Mr. Mike Sellars

MICHAEL A. DUCHEMIN ATTORNEY AT LAW 637 N.E. HAUGEN STREET

POULSBO, WA 98370 Phone: (360) 394-1604 - Fax: (360) 824-6104

E-mail: md@madlawoffice.net

March 13,2014

Public Employment Relations Commission 112 Henry Street N.E., Suite 300 P.O. Box 40919 Olympia, WA 98504-0919

RE: Unfair Labor Practice Complaint filed by the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2819 - Kitsap County Fire Protection Districts 1 and 15 (aka, Central Kitsap Fire & Rescue).

Dear Mr. Sellars:

Enclosed for filing is a complaint charging unfair labor practices. It includes the statement of facts, remedy requested, and a copy of the collective bargaining agreements between the parties. The original complaint has been sent by e-mail and same day mailing by First Class Mail to the Public Employment Relations Commission Olympia office.

The employer, through its Fire Chief Scott Weninger and the Chairman of the Board of Fire Commissioners, Dave Fergus, have been served with a copy of the complaint by e-mail and same day mailing by regular First Class Mail under cover of this letter.

cc: Craig Becker, President Ronny Smith, Vice-President IAFF, Local2819

MICHAEL A. DUCHEMIN

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION STATE OF WASHINGTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: MICHAEL A. DUCHEMIN makes the following declaration in accordance with RCW 9A.72.085:

I hereby certify that on March 13, 2014 I served the amended complaint charging unfair labor practices on behalf of the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2819 on Central Kitsap Fire & Rescue dated March 13, 2014 by transmitting by e-mail and in the U.S. Mail a copy of the complaint and attachments to the District's Fire Chief and Board Chairman and to the Public Employment Relations Commission at the following addresses:

Fire Chief Scott Weninger Board Chairman Dave Fergus 5300 N.W. Newberry Hill Road, Suite 101 Silverdale, W A 98383 (360) 447-3550 s weninger@ ckfr. org

Public Employment Relations Commission 600 Fourth A venue P.O. Box 40919 Olympia, WA 98504-0919 Phone (360) 570-7300 filing@perc. wa.gov

This Certificate of Service is served and filed herewith by the same means. I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State Of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct:

DATED this March 13,2014 /I " / I , I r

MICHAEL A. DUCHEMIN

Place: Poulsbo, Washington

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION 112 Henry Street NE, Suite 300, Olympia WA 98506

PO Box 40919, Olympia WA 98504-0919 Phone: 360.570.7300 Email: filing@perc.wa.gov

Web: www.perc.wa.gov STATE OF WASHINGTON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMPLAINT

D Amended Complaint in Case# Applicable Rules: Chapters 10-08, 391-08, and 391-45 WAC PARTIES Include information for all Qarties involved. ALLEGED VIOLATION

Indicate if the alleged violation is against: COMPLAINANT lnt'l Assoc of Fire Fighters, Local 2819 Employer D Union D Both* Contact Michael A. Duchemin *Note: lfthe violation is against both the union and Address 637 N.E. Haugen Street employer, two separate complaints must be filed with

two statements of facts describing the alleged violation City, State, ZIP Poulsbo, WA 98370 against each. Telephone (360) 394-1604 Ext. STATEMENT OF FACTS and REMEDY REQUESTED Email md@madlawoffice.net Attach on separate sheets of paper in numbered paragraphs a brief statement of the facts regarding the

alleged unfair labor practice(s). RESPONDENT Central KitsaQ Fire & Rescue Include times, dates, places, and participants of

occurrences. Contact Fire Chief Scott Weninger Indicate statutes allegedly violated.

Address 5300 N.W. Newberry Hill Road, Suite 101 State whether a related grievance has been filed. Describe the remedies requested. City, State, ZIPSilverdale, WA 98383 For more information refer to WAC 391-45-050.

Telephone (360) 447-3550 Ext. BARGAINING UNIT Email sweninger@ckfr.org *Note: If the alleged violation relates to more than one

bargaining unit, a separate complaint must be filed for EMPLOYER Central KitsaQ Fire & Rescue each unit.

Contact Chairman Dave Fergus, Commissioner Indicate Bargaining Unit: Uniformed FF (Article 1.1)

Address 5300 N.W. Newberry Hill Road, Suite 101 Department or Division: Fire

City, State, ZIPSilverdale, WA 98383 Collective Bargaining Agreement: Telephone (360) 377-8773 Ext. D The parties have never had a contract. Email Not Available

copy of the most current contract is attached.

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE FOR COMPLAINANT

Print Name Michael A Duchemin, Attorney At Law Telephone (360) 394-1604 Ext. __ _

Address 637 N.E. Haugen Street Email md@madlawoffice.net

City, State, ZIPPoulsbo, WA 98370 A I

Signature ______ Date 3/13/14

Form U-1 (3/2013)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. INTRODUCTION.

1.1 Central Kitsap Fire & Rescue Kitsap (Kitsap Fire Districts 1 and 15) is a public

employer as that term is defined by RCW 41.56.030(12) (hereafter "the District").

1.2 Complainant Local 2819 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-

CIO, CLC, is a labor organization and a bargaining representative as that term is defined by

RCW 41.56.030(2) (hereafter the "Union").

1.3 The Union represents a bargaining unit consisting of uniformed personnel

employees of the District whose positions meet the definition of "firefighter" in RCW

41.56.030(13)(e), as follows: all full-time uniformed employees holding the positions of "career

uniformed fire fighters, paramedics, lieutenants, captains, and battalion chiefs." Parties' current

collective bargaining agreement. Exhibit 1 (hereafter "Ex._."), Article 1, Section 1.1.

1.4 The District employs seventy-five firefighters to staff three twenty-four hour shifts

with twenty-five firefighters assigned to each shift. The three shifts are designated as "A Shift,"

"B Shift," and "C shift." The District's Fire Department is run by Fire Chief Scott Weninger

("Weninger").

1.5 The District staffs five fire stations with paid, full time firefighters- Stations 41,

45, 51, 56 and 64.

1.6 Stations 45 and 64 are "cross staffed" with two firefighters (one is a Company

Officer and one is an Apparatus Operator). Cross staffing means that these two assigned

firefighters respond on a fire engine when needed (Engine 64 and Engine 45), but when an "aid

car" is needed to provide Basic Life Support services they abandon the staffing of Engine 64 and

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respond with the aid car (Aid 64).

1.7 Stations 41 and 56 are staffed with four firefighters with two assigned to a fire

engine (a Company Officer and an Apparatus Operator) (Engine 41 and Engine 56 respectively)

and two assigned to an Advanced Life Support unit (one Firefighter/Paramedic and one

Firefighter/EMT) (Medic 41 and Medic 56 respectively).

1.8 Station 51 is staffed with a total of seven firefighters. One is a Battalion Chief

that is assigned to a Battalion Chief unit, two are assigned to a ladder truck, (a Company Officer

and an Apparatus Operator) (Ladder 51), two are assigned to a fire engine (a Company Officer

and an Apparatus Operator) (Engine 51), and two are assigned to a "medic unit" (a

Firefighter/Paramedic and a Firefighter/EMT) (Medic 51).

2. UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION TO REDUCE EQUIPMENT STAFFING THAT ADVERSELY AFFECTS FIREFIGHTER SAFETY, WORK LOAD, OVERTIME OPPORTUNITIES, OTHER DESIRABLE WORKING CONDITIONS, AND BAD FAITH BARGAINING.

2.1 On January 1, 2014, the District implemented a policy that authorized periodic de-

staffing of fire department units housed in Station 64 in order to save on the overtime costs

associated with staffing other fire department units located elsewhere in the District (i.e., by

periodically de-staffing Engine 64 and Aid 64 and sending their permanently assigned Company

Officer and/or Apparatus Operator to fill in for other Company Officers or Apparatus Drivers

that are absent from duty on their respective fire department units).

2.2 As described below, the District's policy authorizing periodic de-staffing of

Engine 64 and Aid 64 on January 1, 2014 was done unilaterally, without bargaining with the

Union as required by chapter 41.56 RCW and, as described herein, those reductions decreased

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the safety and increased the workload of bargaining unit personnel by, among other things: (1)

increasing the response times of a fire engine to structure fires in Station 64's response area, (2)

increasing the response times of a "second in" fire engine to coverage areas adjoining Station 64,

and (3) increasing the workload of other bargaining unit members who must pick up the transport

duties previously performed by bargaining unit members on Aid 64.

2.3 The District's decision to periodically de-staff Engine 64 and Aid 64 was

motivated by the desire to reduce overtime costs associated with staffing other units in other

response areas of the District and was not driven by a desire to reduce the level of service within

the District. By virtue of the District's de-staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64, bargaining unit

members also lost overtime opportunities that would have otherwise been available but for the

reductions. This is true because these members would have been called in on overtime to fill the

vacancies that are now filled by the Company Officer and/or Apparatus Driver from Station 64

and/or because they lost "working out of classification" opportunities at other stations.

2.4 An early aggressive and offensive primary interior attack on a working structure

fire reduces risk of firefighter injuries. An increase in the number of minutes it takes for

firefighting crews to arrive on the scene of a structure fire increases their risk of injury.

2.5 A widely accepted rate of fire propagation, which combines temperature rise and

time, shows that a fire increases dramatically in size at about the four minute mark, taking only

eight minutes to extend beyond the original room of origin. Fire can usually be controlled within

the room of origin when water is effectively applied within six minutes of ignition. A larger,

hotter fire increases the risk of injury or death to firefighters.

2.6 Two of the most important elements in limiting fire spread are the quick arrival of

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sufficient numbers of personnel and equipment to attack and extinguish a fire as close to the

point of its origin as possible. As each minute of a structure fire passes, the fire rapidly

progresses to a condition called "flashover" (i.e., the very rapid spreading of the fire due to

superheating of room contents and other combustibles). A typical fire within a room will often

reach the "flashover" stage in about six minutes from the time of ignition. Flashover is a highly

dangerous condition for firefighters to face. The sooner firefighters arrive on scene and begin

fire attack there is an increased likelihood that flashover can be prevented.

2.7 As a fire gets hotter due to a delayed response of a firefighting crew, the potential

for a building or ceiling collapse increases, thereby exposing firefighters to greater risk. Slower

response times to fires within Station 64's area (because Engine 64 has been de-staffed on that

day), and to adjoining response areas (because Engine 64 is not able to respond to those areas),

decreases safety of bargaining unit members once they arrive at, and begin fighting, those longer-

burning fires.

2.8 Under Washington State law, in the initial stages of an incident where only one

crew is operating in a "hot zone" (such as a structure fire) a minimum of four individuals are

required before interior fire attack can take place, consisting of two individuals working as a

crew in the hot zone and two individuals present outside the hot zone available for assistance or

rescue of firefighters during emergency operations, as needed, where entry into the hot zone is

required (often referred to as the "two-in/two-out" rule). The more often a two-person fire crew

operating in a hot zone has two firefighters waiting outside to rescue them, if necessary, their

personal safety is enhanced.

2.9 There is an exception under State law for the two-in/two-out rule. If upon arrival

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at a structure fire (or some other type of hot zone) responders find a known rescue situation

where immediate action could prevent the loss of life or serious injury, they can take such action

using a two-in/one-out approach. However, using this configuration decreases firefighter safety.

2.10 The District's unilateral implementation of reduced Engine 64 staffing increases

the number of incidents where firefighters would likely face the need to utilize a two-in/one-out

crew configuration to rescue trapped victims, thereby decreasing the safety and increasing the

workload of bargaining unit personnel.

2.11 As demonstrated further below, there are a myriad of other factors that decrease

the safety and increase the workload of firefighters because of the District's unilateral de-staffing

of Engine 64 and Aid 64.

2.12 For more than two years the District has staffed Engine 64 or Aid 64 with two,

full-time, paid firefighters. Although the District has assigned twenty-five firefighters to each of

its three shifts, when firefighters take time off for things such as vacation, holiday, sick leave, or

training opportunities, the staffing can drop below that mark.

2.13 In order to have enough personnel on duty to staff Engine 64 or Aid 64 with two

firefighters (a Company Officer and an Apparatus Driver), the District has maintained a status

quo practice of requiring that a minium of nineteen firefighters be on-duty for each day of the

year. This minimum staffing level is necessary to keep two firefighters assigned to Engine 64 or

Aid 64 as described above.

2.14 On October 14, 2013, at a Commissioners' meeting, the Commissioners merely

discussed the idea that the District may want to reduce the minimum daily shift staffing

requirement from nineteen to fifteen in order to save on the overtime costs paid out by the

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District. Although the possible staffing reductions were being discussed, Weninger did not at

that time propose any plan of action or provide any proposed options on how such staffing

reductions could be accomplished.

2.15 By letter dated October 17, 2013 (Ex.2), the Union pointed out to Weninger that

any reduction in daily staffing would adversely affect the safety and workload of bargaining unit

members and insisted that the District "bargain over any changes that affect the safety and the

workload of personnel prior to implementation and request that impact bargaining occur if

necessary."

2.16 At a November 12, 2013 meeting of the Board of Fire Commissioners the

Commissioners approved Weninger's request to reduce daily minimum staffing from nineteen to

seventeen. By e-mail dated November 14, 2013, the Union's Vice-President, Ronny Smith

("Smith") reminded Weninger that he must bargain over any decision or effects as they would

related to any staffing reduction and asked him to provide some type of plan on how he intended

to reduce staffing, stating as follows:

The Union requests the District provide a detailed plan of implementation if staffing was to fall below the agreed upon 19 daily minimum. In order to meet, confer, and appropriately bargain impacts the Union must know what the Districts proposal of change is going to be. It is difficult at this time to address all possible impacts without the information pertaining to changes to policies and operations. Please provide in advance of our meeting the District's proposals within a reasonable time frame to allow us to schedule subsequent meetings.

2.17 Between mid-November and December 31,2013, the Union and Weninger

exchanged e-mails and other correspondence that discussed the duty to bargain, possible meeting

dates, and the Union's request for information that would enable it to intelligently and

meaningfully bargain over any possible staffing reductions. Weninger insisted that the Union

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meet with him right away to bargain over possible ideas, but the Union indicated it could not

make any of the dates he proposed work (because of other bargaining obligations and the

holidays) and that it would have to obtain the information it had asked the District to provide

before it could bargain in any meaningful way.

2.18 Thus, by letter dated November 19, 2013, the Union asked the District to provide

the Union with information by which the Union could consider proposals to reduce staffing.

Smith, wrote, in relevant part, as follows:

Pursuant to the Public Records Act (RCW 42.56) and RCW 41.56 (Public Employees Collective Bargaining), Labor requests the following information;

1. Documents and records related to all notes, e-mails, written analysis', internal documents, meeting minutes, and correspondence generated from the Board of Fire Commissioners, Fire Chief, Assistant Chief, Deputy Chief, HR Manager, Division Chiefs, the Battalion Chiefs, and staff as they relate to any reduction in minimum daily staffing from 19, overtime analysis, safety analysis, and studies ...

2. Documents and records related to all notes, e-mails, written analysis', internal documents, meeting minutes, and correspondence generated from the Board of Fire Commissioners, Fire Chief, Assistant Chief, HR Manager, Deputy Chiefs, Division Chiefs, and the Battalion Chiefs where a reduction in minimum daily staffing from 19, overtime analysis, safety analysis, and studies have been mentioned ...

3. Any correspondence received from the state, county, or any regulatory office regarding budget. Particularly vacation and sick leave bank funding requirements and fiscal budget obligations and requirements.

2.19 By letter dated November 25, 2013, the District indicated that it could not provide

the information requested by the Union until March 1, 2014, but that it would provide documents

as they became available. In order to allow the Union to provide feedback on possible ideas, it

asked Weninger to facilitate a much faster response to the Union's information request. He

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refused to do so.

2.20 In order to make it clear that the Union was unwilling to waive any collective

bargaining rights on the staffing issues it, once again, by letter dated December 3, 2013, told

Weninger that it wanted to bargain both any decision to implement any staffing reduction and

any related impacts or effects, and reminded Weninger that the Union could not provide

meaningful responses to any staffing issues until it received the information it had requested

from the District.

2.21 The District's first document production did not take place until December 19,

2013, and then it was only a limited, partial response to the Union's request. To date the District

has not yet fully complied with the Union's information requests. In fact, by e-mail dated March

3, 2014, the District told the Union that it would not provide further information and records

related to the unit staffing issues until April 1, 2014. The District's refusal to provide relevant

information requested by the Union, in a timely manner that would have allowed the Union to

meaningfully bargain over the proposed staffing reductions, constitutes a failure to bargain in

good faith and a refusal to provide information requested by the Union in a timely manner.

2.22 Despite the fact that the Union had repeatedly asked the District to bargain any

staffing reduction before one was implemented, and that it was prepared to engage in such

bargaining once the District provided the information the Union had requested, Weninger

unilaterally implemented a policy to periodically de-staff Engine 64 and Aid 64 on January 1,

2014 in order to save the overtime costs of staffing other units elsewhere in the District.

2.23 A consequence of the periodic de-staffing Engine 64 is that fire engine response

times to structure fires in Station 64's area, and to its adjoining response areas, have been

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increased substantially enough to cause a decrease in firefighter safety for the reasons identified

above. At a November 12, 2013 meeting of the Board of Fire Commissioners, Weninger

admitted that a consequence of reduced daily staffing from nineteen to seventeen will increase

fire department unit response times. In fact, by de-staffing Engine 64 the response times to fires

within Station 64's response area, and to its adjoining areas, have increased by enough minutes to

adversely effect the safety and workload of bargaining unit members (for all of the reasons

discussed above). In an e-mail between Leslie Kelly of the Central Kitsap Reporter dated

November 15, 2013, Weninger admitted that "Which staffed units are available could mean

longer travel times ... ".

2.24 Weninger maintained that he needed to implement the periodic de-staffing of

Engine 64 and Aid 64 in order to avoid filling other positions elsewhere in the District with

overtime. His unilaterally implemented plan was to "rove" the Company Officer and/or

Apparatus Operator assigned to Engine 64 and Aid 64 to staff other units in the District as

needed to avoid the overtime necessary to otherwise staff those units.

2.25 "Roving" is the practice of moving a firefighter around from one station to the

other in order to fill vacancies that may occur as a result of permanently assigned firefighters

being absent from work because of things such as vacations, holidays, sick leave, or training

assignments. For the reasons discussed immediately below, roving is considered to be an

undesirable assignment.

2.26 Firefighters prefer not to "rove" because they value the opportunity to be

permanently assigned to a particular fire station. For example, a permanent assignment to a fire

station allows a firefighter to keep in one place his or her equipment, personal belongings, or the

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food to be consumed during a tour of duty (it is a burden to have to "cart" these items to other

locations on a rotating basis), a permanent assignment allows a firefighter to be much more

familiar with the streets, buildings, or high risk structures or areas within their station's response

area (thereby increasing their safety and making the work they perform much easier to

accomplish), and if one has to drive from one station to another during a tour of duty he or she

incurs additional time, inconvenience, and costs associated with doing so.

2.27 One of the benefits of being promoted to the position of a Company Officer or an

Apparatus Operator, is that he or she is permanently assigned to a fire station and is not required

to rove.

2.28 When Weninger implemented the policy on January 1, 2014 that required the

bargaining unit members permanently assigned to Engine 64 and Aid 64 (i.e. the Company

Officer and/or the Apparatus Operator) to rove, he removed from them a benefit and a favorable

working condition.

2.29 Firefighters who are assigned to the same fire station as their own Company

Officer or Apparatus Operator value the opportunity to fill in for either of these two individuals

when they are absent from duty (commonly referred to as "Acting"). Acting as a Company

Officer or an Apparatus Operator means the Actor is paid additional compensation for

performing that work and he or she gains valuable experience and training that improves his or

her chance of later being promoted. Weninger's implementation of the policy requiring the

Company Officer or Apparatus Operator permanently assigned to Engine 64 and Aid 64 to rove

to fill these positions, when the normally assigned Company Officer or Apparatus Operator is

absent from duty, deprives these members of the opportunity to Act in their own stations. It has

10

the additional burden of requiring these Firefighters to then rove to other stations when they

otherwise would not have been required to do so (i.e., because they are displaced by the incoming

Company Officer or Apparatus Driver).

2.30 The de-staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64 has another detrimental effect on the

working conditions of bargaining unit members who are assigned to Station 64. That is, by

practice, bargaining unit members enjoy the ability to obtain "early relief' from members who

are corning on duty in the morning. The "early relief' is often scheduled in advance so a member

can be relieved from duty for a variety of important personal reasons (e.g., take kids to school,

catch an airplane, go to the doctor, etc.). If a firefighter assigned to work a unit somewhere else

in the District calls in sick, and the District de-staffs Engine 64 and Aid 64 so those assigned to

those units can rove to another station, the firefighter who was to provide early relief is diverted

from working at Station 64, thereby depriving the member at Station 64 on that day of previously

scheduled early relief.

2.31 There is a Captain assigned to Station 64 that has the additional responsibility of

overseeing matters related to the station itself (e.g., ordering supplies, assuring that safety

inspections of equipment or facilities are accomplished, assuring the readiness of the apparatus in

the station, etc.). When the Captain is required to rove, which could involve being away from the

station for extended periods of time, he or she is unable to fulfill those responsibilities (or will be

held accountable for them even though he or she is not being given the same amount of time to

accomplish those duties than he or she would have had but for being required to rove to other

stations).

2.32 Additional workload and safety issues arise because when crews are not staffing

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the engine and other rigs at Station 64 important "rig checks" are not getting accomplished.

Station 64 houses a fire engine, an aid car, and a "Tender." Weekly checks are to be performed

on all of these rigs on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. When these units at Station 64 are de-

staffed, crews that subsequently staff these pieces of equipment will have to do all of the weekly

apparatus inspections on the day they return. This is not done with respect to other units in the

District where normal staffing levels are maintained.

2.32 There are "resident firefighters" (i.e., non-paid firefighters) who reside at Station

64 and respond to emergency incidents along with paid crews. These resident firefighters are

currently supervised by a career Company Officer who works at Station 64. With the unilateral

implementation of periodic de-staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64, that supervisory work is being

removed, diminished, or transferred to others because the Company Officer is no longer assigned

to Engine 64 or Aid 64 all of the time.

2.33 De-staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64 has occurred since January 1, 2014 as

follows:

Full shift closures: January 8, 18, 29, 31; February 4,5,6,7,9,13,18,20,28; March 1.

Partial shift closures: January 19, 25, 27; February 10, 11; March 2.

2.34 The frequency of de-staffing Engine 64 and Aid 64 will increase substantially in

the corning months because it is during these months that more bargaining unit members take

annual leave time off (because of desirable spring and summer weather). The increased number

of members off on these days increases the frequency of de-staffing Engine 64 and Aid 64.

2.35 Even if it were true that the District had the right to unilaterally implement the

periodic de-staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64, which it did not, the District has still committed an

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unfair labor practice because, against the Union's objections, Weninger implemented the staffing

reduction before bargaining over the effects that such decision had on mandatory subjects of

bargaining (e.g., all of those mentioned above and the effect on various operational policies and

procedures that have also not yet been addressed).

3. UNILATERAL ELIMINATION OF ANNUAL LEAVE CARRY OVER RIGHTS, UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLICY THAT REQUIRES BARGAINING UNIT MEMBERS TO FORFEIT ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE, AND BAD FAITH BARGAINING.

3.1 Throughout the latter part of 2013 and the first part of 2014, the Union and the

District have been engaged in collective bargaining to establish the terms and conditions of a

collective bargaining agreement to succeed the one that expired on December 31,2013. Since at

least November of 2013 the parties have been actively engaged in mediation to resolve their

outstanding contractual disputes.

3.2 During those negotiations, and during mediation, the parties have exchanged

proposals on what terms, rights, and benefits shall be included in the Annual

Leave/Compensatory Time article in the collective bargaining agreement (Article 12). During

those negotiations the District has proposed to amend the contract to reduce the number of

annual leave hours bargaining unit members are allowed to carry over into a subsequent year.

With slight modifications, the Union has proposed to keep the current contract language.

3.3 Under the current status quo practice, and pursuant to the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement (Article 12), bargaining unit members are allowed to carry over from one

year to the next twice the total amount of annual leave accrued in the current calendar year. By

practice, and current contract language, the annual accrued leave that can be carried over has

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always included the one hundred and eight (108) annual leave hours credited to the employee's

annual leave account on January 1st of each year in lieu of being required to work the holidays

listed in Article 12.

3.4 On February 20, 2014, both the Union and the District exchanged "what if'

proposals directly related to this subject. In addition, the Union had, over time, expended a great

deal of effort to explain to Weninger (who, as a relatively new fire chief, has limited experience

on how the status quo practice has historically worked with respect to this benefit) that annual

leave hours accrued in lieu of holidays were part of the annual leave balances that can be carried

over year-to-year.

3.5 When it carne to light that some members had unintentionally accumulated more

annual leave carry over hours than allowed, Weninger announced that these bargaining unit

members would have to forfeit these hours. Never before had bargaining unit members been

required to forfeit annual leave hour accumulations. The Union objected to any such forfeiture.

3.6 Notwithstanding the foregoing bargaining history and status quo practices, by

Department Directive #DD 14-002 (Ex. 3) Weninger unilaterally, and without bargaining as

required by law, and in circumvention of the ongoing bargaining process over the topics covered

by this Directive, implemented a policy that prohibits bargaining unit members from carrying

over the one hundred and eight (108) annual leave hours credited to the employee's annual leave

account on January 1st of each year in lieu of holidays.

3.7 Notwithstanding the foregoing bargaining history and status quo practices, by

Department Directive #DD 14-002, dated February 25, 2014 (Ex. 3), Weninger unilaterally,

without bargaining as required by law, and in circumvention of the ongoing bargaining process

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over the topics covered by this Directive, implemented a policy that now requires bargaining unit

members to forfeit any annual leave hours that exceed those hours a member is otherwise

allowed to carry over. The Union had proposed a solution on how this matter could be resolved,

but Weninger unilaterally rejected that approach.

4. UNILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION OF "SCBA MASK/HEPA FIT TESTING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, DIRECT DEALING WITH BARGAINING UNIT MEMBERS, AND BAD FAITH BARGAINING.

4.1 During the bargaining process described in paragraph 3.1 above, the parties have

been negotiating over whether certain bargaining unit members would be allowed and/or required

to perform "SCBA Mask/HEPA Fit Testing" for various paid and/or volunteer firefighters. In

addition, the parties were bargaining over which of those members would be compensated for an

increase to their work responsibilities and workload for such duties and how much the relevant

compensation would be.

4.2 Notwithstanding the foregoing bargaining history and status quo practices, by

Department Directive #DD 14-001 dated February 25, 2014 (Ex. 4), Weninger unilaterally,

without bargaining as required by law, and in circumvention of the ongoing bargaining process

over the topics covered by this Directive, implemented a policy that requires personnel who

previously were not required to perform SCBA mask/HEP A Fit Testing to now do so. These

duties have also been imposed without any increase in compensation for such additional duties

and responsibilities and without being provided the training necessary to perform these functions.

4.3 As evidenced by an e-mail dated March 4, 2014 (Ex. 5), at a Battalion Chief

meeting on March 4, 2014, the District circumvented the Union as the authorized exclusive

bargaining representative, and has begun dealing directly with bargaining members on the type,

15

nature, scope, and configuration of the plan to implement the SCBA Mask!HEP A Fit Testing

program. That e-mail states as follows:

All,

The recent Department Directive regarding SCBA testing stated that Fit Testing and record keeping would be done by the line staff under the direction of Captain Twomey. At the BC meeting today we discussed this issue corning to no conclusion as to what extent line personal were going to do this work nor did we have a plan to get it done. Because the directive states it is to be done, "under the direction of Captain Twomey" Brett and I met with Force in effort to get more info and discuss a plan.

Apparently the persons that used to do SCBA FIT testing for volunteers, Chuck Shaw and Gene Ellis are gone and the only one left is Ed Scholfield who has limited time to do it. Force has learned how to do it to some degree and said he will help for now but has been told that he isn't going to be doing it as a long term plan. We felt that Wednesday nights would be the best time to do FIT testing for volunteers with times limited from 4 to 8 in March and April. Force stated he would organize sending companies to get tested from 56 or 41 and would call 56 with times so they didn't have to wait for no one to show up and could start up the machine ahead of time.

Although Brett was mentioned in the Chiefs directive, this program is run primarily by Scott, Beau and the other officers and testers at 56. Brett will discuss this proposal with Scott and Bill for input. Obviously Brian and Mike should have input too.

Emphasis added.

5.0 SKIMMING OF BARGAINING UNIT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY WORK AND REFUSAL TO BARGAIN.

5.1 Since 1993, bargaining unit member Captain Dave Tucker ("Tucker") did all of

the Information Technology work for the District, which allowed him to work approximately

1,000 hours of overtime per year. The work included at least the following:

5.1.1 The responsibility and privilege of having access to all electronic records and computer related information of the District;

5.1.2 Computer Server maintenance

5.1.3 Purchasing and maintenance of Mobile Computer Terminals located in fire

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department units, including trouble shooting and relevant software and equipment purchases.

5.1.4 Purchasing and updating of all District software.

5.1.5 Budgeting and ordering of equipment and necessary supplies for IT purposes.

5.2 As a result of Weninger's "State of the District" presentation in November of

2013, the Union became aware that Weninger desired to hire a new Information Technology

Manager. The Union opposed the creation of such position due to proposed budget cuts that

would decrease line firefighter staffing. The Union told Weninger and other District officials

that it saw no need for such new position as the work that would be assigned to that position was

already being performed by Tucker.

5.3 The Union asked Weninger to bargain over any decision or effects related to the

creation of any such position, but Weninger refused to engage in bargaining as requested by the

Union.

5.4 Despite the Union's bargaining request, on March 10,2014, the Board of Fire

Commissioners approved the hiring of an individual to fill a new "IT Program Manager"

position, effective retroactively to March 3, 2014 (Ex. 6). As part of that action, the District has

unilaterally, and without bargaining as required by law, transferred most, if not all, of the work

previously performed by Tucker to the new IT Program Manager position.

6.0 DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH PROTECTED ACTIVITIES.

6.1 Protected Activities:

6.1.1 Union members, including Smith, have sought to improve their working

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conditions and positions at the bargaining table on the firefighter safety and workload issues

discussed above by waging a multi-faceted and organized effort to accomplish those goals. Such

activities have included various methods designed to highlight and expose the increased response

times of Engine 64 and Aid 64, and of the units that adjoin Station 64's area, due to Weninger's

decision to periodically de-staff Engine 64 and Aid 64. In essence, the Union has launched a

"minutes matter" campaign by which it has sought to rally support amongst its members, District

officials, and the public to fight for the restoration of the staffing of Engine 64 and Aid 64 -

because a failure to do so adversely affects firefighter safety and workload.

6.1.2 As part of this effort, Smith has, among other things: (1) made a presentation to

the Board of Fire Commissioners on November 12, 2013 imploring them not to reduce staffing,

contrary to Weninger's proposal, (2) circulated informative and urgent updates to his members in

order to keep them apprised of Weninger's efforts and actions to reduce staffing, (3) sent

multiple letters and e-mails to Weninger asking him not to reduce staffing unless and until he has

fully bargained with the Union (asking him repeatedly to propose some type of plan for doing

so), (4) made broad document and information requests to the District on budgetary, staffing, and

related operational issues, (5) asked Union members who sat on the District's Safety Committee

to voice their concerns over the safety and workload issues related to de-staffing Engine 64 and

Aid 64, (6) filed a successful grievance on January 8, 2014 (Ex. 7a), that effectively foreclosed

Weninger from implementing a staffing reduction contrary to the terms of a previous

Memorandum of Understanding between the District and the Union (Ex. 7b ), (7) fought an effort

by Weninger to create a new Administrative Lieutenant position because it would drain financial

resources away from the District that could be better used to fund firefighter operational staffing,

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(8) opposed Weninger's attempt to create a new Information Technology Manager position

because it would drain financial resources away from the District that could be better used to

fund firefighter operational staffing, and (9) sent letters to the Kitsap Fire Watch website and the

Central Kitsap Reporter entitled "Minutes Can Make The Difference" wherein Smith highlighted

two specific emergency response incidents showing that fast response times from Station 64 units

made a positive difference between life and death (arguing that had Engine 64 or Aid 64 been de-

staffed that the no such fast response would have occurred). Exs. _.

6.1.3 As part of the effort described above, the Union has taken advantage of the

opportunity to voice its concerns on a website called the "Kitsap Fire Watch," which, among

other things, provides a vehicle by which the Union can advance its efforts to: (1) cause the

District to restore Engine 64 and Aid 64 staffing, and to discourage the District from taking any

further actions to de-staff other units, and (2) to improve the likelihood that the Union's

bargaining efforts will be successful in restoring unit staffing and preventing any such future

reductions.

6.1.4 Weninger has made statements, and taken other actions, that show he

believes that the Kitsap Fire Watch website was established by the Union as a tool to resist the

staffing reductions that he has implemented and that he threatens to reduce in the future.

6.1.5 The Central Kitsap Reporter and the Kitsap Sun are public newspapers

unrelated to the Union.

6.2 Unlawful Interrogation, Discriminatory Actions, Threats of Force, Reprisal, Disparaging Remarks, Monitoring of Union Activities, and Discouraging Bargaining Unit Members From Engaging in Protected Activities.

6.2.1 The District took unlawful actions against Smith and others for engaging

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in protected activities as follows:

6.2.2 On November 11, 2013, without ever notifying the Union, Weninger

announced that he was creating a new Administrative Lieutenant position. By e-mail later that

day, Smith asked Weninger to withdraw the announcement and bargain over it as required by

law. Weninger refused to do so, assigning a lieutenant rank to the new position and

implementing a related job description. See Ex. 8.

6.2.3 Subsequently, Weninger was effectively prohibited from implementing

that position because the Union refused to let him utilize an expired lieutenant promotional list to

fill the position. As a result, Weninger intentionally disparaged Smith to the Union members

who stood to benefit by a promotion to the Administrative Lieutenant position (Owen Rhodes,

Chris Bigelow, and Amanda Rohr). Weninger told these members that they should blame the

Union (and by implication, Smith) for not having the opportunity to get promoted to this

position. Each of these members report that Weninger expressed great hostility towards Smith

for his assertion of the Union's collective bargaining rights, so severe in fact that Amanda Rohr,

who was a good friend of Smith, called Smith and stated, "So the Union fucked me."

Weninger's actions in this regard reflects union animus, amounts to retaliation for the filing of a

grievance, and unlawfully disparaging a union official for the performance of his duties.

6.2.4 On or about January 1, 2014, the Union posted a sign in front of Station 64

asserting, by its design, that Weninger had "upside down" priorities when it carne to de-staffing

the units housed at Station 64 (the word "priorities" on the sign was written upside down).

6.2.5 Stories about the sign ran in the widely circulated Kitsap Sun and the

Central Kitsap Reporter. Exs. 9 and 10.

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6.2.6 In mid-January Smith drafted a "Fact Sheet" about the staffing and budget

related issues, attached a photo of the sign with a car accident showing in the background (the car

accident was happenstance), and sent it to the KFW, which was subsequently posted on that site.

Ex. 11.

6.2.7 On January 14, 2014, Lavato launched a campaign to find out who was

behind the posting of the upside down priorities sign, and in particular he wanted to know who

took the picture used in the KFW report. Lavato told employees that Weninger was upset about

the picture.

6.2.8 Thus, at approximately 9:00a.m. on January 141h, Lavato asked all of the

District's company officers to ask each of their crew members whether they knew who took the

picture. Lavato also wanted to know who the administrator of the KFW website was.

Weninger's and Lavato's investigation, which in essence was a bald attempt to intimidate

bargaining unit members who had anything to do with the Union's campaign to highlight its

concerns about staffing, caused a widespread sentiment that if one wanted to protect his or her

job they should have nothing to do with the Union's campaign. Weninger's surveillance of the

Union's activities did not stop there.

6.2.9 On or about February 3rct, Smith sent a report to the KFW that was

intended to highlight how much faster the response times were to emergencies when the units in

Station 64 are properly staffed. The report, entitled "Grover Ln. Cardiac Arrest" (Ex. 12,

"Grover Lane"), was essentially quoted verbatim from a report that was provided to Smith, in his

capacity as a Union Vice-President, by another bargaining unit member (Justin Brown). Brown

had been told to write the report by Battalion Chief Hostetter, one of his supervisors. Hostetter

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knew that the report had been sent to Chris Bigelow, a Union shift representative, and Smith in

his capacity as the Union's Vice-President. See, Ex. 13.

6.2.10 Hostetter told the District that he asked Brown to write the report, that he

knew that Smith had received it, that he felt it looked essentially like a press release, and saw

nothing wrong with disseminating it to the Union.

6.2.11 Notwithstanding that Hostetter, a high ranking Battalion Chief, felt it was

appropriate for Brown to give it to Smith, and that he regarded it as a typical press report,

Weninger decided to treat it as an unlawful release of medical information protected by the

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPP A").

6.2.12 Weninger believed that the Union was behind the KFW website. Thus, on

the day the Grover Lane report was posted, February 4, 2014, Weninger asked one of his District

employees named Ileana LiMarzi to provide him with the weblink to the KFW and a computer

screenshot of the Grover Lane report. Ex. 14. By e-mail dated February 5, 2014, Weninger also

asked LiMarzi to "continue to monitor Kitsap Fire Watch and their Facebook page." Ex. 15.

Board Chairman David Fergus said the same, "management needs to be vigilant in monitoring

both of these sites." Ex. 16.

6.2.13 Weninger's animus towards, the KFW website, which he believed was a

tool of the Union, is illustrated by the following:

6.2.14 On February 4, 2014 he discovered that the Grover Lane report was up on

the KFW website. On February 51h, he sent a highly intimidating letter to the KFW stating, in its

entirety as follows:

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February 5, 2014

Kitsap Fire Watch www .kitsapfirewatch.org

Sent by e-mail to kitsapfirewatch@ gmail.com

Dear Kitsap Fire Watch:

This letter constitutes a demand by Central Kitsap Fire & Rescue that you immediately cease and desist from publishing confidential medical information regarding District patients. Your disclosure is located on the internet at http://kitsapfirewatch.org/front-page.html and is titled "Grover Ln. Cardiac Arrest."

The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIP AA), 42 USC 1320D-6(a), prohibits knowingly obtaining and disclosing individually identifiable health information without authorization. Individuals who violate HIP AA are subject to civil fines up to $250,000 and criminal imprisonment for up to ten years. 42 USC 1320D-6(b). Health information is not "de-identified" under HIPAA except in accordance with certain conditions, including a determination by a qualified statistician that the information cannot identify a patient and removal of all potentially identifying information such as dates of care and all geographic subdivisions smaller than a state. 45 CFR 164.514.

You are hereby on notice that you have obtained and are disclosing confidential District identifiable patient medical information without District authorization and your publication of it on your website is in violation of HIP AA which exposes you to criminal and civil penalties. The District hereby demands that you remove the information from your website and any other publications where this information may appear immediately. Should you refuse, the District reserves the right to pursue all available remedies against you to the fullest extent of the law.

In addition to your violation of HIP AA, your actions are a violation of Washington State law for municipal officers to disclose confidential information gained by reason of their office. RCW 42.23.070(4). It is also a class C felony for any person to willfully and unlawfully remove a public record from a public office. RCW 40.16.010.

Sincerely,

Scott Weninger

Ex. 17, Emphasis in original.

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6.2.15 On February 7, 2014, Weninger knew that the Grover Lane report was

posted on the Central Kitsap Reporter website. The report remains posted at

http://www .centralkitsapreporter .com/news/24403 3611.html.

6.2.16 To date Weninger has never sent the Central Kitsap Reporter the same

letter he sent to KFW, as set forth in paragraph 6.2.14.

6.2.17 On February 6, 2014, Weninger launched an investigation of Smith's role

in acquiring and disseminating the Grover Lane report. The disciplinary investigation, and

subsequent actions taken by Weninger against Smith, were a pretext to a vigorous plan to

intimidate, retaliate, and discriminate against Smith for engaging in protected activities.

6.2.18 The aberrant nature of Weninger's course of action is profound. Unlike

any normal investigation into alleged employee misconduct, which would follow a logical course

of gathering information from all sources and individuals, which normally takes a substantial

amount of time and review in order to allow for a fair and reasonable outcome, Weninger

followed no such course.

6.2.19 The longstanding practice, and policy, of the District is to include an

employee's immediate and intermediate supervisors in the disciplinary and investigative process.

In Smith's case, that would have meant that his immediate company officer would have reviewed

the matter with him and sought to document relevant facts. Moving further up the chain of

command, normally a Battalion Chief would have provided input, guidance, and investigate the

matter further as necessary. In this case Battalion Chief Hostetter would have been a logical

person to involve in the investigation because he was the one that told Brown to draft the report

and to disseminate it to others, knowing that it was also going to Smith and Chris Bigelow, both

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Union officials. Hostetter was never consulted in the process until after Weninger had already

made a decision that discipline was, in his view, warranted. Even then, he only had Hostetter

interviewed after the Union's counsel pointed out that defect to Weninger at Smith's Loudermill

meeting.

6.2.20 Here is how the "investigation" and disciplinary process took place:

1. February 4, 2014, Weninger sees the Grover Lane placed on the KFW website. By 10:00 a.m., Weninger has one of his human resources employees contact the District's labor attorney (Sofia Mabee) for advice (the 11:36 a.m. e-mail sent to Mabee had attached to it a document that dealt with an employee's pledge to not disclose confidential patient information, Ex. 18). This "lawyering up" on the labor issue took place before Weninger had heard from anyone directly involved in the matter (e.g., Smith, Smith's supervisor, Brown, and Hostetter).

2. February 5, 2014 Unbeknownst to Smith, Brown, their immediate supervisors, and Hostetter, Weninger launches an "investigation."

3. February 6, 2014, on one hour's notice, Smith and Brown were called into Lavato's office for a disciplinary investigative interview (Exs 19 and 20 respectively) where he was immediately read his "Garrity Warning" which declares, "your statements cannot be used against you in any subsequent criminal proceedings." Ex. 20. The Garrity Warning is normally only given to an employee that could be facing criminal charges.

Weninger was going after Smith.' His letter to KFW said that your actions are a violation of Washington State law for municipal officers" and that when a "municipal officer" discloses confidential information he or she is subject to a Class C felony conviction.

The letter to KFW dealt with the potential liability of an employee that works for a HIPPA covered agency. KFW is not a HIPPA covered agency. Thus, Weninger was directly threatening Smith that he could be facing

1More broadly, because Weninger regarded the KFW as a Union controlled entity, he was going after the Union as an organization as well.

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criminal charges for publicizing the Gover Lane report.2

Weninger's allegation that Smith disseminated a HIPP A protected report was simply a pretext to harass and intimidate Smith for engaging in protected activities.

4. February 7, 2014 Smith was are given a "Loudermill" letter telling them that his "anticipated disciplinary action in this matter [will be] up to and including termination." Ex. 21. A Loudermillletter is normally issued after an investigation has been completed and the employer has come to a decision on what the discipline should be imposed.

6.2.21 At this juncture Weninger was discriminating against Smith because, even

though Brown was the principle author of the report, and gave it to the Union as an outside

entity, Brown was told he would only be subject to a written reprimand. Ex. 22. Smith was told

that he could be terminated for his actions. Ex. 21.

6.2.22 After completion of the District's process, on March 13, 2014, Brown was

only given a written reprimand (Ex. 23). Smith was given three twenty-four hour shifts off

without pay (Ex. 24 ). In another sign of overt discrimination, Smith was told that he would have

been terminated but for the sole fact that he pointed out that he had no knowledge that what he

disclosed was supposedly HIPPA protected. No such threat was made against Brown, even

though Weninger concluded about him that, "As a highly trained Paramedic, you are or should

be intimately familiar with medical privacy concepts and the laws regarding HIPPA." In

other words, according to Weninger Brown actually knew, or should have known, that the report

2The assertion that the Grover Lane report contained HIPP A protected information is simply not true. It contains information that under industry and District standards is not treated as HIPPA protected. The District even allows newspaper reporters to ride along with emergency medical aid units to directly witness its employees gathering specific medical information from patients, without having the reporter sign non-disclosure agreements and without the permission of the patient being treated. See, e.g. Ex.27 (a Central Kitsap Reporter article from November I, 2013 shows that the District's Public Information Officer, Ileana LiMarzi, per the District's normal policy, allowed reporter Seraine Page to witness a patient evaluation on an aid call responded to that day.

26

was HIPP A protected, but he did not threaten him like he did Smith.

6.2.23 At this juncture Weninger was discriminating against Smith because, even

though Hostetter directed Brown to draft and disseminate the report, and Repar (the District's

Privacy Officer) knew it had been disclosed to the Union, neither Repar or Hostetter had even

been interviewed, much less subjected to possible discipline.3 This is particularly egregious

when Brown was told on February 7, 2014, that the information contained in the Grover Lane

report should not have even been disclosed to any "employees who were not involved in

providing care to the patients referenced." Ex. 22.

6.2.24 Weninger also discriminated against Smith when he took another

unsolicited action that had never been done before - he circumvented the duly appointed Union

representatives of the CKF&R uniformed bargaining unit, and sent information related to the

incident at hand to the Union's President Craig Becker, who does not even work for CKF&R.

Ex. 25 (showing materials that Weninger sent to Becker). Never before had Weninger, or any

other previous fire chief, circumvented the duly appointed Union official tasked with

representing the bargaining unit subject to his authority.

6.2.25 On February 61h, 25th, and March 11, 2014, Weninger and/or Lavato

unlawfully interrogated Smith about internal Union activities, requiring him to answer such

questions under penalty of discipline. In each case, Smith made it clear that he objected to such

interrogation on the basis that it was protected Union activity.

3 After the Union pointed this out during Smith's Loudermill meeting, the District went back and interviewed Hostetter, but told him even then that he was not going to be subject to any discipline. The District cannot say that this was new information because it already knew that Hostetter had been "in the loop" on the report's disclosure. Ex. 13 (this February 1, 2014 e-mail was given to the Union after it requested that the District provide all information upon which it relied to decide that Smith should be disciplined).

27

6.2.26 The District's animus towards union activity extends beyond Weninger.

In an obvious attempt to put the Union in a bad light for engaging in normal collective bargaining

activities, i.e., gathering information to allow it to bargain with the District in a meaningful way

over the staffing issues, Board Chairman Dave Fergus complained to the press that the Union's

requests for information was costing the District a great deal of money. The "Fire Officials Are

Leery of Records Request" article quotes Fergus as saying:

Ex. 26.

Board Chairman Dave Fergus said he wants the district to keep track of all hours spent on doing research on this request ... "so that we are able to let our taxpayers know what public records requests are costing ... "

"There will be a cost to that, so the budget needs to reflect enough legal counsel time to do that."

6.2.27 The District's actions as described above have been so severe that it has

sent the message that there is a high cost for engaging in activities protected by chapter 41.56

RCW. The message has been sent that one's employment is in jeopardy if one engages in

protected activities. In this case the evidence will show that this message has also caused

profound anxiety in family members who rely upon their loved ones for their family's economic

and emotional well being.

6.3 Causal connection.

As demonstrated above, and as will be further established by the presentation of

witnesses and evidence at a hearing, Weninger's actions stem from Union animus and an effort

to make it costly for any Union representative, and particularly Smith, to engage in activities

protected by the terms of chapter 41.56 RCW.

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7.0 Statutes Violated

RCW 41.56.140 (1) (2) (3) and (4).

8.0 Status of Grievance

As of the date of filing no grievance has been filed. Complainant intends to file a

grievance shortly. But, in any event, due to the nature of the complaint, no deferral would be

appropriate.

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REMEDY REQUESTED

As a remedy for the District's unlawful conduct as described above, the Union requests

that the Commission order the District to:

1. Restore the status quo practice in each of the areas described in the Statement of

Facts above and make bargaining unit members whole for all lost pay and benefits (e.g.

compensation lost because of lost overtime or acting officer opportunities, and the unpaid time

off imposed on Smith).

2. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain as required by chapter 41.56 RCW and

from otherwise interfering, restraining, coercing or discriminating against employees who

exercise their rights under chapter 41.56 RCW.

3. Post appropriate notice.

4. Read aloud the Commission's remedial order at a regular public meeting of the

Board of Fire Commissioners, include a copy of the order in the District's minutes of the

meeting, and publish the notice in the Kitsap Sun, the largest local newspaper.

10.5 Provide any other relief that the Public Employment Relations Commission deems

appropriate to remedy the District's unfair labor practices, including costs and attorneys' fees.

1