Unionization, Union Involvement, and the Performance of ...
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Tous droits réservés © Département des relations industrielles de l'Université Laval, 1997 This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit (including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can be viewed online. https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/ This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit. Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal, Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is to promote and disseminate research. https://www.erudit.org/en/ Document generated on 04/19/2022 8:47 p.m. Relations industrielles Industrial Relations Unionization, Union Involvement, and the Performance of Gainsharing Programs Dong-One Kim and Paula B. Voos Volume 52, Number 2, 1997 URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/051168ar DOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/051168ar See table of contents Publisher(s) Département des relations industrielles de l'Université Laval ISSN 0034-379X (print) 1703-8138 (digital) Explore this journal Cite this article Kim, D.-O. & Voos, P. B. (1997). Unionization, Union Involvement, and the Performance of Gainsharing Programs. Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, 52(2), 304–332. https://doi.org/10.7202/051168ar Article abstract This study empirically examines the relationships between union status, union involvement, and the performance of gain sharing programs. Using survey data from 217 establishments in the U.S.A. and Canada, the authors evaluate the predictions ofvarious competing theoretical perspectives: the agency/transaction cost approach, the monopoly model, the institutional voice model and a "two faces" model of labour organization. Ordered-probit and OLS regression results show that gain sharing programs with union involvement in program administration resulted in better perceived performance than average programs in the nonunion sector. However, gain sharing programs in the union sector without union involvement had worse outcomes than those in the nonunion sector. These two divergent situations resulted in union status itself having an insignificant relationship with program performance. These results are most compatible with the "two faces" model.
Transcript of Unionization, Union Involvement, and the Performance of ...
Tous droits réservés © Département des relations industrielles de l'UniversitéLaval, 1997
This document is protected by copyright law. Use of the services of Érudit(including reproduction) is subject to its terms and conditions, which can beviewed online.https://apropos.erudit.org/en/users/policy-on-use/
This article is disseminated and preserved by Érudit.Érudit is a non-profit inter-university consortium of the Université de Montréal,Université Laval, and the Université du Québec à Montréal. Its mission is topromote and disseminate research.https://www.erudit.org/en/
Document generated on 04/19/2022 8:47 p.m.
Relations industriellesIndustrial Relations
Unionization, Union Involvement, and the Performance ofGainsharing ProgramsDong-One Kim and Paula B. Voos
Volume 52, Number 2, 1997
URI: https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/051168arDOI: https://doi.org/10.7202/051168ar
See table of contents
Publisher(s)Département des relations industrielles de l'Université Laval
ISSN0034-379X (print)1703-8138 (digital)
Explore this journal
Cite this articleKim, D.-O. & Voos, P. B. (1997). Unionization, Union Involvement, and thePerformance of Gainsharing Programs. Relations industrielles / IndustrialRelations, 52(2), 304–332. https://doi.org/10.7202/051168ar
Article abstractThis study empirically examines the relationships between union status, unioninvolvement, and the performance of gain sharing programs. Using surveydata from 217 establishments in the U.S.A. and Canada, the authors evaluatethe predictions ofvarious competing theoretical perspectives: theagency/transaction cost approach, the monopoly model, the institutional voicemodel and a "two faces" model of labour organization. Ordered-probit and OLSregression results show that gain sharing programs with union involvement inprogram administration resulted in better perceived performance thanaverage programs in the nonunion sector. However, gain sharing programs inthe union sector without union involvement had worse outcomes than those inthe nonunion sector. These two divergent situations resulted in union statusitself having an insignificant relationship with program performance. Theseresults are most compatible with the "two faces" model.
