65 Phil. 56 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Probation Law

Separation of Powers – Undue Delegation of Powers – Power to Pardon

Constitutionality of Laws – May the State Question Its Own Laws

In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and

Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the

Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition for probation. A hearing

was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition.

Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme

Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera)

have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No.

4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;

that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no

designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it

violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law

makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law – if a province chooses to

apply the probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer

will be appointed – hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the

option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law – however, the legislature did

not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executive’s power to grant

pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the

executive’s power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC –

ironic because their main stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while

recognizing its application in provinces).

For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as

well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State

itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation

Law in the past without question but is now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).

ISSUE: 

1. May the State question its own laws?

2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

HELD:

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning

the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.

2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal

protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing

for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within

said province will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.

Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces

where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it

state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether

or not to apply the probation law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act

arbitrarily according to its whims.

Encroachment of Executive Power

Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for

probation. Probation does not encroach upon the President’s power to grant pardon. Probation is not

pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president

to commute penalties.

 

United States vs. Ang Tang Ho

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.

2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said

act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the

necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to

this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on

August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other

hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,  sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of

eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale

was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the

said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus

a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of

power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act

prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.

Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the

law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and

clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform

policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance

commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that

could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law

must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the

government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or

delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in

presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the

ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

US VS. BARRIAS

G.R. No. 4349, U.S. v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

September 24, 1908

G.R. No. 4349

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.

Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

TRACEY, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70

and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved

by the Secretary of Finance and Justice.[[1]] After a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving

her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew,

and without steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being

towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.

Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less

than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is

unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355 ; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the

interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal

delegation of legislative power.

The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the defense in asking for

the discharge of the prisoner on the first ground stated by the defense, that the rule of the Collector cited was

unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of the delegation of legislative power.

By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license

craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain

exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to

promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business

herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the

Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a

misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of

not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion

of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven

hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.

Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in

sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act,

is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was navigating the

Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the river, the docks

whereof are used for the purpose of taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right

sense a part of the harbor, without having recourse to the definition of paragraph 8 of Customs Administrative

Circular No. 136, which reads as follows:

The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the lighterage and harbor

business) shall be considered to include its confluent navigable rivers and lakes, which are navigable during any

season of the year.

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is

recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be

enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police

regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.

The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at

No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No.

1235 , the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation

thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.

This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can

not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the

authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution

itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can

not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can

its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have

seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to

be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of

legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil.

Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be

necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a

misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the

Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the

use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge

and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively

lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the

Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner

of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter

constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):

The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the

particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or

supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . .

In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel the power to

make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al., 135 Mass. 175).

In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal.

491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the

court saying:

Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with

reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter

purely in the hands of the legislature.

Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is sufficient

to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the

extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not material, as we have frequently

held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is

immaterial.

We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section Act No.

1136.

So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and

1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of

both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., reserve his opinion.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994

FACTS : Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.

This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range."

Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares.

On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.

HELD:Yes.

x x x

Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4043             May 26, 1952

CENON S. CERVANTES, petitioner, vs.THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

Cenon Cervantes in his own behalf.Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondent.

REYES, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Auditor General denying petitioner's claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation, otherwise known as the NAFCO.

It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month. Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said resolution was on August 3, 1949, disapproved by the said Committee on strenght of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at the sum not to exceed P15,000 a year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance.

On March 16, 1949, the petitioner asked the Control Committee to reconsider its action and approve his claim for allowance for January to June 15, 1949, amounting to P1,650. The claim was again referred by the Control Committee to the auditor General for comment. The latter, in turn referred it to the NAFCO auditor, who reaffirmed his previous recommendation and emphasized that the fact that the corporation's finances had not improved. In view of this, the auditor General also reiterated his previous opinion against the granting of the petitioner's claim and so informed both the Control Committee and the petitioner. But as the petitioner insisted on his claim the Auditor General Informed him on June 19, 1950, of his refusal to modify his decision. Hence this petition for review.

The NAFCO was created by the Commonwealth Act No. 332, approved on June 18, 1939, with a capital stock of P20,000,000, 51 per cent of which was to be able to be subscribed by the National Government and the remainder to be offered to provincial, municipal, and the city governments and to the general public. The management the corporation was vested in a board of directors of not more than 5 members appointed by the president of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. But the corporation was made subject to the provisions of the corporation law in so far as they were compatible with the provisions of its charter and the purposes of which it was created and was to enjoy the general powers mentioned in the corporation law in addition to those granted in its charter. The members of the board were to receive each a per diem of not to exceed P30 for each day of meeting actually attended, except the chairman of the board, who was to be at the same time the general manager of the corporation and to receive a salary not to exceed P15,000 per annum.

On October 4, 1946, Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council to be composed of the President of the Philippines as chairman, the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as vice-chairman, the chairman of the board of directors and managing heads of all such corporations as ex-officio members, and such additional members as the President might appoint from time to time with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The council was to advise the President in the excercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a Control Committee composed of the Secretary of Commerce and Industry as chairman, a member to be designated by the President from among the members of the council as vice-chairman and the secretary as ex-officio member, and with the power, among others —

(1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their operations;

(2) To pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the respective Boards of Directors of the said corporations; and

(3) To carry out the policies and measures formulated by the Government Enterprises Council with the approval of the President. (Sec. 3, Executive Order No. 93.)

With its controlling stock owned by the Government and the power of appointing its directors vested in the President of the Philippines, there can be no question that the NAFCO is Government controlled corporation subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 51 and the executive order (No. 93) promulgated in accordance therewith. Consequently, it was also subject to the powers of the Control Committee created in said executive order, among which is the power of supervision for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in the operations of the corporation and also the power to pass upon the program of activities and the yearly budget of expenditures approved by the board of directors. It can hardly be questioned that under these powers the Control Committee had the right to pass upon, and consequently to approve or disapprove, the resolution of the NAFCO board of directors granting quarters allowance to the petitioners as such allowance necessarily constitute an item of expenditure in the corporation's budget. That the Control Committee had good grounds for disapproving the resolution is also clear, for, as pointed out by the Auditor General and the NAFCO auditor, the granting of the allowance amounted to an illegal increase of petitioner's salary beyond the limit fixed in the corporate charter and was furthermore not justified by the precarious financial condition of the corporation.

It is argued, however, that Executive Order No. 93 is null and void, not only because it is based on a law that is unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislature power to executive, but also because it was promulgated beyond the period of one year limited in said law.

The second ground ignores the rule that in the computation of the time for doing an act, the first day is excluded and the last day included (Section 13 Rev. Ad. Code.) As the act was approved on October 4, 1946, and the President was given a period of one year within which to promulgate his executive order and that the order was in fact promulgated on October 4, 1947, it is obvious that under the above rule the said executive order was promulgated within the period given.

As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957). Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.

It is also contended that the quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 per anum. But regardless of whether quarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of the directors authorizing payment thereof to the

petitioner cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. And in any event, petitioner's contention that quarters allowance is not compensation, a proposition on which American authorities appear divided, cannot be insisted on behalf of officers and employees working for the Government of the Philippines and its Instrumentalities, including, naturally, government-controlled corporations. This is so because Executive Order No. 332 of 1941, which prohibits the payment of additional compensation to those working for the Government and its Instrumentalities, including government-controlled corporations, was in 1945 amended by Executive Order No. 77 by expressly exempting from the prohibition the payment of quarters allowance "in favor of local government officials and employees entitled to this under existing law." The amendment is a clear indication that quarters allowance was meant to be included in the term "additional compensation", for otherwise the amendment would not have expressly excepted it from the prohibition. This being so, we hold that, for the purpose of the executive order just mentioned, quarters allowance is considered additional compensation and, therefore, prohibited.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for review is dismissed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.