difference design to estimate the impact of exposure to officer-involved killings on the

educational outcomes of inner-city youth. Relative to others in their neighborhood, students living within

four blocks of a police shooting experience significant and persistent decreases in grade point average.

These students go on to obtain .25 fewer years of schooling and are 15% less likely to graduate from

high school and 18% less likely to enroll in college. Notably, academic performance decreases only

among minority students and only following police killings of minority suspects. Drawing on contextual

details from county attorney incident reports, I show that the magnitude of these effects increases with

the demographic similarity of the suspect and decreases with the apparent reasonableness of lethal force.

Analysis of clinical and survey data reveals that students exposed to police shootings are significantly

more likely to be diagnosed with emotional disturbance, a chronic learning disability associated with

PTSD and depression, and to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods. Taken together, these

findings suggest that acts of police violence exert large unseen costs on minority communities and that

these effects are driven by psychological trauma and perceptions of injustice.

“Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter: Long-Run Effects of Federal Oversight under the Voting Rights Act” (under

submission)

In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the Voting Rights Act that mandated federal oversight

of election laws in discriminatory jurisdictions, prompting a spate of controversial new voting rules.

Utilizing difference-in-differences to examine the Act's 1975 revision, I provide the first estimates of the

effects of “preclearance” oversight. I find that preclearance increased long-run voter turnout by 4-8

percentage points, due to lasting gains in minority participation. Surprisingly, Democratic support

dropped sharply in areas subject to oversight. Using historical survey and newspaper data, I provide

evidence that this was the result of political backlash among racially conservative whites.

“Civic Responses to Police Violence: Evidence from Los Angeles Voter Records”

In recent years, officer-involved shootings of minorities have generated widespread controversy –

sparking social and political movements like Black Lives Matter among historically under-represented

minority groups. Utilizing detailed individual-level records for over four million registered voters in Los

Angeles county, I examine the effects of police shootings on civic engagement. I find that exposure to

police killings involving black victims increases voter turnout among blacks by 3-5%. However, I find

no effects on white or Hispanic turnout, or for shootings involving white or Hispanic victims. Exploiting

historical referenda voting, I show that black turnout increased specifically among those neighborhoods

opposed to harsher penalties for drug and gang-related crimes. Furthermore, I find that gains in turnout

are larger following police killings of unarmed individuals and during midterm elections, when the

county sheriff is chosen. Taken together, these results suggest that blacks may strategically respond to

police killings by engaging with democratic institutions in order to reform the criminal justice system.

PUBLICATIONS

“Association between Academic Medical Center Pharmaceutical Detailing Policies and Physician Prescribing”

with Ian Larkin, Jonathan Steinhart, Matthew Chao, Mark Patterson, Sunita Sah, Tina Wu, Michael Schoenbaum,

David Hutchins, Troyen Brennan and George Loewenstein, Journal of the American Medical Association, 2017

In an effort to regulate physician conflicts of interest, some US academic medical centers (AMCs)

enacted policies restricting pharmaceutical representative sales visits to physicians (known as detailing)

between 2006 and 2012. Little is known about the effect of these policies on physician prescribing.

Using a difference-in-differences design, the study compared changes in the prescribing behavior of

2126 physicians at 19 academic medical centers during the periods before and after enactment of

detailing policies with changes in the prescribing behavior of 24 593 matched control physicians during

the same period for 262 drugs in 8 drug classes. Policy enactment was associated with a 1.67 percentage

point decrease in the market share of detailed drugs and a 0.84 percentage point increase in the market

share of nondetailed drugs. Both estimates were statistically significant in the full sample, but were only

statistically significant for 9 of the 19 individual academic medical centers.

Desmond Ang


Media: CNBC, Forbes, Foreign Affairs, NBC News, Newsweek, NPR, Slate, U.S. News

“Restrictions on Pharmaceutical Detailing Reduced Off-Label Prescribing of Antidepressants and Antipsychotics

in Children” with Ian Larkin, Jerry Avorn and Aaron Kesselheim, Health Affairs, 2014

The treatment of pediatric depression is controversial because it includes substantial prescribing of drugs

for uses that have not been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“off label”) and are not

evidence based. Some academic medical centers (AMCs) restrict “detailing” by pharmaceutical sales

representatives, or the promoting of drugs directly to physicians via sales calls, to reduce the effect of

such marketing on physician prescribing. With data from thirty-one geographically diverse AMCs and

their affiliated hospitals, we used a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of anti-

detailing policies on off-label prescribing of antidepressants and antipsychotics by pediatricians and by

child and adolescent psychiatrists in the period January 2006–June 2009. We found that after the

introduction of such policies, prescriptions for off-label use of promoted drugs fell by 11 percent,

consistent with the ongoing presence of off-label marketing to physicians. Prescriptions for on-label use

of promoted drugs fell by 34 percent after the adoption of the policies. Conversely, prescriptions for on-

label use of nonpromoted drugs rose by 14 percent, and those for off-label use of nonpromoted drugs

rose by 35 percent. These results suggest that pharmaceutical sales representatives promoted drugs not

approved for pediatric use and that policies that restrict detailing by those representatives reduced such

off-label prescribing.

Media: Wall Street Journal

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Economics of Adverse Childhood Experiences”

“Inclusion and Motivation: The Impact of ICE Raids on Migrant and Hispanic Students”

“Health Spillovers from Desegregation: Evidence from Historical Infant Mortality” with Mitch Downey

“Who Responds to Racial Threats? A Field Experiment in Voting”

“Partisan Differences in Voting Rights Enforcement” with Mitch Downey

“Do Small Gifts from Pharmaceutical Salespeople Influence Physician Prescribing? Evidence from a Large-

Sample Quasi Experiment” with Ian Larkin and Matthew Chao

TEACHING

Teaching Assistant for Economic Development in India and South Asia, Prof. Subramanian Swamy, Harvard

Summer School, Summer 2011

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITES

Russell Sage Foundation, Summer Institute in Computational Social Science, 2017 (declined)

Russell Sage Foundation, Summer Institute in Behavioral Economics, 2016

OTHER INFORMATION

Citizenship: USA

Date of birth: April 28, 1986

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ERIN GIFFIN ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT


Placement Director: Julie Cullen (858) 822-2056 [email protected] Placement Assistant: Cathy Pugh (858) 534-1867 [email protected] Contact Information: Department Address: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~egiffin/ [email protected] (303) 910-1931 Citizenship: U.S.

Department of Economics, 0508 University of California, San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

GRADUATE EDUCATION University of California, San Diego Ph.D. Economics, expected 2018

Committee: James Andreoni (Co-Chair), Isabel Trevino (Co-chair), Joel Watson UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION University of Colorado, Boulder B.A. Economics and Psychology, Summa Cum Laude with Departmental Honors in Economics, 2011 REFERENCES James Andreoni Isabel Trevino Joel Watson Kate Antonovics (Co-Chair) (Co-Chair) (Teaching Reference) UCSD UCSD UCSD UCSD Economics Economics Economics Economics 858-534-3832 619-630-5852 858-534-6132 858-534-2973 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING Microeconomic Theory, Behavioral Economics (Economics and Psychology), Experimental Economics GRANTS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND HONORS GRANTS: Frontiers of Innovation Scholars Program Project Fellowship ($25,000) 2017 Department of Economics Research Grant ($1,500) 2016 Department of Economics Research Grant ($800) 2015 FELLOWSHIPS: Summer Graduate Student Research Fellow 2012, 2013, 2014

ERIN GIFFIN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

JOB MARKET PAPER “Identity Formation, Gender Differences, and the Perpetuation of Stereotypes” Using experimental data from a set of previously published papers where gender data were collected but never analyzed, I provide evidence that gender differences are more prevalent than we currently realize. Moreover, I find that the published results from these papers were either partly or entirely driven by one gender. Given this new evidence, even in contexts where choices are completely anonymous, a key question is where these differences originate. The prevailing theory is that men and women differ in terms of fundamentals (i.e., preferences or types). I introduce a model that highlights that this needs not be the case. I present a model where gender differences are not exogenously endowed but rather are endogenously created and then propagated. I show that even if members of two groups are identical ex ante, if there exists a stereotype about one of the groups, then individuals will behave in a way that confirms this stereotype in equilibrium. Extending this to a multi-period model, I then show that if individuals endogenously form group identities through habit formation, these group differences will persist in the long-run, even after choices are no longer observed. The model's results suggest that men and women may not be as different as data on behaviors lead us to believe. WORKING PAPERS “Recall of Repeated Games” In repeated interactions, players frequently want to condition their behavior on past events. This requires them to recall the game’s history. However, players may not be able to accurately remember the history, because their memory may be finite or biased. Although there is a growing theoretical literature that allows for memory imperfections, there is currently a lack of empirical or experimental work that examines individuals’ memory in these environments. Using an experiment on the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, I examine individuals’ recall of a repeated game. I first establish evidence on general trends for recall inaccuracy in a repeated game environment. I find evidence that memory has a limited capacity and is biased, with both timing of information and specific outcomes being associated with recall accuracy. I then develop a method to estimate individual subjects’ strategies from their observed behavior to analyze how memory is associated with behavioral outcomes (strategy and strategy implementation). I find that subjects frequently remember using a different estimated strategy than they actually did, and they recall making fewer implementation errors for their recalled strategy. I also find that the number of strategy implementation errors is negatively correlated with subjects’ recall accuracy of the history. “Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure in Litigation,” with Erik Lillethun. Legal settings frequently feature parties (senders) with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort, which may be revealed or concealed to persuade a judge or jury (the receiver). We examine how the sender's risk preferences and legal institutional design influence evidence acquisition incentives. The receiver's information about the sender's effort affects equilibrium effort, but this effect vanishes for very risk-averse senders, who exert nearly zero effort. We then study commitment to decision rules to balance good decision making against the cost of effort. The full commitment optimum features overincentivization (higher rewards for revealing evidence and worse penalties for concealing) or underincentivization (lower rewards and less severe penalties) depending on the cost weight in the social welfare function. Moreover, sufficiently high risk aversion always makes overincentivization optimal. We find similar results for various common legal rules (e.g., admissibility of evidence, maximum penalties, and minimum penalties). This has implications for how laws and courtroom procedures should differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals and criminal defendants) and low risk aversion types (e.g., large corporations and prosecutors) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS “Memory Management” “Learning about Commitment,” with Shanthi Manian.

ERIN GIFFIN UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 2017: North American Regional ESA meeting (scheduled) TEACHING EXPERIENCE Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, UC San Diego 2011-present Principles of Microeconomics, Market Imperfections and Policy, Principles of Macroeconomics, Intermediate Microeconomics, Economics of Ocean Resources, Labor Economics AWARDS AND HONORS Val B. and Helen W. Fischer Award for Academic Superiority in the Social Sciences (awarded to 2011 top student graduating in Economics) Phi Beta Kappa 2011 SERVICE Group Leader, Women in Economics Mentoring Group, UC San Diego 2013-2014 ADDITIONAL SKILLS Software packages and tools: Stata, LaTex, R

Pedram HeydariECONOMICS DEPARTMENT


Placement Director Julie Cullen (858) 822-2056 [email protected] Coordinator Cathy Pugh (858) 534-1867 [email protected]

CONTACT INFORMATIONDepartment of EconomicsUniversity of California, San Diego9500 Gilman DriveLa Jolla, CA 92093-0508

Phone:Email:Website:

(510) [email protected]://econweb.ucsd.edu/~peheydar/

EDUCATIONPhD Candidate in Economics, University of California, San Diego, expected completion 6/2018

Committee: Christopher Chambers (Co-Chair), Mark Machina (Co-Chair), Faruk Gul, Joel Sobel

M.A., Economics, University of California, San Diego, 2017

Visiting Student Research Collaborator, with Faruk Gul, Princeton University, 2016-2017

B.A., Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2012

B.A., Applied Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley, 2012

REFERENCESChristopher Chambers, Georgetown University, [email protected], (202) 687-7559

Faruk Gul, Princeton University, [email protected], (609) 258-4009

Mark Machina, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 534-2391

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics, Network economics

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELDResearch Assistant, Stefano Della Vigna, 2010-2011


Graduate Summer Research Fellowship, 2013

Silver Medal, Iranian National Mathematics Olympiad, 2006

WORKING PAPERS

“Luce Arbitrates: Stochastic Resolution of Inner Conflicts” (Job Market Paper)

I propose and axiomatically characterize a multi-attribute stochastic choice model that simultaneouslygeneralizes the classical deterministic choice and the Luce model. Attributes are cardinal, independentmeasures of desirability that are endogenously inferred from observed choices, and thus subjective. Anitem is chosen with a positive probability from a set of available items (menu) if and only if it isundominated attribute-wise in that menu. This randomness of choice reflects the complexity of decisionmaking and possible lack of decisiveness in presence of conflicting motives due to the multiplicity ofattributes. The model leads to the context-dependent evaluation of items by assigning every menu a distinctreference point relative to which the menu items are re-evaluated. The reference point of every menu takesthe minimum values of attributes in that menu. This reference point can be interpreted as a context-dependent version of the commonly used status quo or default. Moreover, I provide an intuitive





http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~peheydar/



Pedram HeydariUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

characterization of this reference point. With appropriate choice of parameters, the model canaccommodate a range of empirical findings that are incompatible with classical deterministic choice andthe Luce model, such as the attraction effect, the compromise effect, and violations of stochastictransitivity. Finally, explicit modeling of attributes allows my model to avoid the duplicate problem of theLuce model.

“Stochastic Choice over Menus”

Most models of choice over menus aim at capturing the effect of some behavioral or non-standard elementof decision making on the behavior of a single decision maker. These models are usually compared withthe standard model of choice over menus, in which the decision maker chooses a menu whose best item isbetter than that of all other available ones. However, in many real settings, such as experimental studies,the choice data might come from a population of decision makers with possibly different attitudes andtastes. This heterogeneity can make the observed choices over menus stochastic. This fact calls for astochastic characterization of models of choice over menus to be able to better compare and contrast them,empirically. I do this task for the standard model, which would be an extension of the random utility modelto the realm of choice over menus. In particular, I provide the necessary and sufficient conditions, i.e.axioms on (stochastic) choice data over menus for it to be consistent with a population of decision makerseach of whom behaves according to the standard model. The axioms that characterize the model are theaxiom of revealed stochastic preferences over singletons, and two rationality axioms. At the end, I alsobriefly discuss an extension of the model to a setting with potentially time-inconsistent decision makers.

“Efficient Integration in Multi-Community Networks” joint with Mohsen Mosleh and Babak Heydari

There are many social and economic situations where two or more communities need to be integrated in anefficient way that facilitates overall resource access throughout the network. We study structures forefficient integration of multi-community networks where building bridges across communities incurs anadditional link cost compared to links within a community. Building on the connections models with directlink cost and direct and indirect benefits, we show that the efficient structure for homogeneous cost andbenefit parameters, and for communities of arbitrary size, always has a diameter no greater than 3. Wefurther show that if the internal cost is not small enough to justify a full graph for each community,integration always follows one of these two structures: either a single star, or a new structure we introducein this paper, called parallel hyperstar, which is a special multi-core/periphery structure with parallel linksamong core nodes of different communities. We discuss cost and benefit conditions for realization of eachefficient structure and comment on their stability conditions. We show that a parallel hyperstar with morethan one core node in each community is never both efficient and stable. Other efficient structures,however, can also be stable for a range of cost and benefit parameters. In the end, we discuss futureextensions of this model.


“Contracting with Stochastic Agents”

“Pairwise Community Stability” (with Mohsen Mosleh and Babak Heydari)

“Multi-Attribute Luce and the Similarity Effect”

TEACHING

Pedram HeydariUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Teaching Assistant, UC San Diego

Principles of Microeconomics (Econ 1) - Fall 2013, Spring 2014, Summer 2015

Market Imperfections and Policy (Econ 2) - Summer 2014

Principles of Macroeconomics (Econ 3) - Winter 2013

Microeconomics (Econ 100B) - Spring 2015

Game Theory (Econ 109) - Fall 2014

Econometrics (Econ 120A and 120B) - Fall 2012, Spring 2013, Winter 2014 and 2016

Operations Research (Econ 172B) - Winter 2015


Presentations

2017: IBM, T.J. Watson Research Center

2017: Theory Seminar, Princeton University

OTHER INFORMATIONCitizenship: U.S.A.

Date of birth: 04/22/1989

Languages: Farsi (Native), English (Fluent)

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DIEGO A. VERA-COSSIODEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS



Placement Coordina-

tor

Cathy Pugh (858) 534-1867 [email protected]

CONTACT INFORMATION



9500 Gilman Drive

La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

Phone: (202) 999-7602

Fax: (858) 534-7040

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/ ˜ dveracos/

EDUCATION

University of California - San Diego, California,

U.S.A.

Ph.D .Candidate in Economics, 2018 (expected)

Committee:

Prashant Bharadwaj (chair)

Gordon Dahl

Craig McIntosh

Karthik Muralidharan

Krislert Samphantharak

Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile M.A. Economics, Graduated with the highest

honors, 2012

Universidad Catolica Boliviana San Pablo, La

Paz, Bolivia

B.A. Economics , 2009

REFERENCES

Prashant Bharadwaj UC San Diego [email protected] (858) 822-6760

Craig McIntosh UC San Diego [email protected] (858) 822-1125

Gordon Dahl UC San Diego [email protected] (858) 822-0644

Karthik Muralidharan UC San Diego [email protected] (858) 534-2425

Robert Townsend MIT [email protected] (617) 452-3722

FIELDS OF INTERESTS

Development and Labor Economics

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

Research Assistant UCSD (Prof. Craig McIntosh) 2016-2017

Research Assistant UCSD (Prof. Krislert Samphantharak) 2015-2016

Research Fellow Inter-American Development Bank (Supervi-

sor: Diether Beuerman)

2012 - 2013

Research Assistant Universidad de Chile (Prof. Oscar Lander-

retche)

2011

Consultant United Nations Development Program (La Paz,

Bolivia)

2009

mailto: [email protected]



http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~dveracos/






DIEGO A. VERA-COSSIO


HONORS AND AWARDS

Best Student award. Department of Economics. Universidad de Chile, 2012

WORKING PAPERS

• “Targeting credit through community members” (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: The provision of affordable credit to poor and high-productivity households could

enable them to escape poverty traps. I study whether one of the largest credit programs in the

world, the Thai Million Baht Village Fund, is able to provide affordable loans to poor and pro-

ductive households by delegating the allocation of loans to an elected committee of community

members. Using data from a long panel, I recover structural estimates of household total factor

productivity. I combine these estimates with pre-program data to evaluate the allocation of credit

along three notions of optimality: poverty targeting, productive efficiency, and sustainability –

proxied by household measures of per-capita consumption, productivity, and lender profitability–.

I study how committee members balance these criteria against incentives for rent-seeking behavior,

and how informal credit markets react to the resulting allocation. I provide three main results:

First, using within village comparisons, I show that program beneficiaries are richer and less

productive than non-beneficiaries. I find that an alternative allocation criterion based on wealth

rankings would have offered credit to the poorest households without shifting resources from pro-

ductive households. Second, I exploit socioeconomic interactions data to elicit baseline networks

and show that committee members disproportionately allocate credit to households with connec-

tions to local elites, reducing the program’s profitability. Third, while households without such

connections receive less program credit, this is partially offset by informal credit markets. Using

quasi-experimental variation in the rollout of the program, I show that unconnected households

obtained credit by borrowing from relatives and that debt owed to relatives increased by 30% for

those households. Overall, efforts to allocate credit to poor and productive households by relying

on elected community members can be undermined by favoritism towards politically connected

households, and that informal credit markets can offset targeting errors.

• “Dependence or constraints? Labor supply responses from a cash transfer program”

Abstract: Reductions in labor supply in response to cash aid may prevent social programs from

having long lasting effects on poverty alleviation. However, in contexts of fixed costs to work and

limited access to credit, cash aid could provide enough liquidity to overcome these fixed costs.

Using quasi-experimental variation in the eligibility for a conditional cash transfer program in

Bolivian public schools, I study the effects of the program on labor supply for adults from house-

holds of eligible children. In a context of high pre-program school attendance and massive gender

disparities in adult labor force participation, I find that the program increased work hours by 8%

in the case of adult females from households of eligible children. Three pieces of evidence suggest

this increase is explained by fixed costs to work, and limited access to institutional credit. First, Es-

timating treatment effects along the distribution of work hours, I find that effects are concentrated

on the extensive margin of work. Second, using cross-municipality variation in the pre-program

number of branches from financial institutions, I find that the effect is higher for adult females

in municipalities with a lower number of per-capita branches. Finally, the program stimulated

entrance into self-employment. The results suggest that in a context of fixed costs to work and

limited access to credit, two characteristics of developing countries, cash transfers may not induce

reductions in labor supply. Instead, even small transfers can increase labor force participation.


• “The long-term macroeconomic consequences of microeconomic investments in human capital:

Evidence from the 1953-55 Bolivian Education Reform”

Abstract: We quantify the extent to which household investments in human capital, induced by

countrywide educational reform, lead to increases in total factor productivity at the macro level.

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/kcmc2r2cvip9psb/AACd-DwmHql0L2h0nT1hERl8a?dl=0



We first document a dramatic increase in aggregate total factor productivity in Bolivia. Second,

we exploit the natural experiment of the Bolivian Education reform in 1954 which granted access

to public, education to females with Spanish descent, and males and females with indigenous ori-

gins. We use age at the time of the reform as a first source of variation in exposure, and interact

it with cross-municipality variation in the changes in the supply of schools induced by the reform.

Using census micro-data we compute difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the reform

on schooling. Third, we use these causal estimates to decompose aggregate changes in schooling

due to the reform from changes in schooling that would have occurred in absence of the reform,

and combine this information with historic data regarding national accounts, and total factor

productivity estimates to understand the extent to which the reform was able to explain long term

variation in aggregate total factor productivity. Currently, we are working on the digitalization of

data regarding the reform.

• “Village Networks: theory and evidence from Thailand.” Joint with Cynthia Kinnan, Krislert

Samphantharak and Robert Townsend.

• “Access to credit and productivity: Evidence from Thai villages” Joint with Emily Breza and

Robert Townsend.

TEACHING ASSISTANT EXPERIENCE

Undergraduate courses, Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Economic Development Spring 2017 (Prof. Prashant Bharadwaj)

Economics of Education Fall 2016 (Prof. Julian Betts)

Econometrics Winter 2017 (Prof. Graham Elliot), Fall 2015 (Prof. Andres Santos), Win-

ter 2016 (Prof. Gordon Dahl)

Macroeconomics Fall 2014 (Prof. David Lagakos)

Graduate courses, School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS), UC San Diego

Evaluating Technological Innovation Winter 2016 (Prof. Craig McIntosh)

Quantitative Methods II Spring 2014 (Prof. Jennifer Burney)

Graduate courses, Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile

Microeconomics Fall-Winter 2011 (Prof. Pablo Serra & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez)

Econometrics Fall-Winter 2011 (Prof. Esteban Puentes)

Macroeconomics Fall-Winter 2011 (Prof. Oscar Landerretche)

Applied Microeconometrics Fall-Winter 2011 (Prof. Sergio Urzua)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Conference Presentations

2017 Western Economic Association International, Midwest International Economic Development

Conference (U Wisconsin, Madison), Annual All California Labor Economics Conference

(Poster presentation at SIEPR)

2016 LACEA/LAMES, Bolivian Conference in Development Economics

2015 LACEA

2014 Bolivian Conference in Development Economics.

Referee Service

World Development

Journal of Poverty Alleviation and International Development



OTHER INFORMATION

Citizenship: Bolivian

Date of birth: September 2nd, 1986

Languages: Spanish (Native), English (Proficient)

Xiaxin Wang (Updated: September 26, 2017)

ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT



Placement Coordinator Cathy Pugh (858) 534-1867 [email protected]

CONTACT INFORMATION



9500 Gilman Drive

La Jolla, CA 92093-0508

Phone:

Email:

Website:

(858) 703-7442

[email protected]

http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~xiw105

EDUCATION

PhD Candidate in Economics, University of California, San Diego, Expected Completion June 2018

Committee: Roger Gordon (Chair), Eli Berman, Julie Cullen

M.A. in Economics, Peking University, 2012

B.A. in Management, Nanjing University, 2008

REFERENCES

Roger Gordon, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 534-4828

Eli Berman, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 534-2858

Julie Cullen, University of California, San Diego, [email protected], (858) 822-2056

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Primary Fields: Public Finance, Taxation

Secondary Fields: Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics


Graduate Student Tuition Scholarship, UCSD, 2012-present

Graduate Student Research Fellowship, UCSD, 2013, 2015

Graduate Student Travel Funding, UCSD, 2016, 2017

JOB MARKET PAPER

"Understanding the Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Tale of Two Approaches," with Daixin He, Langchuan Peng,

This paper develops a framework to conduct the first formal comparison of two main approaches (the traditional tax

reform approach and the recently developed bunching approach) to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), a

central parameter in the public finance literature since Feldstein (1999). Using a novel panel of administrative

personal income tax data from China and exploring China’s progressive personal income tax schedule and a tax

reform in 2011, we document two key differences between the ETI estimates using the two approaches. First, the

tax reform ETI estimates increase concavely over time, while the bunching ETI estimates are much more stable over

time. Second, the tax reform ETI estimates (around 4 in the long-run) are much larger than the bunching ETI

(around 0.5) and the difference is statistically significant. These stylized facts imply very different behavioral

responses captured by the two approaches. While the tax reform ETI reflects permanent yet infrequent adjustment of

hours of work, the bunching ETI mostly captures temporary income adjustment. Our findings imply that the tax

reform ETI estimates are more relevant for policy making due to the behavioral responses they are able to capture.




http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~xiw105

Xiaxin Wang


WORKING PAPERS

"Tax Evasion and Avoidance among U.S. Households"

In many countries like the U.S., employees honestly report income due to third-party reporting, while the self-

employed generally under-report income. Based on such facts, previous literature (Pissarides and Weber, 1989;

Hurst et al. 2014) estimates the income under-reporting scale of the self-employed by comparing the income-

consumption relation between employees and the self-employed. In this study, by exploring the panel structure of

PSID data, I examine how reported total income changes when (the head of) a family transitions from being an

employee to becoming self-employed, conditional on total consumption, and use this to obtain an estimate of

income under-reporting close to the scale implied by the IRS audits. Furthermore, I distinguish tax evasion from

several types of tax avoidance (income shifting; income deferral; use of exemptions and deductions) and carefully

investigate how tax liability changes due to evasion and avoidance when a family becomes self-employed. The main

finding is that, on average for the self-employed in the U.S., the amount of tax evasion is comparable to that of tax

avoidance. But the corporate self-employed rely more on tax avoidance while the non-corporate self-employed rely

more on tax evasion.

"How Do Minimum Wage Adjustments Affect Wages in China? Evidence Based on Administrative Personal Income

Tax Data," with Langchuan Peng, Daixin He, revision requested by Contemporary Economic Policy

By using unique administrative personal income tax data covering the population of a middle-sized Chinese city

from 2009 to 2013, we explore how minimum wage adjustments affect wages of low-wage workers. Overall, the

empirical evidence documented in this paper implies a unique pattern of minimum wage regulation: while it permits

wages to stay below the prevailing minimum wage threshold temporarily, it does encourage a higher growth rate for

wages below the threshold. Overall, such a pattern might help lessen any downward pressures on employment,

while ensuring that low-wage earners gradually get better off over time.


"Preferential Corporate Tax Rates Based on Firm Scale: Take-ups and Impacts," with Langchuan Peng, Daixin He "Financial Transaction Taxes (FTT) in Latin America: Revenues and Tax Base Effects"

PUBLICATIONS

"The Effect of China's Agricultural Tax Abolition on Rural Families' Incomes and Production," with Yan Shen,

China Economic Review, 29 (2014): 185-199.

"How Will Fertility Imbalances Affect the Human Capital Structure in China? --Evidence from the National Family

Planning and Fertility Health Survey," with Xiaoyan Lei, Yan Shen, China Economic Journal, December 2012, vol.

5, no. 1. p29-45.

TEACHING (TA at UCSD 2012-present):

Principles of Microeconomics; Principles of Macroeconomics; Intermediate Microeconomics; Intermediate

Macroeconomics; Intermediate Econometrics; Public Finance: Taxation; Decision Under Uncertainty.


Presentations:

2018: “Bunching Estimators and their Applications” Conference (UCSD, scheduled)

2017: NTA Annual Conference (Philadelphia), Young Economist Symposium (Yale), WEAI (San Diego), UCSD

applied lunch seminar

Xiaxin Wang


2016: All California Labor Economics Conference (Poster, UC Davis), UCSD applied lunch seminar, UCSD

international/development lunch seminar

2015: UCSD applied lunch seminar

2011: 11th China Economic Annual Meeting (SHUFE, Shanghai), 8th International Conference on the Chinese

Economy, (CERDI-IDREC, University of Auvergne, Clermont-Ferrand, France)

Journal referee:

China Economic Review.

OTHER INFORMATION

Citizenship: China

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