United Nations Development Programme – OAI, Social and ......specified start date), supported a...

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme–OAI,SocialandEnvironmentalComplianceUnit

InvestigationReport

Investigatingallegationsofnon-compliancewithUNDPsocialandenvironmentalcommitmentsrelatingtothefollowingUNDPprojects:“FortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaenresultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanama”and“Apoyoal

ProgramadeReformasdelMINGOB”

CaseNo.SECU0004Date:April19th2018

OfficeofAuditandInvestigations

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BasicDataCaseNo. SECU0004

CategoryofNon-Compliance SocialandEnvironmental

Location: Panama

Priority: High

Datecomplaintreceived: 15August2017

Sourceofcomplaint: M10:MOVIMIENTO10DEABRIL

Eligibilityassessmentconductedby:

RichardBissell,LeadComplianceOfficer

ComplianceOfficerassigned: RichardBissell,LeadComplianceOfficer

Otherinvestigatorsassigned: AnnePerrault,ComplianceOfficer

Signatures:

Preparedby:

Date:

Reviewedby:

Date:

Approvedby:

Date:


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I. ExecutiveSummary1. TwoUNDPprojects,the‘Fortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaen

resultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanamá’(herein‘MIREproject’),withastartdateofDecember2014,and‘ApoyoalProgramadeReformasdelMINGOB’(herein‘MINGOBprogramme’),signedinMay2015(withnospecifiedstartdate),supportedadialogueprocessin2015and2016relatedtoPanama’sBarroBlancoHydropowerProject.

2. On22August2017,theSocialandEnvironmentalComplianceUnit(SECU)ofthe

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeregisteredacomplaintfromthePanama-basedNgäbeBugléareaorganizationM10:MOVIMIENTO10DEABRIL,regardingtheseprojects,andthesupporteddialogueprocess,andrequestingacompliancereview.

3. On25September2017,SECUdeterminedthecomplaintmetthecriterianecessaryfor

SECUtoinvestigateUNDP'scompliancewithitssocialandenvironmentalcommitments,postingthesignedEligibilityDeterminationtoitsregistryhere.,

4. SECUundertookadocumentreview,and,from9Novemberto13November2017,

SECUtraveledtoPanamatointerviewcomplainants,relevantgovernmentofficials,theUNResidentCoordinator/UNDPResidentRepresentative,UNDPstaff,relevantcivilsocietyorganizations,technicalexpertsandothers.

5. Theinvestigation,includingfieldwork,wasfocusedongatheringandreviewing

evidence,includingrelevantUNDPreportsandmaterial,relevantmeetingdocumentation,in-personinterviewstatements,amongotherevidence.TheevidencesoughtrelatedtothedialogueprocessfromFebruary2015toAugust2016,includingUNDP’sroleineachphaseoftheprocess,proceduresemployedbyUNDPandotherstocreateandimplementeachphaseofthedialogueprocess,participationofindigenouscommunitiesandtransparencyforeachphaseofthedialogueprocess,howUNDPassessedandmitigatedrisksthroughoutthedialogueprocess,andUNDP’sparticipationinthefinalagreement.

6. Afterthefieldworkandadditionalresearch,SECUmakesthefollowingfindings:

i. UNDPdidnotmeetUNDPrequirementstoscreenprojectsandprogrammes,includingarequirementtoapplytheEnvironmentalandSocialScreeningProcedure(ESSP)toprojectsapprovedin2014,andarequirementtoapplytheSocialandEnvironmentalScreeningProcedure(SESP)toprojectsandprogrammesapprovedafter1January2015.TheUNDPPanamaCountryOffice(UNDPCO)didnotapplytheESSPtothe2014MIREProject.ItalsodidnotapplytheESSPorSESPtothe2015MINGOBProgramme,anddidnotseekanofficialwaiverfromapplicationofthescreeningtools.Therelativelybroadandnon-detaileddescriptionofactivitiestobesupportedbythesignificantvolumeoffundingfortheMINGOBprogrammemadescreeningforrisksmorechallenging.

ii. UNDPdidnotprepareastakeholderanalysisandstakeholderengagementplan

priortotheRoundtabledialogue,asrequiredforUNDPengagementswith


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IndigenousPeoples-engagementsthatposeatleastmoderate(andlikelysignificant)risksforbothcommunitiesandUNDP.

iii. DespiteUNDP’sfailuretoapplyscreeningtoolsandpreparearobuststakeholder

analysisandengagementplantoguideUNDP’sengagementthroughoutthedialogueprocess,UNDPotherwiselargelymetUNDPrequirementsfortransparency,consultation/consent,andIndigenousPeoples’rightsduringtheRoundtableDialoguefromFebruary2015toMay2015.UNDP’ssupportfordevelopmentoftheMethodologyfortheRoundtableandanagreementonthecompositionoftheIndigenousCommissionwereimportantproceduralundertakingsreflectingUNDPeffortstocomplywithUNDPcommitments.Arguably,theagreedMethodologyfortheRoundtableDialogue,whilerelativelysparseondetail,functionedastheconsultationframeworkrecommendedbytheUNSpecialRapporteurtosecurerights.UNDP’scommitmentstotransparencyandinclusivenessintheRoundtablealsowereconsistentwithUNDPcommitments,aswasUNDP’sconsistentandcleararticulationofitscommitmentstorespectforrights.

iv. UNDPdidnotmeetrequirementsforduediligence,transparency,

consultation/consentandIndigenousPeoples’rightsaftertheRoundtableDialoguewasconcluded,inapproximatelyJune2015.UNDP,forexample,didnotensureconsistencywiththecautionsandfindingsoftheUNSpecialRapporteur,includingcautionsthatinadequateconsultationandconsentprocesseswerethesourceofmostissuesandproblemsregardingrespectforandprotectionofindigenousrights,andmeasuresnecessarytoensurerespectforrights(detailedmorebelow).

7. TohelpensureUNDP’scompliancewithitspolicies,SECUmakesthefollowing

recommendationsforactionbytheUNDPPanamaCountryOffice–withaninitialobservationaboutlimitationsonremediesinthiscontextforspecificharms:

i. Normally,inaSECUcompliancereview,SECUisabletoidentifyremediesin

responsetoharm.Inthiscase,wheremanagementcurrentlyhasdecidedtoterminateinvolvementinissuesrelatedtotheBBHP,specificrecommendationstoremedyharmsarelimited,althoughclearlytherehavebeenharmstoexcludedpartiesduringthedialogueprocess.Forinstance,whileremediestobeconsideredhavebeenadvanced-particularlyloweringthefloodleveltoavoidimpactstoterritoriesofcomplainantsandotherIndigenousPeoples,ensuringrevenuesinatrustfundforIndigenousPeoples,amongothers–UNDP’scurrentnoninvolvementlimitsitscapacitytoadvancediscussionofsuchremedies.ThefollowingrecommendationsapplytoUNDPengagementsinfutureactivities,includinganyrelatedtoBBHP.ItshouldbenotedthatmultipleprojectsareunderwayorproposedforexploitationofnaturalresourcesintheterritoriesofIndigenousPeoplesinPanama.

ii. PreparearobuststakeholderanalysisthatguidesfutureUNDPengagementsin

activitiesthatinvolveIndigenousPeoples,tohelpensurethatUNDPactivitiesrespectrights,strengthenIndigenousPeoples’institutionsandtheirowndecision-makingstructuresandprocesses,ensureattentiontotherights,views,andneedsofaffectedcommunities,anddonotincreasedivisionswithinandamongcommunities.


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iii. Ensureapplicationofscreeningprocedurestofutureprojectsandprogrammes,

andensure,foractivitiesnotdetailedinprogrammes,thatrisksassociatedwithagivensectorofactivitiesareidentifiedatprogrammedevelopment.Whenactivitiesaredetailedsubsequently,ensurethatsocialandenvironmentalrisksassociatedwithsuchactivitiesareavoidedand/ormitigatedinamannerconsistentwiththeSES.

iv. EnsurethatUNDPactivitiesareconsistentwithfindingsofUNbodies,including,

forUNDPengagementsrelatedtotheBarroBlancoHydropowerProject,andfindingsoftheUNSpecialRapporteuronindigenousrights.Thesefindingsrelatetorobustconsultationsandtheneedforconsentfreefromcoercion,andexplicitandcarefulattentiontostandardsandrobustprocedureswhenengagementsrelatetomeasuresinthepublicinterest,e.g.,thefindingthat‘theStateshouldnotallowtheterritorialrightsofthispeopletobeprejudicedinanywayunlessitisnecessarytodosoforapublicpurposethatisvalidfromahumanrightsperspectiveand,insuchcases,onlytotheextentthatitisnecessaryforandproportionaltothatvalidpurpose.’

v. RobustapplicationofSESrequirementstodevelopStakeholderEngagement

PlansandIndigenousPeoplesPlans,asappropriate,whenUNDPactivitiesinvolveIndigenousPeoples,andnotificationtothePanamaniangovernmentthatUNDPmustcomplywithUNDPSES.

vi. RobustapplicationofSESrequirementsfortransparencyandinclusivityin

UNDPactivities,including,inthecontextofdialogueactivities.II. Overview8. On22August2017,theSocialandEnvironmentalComplianceUnit(SECU)ofthe

UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeregisteredacomplaintfromthePanama-basedNgäbeBugléareaorganizationM10:MOVIMIENTO10DEABRIL,concerningtwoUNDP-supportedprojects:‘FortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaenresultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanamá’(herein‘MIRE’project)and“ApoyoalProgramadeReformasdelMINGOB’(herein‘MINGOB’programme).(https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECUPages/CaseDetail.aspx?ItemID=2)

9. TheProjectDocumentfortheMIREprojectwassignedbyUNDPon28November

2014(AtlasAwardID:00084302,ProjectID:00092385),withastartdateofDecember2014,anenddateofDecember2016,andaUS$926,497.00budget.TheprojectdocumentfortheMINGOBprogrammewassignedbyUNDPon20May2015(AtlasAwardID:00083709)withnoprojectstartandenddate,occurringduringthe2014–2019countryprogrammetimeframe,andwithaUS$65,402,369.81budget.1

1TheUNResidentCoordinatorandUNDPResidentRepresentativeforPanamanoted,inan11September2017responsetoaSECUrequestforinformation,‘UNDPalsoprovidedlogisticalsupportforthemobilizationoftherepresentatives,venues,etc.throughprojectsPS92046“ApoyoalProgramadeReformasdelMINGOB”andPS00092385“FortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaenresultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanamá”.


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10. On25September2017,SECUdeterminedthecomplaintmetthecriterianecessaryforSECUtoinvestigateUNDP'scompliancewithitssocialandenvironmentalcommitments,andpostedthesignedEligibilityDeterminationonitspublicregistryhere.

11. SECUundertookadocumentreview,andfrom9Novemberto13November2017,

SECUtraveledtoPanamatointerviewcomplainants,relevantgovernmentofficials,theUNResidentCoordinator/UNDPResidentRepresentative(herein‘RC/RR’),UNDPstaff,relevantcivilsocietyorganizations,technicalexpertsandothers.

12. Thisreportincludesthefollowing:(1)overview;(2)backgroundandconcernsthat

ledtothecomplaint;(3)socialandenvironmentalcommitmentsthatappliedinthecontextofthisproject;(4)findingsrelatedtoapplicationofthecommitments;and(5)recommendations.

III. BackgroundandConcernsThatLedtoComplaint13. In2006,thePanamaniangovernmentselectedaPanamaniancorporation,the

GeneradoradelIstmoS.A.Corporation(GENISA),toadvancea19MWhydropowerproject–theBarroBlancoHydropowerProject(BBHP)–ontheTabasaráRiver,ariverflowingthroughtheterritoryoftheNgäbeBugléIndigenousPeoples.2TheproposalindicatedthatthedamfortheBBHPwastobebuiltdownstreamfrom,butincloseproximityto,thisterritory.

14. OnthebasisofanenvironmentalimpactassessmentcommissionedbyGENISAin

2007,thePanamanianEnvironmentalAuthority(ANAM)approvedtheprojectin2008,andinearly2009GENISAandthegovernmentofPanamasignedtheconcessioncontract.3

15. InMay2009,GENISArequestedamodificationofthepermittoincreasethecapacity

ofthedamto28.8Megawattsfromtheoriginal19Megawatts(a52%increase)–increasingthesizeofthedamandareaflooded.InJanuary2010,ANAMapprovedthemodification,apparentlyintheabsenceofsignificantmodificationstotheenvironmentalimpactassessment,4andinJanuary2011theconcessioncontractwasmodifiedtoincreasethedamcapacityto28.8Megawatts.

2Accordingtothe‘BarroBlancoHydroelectricProject’investigationreport,publishedon29May2015bytheIndependentComplaintsMechanism–theaccountabilitymechanismfortwobanksfundingtheBBHP(theGermanInvestmentCorporation(DEG)andtheNetherlandsDevelopmentFinanceCompany[FMO])-amuchlargerhydropowerprojecthadbeenproposedforthissiteinthelate1990s,butwasabandonedinlightofoppositiontotheproject(bytheM10movementformedinresponsetotheeffort).3GENISAclaimsitsecuredvalidconsentfromIndigenousPeoplestobuildthedam(RoundtableDialogueMeetingMinutes19March2015).IndigenousPeoplesdisputetheideathatvalidconsentwasprovided(RoundtableDialogueMeetingMinutes19March2015).4AreportbytheIndependentComplaintsMechanism,theaccountabilitymechanismfortwobanksfundingtheproject,FMOandDEG,reflectsthatnoadditionalenvironmentalandsocialimpactanalysishadbeenperformedpriorto10July2010.FMO-DEGIndependentComplaintsMechanism,PanelreportNo.1,BarroBlancoHydroelectricProjectPanama,29May2015.


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16. AccordingtoareportsharedwithSECUbytheUnitedNationsResidentCoordinator/UNDPResidentRepresentative(UNRC/UNDPRR),‘ConflictovertheBarroBlancoHydroelectricProject.Origins,evolutionandagreements.PreparedbyUnitedNationsSystem’,(herein‘UNSReport’)thedam‘willrequirefloodingof258.67hectarestoenableTabasará’sreservoiroperations;and5hectaresforthedam,engineroom,andcomplementaryworks…thereservoirwouldfloodanareaof6hectares’oftheNgäbeBugléregion,althoughthedamislocatedoutsidethisregion.

17. InJanuary2011,twoEuropeanstate-ownedbanks,theGermanInvestment

Corporation(DEG)andtheNetherlandsDevelopmentFinanceCompany(FMO),agreedtofundtheproject,and,in2011,theCentralAmericanBankforEconomicIntegration(CABEI)approvedaloantotheprojectdeveloper.

18. ConstructionofthedambeganinFebruary2011.19. Beginningwiththeinitialprojectproposal,andleadingintothedialogueprocessat

issueinthecomplainttoSECU,theprojectwaschallengedbymostIndigenousPeoplesintheregionoftheTabasaráRiver,includingnotonlycomplainants,butalsootherIndigenousPeoplesandtheirrepresentatives(includingtheCaciques-thetraditionalauthoritiesoftheNgäbeBugléComarca,i.e.,indigenousterritory).5Indeed,thedialoguesatissueinthiscomplaintwereareflectionofthestrongoppositionbyIndigenousPeoplestotheproject.

20. Duringthistime,IndigenousPeopleshadraisedsignificantissueswiththeproject,

and,basedontheseissues,soughttochallengetheproject.Theysoughtassistanceand/orredressfromseveralentities,includingtheUnitedNations,theFMO-DEGIndependentComplaintsMechanism(theaccountabilitymechanismfortwobanksfundingtheproject,FMOandDEG),andPanama’sdomesticcourts(variouslawsuits).IndigenousPeoplesadditionallyheldseveralprotests,includingproteststhatwereviolentandresultedinphysicalinjuryanddeath.OnesuchprotestrequiredatemporaryhalttodamconstructioninMay2012.

21. AmongthemostsignificantissuesidentifiedbyIndigenousPeoplesincludedan

inadequateenvironmentalandsocialimpactassessment,insufficienttransparency,flawedconsultationswithIndigenousPeoples,alackofvalidfree,prior,informedconsentfromIndigenousPeoplesfortheproject,inattentiontotherightsofprotestors,andrelatedhumanrightsconcerns.AlthoughIndigenousPeopleswerenotsuccessfulineverychallenge,significantprojectshortcomings(includingthoserelatedtotheissuesabove)wereacknowledgedandconfirmedbyseveraloftheentitiesfromwhichtheysoughtredress.

22. TheUN’sresponsetoIndigenousPeoples’requestsforhelpincludedseveralUNDP-

fundedinitiatives:a‘TechnicalCommission’studyfromMaytoAugust2012,a‘jointverificationmission’inSeptember2012,6andadetailed‘independentassessment’in2013,carriedoutbytheexpertteamofGonzaloCastrodelaMataandLuisLopez.This

5In2009,M10andseveralotherorganizationsfiledacomplainttotheEIBaccountabilitymechanismwhenEIBintheprocessofdecidingwhethertofundtheproject.AfterGENISAwithdrewitsrequestforassistance,thecomplaintwasdismissed.6Protestsatthedam(whichhadhalteddamconstructioninMay2012)weresuspendedtoallowtheUNinspection.


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teampreparedan‘IndependentAppraisaloftheBarroBlancoDam,Panama,’whichincludedaparticipatoryruralappraisal,analysisoftheecologicalandeconomicaspectsoftheproject,andawaterflowsimulation.Subsequently,theUNSpecialRapporteurontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,JamesAnaya,investigatedinJuly2013andpublishedareportin2014examiningissuesrelatedtoIndigenousPeoples’rightsinPanama.7HeofferedrecommendationsspecifictotheBBHP(describedmorebelow).

23. OnefunctionofthetechnicalreportfundedbyUNDPandpreparedbydelaMataand

Lopezwastostudyecologicalandeconomicfactorsandrelatedsocialconcernsnotadequatelyconsideredintheoriginalenvironmentalandsocialimpactassessment-includingconcernsrelatedtotheincreaseinmegawattsproduction.8

24. Ontheinadequacyoftheoriginalimpactassessmentandtheneedtomorerobustly

considerimpactstotheNgäbeBuglépeoplesthereportnoted:‘TheprojectisadjacenttotheIndigenousComarcaofNgäbeBuglé,anditisestimatedthatthereservoircouldpermanentlyfloodapproximately6hectaresoftheregioninitsadjacentareas,withoutconsiderationforpossibleadditionalfloodingduringtimeswhenthewaterlevelrises(Lopez2013).ThelackofclearinformationontheprojectanditseffectsontheindigenouspopulationoftheNgäbeBugléRegionhascausedanumberofconflictsin2011and2012,includingproteststhatresultedintheclosureoftheInter-Americanhighway,andatragiclossofhumanlives.’

25. Itnotedthatwhilethedamhadnoimpactonglobalbiodiversity,ithad‘realand

importantimpacts’ontheindigenouspopulationslivinginthearea,andfurtherconcluded,‘thelocalpopulationhadnotbeencorrectlyconsulted.’Itidentifiedseveralpotentiallysignificantecologicalimpactsthathadnotbeenadequatelyconsidered,includingimpactstothegalleryforestadjacenttotheriver,aquaticbiota–andparticularlytothemovementofmigratoryspecies,andtheriverbank.Itdescribedtheimplicationsoftheseimpactsforcommunities,describing,forexample,that‘naturalresourcessuchaswood,medicinalplants,andothercropsusedbythecommunitywillbelost.Withrespecttohydro-biologicalresources,fishandcrustaceanswillbeaffected.Whilstthenetimpactmaynotnecessarilyrepresentadecreaseinthetotalvolumeofaquaticlife,giventhatsomespecieswillbenefitandwillreplacethosethataredisadvantaged,thesechangeswillhaveanimpactonthetraditionalwayoflifeoftheNgäbepopulation.’Italsonotedthatfloodingandincreasedwaterlevelswoulddecreaseaccessofthecommunitiestothenaturalresourcestheyuseandrelyon.Finally,itobserved,‘thereareintangibleeffectsrelatedtothecultureoftheNgäbecommunity,andtheirtraditionalwayoflife.OneoftheseisthealterationofthePetroglyphsofQuebradaCañaandKiad,whichcontinuetohaveculturalsignificancefortheNgäbepopulation.ThecumulativeeffectsofthedescribedchangesincharacteristicsandaccesstonaturalresourcesmayalsohavesignificantconsequencesforthewayoflifeandcultureofthethreeNgäbecommunities.’

7HumanRightsCouncil,‘ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightsofindigenouspeoples,JamesAnaya.’3July2014.8AllintervieweesinterviewedbySECUsimilarlyacknowledgedthattheoriginalimpactassessmentwasflawed.


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26. Itnotedthefollowingrequirementsfordevelopmentinthearea,‘Anyopportunityfordevelopmentbeingcarriedoutwillrequirejointassessmentandtransparentandopendialogue,inordertoensurethatitsimplementationrespectsthelegitimateaspirationsandtraditionalvaluesofthecommunities.Theseactionsmayinnowaybeconsideredareplacementforactionsofmitigationandcompensationfortheaffectedpopulations,towhichthefirmisobligedonthebasisoftheimpactsidentifiedwithinthisexpertreport.’

27. SubsequenttotheUNtechnicalexpertsreport,theUNSpecialRapporteuronthe

rightsofIndigenousPeoples,Mr.Anaya,visitedPanamain2013,andsubmittedareporttotheUNGeneralAssemblyinJuly2014.9

28. HesimilarlyconcludedtheNgäbe"werenotproperlyconsulted’andemphasized

IndigenousPeoples’concernsrelatedtohydropowerandtheBBdamspecifically.HeconfirmedthatwhilethedamwastobelocatedoutsidetheboundariesoftheComarca,thedam’sreservoirwouldfloodlandsinanadjacentarea‘andwillthushaveadirectimpactonanumberofthecomarca’sinhabitants.’

29. Thereportacknowledgedshortcomingsintheenvironmentalimpactstudyapproved

bytheNationalEnvironmentAgency,notingithas‘givencauseforconcern,sinceitfailstoassesstheproject’simpactonthelandsandterritoriesoftheNgäbeBuglépeople’and‘irregularitiesintheprocessesinvolvedinobtainingauthorizationfortheconstructionofhydroelectricpowerstationsorinreachingagreementonsuchprojects.’10

30. OfparticularnotefortheUNDP-supporteddialoguesistheobservationthattensions

aredirectlyrelatedtoinadequateconsultations,‘RepresentativesoftheGovernmentandoftheIndigenousPeoplesconcernedagreethattheexistingtensionsandthecontinuedrejectionoftheprojectbytheNgäbepeopleare,toalargeextent,theconsequenceofshortcomingsintheconsultationprocess.

31. Thisreportacknowledges,astheearlierUN-supportedindependentinvestigationdid,

significantconflictsrelatedtothedam,includingtheviolentdemonstrationsin2011and2012thateventuallyledtoa2012jointverificationmissiontocarryouta

9HumanRightsCouncil,‘ReportoftheSpecialRapporteurontherightsofindigenouspeoples,JamesAnaya.’3July2014.10Anaya’sreporttotheHumanRightsCouncilnotes,‘Ingeneral,theIndigenousPeoplesaffectedbytheseprojectsclaimthattherehavebeenirregularitiesintheprocessesinvolvedinobtainingauthorizationfortheconstructionofhydroelectricpowerstationsorinreachingagreementonsuchprojects.Ithasalsobeenclaimedthattherevenuesfromtheseprojectshavebeendistributedimproperly.Mostoftheseprojectsarelocatedoutsideoftheboundariesoftheindigenouscomarcas,buttheyneverthelesshaveanimpactonlandsrecognizedasbelongingtoorclaimedbyIndigenousPeoples.RecentexperiencesinconnectionwithhydroelectricprojectsinPanamaillustratetheconsequencesofthelackofanappropriategoverningframeworkforconsultationswithindigenouscommunities.Inthecasesthathavearisenrecently,consultationswerecarriedoutinanimprovisedmanner.RepresentativesofboththeGovernmentandIndigenousPeoplesstatedthatthoseprocesseswereunsatisfactory,partlybecausetheenterprisesinvolvedundertooktocarryouttheconsultationsontheirownandfailedtoworkwiththepeoplesconcernedthroughtheirrepresentatives.


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preliminarystudyontheimpactoftheproject,and,inturn,theUN-supportedinternationalteamofexperts.11

32. ItprovidedthefollowingtwokeyrecommendationsspecifictotheBarroBlanco

HydropowerProject:

‘Inthelightofrecentexperienceswiththeimplementationofhydroelectricprojectswithoutappropriateconsultationswiththeindigenouscommunitiesconcerned,suchastheBarroBlanco…,establish,incoordinationwithindigenousrepresentatives,agoverningframeworkforasystemofconsultationstobeappliedinthecaseofhydroelectricandextractiveprojectsthathaveanimpactonIndigenousPeoples(paras.42to46).’‘AstotheBarroBlancohydroelectricproject,thelandsoftheNgäbepeopleshouldnotbefloodedoradverselyaffectedinanywaywithouttheprioragreementoftherepresentativeauthoritiesofthatpeopleastotheconditionsattachedthereto.WithouttheagreementorconsentoftheNgäbepeople,theStateshouldnotallowtheterritorialrightsofthispeopletobeprejudicedinanywayunlessitisnecessarytodosoforapublicpurposethatisvalidfromahumanrightsperspectiveand,insuchcases,onlytotheextentthatitisnecessaryforandproportionaltothatvalidpurpose(paras.42to45).’

33. On29May2015,theFMO-DEGIndependentComplaintsMechanismreportdescribed

similarkeyshortcomings,notinganinadequateinitialassessmentofpotentialimpactstoIndigenousPeoples,theirculturalheritage,biodiversityandthelocalecosystem.Withrespecttothelatter,thereportfurtherconcludes,‘thesubjectofthegalleryforests,itsvalueandsocialeconomicuseofthecommunitiesremainsun-resolvedand

11Itdescribes,‘Thedisputessurroundingthisprojectbeganatthestartof2011,whenmembersoftheNgobepeopleclosedoffvarioussectionsoftheInter-AmericanHighway.Thedemonstrationsendedon27February2011withthesigningoftheSanFélixAgreementbytheGovernmentandtheCoordinatingBodyfortheDefenceoftheNaturalResourcesandRightsoftheNgobe-BuglePeopleandCampesinos.TheGovernmentundertooktoworkforthepassageofalawthatwouldprohibitminingandmineralexplorationintheNgobe-Buglecomarca.However,whenthebillwaspassedintolawbytheNationalAssemblyatitsfirstreading,thearticleprovidingforthecancellationofcommercialminingconcessionsalreadyinoperationwithinthecomarcahadbeenremovedfromthetext.Thissparkedafreshwaveofdemonstrations,andtheInter-AmericanHighwaywasagainclosedoffinFebruary2012.TwomembersoftheNgobecommunitydiedduringthosedemonstrations,andtheinquiryintothecircumstancessurroundingtheirdeathshasnotbeencompleted.IndigenousPeoplesandvariouscivilsocietyorganizationsalsoclaimthat,whileinpolicecustody,anumberofgirlsandwomenweresubjectedtosexualviolence,includingrapeinonecase.Investigationsarealsoongoinginthesecases….FollowingthesigningoftheSanLorenzoAgreementinFebruary2012,theGovernment,withtheCatholicChurchactingasmediatorandtheUnitedNationscountryteaminPanamaasanobserver,setuptworoundtableswithrepresentativesoftheNgobepeopletoaddresscontroversialissuesthatremainedunresolved,includingtheMiningActandtheBarroBlancohydroelectricproject.TheroundtableontheMiningActledtothedraftingandadoptionofActNo.11of2012(seepara.15above).AsaresultoftheroundtableontheBarroBlancodam,thepartiesagreedtosendajointverificationmissioncomprisedofrepresentativesoftheGovernmentofPanama,theUnitedNationsandtheNgobe-Buglecomarcatotheareatocarryoutapreliminarystudyontheimpactoftheproject…InitsreportofSeptember2012,thejointverificationmissionrecommendedthatanindependentstudybecarriedoutbyaninternationalteamofexperts.Thehydraulic,ecologicalandeconomicaspectsoftheprojectwereexaminedinJulyandAugust2013andaparticipatory,community-levelassessmentwasprepared.’


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theinabilitytofinalizetheassessmentandputinplaceappropriateactionsinthedisputedareastemsfromthefailuretoenterintohealthydialogueandconsequentlyaninabilitytocarryoutdetailedanalysisandvisitstotheforest.’12ThemechanismadditionallydeterminedFMO/DEGshouldhavetakenactiontorespondtoUNfindingsofimpactstoalimitednumberofpeople.

34. ThemechanismgavepointedattentiontohowFMOandDEGconsultedwithaffected

communities,finding,‘RegardlessofthequestionoftheformalrelationshipandconsultationwiththerepresentativestructuresoftheComarca,thereareseriousquestionsastowhetherthelenderscouldbesatisfiedthattheconsultationswiththeaffectedcommunities(emphasisadded)havebeenconductedinaformatandintensity(goodfaithnegotiations)thatisrequiredbyIFCPS7.Thepanelisoftheopinionthelendershavenottakentheresistanceoftheaffectedcommunitiesseriouslyenough.Thismaybe,toanextent,becausealegalagreementwasreachedbetweenBBHPandtheregionalcounciloftheComarcaandthiswasconsideredbythelenderstobesufficienttodealwiththeissue.Nevertheless,theIndigenousPeoplesreportclearlydocumentedthatthedirectlyaffectedcommunitieschallengedthelegitimacyofsuchagreements.ThisshouldhavetriggeredthefurtherstepsidentifiedinthatReport….TheIndigenousPeoplesreportconcludedthatitwasnotawareofanyplanhowtorelatetotheNgäbepeopleintheaffectedcommunities.Thisconclusionshouldhavebeentakenmoreseriouslybythelendersandtheyshouldhaveinsistedinclarifyingtheissuefasterandtryingmoreoptionsforconsultation.’

35. Afterseveralunsuccessfulattemptstoresolveconcerns,thedialogueprocessatissue

inthiscomplaintwasinitiatedinFebruary2015.36. Asdetailedbelow,thisprocesswasnotasingledialogue,butseveral.Itwasinitiated

asa‘RoundtableDialogue’inFebruary2015,whenBBHPwasapproximately95%completed.13ThisRoundtablewasconcludedbyJune2015.Subsequently,on10August2015,thegovernmentandtheCacicaGeneraloftheNgäbeBugléComarcasignedanagreementtocreatea‘JointTechnicalTeam’and‘continuethedialogueprocess.’The‘JointTechnicalTeam’beganmeeting28September2015,andappearedtocompleteitsworktowardtheendofNovember.Subsequently(therearenopublicdocumentsreflectingaspecificdate),thegovernmentandtheCaciquesoftheNgäbeBugléComarca(withouttheparticipationofthedirectlyaffectedcommunitieswithinM10)beganmeetingandsigneda‘CommissionAgreement’on17August2016(detailedinparas.103-108,below).

37. AccordingtoUNDPPanamaCO(UNDPCO)staff,thePanamaniangovernment

requestedsupportfromtheUnitedNationsSystemfortheentiredialogueprocessbeginninginFebruary2015andendinginAugust2016.TheUNRC/UNDPRR,MartinSantiago,wasaskedtoco-facilitatethisprocesswiththeUnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissioneronHumanRights(UNOHCHR)RegionalRepresentativeforCentralAmerica.

38. OneUNDPrepresentativeinterviewedbySECUdescribedthecollaborationwithUN

OHCHRasfollows,‘UNOHCHRparticipationinthedialoguewascritical,asitprovided

12FMO-DEGIndependentComplaintsMechanism,PanelreportNo.1,BarroBlancoHydroelectricProjectPanama,29May2015.13RoundtableDialogueMeetingMinutes,5March2015.


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thenecessarytechnicalassistancetotheUNRC/UNDPRRthroughouttheprocesstoensurethattherightsofindigenouspeoplewerenotcompromisedinanyway.Moreover,UNOHCHRalsoplayedakeyroleinensuringthatanyagreementcomingoutofthedialogueprocessbeinfullcompliancewithnationalandinternationalstandards.’

39. Ms.CarmenRosaVillaQuintanaparticipatedinthisprocessforUNOHCHRuntilher

retirementinJune2015.Mr.FrancescoNottibecameRegionalRepresentativeafterMs.VillaQuintana’sdeparture,buthisparticipationwasmuchmorelimitedthanMs.VillaQuintana’s,i.e.,heattendedonlyonedialoguemeeting,inMarch2016,andhelefthispostinJune2016.14

40. Mr.SantiagoandMs.VillaQuintanaacceptedtherequestandreachedagreementwith

theNationalgovernmentandIndigenousPeoples–includingdirectlyaffectedcommunitiesaswellastraditionalindigenousauthorities,e.g.,theCaciques–ontheroletheUNwastoplayinthefirstRoundtableDialogueinitiatedinFebruary2015.

41. UNDPprovidedinitialtechnicalandfinancialsupportfortheentiredialogueprocess

throughtwoprojects:‘FortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaenresultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanamá’(MIREproject)–approvedin2014,and‘ApoyoalProgramadeReformasdelMINGOB’(MINGOBprogramme)–approvedin2015.15

42. ThecurrentUNRC/UNDPRRdescribedthespecificprojectdocumentprovisions

thatsupportedthedialogueprocess,‘Thedialogueprocesswassupportedundertheactivity“LascapacidadesdelEstadohansidofortalecidasparadarrespuestaalasdemandasynecesidadesdelospueblosindígenas”(pages18and27,inApoyoalProgramadeReformasdelMINGOBProjectdocument)and“FacilitadoslosinsumostécnicosnecesariosparaeldesarrollodelasiniciativasestratégicasdelMIREydelasfuncionesasociadasalaVicepresidenta”,specificallyundertheactivity“Ladirecciónyseguimientodelasmesassectorialesdediálogoyconsensoyainstaladas(salud,educaciónyempleo)ylasquesedecidaninstalarenelmarcodelapolíticadediálogoyconsensodelgobierno”(pages13,14and27,inFortalecimientoinstitucionalparalagestiónbasadaenresultadosdelMinisteriodeRelacionesExterioresdelaRepúblicadePanamáProjectdocument).

43. Asnotedintheaboveparagraph,theprojectdocumentsthroughwhichsupportfor

thedialogueoccurreddonotexplicitlyreferencedialoguesrelatedtoBBHP,althoughtheydoreferenceactivitiestostrengthencapacitiesofnationalinstitutionstoimprovegovernanceofindigenousterritories.Theyalsoidentify‘agreements’reachedasanindicatorofsuccess.

44. TheUNDPCOhasmaintainedthatthedialogueprocesswasnotco-facilitatedby

UNDP.TheCOdescribesthattheUNwasrepresentedbyMr.MartinSantiagoinhisroleasUNResidentCoordinatorandbyMs.VillaQuintanaforUNOHCHR.16Atthat

14AccordingtoMr.Notti,theMarchdialoguemeetingwasheldonthesidelinesofanothermeetingfocusedonPanamaandInternationalLaborOrganizationConventionNo.169(ILO169).15Thisinformationwasprovidedinan18September2017emailtoSECU.16UNDP,initsinitialcommunicationwithSECU,relayedthatUNDPhad‘norole’inthedialogueprocess


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time,Mr.SantiagowasservingasboththeUNResidentCoordinator(fortheUNSystem)andtheUNDPResidentRepresentative.ThedistinctionbetweentheUNSystemandUNDPlikelywasnotcleartomostattendees.IninterviewswithSECU,theUNDPCOdescribedthatUNDP’sroleinrelationtotheUNResidentCoordinatorisnoteasilydistinguishedinpractice;theUNResidentCoordinatorrelieswhollyonUNDPtofunction.TheUNResidentCoordinatorhasonlyUNDPstafftosupportitsefforts,andhis/hersalaryispaidbyUNDP.Allprocurement,staffrulesandregulations,procedural/logistical/finance,andapplicablepolicies,standardsandproceduresaregovernedbyUNDP.

45. Eachsetofminutestothetendialoguemeetingsoccurringfrom21Februaryto18

May2015chroniclethatMr.SantiagoparticipatedasarepresentativeofUNDP(listedaseither‘MartinSantiago,ResidentRepresentativeofUNDP’or‘MartinSantiago,UNDPRepresentative’).AdditionalUNDPstaff,includingIñakideFrancisco,CoordinatoroftheDevelopmentPlanforIndigenousPeoplesatUNDP,attendedmost,ifnotall,ofthedialoguesessions,asdidCynthiaRodriquezandSamaraPellecer,identifiedas‘UNDP’sTechnicalSecretary’inthe19March2015meetingnotes.VariousotherUNDPstaff,includingGiseleDidier,FernandoHiraldo,andJulieCastillo,attendedatleastonemeeting.

46. IninterviewswithSECU,theUNDPCOacknowledgedthat,inadditiontofunding

variousaspectsofthedialogueprocess,e.g.,transportationforlocalcommunities,,theUNDPCOstaffprovidedotherlogisticssupport,includingpreparingandcirculatingmeetingagendasandminutes.SeveralintervieweesdescribedUNDPasplayinganimportantrole,withoneGovernmentCommissionmemberdescribingitas‘averyimportantcentralrole.’

47. TheUNDPCOdidnotscreeneithertheMIREorMINGOBprojectdocumentsusing

UNDP’sscreeningtoolsexistingwhentheprojectdocumentsweresigned.TheEnvironmentalandSocialScreeningProcedure(ESSP)wasinplace,anditsapplicationrequired,whenUNDPapprovedthefirstproject,theMIREproject,in2014.TheSocialandEnvironmentalScreeningProcedure(SESP)wasinplace,anditsapplicationrequired,whenUNDPapprovedthesecondproject,theMINGOBprogramme,in2015.TheUNDPCOindicatedthatsinceUNDPwasenteringintoanewpartnership,andtheprocesstocreatetheprogrammehadbeenmovingforwardforawhile,itmadeaconsciousdecisiontodealwiththeSESlater-wheneverasubstantiverevisiontotheprojectoccurred.

48. AlthoughtheUNDPCOdidnotusetheESSPandSESPtoidentifypotential

environmentalandsocialriskswhentheprojectswereapproved,atsomelaterdateUNDPpostedtothe‘QualityAssurance’portionofUNDP’sinternalwebsitebriefresponsestoseveralquestionsundertheheading‘SocialandEnvironmentalStandards.’

49. FortheMINGOBproject,thisincludedthefollowingtwoquestions:‘8.Doesthe

projectseektofurthertherealizationofhumanrightsusingahumanrightsbasedapproach?’And‘9.Aresocialandenvironmentalimpactsandrisks(includingthoserelatedtohumanrights,genderandenvironment)beingsuccessfullymanagedandmonitoredinaccordancewithprojectdocumentandrelevantactionplans?’Theresponseforbothwasareferencetoaone-pageriskmatrixthatdoesnotmentionIndigenousPeoples,humanrights,oranyothersocialandenvironmentalstandard.


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50. FortheMIREproject,oneadditionalquestionincluded‘10.Areunanticipatedsocial

andenvironmentalissuesorgrievancesthatariseduringimplementationassessedandadequatelymanaged,withrelevantmanagementplansupdated?Forthefirstquestion,theresponsewas‘Theprojectforeseeswithinitsactivitiesthe1.Planning,monitoringandinstitutionalizationofthepositionofPanamaintheCounciloftheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights.’Forthesecondandthirdquestions,theanswerwas‘noposee’–presumablysuggestingtherewerenosocialandenvironmentalimpactstobeconsidered.

51. Sometimeduring(orafter)17the2015DialogueRoundtable,theUNDPCOprepareda

twopageinformal,undated‘StakeholderAnalysis….aboutindigenousstakeholdersintheBarroBlancoconflict.’ItidentifiesM10asakeygroupwithintheIndigenousandpeasantscommission,andindicatesthatthiscommissionisoneof‘fourindigenousstakeholders’intheconflict.ItdescribesM10astherepresentativeoftheindigenouscommunitiesdirectlyaffectedbytheproject.A‘StakeholdersMap’isattachedtotheanalysis,anditdescribesrelationshipsamongthefourstakeholdergroupsbrieflydescribedintheanalysis.

52. ThepartiestotheDialogueRoundtable,includingthegovernmentandIndigenous

Peoples,preparedabrief‘ConsensualMethodology’thatwasfinalizedon27February2015toguidetheDialogueRoundtable.Themethodology‘Objective’describedthattheRoundtablewasestablishedfordialogueandreflection,aimedat(i)identifyingagreementsanddisagreementsoverpointsofcontentionand(ii)discussingpossiblesolutionstotheexistingconflictbetweentheNgäbeBugléandpeasantpeoplesandtheGenisaCompany,duetothehydroelectricProjectBarroBlanco.Nootherformalframeworkforconsultationwasprepared.

53. The‘DialogueStructure’outlinedinthemethodologydescribedtwomajorgroupsto

thisdialogue–the‘Government’and‘AffectedPeople’-thateachhadacommission,aGovernment‘Highlevelcommission’andan‘IndigenousCommission.’Thesecommissionsweremandatedtoaimat‘solutionsidentification.’

54. Specific‘Subjectstobediscussed’inthemethodologyincluded‘agreementsand

disagreementsrelatedto…Environmentalsystem,Socialdevelopment,Economicdevelopmentand,Culturaldevelopment…oftheNgäbeBugléandpeasantpeople,accordingtothelegalsystemandHumanRights’and‘NgäbeBugléandpeasantpeople’srequesttocanceltheBarroBlancoProjectandfreeTabasaráriver.’

55. UNDP’sResultsOrientedAnnualReport(ROAR)from2015,whichwaspreparedby

theUNDPCO,providesthefollowingdescriptionofthemethodology,andemphasizesattentiontoaffectedindigenouscommunities:‘Throughaco-designedprocess,adialoguemethodologywasjointlyconstructedtofindasolutiontotheBarroBlancoconflict.Thismethodologywasbasedonasustaineddialoguetoolwiththeobjectiveofidentifyingsimilaritiesanddifferencesonthepossibleimpactsoftheproject-environmental,social,culturalandeconomiclevel.BoththejointconstructionofthemethodologyoftheprocessandthefacilitationofUNDPthroughoutit,ensuredthe

17AhardcopyoftheanalysiswasprovidedtoSECU,anditdoesnotspecifywhenthedocumentwasprepared.Itdescribes,however,‘TheIndigenousandPeasantsCommission’spositionhasremainedconstantthroughoutthe2015dialogueprocess,theydemandtocanceltheBarroBlancoproject.’


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inclusionandactiveparticipationoftheaffected(emphasisadded)indigenouscommunities,whichcontributedtoanagreementbetweenthenationalgovernmentandthetraditionalindigenousauthorities.’

56. Accordingtoallinterviewees,allIndigenousPeoplesparticipatinginthedialogue

processagreedonthecompositionoftheIndigenousCommissionaswellastheRoundtableDialogueprocedures.

57. Accordingtotheminutesofthefirstmeeting,on21February2015,RicardoMiranda

(aleaderofthedirectlyaffectedcommunitythatispartofM10)wasthe‘GeneralCoordinator,’and‘spokesperson,’andothermembersoftheCommissionincludedthetraditionalauthorities–theCaciques,theMayorofMuna,a‘Deputy’,technicaladvisors,amongothers.Inthe27February2015minutes,theIndigenousCommissionindicated,‘wemadeitclearwhowouldbethespokesperson,butallthosewhoarepartoftheCommissionareauthorities…RicardoMirandaisthespokespersonbutChitocantalkaboutthistopic.’TheindividualcompositionvariedsomewhatthroughtheFebruarytoMay2015phaseoftheRoundtabledialogue,butwithRicardoasGeneralCoordinatoruntilthefinaltwomeetings,on4Mayand18May2015,whichhedidnotattend.Panama’sVicePresidentobserved,inthefirstmeeting,‘WehaveacceptedthatthisCommissionisrepresentativeoftheregion.’TheIndigenousPeoples’GeneralCongresswasneveraformalmemberoftheIndigenousCommission,anditsparticipationwasdebatedduringseveralmeetings.

58. TheGovernmentCommissionincludedPanama’sVicePresidentandMinisterof

ForeignAffairs,IsabelSantMalodeAlvarado,othergovernmentministries,includingtheMinisterandDeputyMinisterfortheNationalEnvironmentalAuthority(ANAM),theMinisterofSecurity,theMinistryofIndigenousAffairs,amongotherministries,andtheChiefofOfficefortheMinisterofForeignAffairs.ThecompositionvariedsomewhatthroughtheFebruarytoMay2015;notallministriesorindividualsparticipatedineverymeeting.

59. GENISAwasinvitedtoparticipateinmeetingsfrom5Marchto31March2015.60. Minutesfromthefirstdialoguemeeting,on21February2015,describethe

participantsoftheUnitedNationsasfollows:‘UnitedNationsfacilitationteamconsistingof:MartinSantiago,UNDPRepresentative;CarmenRosaVilla,UNOHCHRRegionalRepresentative,FrancescoNotti,AssistantRepresentativeUNOHCHR;GastónAin,GiseleDidier,IñakideFrancisco,CynthiaRodríguez,AlejandraAraúzandSamaraPellecer’(thefinalsixUNparticipantsappeartohaveUNDPaffiliations).

61. TheRoundtablefromFebruarytoMay2015was,byallaccounts,fullytransparent

andinclusive.Meetingminutesweretakenandpublished,meetingswereopentothepublic,mostmeetingswereheldinTolé,andatleastsomemeetings(meetingsnotinTolé)werebroadcast,e.g.,the19March2015meetingheldinPanamaCity.The21FebruarymeetingnotesquotetheVicePresidentasstating‘Thepresenceoftheobserversisimportantinordertoarriveatasolidagreement,andtoavoidcomplaints….’SheobservedthatwhiletheIndigenousCommissionwasrepresentativeoftheregion,‘webelievethatitmaybeinappropriatenottoallowotherpartiestobeheard.’The27FebruarynotesreflecttheIndigenousCommissionrequestfor‘respectandtransparency.Donotmakeaclosedsystem.’


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62. MinutesfromthemeetingsreflectthatIndigenousPeopleswereparticipatingintheRoundtableDialoguewiththeexpectationtheBBHPcouldbecancelled–andwouldbecancelledifthe‘incompatibilities’identifiedduringthedialogueprocesswerenotresolvable.Theynoteinthefirstmeetingon21February2015,‘WewouldliketohighlightthepointmadebytheVicePresidentthatsheisoneofus.Ifthisisthecase,wehavebeenveryclearsincebeforeasinglebrickwaslaid:wewanttheprojecttobecancelled.Ifsheisindeedoneofus,wewelcomeher,andifsheisoneofus,shewillsaythesameasus:thattheprojectshouldbecancelled.’Inthesecondmeetingon27February,theCacicaGeneralobserved,‘ThetransmissiontowersinBarroBlancoarestillbeingbuilt….Inordertoguaranteethisdialogue,theprojectmustbetotallystopped.’SeveralintervieweessuggestedthatthehaltindamconstructionpriortothedialogueswasanencouragingsignforIndigenousPeoplesinthisregard,i.e.,thatIndigenousPeoplesperceivedthatthehalttoconstructionreflectedthepossibilitythattheentiredamcouldbecancelledasaresultofthedialogue.TheIndigenousCommissionemphasizedinseveralofthemeetingsthatitshouldnotbea‘negotiation’butadialogue.

63. Inresponse,theGovernmentCommission,inseveralmeetings,described

responsibilitiestoboththecommunitiesandthecompanyandadesiretofindsolutionstotheproject.Forexample,theGovernmentCommissionstated,inthe21February2015meeting,‘TheGovernmenthastakensignificantstepstobuildconfidence.Theprojecthasbeentemporarilyhalted.Thepeopleheretodaywerenotherepreviously,andweasktobegivenavoteofconfidence.TheGovernmenthasaresponsibilitythatitcannotavoid.Thefirmismakinguseofandexercisingitsrightstoputinplacelegalmeasures….Itisvitalthatwekeepinmindhumanrightsandtherightsofindigenouspeople,andthatweseeksocialpeaceandsecurity.TheGovernmentcannotturnbacktheclock.Icannotgiveyounowtherightstoprior,freeandinformedconsent,becauseinthiscaseitisnotprior.Allowus,intoday’sreality,tofulfillourworkintheframeworkofrights;bothyourownrights,andthoseofothers….Weneedadialogue,notanegotiation.’On9March2015,theGovernmentCommissionindicated,‘thegovernmentisbeingpressurebybanksandothers.Theyhavetherighttodoso.ThegovernmenthasalotofpressurefromtheIndigenousCommissionandthecompany.Wearelookingforasolutiontothestandoffwehaveatthismoment.Let’strytofindamiddleground.’

64. Indigenousparticipantsrequestedresponsestothepossibilityofdamcancellationin

severalmeetings,includingthesecondmeetingon27February2015inwhichoneindigenousparticipanturgedsucharesponse:‘Wehavebeenfightingformorethan15years.Behonestandtelluswhatwillhappenassoonaspossible….WewantthecancellationofBarroBlancobecausethecompanydidnotconsultwithus….Decidecancellationornocancellation,andwecanstopwastingpaperhere.’On9March2015,aftertheGovernment’ssuggestionforsolutions,theIndigenousCommissionstated,‘Thisisthefifthtimewesitdownatthetableandthepopulationisaskingwhattheobjectiveofthisis.Wecomeforananswer.Wewanttoknowiftheprojectisgoingtobecancelledortheywillruledoutinfavorofthecompany,tellthetruth.’On27March2015,theIndigenousCommissionreiterated,‘Withallduerespect,thepurposeofthistableistocanceltheBarroBlancoproject….Thereisonlyonesolutionandit’stheprojectcancellation.BarroBlancoisnotcompatiblewiththecommunitybasedinthelawandhumanrights….Wewillnottoleratethatthisdecisiontakesmuchlongerifyou’regoingtotellusthattheprojectwon’tbecancelled….Youbringusheretoentertainussoattheendyoucantellusthatprojectcannotbecancelled.’The


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IndigenousCommissionreiteratedrequestsforcancellationonboth30Marchand1April2015.

65. TheFacilitatorsobserved,inthe13March2015meetingthat‘Inthepreliminary

discussionswehadwithbothCommissions,itwasagreedthatthedialoguewouldbeconductedwithoutpreconditionsorimpositions.’

66. MeetingsheldfromMarchthroughAprildiscussedissueswiththeproject,including,

butnotlimitedto,thefollowing:inadequateconsultations/consentandimpactassessmentsleadingtoconstructionofthedam,i.e.,on27March2015theGovernmentCommissionacknowledged‘TheStatehasactedirresponsiblewiththeindigenouspeople’;alackofclarityrelatingtotheminimumandmaximumfloodheight;questionsregardingwhythedamwasallowedtomovefrom19to28metersinheightwithoutanadditionalenvironmentalimpactassessment;lingeringquestionsassociatedwithsafetyofthedam(e.g.,theleftabutment)andmeasuresnecessarytorespondtosafetyrisks;impactstoculture,e.g.,petroglyphs,cemeteries,etc.;paymentsmadetoindividualsbythecompany;questionsabouthowthedamis‘compatible’withtherightsoflocalcommunities;andconcernsaboutuseofforce;etc.

67. DuringmeetingsattendedbyGENISA,itprovideditsownperspective,i.e.,itwonthe

bidforthedamingoodfaithinresponsetothegovernment’sownrequestforproposals;itattemptedtomeetrequirementsbutagreedthatseveralmeasureswereinadequate–includinginadequateconsultationsandimpactassessments;itwaswillingtoprovideothermeasurestofindasolution;itpaidPanamaUS$700,000andwouldrequestcompensationiftheprojectwascancelled;itbelievedtheprojectwas‘100%compatible.’

68. On16April2015,afterseveralmeetingstodiscusstheseissuesand

‘incompatibilities,’theIndigenousCommissionsubmittedareport-InformeTécnicoSistemaAmbiental.ThisreportdetailedtheCommission’sunderstandingofthevariouswaysinwhichtheirexpertsbelievedBBHPwasnotconsistentwithIndigenousPeoples’wellbeingandrights–andthusnotcompatibleforthearea.

69. Atthe16April2015(9th)meetingoftheRoundtable,theIndigenousCommission

formallysubmittedarequestforfinalcancellationoftheproject(afterdenouncingGENISA’spublicannouncementthatitwasfinishingconstructionandstartingoperations).

70. Atthe4May2015(10th)meetingoftheRoundtable,theCacicaGeneralreiteratedthat

theIndigenousCommission‘deliveredalltechnicalproofsthatdemonstratetheincompatibilitiesbetweentheBarroBlancoprojectandtheNgäbeBuglépeople.Theywantindigenouspeopletodecidetheirowndevelopmentandthisdevelopmentnottobeimposed.’

71. Atthismeeting,theUNindicated,‘it’simportanttolookforagreementsthatfoster,

defend,guaranteeindigenousrights,whichareestablishedbyinternationallegalsystemsandtheUNaswell.Theseagreementsarerelatedtolife,integrity,territory,naturalresourcesandgovernments….Thedialoguehasbeenconductedfollowingmutualrespect,egalitarianism,transparencyandimpartialityprinciples.Thepartieshaveshownwillingnesstocooperate,andthegovernmenthastemporarilystoppedallworksinthedamsite.Thedialoguehasfollowedamethodologyandstructure.’


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72. Atthismeeting,theGovernmentCommission(representedbytheVice-Presidentof

Panama)acknowledged‘thecommunity’sclaimswerefair’and‘highlightedthegreatvalueanddignityshownthroughouttheNgäbeBuglé’sfight.’Sheexpressedthatthegovernmenthadadilemmabecause‘energyisanelementofdevelopment’butGENISAmademistakesandhaslimitations.Shenotedaneedforthegovernmentto‘findasolutionthatfulfillstheNgäbeBuglé’slegitimatedemand,andcomplieswiththeirresponsibilitiesastheexecutivegovernment.’Shethenoutlinedaproposal,offering‘optionstobediscussed.’Shedescribedgovernmentdiscussionswiththebanks(financingtheproject)totransfertheproject’smanagementtoanothercompany’–thiswouldoccuronly‘afterconsultationwiththeindigenouscommunity,withoutimposition,becauseonlythecommunitycandefinewhatadecentlifemeansofthesolutiontotheculturalissuesdiscussed.’Shestated,‘Thegovernmenthastoguaranteethecommunity’srights.Theycannotabandonthecommunitiesandletthemdealwiththecompany,’andindicatedagovernmentcommitmenttoseveralmeasures,includingseveral‘immediateactionstoensurethattheprojectiseffectivelyconducted’–establishinganewgovernmentofficeneartheprojectsite,providingadministrativesupporttotheMunadistricttohelpthemensurelawsarefollowed,establishinganenergyprojectfortheComarca,andcreatinga$15millioninvestmentplanforeducational,reforestation,cleanwaterandroadimprovementactionsintheComarca.

73. TheGovernmentobserved‘thesituationisdifficultbutthatisnecessarytosolveit

together.Thetruthisthatthere’sanalmostcompleteddam,builtwithoutconsultation.Thecompanyhasmademistakes.Howcanwewithdrawtheprojectwithoutharmingthecountry?AnydecisionhasconsequencesandPanamacanfacelawsuitsinsideandoutofthecountry.ThereareinvestorsfromSwedenandNetherlands.HowcanwecompensatetheharmtotheNgäbeandpeasantpeoples?ThereisarealpossibilitythatthebanksdismissGenisa,whichwillhelptoavoidalawsuit.Thesebanksmustsendanewteamapprovedbythegovernmentandthecommunity.Anewadministratoropensnewpossibilities,forexample,toestablishthatapercentageofthegeneratedenergybenefitsonlyaffectedpeopleandtherestoftheComarca,toguaranteethatlevel103willbethemaximumlimitallowed,toopenawatertreatmentplan,putfishesandguaranteeanimalprotein.Thereareseveraloptionstobediscussed,thuswearegoingtosetupanofficeintheregion.’

74. Meetingminutesdescribethefollowingresponse,amongothers,fromtheIndigenous

Commission:‘DefinitivesuspensionoftheBarroBlancoproject;ThegovernmentmustcancelGENISA’scontract;Wedonotacceptthatanothercompanytakesontheprojectoranynegotiationwiththebanks;Werequestthatalldecisionsinregardstotheprojectaredefinedbytheindigenouscommissionformedbytraditionalauthorities,administrativeauthorities,surroundingaffectedcommunitiesrepresentedbyM10,andtechnicalteam,alongsidethenationalgovernment.ThestatementissignedbyCacicaGeneralSilviaCarrera,MayorRolandoCarpintero;LocalCaciqueChitoGallardo,M10ManoloMiranda,KadriCaciqueJeremiasMontero,LegislatorCrescenciaPrado.’

75. ThemeetingconcludedwiththeGovernmentCommissionconfirming‘theycannot

proceedwithafinalcancellationthatwouldcauseamilliondollarlawsuittothePanamagovernment….Genisa’sejectionistherightpath,andthattheyneedtofindasolutionthatgenerateslesscoststothePanamaniangovernment.’TheIndigenous


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Commissionresponded‘Theyhavedemonstratedtheprojectinconsistencies,notGenisa’sinconsistencies’andalthough‘Theyunderstandthegovernment’sconcerns’projectincompatibilitiesrequirecancellation.AproposaltohavebothCommissions’technicalteamsmeettoquantifypossiblesolutions(inato-be-confirmed15dayperiod)wasacceptedbybothparties.

76. NotesfromthefinalRoundtableDialoguemeetingon18May2015(the11th),reflecta

GovernmentCommissiondesireto‘continuethedialoguethroughatechnicalroundtable’withnoclearchangeinthepositionarticulatedinthepreviousmeeting,butwithadecisionthatGENISAwill‘withdrawfromadministrationofBBHPconstruction….Athirdpartywillmanagetheconstruction’anda‘commitmenttoworkalongsidetheindigenousandpeasants’communities,andtheshareholdersoftheBarroBlancoproject,tosolvethediscrepanciesfoundthroughoutthedialogue.’

77. TheIndigenousCommissionrejectedtheproposalforacontinueddialoguethrougha

‘newtechnicalroundtable,’citing‘Genisa’sdisrespectfulactions’including,fromtheirperspective,GENISAcontinuingtobuildthedam(notjustfixtheleftembankment)duringthedialogueprocess.TheIndigenousCommissionindicatedthatwhile‘Theyknowthatthegovernmentcannotcancelthegrantagreement,buttheyshouldhavesaiditsincethebeginninginsteadofcreatingadialogueroundtable…Theproblemisnottoselectathirdparty,theproblemisthattheindigenousrightswereviolatedandtheprojectisnotgoingtobecancelled…’and‘Theyhavelosttheirabilitytotrustthegovernment.’TheythenaskedtheUN‘toestablishitspositioninregardstotheprojectorthatthecancellationrequestisdiscussedinthegeneralassembly.’

78. TheUNteamconcludedtheroundtablediscussionwiththefollowingpoints:‘itisnot

goingtobepossibletoscheduleanextmeeting….Thedialogueshowedtheinconsistenciesandit’shistoric….TheUNiswillingtoholdindividualmeetingswiththecommissionsgiventhisdialoguestagehasconcludedandithasbeendifficulttobridgedifferencesofopinion.’Theteamfurtherindicated,‘TheUNhasinsistedthatindigenouscommunitiesneedtoparticipateinallprojectsthatmightaffectthem,notonlythroughtheconsultationprocessbutalsotoachieveafree,previousandinformedconsent.TheUNalsohastheDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,andhasbeenworkingwithindigenouscommunitiesforthelast20yearstofinallyratifythisdeclarationin2007.TheUNhasnotbeenandwillneverbepartofascheme,wehavefacilitatedtheroundtablebecausewebelievedialoguescanhavegoodresultsevennoconsensusisachieved.Theyhighlightedthatdialoguedoesnotmeanconsensus,itisajointlearningprocessinwhichbridgescanbeconstructedtosolvedifferencesofopinion.TheUNwillcontinuetoaskforthegovernment’sratificationofagreement169,andthatinanyfutureproject,aconsultationprocessneedstobeconductedwiththeIndigenousPeoplesasakeyelementtoensuredemocracyandpreventsocialconflicts.’Theidentified‘nextsteps’werefortheUNto‘holdindividualmeetingswithbothcommissionstodiscusspossiblenextsteps.’

79. TheUNDPCO’sresponsetoSECU’sinitialrequestforinformationcorroboratedthat

theRoundtable‘wasformallyconcludedinJune2015.’


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80. Accordingtocomplainantsandotherinterviewees,moredemonstrationsensuedon25July2015–withmanypeopledetainedandarrested,andseveralinjured.18

81. On10August2015,anewagreementwasenteredintobetweenthePresidentofthe

RepublicofPanamaandtheCacicaGeneral,withthefollowingheading,‘TheGovernmentOfTheRepublicOfPanamaAndTheTraditionalAuthoritiesDesignatedByTheLawsOfTheNgabe-BugléRegion,InLightOfTheBarroBlancoConflict,AndInOrderToContinueWithTheDialogue,HaveAgreedToTheFollowing’.

82. Inthenewagreement,thepartiesmadeseveraljointcommitmentsincluding‘to

createajointtechnicalteamtostudythecurrentproblemwiththedam…and,toissueanopinionaboutthestatusoftheseissues’;‘continuethedialogueprocessabouttheprojectfeasibility,basedontheinconsistenciesdiscussedduringtheroundtable’;‘analyzepotentialsolutionsfortheproject,includingthepurchaseoftheBarroBlancoprojectproperty,justifiedbyscientificandfinancialreasons,andundertheprinciplesofrespectforcommunities,speciallytothosedirectlyaffected’;and‘accepttheresultsandconclusionsthatresultfromthetechnicalteam’sanalysis,asabasisforfuturedecision-making.’

83. Thegovernmentmadeseveralofitsowncommitments,includingtoensure‘all

necessaryworkstostabilizethedam…toavoidharmingthecommunities’;‘finalizeallcivilworks,howeverelectro-mechanicworkswouldbeavoided;’andnotflood‘thereservoirorstartoperationsintheBarroBlancoProject,untilafinalagreementbetweenthedisputingpartieshasbeenreachedandlegitimizedbythelocaldemocraticinstitutionsestablishedbytheLaw.’

84. Theagreementmentioned‘thosedirectlyaffected,’butthegrouprepresenting

IndigenousPeoplesdidnotincludeallindividualsformerlypartoftheIndigenousCommissionthatwasendorsedbyallindigenousparticipants.Thegroupdidnotinclude,forexample,membersofM10,includingthepreviousspokespersonfortheIndigenousCommission.Relatedly,theagreementdidnotindicatehowthosedirectlyaffectedindigenouscommunitieswouldbeengagedin,orinformedabout,thesubsequentdialogueprocess.

85. TheUNSystem(UNS)ReportsharedwithSECUinresponsetorequestsfor

information,describedthat‘severalinternaldivisionsoccurredwithintheIndigenousCommission,thatledtothecreationofanewIndigenousCommissionformedbytraditionalauthorities(GeneralCacica,RegionalCacique,LocalCaciqueandLocalCongressPresident,togetherwithadministrativeauthorities,Muna’sMayor,municipalityrepresentatives,andothers.)’

86. Thesubsequentdialoguesdidnotusethemethodologypreviouslyagreedbyallfor

theearlierRoundtableDialogueinitiatedinFebruary2015.TheUnitedNations

18SECUwasnotabletoconfirmthenumbers.ThecomplainantsindicatedtoSECU,intheircomplaintandinaninterview,thatmorethan50weredetainedandfiveinjured–withonepersonpermanentlycrippledbyananklewound.ThecomplainantsdescribedthatthisoccurredinfrontoftheUNDPcoordinator,and‘ThissituationcausedatotalbreakdownoftheDialogueTablebytheGovernment,whichconvenedanewTechnicalDialogueTableformedbydecision-makersandsupportedbyUNDP.’


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reportdoesnotindicatethattheUNDPCOorUNOHCHRperformedanyassessmentofsocialorhumanrights-relatedrisksrelatedtocontinuingthedialogue.

87. OnememberoftheGovernmentCommissioncharacterizedtheRoundtableDialogue

as‘notademocraticprocess,theylookedforconsensus’andwhenM10didnotagree,anddidnotwanttocontinuetoengageinadialogueprocess,theprocesswasadvancedwithoutthem.

88. AccordingtoaPanamaniannewspaper,19on31August2015thegovernmentof

PanamafinedGENISA$775,200fornon-compliancewithitsobligationto"negotiatewith,relocateandcompensatethoseaffectedbythehydroelectricproject."’

89. The‘JointTechnicalTeam’firstmeton28September2015.ItmetattheUNDPoffices

(asdidsubsequentmeetingsofthisTeam).AccordingtotheUNSreport,theTechnicalgroupmeetingswerethe‘firstphase’ofanewdialogueprocess.IndigenousPeoplesparticipatingincludedseveralmembersoftheformertechnicalteamtotheRoundtableDialogue,butnotall.Onenon-participantindicatedtoSECUthathedidnotparticipatebecauseaffectedcommunitieshaddecidednottoparticipate.TheUNOHCHRdidnotparticipateinthesemeetings.

90. Unlikethepreviousmeeting,theJointTechnicalTeammeetingwasnotopenfor

observationbyanyinterestedindividual.Meetingnotesfrom28September2015to11November2015,preparedbyUNDP,wereprovidedtoSECU.Itisnotclearifthesenotesweremadepublicimmediatelyaftertheywereprepared,oriftheywereeverdisseminatedpublicly.

91. Notesindicate,amongotheritems,thatmeetingsincludeddiscussionsrelatedto

requestsforinformationfromGENISA,adecisionthatUNDPwouldbetherepositoryforinformation,concernsthatGENISAwasnotmakingallrequestedinformationavailable,planstovisitthesite,andaplantomakepresentationstothesignatoriesofthe10Augustagreementon10December2015and14January2016.

92. TheTechnicalTeamcompleteditsworkinJanuary2016,withapresentationofits

findingsinLlanoÑopo.2093. RegardingthedialogueoccurringaftertheTechnicalTeamcompleteditswork,the

UNSReportprovidedtoSECUindicates,‘ThesecondphaseoftheprocessbeganwiththeinstallationofaJointWorkCommissioninordertoanalyzepotentialsolutionstotheinconsistenciesfoundbythe2015DialogueCommission.FromMarchtoMay2016,aseriesofweeklymeetingswereheldtodealwithinconsistenciesinfourkeyaxes:environmental,social,culturalandeconomic.Theresultofthesemeetingswasthejointdevelopmentoffourdocumentscontainingrecommendationsandproposalstobeimplemented.Thesedocumentsmustbetransformedintoaroadmaptoaddress

19LaPrensa,24September2015.Anothercompany,HidraulicaSanJose,wasfined$450,000over"unauthorizeddischarges"intoastreamanda"lackoffollow-upreports.”20AccordingtotheUNSReport,itnotonlydevelopeda‘stirrupsstudy,butalsoacomprehensiveanalysisonthetechnicalfeasibilityoftheproject,focusingondifferentdesignandconstruction’sfeatures.Thefinalreportbringclaritytotheproject’sissuesasitconcludedthattheprojectwasdesignedandconstructedaccordingtothegeological,topographicalandhydrologicalconditionsofthedamsite.Theteamrecommendedminoradjustments.’


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theeffectsoftheBarroBlancoProjectintheTabasaráBasin.Theaforementioneddocumentscontainedrecommendationssuchasthegalleryforestsrecovery,ensuringthesocialandproductiveusesbycommunitiesdownstreamfromthedam,notdevelopinganyotherstructureorhydraulicprojectinthebasin,anddevelopinganIntegralPlanofDevelopmentofthebasin.Likewise,therecommendationsdocumentsandthegeneralagreementestablishedthatallconsensusesmustbediscussedandapprovedbytheRegion’sauthoritiesasestablishedbyLaw10of1997andRegion’sCharter.’

94. SECUwasnotprovidedanyagreedmethodologyforthisJointWorkCommission.This

CommissionwassupportedbytheUNDPCO,butnopublicdocumentsdescribethissupport.TheUNDPCOdidnotshareanyanalysisofpotentialsocial/humanrights-relatedriskswithSECU.

95. Asnotedearlier,UNOHCHRparticipatedinonlyonedialogue-relatedmeetingafter

June2015(afterthepreviousRoundtableDialoguewasconcluded).ThismeetingwasinMarch,onthesidelinesofanothermeetingfocusedonPanamaandILONo.169.

96. NoticesofJointCommissionmeetingsfromMarchtoMay2016werenotprovidedto

thebroaderpublicorcommunitymembers,andmeetingnotesarenotavailable.ComplainantsstatedtoSECUthattheywerenotprovidedinformationaboutthesemeetings–theywerenotawareofwhenandwheretheyweretakingplace.AmemberoftheGovernmentCommissionsharedabeliefthatthesemeetingsweremoretransparentbecausethegovernmentvisitedcommunitiesintheComarca,includingthosenotsuggestedbyM10,tosecuretheiropinionsontheissues.

97. AccordingtotheUNSReport,‘Thethirdphaseoftheprocessincludedthecreationofa

FinancialSub-CommissionresponsibleofanalyzingtheProject’sfinancialsituation.ItwasdefinedthattheStatewasabletotakeownershipoftheproject,providedascientificandfinancialjustification.Theanalysiscarriedoutbythisentity,ledbytheMEF,showntherealproject’svalueandexpectedfuturevalueingreaterdetail.’

98. On24May2016GENISAbegantofillthereservoirbehindthedam,leadingtoflooding

oftheareaandweeksofsignificantandsometimesviolentprotests.99. ApressreleasepostedonthePanamaniangovernment’swebsiteon24August2016

suggestedthefloodingwasatestofthedam,andnotedthatpeoplepotentiallyimpactedwererelocated‘ensuringrespectfortheirhumanrights.’21

100. Othergroupsandindividualsindicatedthathumanrightshadbeenviolated.They

notedthatthefloodingwasasurprise–thatitoccurredintheabsenceofanagreementwithIndigenousPeoplesand,assuch,wasnotconsistentwithakeyfindingoftheUNSpecialRapporteuronindigenousrightsthatsuchanagreementwasnecessary,andalsonotconsistentwiththe10August2015agreementofthe

21BarroBlanco:TheStoryofAnArduousProcessofDialogue,24August2016..‘AllthepeoplewhowereinthefloodplainareasandprivatelandsoftheHydroelectricProject,weretransferredonMay23bytheStatesecurityforcestoJesusObrerodeToléMissionCenter’and‘OnMay24,2016,agroupofpeoplefromtheMamaTatachurchwhowereinthefloodareas(thesepeopledidnotliveintheprojectarea)weremovedwithinthelegalparametersandensuringrespectfortheirhumanrights.’


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traditionalauthoritieswiththegovernmentthatsuchfloodingwouldnotoccurwithoutthesupportofIndigenousPeoples.

101. AccordingtoareportpreparedbytheHumanRightsNetworkofPanama,fillingofthe

BarroBlancoreservoirbeganon24May2016,afteranillegalforcedevictionoccurred.Itnoted,‘AgroupcomposedoftheStatePolice,firefighters,andSINAPROC’enteredthedamsite,carriedout‘theevictionoftheMamaTatacamp,’and‘force(d)thetransferofpeople’toJesusObrerodeToléMissionCenteron23May2016.Itquotedwitnessestotheevictionassaying‘evictedpeoplesweremainlywomenandchildren….fourtractorscameinanddestroyedthehousesandthecampchurch.’22Thereportdescribedroadblocks,protests,andmanyarrests.ItnotedthatwaterfromthefloodingreachedtheComarca–specificallytheQuebradaCanacommunity–on28May,andM10gaveanultimatumof48hoursfortheBarroBlancofloodgatestobereopened.Itdescribedaseriesofroadblocksandprotestsfrom29Mayuntilmid-June,including‘apeacefulprotestinfrontofthePNUD[UNDP]buildingsinCiudaddelSaber.’Italsoreportedseveralmeetings,includingonewiththeUnitedNationsintheKiadcommunityon6June,andvisitsbythePanamanianOmbudsman.23

102. AcivilsocietygroupinterviewedbySECUsharedthatwhilethefillingmayhavebeen

apreliminarytest,itkilledthefish,vegetation,andcrops,andharmedpatrimonialsitesinviolationofhumanrights.

103. On8June2016,thegovernment(ledbytheVicePresident)andthetraditional

authoritiesoftheComarcametinTolétodiscussissuesrelatedtothefillingofthedamandthedialogue.Newspaperarticlesdescribeseveraloutcomes.OnekeyoutcomewastherejectionbyIndigenousPeoplesofagovernmentproposaltomovemanagementoftheprojecttoanewgroupandexploremechanismstoguaranteeeconomicbenefitsforthe‘comarcaandaffectedparties,’inexchangeforcommitmentsfromcommunitiestoallowtheinitialfillingofthedam(for‘thesolepurposeofdemonstratingtheprojectworksproperly’)andrecognizethatprogressingovernmentcommitmentswould‘laythefoundationtoauthorizeprojectimplementation.’24Accordingtothearticles,(unspecified)IndigenousPeoplesattendingthemeetingmaintainedthepositionthattheprojectbecancelled,thegovernmentagreedtomaintainthedamwatertestinglevelat‘level87’inresponsetoconcernsexpressedbytheComarca,andthetraditionalauthoritiesandthegovernmentagreedtocontinuethedialogueprocess.Regardingthefillingthathadbeeninitiatedon24May,andpromptedprotests,theVicePresidentwasquotedasstatingthatthetestfillingwasnecessaryforGENISAtobeabletoleavetheproject,and,onthatbasis,ASEPgavetheauthorizationtofillthereservoir.

104. RegardingtherelationshipbetweenM10andthetraditionalauthoritiesatthattime,

theHumanRightsNetworkofPanamareportdescribedin-personinterviewsthatreflectedaperceptionthattheCacicaSilviaCarreracontinuedtosupportcancellationofthedam.Thereportobserved,‘Currentlythereistensionbetweenthisauthority

22MarielaArceOlmedoCarrasquillaandIlleanaMolo.HumanRightsNetworkofPanama.HumanRightsReport.BarroBlancoCrisis:FillingtheDam.ComarcaNgabeBugle.Panama.DateofFieldWork:12-15June2016,ResearchPeriod:May222016-June152016.

23Id..24NimayGonzalez.Telemetro,8June2016.‘WithoutReachingAgreement,theMeetingonBarroBlancoConcludes,DialogueContinues.’


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andleadersoftheorganizationsthatareintheconflictzone.AlthoughbothpartiesagreeuponthecancellationoftheBarroBlancodam.’25

105. AccordingtoareportbyGlobalSisters,andadescriptionprovidedbyamemberofthe

IndigenousCommissionfromtheRoundtableDialogue,testfloodingoccurredagainon19August,threedayspriortothesigningceremony.26

106. AccordingtotheUNSReport,‘DuringJune,JulyandAugust2016,aseriesofmeetings

wereheldwiththeobjectiveofdraftingajointsettlementdocumentthatwouldincludealltheagreementsmadeinpreviousmonths.’Thereportdoesnotdescribewhoparticipatedorwherethemeetingswereheld,andmeetingnotesarenotavailableforthesemeetings.

107. AbriefdescriptiononthePanamaniangovernmentwebsiteindicates‘Anattemptwas

madetoapproachtheenvironmentalgroupknownasMovimiento10deAbril(M10)toinformthemabouttheprocessuptothatmomentandtheydidnotshowinterest.’27AmemberoftheGovernmentCommissionconveyedtoSECU,‘M10wasinvitedtojointhesecondphaseofthedialoguecommissionbuttheyrefusedthisinvitation’.ComplainantsindicatedtoSECUthattheywerenotprovidedinformationaboutthemeetings,andtheyknewnothingabouttheagreementeventuallysigned.

108. TheUNSReportfurthernotes,‘Thissettlementdocumentwasfinallyapprovedata

meetingonAugust17th,2016,attendedbythePresidentandVicePresidentofPanama,inthePresidentialbuilding.TraditionalauthoritieswererepresentedbytheGeneralCacica,theRegionalCacique,andtheLocalCacique;alongwithotherRegion’sauthoritiesand,IndigenousCommissionleaders.TheofficialsigningoftheagreementwasheldonAugust22nd,inLlanoTugrí,intheNgäbeBugléregion.Duringthesigningoftheagreement,severalmembersofM10,theorganizationthatoriginallyrequestedthecancellationoftheproject,alongwithanothergroupofpeople,usedviolencetopreventthesigningoftheagreement.Finally,afterhoursofdelay,thedocumentwassigned.ThePresidentMr.JuanCarlosVarelasignedinrepresentationoftheNationalgovernment,whilefortheNgäbeBugléregion,theGeneralCacicaGeneralSilviaCarrerasignedtheagreement.’

109. TheagreementreflectsthatMartinSantiagoattendedthesigningceremonyandalso

signed,asUNResidentCoordinator,witnessofhonor.Attheceremony,andsubsequently,Mr.Santiagodescribed,tovariousmedia,thattheagreementwasagoodagreement.UNOHCHRwasnotrepresentedattheceremony.

110. AmemberoftheIndigenousCommissionwhodidnotparticipateindiscussionsafter

theRoundtableDialogueclaimedthatMr.SantiagosaidtheagreementwasexemplaryandhumanrightswerenotviolatedintheBarroBlancoproject.ThismemberindicatedthatthesestatementsupsetmanyIndigenousPeoples.

25MarielaArceOlmedoCarrasquillaandIlleanaMolo.HumanRightsNetworkofPanama.‘HumanRightsReport.BarroBlancoCrisis:FillingtheDam.’ComarcaNgabeBugle.Panama.DateofFieldWork:12-15June2016,ResearchPeriod:May222016-June152016.26TracyL.Barnett.GlobalSistersReport,29March2017.‘AWallinTheirRiver:FloodedNgabeCommunitiesContinuetoFightDam’27BarroBlanco:TheStoryofAnArduousProcessofDialogue,24August2016


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111. M10andotherintervieweesindicatedtoSECUthattheprotestduringthesigningceremonybeganasapeacefulprotestbutturnedviolent,andlastedforseveralhours.Theviolence,theyclaimed,waswitnessedbyMr.Santiago.Foraperiodoftime,protestorspreventedtheCaciquesfromsigningtheagreement.Eventually,thesigningceremonywasmovedtoalocationinwhichsignatoriescouldsign.Someintervieweesdescribedasmallgroupofprotesters,approximately12.Others,includingagovernmentrepresentative,indicatedthat70-80peopleprotestedagainsttheagreement.

112. TheUNSReportdescribesthe‘agreement’smainconclusions’asfollows:‘1.The

withdrawalofGENISAfromtheHydroelectricProject’soperations;2.Thecreationofatrustfundthatwillreceive15%oftheannualincomegeneratedbythehydroelectricdam,tofunddevelopmentactivitiesintheTabasaráRiverBasinandintheregion;3.Toguaranteepropercompensationtothosewhoaredirectlyaffectedbytheproject,includingtheirresettlementinlandsofequalorgreatervaluethantheaffectedones.Thesecompensationsshallbereachedbycommonagreement;4.TocancelanyhydroelectricconcessionthatmayexistintheTabasaráriverbasin.Forfutureconcessions,regionandtraditionalauthoritiesmustgiveitsconsentthroughaconsultationprocess;5.TheNationalGovernmentundertakestoimplementallrecommendedactionsidentifiedinthesocial,economic,culturalandenvironmentalinconsistenciesdocumentspreparedbytheCommissionfromMarchtoMay2016.’

113. OthersignatoriesincludedChitoGallardo,theLocalCacique,andJeremiasMontero,

theRegionalCacique,amongothers,butnotthePresidentoftheGeneralCongress,DemesioCases.MostintervieweesagreedthatfortheagreementtotakeeffecttheGeneralCongressmustsignit,andithasnot.TwomembersoftheGovernmentCommissioninterviewedbySECUindicatedabeliefthattheCongresshassignedtheagreement,butthePresidentoftheGeneralCongressstatedtoSECUthatithasnotbeensigned.

114. SomemembersoftheIndigenousCommissionwhodidnotparticipateinthedialogue

processafterMay2015,andanotherindigenousinterviewee,conveyedabeliefthatwhiletheCaciquesunderdomesticlawaretraditionalauthorities,theyarenotrepresentativeswhocandecideandsignanagreementforthepeoplewithintheComarca,particularlyintheabsenceofconsultationswithmembersofthecommunity.Theseindividualsperceivethereisno‘agreement’(becausetherecannotbe)and,inanyevent,theGeneralCongresshasnotprovidedthenecessaryagreementfortheBBHP.TheseindividualsrelayedabeliefthattheUNDPCOshouldhaveknownmoreabouttraditionaldecision-makingprocedures,andbeenmorecautiousabouteffortstochangeorignoresuchprocedures.TheyindicatedthattheUNDPCOshouldhaveindicatedaneedfortheGeneralCongresstoapprovethedocumentforittobeanofficialagreement.

115. Anotherintervieweeindicated,however,thattheCaciquesdecidedtosignbecause

theCongresswasdivided,i.e.,thereweretwoCongressesanddecision-makingbytheCongresswas,therefore,notpossible

116. TwoIndigenousPeopleswhoparticipatedinthedialogueprocessaftertheconclusion

oftheRoundtableDialogueindicatedtoSECUthataftercompletionofthedamandtestfloodingthereappearedtobenochoicebuttosecuresomebenefits.


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117. The2017GlobalSistersReportarticledescribedanin-personinterviewwiththeGeneralCacica,indicatingthatwhileshehadbeenastrongvoiceagainstthedam,‘somethingchangedlastAugust,whenshesignedtheagreement.’Thearticledescribed,she‘signedtheagreementbecausethedamwasdone,andshefeltitfelltohertonegotiatesomebenefitsforthecomarca.’28

118. TheGlobalSistersReportreportindicatedthatM10requestedthat,attheveryleast,

‘thereservoirlevelsbeloweredtobelowthelimitsoftheNgäbeterritory.It’snotenoughtorepairthedamageoreventheriver,butit’sasolutiontheycanlivewith.’29

119. Anotherindigenousleadersigningtheagreementdescribedaconcernfor‘social

interests’ofthebroadercommunity,andnotedthatmanycommunitymembers(otherthanthosewithinM10)supporttheagreement.Thisindividualagreed,however,thatratificationbyCongressisnecessaryforcompletionoftheagreementandthishasnotyetoccurred.

120. TheUNDPCOindicateditisnolongerinvolvedintheBBHP-relateddialoguesor

efforts.AGovernmentrepresentativedescribedthatoneUNDPCOstaffmemberisworkingontheUNDP-supportedefforttodevelopacomprehensivedevelopmentplanforIndigenousPeoplesandagovernanceframework,butUNDPnolongerhasapointpersonfortheBBHPprojectspecifically.

IV. UNDP’sSocialandEnvironmentalCommitments121. Since2014,UNDPhasrequiredstafftoscreenprojectstoidentifyrisksrelatedto

humanrightsandtheenvironment,andtopursueadditionalassessmentsandmeasuresasnecessarytorespondtotheserisks.

122. UNDP’sEnvironmentalandSocialScreeningProcedure(ESSP)wasthefirsttool

developedtoassiststaffeffortstoperformthisscreening.In2015,theSocialandEnvironmentalScreeningProcedure(SESP)replacedtheESSP.ScreeningperformedbythesetoolsconsiderspotentialrisksandimpactsassociatedwithallactivitiesoutlinedinProjectdocumentationand‘includesreviewofdirectandindirectimpactsintheProject’sareaofinfluence.’

123. BothtoolsenableUNDPstafftoidentifyrisksrelatedtoactivitiesinvolvingIndigenous

Peoples.124. SESPscreeningquestionstiedtoUNDPengagementswithIndigenousPeoplesand

otherlocalcommunities,andpertinentinthecontextoftheUNDP-supporteddialogueactivity,includethefollowing:‘CouldtheProjectleadtoadverseimpactsonenjoymentofthehumanrights(civil,political,economic,socialorcultural)oftheaffectedpopulationandparticularlyofmarginalizedgroups?Havelocalcommunitiesorindividuals,giventheopportunity,raisedhumanrightsconcernsregardingtheProjectduringthestakeholderengagementprocess?IsthereariskthattheProjectwouldexacerbateconflictsamongand/ortheriskofviolencetoproject-affectedcommunitiesandindividuals?WilltheproposedProjectresultininterventionsthat

28TracyL.Barnett.GlobalSistersReport,29March2017.‘AWallinTheirRiver:FloodedNgabeCommunitiesContinuetoFightDam’29Id.


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wouldpotentiallyadverselyimpactsites,structures,orobjectswithhistorical,cultural,artistic,traditionalorreligiousvaluesorintangibleformsofculture(e.g.knowledge,innovations,practices)?TheESSPposessimilarquestions.

125. ‘Yes’answerstothesequestionsreflectriskstoconsider.Forprojectswith‘yes’

answersandthatinvolveIndigenousPeoples,UNDPisrequiredtoperformadditionalassessments/reviewsofpotentialimpactstothesecommunities,andtotakemeasurestoavoidandmitigatesuchimpacts.

126. UNDP’sSocialandEnvironmentalStandards(SES)Standard6–IndigenousPeoples-

emphasizestheneedforadditionalassessmentorreviewwhentherightsandresourcesofIndigenousPeoplesmaybeimpacted,stating,‘10.Priorsocialandenvironmentalimpactstudy:AllProjectsthatmayimpacttherights,lands,resourcesandterritoriesofIndigenousPeoplesrequirepriorreviewand/orassessmentofpotentialimpactsandbenefits.Projectswithpotentiallysignificantadverseimpactsrequireafullsocialandenvironmentalassessmentconductedbyanindependentandcapableentity.Reviewsandassessmentswillbeconductedtransparentlyandwiththefull,effectiveandmeaningfulparticipationoftheIndigenousPeoplesconcerned.’SESfootnote75,notes,‘ForProjectswithoutadverseimpactsonrights,lands,resourcesandterritoriesofIndigenousPeoplesbutwhichstillaffectIndigenousPeoples,UNDPwillensurethatsuchProjectsarereviewedtoidentifyanypotentialotherimpacts.Reviewsmaytaketheformofalimitedsocialandenvironmentalimpactassessment,socialassessment,ormitigationandmanagementplan.’

127. Thisemphasisonreviewsandassessmentsofpotentialimpactsandbenefitsresponds

tothestatedobjectivesofSESStandard6to‘ensurethatUNDPProjectsthatmayimpactIndigenousPeoplesaredesignedinaspiritofpartnershipwiththem,withtheirfullandeffectiveparticipation,withtheobjectiveofsecuringtheirfree,prior,andinformedconsent(FPIC)wheretheirrights,lands,resources,territories,traditionallivelihoodsmaybeaffected….Topromotegreatercontrolandmanagementbyindigenouspeoplesoverdevelopmentsaffectingthem,includingtheirlands,resourcesandterritories,ensuringalignmentofProjectswithIndigenousPeoples’distinctvisionandself-identifieddevelopmentpriorities….Toavoidadverseimpactsontherightsofindigenouspeoples,theirlands,resourcesandterritories,tomitigateandremedyresidualimpacts,andtoensureprovisionofjustandequitablebenefitsandopportunitiesforIndigenousPeoplesinaculturallyappropriatemanner.’

128. Standard6additionallydetailsrequirementsandmeasuresUNDPmusttaketoavoid

andmitigateimpactsidentifiedduringthesereviewsandassessments.129. OnekeyrequirementoftheSES,includedinbothStandard6andintheSES‘Human

Rights’principle(andalsoreflectedin2014UNDPsocialandenvironmentalcommitments),isrespectforhumanrights.Inthisregard,theSESprovidesexplicitattentiontoUNDP’scommitmenttotheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP),“UNDPwillnotparticipateinaProjectthatviolatesthehumanrightsofIndigenousPeoplesasaffirmedbyApplicableLawandtheUnitedNationsDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples(UNDRIP).UNDPwillensurethatsocialandenvironmentalassessmentsforProjectsinvolvingIndigenousPeoplesincludeanassessmentoftheirsubstantiverights,asaffirmedinApplicableLaw.”


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130. SeveralarticlesoftheUNDRIPemphasizetherightsofIndigenousPeoplestolandsandresources,andwithconsiderationforfuturegenerations.Article25,forexample,describestherightofIndigenousPeoplestomaintainandstrengthenthedistinctivespiritualrelationshipwiththeirtraditionallyownedoroccupiedandusedlands,territories,andwatersandtoupholdtheirresponsibilitiestofuturegenerations.Article26alsoindicatestherightsofIndigenousPeoplestolandsandresourcestheypossessbyreasonoftraditionaloccupationoruse.

131. TheUNDRIPreflectsthatthesesubstantiverightsmustbesecuredthroughrobust

procedures,includingeffectiveandtransparentconsultationprocedureswithIndigenousPeoples,andprocedurestosecuretheirconsentinspecificcircumstances.

132. TheUNDRIPacknowledgesthisthroughseveralarticles,includingthefollowing:

‘Article18,IndigenousPeopleshavetherighttoparticipateindecision-makinginmatterswhichwouldaffecttheirrights,throughrepresentativeschosenbythemselvesinaccordancewiththeirownprocedures,aswellastomaintainanddeveloptheirownindigenousdecisionmakinginstitutions;Article19,StatesshallconsultandcooperateingoodfaithwiththeIndigenousPeoplesconcernedthroughtheirownrepresentativeinstitutionsinordertoobtaintheirfree,priorandinformedconsentbeforeadoptingandimplementinglegislativeoradministrativemeasuresthatmayaffectthem;Article20,1.IndigenousPeopleshavetherighttomaintainanddeveloptheirpolitical,economicandsocialsystemsorinstitutions,tobesecureintheenjoymentoftheirownmeansofsubsistenceanddevelopment,andtoengagefreelyinalltheirtraditionalandothereconomicactivities;andArticle23,IndigenousPeopleshavetherighttodetermineanddevelopprioritiesandstrategiesforexercisingtheirrighttodevelopment.Inparticular,IndigenousPeopleshavetherighttobeactivelyinvolvedindevelopinganddetermininghealth,housingandothereconomicandsocialprogrammesaffectingthemand,asfaraspossible,toadministersuchprogrammesthroughtheirowninstitutions.

133. Toensurerespectforrights,UNDPmustalsoconsiderfindingsofUNhumanrights

bodies.Inthisregard,thefindingsoftheUNSpecialRapporteurontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,JamesAnaya,regardingPanamaareimportantforUNDP.Asnotedearlier,Mr.AnayaprovidedtworecommendationsspecifictoBarroBlanco.

134. OtherSESprovisionssimilarlyemphasizetherightsofIndigenousPeoplestotheir

landandresources,andimplythatattentiontoproceduresisanecessarypartofsecuringtheserights.

135. Standard6,Requirement6,‘Land,resourcesandterritory:UNDPProjectswill

recognizethatIndigenousPeopleshavecollectiverightstoown,use,anddevelopandcontrolthelands,resourcesandterritoriesthattheyhavetraditionallyowned,occupiedorotherwiseusedoracquired,includinglandsandterritoriesforwhichtheydonotyetpossesstitle.’

136. TheSES‘PolicyDeliveryProcessandAccountability’requirementsfor‘Screening,

AssessmentandManagementofSocialandEnvironmentalRisksandImpacts,’includeacknowledgementthatUNDPmustconsultwithaffectedcommunities,‘Stakeholderanalysisandengagementwillbeconductedinagender-responsive,culturallysensitive,non-discriminatoryandinclusivemanner,ensuringthatpotentiallyaffectedvulnerableandmarginalizedgroupsareidentifiedandprovidedopportunitiesto


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participate.’Andalsonotesaneedfor‘stakeholderengagementplans,’‘StakeholderengagementplanswillbedevelopedforallProgrammesandProjects,scaledtoreflectthenatureoftheactivityanditspotentialimpacts(e.g.fromrelativelysimplemeasuresforProgrammes/orProjectswithfewifanysocialandenvironmentalriskstocomprehensiveplansforHighRiskactivitieswithpotentiallysignificantadverserisksandimpacts).’

137. Standard6Requirement9,describestheneedfor‘Full,effectiveandmeaningful

participation’ofIndigenousPeoples:‘AttheearlieststageofProjectconceptualizationanddesign,anditerativelythroughoutimplementationandclosure,mechanismswillbeidentifiedandimplementedtoguaranteethemeaningful,effectiveandinformedparticipationofIndigenousPeoplesonallmatters.CulturallyappropriateconsultationwillbecarriedoutwiththeobjectiveofachievingagreementandFPICwillbeensuredonanymattersthatmayaffecttherightsandinterests,lands,resources,territories(whethertitledoruntitledtothepeopleinquestion)andtraditionallivelihoodsoftheIndigenousPeoplesconcerned.Projectactivitiesthatmayadverselyaffecttheexistence,value,useorenjoymentofindigenouslands,resourcesorterritoriesshallnotbeconductedunlessagreementhasbeenachievedthroughtheFPICprocess.’

138. SESfootnote74pointstoguidanceavailabletoUNDPstafftoimplementFPIC

requirements,includingtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentGroupGuidelinesonIndigenousPeoples(hereinUNDGGuidelines)andtheUN-REDDGuidelinesonFree,PriorandInformedConsent(hereinUN-REDDGuidelines).TheUNDGGuidelinesdescribethatFPICimplies‘anabsenceofcoercion,intimidationormanipulation,thatconsenthasbeensoughtsufficientlyinadvanceofanyauthorizationorcommencementofactivities,thatrespectisshownfortimerequirementsofindigenousconsultation/consensusprocessesandthatfullandunderstandableinformationonthelikelyimpactisprovided….Theparticipationofindigenouspeoplesmaybethroughtheirtraditionalauthoritiesorarepresentativeorganization.’30TheUN-REDDGuidelinesprovideasimilardescriptionofFPIC.

139. Bothguidancedocumentssimilarlyrefertothe‘ReportoftheUNPFIIworkshopon

MethodologiesregardingFreePriorandInformedConsentandIndigenousPeoples’asprovidingelementsofacommonunderstandingofFPIC.Thisreportreflectsthatwhiletheobjectiveofaconsultationprojectistoreachagreement,‘notallFPICprocesseswillleadtotheconsentofandapprovalbytherights-holdersinquestion.AtthecoreofFPICistherightofthepeoplesconcernedtochoosetoengage,negotiateanddecidetograntorwithholdconsent,aswellastheacknowledgementthatundercertaincircumstances,itmustbeacceptedthattheprojectwillnotproceedand/orthatengagementmustbeceasediftheaffectedpeoplesdecidethattheydonotwanttocommenceorcontinuewithnegotiationsoriftheydecidetowithholdtheirconsenttotheproject.’

V. Findings140. TheUNDPCOplayedanimportantroleinthedialogueprocessfromFebruary2015to

August2016,providingnotonlyfunding,butotherkeysupportincludingfacilitation,

30UNDGGuidelines,p.13


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agendasetting,andlogistics.ManyintervieweesperceivedthattheUNDPCOwasplayingaleadrole.

141. Finding:TheUNDPCOdidnotmeetUNDPrequirementstoscreenprojectsand

progammes,includingarequirementtoapplytheEnvironmentalandSocialScreeningProcedure(ESSP)toprojectsapprovedin2014andtheSocialandEnvironmentalScreeningProcedure(SESP)forprojectsandprogrammesapprovedin2015.TheUNDPCOdidnotapplytheSESPtothe2015MINGOBProgrammebecausetheProgrammehadbeenindevelopmentforasignificantperiodoftime.TheESSP,however,couldhavebeenappliedtotheprogramme,and,inanyevent,theUNDPCOcouldhavesoughtanofficialwaiverfromapplicationofthescreeningtool.

142. GiventhattheMIREProjectandMINGOBProgrammedidnotidentifyordetailmany

oftheactivitiestobefundedbyUNDP,socialandenvironmentalrisksassociatedwithspecificactivitiessuchasthedialogueprocesscouldnothavebeenidentifiedandaddressedwhentheprojectandprogrammewereapproved.Nevertheless,applicationofthescreeningtoolcouldhavehelpedtheUNDPCOunderstandinbroadtermsthetypesofriskslikelywith‘downstream’activities,e.g.,activitiesinvolvingIndigenousPeoplesarelikelytoposeatleastmoderaterisks.SECUobservesthattheexpansivenessandvaguenatureofactivitiesfundedthroughthe2015programmewouldhaveposedaparticularchallengeforapplicationofthescreeningtool.

143. Althoughrisksassociatedwiththedialogueactivitiescouldnothavebeenidentified

whentheprojectorprogrammewereapproved,theUNDPCOcouldhaveappliedthescreeningtoolsto,orotherwiseassessedrisksassociatedwith,thedialogueactivityoncethisactivitywasidentified.

144. Asacknowledgedduringthe4May2015RoundtableDialoguemeeting,thedialogue

activitieswererelateddirectlytorightsofIndigenousPeoplestolands,accesstoresources,andculture.TheUNDPCOwouldhavehadaffirmativeresponsestoseveralquestionsposedinthescreeningtools,includingthoseattemptingtodetermineiftheprojectcouldleadtoadverseimpactsonenjoymentofhumanrights;ifcommunitieshadraisedconcernsabouttheproject,i.e.,affectedcommunitieshadindicatedconcernsaboutcontinueddialogue,andprotestedwhentestfloodingoccurredduringthisdialogue;iftherewasariskofviolence,i.e.,ifthedialoguecontinued,andagreementwasreachedwithoutaffectedcommunities,violenceclearlywaspossible;andiftheprojectcouldresultinimpactstoindigenousculture,i.e.,itwasclearthedialoguecouldleadtoanagreementthatwouldadverselyimpactthepetroglyphsandotherformsofaffectedcommunityculture.

145. Giventhese‘yes’responses,thedialogue,asaproject/progammeactivity,wouldhave

beencharacterizedasposingatleastmoderate(andlikelyhigh)risksofimpactstocommunities.Assuch,thesedialogueactivitiesalsoposedatleastmoderaterisksforUNDP.

146. Finding:SECUfindsthatwhiletheUNDPCOmetimportantUNDPcommitmentsto

duediligence,transparency,participation,consultation/consent,andhumanrightsduringtheRoundtableDialogue,theUNDPCOdidnotmeettheserequirementsaftertheRoundtableDialoguewasconcluded.


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147. TheUNDPCO,inengaginginthedialogueprocess,clearlywasengaginginasituationthathadbeenfraughtwithissues–particularlysignificantissuesrelatingtotherightsofIndigenousPeoples,andissuesrelatingtoviolenceandevendeath.UNinvestigations,includingtheUNDPinvestigationbydelaMataandLopezandtheinvestigationbytheUNSpecialRapporteurontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples,identifiedmanyoftheseconcernsandshortcomings.TheUNSpecialRapporteur,forexample,indicatedthatinadequateconsultationandconsentprocesseswerethesourceofmostissuesandproblemsregardingrespectforandprotectionofindigenousrights.Heidentifiedmeasuresnecessarytoensurerespectforrights,andtheUNDPCOhadanobligationtoattempttoadvancethesemeasureswiththePanamaniangovernmentandnotengageifthesemeasureswerenottaken.IdentifiedissueswereredflagsindicatinganeedfortheUNDPCOtoproceedwithcaution.

148. TheUNDPCOproceededwithrelativecautionduringthefirstRoundtableDialogue,

workingcloselywithUNOHCHRandpursuingseveralmeasuresnecessarytoavoidpotentialharmsandensurerespectforrights,and,toalargeextentinthisregard,metUNDPcommitments.TheUNDPCO’ssupportforthedevelopmentoftheMethodologyfortheRoundtableandagreementonthecompositionoftheIndigenousCommissionwasanimportantundertakingthatreflectedUNDPCOeffortstocomplywithUNDPcommitments.Arguably,theagreedMethodologyfortheRoundtableDialogue,whilerelativelysparseondetail,functionedastheconsultationframeworkrecommendedbytheUNSpecialRapporteurtosecurerights.

149. TheUNDPCO’scommitmentstotransparencyandinclusivenessintheRoundtable,

includingpublishingmeetingminutes,allowinganyinterestedindividualtoobservetheproceedings,andbroadcastingtheproceedingswhentheywerenotheldinTolé,alsowereconsistentwithUNDPcommitments.TheUNDPCO’scleararticulationofrolesUNDPwould(andwouldnot)playduringtheRoundtableDialogue,anditsconsist

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