UNIFYINGHINDUISM

SOUTHASIAACROSSTHEDISCIPLINES

SOUTHASIAACROSSTHEDISCIPLINES

EDITEDBYDIPESHCHAKRABARTY,SHELDONPOLLOCK,ANDSANJAYSUBRAHMANYAM

Fundedbyagrant fromtheAndrewW.MellonFoundationand jointlypublishedbytheUniversity ofCaliforniaPress, theUniversity ofChicagoPress, andColumbiaUniversityPress

ExtremePoetry:TheSouthAsianMovementofSimultaneousNarrationbyYigalBronner(Columbia)

TheSocialSpaceofLanguage:VernacularCultureinBritishColonialPunjabbyFarinaMir(California)

EverydayHealing:HindusandOthersinanAmbiguouslyIslamicPlacebyCarlaBellamy(California)

SouthAsiaAcrosstheDisciplinesisaseriesdevotedtopublishingfirstbooksacrossawiderangeofSouthAsianstudies,includingart,history,philologyortextualstudies,philosophy,religion,andtheinterpretivesocialsciences.Seriesauthors all share the goal of opening up new archives and suggesting newmethods and approaches, while demonstrating that South Asian scholarshipcanbeatoncedeepinexpertiseandbroadinappeal.

UNIFYINGHINDUISM

PHILOSOPHYANDIDENTITYININDIANINTELLECTUALHISTORY

AndrewJ.Nicholson

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CONTENTS

AcknowledgmentsListofAbbreviations

[1]INTRODUCTION

ContestingtheUnityofHinduism

VijñānabhikṣuandHisLateMedievalMilieu

DoxographyandMethod

PremodernPhilosophyinaPostcolonialWorld

[2]ANALTERNATIVEHISTORYOFVEDĀNTA

VedāntaandOrientalistHistoriography

EarlyBhedābhedaVedānta

BhedābhedaVedāntaAfterŚaṅkara

TheFutureofBhedābhedaVedānta

[3]VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU’S“DIFFERENCEANDNON-DIFFERENCE”VEDĀNTA

TheMeaningof“Bhedābheda”

SelfandBrahmanasPartandWhole

Brahman’sCausalityinAdvaitaandBhedābhedaVedānta

BhedābhedaandtheUnityofPhilosophies

[4]AHISTORYOFGODINSĀṂKHYAANDYOGA

Sāṃkhya:AnAtheistPhilosophy?

TheisminEarlySāṃkhyaandthePurāṇas

AtheismandTheismin“Classical”Sāṃkhya

SāṃkhyaandYoga

[5]READINGAGAINSTTHEGRAINOFTHESĀMKHYASŪTRAS

AtheismintheSāṃkhyasūtras

Kapila’s“BoldAssertion”asSpeechAct

DegreesofDeceptioninSāṃkhyaandthePurāṇas

DisprovingGodintheSāṃkhyasūtras

[6]YOGA,PRAXIS,ANDLIBERATION

TheExcellenceoftheYogicPath

KarmaandEmbodiedLiberation

TheUnityofYogaandVedāntaSoteriologies

[7]VEDĀNTAANDSĀṂKHYAINTHEORIENTALISTIMAGINATION

IndianPhilosophyandtheCritiqueofOrientalism

ColebrookeandGough:TheStrugglefortheEssenceofVedānta

PaulDeussenandtheInfluenceofGermanIdealism

RichardGarbe:SāṃkhyaastheFoundationofIndianPhilosophy

OrientalismandModernHinduThought

[8]DOXOGRAPHY,CLASSIFICATORYSCHEMES,ANDCONTESTEDHISTORIES

DoxographyasaGenre

EarlyModelsforDoxographyinIndia:CāttaṉārandBhāviveka

Haribhadra,Jainism,andtheSixSystems

MādhavaandtheInfluenceofAdvaitaDoxography

MadhusūdanaSarasvatī:ForeignnessandthePhilosophicalOther

[9]AFFIRMERS(ĀSTIKAS)ANDDENIERS(NĀSTIKAS)ININDIANHISTORY

TowardaComparativeHeresiology

TheMeaningofĀstikaandNāstika

PerspectivesfromtheJainas,Buddhists,andGrammarians

BeyondOrthodoxyandHeterodoxy

ĀstikaandNāstikaintheLateMedievalPeriod

[10]HINDUUNITYANDTHENON-HINDUOTHER

InclusivismandHinduToleration

DecodingLateMedievalDoxography

TheAbsenceofIslam

Hinduism:AModernInvention?

Communalism,Universalism,andHinduIdentity

NotesBibliography

Index

TACKNOWLEDGMENTS

HEREAREmanypeoplewhodeservethanksforhelpingmetowritethisbook.SheldonPollockhasbeenwithmethrougheverystageofthisproject,frommyfirstinchoatethoughtsonlatemedievalSāṃkhyathroughthemostrecentround

of revisions. His willingness to let me follow my own path, even when that pathsometimes led to a dead end, iswhatmade this book possible in its current form.MatthewKapsteinhasconsistentlychallengedmetorethinkmybasicpresuppositionsabout Indian intellectualhistory,doxography,andperiodization;andJonardonGanerihasofferedencouragement,guidance,andphilosophicalperspectivefromacrosstheocean.Most recently, Johannes Bronkhorst and Edwin Bryant have been generouswith their time and have offered many suggestions that have improved this book.Wendy Lochner, ChristineMortlock, AnneMcCoy, and Roy Thomas with ColumbiaUniversity Press have been invaluable in their guidance and prompt answers tomymanyquestions.Agrant from theColumbiaUniversitySeminarsenabledme tohireHamsaStainton,who expertly proofread theSanskrit passages in this book. I givespecialthankstoCynthiaGarver,whopainstakinglycopyeditedthefirstninechaptersof thisbookbutsuddenlyand tragicallypassedawaybeforewehadcompletedourworktogether.The funding for the initial research in India for this bookwas provided through a

U.S. Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Fellowship and fellowships from theUniversity of Chicago Committee on Southern Asian Studies. My daily tutorialsreadingSanskrittextswithShreeNarayanMishra,ProfessorEmeritusofSanskritatBenaresHinduUniversity,formedthecoreofmyresearchinIndia.Withouthiseruditeinstruction,myknowledgeofSanskrit and Indianphilosophywouldbemuchpoorer,andthosesessionsaresomeofmyfondestmemoriesfrommytimesinIndia.KanshiRamofHansRajCollege,DelhiUniversity,wasextremelyhelpful ingivingasecondopinion on various perplexing passages. Unless otherwise noted, however, allSanskrittranslationsinthisbookaremyown.Ihavepresentedpartsof thisbook inseveralscholarly forums. I thankaudiences

at theUniversityofChicagoSouthAsiaWorkshop,13thWorldSanskritConference,Columbia University Seminar on South Asia, University of Pennsylvania South AsiaColloquium, American Academy of Religion Buddhism Section, and Worldview andTheory in Indian Philosophy Conference for their spirited and insightful reactions.Someof themany conversation partnerswhohaveenriched the thoughts I presenthere are Dan Arnold, Purushottama Bilimoria, Arindam Chakrabarti, ChristopherChapple, Malcolm David Eckel, Vincent Eltschinger, Jonathan Gold, Hiroshi Marui,John Nemec, Hugh Nicholson, Parimal Patil, Ajay Rao, T. S. Rukmani, StuartSarbacker,AudreyTruschke,MilindWakankar,andIanWhicher.TheencouragementandcollegialatmosphereprovidedbymycolleaguesintheDepartmentofAsianandAsianAmericanStudies and theCenter for IndiaStudies at StonyBrookUniversity

have also facilitated my work in recent years. Parts of this book were originallypublished as articles in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, Journal of VaishnavaStudies,and InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,and I thank themforallowingmetoreprintthemhere.Finally, I thank Norman and Marlene Nicholson for their unflagging faith in my

abilities,andIthankClaudiaMisiandSilviaNicholsonforkeepingasmileonmyfaceduringthelongmonthsandyearsthatthisbookhasbeeninpreparation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Bh.Pu. BhāgavataPurāṇaBhG BhagavadGītāBṛh.Up. BṛhadāranyakaUpaniṣadBS BrahmasūtrasofBādarāyaṇaBSB BrahmasūtrabhāṣyaCh.Up. ChāndogyaUpaniṣadKai.Up. KaivalyaUpaniṣadKaṭhaUp. KaṭhaUpaniṣadKūrmaPu. KūrmaPurāṇaManu. Manusmṛti(Mānavadharmaśāstra)Mbh MahābhārataMHK MadhyamakahṛdayakārikāofBhāvivekaMMK MūlamadhyamakakārikaofNāgārjunaMokṣ. MokṣadharmaParvanMS MīmāṃsāsūtrasofJaiminiPMS PūrvamīmāṃsāsūtrasSDS SarvadarśanasaṃgrahaofMādhavaSK SāṃkhyakārikāofĪśvarakṛṣṇaSPB SāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣyaofVijñānabhikṣuSS SāṃkhyasūtrasofKapilaŚvet.Up. ŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣadTai.S. TaittirīyaSaṃhitāTai.Up. TaittirīyaUpaniṣadTK TattvakaumudīofVācaspatiMiśraTSS TattvasamāsasūtrasTV TattvavaiśāradīofVācaspatiMiśraVAB VijñānāmṛtabhāṣyaofVijñānabhikṣuViṣ.Pu. ViṣṇuPurāṇaYaj.Smṛ. YajñavalkyaSmṛtiYD Yuktidīpikā

YS YogasūtrasofPatañjaliYSS YogasārasaṃgrahaofVijñānabhikṣuYV YogavārttikaofVijñānabhikṣu

[1]INTRODUCTION

CONTESTINGTHEUNITYOFHINDUISM

The word “Hinduism” is loaded with historical and political resonances. Like suchcomparable termsasBuddhism,Sikhism,Confucianism,andTaoism, thisword is asiteofcontestation,withproponentsanddetractors,opentovariedinterpretations.Inthis introduction I briefly sketch two opposing and influential contemporaryinterpretationsofHinduism,bothofwhichIbelievehavesignificantweaknesses.The first, often enunciated byHindus themselves, is that Hinduism is themodern

term forwhatwasknown inearlier timesas theeternal religion (sanātanadharma)described insuchtextsastheBhagavadGītāand theVedas.1Properlyspeaking, ithas no history. Although historians today attempt with some degree of success tochroniclethepoetsandphilosopherswhofoundnewwaysofexpressingthetruthsofHinduism,theessenceofthisreligionhasremainedthesamesincetheverybeginningof Indian civilization, thousands or even tens of thousands of years ago. In thisregard, Hinduism is different from Christianity and Islam, two traditions foundedrelatively recently by single individuals which have undergone extensive changes inresponsetoworld-historicalevents.In the second, partly as a response to this portrayal, some scholars of modern

history, anthropology, and postcolonial studies have argued that a unified set ofbeliefsandpracticesknownasHinduismdidnotexistbefore thenineteenthcentury.According to this narrative, British scholars closely aligned with Britain’s imperialprojectlookedforanIndiananaloguetotheWesternreligionsthattheyalreadyknew.Butafterarriving in Indiaandfindingamultitudeofpopular riteswithoutanyunifyingphilosophicalortheologicalframework,“thefirstBritishscholarsofIndiawentsofaras to invent what we now call ‘Hinduism,’ complete with a mainstream classicaltraditionconsistingentirelyofSanskritphilosophicaltextsliketheBhagavad-GitaandtheUpanishads.”2This inventionwas internalizedby theEnglish-educated Indiansofthe so-called Hindu renaissance, who were in fact elaborating on an entirely new

religion that had little to do with the self-understanding of their own ancestors.Accordingtothisinterpretation,theinventionofHinduismisoneparticularinstanceofthe widespread tendency toward “the invention of tradition” that was so commonamongtheVictorians.3Hinduism,farfrombeingtheoldestreligionintheworld,isoneoftheyoungest,ifitcanreallybesaidtoexistatall.ThesetwostoriesabouttheprovenanceofHinduismcouldhardlybemorestarkly

opposed.Criticsofthefirstnarrativearguethatit issimplyanahistoricalfabrication.It is based on a selective reading of ancient texts that ignores the great variety ofopposedcontradictorybeliefsandpracticesandthecompletelackofanynotionofa“Hinduunity” that existedbefore thearrival of theBritish in India.Conversely,manyHindussee the “modern inventionofHinduism”hypothesisasaslap in the face, thefinalculminationofWesternimperialistscholarshiponIndia,portrayingfaithfulHindusas passive dupes and Hinduism as nothing more than a fraud perpetrated by theimperialists themselves. I argue that these two general approaches, admittedlyintroduced here only in broad outline, are tendentious readings based on amoderntendencytohomogenizeandoversimplifypremodernIndianhistory.TheideaofHinduunityisneitheratimelesstruthnorafictionwholly inventedbytheBritishtoregulateandcontroltheircolonialsubjects.The thesis of this book is that between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries CE,

certain thinkersbegan to treatasasinglewhole thediversephilosophical teachingsof theUpaniṣads,epics,Purāṇas,and theschoolsknownretrospectivelyas the“sixsystems” (ṣaḍdarśana) of mainstream Hindu philosophy.4 The Indian and Europeanthinkers in the nineteenth century who developed the term “Hinduism” under thepressure of the new explanatory category of “world religions” were influenced bytheseearlierphilosophersanddoxographers,primarilyVedāntins,whohadtheirownreasons for arguing the unity of Indian philosophical traditions. Before the latemedieval period, there was little or no systematic attempt by the thinkers we nowdescribe asHindu to put aside their differences in order to depict themselves as asingle unified tradition. After this latemedieval period, it became almost universallyacceptedthattherewasafixedgroupofIndianphilosophiesinbasicagreementwithoneanotherandstandingtogetheragainstBuddhismandJainism.In pre-twelfth-century India, many thinkers today labeled “Hindu” went to great

efforts to disprove one another’s teachings, including use of ad hominem attacks,strawmanarguments, and other questionablemeans. Therewas no understandingthenthatallofthesethinkerswerepartofasharedorthodoxy.Norwasthereanideathat schools such asSāṃkhya andMīmāṃsā had commonalities that differentiatedthemfromthenon-Hinduphilosophiesof theJainasandBuddhists.KumārilaBhaṭṭa,theinfluentialseventh-centuryMīmāṃsaka,wrotethat“thetreatisesonrighteousnessand unrighteousness that have been adopted in Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra,Pāśupata, and Buddhist works… are not accepted by those who know the tripleVeda.”5 Likewise, Sāṃkhya and Yoga philosophers faulted Vedāntins andMīmāṃsakas for their uncritical acceptance of Vedic authority, which included theperformanceofwhat theyconsidered immoralanimalsacrifices.6Oneauthorof this

period,theeleventh-centuryŚaivaauthorSomaśambhu,evenassertsthatVedāntins,Mīmāṃsakas,andthosewhoworshipothergodssuchasViṣṇuwillbereborninhellsunless they undergo a complicated conversion ritual designed to make them full-fledgedŚaivas.7LatercodifiersofIndiantraditionssoughttodepictthe“sixsystemsofphilosophy”

(ṣaḍdarśanas)assharingafundamentalcommitmenttotheauthorityoftheVedathatunified them as Hindus and made them understand themselves as fundamentallydifferent fromJainasandBuddhists.However,nosingle,well-demarcatedboundarybetween “affirmers” (āstikas) and “deniers” (nāstikas) existed before the latemedievalperiod.Butby thesixteenthcentury,mostMīmāṃsakasandVedāntinsdidunderstand themselves united in their shared commitment to the Vedas over andagainstothergroupstheydesignatedasnāstikas.Inthisbook,Itellthestoryofthisremarkableshift,arguingthat theseedswereplantedfor thenow-familiardiscourseof Hindu unity by a number of influential philosophers in late medieval India. I giveparticular attention to one such philosopher, Vijñānabhikṣu, a sixteenth-centurypolymathwhowasperhapstheboldestofalloftheseinnovators.Accordingtohim,itwasnot just thatallof thephilosophiesof theāstikasagreedon thesanctityof theVeda. He claimed that, properly understood, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, and Nyāyawere inessencedifferentaspectsofasingle,well-coordinatedphilosophicaloutlookandtheirwell-documenteddisagreementswerejustamisunderstanding.BecauseofVijñānabhikṣu’sboldrethinkingof therelationshipbetweentheschools

of Indian philosophy, Western scholars have regarded him with suspicion. Thenineteenth-century translator and historian Richard Garbe expressed the opinion ofmany of his colleagues when he wrote that “Vijñānabhikṣu mixes up many …heterogeneous matters, and even quite effaces the individuality of the severalphilosophical systems.”8 Nonetheless, Garbe considered Vijñānabhikṣu’s works tooimportant to be written off as the idiosyncratic ramblings of a fringe thinker. HedescribesVijñānabhikṣu’scommentaryontheSāṃkhyasūtrasas“notonly the fullestsourcewehaveoftheSāṃkhyasystem,butalsooneofthemostimportant.”9Morerecently, scholarsofYogahave foundVijñānabhikṣu’ssubcommentaryonPatañjali’sYogasūtrassimilarlyindispensableforadetailedunderstandingoftheYogasystemofphilosophy10All of theprevious scholarly treatments onVijñānabhikṣuhavehad in commonan

approach that understands him only from a single perspective, through the lens ofSāṃkhya,Yoga, orVedānta.11 They either sidestep the question of the relationshipbetween the three parts of Vijñānabhikṣu’s corpus or are openly hostile toVijñānabhikṣu’sefforts towardaconcordanceofphilosophicalsystems.Thisattitudeisbasedonanuncriticalacceptanceofaparticularmodeloftherelationshipbetweenthe philosophical schools of India. According to this model, the schools of Indianphilosophy are well established and distinct. Most commonly, they list six āstikadarśanas(commonlytranslated“orthodoxschools”),withoutexploringtheprovenanceofthislist.12Ontheothersidearethenāstikaschools,themostwellknownofwhicharetheBuddhists,Jainas,andCārvākamaterialists.Anyattempttoblurthedivisions

between these discrete philosophical schools is condemned as syncretism, an illicitmixtureofirreconcilablephilosophies.It issurprisinghowwidespreadand influential thisunderstandingof theschoolsof

Indianphilosophyremains today.Thispicturecomes fromthewritingsof Indologistsof the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although these early Indologists did notinvent these ideas by themselves.Rather, they adopted for their ownpurposes theclassificatory schemes they found in reading medieval catalogues of doctrines, ordoxographies. These doxographies, composed at a relatively late date by authorswho were themselves partisan adherents of one or another of the schools theysought to catalogue, were widely accepted by eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuryOrientalistsasobjectivedepictionsofafixedstateofaffairs.Orientalistsextrapolatedfrom these texts the notion that the Indian philosophical schools arose as separateanddistinctinancienttimesandhaveremainedstableandessentiallyunchangedforcenturies.Bycomparison,theyunderstoodWesternphilosophicalschoolsasarising,adapting, and going out of existence in historical time, sometimes portrayed as theunfoldingofalargerhistoricaldialectic.MuchlikeMarx’sdepictionoftraditionalIndiansocial life as “undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative,”Orientalists often understoodIndian philosophy as existing outside of history. Unlike Marx, however, theyunderstood this ahistoricity as one of the positive features of Oriental wisdom, incontrast to the changeable fads of European intellectuals.13 Hindu reformers of themodern period pickedup theOrientalist narrative of premodern India as a timelessrealmofphilosophicalcontemplationtoservetheirownends.AlthoughmodernHinduscontinue to take the great antiquity of Indian intellectual traditions as a source ofnational pride, many have denied the incompatibility of the āstika philosophicalschools,insteadarguingforacommonessenceattheheartofallāstikaschools.Oneof the ironiesof theOrientalists’ useofmedieval doxographies to show that

theschoolsofphilosophyweredistinctandlogicallyincompatibleisthatitwasthesesame doxographies that began to question earlier assumptions about the logicalincompatibility of philosophical schools. Vijñānabhikṣuwas only one of a number oflate medieval intellectuals in India who sought to find unity among the apparentdifferencesofthephilosophicalschoolsoftheāstikas.Śaṅkara,theinfluentialeighth-centuryAdvaitaVedāntin, issuedscathingattacksonāstikaandnāstikaalike,hardlydistinguishingbetweenthetwo.14YetŚaṅkara’sself-proclaimed followersof the latemedieval period rehabilitated the same āstika schools that early Vedāntins hadscorned, most notably the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools. The medieval AdvaitadoxographersMādhavaandMadhusūdanaSarasvatīsuggestthatsuchnon-VedānticschoolsareusefulaspartialapproximationsofatruthonlyfullyenunciatedbyAdvaitaVedānta. Although his allegiances were to a different school of Vedānta,Vijñānabhikṣuisthemostoutstandingexampleofthislatemedievalmovementtofindunity among the apparent diversity of philosophical schools. None of these unifierswould have described themselves as “Hindus,” a term that was still uncommon insixteenth-century Sanskrit usage. But it was their unification of āstika philosophiesthat nineteenth- and twentieth-century reformers drew on when they sought to

enunciateaspecificsetofbeliefs foraworldreligioncalled“Hinduism.”WhilesomerecentscholarshavearguedthatthevisionofHinduismasasingle,all-embracingsetof beliefs is wholly a modern fabrication, such assertions ignore the historicaldevelopmentsofthelatemedievalperiod.Inunifyingtheāstikaphilosophicalschools,VijñānabhikṣuandhiscontemporariesmadepossibletheworldreligionlaterknownbythenameHinduism.

VIJÑĀNABHIKṢUANDHISLATEMEDIEVALMILIEU

Likemanypremodern Indianauthors,Vijñānabhikṣu offers little in hisworks to helpidentifyhistimeandplace.Hemakesnomentionofhisteachersorfamily,nordoeshe comment on political or historical events. Although there is consensus amonghistorians that he lived in the latter half of the sixteenth century, this dating is itselfbasedonmeagerevidence.15ScholarshaveestimatedVijñānabhikṣu’sdatesbasedon thedatesofhisdisciples, inparticularonedisciplenamedBhāvāgaṇeśa.16SinceBhāvāgaṇeśa identifieshimselfasan immediatediscipleofVijñānabhikṣu,andsinceBhāvāgaṇeśa’s life span has been estimated from the late sixteenth to the earlyseventeenth century, it follows that Vijñānabhikṣu’s dates would be slightly earlier,suggestingthatheflourishedsometimeafter1550.17ScholarshavealsoattemptedtolocateVijñānabhikṣuintimebasedonperceivedinfluencesonhisphilosophy.So,forinstance,S.C.ŚrīvāstavyaputsVijñānabhikṣuafterSadānandaVyāsa,authoroftheVedāntasāra, and T. S. Rukmani argues that Vijñānabhikṣu was influenced by theNavya-NaiyāyikaRaghunāthaŚiromaṇi.18SinceVijñānabhikṣuneither refers to theseauthors by name nor quotes their works directly, these, too, are admittedlyconjectures. Śrīvāstavya also attempts to determine Vijñānabhikṣu’s place ofresidence based on his occasional references to Prayāga (modern-day Allahabad)and claims based on his analysis of Vijñānabhikṣu’s Sanskrit usage that he was aHindi speaker.19 Reviewing all the evidence collectively, there is enough to suggestthathelivedinnorthernIndiainthelatemedievalperiod.TentativelyacceptingGode’sarguments regardingBhāvāgaṇeśa’s identity, I will assume for the purposes of thisstudy thatVijñānabhikṣu lived inapproximately the latesixteenthcentury,perhaps inthevicinityofwhatisnowUttarPradesh.Vijñānabhikṣuisprimarilyknowntomodernscholarsforhiscommentariesontexts

from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools, especially for his commentary on theSāṃkhyasūtras (the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya) and his subcommentary on theYogasūtras (the Yogavārttika). However, his works on Sāṃkhya and Yoga werewrittenafterhisVedānticworks,whichmakeupthemajorityofVijñānabhikṣu’sextantcorpus.20TheseworksincludeVijñānabhikṣu’scommentaryontheBrahmasūtras(theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya), his commentaries on numerous Upaniṣads (collectively knownby the nameVedāntāloka), and his commentary on the ĪśvaraGītā section of theKūrmaPurāṇa (entitled Īśvaragītābhāṣya).Vijñānabhikṣuconsiders thesethree textstobehisprasthānatrayī,thetrilogyofcommentariesobligatoryforVedāntins.Itisthis

he has in mind when he remarks at the beginning of the Īśvaragītābhāṣya that hiscommentary on the Īśvara Gītā makes up for the lack of a commentary on theBhagavadGītā,sincethereisnodifferenceinmeaningbetweenthetwo.21TheseVedānticwritingshavebeenlargelyneglectedbymodernscholars.Although

editions of Vijñānabhikṣu’s four works on Sāṃkhya and Yoga have been publishedbothinSanskritandinEnglishtranslations,onlyoneofVijñānabhikṣu’sVedāntictextshas been published in Sanskrit, and none have been translated in full.22 Yet anunderstanding of these earlierworks is necessary to comprehend themetaphysicalfoundationsofhis laterwritingsonSāṃkhyaandYoga.Vijñānabhikṣuhimselfmakesthis clear by referring the reader time and again to his Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya whendiscussing metaphysical issues in the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya and Yogavārttika.This is also clear evidence that Vijñānabhikṣu conceives of all of his writings aspresenting a single comprehensive philosophical position. Unlike other thinkers whocommented on texts of multiple schools, Vijñānabhikṣu is not content to see hiscommentsonasingle textasmerelyapplying to thatschoolandnoother.Heseesthe dualism of Sāṃkhya and Yoga’s puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (primalmatter)asvalidatacertain levelofanalysis,andherefrainsfrompositingahigher,overarching unity in hisworks onSāṃkhya andYoga. But by his references to theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya,heclearlymaintains that thishigherunityexists—inhisworkonSāṃkhyaandYoga,henever retractsstatements fromhisearlierVedanticwritings.Inmostcases,heinsteadtactfullyskimsoverissuesaboutwhichVedānta,Sāṃkhya,andYogadisagree.23In his Vedāntic works, Vijñānabhikṣu only hints at the coordination of various

doctrinesfoundinhis laterSāṃkhyaandYogacommentaries.It is likelythathehadnot yet fully worked out the details of this concordance, and at times he criticizesSāṃkhyaandYogafortheirshortcomings.ButtheBhedābheda(DifferenceandNon-Difference)metaphysicalfoundationhelaysoutintheseearlierworksiswelladaptedto accommodate the realist and dualistic aspects of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. LikeSāṃkhyaandYogacommentators,mostBhedābhedavādinsacceptsomeformoftheview that theworld isa real transformation (pariṇāma)ofBrahman,andnotmerelyan illusory manifestation (vivarta). Using Bhedābheda interpretive strategies,Sāṃkhya’steachingofthemultiplicityofindividualselves(puruṣas)canalsoeasilybereconciledwiththestatementsfromtheUpaniṣadsapparentlyexpressingtheultimateunityoftheself.AlthoughVijñānabhikṣuunderstandsnon-separation(avibhāga)tobethefundamentalrelationoftheindividualselvesandBrahman,duringtheperiodoftheworld’sexistenceselvesbecomeseparatedfromBrahmanandfromeachotherandtherefore exist as described in the Sāṃkhyasūtras. Similarly, the fundamentaldichotomy described in Sāṃkhya between consciousness and matter, prakṛti andpuruṣa,canbeexplainedasrealfromacertainperspectivebytheBhedābhedāvādin,although originally both must be understood to come from Brahman, the materialcause(upādānakāraṇa)oftheentireworld.MyapproachtoVijñānabhikṣuinthisbookproceedsfromthepremisethathewas

not the willfully perverse and arbitrary thinker that his critics make him out to be.

When understood in proper historical context, even his most controversial claimsmakesense.Vijñānabhikṣu’sclaim thatKapila, themythical founderof theSāṃkhyasystem, was not an atheistmust be understood in light of the influence of PūraṇicSāṃkhya in the medieval period. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, for instance, contains alengthy section inwhichKapila teaches the valueof devotion toGod tohismother,Devahūti.24 Modern advocates of Advaita Vedānta have portrayed Vijñānabhikṣu’srealistVedāntaasnonsensicalandhisclaimsofdefendinganolderformofVedāntafromthemorerecentAdvaitaschoolashistoricallybaseless.Theattitudesofcriticsgenerally stem from their own lack of knowledge of the complexity within thephilosophical traditions of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. In the case of Sāṃkhya, thisincludes their arbitrary insistence on the canonical status of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’sSāṃkhyakārikā, pairedwithan ignoranceofearly commentarieson thissameworkthat are theistic in their outlook. In the case of Vedānta, the hegemony of AdvaitaVedānta in themodern period has blindedmostmodern authors to the diversity ofopinions among the Vedānta schools. The realist tradition of Bhedābheda Vedāntapredated Śaṅkara’s school of Advaita Vedānta, and in the late medieval periodBhedābhedaexperiencedarenaissanceinnorthernIndia.Vijñānabhikṣu’scorpuswasapartofthatrenaissance.Althoughhisphilosophycontainsitsowninternaltensions,as any comprehensive philosophical systemmust, it can almost never be as lightlydismissedashiscriticsmaintain.

DOXOGRAPHYANDMETHOD

Vijñānabhikṣu’s assertions about the concordance of the āstika schools must beunderstoodinthecontextofhislatemedievalintellectualmilieu.Hiscontemporarythesixteenth-century doxographerMadhusūdanaSarasvatī, argues that since all of thesageswhofoundedtheāstikaphilosophicalsystemswereomniscient, it followsthatthey all must have shared the same beliefs.25 The diversity of opinions expressedamongthesesystemsisonlyforthesakeofitshearers,whoareatdifferentstagesofunderstanding.Madhusūdana,whounderstoodthehighesttruthofthesesagestobe the monistic doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, not Vijñānabhikṣu’s BhedābhedaVedānta,sharedwithVijñānabhikṣuaconcernforreconciling thediversesystemsoftheāstikas.According toMadhusūdana, the sages taught these various systems inorder to keep people from a false attraction to the views of nāstikas such as theBuddhists and Jainas. Even Mādhava’s well-known fourteenth-century doxographySarvadarśanasaṃgraha (CompendiumofAllSchools)canbe readasanattempt toshow that all of the āstika philosophical schools exist in a complementary logicalhierarchy.AlthoughVijñānabhikṣu’sprojectismoreambitiousthantheseotherauthorsand based on Bhedābheda instead of Advaita notions of ultimate truth, his basicproblematic is common to a number of other late medieval thinkers. Vijñānabhikṣuneverwroteadoxography,buthisentirecorpusismotivatedbydoxographicconcern,the need so typical among late medieval Vedāntins to organize, classify, and rank

differentphilosophiesinorderoftheirtruthandefficacy“Doxography” is, of course, not a native Sanskrit category. Scholars of Indian

philosophyhaveadoptedthetermfromscholarsofWesternphilosophyonlyrecentlytodistinguishagenreofIndiantextsoftenlabeledusingtheSanskrittermssaṃgraha(“compendium”) or samuccaya (“collection”).26 The word “doxography” was aneologism coined by the classicist HermannDiels in 1879 for his collection entitledDoxographiGraeci. SinceDiels, historians ofWestern philosophy have applied thisterm,sometimesquiteloosely,torefertoworksbyauthorssuchasCicero,Plutarch,andDiogenesLaërtius thatpresent thephilosophical viewsofanumberofdifferentthinkers or schools.27 There are differences between Sanskrit doxography anddoxographywritteninGreekandLatin,buttheyhaveenoughincommontojustifytheuseofasingletermtorefertobothgroupsoftexts.ThestudyofdoxographyinIndiais still quitenew,andscholarsof Indiandoxographycan look to the recentworkofJaapMansfeldandDavidRuniaonEuropeandoxography foranexampleofhow toproceed.RichardRorty,inhisessay“TheHistoriographyofPhilosophy:FourGenres,”nicely

encapsulates an important feature that Indian andWestern doxographies share. InRorty’s use of the term, doxography is “the attempt to impose a problematic on acanon drawn upwithout reference to that problematic, or, conversely, to impose acanononaproblematicconstructedwithoutreferencetothatcanon.”28ForDiogenesLaërtius, this means asking the question “what did X think the good was?” for adisparate group of philosophers whomay ormay not have directly addressed thisquestion.Similarproblemsoccurfortheeighth-centuryJainadoxographerHaribhadrawhenheseekstoclassifythephilosophicalschoolsaccordingtodeity(devatā).Whenconfrontedwithschoolsthathavenodeity,hestretcheshisdefinitioninsuchawaytoservehisneedsasacomprehensivecataloguerofphilosophicalviews:heascribestoBuddhists a deity known as Sugata (i.e., the Buddha), and Jinendra, the supremeJainapatriarch,becomesthedeityoftheJainas.ThiswayofapproachingBuddhismandJainismservesHaribhadra’sclassificationalneedsasadoxographer,butitdoessobydistortingtheactualviewsofthetwoschools.Rorty ismore interested in“doxography” in themodernperiodthan in theancient,

andDavidRuniahascensuredhimforunnecessarilystretchingthetermandturningitintoapejorative.29Rortyexpandsthecategoryofdoxographytoincludemorerecentworksthatsharethefeatureheconsidersessential, thedoxographer’s impositionofaproblematiconagivencanonof thinkers.Examples includemanycommonworkswith the title “A History of Philosophy,” such as those by Frederick Copleston andBertrandRussell. It isnotdifficult tofindmodern“historiesof Indianphilosophy”thatsuffer from the same defects. Of these, there is sometimes a direct link to themedieval doxographies ofMādhavaandPseudo-Śaṅkara.30 Often authors of workson Indianphilosophyseemuncertainof theprecisepurposeof theirwritingandendup with works that neither are faithful enough to the original Sanskrit text to bedescribedas translationsnoranalyzearguments inanydepth.Suchwritings involvelistsofconclusions,skippingover thedialectics that led to theseconclusions.These

“histories” are neither historical nor philosophical—they are doxographies, in thebroadest literal sense of a text that records the opinions (doxai) of philosophers.From the reader’s perspective, the most immediate problem of such works isboredom.Listsofotherpeople’sbeliefsdonotmakeforexcitingreading,especiallywhenthereisnoefforttogivecontextorshowthewiderrelevanceofthesebeliefstocontemporaryphilosophicaldebates.Whentheproblemiscompoundedbythejargonand stilted language that are typical ofmany books on Indian philosophy, even themostmotivatedstudentsaredriventodespair.It is no wonder, then, that educated readers with a good general knowledge of

Western philosophy are so often ignorant about even the most basic aspects ofIndian philosophy. While the near-total exclusion of Indian philosophy fromdepartmentsofphilosophy inNorthAmericanuniversities isprimarilydueto lingeringEurocentric biases, some responsibility must also be accepted by Anglophoneauthors on Indian philosophy. We have for too long been content to repeat thesesame lists of doctrines, devoid of serious philosophical analysis or historicalexamination of their claims (such as the time-worn belief that the true Sāṃkhya isatheistic).Suchpresentationshaveledreaderstoconcludethat thebeliefsof Indianphilosophers were derived from private mystical experiences, operating entirelyoutsidetherealmofwarrantandrationalargument.HencethewidespreadideathatIndian religions aremystical rather than rational.31 Public intellectuals like FreemanDysoncanproclaimintheNewYorkReviewofBooks that “HinduismandBuddhism… have no theology” and are “poetical, rather than analytical.”32 None of Dyson’seditors caught the mistake, as they surely would have with such a massive erroraboutWesternintellectualtraditions.Books titled “The History of Indian Philosophy” rarely deal with history. The

“historical” portion of such books is generally limited to a few sentences at thebeginningofeachsectionlistingthephilosopher’sdatesand(optionally)inwhichpartofIndiahelived.Thetheoryofhistorypresupposedinthesebookstypicallyconformstoaperennialphilosophy/greatbooksmodel.Asmallgroupofgreatmindswasableto rise above the petty squabbles that concerned their contemporaries, to addressthe same timeless, universal philosophical concerns thatwe grapplewith today.Bystudying theanswers to theseperennialquestionsprovidedbysuchgreatmensideby side, we ourselves become culturally literate. Such a minds-floating-in-the-ethermodel of the history of philosophy led in the late twentieth century to a spate ofcomparativeworksmixing andmatchingDerrida,Wittgenstein, Śaṅkara, Bhartṛhari,and Nāgārjuna.33 These articles generally avoid the messy complexities of textualanalysis and rely on theDavidsonian premise that any linguistic differences can bereadily bridged with a good translation, so knowledge of primary languages isunnecessary.34Thelingeringeffectsofthisdiscoursehavehaddisastrouseffectsonthediscipline

of the history of Indian philosophy. Modern histories of Indian philosophy generallyoffer depictions quite similar to their premodern Indian doxographic counterparts,including discussions of a fixed number of philosophical schools (typically, the

aforementioned six systems: Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, andNyāya).35 Such histories deemphasize the disagreements and historical shifts thatoccurred within these philosophical schools, along with the contradictions andambiguities within the bodies of work of individual authors. The reason earliergenerations of scholars were attracted to simple generalizations and classificatoryschemes is clear. Early authors on Indian philosophy, such as T. H. Colebrooke(1765-1837)andA.E.Gough(1845-1915),facedthedauntingtaskofmakingamapofanintellectualworldhithertouncharted.TakingseriouslytheclassificatoryschemesprovidedbyIndianauthorswasanimportantfirststep,enablingWesternscholarsforthe first time tomake out the outlines of the various thinkers and schools in Indianphilosophy. But in our current situation, approximately two hundred years after thepioneersinthehistoryofIndianphilosophymadethesefirstattempts,suchsimplisticschemesasthe“sixsystems”domoreharmthangood.Confrontingthissituation,thephilosopherandhistorianDayaKrishnaremarked,

[TheschoolsofIndianphilosophy]aretreatedassomethingfinishedandfinal.Nodistinction,therefore,isevermadebetween the thoughtof an individual thinkerand the thoughtof a school.A school is, inan importantsense,anabstraction.Itisalogicalconstructionspringingoutofthewritingsofanumberofthinkerswhoshareacertainsimilarityofoutlook in tacklingcertainproblems.Sāṃkhya, forexample, is identified toomuchwithĪśvarakṛṣṇa’swork,orVedāntawiththeworkofŚaṅkara.Butthisisduetoaconfusionbetweenthethoughtofanindividualthinkerandthestyleofthoughtwhichheexemplifiesandtowhichhecontributesinsomemanner.All that Śaṅkara has written is not strictly Advaita Vedānta. Nor all that Īśvarakṛṣṇa has written, Sāṃkhya.Unless this is realized,writingson Indianphilosophywillcontinuouslydo injusticeeither to thecomplexityofthoughtoftheindividualthinkerconcerned,ortotheuniquenessofthestyletheyarewritingabout.36

The philosophy of Vijñānabhikṣu flies in the face of the reified conception ofdiscretephilosophicalschoolschampionedbynineteenth-centuryOrientalists,anditisthis that accounts for much of the hostility directed toward him. Hence, anexamination of Vijñānabhikṣu’s entire oeuvre offers not just the opportunity torehabilitate the reputationofamaligned thinker;hisworkalso forcesus to turnourgazebackonourselves,thehistoriographersofIndianphilosophy.LikeDayaKrishna,Ibelievethatwemustovercomethefacileoverrelianceon“schools”thatstill informsmuch writing on Indian philosophy. At the same time, when understood to be aconstructionof thehistorian insteadof apre-givenentity, thenotionof “school” hasvalue as a heuristic device, in pointing out the similarities between thinkers. Thedanger of the notion of schools, however, is the tendency to concentrate on thesimilaritiesbetweenthinkersclassifiedundertherubricofasingleschoolandtoglossoversignificantdifferences.Justastheconceptof thephilosophicalschooloveremphasizessimilaritybetween

thinkers within the school, it has also frequently led to the assumption that thedoctrinesofseparateschoolsarecontradictoryandirreconcilableandthatthinkersofseparateschoolsarenaturalenemies,competingforadherentstotheirphilosophies.Inthewest,ourunderstandingofIndianphilosophicalschools(astheworddarśanaisgenerallytranslated)hasbeencoloredbyourownhistory.Thedefaultmodelfortherelationshipbetweentheseschoolsisoftenunwittinglybasedonmodelsderivedfrom

Westernreligioushistory: thehostilitiesbetween the threereligionsof theBook, themodern relationship of the various Christian denominations, or even the relationbetweenorthodoxandheterodoxsectsinearlyChristianity.Butotherfamiliarmodelscan also be deployed as a corrective to models emphasizing conflict aboveconcordance.One is the relationshipbetween thenatural sciences in contemporaryacademia.Biologists,chemists,physicists,andastronomers typicallysee theirworkascomplementary,notindirectconflict.Thebiologistassumesthelawsofchemistryandphysicstobetrue,anditiswiththeselawsinthebackgroundthatheundertakeshisownexperiments.InIndia,thismodelofcomplementaritypredatedVijñānabhikṣu,andheextendsitevenfarther.Heportraysalloftheāstikaschoolsinthisway,sayingthatwhen theschoolsofphilosophyareunderstood in termsof theirproper scope,theyarecomplementaryandnotatallcontradictory.37Thisclaimhassomeplausibilitysince the various schools of Indian philosophy do have different central foci:Mīmāṃsā focuses on exegesis of Vedic ritual injunctions, Vedānta on the nature ofBrahman,Nyāyaon logicalanalysis,Vaiśeṣikaonontology.Yet therearealsomanyapparentcontradictionsbetweentheāstikaschools,asastudentwitheventhemostcursory knowledge of Indian philosophical polemics will show. Vijñānabhikṣu’schallengeistoshowthatthecomplementaritymodelheespousesissuperiortoothermodelsemphasizingconflictandcontradiction.Evenhisdetractorsmustadmitthatheoftenshowsextraordinaryphilosophicaland interpretive ingenuity,whetherornotallhisargumentstothisendareultimatelypersuasive.

PREMODERNPHILOSOPHYINAPOSTCOLONIALWORLD

After Richard Rorty impugned what he described as “modern doxographies,” heregistered his support of another genre of writing about philosophers, called“intellectualhistory.”Includedinthisgenreisoneparticularsubcategory:

Ishouldwanttoincludeunder“intellectualhistory”booksaboutallofthoseenormouslyinfluentialpeoplewhodonotget into thecanonof thegreatdeadphilosophers,butwhoareoftencalled“philosophers”…people likeErigena,Bruno,Ramus,Mersenne,Wolff,Diderot,Cousin,Schopenhauer,Hamilton,McCosh,BergsonandAustin.Discussionofthese“minorfigures”oftencoalesceswiththickdescriptionofinstitutionalarrangementsanddisciplinarymatrices.38

Had Rorty concerned himself with the Indian intellectual sphere, he would havecertainly included Vijñānabhikṣu in his list. Like those thinkers, Vijñānabhikṣu existssomewhereat thefringesof thephilosophicalcanon.UnlikeŚaṅkaraandRāmānuja,he did not found a lasting intellectual lineage, nor were hagiographies composedabouthislife.Therewaslittletimeforthat—helivedduringthefinalflourishingoftheSanskrit intellectual tradition, just a few years before theMughalEmperor JahangirofficiallyrecognizedtheBritishEastIndiaCompanyin1617,partofaseriesofeventsthatwouldleadtoBritishpoliticaldominanceofthesubcontinent.Byindicationssuchas the small number of hismanuscripts available in Indian archives,Vijñānabhikṣu’sinfluence amongSanskrit intellectualswas not as great as the enormous impact of

theBhedābhedaVedāntinsCaitanyaandVallabha,whoselineagescontinuetothriveinmodern-dayIndiaandelsewhere.39Vijñānabhikṣu’s greatest fame began in the eighteenth century, whenOrientalists

seekingtocataloguethedoctrinesoftheHinduslookedtohistreatmentoftheIndianphilosophicalschools inhiscommentaryon theSāṃkhyasūtras asapossible setofguidelines forunderstanding therelationshipbetweenVedānta,Sāṃkhya,Yoga,andNyāya.Also inquestionwastheauthenticityof theAdvaitaVedānta interpretationofthe Vedas, which H. T. Colebrooke argued was a recent departure from an oldertradition. By the late nineteenth century, the Indological controversies surroundingVijñānabhikṣu had died down. Some rejected his model for the concordance ofschools in favor of other concordances that portrayed Advaita as the pinnacle ofāstikaphilosophies.Otherscholars,likeGarbe,insistedontheirreducibilityofthesixancient schools of Indian philosophy. Vijñānabhikṣu’s name, if not his Bhedābhedaphilosophy,hasbeenrecognizabletosubsequentgenerationsofscholars,oftenwithawhiffofcontroversy.Hisworkstodayappearinscholarlyfootnotesandfromtimetotime as optional reading in Indian university curricula. Meanwhile, the hegemonicnarrativeestablishedinthenineteenthcenturyofAdvaitaVedāntaastheessenceandculmination of Indian philosophical systems has drowned out competingcounternarratives,especiallyatthepopularlevelofappreciationforIndianphilosophy.TherecoveryofthehistoryofIndianphilosophyisadifficultproject,giventhefew

chronologicalmarkersleftbyauthorswritinginSanskritandthedifficultyinsettlingoneventhemostminimalbiographicaldetailsaboutthesethinkers.Isitalsoamisguidedproject,aphilologicalflightfromrealhumanconcernsinthepostcolonialera?Thisisa logical conclusion that might be drawn from the “modern invention of tradition”hypothesiswith regard toHinduphilosophyand religion. If the IndianencounterwithEuropean colonialism was truly a rupture in which all traditional institutions for thetransmissionofknowledgewereuprooted,replacedwithnewregimesofknowledgeand power by the British, then the study of precolonial India has little or nosignificance for understanding the current postcolonial situation.Whether or not thisattitudetowardpremodernIndianintellectuallifehasbeenfullyarticulatedbyscholarsofmodern India, it is impossible todeny thedisciplinarychasmbetweenscholarsofpremodernandmodernIndia.Perhaps it issurprising that theuselessnessof theattempt to recoverpremodern

Indian intellectual history is the one area where more extreme advocates of the“inventionofHinduism”hypothesistendtoagreewiththosewhounderstandHinduismas eternal and essentially unchanging. For the first group, premodern history hasnothing to tell us about the present,making it the sole province of thosewho seekimaginative escape from their current situations and from human life, the class ofphilological footnote-scribblers.For thesecondgroup,premodern intellectualhistoryisawastebecauseithasnoabilitytoshedlightontheperennial,universalaspectsofIndian philosophical traditions. The truth of Hindu philosophy transcends space andtime,andthereforeanyattemptforahistoricallygroundedstudyofIndianphilosophyis doomed from the outset. Timewould be better spent studying the other thinkers

East andWest whose thought transcends history (e.g. Meister Eckhart, Plotinus),insteadof beingdistractedby theaccidental sociopolitical conditions inwhich thesethinkerslivedandworked.Suchportrayalsofatimeless,otherworldly,spiritualOrienthavebeenablycritiqued

by Edward Said and other critics of Orientalism, including many scholars of SouthAsia.However, Said’smodel of the relationship betweenOrientalist andOrient hasalsocontributedtotheneglectofthestudyofpremodernAsianintellectualtraditions.Said, a scholar of European literature by training, emphasizes the irrelevance ofknowledge of a “real” Orient when it comes to studying the phenomenon ofOrientalism.InthebookOrientalismheisambivalentaboutwhethersucharealplaceexists. Sometimes he seems to suggest that the Orient is nothing more than a“production”ofEuropeanculture.Atothertimesheshiesawayfromthisconstructivistlanguage and acknowledges that there is a real Orient.40 But Said is insistent thatknowledge of the real Orient, whatever its ontological status, is irrelevant to theunderstandingofthewhollyEuropeanphenomenonofOrientalism.41If Said is correct that the Orient is little more than a blank screen on which

Orientalists projected their fantasies of a spiritual, exotic, timelessOther, it followsthat knowledgeof the texts that theOrientalistswere readingand thenon-WesterninterlocutorswithwhomtheywerespeakingisoflittleusetothestudyofOrientalism.But, of course, to know whether Said’s model is correct requires us to knowsomethingabout these textsandpeoples, toascertainwhetherornot there issuchanabsolutedisconnectbetweenthediscoursesoftheOrientalistsandtheobjectsoftheir study. I believe that this is not the case.We require analternativemodel thatsees Orientalists as engaged in a project of interpretation, albeit one whoseprejudicesoftendistortedtheobjectofstudycompletelybeyondrecognition.InsteadofunderstandingthephenomenonofOrientalismasaone-wayprojection,weshouldapproachitasatwo-wayrelationship.Thisrelationshipwasoneinwhichtherewasavast imbalance of power. Yet the “Oriental” objects of the Orientalists’ studies didhave a part in shaping the Orientalist stereotypes that became prevalent in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the words of Chinese historian Arif Dirlik,Orientalism is“theproductofanunfoldingrelationshipbetweenEuro-AmericansandAsians, that required thecomplicityof the latter inendowing itwithplausibility.”42 Inthe case of the history of Indian philosophy, the Orientalists’ primary livinginterlocutorswereBrahminpundits,whothemselveshadaparticularunderstandingoftheir own intellectual traditions and who did their best to portray themselves asessential toanyOrientalistproject togovernaccording tonativecustomsand laws.TheywerealsoeagertogivetheseWesternscholarsofIndianphilosophywhattheywanted, specifically to point them to the types of texts that would confirm theEuropean stereotype of Indians as quietistic, impractical idealists who doubted ordenied the very existence of the physical world. It is in this way that Vedānta,especiallythe“idealist”AdvaitaVedānta,gaineditsmodernreputationastheessenceoftheIndianmind.Thebacklashagainst traditionalOrientalismsincethe late1970shasalsohadthe

consequence of delaying further advances in the study of Vedānta, particularly inthosepartsoftheWesternworldthathavebeenmostinfluencedbypostcolonialandpost-Orientalist thought. Recent studies have made enormous advances in theunderstanding of realist intellectual traditions that had been largely neglected byOrientalisthistoriography,suchasMīmāṃsāandNyāya.Itisironic,however,thatourpictureofVedāntahasnotbeenupdatedtothesameextentandthatmanyoftheseOrientalistdiscourseshavecontinuedtohamperourabilitytoappreciatethediversityofVedāntaphilosophicalschools.Inthisbook,Ishowthatmostoftheseschoolsbearscantresemblanceto thestereotypeofVedāntaasan idealistmonismunconcernedwithethicalactionandbeingintheworld.Recent trends in academia havemoved away fromOrientalist biases,which is a

goodthing,butindoingsohavealsomovedawayfromthestudyofpremodernIndia,especially by marginalizing the study of the “elite” Sanskrit knowledge systems infavor of more practical orientations toward India as an emerging economic andpoliticalsuperpower.43 Indologists today tend toargueagainst this trendby invokingthe importanceof pure knowledgeandof studyof thepast as itself having intrinsicvalue.Butanotherargumentcanbemade,oncewebetterappreciatetheimportanceofSanskritknowledgesystemstowardthemakingofthemodernworld,throughtheirinfluence on both the European Orientalists and Indian intellectuals in the modernperiod.Noonecandenythe importanceof these intellectuals, includingRamMohanRoy, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, andMohandasGandhi,inshapingIndians’self-understandingandthepoliticalformationofIndiaasamodernnation-state.Once the theoryof theBritish inventionofalmosteverything inmodernIndiahasbeenproperlydebunked,wecanlookrealisticallyatthewaysthatsuchthinkerscreativelyappropriatedsomeIndiantraditionsandrejectedothers.Thisisnot theonlyreason tostudypremodern India,but it isoneof themost important.Sanskrit intellectual traditions should be approached not as a rarefied sphere ofdiscourse hovering above everyday life and historical time but, rather, as a humanpractice arising in the messy and contingent economic, social, and political worldsthattheseintellectualsoccupied.Althoughscholarsarenowadaysatgreatpains toavoidperpetuatingstereotypes

about the essential otherness of the consciousness of modern Indians, discoursesabout otherness persist when dealing with the mindset of the premodern Indian.Medieval historian JeffreyCohen has observed that “postcolonial theory in practicehas neglected the study of this ‘distant’ past, which tends to function as a field ofundifferentiatedalterityagainstwhichmodernregimesofpowerhavearisen.”44So itis,according to thehypothesisof themodern inventionofHinduism, that Indianself-consciousnessunderwentanabsolutetransformationatthebeginningoftheso-calledHindu renaissance. At the hands of theBritish, the Indians becamemodern for thefirst timeand in thisprocessbecamecompletelyalienated fromtheirowntraditions.Recapitulating the rupture that occurred with the renaissance in sixteenth-centuryEurope, the Indians received the gift and the burdenofmodernity from theirBritishcolonizers.

SinceEdwardSaid’s bookOrientalism, published in 1978, scholars of Asia havebentoverbackwardtoavoid“Orientalizing”thepeoplesandtextsoftheirstudies:thatis, positing Orientals as an ontological other wholly distinct from Europeans.According to the Orientalist discourses prevalent during the eighteenth, nineteenth,and most of the twentieth centuries, Oriental peoples are not like Europeans.Europeansarehistorical,whileOrientalshavenohistoricalconsciousness.Europeans(especially modern Europeans) are secular, while Orientals have a fundamentallyreligiousoutlookthatprovidesallthenormsbywhichtheylivetheirlives.45Europeansare rational,while the livesofOrientalsaresuperstitious.ContemporaryscholarsofAsian studies have rejected these pernicious stereotypes, yet they live on in latentformsinavarietyofways.ForsomehistoriansofmodernAsia,thestereotypeshavejustbeenpushedbackseveralcenturies.ModernAsians,thisthinkinggoes,arequitea bit like us—how could they not be, since their entire conceptual universe wasdeterminedbythediscoursesoftheirEuropeancolonialoppressors?Forthisreason,Asianshavenorealunderstandingoftheirownhistories,justavagueideaofculturalsuperiority employed to the ends of identity politics and nationalist ideologies. Thelivesandthethought-worldsoftheirancestorsfourhundredyearsearlierarejustasforeigntothemastheyaretotheEuropeanscholarswhostudythem.Wesometimesforgetthat thestereotypesearliergenerationsofOrientalistsused

to “Orientalize” the peoples of Asia were not invented by them. In fact, they werelargely recycled from the discourses about premodern Europe propagated byhistorians in the nineteenth century. For instance, one influential historian of therenaissance,JacobBurckhardt,wrotein1860:

IntheMiddleAges,bothsidesofhumanconsciousness—thatwhichwasturnedwithinaswellasthatwhichwasturnedwithout—laydreamingandhalfawarebeneathacommonveil.Theveilwaswovenoffaith,illusion,andchildishprepossession, throughwhich theworldandhistorywereseenclad instrangehues.Manwasconsciousof himself only asamemberof a race, people, party, family, or corporation—only through somegeneralcategory.46

With a few alterations (replacing “Middle Ages” with “Asia” and changing verbsfrompast to present tense), this confident statement by a romantic historian aboutthe European past would be quite at home in the description of the Hindus fromJames Mill’s History of British India. Present here are statements about thedreamlike, passive state of themedievalEuropean consciousness.Also here is theideathatmedievalshadnoindividualconsciousnessbut,instead,wereonlyawareofthemselvesas“dividuals,”merepartsinthelargerwholeofsociety.47Contemporarymedievalstudieshasrejectedthis“medievalism,”thetreatingofthe

European middle ages as the ontological other of the modern era, lacking allconstitutive features of modernity.48 So, too, have scholars of Asia rejectedOrientalismin itsmostblatantforms.ButtheOrientalmedieval isstilloftendepictedby default using these familiar ideas from European scholars centuries ago. So itbecomes possible to oppose “traditional Hinduism” with “Neo-Hinduism”—the firstbeing the authentic mindset of premodern Hindus, the second the Westernized

consciousnessofmodernersatzHindus.49Bothoftheassumptionsatworkhereareproblematic:thefirstthattherewasasingletraditionalwayofbeingIndianorHindu,andthesecondthat,duetotheshockofcolonialism,thetraditionalwayofbeingisnolonger available toWesternized Indians. Instead of taking our cue from Orientalistperiodizations that posit three eras in Indian history—Hindu, Muslim, and British(whichwerethemselvesinspiredbytheperiodizationofEuropeanhistoryintoancient,medieval, and modern periods)—we must instead recognize the ruptures anddiscontinuities within each of these supposed epochs, along with the ideologies ofthosehistorianswhocreatedtheseperiodizations.50Evenfurther,wemustrecognizethat human subjectivities in the contemporaryworld are complex and contradictory,bearing the contemporaneous imprint of the “premodern,” “modern,” and“postmodern.” This is not only the case in India,where the cliché of “ancient faithsmeet modern democracy” is invoked by the Western media every time an Indianelection occurs, but also in the west and particularly in North America, where theonce-seemingly inevitable triumph of secularism and thewithering away of atavisticbeliefsystemshasshownitselftobeanillusion.Wepostmodernsaremoremedievalthanwecaretoadmit.SomeavenuesopenedbythepostcolonialcritiqueofEuropeanculturalhegemony

have yet to be fully explored. One of these is what DipeshChakrabarty terms the“provincializing” of Europe. Virtually all of the work done in contemporary literarytheoryandcontinental philosophy isoverwhelminglyEurocentric.51Even theworkofpostcolonial and post-Orientalist thinkers remains almost exclusively devoted to aEuropeancanonofFrenchandGermanintellectuals.AsChakrabartyputsit:

Facedwith the task of analyzingdevelopments or social practices inmodern India, few if any Indian socialscientistsorsocialscientistsofIndiawouldargueseriouslywith,say,thethirteenth-centurylogicianGaṅgeśaorwiththegrammarianandlinguisticphilosopherBhartṛhari(fifthtosixthcenturies),orwiththetenth-oreleventh-centuryaestheticianAbhinavagupta.Sadthoughitis,oneresultofEuropeancolonialruleinSouthAsiaisthatthe intellectual traditions once unbroken and alive in Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic are now onlymatters ofhistoricalresearchformost—perhapsall—modernsocialscientistsintheregion.Theytreatthesetraditionsastrulydead,ashistory.52

TheEurocentrismoftheinstitutionalstructuresthathaveexcludedthinkersfromthecurriculaofgraduateprograms inphilosophy, literary theoryand thesocialscienceshasnotyetgivenwaytothepressureofpost-Orientalistcritique.Studentsofliterarytheorytoday,whether inCalcuttaorCambridge, takemore inspirationfromAristotlethan from Abhinavagupta. If they are acquainted with Indian philosophy at all, it isregarded only as a historical curiosity, not as a vital philosophical tradition. Thisentrenchedhistoricistattitude, inwhichtheworksofpremodernthinkerscanonlybeapproachedassymptomsofa certainhistoricalepoch,has longsince fallenby thewayside in works on the history of philosophy in European antiquity. Yet when weapproachthehistoryofIndianphilosophy,thereisanunspokentabooagainstraisingquestionsoftruthandfalsity.Contemporaryhistoriansofphilosophyarewillingtofullyengage with and criticize European philosophers: perhaps to say that Plato wasmistakeninhispositingonarealmofpureforms,thatDescartes’mind-bodydualism

is untenable, or that Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic propositionscannotpassmuster.OutofalingeringsensethatpremodernIndianphilosophersaresomehowfundamentally“other” inawaythat thephilosophersofEuropeanantiquityarenot,historiansof Indianphilosophy inEuropeandNorthAmericahave refrainedfromapproachingthesethinkerswithaproperlycritical—that is tosay,philosophical—attitude.Yetwhetherornotweacknowledgeit,historiansofphilosophyarenotjustwritinghistory.Wearealsodoingphilosophy.Evenwhenthisisnotexplicit,therearealways implicit philosophical commitments that the historian of philosophy brings tobearonhersubjects,includingphilosophicalcommitmentsaboutthenatureofhistoryitself. The very act of choosingwhich philosophers’works are of sufficient value toinclude inaphilosophicalcanonandwhichareonlyofmarginal importance isbothahistoricalandaphilosophicaljudgment.Although at times in this book I do critique premodern Indian philosophers, I am

generallymoreconcernedwithcritiquingtheclaimsofthoseWesternIndologistswhosought, for instance, tomarginalize theworks of realist Vedāntins in arguing for anauthentic,originallymonistVedāntaorthodoxy. Iemploy to thisenda “hermeneuticsofcharity.”AsIunderstandit,thismeansgivingthebenefitofthedoubttopremodernthinkerssuchasBhāskaraandVijñānabhikṣuwhoseworkshavebeendismissedasphilosophicallyincoherent.Whenconfrontedwithanidea,anargument,orablockoftext that appears problematic, instead of assuming that the premodern thinker ischildish,guiltyofaphilosophicalsolecism,oravictimoffalseconsciousness,IbeginwiththeassumptionthatIastheinterpreteramtheonewiththeproblem.Thisdoesnotmean that thepremodernauthor isalways right. Instead, it isanassumptionofinnocence until proven guilty. This principle of charity is not the same as thatexpounded by Donald Davidson, in which any apparent philosophical mistake anearlier philosophermakes is tobe read in suchaway to impute tohim the correctanswer established by later generations. It is, rather, an attempt to identify andpreserveideasthatseemsodifferent,wrongheaded,orstrangethattheyappeartorequire immediatecorrection.53Once thisproject of hermeneutic recoveryhasbeenprovisionallyaccomplished,thesethinkers’workscanbecomepotentialparticipantsintwenty-first-centuryphilosophicalconversations.Instead of approaching these premodern Indian philosophers in terms of an

ontologicalother,asearlierOrientalistsandsomecurrentscholarsarewonttodo,Ibelieve that the language of “difference” ismuchmore productive.54 This approachavoids the falsedilemmaof (1) if thepremodernphilosopher is trulyother, thenwehave no real access to his ideas since they arise in such a different conceptualuniverse that theywill have nomeaning to us in our current situation and (2) if thepremodern philosopher is the sameasweare, thenwehavenothing to learn fromhim since the things he says we have already heard.55 Using the language of“difference,” however, we can recognize both that a philosopher might havesomething relevant to say to us that has not yet been said in our Europeanphilosophical tradition and that, with some effort, these different ideas arerecoverable in spite of obvious historical and linguistic obstacles. Philosophers in

medievalIndiadohavesomethingtoteachthoseofuslivinginthetwenty-firstcenturytohelpusoutoftheapparentphilosophicalimpassebetweenthesovereign,universalsubjectoftheEuropeanEnlightenmentandthefragmented,localizedsubjectivitiesofpost-Enlightenmentcritique.56Tothatend, inthisbookIattempttocreateaclearingfor futureattemptsat constructiveengagementwithmedieval Indianphilosophy.Myhope here is that I can point to possible modes of self-understanding and self-transformation that fall between such binaries as religious/secular, rational/mystical,and Hindu/non-Hindu—alternative possibilities that have been overlooked by mostphilosophersinthemodernWest.Thisbook isstructured togiveanoverviewofcertainphilosophicalcurrents in the

Wirkungsgeschichte of premodern India. I also feel it necessary to go into somedepth presenting specific arguments in theworks of Indian philosophers, especiallythosewhosecorephilosophieshavebeenwidelymisinterpretedormisrepresentedinthemodernperiod.Althoughreaderslookingforageneralhistorymaybesomewhatless interested in these close readings of Vijñānabhikṣu and other medievalphilosophers, theyarenecessary to fullyunderstand the interpretive tendenciesandphilosophical rigor of those thinkers who attempted to establish unity of Indiandarśanas. In chapters2 and 3, I present BhedābhedaVedānta, first by uncoveringthehistoryofBhedābhedaVedāntaand itsrelation tootherschools(chapter2)andthenbypresentingthreeofVijñānabhikṣu’scharacteristicallyBhedābhedaargumentsin some detail (chapter 3). In chapters 4 through 6, I take a similar approach toSāṃkhyaandYogaphilosophy.Chapter4isahistoricalexplorationofSāṃkhyaandYoga,withparticularreferencetotherelationbetweenthesetwoschools(if,indeed,they are two separate schools) and to the question ofGod’s existence in each. Inchapter 5, I analyze Vijñānabhikṣu’s reading of the Sāṃkhyasūtras, especially hisattempt to find a place for God in Sāṃkhya in the context of theistic Sāṃkhyatraditions. In chapter 6, I focus on Vijñānabhikṣu’s works on Yoga, showing hisunderstandingofYogaasbothaspecificphilosophicalsystemandapracticeofself-transformationopentovaryingphilosophicalinterpretations.In chapters 7 through 10, I look at questions surrounding the classification of

philosophical schools, expanding the focus of this study to understand the earlyhistory of the formation of these boundaries and the influence of medieval Indianclassificationsonmodernscholars. Idothis inchapter7by taking thecontroversiessurrounding Vijñānabhikṣu’s concordance of schools in his reception by eighteenth-andnineteenth-centuryOrientalistsasanopportunity to reflecton thehistoriographyof Indian philosophy. In chapter 8, I analyze tendencies in the forms of Indiandoxography, from their earliest examples through to the late medieval period. Inchapter9, I deal extensivelywith the distinction ofāstika and nāstika throughout avariety of texts, aswell as lookingmore generally atmodes of “othering” in Indianphilosophicaldiscourse.Iconcludeinchapter10byarguingthatVijñānabhikṣuandhiscontemporaries formulatedaproto-Hindu identity. This identitywas later elaboratedbyHindureformersinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesandtransformedintothebasisoftheworldreligionknowntodayasHinduism.

[2]ANALTERNATIVEHISTORYOFVEDĀNTA

VEDĀNTAANDORIENTALISTHISTORIOGRAPHY

One reason to focus on the latemedieval period in general, and on the sixteenth-century philosopher Vijñānabhikṣu specifically, is in order to reframe commonassumptionsabout thehistoryof IndianphilosophyAccording tostandardOrientalistaccounts, thehistoryof India canbedivided into threeperiods:Hindu,Muslim, andBritish.1DuringtheMuslimperiod,fromtheeleventhtotheeighteenthcentury,Indianculturewent intoadecline, only to be revived in theBritishperiodby theefforts ofWesternIndologiststorediscoverandhelpIndiansrecoverthegenuineachievementsof Indian civilization and to filter out the lesser cultural accretions of the medievalperiod in India.Historiansof Indianphilosophyhave taken this tomean that all thatwas greatest in Indian philosophy was already present in the Upaniṣads. TheachievementofclassicalIndianphilosopherssuchasŚaṅkarawastosystematizethemystical insightsof theUpaniṣadicseers,andby the fourteenthcentury, theancientinsightsof theVedicseershadbeenalmost irrecoverably lost, coveredoverby thepedantryofmedievalscholasticismandtheeffusivesuperstitionsofdevotionalHindusects.Powerfully influential narratives such as this one do not die without a struggle.

Thanks to the influence of postcolonial studies and the critique of Orientalism, themotives of Indologists and the British colonialists have been put under a criticalmicroscope. However, in some corners of the academy, the Orientalists’understanding of premodern Indian history has so far escaped thoroughreexamination.InthebackwaterthatisthehistoryofIndianphilosophy,thisnarrativeof cultural degeneration is still often accompanied by the idea that the authenticphilosophy of the Upaniṣads was Advaita Vedānta and the unfortunate movementawayfromtheUpaniṣads’puremonismtowarddualismandtheismwastheresultofthe cultural degenerationof themedieval period.2 Until quite recently this led to thescholarlyneglectof realist schoolsofVedānta,not tomentionphilosophical schools

like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, whose commonsense realism did not jibe with theOrientalistdepictionsof Indiaas the landofmysticalother-worldliness.3 The riseofBhedābhedaVedāntaisunderstoodinthishegemonicnarrativeasasymptomofthedeclineof thetruemonisticVedāntaof theUpaniṣads,alongwith itsreplacementbytheistic forms based on non-Vedic texts such as the Purāṇas. Such an OrientalistreadingofthehistoryofIndianphilosophyhasalsobeenco-optedbyHindureformerssuchasDayanandaSaraswati,whoargued thatwhatwasneededwasa return tothetruebeliefsoftheVedasandaturningawayfrommedievalsuperstitionssuchasbhaktiandanimalsacrifice.In this chapter, I present a counternarrative to the Advaita-centric histories of

Vedānta that have been so influential. Rather than seeingAdvaita as the authentic,timelessphilosophyof theHindus, textualevidencesuggests that itwasa relativelyrecent development in the long-term intellectual history of India. The teachings ofŚaṅkara, the most well-known thinker in Advaita Vedānta, were in part a reactionagainstearlierBhedābhedainterpretationsoftheBrahmasūtrasandtheUpaniṣads.Itisalsonot fair tosaythat theearlyUpaniṣadswerethemselvespropoundingapuremonisticor idealisticphilosophy.As recent scholarshiphasshown, thephilosophicalthemespresentedbytheBṛhadāraṇyakaand theChāndogyaUpaniṣadswerequitevaried, and by no means uniformly monistic, as Paul Deussen and other Advaitaapologistsmaintained.4In this chapter, I have chosen to foreground Bhedābheda and push to the

backgroundotherformsofVedānta,includingtheViśiṣṭādvaita(QualifiedNon-Dualist)and Dvaita (Dualist) schools. There are doubtlessmany other histories of VedāntaandhistoriesofIndianphilosophywaitingtobewrittenfromthedifferingstandpointsof other neglected philosophical traditions. While this brief history of BhedābhedaVedānticrealismisonlyoneofthesemanypossiblealternativehistories,itcanserveasatleastapartialcounterbalance.Theotherfunctionofthischapteristoserveasanecessary historical introduction to the philosophy of Vijñānabhikṣu, the sixteenth-centuryphilosophicalpolymathwhoseinnovationsinBhedābhedaVedānta,Sāṃkhya,and Yoga I investigate in subsequent chapters. His works on Sāṃkhya werediscovered by Indologists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and growinginterestinyogaandallthingsassociatedwithitinthelatetwentiethcenturyhasledtonew interest in Vijñānabhikṣu’sYogavārttika andYogasārasaṃgraha. But still todayhis earliest works, on Bhedābheda Vedānta, are widely ignored, despite theirenormous influence on his laterworks inSāṃkhya andYoga. In this brief historicaloverview, I locate Vijñānabhikṣu’s early works in their proper context and clear upsomepersistentmisconceptionsaboutthehistoryofVedāntaphilosophyinIndia.

EARLYBHEDĀBHEDAVEDĀNTA

Numerous Indologists, including Surendranath Dasgupta, Paul Hacker, HajimeNakamura,andMysoreHiriyanna,havedescribedBhedābhedaasthemostinfluential

school ofVedānta beforeŚaṅkara (eighth century).5 Nakamura andDasgupta evenclaim that the author of the Brahmasūtras was himself a Bhedābhedavādin.6 TheBrahmasūtras are a collection of terse aphorisms (sūtras, or literally “threads”).Bādarāyaṇa is traditionally regardedas theirauthor,a figurewhowas in later timesconflated with the sage Vyāsa, legendary author of the Mahābhārata. From ahistorical perspective, theBrahmasūtras are best understood as a group of sūtrascomposed by multiple authors over the course of hundreds of years, most likelycompiledinitscurrentformbetween400and450BCE.7TheearlieststratumofsūtrasintheBrahmasūtrasisconcernedwiththeinterpretationoftheUpaniṣads,especiallythe attempt to harmonize the apparent differences between the teachings of theChāndogya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and Taittirīya Upaniṣads. In later periods, theBrahmasūtraswererevisedandexpanded,andnewsūtraswereaddedtorefutethedoctrinesof rivalphilosophical schools.Themajorityof theseattacksweredirectedagainst the Sāṃkhya school, although Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist, Jaina, Pāśupata, andBhāgavatateachingswerealsosubjecttocritique.Even in comparison with other sūtra compilations such as the Yogasūtras of

Patañjaliand theNyāyasūtrasofGautama, theaphorismsof theBrahmasūtras areunusually laconic. For that reason, the Brahmasūtras are unintelligible withoutreferencetoacommentary(bhāṣya).Thecrypticqualityoftheaphorismswouldhaveassured that those without the proper qualifications, śūdras and outcastes inparticular,hadlittleaccesstothephilosophicalcontentoftheBrahmasūtras.8Itisthissame quality that eventually led to the proliferation of competing schools in laterVedānta, as therewere few textual restraints on later commentators to keep themfrom reading into theBrahmasūtras later ideas,suchas theconceptofbhakti, thatwere beyond the purview of the Brahmasūtras’ fifth-century compiler. From theperspectiveofthehistoryofideas,itispossibletoreconstructprobablemeaningsoftheoriginalsūtrasbycarefulcomparisonofthedifferentextantcommentariesandbypayingcloseattentiontotheterminologyofthesūtrasthemselves.Thisprojectshouldinnowaybeseenasadisproofof laterdevelopments inVedānta.Rather, itshouldlead us to a new appreciation of the ingenuity of later Vedāntins, who often showevenmorecreativityandphilosophicalsophistication than theBrahmasūtras’originalauthors.All commentators, followingBrahmasūtra 1.1.2, agree thatBrahman is the cause

oftheworld.ButtheprecisenatureofthiscausalityhasbeenasourceofcontentionamongVedāntins.MedievalVedāntinsdistinguishedtwobasicpositions.Onetheory,Pariṇāmavāda,statesthattheworldisarealtransformation(pariṇāma)ofBrahman.Just as clay is transformed into themultiple forms of pots, saucers, cups, and soforth, Brahman is thematerial cause, transforming itself into themany real entitiesvisible in theworld.Thealternative to thismodel isVivartavāda, the theory that theworldismerelyanunrealmanifestation(vivarta)ofBrahman.VivartavādastatesthatalthoughBrahmanappearstoundergoatransformation,infactnorealchangetakesplace.Themyriadofbeingsareessentiallyunreal,astheonlyrealbeingisBrahman,thatultimaterealitywhichisunborn,unchanging,andentirelywithoutparts.Themost

visibleadvocatesofVivartavādaaretheAdvaitins,thefollowersofŚaṅkarawhowenton to establish a powerful network of monastic schools across India. In thePariṇāmavādacampwe find themajorityofother schoolsofVedānta,whosee thephenomenalworldasreal.TheBrahmasūtras themselves espouse the realist Pariṇāmavāda position, which

appears to have been the view most common among early Vedāntins.9 For theBrahmasūtras, the world is a real transformation of Brahman from one form toanother. Brahman is the material cause of the world (BS 1.4.23, 2.1.18-20). Thiscausalprocessshouldbeseenasanalogoustotheprocessbywhichmilkturnsintocurds (BS 2.1.24), transforming itselfwithout any outside agent or the existence ofsome type of lower Brahman that engages in creative activity while the higherBrahman remains unchanged. BS 2.3.43 defines the individual self as being bothdifferent and non-different from Brahman. This is because it is a part (aṃśa) ofBrahman:“[theindividualselfis]apart[ofBrahman],onaccountofthedeclarationofdifference [between the two]andalso theopposite.”10Thispassagehasbeenseenas problematic since elsewhere, inBS 2.1.26, Brahman is described as “partless”(niravayava). The latter supports the monistic position of Śaṅkara and otherAdvaitins, who mention that Brahman is absolutely without parts and that eachindividualselfexists ina relationof identitywithBrahman.So,whenconfrontedwiththedefinitionoftheindividualselfasbeingapartatBS2.3.43,Śaṅkarachooses toexplain thispassageawayusingafigurative interpretation:“‘Part’means ‘likeapart’(aṃśa iva), since a thing that is free from parts (niravayava) cannot literally haveparts (aṃśa).”11 By contrast, the commentators Bhāskara and Rāmānuja read thissūtra literally. Although apparently contradictory, the terminological difference in thetwopassagesallowssomeinterpretiveleewayforcommentatorswhowishtoupholdtherelationpartandwholebetweenindividualselfandBrahman.AlthoughBrahmanisfree from one type of part (avayava), it is nonetheless correct to say that itpossessesanother kindof part (aṃśa).Nor, according to theBrahmasūtras, is theindividualselfcompletelydissolvedintoBrahmanatthetimeofitsliberation.AlthoughBS 4.2.16 describes the liberated self as “non-separate” (avibhāga) andindistinguishable from Brahman, there nonetheless remains a trace of individuality.Unlikeapersoninastateofdeepsleeporunconsciousness,theliberatedselfretainsvolition and discriminative awareness (BS 4.4.8, 4.4.16). TheBrahmasūtras’ basicunderstandingofindividualselfandBrahmanaspartandwholeinfluencedmanyearlyVedāntins,includingtheBhedābhedaVedāntinBhartṛprapañca.One of the challenges of reconstructing the intellectual world of the early

Bhedābheda Vedāntins is that the works of many important figures such asBhartṛprapañca(sixthcentury)areonlyavailablesecondhand.Bhartṛprapañcafollowsthe general outlook of the Brahmasūtras, upholding Pariṇāmavāda and his owndistinctiveversionofBhedābhedaVedānta.Buthisextantworksillustratehowevenatthis early stage,Vedānta commentatorselaboratedonandexpanded themeaningsthey found in the Brahmasūtras and Upaniṣads, claiming the authority of traditionwhiletransformingitthroughstrongmisreadingofauthoritativetexts.Itisonlythanks

toBhartṛprapañca’slaterenemies,theAdvaitinsŚaṅkara,Sureśvara,andĀnandagiri,thathisviewsareavailabletousatall.Śaṅkara’scommentaryontheBṛhadāraṇyakaUpaniṣad repeatedly attacks Bhartṛprapañca’s interpretations, and Śaṅkara’sfollowers Sureśvara and Ānandagiri flesh out these disagreements, sometimesrepeating direct quotations from Bhartṛprapañca’s commentary on the sameUpaniṣad. These attacks indicate the major split between the Advaitins and theBhedābhedainterpretersthatcamebeforethem.According to Bhartṛprapañca, Brahman is that “whose nature is dual and non-

dual.”12 He claims that both duality and non-duality are absolutely real and it is notappropriate to subordinate one to the other. He cites the example of a turbulentocean:boththewaterandthewavesarereal,andit isnotappropriatetoclaimthatwavesaresomehow less real thanwater.Bhartṛprapañcashares thisviewwith thelater Vedāntins Yādavaprakāśa (eleventh century) and Nimbārka (thirteenthcentury?).ButnotallBhedābhedaVedāntinsembracehispositionthatultimaterealityis in its nature both dual and non-dual (Svābhāvika Bhedābheda). The majorityposition in later times was the view of Bhāskara (ninth century), who held thatBrahmaninitself isnon-dualanddualityintheworldisonlyduetolimitingconditions(upādhis) that are extrinsic to Brahman’s absolute nature. While Bhāskara stillmaintainsthattheworldofdualityisreal,histheorysuggeststhattherearedifferentgrades of reality, proceeding from the ultimate reality of non-dual Brahman to themundane reality of the phenomenal world. Bhāskara’s philosophical position ofdifference and non-difference merely due to limiting conditions (AupādhikaBhedābheda) is much closer to Advaita than is Bhartṛprapañca’s uncompromisinginsistencethatdualityandnon-dualityareequallyreal.Bhartṛprapañca’sacceptanceoftheworld’sabsoluterealitycreatesanopportunity

for increased reliance on rational inference (anumāna) in understanding Brahman.TraditionalIndianlogicmaintainsthatanumānadependsonperception(pratyakṣa)forits data. The five-step logical syllogism developed by the Nyāya school requires areal-worldexample(udāharaṇa).So,inthecommonNaiyāyikaexample,afterseeingsmoke somewhere, we can only infer that there is fire if we have seen smokeaccompaniedby fire inotherplaces.Rational inference is thereforenot independentofworldlyexperiences,asitisintheformallogicofAristotle.Thislimitsthescopeofrational inferencefor thosephilosopherswhodenythateverydayobjectsarereal. IfBrahman is transcendent, completely other than the world of lived experience, itfollowsthat the typesof reasoninguseful inworldly interactionswillnotbehelpful inunderstanding Brahman. This explains the tendency among Advaita Vedāntins tocriticizeperception,whichprovidesuswithadualisticunderstandingoftheworld,andrationalinference,whichtakesthiserroneousdualismasitsbasis.Bhartṛprapañcateachesusthatoursensesdonotdeceive.Therereallyaremany

thingsintheworld,notjustinaconventionalsensebutinanultimatesense—thepots,towels,andcowsofoureverydayexperienceshave thesameontologicalstatusasBrahman.Accepting this, newpossibilitiesopenup in theapplicationofa posteriorireason.SinceweseeBrahman’seffects firsthand,wecan investigate thenatureof

these effects in order to understand the nature of their cause. No longer are wesolely dependent on Vedic authority for knowledge of Brahman. According toBhartṛprapañca, theuniversalpropositionweabstract fromallofourexperiences intheworldisthis:“Allthingsareintheirnaturebothdifferentandnon-different.”13ForBhartṛprapañca,therearefourcategoriesofdifferenceandnon-differencerelations:

1. Cause(kāraṇa)andeffect(kārya),suchasclayandpot.2. Whole(bhāgin)anditsparts(bhāga),suchasachariotanditshub.3. Thesubjectofastate(avasthāvat)andthestateitself(avasthā),suchasseawaterandfoam.4. Universal(sāmānya)andparticular(viśeṣa),suchasacowanditsdewlap.14

Bhartṛprapañca’s general interest in rational inference and his concern with therelationofuniversalandparticularshowsimilarconcernstotheNyāyaschooloflogic.The Naiyāyikas’ stock example of the universal-particular relation is the cow. OnBhartṛprapañca’sinterpretation,anindividualcowpossessestheuniversalpropertyof“cowness.” Without this property, we would not be able to understand her as amember of a species of animals. Yet she also possesses particular characteristicsthat belong to her alone—a certain pattern of markings, a slight tilt to one of herhorns,andso forth—thatallowus todistinguishher from theothermembersofherclass.Both aspects of the coware real andnecessary, andneither aspect can besubordinated to the other.We look around and find that everything possesses thisdual aspect, both different (as particular) and non-different (as universal). AndBhartṛprapañcamaintains that every entity, including Brahman, is in some sense a“thing.”ItthereforefollowsthatBrahman,likethecow,hasanaturethatisbothdual(dvaita) and non-dual (advaita). In this way, Bhartṛprapañca uses a posteriorireasoning,examiningthephenomenalworldtomakeconclusionsaboutBrahman,theultimatecause.

BHEDĀBHEDAVEDĀNTAAFTERŚAṄKARA

AlthoughtheAdvaitaschoolhasbeenwidelyunderstoodaspropoundingthetheoryofvivarta, or the world as an unreal manifestation of Brahman, there are somequestions regarding where Śaṅkara himself stood on this issue. Paul Hacker, forinstance, sees considerable ambiguity in Śaṅkara on this point. Hacker points inparticular to a metaphor from one passage of an early work of Śaṅkara, theUpadeśasāhasrī. There Śaṅkara likens the creation of unevolved name- and- formfrom Brahman to the creation of dirty foam from clear water. Śaṅkara’s ownexplanationofthismetaphorsuggeststhathehadinmindarelationofdifferenceandnon-differencebetweenthecauseanditseffect:

Originally unmanifest name and form, manifesting from this very self (ātman), took on the name “space”(ākāśa). Inthisway,theelementnamedspacewascreatedfromthehighestself inthesamewaythatdirtyfoam is created frompurewater. Foam is notwater, nor is it completely different (atyantaṃbhinnaṃ) fromwater,sinceit isneverseenintheabsenceofwater.Butwaterispureanddifferentfromfoam,whoseform

(rūpa)isdirt.15

Śaṅkarausesthelanguageofdifferenceandnon-differenceinhisdiscussionoftherelationbetweentheworldofnameandformandthehighestself.Furthermore,thereisnosuggestioninthispassagethattheworldhasanontologicalstatusanydifferentfrom thatof thehighest self.Themetaphorof “dirty foam”suggests impurity ratherthanunreality.Hacker therefore tookthispassageasevidencethatŚaṅkara’sviewsontherealityoftheworldandtheprecisecausalrelationshipbetweenBrahmanandworldwent througha“transitionalstage”before finallyreachingthefull-blowntheoryof unreal manifestation (vivarta) found in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras.16Hacker saw Śaṅkara as an innovator who took the earlier theory of the realtransformation(pariṇāma)ofBrahmanandeventuallydevelopeditintoatheoryofanillusoryphenomenalworld.Morerecently,SrinivasaRaohascontendedthatŚaṅkaranever argued for the unreality of the phenomenal world and that this view wasprojected onto him by his later followers.17 This would mean that Śaṅkara fullysupported the theory of pariṇāmavāda. Whether or not Rao’s interpretation iscorrect, such ambiguities in Śaṅkara’s works are further evidence of the deepinfluenceoftheearlytheoryoftherealtransformation(pariṇāma)ofBrahmanacrossa wide spectrum of schools and thinkers. Although there were also vivartavādinssuch as Gauḍapāda writing during the early Vedāntic period, the majority positionseemstohavebeensomevarietyofpariṇāmavāda.The first Bhedābhedavādin widely recognized as such by the later tradition is

Bhāskara(eighth/ninthcentury).18HewaseitherayoungercontemporaryofŚaṅkaraor perhaps lived slightly after Śaṅkara. Besides his commentary on theBrahmasūtras, he also commented on theBhagavadGītā. His commentary on theBrahmasūtras is expressly written in order to defend the earlier claims ofBhedābhedavādins against Śaṅkara’s interpretation. Although he never mentionsŚaṅkarabyname,hemakes it clear from thebeginning thathisprimary intention incommenting on theBrahmasūtras is to oppose some predecessor: “I amwriting acommentary on this sūtra in order to obstruct those commentators who haveconcealeditsideasandreplacedthemwiththeirown.”19Bhāskaraistheearliestinalong line of Vedāntic authors concerned to refute Advaita (including Rāmānuja andMadhva,nottomentionnumerousBhedābhedavādins).Manyofthestockargumentsusedagainst theAdvaitaoriginatedwithBhāskara, if indeedhedidnotborrowthemfromanevenearlier source.20 TheAdvaita tradition also seems to have collectivelyremembered him as a thorn in its side. So, for instance, in the fourteenth-centuryhagiographyofŚaṅkara,Śaṅkaradigvijaya,Mādhavadepictsone “BhaṭṭaBhāskara”as a haughty and famous Bhedābhedavādin whom Śaṅkara defeats in a lengthydebate.21BesidesinsistencethatthephenomenalworldisarealtransformationofBrahman,

another view shared by all Bhedābhedavādins is the need for ritual acts incombination with knowledge (jñānakarmasamuccayavāda) in order to obtainliberation. This seems to have been a particular concern of Bhāskara. He devotes

much of the beginning of his commentary on theBrahmasūtras to a critique of theviewthatknowledgealoneissufficientfortheattainmentofBrahman,aslongasonehasfulfilledone’sritualrequirementsatanearlierstage.AlthoughpolemicsbetweenVedāntins are usually depicted in solely philosophical or theological terms, thissuggests that perhaps above all, Śaṅkara’s new teachings were seen by otherVedāntins of the time as a serious threat to the ritual and social order. Śaṅkaraarguesthatknowledgealoneleadstoliberation.However,thatisnottosaythatritualactshavenoplaceinŚaṅkara’sthought.Śaṅkaraagreesthatordinarypeopleshouldperformritualactivitiesthroughouttheirentirelives.Vedicstudyandritualactivityareboth necessary before embarking on higher instruction in the meaning of theUpaniṣads.Performanceof obligatory (nitya) and contingent (naimittika) rites leadstothepurificationofthemind,andwithoutapuremindnounderstandingofthenatureofBrahmanispossible.However,optional(kāmya)rites,precededastheyarebythefulfillment of worldly desires, actually militate against purity of mind, and for thisreason they should be abandoned. Bhāskara and others who followjñānakarmasamuccayavādaalsoagreewithŚaṅkara thatsuchoptional ritesshouldnotbeperformed.ThecontroversyariseswiththeAdvaitins’argumentthatafterthemindiscleansed

bymeans of such activities, ritual can be completely abandoned. After themind ispurgedofdefilementsandthefourprerequisitevirtues(sādhanas)necessaryforthereceptionofVedāntic instructionarecultivated, thepractitionermovesontothenextstage of spiritual development. In this next stage, ritual activity is superfluous—orevenworse thansuperfluous,sinceAdvaitinspointout that it candistract theadeptfromhearing, reflection,andmeditationon theUpaniṣads.Bhāskaraand the restofthe Bhedābhedavādins take exception to this and cite BS 3.4.26, “And there isrequirement of all, according to the scripture beginning ‘sacrifice’” as evidence thatritual activity must be performed throughout one’s entire life.22 Non-activity, theyargue, always leads to the generation ofmental impurity, and therefore there is nostageatwhichthepractitionercancompletelyabandonritualactivity.Oneparticularlyhigh-profileforuminwhichtheseargumentsareplayedoutisincommentariesontheBhagavadGītā. The performance of action without concern for its results, and theunacceptability of non-action, is often depicted as the central teaching of theBhagavad Gītā.23 Because this message seems to be more in keeping withBhāskara’sandRāmānuja’sviews,thisworkisaparticularchallengeforŚaṅkaraandhisfollowers,ashiscommentaryontheBhagavadGītāfrequentlyreveals.24Śaṅkara’s position with regard to ritual is much more modest than sometimes

portrayed by his opponents. It is not a complete abandonment of ritual duties, butonly an abandonment of ritual duties for those rare few who have been able tobecomecompletelyfreeofimpuritythroughthepreviousperformanceofritualduties.Nonetheless, his view has the potential for an enormous destabilization of previoussocial norms, since it gives those who are lazy or subversive an easy excuse forabandonment of traditional ritual responsibilities. This practical argument as such isneverpresentedagainsttheAdvaitaposition,andinsteaditsopponents’critiquesare

arguments from scripture and inference. Nonetheless, I believe we should seeBhāskara’slengthyargumentationonthistopicasindicationofarealconcernforthesocialeffectsofapparentlyabstractcontroversiesinscripturalinterpretation.25Manymodern interpreters have tried to depict Advaitins and their opponents as purelyphilosophicalintheirfocus.Yetbytheamountofspacetheydevoteintheirwritings,itisclearthattheVedāntins,likethePūrvaMīmāṃsakas,wereacutelyconcernedwithissuesrevolvingaroundritualpracticeanditsimplications.Perhaps one of the reasons that Bhedābheda is not a widely known school of

Vedāntaisthatthetermbhedābhedaeventuallytookonanegativeconnotation,whileadvaita was a term that thinkers ofmany different typeswanted to associatewiththeirownthought.OnecaseinpointisRāmānuja’s(eleventh/twelfthcentury)systemof Viśiṣṭādvaita (QualifiedNon-Dualism), often depicted in textbooks as the secondmajorschoolofVedāntaafter theAdvaita.Rāmānuja’scomplicatedrelationshipwithBhedābhedavāda thinkers is rarely discussed. It is clear from Rāmānuja’s writingsthat he is widely conversant with Bhāskara’s works, and many of his attacks onAdvaita echo thewords ofBhāskara’sBrahmasūtrabhāṣya. Yamunācārya, perhapsRāmānuja’smain intellectual influence,mentionsBhartṛprapañcaandBhāskara inhiswritings.26 Furthermore, Rāmānuja’s own teacher Yādavaprakāśa was aBhedābhedavādin. Inspiteof (orperhapsbecauseof) this,Bhedābhedavāda isoneof thecentral targetsofopprobriumforRāmānujaandhis followers,suggestingthattheveryaffinityofmanyofhisideasledRāmānujatotrytodifferentiatehimselffromwhat was still clearly an influential Vedāntic tradition.27 The vilification ofYādavaprakāśabecomes complete in some later hagiographies ofRāmānuja. TheydepictYādavaprakāśaassoangeredbyRāmānuja’simpertinenceforchallenginghisinterpretationsof theUpaniṣads that hearrangesa plot to assassinate his pupil bydrowninghimintheGangesduringapilgrimagetoAllahabad.28Yādavaprakāśa’sworkshavebeenlost,andthereforealmostallofwhatweknow

of his ideas comes from Rāmānuja and one of Rāmānuja’s commentators,Sudarśanasūri.However,itispossiblefromthesenumeroushintstodrawasketchofYādavaprakāśa’sbasicviews.29RāmānujadepictsYādavaprakāśaasanexponentofSvābhāvika Bhedābhedavāda, the view that Brahman is both different and non-different than the world in its very nature, and that difference is not simply due todifference of artificial limiting conditions (upādhis).30 He shares this basic viewpointwith theBhartṛprapañcaandNimbārka (thirteenthcentury?),anddisagreeswith theAupādhika Bhedābhedavāda of Bhāskara, whomaintains that the difference of theworld and Brahman is due to limiting conditions. Although differing in this respect,Bhāskara,too,canmaintainthattheworldisreal,sinceforhimthelimitingconditionsare themselves real and not ultimately unreal as in the Advaita tradition. Anothercharacteristic of Yādavaprakāśa’s thought is his repeated insistence that Brahmanhas the substance of pure existence (sanmātradravya). The relationship betweenBrahmanandtheworldisnotmerelyoneofclass(jāti)andindividual(vyakti);rather,both are existent entities, standing in the relationship of cause (kāraṇa) and effect(kārya).31

In the late medieval period, the doctrine of Bhedābheda became increasinglyassociatedwithdevotional(bhakti)movementsinNorthIndia.Itislargelyonthebasisoftheirreputationsasthefoundersofreligioussects,andnotasphilosophersperse,thatthinkerssuchasVallabha(1479-1531)andCaitanya(1485-1533)becamewidelyknown. Among the former’s most influential works are a commentary on theBrahmasūtras entitled Anubhāṣya and his commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,entitledtheSubodhinī.Vallabha founded theVaiṣṇavasectof thepustimārga (“pathof grace”) popular with the Gujarati merchant caste, now based in Nathdwara,Rajasthan.Hisphilosophicalsystem,calledŚuddhādvaita (PureNon-Dualism), takesitsnamefromhisviewthatthereisnodualismwhatsoeverbetweenarealBrahmanandanunrealworld.Sincebotharecompletelyreal,hedeniesthattherecanbeanysort of ontological dualism of real and unreal between the two—therefore it is a“pure” non-dualism.32 Obviously, this refers to the Advaita school’s view that thephenomenalworldisnotrealinanultimatesense,andisacleverattemptatreappro-priating the valued label advaita for his own school. Yet in this regard, allBhedābhedavādinsequallydeserve thenameśuddhādvaita, sinceall schoolsassertthe reality of the phenomenal world. Vallabha is also notable for maintaining, likeBhāskara,thatthesoulisatomicinsizeandnotomnipresentasmaintainedbymostVedāntins.CaitanyawasalsoaVaiṣṇavatheologian,famousforaschoolofthoughtknownas

Acintyabhedābheda(InconceivableDifferenceandNon-difference).Noworks remainthatwerewrittenbyCaitanya.However,hehadnumerousfollowerswhowroteworksinspired by his teachings, such as Jīva Gosvāmin, author of a well-knowncommentary on the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.33 This system’s notion of “inconceivability”(acintyatva) is a central concept used to reconcile apparently contradictorynotions,suchasthesimultaneousonenessandmultiplicityofBrahmanandthedifferenceandnon-differenceofGodandhispowers.Thisnotionhasalsoledsomephilosopherstoaccuse all Bhedābhedavādins of being irrationalists. However, this notion ofacintyatvaappearsnowhereintheworksofBhāskara,Nimbarka,orVijñānabhikṣu.Infact, it is precisely the rational resolution of such apparent contradictions thatmotivatessomuchofthewritingsofVijñānabhikṣuandotherBhedābhedavādins.It isnotacoincidence thatBhedābhedavādahashistoricallybeenassociatedwith

theism. Like the schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva, Bhedābhedavāda is a realisttradition.WhereasintheAdvaitaschool,evenGod(īśvara)hastobeunderstoodasultimately unreal, since he, too, ismerely Brahman limited the artificial condition oflordliness (aiśvarya), certain types of Bhedābheda philosophy can accommodate aGodwhoisrealinhisqualified(saguṇa)form.Althoughonacertainlevel,anAdvaitincanprofessabeliefinGod,heorsheknowsthatultimatelyGodismerelyacrutch,aheuristic to enable human beings to go one step closer to that ultimate Brahmandevoid of qualities. Such a God is ultimately unsatisfying for those whose primaryinterestisdevotion—inanysystemofAdvaita,devotionmustoccupyalowerpositionthanpureknowledge.Still,manyworshipperswillalsobeunsatisfiedwiththeDvaitaschool’s uncompromising notion that they themselves are completely separate from

God and that ultimate unification with the Godhead is impossible. BothBhedābhedavāda and Viśiṣṭādvaita offer the possibility to bridge these twoalternatives, by offering the alternative of both a realGod possessing qualities andthe possibility of personal participation in that Godhead. However, this attempt tohave it both ways, to bridge apparently contradictory opposites, also presentsphilosophicalpuzzles.ScholarssometimesrefertoBhedābhedaasa“school”ofphilosophy,butthisterm

has to be defined and qualified in certain ways. Vijñānabhikṣu and his earlierpredecessors were clearly aware of and had read the works of earlierBhedābhedavādins,borrowingcertaincentralideasandmetaphors(theoceananditswaves, the sun and its rays) as part of their own philosophies. However, theBhedābhedatraditiondoesnot trace itselfback throughasingle lineageof teachersandpupilstoearlierfiguressuchasBhāskara.Althoughsuchlineageshavenodoubtexisted, they were regional and limited in scope. This contrasts markedly with theAdvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions, whose founders not only set down a certainphilosophical viewpoint but also established a set of institutions designed for thecontinuation and propagation of these philosophical ideas. The most clear andinfluential example of this type of institutionalization occurswith the Advaita school,and its establishment of fivemaṭhas (monasteries) at Sringeri, Dwaraka, Badrika,Puri,andKanchipuram.SomethingsimilaroccursamongtheViśistādvaitins,althoughtheir influence outside of their base in Tamil Nadu has not been as great as thewidespread, pan-Indian appeal of Advaita. The most similar example of suchinstitutions amongBhedābheda philosophers occurs in the case ofVallabha,whosesect in Rajasthan has a formalized institutional hierarchy with a single appointedleader similar to those of the Advaitins and Viśistādvaitins. Therefore, it might bebettertorefertoalooseBhedābheda“tradition”ofscholarswho,althoughseparatedbyspaceandtime,holdcertainessentialviewsincommonsuchastherealityoftheworld and the difference and non-difference of the soul and Brahman. Within thisoverarchingtraditiontherearealsomorelocalizedschools,suchasthoseofVallabhaandCaitanya.EvenVijñānabhikṣumightbesaidtohavefoundeda“school”inaverylimited sense, as his teachings are clearly reflected in the works of his disciplesBhāvāgaṇeśaandDivyasimhaMiśra.To be sure, philosophers outside the tradition of Bhedābheda Vedānta have also

characterized certain relations in terms of “difference and non-difference.” Forinstance, the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa characterizes the relation between theuniversal (sāmānya) and the particular (viśeṣa) as one of difference and non-difference.34ButthisaloneisnotenoughtoqualifyKumārilaasaBhedābhedavādin.35The defining characteristic of all Bhedābheda Vedāntins is the affirmation of abhedābhedarelationbetweenBrahmanandtheindividualself(jīvātman).Thisrelationis commonly portrayed as a relation of cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya), or arelationofpart(aṃśa)andwhole(aṃśin).ButeachBhedābhedavādinstakesouthisseparate view by his individual interpretation of the precise meaning of thesephilosophical terms.Bhāskara, for instance, takes the view thatwhen the individual

self(jīva) is termeda“part”(aṃśa) inphilosophyandscripture, it isnotapart in itsnormal sense but, rather, has a technical meaning: it is limited by the artificialconditionsofmind(antaḥkaraṇopādhyavacchinna).36Vijñānabhikṣualsounderstandsthe importantBhedābheda term “part” (aṃśa) in a specializedway.Becauseof theextraordinary flexibility of these philosophical concepts, there are often substantialdisagreementsamongBhedābhedaVedāntins.

THEFUTUREOFBHEDĀBHEDAVEDĀNTA

Although in themodernperiodBhedābhedaVedāntahasbeeneclipsed inpopularitybyneo-Vedantic interpretationsofAdvaitaVedāntaphilosophy, its lineage continuestoday among traditional scholars in Pustimārga and Gaudīya Vaiṣṇava religiouscommunities.And,forthefirsttimeinthelatetwentiethandearlytwenty-firstcentury,BhedābhedaisfinallybeginningtoreceivetheattentionitdeservesfromresearchersinEuropeandNorthAmerica.37Yetmuchmoreworkremainstobedone,particularlyonpivotalbutlittle-understoodfiguressuchasNimbārka,whosecenturyhasnotevenbeenagreedonbyhistorians.TheprecisenatureoftheBhedābhedarenaissanceofthe late medieval period is also unclear. Did Bhedābheda Vedānta go into declinebetweentheninthandthirteenthcenturies,orwerethereotherimportantfiguressuchasRāmānuja’s teacherYādavaprakāśa,whose influencehasbeenelideddueto thepredominance of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita during that period? What were theformative Bhedābheda philosophical influences on Vallabha and Caitanya? WhilethesequestionsarebeyondthescopeofthepresentstudytheyarejustafewoftheissuesthatfutureattemptstorecoverthehistoryofBhedābhedaVedāntawillhavetoaddress. Inchapter3, I turn toone latemedievalexampleofBhedābhedaVedānta,thephilosophyofVijñānabhikṣu.FullyawareoftheearlierchallengestoBhedābhedafromotherphilosophicalschools,VijñānabhikṣuoffersingenioussolutionstoanumberofphilosophicalpuzzlesthathadconcernedtheBhedābhedaVedāntinswhoprecededhim.

[3]VIJÑĀNABHIKSU’S“DIFFERENCEANDNON-DIFFERENCE”VEDĀNTA

THEMEANINGOF“BHEDĀBHEDA”

Does the term bhedābheda present a logical impossibility? It is a dvandvacompound,consistingofthewordsbheda(difference)andabheda (non-difference).1Therefore,Bhedābhedaphilosophywouldbe thephilosophyof “differenceandnon-difference,” holding out the promise of bridging the apparently unbridgeabledisagreements between philosopherswho subscribe to the theory of difference (ordualism, dvaita) and complete, unqualified non-difference (non-dualism, advaita). Inthe few places in Western secondary literature on Indian philosophy whereBhedābhedavāda is mentioned, it is typically translated as “Difference-in-Identity”philosophy,presumablyinanattempttomakeitseemmorefamiliarbylinkingitwiththeWestern traditionof “Difference-in-Identity” typifiedby thinkers likeBonaventure,Spinoza,andHegelAlthoughtherearemeaningfulsimilaritiesbetweentheseWesternthinkers and Indian Bhedābhedavādins, purely on the basis of Sanskrit grammar,“difference-in-identity” cannot be the translation of bhedābheda2 A preferabletranslation is the more literal “difference and non-difference,” since linguistically itleaves open the question of whether difference is ultimately subsumed under non-difference,orviceversa.Sincebasingaphilosophicalsystemonbothdifferenceandnon-differenceappears

to be the equivalent of arguing both “p and not-p” one possible explanation of thedoctrineofbhedābhedavādamight involveadenialorsuspensionof theprincipleofcontradiction, “p and not-p cannot both be true.” Some critics have understood themeaningofbhedābhedavādainjustthiswayandforthisreasonhaveidentifieditwiththeJainatheoryofperspectivism(anekāntavāda).TheViśiṣṭādvaitinVedāntaDeśika,for instance, labels Bhāskara a “Vedantin who smells like a Jaina”(jainagandhivedāntin).3ButjustasitisamistaketoportraytheJainasasdenyingthelaw of contradiction, so, too, it is clearly a misunderstanding to accuse

Bhedābhedavādaofholdingthatpandnot-pcansimultaneouslybetrue.4 In the latemedieval period, it was the Navya-Nyāya school thatmost emphatically upheld thevalidityof logicalprinciplessuchas the lawofcontradictionand for this reasonwasoneofthemostemphaticincondemningtheapparentparadoxofsimultaneousbhedaand abheda. Throughout his works, Vijñānabhikṣu takes pains to illustrate hisunderstandingoftheNavya-Nyāyatechnicalterminology.NotonlydoesVijñānabhikṣutry to show his anticipated Naiyāyika critics that bhedābheda does not involve anylogical contradiction, he also employsNavya-Nyāya termswhile explicating his ownphilosophical ideas. This tendency is even more marked in the writings ofVijñānabhikṣu’sdiscipleBhāvāgaṇeśa,authorof theSāṃkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana,suggestingthatVijñānabhikṣu’sstudentsunderstoodthedefenseofBhedābhedaandSāṃkhya concepts using the language of Navya-Nyāya as an essential part ofVijñānabhikṣu’s project.5 To illustrate the rigor of his own ideas, Vijñānabhikṣu iscarefultonotepreciselytheplaceswhereheseeshisdifferencefromtheNaiyāyikasas merely resulting from arbitrary differences in terminology. One paradigmaticexampleishisexplanationofthemultiplemeaningsofthetermsbhedaandabheda.TobegintounderstandtheadvantagestheBhedābhedaVedāntatraditionhasover

itscompetitors,theDvaitaandAdvaitaschools,onemustkeepinmindthatVedāntaitselfisasmuchaschoolofscripturalinterpretationasitisaschoolofphilosophyperse. Vedāntins of almost all affiliations see scripture (śabdapramāna) as a moreimportantsourceofknowledgethaninference(anumāna).6Althoughbothargumentsfrom scripture and arguments on the basis of inference are frequently cited, theformerisprimary.Thename“Vedānta”asreferringtooneparticularschoolisitselfarelatively uncommon usage in Sanskrit texts.More typically, vedānta simplymeansthe “end of the Vedas,” referring to the Upaniṣads themselves. Often the VedāntaschooliscalledBrahmaMīmāmsā(ExegesisofBrahman)orUttaraMīmāṃsā(LaterExegesis), these epithets obviously alluding to the school of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā(Prior Exegesis). Both schools’ primary concern is the interpretation of the Veda.Whatdistinguishesthetwois that the laterschool isconcernedwiththeexegesisofthe Upaniṣads, those portions of the Veda that describe the nature of Brahman(brahmakānda), while the prior school concentrates on the parts of the Veda thatdescribetheperformanceofrituals(karmakāṇḍa).7Although the two schools do have significant differences in the content of their

interpretations, the UttaraMīmāṃsā, or Vedānta, nonetheless acceptsmost of theinterpretive principles developed by the earlier school for the interpretation of theVeda.One of these is the principle that the entire Veda itself is a single extendedsentence(ekavākyatā)andhencecanneverbeself-contradictory.Thisprinciplehasmany significant consequences, but perhaps the most important is that it forcedschoolsofVedicinterpretationtointerprettheentireVedaasbeingaunitarytextwithasinglemessage.Discardingpartsofthetextbecauseoftheirapparentcontradictionwith other, more celebrated passages was not an acceptable option. Instead, thisprinciple encouraged creativity on the part of interpreters, to use whatever meansthey had at their disposal to show that anomalous passages did not disagreewith

whattheytooktobethemainmessageoftheVedas.VijñānabhikṣubelievesthatBhedābhedaVedāntaissuperiorbecauseit istheonly

Vedāntic school capable of making sense of all of the statements found in theUpaniṣads. Two types of passages are most significant for him: statements ofdifference (bhedavākyas) and statements of non-difference (abhedavākyas). ForVijñānabhikṣu, the primary flaw of Advaitic interpretive strategies is that theysubordinate statements of difference to statements of non-difference. For instance,the eighth-century Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara dubbed four Upaniṣadic sentences as“great statements” (mahāvākyas): “You are that” (tat tvam asi), “I am Brahman”(ahambrahmāsmi), “This self is Brahman” (ayamātmābrahma), and “Brahman isconsciousness” (prajñānaṃbrahma). Each of these statements seems to suggeststrongly that the individual self (jīvātman) is identical to Brahman. Yet there arestatementselsewhere in theVedas that state thedifferencebetweenBrahmanandthe individual self. Because of the principle that the Vedas are a single complexsentence,thesestatementscannotsimplybeignoredorrejectedasfallacious.Thereare a number of strategies for making sense of these statements of differencewithout acknowledging that they have the same weight as statements of non-difference. Often these involve resorting to secondary, or figurative, interpretation(laksanā). Vijñānabhikṣu summarizes one of these interpretive strategies of theAdvaitins,whomhedismissivelylabelsas“modernthinkers”:

However,modernthinkersclaimthatduetothecompleteundividednessoftheselfandBrahman,theprimarymeaningoftheword“Brahman”isalso“self,”justastheprimarymeaningoftheword“space”isalso“spaceinsideofapot.”8Ontheotherhand,thenotionthattheselfisnotBrahmanisbroughtaboutbyignorance.Furthermore,they

say,therearehundredsofrevealedtextsofnon-difference,suchas“Youarethat,”“IamBrahman,”“Havingenteredbymeansofthis,theself,nameandformaredifferentiated,”and“Thereisnoperceiverotherthanhe.”Fromthesetheyclaimthattheselfsimply isBrahman,sincepureconsciousnessisuniformandalsosincelordlinessandbondagearemerelyapairoflimitingconditions.They say that of the hundreds of statements of difference—including “Two birds who are friends and

companionsperchontheselfsametree”[Śvet.Up.4.6];“Changelessamongthechanging,sentientamongtheinsentient,theone,whograntsthedesiresamongthemany,thewiseperceivehimresidinginthemselves.Forthem,andnotforothers,thereiseternalpeace”[Śvet.Up.6.13];“Hewhoresidesintheself,butisotherthan the self, should know, ‘the self belongs tome.’” “In the three abodes,whatevermight be an object ofenjoyment,anenjoyer,orenjoyment,I,pureconsciousness,witness,andalwaysmunificent,amdifferentfromthem”—therecannotbeclaimedalogicalincongruity.Forthestatements[ofdifference]makesenseinsofarastheyreiteratedifferencewithregardtoartificialconditions.9

WhileAdvaitinsacceptthatthereferentsofthestatementsofnon-differencelike“I

amBrahman”aretheindividualself(jīvātman)andBrahman,theyresorttofigurativeinterpretation todeny that the referentofstatementsofdifference isBrahman in itshighestform,evenincaseswheretheword“Brahman”isused.So,forinstance,“Hewhoresidesintheself,butisotherthantheself”cannotpossiblyrefertoBrahmaninitself, since the Advaitin maintains the view that there is complete undividedness(akhandatā) or identity (tādātmya) of the individual self and highest Brahman.Advaitinswouldthereforecommonlyarguethatthereferentofthepronoun“he”inthissentence is not Brahman in its absolute form but only in a lower form, limited by

artificial conditions (upādhi). This is because theAdvaitins take it as axiomatic thattheUpaniṣadicstatementsofnon-differenceexpresscompleteidentityoftheselfandBrahman.However,Vijñānabhikṣuarguesthat this isonlyonepossible interpretationofstatementsofnon-difference,andbynomeansthebestone:

With regard to this, we reply: You claim that the statements of difference contradict statements of non-difference only because they refer to difference regarding artificial conditions. But why not claim that thestatementsof non-differencecontradict statementsof differencebecause they refer tonon-difference in theformofnon-separation,etc.[andnotcompleteidentity]?Botharelogicallyconsistent.10

Here Vijñānabhikṣu lays out his basic strategy for reconciling the statements ofdifference and non-difference that appear in the Vedas, and likewise for logicallyaccommodatingbothdifferenceandnon-difference inaway that theNaiyāyikaswillfind logically rigorous.According toVijñānabhikṣu, the termsdifference (bheda)andnon-difference(abheda) caneachbeunderstood inat least twoways. InNaiyāyikaterminology, non-difference is understood as identity (tādātmya) while difference isthe negation of identity, called “mutual absence” (anyonyābhāva).11 However, thesetwo terms, difference and non-difference, so central to discussions of the relationbetweentheselfandBrahman,canalsobeunderstoodtomeanseparation(vibhāga)andnon-separation(avibhāga).Byadoptingthisalternateinterpretation,itispossibletoexplainboththestatementsofdifferenceandthestatementsofnon-differencethatappear in the Vedas without arbitrarily subordinating one to the other. AlthoughVijñānabhikṣu introduces thissuggestion in response toanAdvaitapūrvapaksin, theargument could equally well appear in response to a Dvaita Vedāntin, since theDvaitinengages inthesamereductiveproject,onlyreversed:he is forcedtoexplainawaystatementsofnon-differenceaftertakingstatementsofthedifferencebetweenBrahman and the individual self as axiomatic. From the point of view of theBhedābhedavādin,bothAdvaitinandDvaitinsharethemistakeofalwaysinterpretingthe words “non-difference” and “difference” in the Upaniṣads as univocal, notunderstandingtheirequivocality.Afterintroducingthesealternatemeaningsforthetwowords,Vijñānabhikṣuhasto

showthat theyare logicalwaysofcharacterizingtherelationbetweenBrahmanandtheindividualself.Hedoesthisbyappealingtoquotesfromrevealedtexts(śruti)andtraditionaltexts(smṛti)thatrefertotheselfbeing“divided”ornot“divided”:

Non-differenceintheformofnon-separationisalsoheardinrevealedtextssuchas:“Inwhichwaypurewaterpouredintothepure[water]islikethat,inthatway,OGautama,istheselfofthelearnedseer.Butitisnotasecond,different from that, divided (vibhakta).”And in the traditional texts: “Andundividedwithinbeings,Hestandsasifdivided.Whethermanifestlyorunmanifestly,Heistrulythesupremepuruṣa.”Weunderstandthispassagetomeanthatultimately,thereisnon-difference[fromthatBrahman]intheform

ofnon-separation,etc.Butwedonotunderstandthispassagetomeanthatthereisadifferenceduetoartificialconditions(upādhi)whichareultimatelyfalse(mithyā).12

Vijñānabhikṣu remarks that in the opinion of the Advaita Vedāntins, half of thestatements of scripture are false—those statements expressing difference betweentheindividualselfandBrahman.Theadvantageofbeingabletounderstanddifference

andnon-difference in termsof separationandnon-separation is that it allowsus tounderstand all of the statements that refer to Brahman as being true, instead ofhaving to explain themasmerely referring to the artificial conditions that appear tolimitBrahmanintheworld.Following this, Vijñānabhikṣu has to give linguistic justification to argue that

“separation” (vibhāga) and “non-separation” (avibhāga) are legitimate ways ofglossing the words difference and non-difference. He does this by appealing toauthorityof thegrammaticalDhātupātha,whichsetsdown themeaningsofSanskritverbalroots:

Andit isnotthecasethatwhenthereistheword“non-difference”(abheda) in thesenseof“non-separation”(avibhāga)thereisafigurativeusage,duetotheruleoftherootbhid:“bhid,inthesenseofsplitting(vidārana),”meaningalsointhesenseofseparation(vibhāga).13

Vijñānabhikṣutakespainstoemphasizethat“separation”isaprimarymeaningoftheword“difference,”notafigurativemeaning.Establishingthisallowshimtoarguethatunderstandingdifferenceas “separation” is just as legitimateasunderstanding it asmutualabsence(anyonyābhāva).AnyNaiyāyikaorVedāntinwhoinsistsonthelattermeaning instead of the former ismerely arguing from the verbal conventions of hisownschool,notfromanyfundamentalprinciplesoftheSanskritlanguage.Of course, Vijñānabhikṣu is not arguing that in all scriptural passages difference

shouldbeunderstoodas “separation”andnotas “mutualabsence.”Tomaintain thiswouldbejustasarbitraryasaNaiyāyika’sinsistencethattheoppositeshouldbethecase. It would also violate the law of contradiction, since the relationship betweenBrahman and the individual self is alternately described as “difference” and “non-difference” in theUpaniṣads.Acceptingsimultaneousseparationandnon-separationwould be no less incoherent than accepting simultaneous difference and non-difference. Both would entail a statement of the form p and not-p, whichVijñānabhikṣu agrees is logically invalid. Instead, these readings have to becoordinatedbasedoncontexttoallowforlogicalcontinuity.Forinstance,inpassageswhere the Upaniṣads reject difference, this difference must be understood asseparation,notasmutualabsence(anyonyābhāva).Thisisbecausemutualabsence,thedenialofcomplete identity, ispermanent.Separation,however, isanephemeralstate,andthefundamentalrelationbetweenBrahmanandtheselfisthestateofnon-separation. Vijñānabhikṣu illustrates the logic behind his interpretive method in apolemicalexchangewithanAdvaitapūrvapaksin:

Objection:Inrevealedtexts(śruti)therearestatementssuchas:“Hewhomakesacavity,afissureinthis,hehasfear”(Tait.Up.2.7.1);andintraditionaltexts(smrti):“Hisknowledgewithregardtobodiesapartfromtheselfasinrealitybeingonlyone,thatisthehighesttruth.Thedualistsarethosewhoseviewsarefalse”(Vis.Pu.2.14.31).Sincethetraditionaltextsrejectdifference,itisnotpossiblefortherevealedtextstohavedifferenceastheirprimarymeaning.Response:No, this isnot thecase.For thestatementsofnon-difference (abheda)areconcernedwithnon-separation (avibhāga), and the statements that reject difference (bheda) have as their concern “difference”(bheda)inthesenseofseparation(vibhāga).Forthatwhichiscontrarytothetopicunderdiscussionmustberejected.Otherwise, in revealed texts such as, “By themind alone this is to be obtained—here there is no

differencewhatsoever.Hewhoseesdifferencehereobtainsdeathupondeath” (KaṭhaUp.4.11),due to therejectionofdifference,therewouldbenon-differencewiththeclassesofinsentientbeings.14

Vijñānabhikṣu sees the fundamental relationship between Brahman and theindividualselfasnon-separation (avibhāga).ThisobtainsbeforeGod’screationandafterhisdestructionoftheworld.However,duringtheworld’sexistence,theindividualselfexistsinastateofseparation(vibhāga)fromBrahman,untilitachievesthestateof liberation. Liberated selves, too, exist in a state of non-separation (avibhāga).Since at various times the self undergoes both the state of separation and non-separation,thisallowsVijñānabhikṣutomakesenseofbothstatementsofseparationand non-separation. This appeal to differences of time is yet another strategy thatVijñānabhikṣuemploystoreconciletheapparentcontradictionofdifferenceandnon-difference.15 If difference and non-difference occur at different times, and notsimultaneously,thenthereisnoproblem:

Thedifferenceandnon-differenceofthepartandwhole,intheformofseparationandnon-separation,isnotacontradictionsinceitreferstodifferencesatdifferenttimes.Butthemutualnon-existence(anyonyābhāva)ofthe self and Brahman is permanent, and the non-separation of the power and the power-possessor ispermanent.16

Because the state of identity (tādātmya) never obtains between the self andBrahman, every passage of scripture that affirms the relation of non-differencebetween the two means non-separation, never identity. The fundamental error ofAdvaitaVedānta is a failure to understand this.Therefore, the relationbetween theself and Brahman can be understood correctly as a permanent state of mutualabsence (anyonyābhāva). This is simply another way of saying that there is nevercomplete identity (tādātmya) between the two. Understanding these four termscorrectly,itispossibletomakelogicalsenseofanypassageexpressingdifferenceornon-difference, without appeal to mystical paradox or denial of the law ofcontradiction.Vijñānabhikṣuneverattemptstoupholdastatementintheform“dandnot-d.” Instead, heunderstands “differenceandnon-difference” tobea caseof “d1andnot-d2.”“D1”mightstandfor“difference”inonesense,suchasmutualabsence,while in “not-d2” d2 refers to “difference” as separation. By mixing the differentdefinitions of difference and non-difference in such ways, Vijñānabhikṣu can avoidlogicalcontradictionentirely.Vijñānabhikṣuunderstands these twopairsof terms tohaveprecisephilosophical

definitions.Onestockexamplefortherelationofidentity(“AisB”)intheIndianlogicaltraditionis“Thepotisthepot.”Thisisacompletedenialofdifference.InthesphereofNavya-Nyāya logic thatVijñānabhikṣupresupposes, tosay “A isB” is tosay thatthese two things are the very same individual.17 The negation of the previousstatement of identity, “A is not B” is given the technical name “mutual absence”(anyonyābhāva)asintheexample“Thepotisnotthecloth.”Notethatthisismerelya denial of the relation of identity between two individual entities; it implies nothingfurther.Thepotinquestioncansharemanypropertieswiththecloth(e.g.,blueness,

handsomeness, being a product, being ephemeral) and still have the relation ofmutual absence. For that matter, there can be two pots sitting side by side,indistinguishable in shape, size, color, and texture. But as long as they are not theverysameindividualpot,theycanstillbereferredtoashavingtherelationofmutualabsence.Identity and mutual absence are familiar concepts from the Nyāya tradition.

Vijñānabhikṣu’s technical definitions of separation and non-separation, however, arehis own innovation. Non-separation refers to a state in which two entities areperceptually indistinguishable from one another, while nonetheless not having therelationshipof identity (tādātmya).Vijñānabhikṣusees the relationofnon-separationexpressedinstatementslike“Inwhichwaypurewaterpouredintothepure[water]islike that, in that way, O Gautama, is the self of the learned seer. But it is not asecond,differentfromthat,divided(vibhakta)”.Otherexampleshecitesincludethemixing of sugar into milk and of salt into water. In both these examples, the twosubstances,althoughmixed, remainseparate things.Another logicalexampleof therelationofnon-separation is the relationbetweenapowerandpower-possessor,orbetween a property and a property-possessor. In the example of a blue cloth,“blueness”andtheclotharenotidentical;conceptually,theycanstillbedistinguished.Yettheyareconjoinedinarelationshipofnon-separationintheblueclothitself.But the previous definitions of separation and non-separation only apply to

everyday examples; in a philosophical context, Vijñānabhikṣu establishes technicaldefinitions: “‘Separation’ (vibhāga) in its technical sense means difference incharacteristics, andmore specifically difference in characteristics that aremanifest.‘Non-separation’ means absence of difference in characteristics.”18 Separation(vibhāga)doesnotmean totaldisjunction,as theNyāya-Vaiśeṣikaschoolmaintains.Rather, it means a manifest difference in properties (abhivyaktadharmabheda).Therefore,althoughVijñānabhikṣu isquitehappytouseexamplesfromeveryday lifeasmetaphorstodescribeseparation,thesemetaphors,generallybasedonspatiality,cannotliterallyapplytoBrahmanandtheselves.SinceBrahmanandselvesarebothomnipresent, there can be no physical-spatial “detachment” of the selves fromBrahman.Rather,whenaselfseparatesfromBrahman,thatmeansthatitmanifestsdifferences in properties from Brahman. So, for instance, bound selves arecharacterizedby limited knowledge (alpajñatva),whileBrahman is characterized byomniscience (sarvajñatva). It is on the basis of such factors that we can describeselvesas“separate”fromBrahman.Vijñānabhikṣuisalsocarefulnottoclaimthatthesetwopairsofconcepts—identity

and mutual absence, non-separation and separation—are as exhaustive as themeanings of the terms “difference” and “non-difference” found in the Upaniṣads.Anotherimportantmeaningoftheword“non-difference”isnon-differenceofessentialattributes (avaidharmya). In theexampleof the two indistinguishablepots, theyareneitheridentical(astheyaretwodistinctindividuals)noraretheynon-separateintheeverydaysense(sincetheyarenotconnectedinspace).Theyaretwotokensofthesametype.Althoughthereismorethanone,theyarenotdifferentbecausetheylack

differencesoftheiressentialattributes.Thismeaningofnon-differenceisparticularlyimportantinthecontextoftheSāṃkhyaschool,whichteachesthattherearemultiplepuruṣas. Even though these puruṣas are multiple in number, and therefore notidentical in theNaiyāyikas’ senseof the term, theyarenon-different in thesenseofnot having a difference of essential attributes (avaidharmya). This is howVijñānabhikṣu understands the well-known passage, “One only, without a second”(Chānd.Up.6.2.1).19Although this state of non-separation exists, Vijñānabhikṣu recognizes that the

relationshipbetween salt andwater, self andBrahman, andbluenessand cloth arenot characterized by permanent inseparability. These things can be separated overtime.Asthecolorblueisbleachedoutofthecloth,orwaterisevaporatedinordertobecomeseparatefromthesalt,sodoestheselfbecomeseparatefromBrahmanincertain conditions (i.e., manifests different qualities). But Vijñānabhikṣu claims thatunlikethefirsttwoexamples,intheexampleoftheselfandBrahman,non-separationis fundamental and can even be termed to be real in a way that the relation ofseparationcannot:

Therefore,differenceandnon-difference in the formof separationandnon-separation isestablished,by therelation of part and whole between the self and God. And between those two, only non-separation is true(satya),due to itsbeingavailableat thebeginningand theendofcreation,due to itsbeing thenaturalstate(svābhāvika), and due to its being eternal. But separation, since it is only for a limited time between thebeginning and end of creation, is conditional (naimittika). Like other changes (vikāra), it is merely verbal(vācārambhaṇamātra).Thisisitsparticularcharacteristic.In this way the non-dual self is explained in general, and we will explain the statements of the non-dual

Brahman in the commentary on the third sūtra. And defining difference as mutual non-existence(anyonyābhāva),God,thereferentofthewordBrahman,canbesaidtobecompletelydifferentfromtheself.20

Vijñānabhikṣu’s assertion that the natural state of Brahman is non-separationseems to align him with Bhāskara’s Conditional Difference and Non-Difference(Aupādhika Bhedābheda), and separates him from Nimbarka and Yādavaprakāśa,who hold that difference and non-difference are both essential to Brahman. ButVijñānabhikṣu goes even further—in the language of the first paragraph, he comesextremelyclosetoadoptingtheAdvaitins’descriptionoftheworldasunreal.Heevenuses thesameepithet from theChāndogyaUpaniṣad thatVācaspatiMiśrauses toapply to the unreal status of the effects of Brahman, “merely verbal”(vācārambhaṇamātra). However, wemust take this passage from Vijñānabhikṣu inthe context of his frequent assertions, in theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya and elsewhere, ofthe reality of the phenomenalworld. Instead of a strict binary relationship betweentherealandunreal,weshouldunderstandatheoryofdifferentgradesofreality.Ontheonehand, non-separation is themost real because it is thenatural stateof theselfandBrahman.Itisevendescribedaseternal(nitya),althoughthis,too,seemstocontradict Vijñānabhikṣu’s previous statements. Although non-separation is thefundamentalstatefromwhichtheworldoriginatesandtowhicheverythingwillreturnaftertheworld’sdissolution,thereisanin-betweenperiodwhenseparationexists.Non-separation can therefore only be understood as “eternal” if we understand

that,atthetimeofthephenomenalworld’sexistence,non-separationexistsinalatentstate. It is also important to note that this notion of the gradations of reality itselfappears in a slightly different form in the mainstream Advaita tradition. AlthoughBrahman in itsunqualified form is theultimate reality, thereare two other stagesofreality below that which is ultimately real. The lowest is the state of that which iscompletelyunreal (prātibhāsika),which includes illusions,physical impossibilities likeasky-lotus,and logical impossibilities like thesonofabarrenwoman.Above this isthe level of the phenomenal world, intersubjectively understood as real by normalpeople.Thisworld,althoughultimatelyunreal(mithyā), isphenomenallyreal,andforthat reason important.TheAdvaitinsuse theepithet “inexplicable” (anirvacanīya) todescribe its ontological state,which is neither totally real (likeBrahman) nor totallyunreal (like illusory objects). Vijñānabhikṣu rejects the Advaitins’ formulation asnonsensical and elsewhere argues that the phenomenal world is real (sat). But attimesheuses terminology thatedgeshimsurprisinglyclose to thestandardAdvaitaposition.

SELFANDBRAHMANASPARTANDWHOLE

OneproblemthattheBhedābhedaVedāntictraditionfacescomesfromitsclaimthattheindividualselvesandBrahmanexistinarelationofpart(aṃśa)andwhole(aṃśin).The stock analogies used byBhedābhedavādins to illustrate the part/whole relationbetweenthetwoincludeafireanditssparks,theoceananditswaves,thesunandits rays. This relation is made explicit in Bhedābheda commentaries on theBrahmasūtrassinceBhāskara,especiallyinreferencetooneparticularsūtra:“Apart,due to being stated as different. And otherwise also, as some people study it asservant, lord, etc.” (BS2.3.43).21 It is partly on the basis of this sūtra that HajimeNakamura reaches the conclusion that the author of the Brahmasūtras was aBhedābhedavādin: “According to one sūtra, the individual self is clearly defined asbeingapart(aṃśa)ofBrahman(2.3.43)….[The]sūtrastatesthattheindividualselfisdifferent(nānā)fromBrahmanbutatthesametimenotdifferent.Fromthisweseethat theBrahmasūtra took the standpoint ofwhatwas calledBhedābheda by laterthinkers.”22However,aserious interpretiveproblemarises. InBS2.1.26, theauthor refers to

Brahman as “partless” (niravayava). Furthermore, asmost commentators point out(includingVijñānabhikṣuandŚaṅkara),therearepassagesintheUpaniṣadsthatalsosaythatBrahman is“partless,”suchasŚvet.Up.6.19: “partless(niskala), inactive,peaceful, faultless, spotless.” Reconciling these two passages is a fundamentalproblem foranyonewhowishes tocommenton theBrahmasūtras.Notsurprisingly,Bhedābhedavādins and Advaitins take drastically different steps to resolve thiscontradiction in the text—this might even be described as the central interpretivedifference between the two schools. Advaita Vedāntins accept the Upaniṣadicstatements of the complete partlessness of Brahman at face value, and describe

Brahmanasasingle,undifferentiatedmass that is totally indivisible (akhanda). Thisleads them to interpret BS 2.3.43, where Brahman is described as a “part,” in apurelyfigurativeway.Śaṅkarawrites:

He[Bādarāyaṇa]says,“itisapart(aṃśa).”Theself(jīva)shouldbeunderstoodaspartoftheLord(īśvara),justas thespark is [apart]of the fire. “Part”means “likeapart” (aṃśaiva), sincea thing that is free fromparts(niravayava)cannotliterallyhaveparts(aṃśa).23

Śaṅkaragoesontoremarkthatwhenthesūtrasays“andotherwisealso,”itrefersto the many statements where the so-called parts are described as non-differentfrom theirwhole.Thesestatementsofnon-difference,according toŚaṅkara,shouldbetakentorefertotheultimatestateofidentitybetweentheso-calledpartsandthewhole,whiledifferenceismerelyduetodifferenceinartificial limitingconditions.It isclear thatAdvaitins simply cannotmake literal senseofBS2.3.43, and hence theyemployinterpretivestrategiestomakethepassageconformtothestandardAdvaitareading.ButAdvaitinshavegoodreasonsformakingthisinterpretivemove,sincetheUpaniṣads attest that Brahman is a partless whole. The Advaitins have not onlyscripturalauthority(śabdapramāṇa)ontheirsidebutalso inference(anumāna). It isinconceivablethatBrahmancouldbemadeupofparts,forthingsthataremadeupofpartsaredependentonthosepartsandimpermanent.Whenthepartsareseparatedfromthatthing, it isdiminished.Forinstance,whenatableisseparatedfromoneofits legs, itno longer functionswellasa table.Anyonewhohopes toargueplausiblyfor the part/whole relation pertaining to the self and Brahmanmust show that it ismeaningful to speak of a different sort of part/whole relation, inwhich thewhole iscompletelyindependentofitsparts.Atthebeginningofhisdefenseofthelogicalcoherenceofthepart/wholerelation,

Vijñānabhikṣuassertsthat it is thebestofallalternatives.Hiscritiqueof theAdvaitaincludes a critique of the metaphors by which the Advaitins theorize the relationbetween Brahman and the individual self (jīva). The most influential analogies fortheorizing thecompleteunityandpartlessnessofBrahmanare thoseof thesunanditsreflection inpoolsofwater,andofspace(ākāśa)andspaceas limitedbyapot.These two metaphors correspond to two major schools of thought within post-Śaṅkara Advaita, reflectionism (pratibimbavāda) and limitationism(avacchedavāda).24:Vijñānabhikṣutriestoshowthroughaprocessofeliminationthatwhenbothof thesemetaphorsbreakdown,theonlyadequatewaytorepresent therelationbetweenBrahmanandtheselfaremetaphorsexpressingthedoctrineofpartand whole (aṃśavāda), such as the fire and its sparks. So, for instance, themetaphorofspaceandthespacelimitedbyapotexpressestheviewthattheselfisidenticalwithBrahmanbutmerelylimitedbyartificialconditions(upādhi)—justasthepotisanartificialconditionthatlimitsspace.But,Vijñānabhikṣuargues,

ifit[Brahman]wereasingle,partlesswhole,thentheremightagainbetheundesirableoccurrenceofbondageforsomeonewhohasbeenpreviously liberated.Foralthoughthe liberatedpart isdisjoinedfromoneinternalorgan(antahkarana), there is thepossibilityofunionwithanother internalorgan.Inthesameway,thespace

thatislimitedbyonepot,evenwhenthatpotisbroken,eventuallycomesbackintorelationwithanotherpot.25

This is a variation on the familiar criticism of Advaita that it cannot account forliberation. The limitationists’ model can account for the conventional appearance ofdifferencebetweenvariousselves,oneselfapparentlybeing liberatedwhileanotherisbound,since liberation justmeans that theartificial limitingcondition (upādhi) hasbeendestroyed.Butitcannotaccountforthepermanentliberationofselves—onthemodel of the pots and space, there would be the constant possibility of the self’sbackslidingandceasing tobe liberated.That isbecauseanygivensectionofspacemightbesurroundedbyanewpot,evenafterthepreviousoneisbroken.After advancing numerous arguments for the inadequacy of the limitationist and

reflectionist models, on the basis of both scripture and inference, Vijñānabhikṣusuggeststhathisowndoctrineofpartandwholeshouldbeacceptedasthelastonestanding:

Wehaveseentheexamplesofthemoonandthemoon’sreflectioninthewater,spaceandthespacelimitedbya pot, fire and its sparks, shade and heat, woman and man. All these correspond to viewpoints likereflectionism,limitationism,thedoctrineofpartandwhole(aṃśavāda),andsoforth.Becausetheyconflict,itisimpossible forallof theseviewstobe true—onlyonecanbeaccepted.Therestof theexamplesshouldbeunderstoodasonlypartiallyexpressingthatwhichisintendedeverywhere.Thisbeingthecase,itisappropriatetoacceptjustthedoctrineofpartandwhole.26

Vijñānabhikṣu does not completely reject the other metaphors for the relationbetweenBrahmanandtheself.Totheextentthattheseotherviewshavesimilaritieswithhisown, theymightbe regardedaspartially true.Toargue that thedoctrineofpartandwhole is theonlyone thatcanbecompletelyacceptedherepeatedlycitesBS2.3.43: “apart,due tobeingstatedasdifferent…”However,simply tocite thissūtra is not enough. To make his case that this sūtra should be read literally, notfigurativelyas theAdvaitinsdo,Vijñānabhikṣuunderstands thathehas toshow thatthe doctrine of part andwhole is logically coherent. To do this, hemakes a subtledistinctionbetweentwodifferentSanskritwordsthatarebothtypically translatedas“part”:aṃśaandavayava.WhiletheselvesaretheaṃśasofBrahman,theyarenotthe avayavas of Brahman. Vijñānabhikṣu wishes to make this distinction by sayingthat an avayava can be understood in the everyday sense of the word “part.”However,anaṃśa hasa specific technicalmeaning in theBrahmasūtras and in hisphilosophicalwritings:

Tobeapart(aṃśa),somethingmustbeofthesameclass(sajātīya)asthewhole(aṃśin)andbetheadjunctofnon-separation (avibhāgapratiyogin). The whole is the subjunct of non-separation (tadanuyogin). Whenreferring to the part as being of the same class as the whole, onemust be consistent with regard to thepropertyunderdiscussion.Forinstance,whendiscussingthepartbeingaself,oneshouldsayitfallsundertheclassofselfhood(ātmatva).Whendiscussingthepartasexistent,etc.,oneshouldrefertoitasfallingundertheclassofexistence(sattva),etc.Followingthisprocedure,therewillbenoconfusion.27

In this passage, Vijñānabhikṣu employs two relational terms from Navya-Nyāya,subjunct (anuyogin) and adjunct (pratiyogin).28 In the Naiyāyikas’ stock example,

“thereisabsenceofthepotintheground,”thepotistheadjunctintherelation,whilethe ground is the subjunct. It is important to see that the relation of absence onlygoesoneway:tosaythatthereisabsenceofthepotinthegroundisnotthesamethingastosaythatthereisabsenceofthegroundinthepot.Likewise,althoughitispossibletosaythattheselvesarepartsofBrahman,itisquitesomethingelsetosaythat Brahman is the part of the selves. Therefore, to avoid the possibility thatBrahman could also be called a “part” and the selves called the “whole,”Vijñānabhikṣu must argue that separation is a one-way relation, not a two-wayrelation as it might appear at first glance. In the relation of separation or non-separation, the anuyogin is the locus, while the pratiyogin is that which separatesfrom the locus. In the example of leaves falling from a tree, the leaf would be thepratiyoginofseparation,whilethetreeistheanuyogin.InthecaseoftheselvesandBrahman, it is the selves that separate from Brahman at the time of creation andreattach to Brahman at the time of the world’s dissolution. Throughout this entireprocess,however,Brahman,thewhole,remainsunchanged.29Onewayofexpressingsuchaone-wayrelationofseparationisbyparadoxicalstatementsofdifferenceandnon-difference, such as one of Vijñānabhikṣu’s favorite passages from the ViṣṇuPurāṇa:“Thereisnothingdifferentfromit,yetitisdifferentfromeverything”(Vis.Pu.1.16.78). Less enigmatically, onemight gloss this tomean that, although all of theselves are its parts, Brahman is not dependent on, or affected by, the states ofbondageandliberationofthoseverysameselves.TheotherhalfofVijñānabhikṣu’stechnicaldefinitionofapart(aṃśa)stipulatesthat

a part must be of the same class (sajātīya) as the whole. Vijñānabhikṣu offersexamples of two such properties that Brahman and the selves share: selfhood(ātmatva)andexistence(sattva).Anotherproperty thatBrahmanandselveshave incommon is consciousness (cittva).30 For Vijñānabhikṣu, however, being bliss(ānandatva)doesnotqualifyasasharedproperty.This isbecause,heargues, theterm “bliss” or “happiness” when applied to the liberated self or Brahman can onlyrefer to a complete absence of suffering. It therefore does not refer to a positivestate, as the word does in everyday statements such as “Devadatta is happy.”Vijñānabhikṣuborrows thisargument from theSāṃkhyasand inarguing thepositioncitestheSāṃkhyasūtras insupportofhisview31Vijñānabhikṣualsoemphasizesherethatproperties likeselfhoodandexistencemustnotbeconflated.This isarejectionofŚaṅkara’sviewthattheconsciousness,existence,andblissofBrahmanareinfactone and the same. Furthermore, according to Śaṅkara, they are not properties ofBrahman—theyareidenticalwithBrahman.VijñānabhikṣualsodiffersfromRāmānujaonthisissue,sinceRāmānujaholdsthatblissisapropertyofBrahman.Vijñānabhikṣubelieves that Brahman possesses multiple properties but bliss is not among them.Strictlyspeaking,blissexistsonlyintherealmofprakṛti,andthereforeitcannotbeapropertyofBrahman.32In his commentary on theBrahmasūtras, Vijñānabhikṣu seeks to justify all of the

traditionalmetaphorshehasinheritedfromotherBhedābhedavādins,inspiteoftheirapparent dissimilarities and inconsistencies. An ocean and its waves, fire and its

sparks,thesunanditsrays,andafatherandhissonarealldifferentintheirspecificdetails.Thefather isclearlythecauseofhisson(alongwiththemother,ofcourse),butitseemsimplausibletomodernsensibilitiesthatasoncanbedescribedasapartofhis father.Likewise, in thecaseofa fireand itssparks, thesparkscease tobepartsofthefireassoonastheyaredistinguishableassparks.Furthermore,withallofthesemetaphorsexceptforthefirst,thereappearstobenoeventualreabsorptionof the parts back into their whole—only the ocean createswaves thatmanifest asdistinct parts of the ocean as a whole and then reabsorbs those same waves.Recognition of the inadequacy of these metaphors is implicit when the Advaitaobjector in theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya asks, “Howdoweknow that the relationofpartand whole as in the examples of the fire and sparks, father and son, etc., isintended?”33Thecommoncharacteristicinallofthesemetaphorsisshowingthepossibilityfora

whole to exist that is completely independent of its parts. In an example thatVijñānabhikṣu does not use, the parts of a human body, loss of a limb greatlydiminishestheproperfunctioningofthebodyasawhole;lossofcertainpartsofthebodywill result in thewhole’s complete termination.But the fire can continue to beseparated from its sparkswithout therebybeingdiminished; thesameholds for thefather,whoisinnowaylessenedbytheproductionofason.ThisdifferencegetstotheheartofVijñānabhikṣu’sdistinctionbetween the twodifferentSanskritwords for“part.”Whileapart in itseverydaysense (avayava) describesa relationshipwherethe whole is dependent on, and constituted by, its parts, a loss of a part in itsspecializedsense(aṃśa)isnotresponsibleforthediminishingofthewhole:

Objection:SinceBrahmanisdevoidofparts(niravayava),howcoulditpossessa“part”(aṃśa)inaprimarysense?Reply: We have seen that it possesses a “part” (aṃśa) as according to the technical definition given

previously,althoughitdoesnotpossessany“part”inthepopularsenseoftheword(avayava).Likewise,thehairisreferredtoasa“part”(aṃśa)ofthebody.Asingleunitiscalleda“part”ofthegroup.Thesoniscalleda“part” of the father. Like thepossessionsof the son that uponhis deathgo to the father, at the timeof thedissolutionoftheuniverse,theselvesgiveuptheirowncharacteristicof illuminationofonlythesense-objectandtakeonunity(ananyatva)with thecharacteristicofBrahman, thepureconsciousness,whichconstantlyilluminateseverything.34Andatthetimeofthecreationoftheuniverse,justduetotheLord’sowndesire,theselves, after attaining effective consciousness, become manifest just as the sons of the father becomemanifest.35 Therefore, selves can be called the parts (aṃśa) of Brahman. By the śruti, “he himself ismanifestedastheson,”thereisnon-differencecharacterizedbynon-separationofthefatherwiththeson.Inthesameway,bytheśruti,“Letmebemanifestasmany”(Ch.Up.6.2.3),thenon-differencecharacterizedbynon-separationofBrahmanwiththeselfisestablished.Hence,theselveshaveastheirprimarymeaning“partsofBrahman.”36

ThespecificsofVijñānabhikṣu’sanalogyof thesonand the father isunclear in itsdetails,inpartpossiblyduetotextualcorruption.EitherVijñānabhikṣumeansthatthefather inherits his son’s possessions (vetanāḥ) when the son dies, or hisconsciousness (cetanāḥ) is absorbed into his father’s at death. The first seemsirrelevant,while thesecond issimply false.Thebasicproblemwith thismetaphor isthatalthoughthefathercancertainlybesaid toberesponsible for themanifestation

ofhis son, it ishard to seehowhemight reabsorbhis sonat the timeofhis son’sdeath. Nonetheless, the basic cosmological picture that Vijñānabhikṣu presents isclear. The world is divided into three periods: origin, existence, and dissolution.Beforetheoriginoftheworld,theindividualconsciousnessesoftheselvesarelatent,not in use. Only after the world’s creation do the consciousnesses of the selvesbecome manifest, or effective. Once again after the selves are reabsorbed intoBrahman,theyreturntotheiroriginallatentstate.Thisthreefoldchronologicaldivisionappears inmostcommentariesonBS1.1.2.37ThisbasiccosmologicalpictureofanundifferentiatedstuffbeingdifferentiatedandthenreabsorbedattheendoftheworldisdepictedinvirtuallyallofthePurāṇas.Italsohasobviousparallelstotheactivityofprakṛti intheSāṃkhya-Yogasystem.However, itseemsslightlymoreproblematic intheVedānticcontext,sinceBrahman,unlikeprakṛti,ischangeless.

BRAHMAN’SCAUSALITYINADVAITAANDBHEDĀBHEDAVEDĀNTA

Oneof theprimarydifferencesbetweenBhedābhedaVedāntaand itsbetter-knownrivalisitsdoctrineofrealtransformation(pariṇāmavāda),asopposedtothedoctrineof unreal or apparent manifestation (vivartavāda) maintained by the Advaita.AccordingtotheBhedābhedavādins,theworldofmultiplicitythatmostnormalpeoplebelieve to be real is in fact just that: although theremay be an underlying, unitarycause fromwhich the universe evolves, the results of this evolution (tables, chairs,books, individual human beings, etc.) are also real. This is denied by AdvaitaVedāntins.38 Although Advaitins will admit that the world can be said to beconventionally real (vyavahārasat), they insist that the only absolutely real entity isBrahman, which is unitary, free from qualities, and the cause of this apparentphenomenalworld.39Providing these two different answers to the question of the reality of the

phenomenal world takes the Advaitins and the Bhedābhedavādins in quite differentdirections and leads to two different sets of problems for each to resolve.40 ToillustratesomeofVijñānabhikṣu’sphilosophicaltendencies,Iwishtodiscussjustonesuch problem confronting the Bhedābhedavādins: How can Brahman, which isuniversally accepted to be eternally unchanging, be the material cause(upādānakāraṇa)oftheuniverse?ThisisaproblemthatmanyAdvaitinsclaimtheydonothavetoconfront,sinceintheirtheorytheworldismerelyanunrealmanifestation(vivarta)ofBrahman.Furthermore,Śaṅkaradoesnotaddress this, implying thathesimply did not consider it to be a problem. Although neither Śaṅkara nor Bhāskaramentions this issue, however, late medieval Advaitins and Bhedābhedavādinsrecognizeitasacentralproblem.Indian logicians name things like “clay” and “copper” as real-world examples of

material causes. The potter (or instrumental cause, nimittakāraṇa) transforms theclay(thematerialcause)intoitsvariousforms:apot,aplate,andsoon.Althoughtheforms (rūpas) of the clay have changed, the essence (svarūpa) of the clay, its

clayness, remains the same throughout all of these transformations. Perhaps themostwellknowndescriptionofwhatitmeanstobeamaterialcausecomesfromthedialoguebetweenŚvetaketuandhisfatherĀruṇiinCh.Up.6.1.4-5.Thisisthe locusclassicusofthedoctrinethattheeffectpreexistsinthecause(satkāryavāda):

“It is like this, son.Bymeans of just one lump of clay onewould perceive everythingmade of clay—thetransformationisaverbalhandle,aname—whiletherealityisjustthis:‘It’sclay.’”41“Itislikethis,son.Bymeansofjustonecoppertrinketonewouldperceiveeverythingmadeofcopper—the

transformationisaverbalhandle,aname—whiletherealityisjustthis:‘It’scopper.’”41

Of course, the unstated subject of this metaphor is Brahman. Brahman is thematerial cause of theworld, just as clay is thematerial cause of pots, plates, andother sorts of things. Although frequently cited, this passage itself is a source ofcontroversybetweenthetwodifferenttypesofSatkāryavādins.SāṃkhyasandrealistVedāntins suchasBhedābhedavādins belong to the school ofPariṇāmavāda,whichmaintains that theworld is a real transformation (pariṇāma) of Brahman. Just as alumpofclaychanges,undergoingarealtransformationwhenitassumestheformofa pot, so does Brahman undergo some real change in form when it becomes thephenomenalworld.However,becausetheclay’sessencedoesnotchange,thelumpofclaycanalsobedescribedasbeingthesameasthepot.ForPariṇāmavādins,thematerial cause and its effects are both different and non-different: different withregard to form, but non-different with regard to essence.42 Advaita Vedāntins areusually described as subscribing to the other school of Satkāryavāda, calledVivartavāda.43 On the interpretation of the Advaitin Vācaspati Miśra, for instance,Brahmanundergoesnorealtransformation.Itsapparentmanifestation(vivarta)intheworld has a merely verbal existence (vācārambhaṇamātra). Therefore, Brahmanitselfdoesnotchangeinanyway.It seems clear that if the Bhedābhedavādins understand Brahman to be the

material causeof theuniverse in thesameway thatclay is thematerial causeofapot,thiswillinvolvesomerealchangeinformofBrahmanitself.Bhāskaraevenusesthemetaphor ofmilk changing into curds to describeBrahman’s transformation intotheworld.Onthismodel,Brahman’scausalitywouldbesimilartothecausalityoftheoriginal,undifferentiatedprakṛtioftheSāṃkhyaschool.TheSāṃkhya’scosmologicaldualismmaintainsthattherearetwoeternal,fundamentalprinciples,onethepuruṣa,the otherprakṛti. The difference between the two is that thepuruṣa is eternal andunchanging(kūtasthanitya),whileprakṛti ischanging,albeitnonethelesseternal in itschanging form (pariṇāminitya). On the Sāṃkhya model, prakṛti begins in anundifferentiated, quiescent form, transforms into twenty-three other principles(tattvas) during the period of creation of the world, then returns to its originalquiescent state after theworld’s dissolution.44One option for theBhedābhedavādinwould be to accept that Brahman is eternal yet changing, just like the Sāṃkhyaprakṛti.However, thiswasgenerallynot anoption. In spiteof themanydifferencesamongVedāntinsintheirinterpretationsoftheUpaniṣads,thereseemstohavebeenagreementthattheUpaniṣadicstatementsassertingBrahman’seternalityalsoassert

its unchangeability. Since the rejection of Brahman as unchanging was not apossibility, the other available option was to reinterpret the precise nature of thecausalityofBrahman.If Vedāntins were hesitant to reject the unchanging nature of Brahman, then

rejectionofBrahmanascauseoftheuniversewasevenmoreofaproblem.Afterall,the secondaphorismof theBrahmasūtras, “Fromwhich there is the origin, etc., ofthis”(BS 1.1.2), is interpreted by the entire tradition to mean that Brahman is that“fromwhichthereistheorigin”ofthisworld(jagat): that is,Brahmanisthecauseoftheworld.Inhiscommentaryonthesecondsūtra,Vijñānabhikṣuattemptstoresolvetheproblemofexplaininganunchangingcauseoftheworldbyreinterpretingmaterialcausality to include what he calls “locus causality” (adhiṣṭhānakāraṇatva).45Vijñānabhikṣu makes his case by arguing that the term “material cause”(upādānakāraṇa ), frequently used to describeBrahman, canbeof two sorts.Onesort is a changing cause (vikārikāraṇa), such as the example of the clay, whichundergoes changes when it is transformed into various effects. However,Vijñānabhikṣuasserts that the termupādānakāraṇacanalso refer toanunchangingcause (avikārikāraṇa), also known as a root cause (mūlakāraṇa) or a locus cause(adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa).Bythisheisnotsayingthatthelocuscanbesaidtobeacausein a figurative, or secondary, sense. Rather, he insists that one of the primarymeanings of “material cause” is “locus cause.” To make this claim, he offers adefinitionofmaterialcausality thatcanapplyequally toachangingcauseora locuscause: “Thegeneraldefinitionofmaterial cause is ‘thatwhich isasubstratum,non-separate from its effect.’”46 This allows Vijñānabhikṣu to claim that an unchanginglocus such as Brahman is no less deserving of the appellation “cause” than achanging cause like the potter’s clay. But what precisely does it mean to callsomethinga“locuscause”?Vijñānabhikṣu’s technical definition of a locus cause is “that from which the

[changeable]materialcauseisnotseparated,andbywhichthe[changeable]materialcause is fully supported.”47 To make this more tangible, Vijñānabhikṣu offers anexample of one such locus cause from Sāṃkhya cosmology. According to theSāṃkhyas, each of the five gross elements has its origin in a corresponding subtleelement,whichistoosmallforthehumansenseorgantoperceive.ButVijñānabhikṣusuggests that for the subtle element of earth to successfully evolve into the grosselement earth, water is necessary as a locus cause: “For example, at the time ofworldcreation,thereareminutepartsoftheearth,knownassubtleelementsandnotseparatefromthewater.Thesesubtleelementschangeintotheformofearthduetothesupportofwater,sowateristhelocuscauseofthegrosselementearth.”48Inotherwords,Vijñānabhikṣuportrays this causal relationashaving three terms:

unchangeable locuscause, changeable cause,andeffect.Thechangeable cause isbothnon-separatewiththeeffectandalsoinheresintheeffect(i.e.,thestuffthattheeffectismadeupofisthesameasthestuffofthematerialcause).Thelocuscause,although non-separate (avibhakta) from both the changeable cause and the effect,doesnotinhereineitherthechangeablecauseortheeffect.Withoutthelocuscause,

nochangecan takeplace in thechangeablecause,and in thatsense the locuscanitself be described as a cause. Nonetheless, the locus cause itself undergoes nochangeinform.Theeffectsimplyarisesbecauseofthepresenceofthelocuscause,not because of any action taken by the locus cause. As we saw, this relationshipbetween locuscauseandchangeablecause isverballycomplicatedby the fact thatbothcanequallybecalled “materialcause” (upādānakāraṇa).Thishas thepotentialfor great confusion, especially since Vijñānabhikṣu commonly refers to a materialcausewithout elaboratingwhich type.But it alsoallowsagreat deal of interpretiveflexibility. ItallowsVijñānabhikṣutomakesenseofapparentlynonsensicalpassagesthat refer to something unchanging as a “cause,” while still accepting that stockexampleslikeclayandcopperarealsocorrectlydescribedasmaterialcauses.IsuggestedbeforethatVijñānabhikṣu’spositingofatypeofcausalitycalled locus

causality was in order to solve a problem specific to Bhedābheda Vedanta and itstheory of real transformation (pariṇāmavāda). However, the lines between thedoctrines of pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda are considerably blurrier than what isusuallydepicted inhistoriesof Indianphilosophy.First,evidence Icited inchapter2suggeststhatthedevelopmentofthetheoryofunrealmanifestationofBrahmanwasactuallyagradualdevelopmentoutof theearlier theoryof thereal transformationofBrahman.PaulHackerbelievesthattheearlyŚaṅkaraheldapositiononthisquestionsomewherebetweentherealistpariṇāmavādaoftheauthoroftheBrahmasūtrasandthevivartavāda of the laterAdvaitic tradition.SrinivasaRaohas arguedevenmoreradically that theŚaṅkaraof theBrahmasūtrabhāṣya doesnot regard the empiricalworld as mithyā, by implication placing Śaṅkara squarely in the camp of thepariṇāmavādins.49’Furthercomplicatingmatters,Vijñānabhikṣuclaimsthathehimselfis neither a pariṇāmavādin nor a vivartavādin.50 This is because he understandspariṇāmavādin to mean one who believes that Brahman is a changeable materialcause,preciselywhathetriestoavoidwithhistwo-folddistinctionofmaterialcauses.Nonetheless, it is clear that Vijñānabhikṣu’s position comes out of the tradition ofpariṇāmavāda,morewidelyconstrued,inwhichtheworldisarealeffectofBrahman.AndthereisnoambiguityaboutVijñānabhikṣu’svitrioltowardthevivartavādapositionofthelaterAdvaitins.In spite of his emphatic rejection of Advaitic views, however, Vijñānabhikṣu’s

concept of locus cause has some remarkable affinities with at least one of theconceptionsofcausalityprevalentamongAdvaitinsinthelatemedievalperiod.Inthisregard, he is much closer to his sixteenth-century Advaita contemporaries than toearly Bhedābhedavādins such as Bhāskara, since these earlier Vedāntins did notappeartoseeanyinherentcontradictionindescribingBrahmanasmaterialcauseandtherefore did not formulate any concept similar to locus causality.51 By the latemedieval period, it seems, consensus held that Brahman could not possibly be amaterial cause in the familiar sense without undergoing some change. Therefore,Advaitins,too,adoptedahostoftheoriestosidestepthisapparentaporia.Appaya Dīkṣita’s sixteenth-century catalogue of the various Advaita views, the

Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha(BriefCompendiumofDoctrines),listsnumerousopinionson

the question of Brahman’s causality. Typically, these later Advaitins saw ignorance(avidyā)orillusion(māyā)themselvesashavingsomepartincreatingtheworld.52Byreifying such terms and giving these entities autonomous causal power, they werelikely quite far from the original position of their school’s putative founder,Śaṅkara,withregardtotheoriginoftheworld.ThiswasinpartbecauseŚaṅkarahimselfwassilent or ambiguous on certain puzzling issues regarding Brahman’s causality.53Therefore,thesethinkersapportionthecausaldutiesinvariousways.AppayaDīkṣitalistsafewofthesealternatives:

1. AccordingtotheauthorofthePadārthatattvanirṇaya[attributedtoĀnandānubhavaorGaṅgāpurīBhaṭṭāraka],bothBrahmanandillusion(māyā)arematerialcauses.Brahman’sbeingmaterialcauseisnotjustatechnicalterm,inthesenseof“locusofapparentmanifestation(vivarta)”.Brahmanitselfundergoesapparentmanifestation,whileillusionundergoesrealtransformation.

2. Some[unidentified]otherssaythatbothBrahmanandillusionarematerialcauses.Buttheysaythatbeingmaterialcausesimplymeans“havingeffectsthatarenon-differentfromthatcause.”Withrespecttotheworld’sexistence,itisnon-differentfromBrahmanwithregardtoexistence,andnon-differentfromillusionwithregardtoinsentience.

3. AccordingtotheauthoroftheSaṃkṣepaśarīraka[Sarvajñātman],Brahmanisthematerialcause.However,becauseitisunchanging,itcannotbeacausebyitself.Thereforeillusion(māyā)isasubordinatecause(dvārakāraṇa).

4. AccordingtoVācaspatiMiśra,Brahmanaloneisthematerialcause,andisapparentlymanifestedintotheformoftheworldbecauseitismadeanobjectbytheillusion(māyā)situatedintheself(jīva).Illusionismerelyanassistant(sahakārin),notasubordinatecause(dvārakāraṇa).

5. AccordingtotheauthoroftheSiddhāntamuktāvalī[Prakāśānanda],thepowerofillusion(māyāśakti)isthematerialcause,notBrahman.Brahmancanonlybedescribedasmaterialcauseinasecondarysense,asitisthelocusofillusion.54

This last suggestion is the view ofPrakāśānanda, a late sixteenth-centuryVedāntinwhoauthored theVedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī (Pearl-StringofVedāntaDoctrines).55Hemay ormay not be the sameperson as the scholar of Advaita namedŚrīpādaPrakāśānandaSarasvatī, who is immortalized in a section of Caitanya’s biography.There,Caitanya takesonasannyāsinwho isa leaderof theAdvaitincommunity inVaranasiandshowshimtheerrorofhiswaysforrejectingbhakti.Althoughtheactualencounter is likely a later fabrication (Caitanya died in 1533, while Prakāśānandaprobably lived in the second half of the century), it may offer evidence thatPrakāśānanda was based in Varanasi, and that he was well known among bothAdvaitinsandnon-Advaitins.Since Prakāśānanda was influential in sixteenth-century northern India and had

numerousdisciples,itislikelythatVijñānabhikṣuwasawareofhisviews.SoitisnotsurprisingthatPrakāśānanda’sviewthatBrahmanisthelocusofthematerialcause,andnotdirectly thecauseof theworld,hassimilaritieswithVijñānabhikṣu’sconceptof locus cause (adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa). Prakāśānanda regards māyā as the directmaterialcauseofworldcreation.Heusesthesametermfor locus(adhiṣṭhāna) thatVijñānabhikṣuuses to refer toBrahman.However, he takes a slightly different tackthan Vijñānabhikṣu. Vijñānabhikṣu habitually avoids appealing to figurative ormetaphorical meanings of words unless there is absolutely no other way to makeinterpretivesenseofthepassageinquestion.Wesawthispreviouslyinhisrejection

of the Advaitins’ figurative interpretations of Upaniṣadic passages expressing non-difference,aswellasinhisrejectionofŚaṅkara’sfigurativeinterpretationoftheword“part”inBS2.3.43.UnlikePrakāśānanda,Vijñānabhikṣuarguesthatthetruedefinitionofmaterialcause,“thatwhichisasubstratum,non-separatefromitseffect,”isbroadenoughtoincludealocus.Hencethereisnoneedtoappealtofigurativeusage,andreferringtoa“locuscause”itselfpresentsnocontradictions.Prakāśānanda,however,freely admits to using figurative interpretation. He believes that strictly speaking,Brahman is not a cause at all. But we can make sense of Bādarāyaṇa’s clearstatement inBS1.1.2 that Brahman is cause of theworld by understanding that alocus can be understood as a material cause (upādāna) in a figurative sense.Prakāśānandaseesthisasthebestwaytoreconcilescripturalpassagesthatseemtodisagreeabouttheworld’scausality:

It is not true that there is a contradiction between the two sets of scriptural passages, one that declaresignorancetobethecauseoftheworldandtheotherthatdeclaresBrahmantobecauseoftheworld:38.Brahmanissaidtobecauseoftheworldonlyoutofignorance,sinceBrahmanhasnothingtodowith

causality.Brahmanisonlydeclaredtobe“cause”becauseitisthelocus.Ignorance, which is indescribable and beginningless, is cause of the world, which is indescribable and

established by means of being visible, and so on. Brahman is not its cause. For Brahman, which ischangeless,isneithercausenoreffect,asstatedbythescripturalpassage,“ThisBrahmanhasnocause,noeffect, no interior, no exterior. This self is the omniscient Brahman.”56 So how is it that in the scripture,Brahman is widely declared to be the cause of the world? By being the locus of the cause of the world,Brahmanisthecauseinafigurativesense.57

ThemostsignificantdifferencebetweenVijñānabhikṣuandPrakāśānandaisintheirpositionsconcerning the realityorunrealityof theworld.Vijñānabhikṣubelieves thatthe world is the real effect of Brahman. Prakāśānanda is extreme even amongAdvaitinsinhisdefenseofthedoctrineofdrstisrstivāda—thattheexistenceofobjectsisnothingmorethantheirperception.58Inthis,heisatoddswiththetwolargestsub-schools in the later Advaita tradition, the Bhāmatī and Vivarana, and is closer toYogācāra Buddhism.59 While mainstream Advaitins such as Vācaspati Miśraunderstand the phenomenal world to have some sort of temporary independentexistence that sets it apart from purely subjective cognitive mistakes likehallucinations, Prakāśānanda denies this. In so doing, he reduces the Advaitins’normal threefold ontological division to two, making the Vedantic technical term“indescribable”(anirvacanīya)synonymouswith“completelyunreal”(tuccha).60Morethan most others, Prakāśānanda deserves the appellation “crypto-Buddhist”(pracchannabauddha) that Vijñānabhikṣu indiscriminately applies to all Advaitins.Prakāśānanda’s thought illustrates a general historical trend in Advaita philosophyitself,whichbeginsinŚaṅkara’searliestworkswithaviewclosetotherealismoftheBhedābheda,moveson toaposition in theworksofVācaspatiandPrakāśātman inwhich the world is phenomenally real although ultimately unreal, and then withPrakāśānanda’sthoughtinthelatemedievalperiodbecomesthoroughlyillusionisticinitsoutlook.In spite of the thoroughgoing illusionism of Prakāśānanda on the one hand and

Vijñānabhikṣu’srealismontheother,boththinkerssawafundamentalcontradictionintheconceptofa“changelessmaterialcause.”Thiscontradictionremains,regardlessof whether the effect of such a cause is real or illusory. While recognized as aproblem bymanymedieval Advaitins, however, some Advaita apologists claim thatthere is no problem precisely because the effect of Brahman is unreal.One of themostcommonwaysAdvaitaapologistsof theBhāmatīschoolattempttodefendthepossibility ofBrahmanbeinga causewhilenonethelessbeingunchanging is to takethepositionthatBrahmandoesnotundergoanyrealchange,onlyapparentchange.Thatisbecausetheworldisultimatelyunreal(mithyā).Totheextentthatitundergoesany change whatsoever, that is only change on a phenomenal or conventional(vyāvahārika) level. Because its effect is itself ultimately unreal, therefore on theultimatelevelBrahmanisnotreallyacauseandhenceundergoesnochange.Butthisargumentfailstodistinguishbetweentwoseparatestatementsregardingacauseanditseffect:

S1.XisthecauseoftheunrealeffectYS2.Xappearstobe,butisnottherealcauseoftheeffectY

Whatwe actually have in the case of a real Brahman as the cause of an unrealworld is S1. In this statement, Brahman really is the cause, although its effect ismerelyapparent.Takeasanexampleanillusionistwhosawshisassistantinhalf.Heisthecauseoftheappearancethattheassistantissawedinhalf;withouthisactivity,the assistant would not appear to be sawed into two separate parts. Although thestate of the assistant is illusory, the illusionist is the real cause of such an illusorystate.ThisisclearlyadifferentsituationfromS2,whereXisnottherealcauseoftheeffectY.OneexampleofS2wouldbeamanwhobelievesthatthereligiousritesheperformsbefore dawneachmorning cause the sun to comeup.Whether the sun’srising is illusoryor real is irrelevant (ifwe like,wecancall it illusory, insofaras theearth revolves around the sun, and not vice versa); the important thing here is thatthere is no real relation of cause and effect between his morning prayers and thesun’srising.FacedwithS2, thequestion inevitablyarises: IfX isnot therealcauseofY, then

whatisY’scause?Itisaxiomaticthateveryeffectmusthaveacorrespondingcause.InthespecificcontextofAdvaitaphilosophy:ifBrahmanisnotreallythecauseoftheworld,thenwhatis?Mereappearances,too,musthavetheircauses.Otherwisetheworldwouldnotexistinanyform,whetherreal(asBhedābhedavādinshold)orunreal(mithyā, asmainstream Advaitins hold). This is where the later Advaitins’ talk of aseparatecause,māyāoravidyā,comesintoplay.Andwhatisthecauseofillusion?Late medieval Advaitins hold that, like Brahman, illusion is not an effect—it isbeginningless (anādi).61 Therefore, also like Brahman, it itself has no other cause.Without positing some other entity that plays an important part in world-creation,Brahmanwouldundergochange.

BHEDĀBHEDAANDTHEUNITYOFPHILOSOPHIES

AlthoughVijñānabhikṣu is a self-describedBhedābhedavādaVedāntin in his earliestworks, he is eager to show his familiarity with the details of the other systems ofthought that were prevalent in late medieval North India. His involvement with theNaiyāyikasisgenerallyoneofappropriatinglogicalconceptsandterminologythathebelieved would allow him to present his own philosophy more rigorously orpersuasively. There is also an apologetic function in his use of Navya-Nyāyaconcepts, since by “translating” Bhedābheda Vedānta into a terminology thatNaiyāyikascanunderstand,hehopestoshowtheviabilityofaphilosophicaltraditionthat by the late medieval period had been savaged by Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, andDvaitapolemics.VijñānabhikṣushowshisfamiliaritywithAdvaita, theotherdominantphilosophical school,primarily throughconstant critiquesof its teachings.But Ihaveshownthat,justasinthecaseoftheNyāya,heisalsoopentotakingconceptsthathe finds inAdvaitaworks(likeBrahmanas locus,adhiṣṭhāna),and recontextualizingthemforuseinarealistphilosophicalsetting.Insomeways,Vijñānabhikṣu’sgeneralworldview isactuallycloser tosixteenth-centuryAdvaitins than it is toeighth-centuryBhedābhedavādins in spite of his shared doctrinal affiliationwith the latter. He, likeotherlatemedievalVedāntins,seesthechangelessnessofBrahman,thecauseoftheworld, as a problem that needs to be explained. Śaṅkara and Bhāskara did not,perhaps because for them, “changelessness” simply meant changelessness ofessence, not changelessness of external form.62 Vijñānabhikṣu, Prakāśānanda, andtheircontemporariesdonotunderstanditinthisway.Another similarity between Vijñānabhikṣu and his sixteenth-century Advaitin

opponents is a more tolerant attitude toward non-Vedāntic schools, most notablySāṃkhya and Yoga. Vedāntins in the eighth century spent a great deal of energycritiquingSāṃkhyaandYoga,particularlythenotionofprakṛti.Bhāskarawasjustasconcerned as Śaṅkara with defeating these philosophical enemies, who appear tohavebeenadominantschoolatthetime.63TheearlyVedānticcommentatorssoughtto show that Sāṃkhya had no basis whatsoever in logical inference or revealedscripture(śruti).ThiswasnotjustadenialofSāṃkhya’sclaimthatprimordialprakṛtiwas insentient and uncreated but also included the rejection of apparently morebenignSāṃkhyateachings,suchasthetheoryofthethreeguṇas.64By the sixteenth century Sāṃkhya had ceased to be an independent intellectual

force to rival the Vedānta. In his own commentary on the Sāṃkhyasūtras,Vijñānabhikṣudescribes it asa veryold school, “devouredby thesunof time,” andseeshisprojectasarehabilitationofSāṃkhya.65Yetwhile ithadvirtuallyceasedtoexistatallasanindependentschool,ittriumphedinadifferentway:itsinfluencehadpermeatedmanydifferentphilosophicaltraditionsandtexts.So,forinstance,thetermprakṛtiinmedievalAdvaitabecomesacceptedasasynonymformāyā.Aslongasitis understood that prakṛti is not ultimately real, Advaitins see no contradiction inadoptingthenotionofaprakṛtidividedintothreeguṇas.MedievalAdvaitinsbegintoseeSāṃkhyaandYogaasvaluableandcomplementaryteachingstoVedānta.Inthe

contextofmedievalVedānta,Vijñānabhikṣu’sacceptanceofSāṃkhyateachingsonaconventional(vyāvahārika) level inhiscommentaryontheBrahmasūtras isnotatallsurprising. But Vijñānabhikṣu goes further than that. In his post-Vedāntic works, heceasestoidentifyhimselfexclusivelyasaVedāntinandambitiouslyattemptstoshowthefundamentalunityamongtheapparentdifferencesoftheVedānta,Sāṃkhya,andYogaschools. Inchapter4, I turn tohiscomplicated relationshipwithSāṃkhyaandYogatraditions,alongwiththetangledhistoryofGodinSāṃkhyaandYoga.

[4]AHISTORYOFGODINSĀṂKHYAANDYOGA

SĀṂKHYA:ANATHEISTPHILOSOPHY?

AlthoughVijñānabhikṣu’sworksonSāṃkhyaandYogahaveearnedhimmostofhisfame in themodern period, they have also been the objects of some controversy.This ambivalence is encapsulated in the Indologist Richard Garbes relationship toVijñānabhikṣus commentary on theSāṃkhyasūtras, the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya.Garbe was almost single-handedly responsible for the notoriety of this work, as itwashewhoeditedtheSanskrittextandfirsttranslatedit.YetGarbeconsideredthetexttobeaninauthenticexpressionoftheSāṃkhyaphilosophyinseveralways.Themost important ofVijñānabhikṣu’s divergences from the trueSāṃkhyadoctrinewashis affirmation of Gods existence, in spite of theSāṃkhyasūtras clear rejection ofGod.Garbewrites:“InordertobridgeoverthechasmbetweentheSāṃkhyasystemandhisowntheism(whichhe ispleasedtostyleVedāntic),Vijñānabhikṣuresorts tothestrangestmeanstodoawaywithoneofthefundamentaldoctrinesofthegenuineSāṃkhya,which is thedenialofGod.”1But forGarbe,Vijñānabhikṣualso failsasarepresentative of Vedānta philosophy.Demonstrating a bias in favor of theAdvaiticinterpretationoftheUpaniṣads,GarbewritesofVijñānabhikṣu:

SomekindredspirithadalreadyidentifiedthemāyāoftheVedāntawiththeprakṛtioftheSāṃkhya,namelyintheŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad,4.10;andaccordinglyourcommentatordoesnotscrupletomakethemostofthisidentificationasascripturalone;andrepeats indiversplacesofhiswork…theexplanationthatbymāyā inScriptureismeantnaughtelsethanrealmatter.InviewofallofthiswecanhardlybesurprisedtofindthatVijñānabhikṣumixesupmanyotherheterogeneous

matters,andevenquiteeffacestheindividualityoftheseveralphilosophicalsystems….NeverthelessinspiteofallofthefalseassumptionsandtheerrorsofwhichVijñānabhikṣuisundoubtedlyguilty,hiscommentaryontheSāṃkhya Sūtras must be declared to be not only the fullest source that we have for a knowledge of theSāṃkhyasystem,butalsooneofthemostimportantofsuchsources.2

This mixing up of heterogeneous matters, which is frequently given the name“syncretism,”isultimatelywhatledIndologiststolabelVijñānabhikṣuasanunreliable

representativeofhisownculturalheritage.YetGarbe’sstatementcontainsanumberofunwarrantedassumptionsaboutthehistoryofIndianphilosophy.Themostobviousof these isabarelyveiledhostility towardtherealistschoolsofVedāntaphilosophy.AsIsuggested in theprecedingchapters,suchanattitude isbasedprimarilyonthesupremacyandantiquityoftheAdvaitaschoolintheOrientalistimagination.However,a preponderance of historical evidence identifies the realist schools as older thanAdvaiticantirealism.Therefore, ifonewishes todefine theauthenticVedāntaas theschoolclosesttotheoriginalviewsoftheBrahmasūtras’author,thenrealism,andnotidealism,winsout.EvenwithintheAdvaitaschool,thereareavarietyofviewsfallingatdifferentpointsontherealist/ idealistspectrum.Atoneendaredoctrinessuchastheextreme illusionismof the sixteenth-centuryAdvaitinPrakāśānanda; at the otheraretherealistornearlyrealistpositionsexpressedintheearlyworksofŚaṅkara.Oneassumption inGarbe’s statement that has received less attention is that the

Sāṃkhya school is unambiguously atheistic in its outlook, and hence thereforeVijñānabhikṣu’s viewsare illegitimate. This assumption is less obviously problematiconly because the conventional wisdom expressed by Garbe in the late nineteenthcentury isstill theconventionalwisdom in theearly twenty-first.Yet it, too, isbasedonoversimplificationsandon thearbitraryprivilegingofcertain “classical” textsoverothers that Indologists have not deemed fit to include in the Sāṃkhya canon. Thisconventionalwisdomhasbeen repeatedagainandagain in thesecondary literaturewithoutcriticalscrutinyorcrosscheckingoftheSanskrittextsthemselves.Therefore,before embarking on an analysis of Vijñānabhikṣu’s argumentative strategies in hisSāṃkhya works, it is necessary to provide an overview of Sāṃkhya history,especiallyvis-à-visthequestionoftheexistenceofGod.

THEISMINEARLYSĀṂKHYAANDTHEPURĀṆAS

AlthoughphilosopherstypicallybegintheiraccountsofSāṃkhyawiththe“classical”Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’sSāṃkhyakārikā (fourth to fifth century CE), when talkingabout the question of God in Sāṃkhya, it is necessary to go back to the verybeginning, to the earliest occurrences of the word sāṃkhya and the allusions toSāṃkhyaconcepts in theUpaniṣads,Arthaśāstra,andMahābhārata.3For instance,theŚvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (fourth to second century bce) makes statements that,althoughallegorical,almostcertainlyrefer toSāṃkhyaconcepts likeprakṛti,puruṣa,andthethreeguṇas:

One[unborn]billygoat,delighting, lieswithone[unborn]she-goat,who iscoloredred,white,andblack,andwhogivesbirthtomanyoffspringwiththesamecolors.Another[unborn]billygoat leavesheraftershehastakenenjoyment.4

Although Sāṃkhya authors, unlike their Vedāntic counterparts, do not habituallyargueon thebasisof scripturalauthority, this is thepassage thatcomesclosest tothe status of a Sāṃkhya “great statement” (mahāvākya). It appears in the

benedictory verses to Vācaspati Miśra’sSāṃkhyatattvakaumudī and three times inVijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya. Italsoseems tohavebeenusedby theSāṃkhyas in defense of their own doctrines in the eighth century CE and earlier.Śaṅkaraattributessuchascripturallybasedargument toaSāṃkhyaadversaryandspendsafairamountoftimearguingthatthe“[unborn]she-goat”(ajā)doesnotrefertoprakṛtiandthatherthreecolorsdonotrefertothethreeguṇas.5TheŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣadalsocontainstheearliestmentionofthenameKapila,themythicalfounderof theSāṃkhya school.6 Aswith the other apparent references to Sāṃkhya in thisUpaniṣad,Śaṅkaramustarguethisallusionaway,bysayingthatthetextinfactreferstoVāsudeva,whoissometimescalledKapila.7Śaṅkaraisnotaloneinmakingthesearguments. Sāṃkhya seems to have been one of the principal adversaries of theearly Vedānta, and Bhāskara makes similar arguments to counter what wereapparently Sāṃkhya’s appeals to scriptural authority.8 It is quite likely that earlierVedānticcommentatorsdid thesame,as refutationsofSāṃkhyaclaimsarewrittenintotheBrahmasūtrasthemselves.9What is most notable about these frequent allusions to what are now known as

distinctivelySāṃkhyaconcepts,however,istheirgeneralcontextintheŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad.BesidesbeingknownasaheavilySāṃkhya-influencedUpaniṣad,itisalsoone of the most theistic. This Upaniṣad makes frequent reference to a powerfulpersonal deity, known by terms such as Lord (īśa),God (deva), Rudra, and Hara.Nor are references to a personal deity kept separate in the text from allusions toSāṃkhya concepts—on the contrary, this Upaniṣad integrates these SāṃkhyaconceptswiththeideaofapowerfulGod.10Thesameisthecasefortheothermainsource for early Sāṃkhya, theMahābhārata. TheMoksadharma Parvan and theBhagavadGītā sections of this epic contain frequent allusions toSāṃkhya, but yetthey are thoroughly theistic. It is a peculiar position to conclude from this that theSāṃkhyataughtintheUpaniṣadsandtheepicsarethereforeconfusedorcorrupted.Nonetheless, this claim is frequentlymade by historians of philosophywriting aboutthis early phase ofSāṃkhya.11 Inmaking this claim, they project back froma laterphaseof(allegedly)atheisticSāṃkhyatoconcludethatearlierSāṃkhyaissomehowimpure. Often the assumption is that there existed a separate atheistic school ofSāṃkhyaataveryearlyperiod.Althoughnowritingssurvivefromthisschool,someofitsbasicteachingssomehowfoundtheirwayintotextsliketheUpaniṣadsandtheepics,wheretheywerethoroughlyconfusedandcompromisedbytheism.Yetthereisabsolutelynohistoricalor textualevidence tosupportsuchaclaim; indeed, there issome fairly strong evidence to the contrary. It is more likely that to the extentSāṃkhya existed at all in the Upaniṣadic and epic periods, it existed as part of awidertheisticworldview.Often the position that there was an early school of purely atheistic Sāṃkhya is

argued on philosophical grounds. Commentators frequently allege that God islogically superfluous in the Sāṃkhya system.12 For God has nothing to do in theSāṃkhyacosmology.Heisnotneededtoeffecttheunionofprakṛtiandpuruṣa,sincetheattractionbetweenthetwoisautomatic,liketheattractionbetweenamagnetand

iron.TheSāṃkhyasystemisapurelymechanisticone,andthesuperfluityofGodisattested to by his uncomfortable situation in Patañjali’s Yogasūtras. There theexistenceofGodistaught,butasaGodwhohaslittlepositiveroletoplayotherthantobeanobjectofdevotionandmeditativecontemplation.Surely,proponentsof thispictureoftheearlySāṃkhyasuggest,theintroductionofGodintheSāṃkhyaoftheUpaniṣadsandepics,and in theschoolofYogaphilosophy, ismerelyanattempt toappealtopopularprejudicesandnotsupportedphilosophicallyinanyway.This argument of the logical superfluity ofGod in Sāṃkhya also rests on certain

assumptionsthatseemself-evidentonlyduetothehistoricalacceptanceofauthenticSāṃkhyaasatheisticbymodernscholars.Anothercompellingphilosophicalargumentisthatprakṛtiandpuruṣathemselvesmusthavesomesuperintendent(adhiṣṭhātṛ),anintelligentbeing,tosettheirunioninmotion.Thisisbecausebeforetheunionofthesetwoentities,prakṛtiexistsinastateoftotalequilibrium,inwhichthethreeguṇasareall present in equalmeasure. It is in a state of complete stasis, andwithout someexternalagenttosetitintomotiontobeginitsseriesoftransformations,suchaunionofthesetwoentitieswouldbeimpossible.Purusacannoteffectthischangebecauseit iseternallyinactive,andprakṛticannotbecauseit is inactiveinitsprimordialstate.Thisisnot,ofcourse,thepositionoftheYogasūtras,inwhichGodhasnoroleinthecreation of the world. But it is precisely this view that is enunciated in PurānicSāṃkhya,asinVisnuPurāṇa1.2.29:“Havingenteredintoprakṛtiandpuruṣabyhisowndesire,at the timeofcreationHari shakes themanifestandunmanifest.”13Wecanputthisargumentintermsofthemetaphorofthemagnetandiron:bothmagnetandironrequireathirdpartytosettheirattractionintomotion.Apieceofironatoneend of the room and a magnet at the other end do not have any effect on oneanother; only when they are brought into proximity by some external force can themagnetattractthepieceofiron.ThisargumentforthenecessityofGodinSāṃkhyawouldhaveseemedevenmore

compelling, given the generally theistic environment in which these texts werecomposed.14Oneof the reasons thatmoderncommentatorshavebeenso insistenton the atheismof the trueSāṃkhya school is that for them,Sāṃkhya functions assomething likeanearly Indiananalogue toDarwin’s theoryof evolution.ForGarbe,Sāṃkhya isproof that even in theearliest timesof Indianphilosophical speculation,rigorousandtough-mindedphilosophiescoexistedwiththemoreotherworldlyfocusofschools such as Advaita Vedānta. Marxist historians, such as DebiprasadChattopadhyaya, have also given attention to Sāṃkhya, along with Cārvāka andBuddhist philosophies, in order to argue for a thriving atheist tradition in ancientIndia.15However,evidencefortheatheismoftheearliestSāṃkhya(sometimescalled“proto-Sāṃkhya” in order to contrast with the mature, atheistic form of “classicalSāṃkhya”)isvirtuallynonexistent.16BesidesthesefrequentallusionstoSāṃkhyaconceptsintheUpaniṣadsandinthe

Mahābhārata,wealsofindthetermssāṃkhyaandyoga themselves,beginningwiththeŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad andwith great frequency in the epic literature. The twoterms also occur in Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra, verse 1.2, where Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and

Lokāyata are described as constituting “investigation” (anvīksikī).17 The question,therefore, is notwhether these termswere used but, rather,what themeanings ofthetermssāṃkhyaandyogawereintheUpaniṣadsandtheepics.Anotherpuzzlefortranslators has been the precise meaning of the compound word sāṃkhyayoga inpreclassical Sāṃkhya, which occurs in the well-known passages ofŚvet. Up. 6.13andBhG5.4.18ThecontextofthewordintheBhagavadGītāindicatesthatitshouldbeunderstoodasadvandva compound,meaning “SāṃkhyaandYoga.”Andbasedon the frequent use of the two terms to contrast with each other in theBhagavadGītā, neither of these two terms denoted a specific system of philosophy. KeepingwiththegeneralthemeofrenunciationversusactionthatisthesubjectofmostoftheBhagavad Gītā, one common interpretation is that the terms sāṃkhya and yogacorrespondwith thewayofknowledgeand thewayofaction, respectively19This istheusageinBhG3.3,forinstance:“Itaughtinancienttimesthatinthisworldthereisatwo-foldfoundation:OftheSāṃkhyasitistheyogaofknowledge(jñānayoga),andoftheYoginsitistheyogaofaction(karmayoga)”.20Thereisnohintherethatyogareferstosomesettledsetofphilosophicaldoctrines.Furthermore,sāṃkhyadoesnotseem to correspond to any particular philosophy but, rather, to any type ofcontemplation that can bring about salvation.21 There are a great diversity ofmeanings of the words sāṃkhya and yoga in the epic, and even variation withinspecific sections.21 But it is clear that nowhere in theBhagavadGītā are the twotermssāṃkhyaandyogaunderstoodinthewaythattheyweregenerallyunderstoodby themedievals andmoderns: Sāṃkhya as a particular philosophical system thatteachesatheismandYogaasadifferentbutcloselyrelatedsystemthatteachestheexistenceofGod.Tocomplicatemattersfurther,thereisanenigmaticoccurrenceofthetwotermsin

Vātsyāyana’s (fifth centuryCE) commentaryon theNyāyasūtras ofGautama. In hiscommentary on sūtra 1.1.29,Vātsyāyana cites someexamples of the philosophicalconclusions(siddhāntas)ofvariousschools.Accordingtohim,theSāṃkhyasbelievethat “the non-existent does not come into being; the existent cannot be destroyed;conscioussoulsareincapableofmodification;therecanbemodificationonlyinbody,sense-organs,mind,objectsofcognition,andinthecausesofallthese.”23ThesefourconclusionsarecharacteristicofbothĪśvarakṛṣṇa’sSāṃkhyakārikāandofPatañjali’sYogasūtras.However,Vātsyāyanagoesontolistfourconclusionsofthosewhomhecalls the “Yogas”: “Thecreationof theworld isdue to thekarman,etc.,of the jīva;defectsandactivityarethecausesofkarman;conscioussoulsarequalifiedbytheirrespectiveattributes;thenon-existentcomesintobeingandthatwhichhascomeintobeing ceases to exist.”24 These four doctrines are not accepted by Patañjali.Furthermore,theyarecontrarytothemostfundamentalviewsofSāṃkhyaandYoga—forinstance,thedoctrineofsatkāryavāda iscontradictedbythefourthconclusion,that“thenon-existentcomesintobeingandthatwhichhascomeintobeingceasestoexist.”Inshort,thefourviewsdescribedbyVātsyāyanaasbelongingtothe“Yogas”areapparentlythedoctrinesofNyāya-Vaiśeṣika.25Theevidence from theMahābhārataand theNyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana should

introduce some doubt among those who would wish to understand the wordssāṃkhyaandyogainŚvet.Up.6.13andKautilya’sArthaśāstra1.2.10asreferringtowhatarelaterknownasSāṃkhyaandYoga.JohannesBronkhorstsuggeststhatthefirst usage of the word yoga as referring to Patañjali’s philosophy is not untilŚaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (eighth century). Even after this, pātañjaladarśanaandseśvarasāṃkhyaweremorecommonepithetsforhissystem.26Therefore,whenKautilyawritesinArthaśāstra1.2.10that“investigation”(anvīksikī) is foundprimarilyin the three systems Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata, it is quite unlikely that heunderstood Sāṃkhya and Yoga to refer to the systems of Kapila and Patañjali,respectively.Itismuchmorelikely,althoughbynomeanscertain,thatthesāṃkhyaoftheArthaśāstra refers to some form of theistic Sāṃkhya. The word yoga, on theother hand, would have very likely referred to either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or both.Bronkhorst argues that “if Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika existed when this sentence waswritten,theywouldbelonginthelist.Itisthereforewisetoassumethatthey—oroneof them—are representedby theword ‘Yoga’, rather than thatour ‘Yogasystem’ ismeant.”27Inlightoftheseotheroccurrences,theusageofsāṃkhyayogaatŚvet.Up.6.13is

more comprehensible: “Having known that cause, which is attainable by means ofsāṃkhyayoga, asGod, he is freed from all fetters.” It should be understoodmorealong the lines of the usage of sāṃkhya andyoga in theBhagavadGītā than theirusage in theNyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana. Because the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad ’sdate of composition is from six hundred to one thousand years before theNyāyabhāṣya, it is likely that the termssāṃkhya andyoga did not refer to specificdoctrinal systems but, instead, to contemplation and practice, respectively. Thecompound word at Śvet. Up. 6.13 could either be a dvandva, “philosophicalinvestigation and spiritual praxis,” or a karmadhāraya, “the spiritual praxis that isphilosophical investigation.” The first interpretation is favored by the tradition (e.g.,Śaṅkara’scommentaryontheŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad).28Althoughmanyscholarsnowadaysagreethattheearly,prephilosophicaltraditionof

Sāṃkhya,sometimescalled“proto-Sāṃkhya,”isgenerallytheisticinitsoutlook,theyclaim that that all changes as Sāṃkhya matures as a philosophical doctrine,particularlyintheSāṃkhyakārikāofĪśvarakṛṣṇa.Sāṃkhyacommentatorstreatthreetexts as fundamental: the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the Tattvasamāsasūtras (ascribed toKapila), and theSāṃkhyasūtras (alsoattributed toKapila). The two sūtra texts arequite late, perhaps as late as the fourteenth century, although both texts seem toinclude some sūtras from earlier periods.29 For that reason,mostmodern scholarstaketheSāṃkhyakārikā(fourthtofifthcenturyCE) tobetheauthoritativeexpressionof the Sāṃkhya philosophy in its mature form. The Sāṃkhyakārikā and theTattvasamāsasūtrasmakenomentionofGod(īśvara),while theydoenumerate thetwenty-five principles (tattvas), including puruṣa, prakṛti, and prakṛti’s twenty-threeevolutes.Unlike theother two texts, theSāṃkhyasūtras explicitly rejectGod. InSS5.10-12, the author lists each of the three means of valid knowledge (pramāṇas)acceptedbytheSāṃkhyaschoolandshowsthatnonecanestablishtheexistenceof

God. At SS 5.2-9, he advances a number of positive arguments refuting thepossibilityof theexistenceofGod.On thebasisof these three texts,mostmodernscholars have claimed that beginning with the Sāṃkhyakārikā, Sāṃkhya was athoroughlyatheisticschoolofthought.Historians of philosophy interested in Sāṃkhya have tended to focus on the

Sāṃkhyakārikā, Tattvasamāsasūtras, and Sāṃkhyasūtras. But the identification ofthesethreetextsastheauthenticrepresentativesof theSāṃkhyaschool leavesoutanenormousbodyofliteraturethatclaimstorepresentSāṃkhyateachings.Mostoftheseworksare theistic in theiroutlook.By far themost influentialof theseare thePurāṇas, whose Sāṃkhya influences are widely acknowledged, if seldom takenseriously as philosophical works in their own right.30 Much of the bias against thePurāṇasbyWesternscholarsofIndianphilosophyseemstobemotivatedbytheideathat the Purāṇas are mythological or literary texts and therefore are notphilosophically rigorous. This ideaof the separation betweenpoetry andphilosophyseems to be an unwarranted influence from the Greek tradition on WesternIndologists—it isdemonstrablyabsentamongpremodern Indian thinkers.AuthorsofcommentariesonSāṃkhya textsand the textsofotherphilosophicalschools readilyintroducematerialfromPurānicsourcestoelucidatetheteachingsofthephilosophicaltext at hand, and in many cases quote from these Purāṇas themselves to lendscriptural support to their arguments. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa (tenth century), themost influential of all Purāṇas, has been the object of dozens of commentaries byphilosophicalauthorsandistreatedbysomeVedānticschools,suchasthefollowersofCaitanya,asanauthorityonaparwiththeVedasthemselves.TheBhāgavataPurāṇaincludesalengthysectionthatpurportstobeanaccountof

Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya school, teaching its doctrines to his motherDevahūti.31 Kapila himself is depicted as an incarnation ofNārāyana and teaches aform of Sāṃkhya that is integrated both with the practice of bhakti and with aVedāntic conception of Brahman. However, as Dasgupta has pointed out, theVedāntic teachings presented in the Purāṇas are generally not compatible with theteachings of Śaṅkara and, instead, have more in common with Rāmānuja andVijñānabhikṣu.Hecontraststothe“semi-realisticinterpretation”oftheUpaniṣadsthatis found in the earliest Purāṇas with Śaṅkara’smonism and suggests that it is theformer thatpresents “theoldestoutlookof thephilosophyof theUpaniṣadsand theBrahma-sūtra.”32 It should therefore not be surprising that Advaita Vedāntins lessfrequently quote the Purāṇas. For Vedāntins of other affiliations, however, thePurāṇasstandsidebysidewiththeBhagavadGītāasthemostimportantsmrtitexts.Whateverwemightmake of the alleged lack of logical rigor of the Purāṇas, the

historian of Indian philosophy can ignore Purānic Sāṃkhya only at his or her peril.PartofthedismissalofthePurāṇasbyearlierscholarsprobablyhadsomethingtodowiththeirapparentdisagreementwith,andirrelevanceto,thedoctrinesoftheAdvaitaVedānta school. Yet, given the strong influence of the Purāṇas on numerousphilosophicalauthors,acompletehistoricalaccountoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofthe different philosophical systems requires thatwe take thePurāṇas into account.

Vijñānabhikṣu himself wrote a commentary on the Īśvaragītā section of theKūrmaPurāṇaandbelievedthatcommentingonthistextwastantamounttocommentingontheBhagavadGītāitself.AsIdiscussinchapter5,thetechniquesthatVijñānabhikṣuusesinhisattempttounifytheapparentlycontradictoryschoolsofāstikaphilosophyhavemuchof theirbasis inportrayalsofdoctrinal conflict and resolution inPurāṇassuchastheVisnuPurāṇa.

ATHEISMANDTHEISMIN“CLASSICAL”SĀṂKHYA

Although exponents of the view that the authentic Sāṃkhya is atheistic can freelyadmit that Purānic Sāṃkhya is theistic simply by saying that it represents apopularizedordebasedformoftherealdoctrines,moreseriousproblemsarisewhenthecommentariesontheSāṃkhyakārikāarereadcarefully.JohannesBronkhorsthasargued that all of the pre-second-millennium commentaries on the SāṃkhyakārikāaccepttheexistenceofGod(īśvara).33Althoughthisdoesnotnecessarily implythatĪśvarakṛṣṇahimselfacceptedtheexistenceofGod,itnonethelessalmostcompletelyoverturns the conventional wisdom regarding the history of the Sāṃkhya school. Iftrue, it would mean that the majority of Sāṃkhya authors historically have beentheistic,andonlyafewrelativelylatetexts,liketheSāṃkhyasūtras,canberegardedasunambiguouslyatheisticinoutlook.Bronkhorst bases his argument for the theism of theSāṃkhya school in the first

millennium on a number of commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā: primarily theYuktidīpikā,butalsotheMāṭharavṛttiandGauḍapādabhāṣya.Allofthesetextsallowfor theexistenceofsome formofGod (īśvara).However, thisseems tohavebeenoverlooked by almost allmodern scholars of Sāṃkhya because of the understatedway that these texts talk about God. The Yuktidīpikā, apparently the oldestcommentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, has frequently been mistaken as arguing anatheistic position. This interpretation is based on an inattentive reading of the text.Theanonymousauthorof theYuktidīpikāspendssignificant timearguingagainst theview that theworldwas createdbyGod, a positionheattributes to thePāśupatasandVaiśeṣikas.34However,closeinspectionofthetextrevealsthattheauthoroftheYuktidīpikādoesbelieveinsomesortofGod.Inonepassage,forinstance,atheisticopponentmakes themistakeofbelieving that theSāṃkhya rejectsGodentirely.Tothis, theYuktidīpikā ’s author responds that Sāṃkhyas do accept the existence ofGod:

Opponent:Furthermore,scriptureteachesthathepossessesaform,“wearingaskin,”“Pinākabowinhand,”“havingadrawnbow,”“black-crested,”etc.Ifthisisaccepted,yourviewisrefuted.Fromthelanguageofthescriptures, aGodwho possesses a form is accepted, and therefore his existence is established. For it isimpossibleforanonexistentthingtopossessaform.Reply: This, too, ismistaken, since you do not understand our intendedmeaning.Wedo not completely

rejecttheparticularpoweroftheLord,sinceheassumesamajesticbodyandsoforth.Ourintendedmeaningisjustthatthereisnobeingwhoisdifferentfromprakṛtiandpuruṣaandwhoistheinstigatorofthesetwo,asyou claim. Therefore, your view is refuted. The conjunction betweenprakṛti andpuruṣa is not instigated byanotherbeing.35

Theviewexpressedhereseemssimilar to theviewofPatañjali ’sYogasūtras.Godexists,buthedoesnothaveanypart in thecreationof theworld.Furthermore, theYuktidīpikā ’s author clarifies that there is no need to posit a twenty-sixth principleover andaboveprakṛtiandpuruṣa As in theYogasūtras, God is a special puruṣa,one distinct from ordinary puruṣas in certain ways but nonetheless, like thosepuruṣas,isconstitutedbypureawareness.AsPatañjalidefinesGodinYS1.24,heisa “special puruṣa, unaffected by defilements, actions, the results of actions, andunconscious traces.”36 According to the Yuktidīpikā, God is also capable of beingembodied in some form, in the aforementioned “majestic body,” and also quitepossibly in bodies of supreme seers like Kapila.37 This would explain why it is notnecessaryfortheSāṃkhyakārikāandtheTattvasamāsasūtras todescribeatwenty-sixthprinciplenamedGod(īśvara).If the views of the Yuktidīpikā regarding God were an anomaly among

commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, it might be possible to dismiss the text asinfluenced by the foreign views of another philosophical school, the Yoga school.However,acceptanceoftheexistenceofGodwastheruleratherthantheexceptionamong commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā in the first millennium CE. Two othercommentaries, theGauḍapādabhāṣya andMātharavṛtti, also take for granted theexistenceofGodin theSāṃkhyasystem.Furthermore, theydosobydrawingevenmoreexplicitly on the notion ofGod found inPatañjali.Both texts, in the context ofdiscussing thepurity of the intellect (buddhi) described inSK23, explicitly draw onthe lists at YS 2.30 and 2.32 where the abstentions (yamas) and observances(niyamas) are enumerated. And like the Yogasūtras, both list devotion to God(īśvarapraṇidhāna) among the observances. Both texts also explicitly deny thepossibility that God himself could have created the world. According to theGauḍapādabhāṣya,“Godisfreeoftheguṇas,andthereforeitdoesnotmakesensethattheworld,whichismadeupoftheguṇas,couldbecreatedbyhim.”38The most influential of all of the first-millennium commentaries on the

Sāṃkhyakārikā is undoubtedly the Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati Miśra (late tenthcentury). Like theSāṃkhyakārikā itself, Vācaspati’s commentary does not explicitlymention God, and hence neither affirms nor denies his existence. However, theTattvakaumudī does implicitly accept God. Like the Gauḍapādabhāṣya and theMātharavrttiwhencommentingonSāṃkhyakārikāverse23,VācaspatirefersreaderstoPatañjali’seight-limbedyogawhenexplainingspecifictechniquesforpurificationofthe intellect. SoVācaspatiwrites: “The virtue brought about by the performance ofsacrifices,charity,etc. isthecauseofgoodfortune.Thevirtuebroughtaboutbythepracticeofeight-limbedyogaisthecauseofliberation.”39Ofcourse,Patañjali’seight-limbed yoga includes devotion to God (īśvarapranidhāna) among the observances(niyamas).AlthoughVācaspatineverwritestheword“God,”heimpliesthatdevotiontoGod is part of theSāṃkhya systemby referringhis readers toPatañjali’s eight-limbedyoga.Vācaspatioccupiesan intriguingplace in thehistoryof Indianphilosophybecause

ofhisinfluenceonawiderangeofphilosophicalschools.Hewrotecommentarieson

textsfromtheVedānta,Sāṃkhya,Yoga,Nyāya,andPūrvaMīmāṃsātraditions.Thetradition characterizes him as sarvatantrasvatantra, “a master of all systems, yetdependent on none.” For instance, thanks to his well-known subcommentary onŚaṅkara’sBrahmasūtrabhāṣya, theBhāmatī,Advaitins typically claimhimasoneoftheir own, and one of the two most influential schools of post-Śaṅkara Advaita isnamedafterthiswork.Vācaspatididnotjustrepeattheviewsofothers—inmanyofthesecommentaries,herefinedandimprovedtheoriesorevenofferednewones.Yetunlike Vijñānabhikṣu, Vācaspati endeavored to keep the strands of thought in hisvariouscommentariesseparate. Inspiteof theapparentcontradictionsbetween theAdvaiticteachingsoftheBhāmatīandtheSāṃkhyaandYogaoftheTattvakaumudī,he makes no attempt to resolve these contradictions by underpinning Sāṃkhya’sdualismwith aVedānticmetaphysics, asVijñānabhikṣudoes.Thismight lead somereaders toask thequestion:WhatwereVācaspati’sactualviewsconcerning issueslikethepluralityorunityofsoulsandtheontologicalstatusofthephenomenalworld?As discussed here, the Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta are at odds on these andmanyotherissues.BesideshisSāṃkhyacommentary, theTattvakaumudī,Vācaspatialsoauthoreda

commentary on the Yogasūtras, entitled Tattvavaiśāradī (Learned Treatise on thePrinciples).UnliketheTattvakaumudī,theTattvavaiśāradīmakesexplicitreferencetoGod, especially in those sūtras where Patañjali mentions God (īśvara): TV 1.23,1.24, and 2.45. Like Vijñānabhikṣu and the Yuktidīpikā, Vācaspati sees God assomethingmorethanapassiveentitywhoseplaceintheuniverseissimplytobeanobject of meditation or devotion. Instead, God is active in helping Yogins achieveliberation through his grace (anugraha). Although modern scholars frequently insistthatPatañjali’sGodispurelypassive, thisconclusiongoesagainst thecommentarialtraditionsonPatañjali’swork. Isuspectseveral factorsareatwork in the insistenceby thesemodern scholars onGod’s passivity inPatañjali. First, they confuse beingcreator of the world (which God in the Yogasūtras is surely not) with bestowinggrace.40AlthoughGodisnotthecauseoftheworld,itisnonethelesspossiblethathehassomecausalrelationtoentities intheworld.WhileGodisdescribedinYS1.24as “unaffected by defilements, actions, the results of actions, and unconscioustraces,” it isanopenquestionwhetherthisimpliesthathecanhavenoactiveroleintheworld.AstheYuktidīpikā’sdepictionoftheGodofSāṃkhyasuggests,itmaybepossibleforGodtobeembodiedandactiveintheworldwithoutbeingaffectedbythefourtypesofimpuritieslistedinYS1.24.TheinsistenceonGod’scompletepassivitymight also be an attempt to keep the role ofGod in theYoga systemas small aspossible, based on the assumption that God is actually out of place in both theSāṃkhya and Yoga systems. From a historical standpoint, it is this antitheisticimpulse that isoutofplace.Contrary topopularbelief,mostSāṃkhyasandYoginsdidnotseeaproblemwithincludingGodintheirsystem.

SĀṂKHYAANDYOGA

The history of Sāṃkhya is inextricably intertwined with the history of what is nowcalled the Yoga school of philosophy. The most common understanding of thedifference betweenSāṃkhya andYoga bymodern scholars is that one is atheisticwhile theotheracceptsGod.Butonce it isestablished that theearlycommentarieson theSāṃkhyakārikā accepted the existence of God, there seems little basis fordifferentiating betweenSāṃkhya and Yoga. As discussed in the preceding section,theseearlySāṃkhyacommentaries themselvesquote theYogasūtraswithapprovalregardingtheexistenceofGod.EvenVācaspatiMiśra,ascholarwhowasnotpronetomixingupdoctrinesfromseparatesystems,referstoPatañjali’seight-limbedYogainordertoelucidateapointonthequestionoftheintellect(buddhi)astaughtbytheSāṃkhyas.41 Perhaps it is entirely mistaken to think that from early times, twoseparatephilosophicalschoolsexisted,onenamedSāṃkhyaandtheotherYoga.AsJohannesBronkhorsthasprovocativelyclaimed:

WemustconcludethatthereneverwasaseparateYogaphilosophy.Thisissayingmorethanthatthe“Yogaphilosophy”iscloselyrelatedwithSāṃkhya,orevenanoldschoolofthelatter.Itentailsthattheearlyhistoryofthe Yoga school of Sāṃkhya cannot be written, not because there is not sufficient material available, asFrauwallnermaintains,butsimplybecauseithasnoearlyhistoryandcanhavenone.42

EvenintheYogasūtrasthemselves,thereisnoevidencethatyogaisunderstoodtorefer toadistinctphilosophical school.Vyāsa’scommentaryon theYogasūtras, theearliestavailabletous,referstoPatanjali’sworkas“Patañjali’sauthoritativebookonYoga,expositoryofSāṃkhya.”43Therefore,Vyāsaseemsto thinkhe iscommentingon a text that belonged to the Sāṃkhya school—otherwise, why refer to it as“expository of Sāṃkhya”?44 The widely used name “Yogasūtras” is not a labelPatañjaligivestohisowntextbutonethatcamelater.It ispresumablyonthebasisonYS1.1: “Now,anexpositionofYoga.”45Yoga isclearly the topicof the text.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatyogashouldbetakenasthenameofaphilosophicalschool.The foundational text of the Mīmāṃsakas, for instance, Jaimini’sMīmāṃsāsūtras,begins, “Now, an inquiry into Dharma,”46 and Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtras, thefoundationaltextoftheVedāntaschool,begins“Now,aninquiryintoBrahman.”47Thefirst line of these sūtras simply establishes the topic of investigation, withoutnecessarilyreferringtoanyparticularschool.Thepreponderanceofevidencesuggeststhat theYogasūtrasandSāṃkhyakārikā

werenotunderstoodbytheirearlycommentarial traditionsasbeingthefoundationaltexts of two separate and at times conflicting schools of thought. Instead, theYogasūtras were themselves considered to be a text belonging to the Sāṃkhyaphilosophicaltradition,albeitonewithaparticularfocus.WhiletheSāṃkhyakārikā isprimarilyinterestedinenumerationofthetwenty-fivemetaphysicalprinciples(tattvas)and their relation to each other, the Yogasūtras proceeds from this metaphysicalbackdrop to describe the practical means to liberation. The focus on the practicalmeans to liberation and particularly on the acquisition of superhuman powers(vibhūtis) is not found in the Sāṃkhyakārikā. But with regard to philosophicaldoctrines, there is little thatdifferentiatesone text fromtheother.Thecommentarial

traditions onboth texts generally acceptGod, albeit aGodwhohadnopart in thecreation of the universe. Commentators believed that God is capable of bringingaboutchangeintheworld,bothbytemporarilyassumingbodilyformintheworld(asaccording to the Yuktidīpikā) and by bestowing grace upon Yogins striving forliberation (as according to Vācaspati’s commentary on the Yogasūtras, theTattvavaiśāradī).AlthoughthisgeneralpictureholdsformostofthefirstmillenniumCE,graduallythe

idea that Yoga and Sāṃkhya represent two separate schools became increasinglywidespread. Bronkhorst traces the notion that there are two different but relatedphilosophical schools toŚaṅkara’s commentary onBS2.1.3. There Śaṅkara writesthat “by the rejection of the Sāṃkhya tradition, the Yoga tradition has also beenrejected.”48 However, Śaṅkara makes no mention of what distinguishes the Yogaschool from theSāṃkhyaschool,andhemakesmostofhispolemicalexertions forthesakeof refuting theschoolhecallsSāṃkhya.Around thesame time, thenotionthattherearetwoschools,onewithGod(seśvara)andonewithoutGod(nirīśvara)beginsto takeshape,not inSāṃkhyaworksthemselvesbut in theaccountsof theiropponents.TheJainadoxographerHaribhadra(eighthcentury),forinstance,wasoneof the first to categorize the schools (darśanas) into six categories in hisṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya.Unlike later lists,however,Haribhadradoesnotmention theYogaasaseparategroupapart fromtheSāṃkhya. Instead,hissixschoolsaretheBuddhists, Naiyāyikas, Sāṃkhyas, Jainas, Vaiśeṣikas, and Mīmāṃsakas. ButHaribhadraremarksinverse35that“SomeSāṃkhyasareatheists,whileothershaveĪśvaraastheirdeity.Butforallofthem,thereare25principles.”49NotethatnowhereinthistextisthenotionofaYogaschoolofphilosophyintroduced;HaribhadrahereissimplytalkingabouttheSāṃkhyaschool.Haribhadra’sdiscussionofSāṃkhyaseemstogoagainstBronkhorst’sthesis,since

Bronkhorst maintains that there was no school of atheistic Sāṃkhya in the eighthcentury. One possibility is that Haribhadra was reading the Sāṃkhyakārikāindependentofitscommentaries,ordidnotreadthemcarefully.TheSāṃkhyakārikāis,ofcourse,“withoutGod”inaveryliteralsense—Godisnevermentioned.AmorelikelyexplanationisoneadvancedbyBronkhorstwithreferencetotwoeighth-centuryBuddhist texts, Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha and its commentary, Kamalaśīla’sPañjikā. Both texts give a description of the doctrine of “Sāṃkhya with God.”Kamalaśīladescribes thisGodas “theunbornonewhocontrolscreation,existence,and destruction.”50 Although this passage clearly cannot describe the doctrines ofPatañjali (who denies thatGod creates theworld), it could refer to any number ofothergroupsortexts.TheVisnuandKūrmaPurāṇasfrequentlydepictGodasbeingresponsible for the world’s creation and the activation of the principles of prakṛtiandpuruṣa, as do the texts of the Pāñcarātras. Therefore, by nirīśvara sāṃkhya,Haribhadramightmore preciselymean “Sāṃkhyaswithout a creatorGod,” and byseśvarasāṃkhya,“SāṃkhyaswithacreatorGod.”Although Haribhadra may not have had Patañjali in mind when referring to

“SāṃkhyawithGod,” laterthinkersexplicitly identify itasthephilosophyofPatañjali.

The most influential of the later texts that make this identification is theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha of the Advaita Vedānta doxographer Mādhava (fourteenthcentury). He devotes one section to the Sāṃkhya with God and another to theSāṃkhyawithoutGod,whichheidentifiesastheviewofĪśvarakṛṣṇa.Andheisclearin what he means by “Sāṃkhya without a God.” According to Mādhava, theSāṃkhyakārikāanditsfollowersrejectGodcompletely.ThefollowersofPatañjali,hesuggests,are“SāṃkhyawithGod”becausetheyacceptGod,albeitaGodwhodoesnot have any role in the creation of theworld. Even at such a late date, however,Mādhavadoesnot identifyPatañjali’s schoolas “Yoga.” It isonly in two later texts,Mādhavasarasvatī’s Sarvadarśanakaumudī and Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, where “Yoga” is first used to denote the school ofPatañjali.51TheprimarypurposeoftheforegoingdiscussionwastoshowthatbeliefinGodwaswidespread among Sāṃkhya authors throughout most of the history of Indianphilosophy. While the relationship between Sāṃkhya and Yoga is a complex andmuch-argued topic, there is substantial evidence to suggest that before the eighthcenturyCE therewaslittleornounderstandingofthetwoasdistinctschoolsholdingconflicting philosophical theories. However, most medieval authors did perceiveSāṃkhyaandYogaas two separate schools, onepreachingatheismand theotherpreachingtheism.ThispresentsaparticularinterpretivechallengeforVijñānabhikṣu,amedieval commentator who argued for the unity of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta.Howcantherebeanysuchunitywhenoneoftheschoolsrejectsabasictenetoftheother two, the existence of God? This question is a challenge that VijñānabhikṣuaddressesinhiscommentaryontheSāṃkhyasūtras,theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya.Ofcourse,hedoesnotdosobyhistoricallycontextualizing the textsof these threeschools, as I have done in this chapter. In chapter 5, I show how he adopts aningenious interpretive strategy based on an appeal to the intention of each text’sauthor and on an understanding of the “proper scope” of each of the āstikaphilosophicalschools.

[5]READINGAGAINSTTHEGRAINOFTHESĀMKHYASŪTRAS

ATHEISMINTHESĀMKHYASŪTRAS

In chapter 4, I addressed the oft-repeated notion that the fundamental differencebetweentheSāṃkhyaandYogaschoolsisontheexistenceofGod:Yogaistheisticand Sāṃkhya is an atheist school Like many other truisms in the history of Indianphilosophy,thisstatementfallsapartwhenexaminedcloselyButthereisonetext,thelatemedievalSāṃkhyasūtras, that reverseshistorical trendsbyofferingasustainedand systematic disproof of the existence ofGod. Although thiswork is traditionallyascribed to themythic teacherKapila, evidence internal to the text suggests that itcamelongaftertheSāṃkhyakārikāofĪśvarakṛṣṇa,perhapsaslateasthefourteenthcenturyTheSāṃkhyasūtras also contain repetitions fromother texts,Sāṃkhya andotherwise.RichardGarbepointedoutthat,amongtheVedānticinfluencesonthetext,SS4.3isaword-for-wordrepetitionofBS4.1.1.1YettheSāṃkhyasūtrasarehardlyfriendlytowardAdvaitaVedānta,andtheydevotemanysūtras(e.g.,SS1.150-57)totherefutationofthetheoryofabsolutenon-dualism.For our immediate purposes, theSāṃkhyasūtras aremost notable because they

aretheonlySāṃkhyasource-text thatexplicitlyarguesfor thenonexistenceofGod.Both the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Tattvasamāsasūtras are silent on the subject. Thisallowscommentatorson theseearlier two texts threeoptions: to readSāṃkhyaasaffirmingGod’sexistence,toreaditasrejectingGod’sexistence,ortoremainsilentonthetopic.TheSāṃkhyasūtrasdonotallowasmuchcommentarial leewayon theissue of God as those other texts. Aniruddha, the author of the only extantcommentaryontheSāṃkhyasūtrasearlierthanVijñānabhikṣus,contentshimselfwitha brief and fairly straightforward exposition of the sūtras. Vijñānabhikṣu’scommentary, the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, takes on a much bigger challenge,arguingagainst thegrainof theSāṃkhyasūtras.Vijñānabhikṣuclaimsthat inspiteofKapila’s apparent arguments to the contrary in the Sāṃkhyasūtras, Kapila was

actuallyabelieverintheexistenceofGod.OneoftheSāṃkhyasūtras’usesforVijñānabhikṣuisascorroboratingevidencefor

the existence of a plurality of individual selves (jīvas). This is something he earlierinsisted on in his commentary on the Brahmasūtras and is an obvious attack onAdvaita Vedānta. He begins this attack in his introductory verses to the text: “Thatwhich isexpressed inhundredsofscripturalpassagessuchas ‘Youare that; that isyou,’ thenon-differenceinessentialpropertiesbetweenall theselves, isthetopicofthis text.”2This isacontinuationofhisattempt in theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya to expandthe definition of “difference” and “non-difference” to present a logically consistentphilosophy.Therefore,headds “non-differenceofessentialqualities” (avaidharmya)to the list of possible meanings of abheda (non-difference), along with the non-separation (avibhāga) and complete identity (akhandatā) presented at length in hisearlier works (see chapter 3). In the context of theSāṃkhyasūtras, however, thisparticular form of non-difference pertains not to the relation between the individualselves(jīvas)andBrahmanbuttothemutualrelationsofallofthesedifferentselves.In theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, Vijñānabhikṣu uses the word brahman sparingly,notbecauseheisnolongerinterestedinquestionsregardingBrahmanbutbecauseitliesoutside the scopeof theSāṃkhya. Likewise, in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya,he indiscriminately uses theSāṃkhya termpuruṣa alongside the term for individualself common in the schools of Vedānta, jīva. Here and elsewhere, he seems toconsiderthetermspuruṣaandjīvatobeequivalent.In his lengthy introduction to the Sāṃkhyasūtras, Vijñānabhikṣu expresses his

overallphilosophical-commentarialprojecttoillustratetheharmonyofthemajorāstikaschools more explicitly than anywhere else in his corpus. The schools in play forVijñānabhikṣu are those he identifies as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, andBrahma Mīmāṃsā (also called Vedānta). Although he generally treats the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as one system, he acknowledges that the prima facie understanding ofSāṃkhya and Yoga is as two separate systems. Vijñānabhikṣu states in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya and the Yogavārttika that the most notable differencebetweentheSāṃkhyaandYogaschoolsisonthequestionoftheexistenceofGod.3Therefore,unlikeGauḍapādaandotherearlierSāṃkhyacommentatorswhonotednodifference betweenSāṃkhya and Yoga on the existence ofGod, for Vijñānabhikṣuthe apparent disagreement between the two schools is a given that has to beexplainedawaybyphilosophicalandexegeticalmeans.VijñānabhikṣuregardstheSāṃkhyaasaveryoldschoolandhimselfaseffectinga

sort of Sāṃkhya renaissance. In one of his introductory verses to theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya,hestates,“TheSāṃkhyateaching,ofwhichonlyasmallpart remains, isamoon fullofnectar,devouredby thesunof time. Iwill fill itonceagain with the nectar of my words.”4 However, there is certainly no notion inVijñānabhikṣuthattheSāṃkhyasūtras themselvesareapartofthisrenaissance—heconsiders themtobe theancient,authenticworkofKapila, founderof theSāṃkhyaschool, whomVijñānabhikṣu identifies as an incarnation of Nārāyana.5 By contrast,VijñānabhikṣuneversuggeststhattheVedānta,Nyāya,orYogaschoolsexistonlyas

fragmentary relics of a hoary past, an indication that the lineages of these schoolsweremoreactive than thoseof theSāṃkhya, ifsucha thingasaSāṃkhya lineageexistedatall inthelatesixteenthandearlyseventeenthcenturies.Atthesametime,however,Vijñānabhikṣuclearlyvaluesantiquityand issuspiciousofnewness.This isespecially evident in his favorite epithet for the Advaita Vedāntins, “moderns”(ādhunikas). In spite of the great number of doctrinal innovations in his ownworksand theworksofother schoolsof hisera like theNavya-Nyāya (literally, the “New”Nyāya),Vijñānabhikṣuseesmorerhetoricalbenefitinemphasizingtheantiquityofhisideasthantheirnovelty.VijñānabhikṣuaddressesthequestionofGodinSāṃkhyadirectlyinhisintroduction

andonceagainhiscommentaryonSS1.92and5.12.Heisawarethat,alongwithhisargument for themultiplicity of selves, his argument for the existenceofGod is hismostcontroversial statement in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya.However, these twostatementsarecontroversial in twodifferentways.Vijñānabhikṣu’sargument for themultiplicityof selves isnotoutofplace inaSāṃkhya text,where it functionsasanattackonthecompetingschoolofAdvaitaVedānta,oneofthemostpowerfulschoolsofphilosophy in latemedieval India.TheexistenceofGod isuncontroversial insofarasit issomethingthatalmostallphilosophersofhiserawouldhaveagreedon,withtheexceptionoftheJainas.Thecontroversyhereisthecontextinwhichhepresentsthe argument, in a commentary on the Sāṃkhyasūtras. Sāṃkhya was widelyacceptedasbeinganatheisticschoolbythesixteenthcentury,followingtheinfluenceof amedieval doxographic tradition that depicted the difference between SāṃkhyaandYogaasonebetweenatheismandtheism.SoVijñānabhikṣumightstraincredulityin upholding theism in his commentary on an atheistic text. This example ofcommentingagainst thegrainof thetext isunusuallyextreme,eveninthecontextofthecreativecommentarialpracticessocommoninpremodernIndia.Vijñānabhikṣufirstestablishestheplaceof theNyāya-Vaiśeṣika inhishierarchyof

schools.The inclusionof thisschool isnotmere lipservice.Vijñānabhikṣu frequentlyuses philosophical terminology developed by the Navya-Nyāya school in his ownapologetics for Bhedābheda Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and he appears to havesome anxiety about establishing his philosophical positions against the powerfulinfluenceof itsexponents.According tohisYogasārasaṃgraha (Compendiumof theEssenceofYoga),heevenwroteatreatiseontheNyāyaschool,whichunfortunatelyhasneverbeen found.6Toclearaspace for theNyāya-Vaiśeṣikaamong theāstikaschools, Vijñānabhikṣu employs the concepts of conventional (vyāvahārika) andultimate (pāramārthika) truth developed by the Advaitins (and before them theBuddhists):

Objection:There iscontradictionbetween theargumentsof theNyāya-Vaiśeṣikas,who teach that theselfpossesses qualities, and the arguments found here in the Sāṃkhya, that the self is free from qualities.Therefore,bothsetsofargumentslackauthority.Vijñānabhikṣu: No, this is not the case. There is no contradiction, and both schools’ teachings are

established,sinceone isconcernedwithconventional truth, theotherwithultimate truth.Fromthecommonexperienceofpleasureandpain,theNyāya-Vaiśeṣikasdistinguishtheselffromthebodybymeansofinferenceat the first level, yet are unable to enter immediately into that which is extremely subtle. Their knowledge,

rejecting thenotion that thebody is thesameas theself, iscertainlycorrectknowledgeat theconventionallevel….NyāyaandVaiśeṣikaareauthoritative,sincetheirintendedmeaningisnotcontradicted.Thisisbecauseoftherule,“themeaningofthewordisthatwhichisintended.”7

TheteachingoftheNyāya-Vaiśeṣikaisthattheselfistheagent(kartṛ)andtheonewhoexperiencessensationslikepleasureandpain(bhoktṛ).Itiscorrect,accordingtoVijñānabhikṣu, insofarasits intentionistodifferentiatetheselffromthebodyandtoteachthattheremustbesomethingbeyondthebody,differentfromit,knownastheself.However, it isnotable to rise to the levelofSāṃkhya,which teaches that theself is ultimately pure, changeless, and free of all qualities. Because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’sintentionissimplytoteachthatthereissomethingdifferentfromthebodyknown as the self, it cannot be considered a defect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that itdoesnotpenetratetothehigherlevelofknowledge.Bymeansofthisargumentativestrategy, Vijñānabhikṣu is able to say both that (1) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a lowerteachingthanSāṃkhyaand(2)thisdoesnotmeanthatNyāya-Vaiśeṣikaisdefective.Thisploy, and theappeal to the rule that “themeaningof theword is thatwhich isintended,” is one that he also uses to find a place for theSāṃkhya denial ofGod.Just as it is not the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s project to teach ultimate truths about thenature of the self, Sāṃkhya is unconcerned with the topic of the existence ornonexistence of God. Although a Naiyāyika would certainly take umbrage at thesuggestion that he is simply unconcernedabout the truenatureof the self, there issomehistoricalplausibilitytothesecondclaimthattheSāṃkhyasaresimplynotveryinterestedinGod,asthereislittleornodiscussionofGodintheSāṃkhyakārikāandits commentaries. But in the text at hand, the Sāṃkhyasūtras, there is explicitrejectionofGod’sexistence.ThisisonceagainexplainedbyVijñānabhikṣuintermsofconventional(vyāvahārika)versusultimate(pāramārthika)truths:

Heretoo,onthequestionoftheexistenceofGod,thereistherelationofconventionalandultimatetruth.“Theysaythattheworldiswithouttruth,withoutfoundation,andGodless”(BhG16.8).Insuchscriptures,atheismisrejected.IntheSāṃkhyasūtras,theconventionalrejectionofGodismentionedonlyforthesakeofindifferenceto lordliness. For if the eternal God had not been rejected just as the materialists do, the practice ofdiscriminationwouldbehinderedbydesireafterseeingperfectlordliness.ThisiswhatKapilaintended.8

Theories of meaning in premodern India were unabashedly intentionalist, andVijñānabhikṣu is no exception. The rule “the meaning of the word is that which isintended”impliesthatknowledgeofastatement’smeaningrequiresknowledgeofthespeaker’s intent. The limitations and problems of such theories have been welldocumentedintwentieth-centuryhermeneutics.9But intheIndiancontext, itpresentssomeinterestingpuzzles.Forinstance,howcanthePūrvaMīmāṃsakas,whobelievethat the Veda is literally authorless, interpret the Veda? If the author or speaker’sintentiondetermines themeaningof hiswords, then it seems thatwhen there is noauthor, there can be no meaning.10 The problems are not quite as great wheninterpreting the non-Vedic texts that have a human author (smṛti), such as theSāṃkhyasūtras of Kapila. Those interpreters who fail to account for what Kapilameant to do with his words when he denied the existence of God will be misled.

VijñānabhikṣusuggeststhatworshippersmightbesodistractedwiththoughtsofGod—particularly with the possibilities of the God-like powers (aiśvaryas) that theythemselvesmightattain—thatknowledgeofGodcanpotentiallybedetrimentaltotheattainment of liberation.11 In theYogasūtras, meditation on God is described as ameans to spiritual advancement. But here Vijñānabhikṣu suggests that there is adownsidetoknowledgeofGodaswell.Presumablyforcertainfollowerswhowouldbe prone to be distracted byGod’s powers rather than benefit frommeditation onhim, Kapila taught the doctrine of the nonexistence of God, knowing that it wasultimately untrue. Therefore, at times one can say that ignorance is preferable toknowledgeon thepath to liberation. Insuchcases, thedisinterestedquest for truthcollideswith thecommon Indiannotion thatphilosophy isprimarilyan instrument forattainingthestateofultimaterelease.Vijñānabhikṣu insists that Sāṃkhya doctrines cannot be considered defective

because they have no flaws when discussing their intended topics, such asdiscriminationof theself fromthematerialworld.Yethe isalsoforcedtoadmit thattheSāṃkhyaislimitedinsomewaysthatYogaandVedāntaarenot.ThisisclearinhisexegesisoftwopassagesfromtheMahābhāratathatpraiseSāṃkhya:

“There isnoknowledgeequal toSāṃkhya.There isnopowerequal toyoga.” “Let therebenodoubt in thisregard:Sāṃkhyaisconsideredthehighestknowledge.”PassagessuchastheseprovethesuperiorityoftheSāṃkhyatoallotherdoctrinesonlywithregardtothediscriminationoftheselffromotherthings.TheSāṃkhyaisnotsuperiortoallotherdoctrineswithregardtoitsrejectionofGod.12

The first of the two quotes cited from the Moksadharma Parvan of theMahābhārata seems to express the difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga in thesensethatFranklinEdgertonpointsout (seechapter4).Sāṃkhya isconsidered thehighest“knowledge”whileYogaisthehighest“power,”suggestingthatthedifferencebetween Sāṃkhya and Yoga is the difference between theoretical knowledge andknowledge as the instrument of liberation. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, understands thetwotermstorefer to twoseparateschools:onethat teachestheexistenceofGod,and one that does not. To reconcile the differing views of the different schools, hedoesnotdenythatthesedifferencesexistbut,rather,deniesthatthedifferencesaresignificant.Eachschoolhasacertainproperscopeoftopics,andwithinthatscopeitisauthoritative.Outsideof thatscope,however, its teachingsshouldnotbeheeded.ThescopeoftheNyāyadoesnot involvetopicshavingtodowiththeprecisenatureof the true self. Sāṃkhya’s scope does not include teachings involving God. Bylimiting each doctrine’s proper range of functioning, he is able to reconcile thesedoctrines.However,foratleasttwooftheschoolshediscusses,YogaandVedānta,thereappearstobenolimitingofscope—thesetwoschoolsareauthoritativeonanytopic.Inasignificantway,thatputsthematahigherlevelinthehierarchyofschoolsthanNyāyaandSāṃkhya.

KAPILA’S“BOLDASSERTION”ASSPEECHACT

Vijñānabhikṣu’soverallphilosophical-commentarialprojecttoillustratetheharmonyofthe major āstika schools is clearly evident in his lengthy introduction to theSāṃkhyasūtras. Inparticular,hewishes toshow that the text iscompatiblewith theBhedābheda (Difference andNon-Difference) Vedānta that he himself champions inhisearliestwritings.All theother textualevidence thatVijñānabhikṣuhasonhand—theBhagavadGītā;theUpaniṣads;thePurāṇas;andthephilosophicaltreatisesoftheNyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, and Vedānta schools—is unanimous in its acceptance ofGod. TheSāṃkhya, an anomaly among theāstika systems, therefore needs to bebroughtback into linewith theclearmajorityofāstika viewpoints.Furthermore, it isinconceivable that Kapila, the omniscient seer who is portrayed in the BhāgavataPurāṇaasanincarnationofthegodNārāyana,coulddiffer inopinionsogreatlywithotherauthoritativetextsonthequestionofGod’sexistence.ButthesheernumberoftimestheSāṃkhyasūtras repeat theirdenialofGodmakes it impossible tosay thatnosuchdenialexists.SomeotherstrategyisrequiredtoreconcileKapila’sassertionwith the theism of the other āstika schools and with Kapila’s own assertionselsewhere.Vijñānabhikṣu therefore shifts the discussion away from what it was that Kapila

taughtintheSāṃkhyasūtrasandtowardwhathisintentionorpurposewasinteachingthosethings.UsingJ.L.Austin’swell-knownterminology,what isatstake isnot thecontentofKapila’swords,thelocutionaryact.13KapilasaidthatGoddoesnotexist;noonedisputesthat.NoristheremuchcontroversyconcerningtheillocutionaryforceofKapila’sstatement:thatis,whathewasdoing insaying thosewords.Kapilawasassertingsomething,notquestioningorpromisingorwonderingoutloud.Instead,therealinterestliesinKapila’sperlocutionaryact:WhatwasitthatKapilabroughtaboutor achieved by saying that God does not exist? Unlike illocutionary acts,perlocutionaryactsarepartofachainofeffectsthatfollowaftertheinitialutterance.They succeed or fail depending on whether they manage to bring about a certaineffectinthelistener.Perlocutionaryactsarethustiedupwiththeintentionalityofthespeaker. In Kapila’s assertion that God does not exist, he wished to convince hislisteners of something that was ultimately untrue. This, according to Vijñānabhikṣu,wastheperlocutionaryeffecthehadinmind.Althoughhehasnothingbut thehighestpraisefor itsauthor,Kapila,Vijñānabhikṣu

admitsthattheSāṃkhyadoctrinesaspresentedarelimited.ButwhatpreciselywereKapila’s intentions in teaching this limitedsetofdoctrines?Are thereprecedents forthissortofbenigndeception?VijñānabhikṣuexpandsontheseissuesinanimportantandcontroversialpassagefromtheSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya:

Asatemporaryconcession(abhyupagamavāda),aboldassertion(prauḍhivāda),etc.,theSāṃkhya’sintentionis the rejectionofGodonaconventional level.Hence, there isnocontradictionwith theYogaandVedānta.Temporaryconcessionalsoappears in theśāstras,e.g., in theVisnuPurāṇa (1.17.83): “O demons, I haveexplained thenotionsof thosewhoseeGodasseparate from themselves,makinga temporaryconcessionregardingthoseviews(krtvā‘bhyupagamaṃtatra).Hearmysummary.”14

Alternatively, itmaybethatinordertoimpedetheknowledgeofthewicked,evenin

partsofthebelievers’systems(āstikadarśana)thereispresentationofviewsthatarecontrarytotheVeda.Onlythosepartslackauthority.Butontheirmaintopics,whicharenotopposedtorevealedscriptureortraditionaltexts,theyareauthoritative.OnlyonthisgroundisthecriticismofallschoolsotherthantheVedāntaandYogajustifiedinthePadmaPurāṇa.The first alternative Vijñānabhikṣu presents is the one suggested previously:

namely, thedenialofGod isactually for thebenefitof theworshipper,sincewithoutanyknowledgeofGod,theworshippercannotbedistractedwiththoughtsofGodlikepowershemight attain.Vijñānabhikṣu labels this typeof assertionasa “temporaryconcession” (abhyupagamavāda) or a “bold assertion” (prauḍhivāda). Of the twoterms, the former is theoneVijñānabhikṣugenerallyuses in thecommentaryon theSāṃkhyasūtras,perhapsbecauseitisamoreprecisedescriptionofhowthedenialofGod’sexistencefunctionsintheSāṃkhyasūtras.15Tounderstandthesetwotermsofart and their relation to one another, it is necessary to turn to the Nyāya school’sanalysisofthe“temporarytenet”(abhyupagamasiddhānta).The Nyāyasūtras, the foundational text of the Nyāya school of logic and

argumentation, enumerate four different types of “established tenets” (siddhāntas).NS 1.1.27 lists them as (1) a tenet accepted by all philosophical systems(sarvatantrasiddhānta), (2) a tenet that is particular to a specific system(pratitantrasiddhānta),(3)atenetthat is impliedbythetopic(adhikaraṇasiddhānta),and(4)atenetthatisacceptedtemporarily(abhyupagamasiddhānta).Itisthisfourthcategory from which Vijñānabhikṣu derives his idea of a “temporary concession”(abhyupagamavāda).ThecontextofthesefourtypesoftenetsfortheNaiyāyikasisclearlyformalphilosophicaldebate;byunderstandingclassificationssuchasthefourtypes of siddhāntas, a participant will avoid breaking the rules and losing thecompetition to his opponent. All four of these classifications received considerableattentionfromcommentatorsontheNyāyasūtras,and thedetailsofeachwerealsothe topicsofsomecontroversy.Formybriefexplanationof the fourthclassification,abhyupagamasiddhānta,IrelyprimarilyontheinterpretationofJayantaBhaṭṭa(ninthcenturyCE)inhisNyāyamañjarī.16In thecourseofphilosophicaldebate, it isnotalwayspossibleordesirabletocall

attentiontoeverypointaboutwhichonedisagreeswithone’sopponents.Attimes,itwill be necessary for a debater to temporarily grant points to his opponent that hedoesnotactuallyaccept,toletcertainassertionsoftheopponentpassunremarked.Forexample,aNaiyāyikamighttrytoproveindebatewithaMīmāṃsakathatsound(śabda)isnoteternal.Thetwodebaterswilldifferinotherdetailsaboutthespecificsofsound.AccordingtoNyāyatexts,soundiscategorizedasaquality(guṇaa),whileMīmāṃsakas consider sound to be a substance (dravya). But during debate, theNaiyāyikamaychoose to temporarilyallowhisopponent’sassertion that sound isasubstancestand,astheNaiyāyikaisprimarily interestedinestablishingsound’snon-eternality.Hecalculatesthatevenifheconcedesthisminorpoint,hewillstillbeabletowin theargument aboutwhether sound is eternal.17 It is clear from this examplethatemploying the “temporary tenet” (abhyupagamasiddhānta) is not something for

amateurs. A debater must be confident and experienced to fight with a handicap,since concedingwhatmay at first appear aminor pointmay end up losing him theentirecompetition.HenceinhisdiscussionofNS1.1.31,Jayantarepeatedlyreferstothe person who employs the acceptance of temporary tenets as a “bold debater”(prauḍhivādin): “Therefore, the meaning of the sūtra is that theabhyupagamasiddhānta is the temporary acceptance of something not examined,done by the bold debater in order to examine its specific property. This is oftenpreciselyhowphilosophersarguewithoneanother.”18VijñānabhikṣuwouldquitelikelyhavebeenacquaintedwithJayanta’saccountofthe

prauḍhivādinintheNyāyamañjarī.Evenifhedidnotderivehisparticularusagefromthis text itself, this Naiyāyika understanding of the one who employs a temporarythesisasbeingaconfidentorbolddebaterisalmostcertainlywhereVijñānabhikṣu’sterm“boldassertion” (prauḍhivāda)originates. It isobvious thatVijñānabhikṣu’suseofthetermabhyuypagamavādahasmuchincommonwithJayantaBhaṭṭa’sdefinitionofthe“temporarytenet.”Kapila’sacceptanceofthenonexistenceofGodismerelyatemporary acceptance of the views of others (implicitly, an acceptance of nāstikaviews).Thistemporaryacceptanceisdonekeepinginmindthegreaterendsthatcanbe achieved. In the example between the Naiyāyika and theMīmāṃsaka, it is theeventualdisprovingof theopponent’sargument. In theacceptanceofatheism in theSāṃkhyasūtras, it is the enabling of the Sāṃkhya practitioner to achieveenlightenment without distraction. Vijñānabhikṣu brings something new to thediscussion by transposing the Nyāya notion of abhyupagama from the context offormal philosophical debate to the wider sphere of rhetoric. The “temporaryconcession” for Vijñānabhikṣu is primarily about persuasion rather than truth orfalsity.19 In fact, for him the primary purposeof the temporary concession is not tolead his listeners to the truth but, rather, to lead them to self-transcendence.According to Vijñānabhikṣu in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, knowledge of God isnotapreconditionforliberation.20The example of “temporary concession” Vijñānabhikṣu cites in his previous quote

comes from the section of the Visnu Purāṇa that tells the story of Prahlāda, thedemon prince who becomes one of Visnu’s foremost devotees. Prahlāda gives asermoninwhichhetriestoconvincehisdemonicbrethrentogiveuptheirhatredandviolence. He first formulates a series of arguments designed to appeal to dualists,those who understand God to be wholly other than themselves. Although thisconceptionof therelationshipbetweenVisnuandthe individualworshipper isa falseone,forthepurposesofendingviolence,heformulatesargumentstoappealtothosewithsuchamindset.Hethengoesontoexplainthehighertruth—thattheentireworldisamanifestationofVisnu—andofferanewsetofargumentsfornonviolencebasedon this insight. For this reason, translations of Vijñānabhikṣu sometimes renderabhyupagamavāda as “concession to popular views.” But it ismore than this. Anyacceptance of an untruth for the sake of a higher purpose can be termed anabhyupagamavāda.Thedoctrineofthe“temporaryconcession”orthe“boldassertion”mayhaveeven

earlier roots than the Purāṇas. Ironically, it may originate with the nāstikasthemselves, in the formof theBuddhist doctrineof skillfulmeans (upāya). An earlyexample of the practice of the Buddha skillfully tailoring his speech to suit theunderstanding of his audience occurs in the Pali Canon, where he addresses twoyoungBrahminsonhowtoattainunionwiththegodBrahmā:

Andheletshismindpervadeonequarteroftheworldwiththoughtsoflove,andsothesecond,andsothethird,and so forth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around and everywhere, does he continue topervadewithaheartoflove,farreaching,growngreat,andbeyondmeasure….Verilythis…isthewaytothestateofunionwithBrahmā.21

Rather than teach theseBrahmins to immediatelyabandon theirworshipof thegodBrahmāandinsteadfollowthenobleeightfoldpath,theBuddhagivesthemateachingthatwillappeal to their levelofspiritualdevelopment. In thiscase,hesuggests thatthe way to union with Brahmā is bymeans of Buddhist loving-kindnessmeditation.This is quite similar to Prahlāda’s bold assertion or temporary concession to thedualistsintheVisnuPurāṇa,wherehespeaksusingdualistictheologicalassumptionsinordertoconvincethedemonstoabandonviolence.Skillful means was later developed farther and more explicitly in the

Upāyakauśalyasūtras, which deal not only with skillful speech acts but also withphysical acts that the Buddha performs to alleviate the suffering of other people,sometimesusingmeansthatseemoutofkeepingwiththeteachingsof theeightfoldpath.Inoneinstance,ayoungwomanwassoinlovewiththeBuddhathatshewouldhavekilledherself if she couldnot havehim.TheBuddha’s skillful responsewas tohaveasexualaffairwith thewoman,as thatwas themost skillfulway to keepherfromsuffering.InanotherstoryfromtheUpāyakauśalyasūtras,theBuddhainoneofhisformerlivesmurdersamantopreventhimfromkillingfivehundredotherpeopleinthefuture.Accordingtothislineofthought,intheoryaBuddhaorBodhisattvacandoanything,nomatterhowcontrarytoBuddhistrestrictionsonverbalorbodilyaction,ifheknowsthatitwillalleviatesuffering.22Early Buddhist hermeneutics was highly aware of the confusions that can result

when listenersdonot take intoaccount the intentionsof thespeaker,usually in thiscase theBuddhahimself. Therefore, earlyBuddhist thinkersdevelopedadistinctionbetweennītārthaandneyārthateachings.Thenītārthasūtraisonewhosemeaningisclear and can be taken literally since it was spoken without any ulterior motive.However, the neyārtha sūtra’s meaning is not so straightforward because it isintentional (ābhiprāyika),basedonsomespecificmotivationon theBuddha’spart.23This twofold distinction of nītārtha/neyārtha served simply as a way of classifyingdifferent teachingsof theBuddha.However, theMādhyamikaphilosopherNāgārjuna(secondcenturyCE)developedthishermeneuticaldistinction into theepistemologicaldoctrine of the “two truths,” conventional and ultimate, which went on to haveenormous influence not only on Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy but also on theAdvaitaVedāntaschool.24 Inspiteofhishostility towardbothBuddhismandAdvaitaVedānta,Vijñānabhikṣualsoinvokesthetwolevelsof“conventional”and“ultimate”in

justifying his own reading of the Sāṃkhya denial of God as merely a conventionalteaching.25 Although Vijñānabhikṣu’s reading of the denial of God in theSāṃkhyasūtrashasoftenbeenportrayedashighlyidiosyncratic,infactheistappingintoaninterpretivetraditionthatpredatedhimbyoverfifteenhundredyears.Just as the Buddha tries to aid the worshippers of Brahmā by telling them to

practiceloving-kindnessmeditationinordertogetclosertohim,VijñānabhikṣuarguesthatKapila isdenyingGod’sexistence tokeep theconceptofGod from thosewhowould find himmore of a hindrance thana boon to liberation. Indeed, as JohannesBronkhorsthasobserved,thesageKapila issomethinglikeaSāṃkhyaBodhisattva.According to Bronkhorst’s reading of theMātharavrtti, an early commentary on theSāṃkhyakārikā, “God is the light of Kapila … the self which resides, shines, inKapila.”26MuchasPurānicSāṃkhya takesKapila tobean incarnationofNārāyana,early (pre-tenth-century) commentaries on theSāṃkhyakārikā takeKapila to be anembodimentof Īśvara, theGodmentioned in theYogasūtras,who isalso frequentlymentioned in Sāṃkhya commentaries. As an incarnation of God, Kapila has asuperhuman knowledge of future events and of the dispositions of the people heencounters. Just as the Mahāyāna Bodhi-sattva tailors his message and actionskeeping in mind the best interests of those around him, Kapila, too, might wish tochange his message based on his audience. This explanation certainly helpedVijñānabhikṣumakesenseoftheatheisticteachingsoftheSāṃkhyasūtras,whicharecompletely contrary to his other major Sāṃkhya sources, the Upaniṣads, theMahābhārata,andthePurāṇas.27

DEGREESOFDECEPTIONINSĀMKHYAANDTHEPURĀṆAS

ToexplaintherampantatheismoftheSāṃkhyasūtras,Vijñānabhikṣu’smostcommonstrategyistocharacterizeKapila’steachingasanintentionaluseofindirectspeechinordertoappealtothelevelofspiritualsophisticationofhislisteners.Inotherwords,itisfortheirowngoodthatKapiladeceivesthemembersofhisaudience.However,heentertainsanotherpossibility.ThesecondalternativeVijñānabhikṣusuggests,theonethatRichardGarbedescribesasa “monstrous idea,” is thatKapila taught the falsedoctrineofatheismtokeepknowledgefromthewicked:“Alternatively,itmaybethatin order to impede the knowledge of the wicked, even in parts of the affirmers’systems (āstikadarśanas) there is presentation of views that are contrary to theVeda.”28This explanation comes only once in the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, as a brief

suggestion immediately after hismention of the “bold assertion” hypothesis. Thesetwo explanations are not necessarily exclusive of one another. It is possible that,among one group of audience members, Kapila determined that withholdingknowledgeofGodwouldbebeneficialinenablingdiscriminationoftheselftoevolve;facedwithademonicaudience,hedeterminedthatwithholdingknowledgewouldbethebestmeansforpreventinghisaudiencefromacquiringdangerouspowersbased

onknowledgeofcorrectdoctrines.Inthissecondscenario,unlikethefirstexplanationforKapila’sdeception,knowledgeleadstopowerandignorancetoruin.This suggestion by Vijñānabhikṣu shows once again a Purānic influence, harking

backtoawell-knownstoryatVis.Pu.4.18.29Inordertodefeatthedemons(daityas)who had succeeded in obtaining great powers through religious austerities, VisnucamedowntoearthdisguisedasanasceticandbeganteachingdoctrinescontrarytotheVedas.First,disguisinghimselfasthefounderoftheJainaschool,hetaughtthedoctrine of anekāntavāda (perspectivism or “non-one-sidedness”) to the group ofdemons.Then,movingontoanothergroup,hechangedhisoutfitand,appearingastheBuddha,taughtthatanimalsacrificesareimmoralandsoforth.Bythismeans,thedemonslostallofthepowerstheyhadattained,andweresummarilymassacredbythegods.Thisstoryisremarkablebecauseitaccomplishestwogoalssimultaneously.First,itmanagestosubsumeBuddhismandJainismunderorthodoxBrahmanism,bydemonstratingthatbothMahāvīra(ifthatisindeedwhoisportrayed—heisnamelessin the Visnu Purāṇa) and the Buddha were incarnations of Visnu. Second, itcompletely discredits the actual content of the doctrines of these two sects, bysuggesting that the teachings of Buddhism and Jainism are intentionally false andnonsensical.ThedupesaretheBuddhistsandJainas,whodonotunderstandthatthesourceofalloftheteachingstheydefendsovehementlyisadivinetrick.30AftermakinghisclaimthatKapilataughtatheisminordertokeepknowledgefrom

the wicked, Vijñānabhikṣu cites a passage from the Padma Purāṇa in which Śivagivesalonglistofthetāmasaśāstras,theteachingsthathavebeenmadeinordertoconfuse rather than illuminate theirhearers.Unlike thestory from theViṣṇuPurāṇa,mostoftheteachingsheenumeratesareconsideredtobeamongtheāstikasystemsby Indian doxographers. Śiva explains that “merely by the hearing of these tāmasaśāstras,eventhewisearebroughtlow.”31AccordingtothepassagefromthePadmaPurāṇathatVijñānabhikṣucites,thesetāmasaśāstrascomprisethefollowing:

1. TheŚaivateachings—forexample,thePāśupatateachingsandthelike,taughtbyŚivahimself.2. The“great”(mahat)VaiśeṣikateachingsofKanāda.3. TheNyāyaofGautama.4. TheSāṃkhyaofKapila.5. ThePūrvaMīmāṃsāofthetwice-bornJaimini,whichdealswiththeVeda.6. ThedespisedCārvākasystem,taughtbyDhisana.7. ThefalsedoctrineofBuddhism,taughtbyVisnuintheformoftheBuddhainordertodestroythedemons;

Buddhismconsistsofthosewhoarenakedandthosecladinblue.328. ThefalsedoctrineofIllusionism(māyāvāda),whichisBuddhismindisguise;Śivataughtthisinthekaliyuga

disguisedasaBrahmin.ThisdoctrineincorrectlyinterpretstheVedas.Itteachesthatritualactivityshouldbeabandoned.Śivahastaughttheunityofthehighestselfandtheindividualself,andthatBrahmaninitshighestformisfreefromqualities.Śivataughtthenon-VedicdoctrineofIllusionisminthekaliyugainordertodestroytheentireworld,whilepurportingtobeteachingthemeaningsoftheVeda.33

VijñānabhikṣucitesthispassagefromthePadmaPurāṇaasscripturalsupport forhissuggestionthattheteachingsoftheSāṃkhya,orsomeotherāstikaschool,couldexist for the sake of misleading its hearers. But Vijñānabhikṣu realizes howoutrageoussuchaclaimmightsoundand therefore iscareful in trying toqualify the

apparentwholesalerejectionofthesystemslistedinthePadmaPurāṇa.Eachoftherejections of the āstika systems in this passage is not a complete rejection of anentire system. Certain parts of these systemswere taught in order to confuse thewicked,and it isonly theseparts thatare false.Hesays that “on theirmain topics,whicharenotopposedtorevealedscriptureortraditionaltexts,theyareauthoritative.Onlyonthisground is thePadmaPurāṇa justified in itscriticismofallschoolsotherthanVedāntaandYoga.”34The list from the Padma Purāṇa is said by the speaker, Śiva, to be “in order”

(yathākrama).35 The organizing principle of this ordering appears to be theprogressively more egregious philosophical mistakes made by the each of thesystems.While some of the first systemsmentioned are described in value-neutrallanguage(orevenpositively,aswhentheVaiśeṣikaiscalled“great”),bythetimethereaderarrivesat theendof the list, it is clearwho thewhipping-boyof thePadmaPurāṇa is.Theworstofalldoctrines is theAdvaita(onlydescribedas“Illusionism”),which is so wrongheaded that it will eventually succeed in destroying the world.Vijñānabhikṣuhimselfpointsoutthattwodoctrineshavebeenleftoffthislist,Vedāntaand Yoga. These two schools are implicitly free from defects in any part andthereforehavenoplacethere.ByVijñānabhikṣu’saccount,Advaitaisnotarealformof Vedānta. Nor is it even an āstika system. According to Vijñānabhikṣu and thePadmaPurāṇa, it issecretlya typeofBuddhism,and in fact, itsdoctrinesareevenmore awful than Buddhism’s. Buddhist doctrines were only capable of deluding agroupofdemonsanddepriving themof theirpowers.Advaitdoctrinesareweaponsofmassdestruction.Vijñānabhikṣuconcludeshis interpretationofthepassagefromthePadmaPurāṇa

by suggesting that he has said more on this topic in his commentary on theBrahmasūtras.36 This statement recurs over and over in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, often in places where it makes obvious sense. Forinstance, since Vijñānabhikṣu takes the Sāṃkhya “person” (puruṣa) to besynonymous with the “individual self” (jīva) of the Vedāntins, reading his lengthyanalysis of the self and its relation to Brahman in the commentary on theBrahmasūtras will aid understanding of the use of the term puruṣa in theSāṃkhyasūtras. However, where his commentary on theBrahmasūtras does haveexplicit discussion of the relationship between Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga, it isoftentodisparageSāṃkhyaandYogaattheexpenseofVedānta.Examplesincludethefollowing:

ThisknowledgeofBrahmanastheselfissuperiortotheknowledgeofthesolitaryself(viviktajīva)taughtbytheSāṃkhyas.ThereisnoknowledgesuperiortotheknowledgeofBrahmanastheself.37

Hereweexplaintheessentialdifferencebetweenourteachingandtheirs.AccordingtotheSāṃkhyaandYoga,twoschoolsthatbelieveintheindependenceofprakṛti,thetransformation(pravṛtti)thatisdirectedtowardstheendsofmanisjustbyitselfunitedwiththepuruṣa,theveryfirstself.Theyassertthatitisjustlikethewayinwhichironisunitedwithamagnet.ButaccordingtoustheunionofprakṛtiandpuruṣaismadebytheLord.38

Althoughthere is talkof therelationshipbetweenSāṃkhya,Yoga,andVedānta intheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya, it is justasoftentopointoutdifferencesasit istopointoutagreement.Furthermore,thereisnowhereasuggestionthattheSāṃkhyaandYogaareonthesamelevelasVedānta,evenifonetakesintoaccounttheirdifferenttopicsof inquiry. In theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya,unlike theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, Vedāntais presented as unambiguously superior to Sāṃkhya and Yoga on any number ofpointsofdoctrine.BythetimehewrotetheSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya,Vijñānabhikṣuhas come to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship of these schools:“Noneoftheāstikateachingsareunauthoritativeorcontradictory,sincewithregardtotheirrespectivetopicsnoneareobstructedorcontradicted.”39AlthoughSāṃkhyaandYogaareimportantinfluencesthroughouthisearlycareer,onlyinhislaterworksdoesVijñānabhikṣucometoacceptthefullvalueoftheseschoolsalongsidetheVedānta.In theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya,Vijñānabhikṣusees the relationshipofSāṃkhya

andYogaastheyareportrayedbymostmoderntextbooksthatenumeratesixāstikasystems without problematizing their history and origins: Sāṃkhya and Yoga areseparateschools,albeitcloselyrelated.Themostnoteworthydifferencebetweenthetwoschools,accordingtoVijñānabhikṣuintheSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya,isthatthelatteracceptsthisexistenceofGod,whiletheformerrejectshim:“TheYogasystem,however, avoids the deficiency by explainingGod, while God is denied by the two[Sāṃkhya texts, the Sāṃkhyasūtras and Tattvasamāsasūtras] because of theirtemporary concession.”40 Therefore, Vijñānabhikṣu’s implicit hierarchy of teachingsbased on their levels of truth and completeness begins with Vedānta at the top,followed by Yoga (which teaches that God exists, while failing to detail his role inworld-creation), Sāṃkhya, and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The other āstika schoolspresumably fall somewherebelow these four.TheAdvaitaVedānta,however, isnotan āstika school at all. Vijñānabhikṣu simultaneously insists that none of the āstikaschools is defective (since they all are correct with regard to each of their maintopics)whilenonethelessbeingabletoholdthattheVedāntaaloneiscomplete—thatis,itiscorrectwithregardtoeveryoneofthestatementsitmakes,onalltopics.Thenāstika schools are left out of this harmonizing strategy. Presumably, the Jaina,Buddhist, Cārvāka, and Advaita Vedānta schools are completely false, or at leastfalseonsomanydifferenttopicsthattheirentireteachingiscompromisedandworthyofderision.Eachof theāstikaschools, incontrast, is largelycorrect in its teachingsandworthyofrespect.

DISPROVINGGODINTHESĀMKHYASŪTRAS

Although this techniqueofavoidingdirectdoctrinalconflictbetweenSāṃkhya,Yoga,and Bhedābheda Vedānta on the question of God can be sustained, it requiresdifficultdecisionsforVijñānabhikṣu inhiscommentaryontheSāṃkhyasūtras.This isnowheremorethecasethanthefifthchapter,whichbeginswithanextendeddisproofof theexistenceofGod.There,argumentsarepresented toshowthat it is logically

indefensibletomaintaintheexistenceofabeingcalledGod(īśvara)whoisunliketheotherpuruṣas.Clearly,Vijñānabhikṣudoesnotagreewiththesearguments,nordoesheeven thinksuchargumentsarepresentedasvalidby theSāṃkhyasūtras’author.Soshouldhegoalongwith the text fulfilling thenormaldutiesofacommentator,orshouldheimmediatelystatehisobjectionstotheargumentsaspresented?Hischoiceis a compromise: although he presents a straightforward gloss of the argumentspresented at SS 5.1-11, at 5.12 he can no longer hold his pen in check andessentially takes back everything he has said to that point, presenting a tersecounterargumentsupportingGod’sexistence.Vijñānabhikṣu explains that chapter 5 of the Sāṃkhyasūtras is devoted to the

destruction of opponents’ viewpoints, since the views of the Sāṃkhya have beenthoroughlyproveninthefirst fourchapters.TheexistenceornonexistenceofGodisthefirsttopicaddressedinthischapter,sinceitisthetopicwheretheSāṃkhyasūtrasaremostatoddswith theotherāstikaschools.41TheargumentagainstGodbeginsatSS5.2,inadiscussiononthelawofkarmaanditsresults.Specifically,whatisthemechanismunderlyingtheconnectionbetweenanactanditsfinalkarmicresult?TheNyāya philosophical school argues that God must exist, since without asuperintendent, the law of karma could not function. Because actions (karma) andmatter (prakṛti) are themselves insentient, they cannot originate any operation ontheirown.Furthermore, itwouldbe incomprehensible forapresentaction tobe thecause of a result in the distant future without positing some sort of sentient beingsuperintendingtheentireprocess.42InresponsetotheNaiyāyikaview,SS5.2claimsthatnosuchpositingofaGodtosuperintendthisprocessisnecessary.Vijñānabhikṣuintroducesandelucidatesthissūtra:

Certainopponentssaythatthesūtra“duetothenon-establishmentofGod”(SS1.92)doesnotmakesense,sinceGodisestablishedastheonewhobestowstheresultsofactions.Theauthorofthesūtrarefutestheseopponents:

5.2Itisnotthatwhen[thecause]issupportedbyGodthereistheattainmentofresults,sincethereisproofthattheresultisbymeansoftheaction.

“When theaction is superintendedbyGod, then there isattainmentof the consequence, in the formof theaction’sresult.”Thisassertionisnotappropriate.Forthereisthepossibilityoftheattainmentoftheresultbythenecessaryactionalone.Thisisthemeaning.43

Vijñānabhikṣu here suggests that the Naiyāyikas’ positing the existence of God inordertoexplainthe lawofkarmaisunnecessarilycomplex. It ispossibletoaccountforthearisingofeffectswithoutrecoursetotheconceptofGod.TheNaiyāyikasthinkthat thearisingof theeffect from theaction ison themodelof thepotter—theclay(thecause)cannotautomaticallygiverisetothepot(theeffect)withoutanintelligentbeing as superintendent. However, the author of the sūtra contends that theNaiyāyikas’causalmodel is faulty. In thiscase,nosupervisingbeing isnecessary tobringabout thecause,as is thecasewithmanyother things in theworld (theseedgiving rise to the sprout, for example). Vijñānabhikṣu is uncharacteristically terse in

commentingon thispassage,and indeed inallSS5.2-11.This is likelybecausehedoes not consider the arguments to be valid. Nonetheless, he goes through themotions necessary as a responsible commentator by fleshing out the syntax of thesūtrastogivethereaderabetterunderstandingoftheauthor’smeaning.44Notonly is it unnecessary topositGod toexplain the functioningof karma; there

arealsoreasonsthatGodcannotbeajointcausealongwiththeactionoftheeffect,in theway that the potter and the clay both cause the pot. Here the author of theSāṃkhyasūtrasgoesbeyondmeredenialthatGod’sexistencecanbeproven.Infact,hearguesthatacreatorGodcannotexist,fortheverydefinitionofGodgivenbytheNyāyaandothertheisticschoolsisself-contradictory45Unlikeanormalhumanpotter,Godhasnoneofhisownendstoserve,sinceheisall-powerfulandalwaysalreadyfulfilled:helacksnothing.Thehumanpottercreatesthepotbecausehehasacertainwant.Heneedsareceptacletoholdwater,orheneedstomakepotsinordertoearnhislivelihood.Godhasnodesire(upakāra)analogoustothedesiresofthepotterandthereforewillnotcauseanything.Theopponentmightrespond:“Verywell,letuspositaGodwho,likethepotter,hasdesiresandneeds.”SS5.4functionsasaresponseto this. If you posit a God who possesses his own desires, he will be just like aworldly lord (laukikeśvara). This is because, as Vijñānabhikṣu points out, “If it isadmittedthatGodtoohasneeds,thenhewouldbejustlikeaworldlylord,subjecttosamsāra.AndsinceHisdesireshavenotbeenfulfilled,therewouldbetheunwantedimplicationofpain,andsoforth.”46Inotherwords,byalteringthedefinitionofGodtoincludehiswantsandneeds,Godwillsimplybeanextremelypowerfulbeingamongbeings,notauniquebeingwhoisall-powerful,omniscient,andfreefromallsuffering.Followingfromthis,SS5.5pointsout that theappellationof“God”(īśvara)would

simply bea technical term referring to the firstpuruṣa at the beginningof creation,andnotreferringtoGodascommonlyunderstoodbythephilosophicalsystems.Theauthor of the Sāṃkhyasūtras is perfectly happy to concede that such a technicalmeaningoftheword“God”ispossible.Infact,itisausefulhermeneuticstrategyforthe Sāṃkhya to allow this interpretation of the word “God,” since it gives them anopportunity toexplainapparent references toGod inscriptureby reducing theword“God”tothefirstpuruṣa,whoissubjecttosamsāraanddidnotcreatetheworld.SS 5.6-7 continue in this vein. Not only will a God who is the superintendent of

karmahavehisowninterests(upakāra);hewillalsobebesetbydesire(rāga),whichisquiteobviously inappropriate.For if it isadmittedthatGodexperiencesdesire,hewillnotbeeternallyfree(SS5.7).Anticipatinganotherstrategybyhisopponent,theauthor states inSS 5.8, “If you claim that he attains the state of God due to hisconnection with the powers of prakṛti, there is the unwanted implication of hisattachment.”47VijñānabhikṣuexplainsSS5.8insomedetail.Theproblemhere,asheseesit,istheflawofmutualdependence(anyonyāśraya)betweenGodandprakṛti:

Moreover,itisnotpossiblethatlordlinessisdirectedtowardprakṛtibydesire,etc.whicharetransformationsofprakṛti.Forthentherewouldbeamutualdependence:theactivationofprakṛtiwouldoccurbeforethearisingofdesire,andthearisingofdesire,etc.wouldoccurbeforetheactivityofprakṛti.Nordoesitmakesensetosaythatdesireexistseternallyinprakṛti.Thatisimpossible,sincetheśrutiandsmrtiteachthatprakṛtiexistsina

stateofequilibriumbeforethecreationoftheworld.48

Althoughprakṛtiexistseternally, itexists inachanging,evolvingstate.Before thecreationoftheworld,itexistsinastateofpureequilibrium,inwhichthethreeguṇas—agitation, lethargy, and purity—all exist in equalmeasure. If the opponent claimsthat God possesses desires merely through his association with prakṛti, and notinherentlyinhimself,thenaparadoxarises.Godistheone,accordingtothetheisticopponent,whosets inmotion theevolutionofprakṛti.Todoso,however,hehas topossesssomedesire todoso.Yetstrictlyspeaking,desire isanevoluteofprakṛti;before prakṛti’s evolution, desire does not exist. Desire can develop in prakṛti onlywhen the guna of agitation is predominant, which is not the case when the threeguṇasareinequilibrium.ThisiswhyVijñānabhikṣuseesthisasanexampleofmutualdependence.PrakṛtidependsonGodinordertoevolve,butbeforeGodcanactivateprakṛti, he himself requires thatprakṛti is already evolved. Therefore, the desire tocreatecanneitherexistforGodinhimself,asproveninSS5.3-7,norcansuchdesirebeapartofprakṛti,sinceitwouldnotbeavailabletoGodbeforethetimeofcreation.Finally, inSS5.9, the author entertains the possibility that the condition of being

God might somehow arise automatically by the mere proximity of prakṛti to thepuruṣa,withoutanyrealattachmentbetweenthetwo.Vijñānabhikṣuusestheanalogyoftheironandmagnettoexplorethispossibility.Sāṃkhyaacceptsthepossibilitythattwo entities can have an effect on each other without any direct association.Mostfamously thismetaphor of iron andmagnet is used to explain the attraction of thepuruṣatoprakṛti.IntheSāṃkhyakārikā,itisthisautomaticattractionofthepuruṣatoprakṛti that begins the process of evolution, and not the intervention of any God.Likewise, theopponentsuggests thatperhaps theproximityofprakṛti to thepuruṣacreates some sort of automatic development of the qualities of God in the puruṣaitself.But, if thiswere thecase, theSāṃkhyasūtraspointout thatallpuruṣaswouldbeGod,insteadofonlyone.Havingexploredallofthepossibilities,theauthorofthesūtra has shown that there is no way for God to exist. The complex of relatedarguments inSS5.2-9 is, inessence,a reductioadabsurdum.Assume thatsuchaGod exists who possesses all of the desires and capabilities necessary forsuperintendingthelawofkarmaandcreatingtheworld.Ifthatwerethecase,theseverydesireswouldprecludehimfrombeingGod,all-powerfuland free fromworldlyattachments.ThebasicthrustoftheargumentsinSS5.2-9isthatdesireisapreconditionforthe

creationofanything.BecauseGodisbydefinitionfreefromdesireoranyotherwant,hecannotbe thecreatorof theuniverse.To rebut theSāṃkhyaargument, the firstoptionwould be to contest its initial premise, that desire is necessary for creation.Themostwell-knownattemptamong theisticschools todo just this isby relyingontheconceptofplay(līlā).Accordingtosometheists,thereisonesortofcreationthatisnotprecededbyanydesireorwantonthepartof thecreator.That is thesortofcreationthatoccursastheresultofthefree,purposelessplayofthecreatorhimself.TheSāṃkhyasūtrasdonotaddressthisargument,althoughitmightbeinterestingto

see how such a theory of play would be rejected by an atheist school. A secondoptionalsoremainsopenforatheist.TheauthoroftheSāṃkhyasūtrashasdisprovedthe existence of a God who is the superintendent of karma and who creates theworldbysettingprakṛtiintomotion.Itispossible,however,toconceiveofaGodwhodoesneitherof thesethings. In fact, this isone interpretationof theaccountofGodgiven in the Yogasūtras, especially among modern rationalizing interpreters ofPatañjali.49 God is an omniscient, all-powerful being who is completely passive,because he has no interest or desire to act. He functions purely as an object ofmeditation and an inspiration for the yogin, who aspires to the state of completedetachmentfromdesirethatGodhasalreadyattained.ThisisnotthepictureofGodportrayedintheYuktidīpikāor theotherearlycommentarieson theSāṃkhyakārikā.There,althoughGodisnotdepictedasthecreatoroftheworld,heisanactivebeingwhoaffectstheworld.ThisisexplicitintheYuktidīpikā’sdiscussionsofthe“bodiesofdignity” (mahātmyaśarīra) that God assumes. That he should desire to take suchbodies,and thathepresumablygoeson toact in theworld, indicates thathedoeshave some particular interests of his own to pursue. This possibility would bedisallowedbytheargumentsoftheSāṃkhyasūtras.TherearethreepossibleaccountsforGodintheSāṃkhyaandYogasystems:(1)

aGodwhoiscompletelypassive,(2)aGodwhoisnotcreatoroftheworldbutisanactiveagentintheworld,and(3)aGodwhoiscreatoroftheworld.TheargumentsofSS5.2-12 are designed to prove the nonexistence of the third type ofGod andwouldalsoseemtoapplytothesecond,sinceanyactionbyGodwouldrequiresomepriordesire.However, theseargumentsarenot targetedat the first sort ofGod,acompletely passive God. This suggests that the existence of a completely passiveGod remains a theoretical possibility for the Sāṃkhya, albeit not one thatVijñānabhikṣu and other late medieval thinkers found particularly compelling orattractive.While theearliest commentarieson theSāṃkhyakārikā seem toendorsethesecondpossibility,Vijñānabhikṣuopts foraGodwho is fully responsible for thecreation of the world, and he makes arguments to show that this was the truepositionofKapila,thefounderoftheSāṃkhyasystem.Vijñānabhikṣu chooses to finally state his objections to these disproofs of God’s

existenceinhiscommentaryonSS5.12.Notably,SS5.12iswherethesūtra’sauthorswitchestothetopicofthescripturalevidenceforGod’snonexistence.Upuntilnow,Vijñānabhikṣuhasremainedafaithfulcommentator,glossingtheSāṃkhyasūtrasandat times adding arguments in support of their assertion that God does not exist.However, after supplying a rather halfhearted gloss of SS 5.12’s contention thatscriptural authority fails to prove the existence of God, Vijñānabhikṣu abruptlyreversescourse.HeessentiallytakesbackeverythinghehassaidoverthecourseofcommentingonthesūtrasdenyingtheexistenceofGod,SS5.2-12.Onceagain,heappeals to the idea fromhis introduction thatKapiladenies theexistenceofGod inthe Sāṃkhyasūtras merely in order to keep its readers indifferent to the Godlikepowerstheymightattain:

And this denial of God is for the sake of indifference with regard to lordliness, as well as for the sake ofexplainingthepossibilityofliberationwithoutknowledgeofGod.Itismerelyaboldassertion(prauḍhivāda),aspreviously explained. Otherwise, there would be excessive complexity resulting from the acceptance of asecondarymeaningofGod’seternality,whichdoesnotbelongtoindividualselves.TherejectionofGodmustbeabandonedbecausetheeternalityofGodisconsistentwithmyviewthattheeternalknowledge,desire,etc.ofGodbelongtohislimitingconditions,andaremodificationsoftheintellect(buddhi),andsoforth.ThiscanbeseenintheVedāntasūtras.50

AfteralongsilenceinwhichVijñānabhikṣuappearstoacceptthesūtras’assertionsrejectingGod’sexistence,hefinallycounterswithwhatheconsiderstobethecorrectview—in fact, the true view of the Sāṃkhya sage Kapila. Besides reiterating hisearlier claim that it invokes indifference to lordliness among hearers, he adds onemorereasonforKapila’sapparentrejectionofGod.Weseecertaininstanceswheremenhavebeenliberatedwithoutanyapparentworshipof,meditationon,oraidfromGod. In fact, it is perfectly possible to achieve liberationwithout any conception ofGod, as the Sāṃkhya teaching shows. At least in certain cases, it seems,acceptance of God is a hindrance to enlightenment, and rejection is a boon. ThenonexistenceofGod,although false, issometimes “good to think.”However,aswewillsee,thissuggestioniscontradictedbycertainpassagesinPatañjali’sYogasūtrasandVyāsa’scommentaryon that text, theYogabhāṣya.PatañjalidepictsGodasanimportant meditative object for yogins seeking liberation. Furthermore, Vyāsa’scommentary implies that without God, there can be no liberation. Although God isacknowledged to have no hand inworld-creation, inPatañjali andVyāsa he has anessentialroletoplayinthedramaofindividualhumanliberation.While the firsthalfof theprecedingquotation from theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya

is straightforward, the brevity of the argument in the second half has causedperplexityamongthefewscholarswhohaveattemptedtomakesenseofit.51IfollowGarbe’s interpretation, which understands the passage to be an argument for therejectionoftheapparentSāṃkhyadenialofGod.IfGodisnotaccepted,thenallofthe passages that speak of God’s eternality and omnipotence will have to beunderstood in some secondary sense and therefore will suffer from the defect ofcomplexity(gaurava).AsIdiscussedinchapter3,Vijñānabhikṣustronglyresistsuseof secondary interpretation of scriptural passages if there is any possibility ofunderstanding the passage in question in a primary sense—this is his centralargument for the rejection of Advaita interpretations of the Upaniṣads. Here, heappliesthesameargumenttotheSāṃkhyasūtras’rejectionofGod.Ifweunderstandthe epithet “God” to refer simply to the firstpuruṣa, thenwewill also have to usesecondary interpretation to understand references to this first puruṣa’s “eternality,”“omnipotence,” and so forth. Themuch simpler course is simply to take passagesfromtheUpaniṣadssuchas“Thenitthought,letmebecomemany”(Ch.Up.6.2.3)ina literal,andnotafigurativesense.Thecreatorof theworld isasentientbeing,notblind, insentient prakṛti. Vijñānabhikṣu’s emphasis on scriptural proofs for God’sexistence is itself uncharacteristic of a Sāṃkhya commentary, where rationalinferencetakespriorityoverscripturalauthority.BybasinghisrefutationofSāṃkhya’sapparentatheismoninterpretationoftheUpaniṣadsratherthanonanargumentfrom

natural theology,VijñānabhikṣuexposeshisBhedābhedaVedānta roots.And,at theendofhiscommentaryonSS5.12,VijñānabhikṣuonceagainrefersthereaderbacktohiscommentaryontheBrahmasūtrasforfurtherelucidationoftherelationbetweentheindividualselfandBrahmanatthetimeoftheworld’sdissolutionandre-creation.ThattextremainsthekeyforunderstandingthemetaphysicalrelationsthatserveasthegroundfortheevolutionofprakṛtiintheSāṃkhyaworldview.Vijñānabhikṣu’s commentary on theSāṃkhyasūtras is hismost unusual work. He

hastoreconcilethetext’scleardenialofGodwithhisowntheismandthetheismofhisreaders,mostofwhomwouldhavebeenbelieversinGod’sexistence,proponentsofsomevarietyofVedāntaorNyāyatheism.Facedwith thisdifficultsituation, inhispaean to Sāṃkhya in the introduction to his commentary, he tactfully hints thatSāṃkhyadoesnotpresent theultimate teachings. Itstopsat the levelofdifferenceand fails to posit explicitly the overarching unity (or non-separation, avibhāga)between the individual self and Brahman. As I will show in chapter 6, he alsosubordinatesSāṃkhyatoYoga.NotonlyisYogamorecompletethanSāṃkhyainitsacknowledgment of God, it is also the highest practical teaching. According toVijñānabhikṣu’s subcommentary on theYogasūtras, Patañjali’s eight-limbed path ofYoga presents a more potent technique for liberation than the purely theoreticalexercisesofdiscriminationbetweenprakṛtiandpuruṣapresentedbySāṃkhya.

[6]YOGA,PRAXIS,ANDLIBERATION

THEEXCELLENCEOFTHEYOGICPATH

VijñānabhikṣusYogavārttika,asubcommentaryonPatañjalisYogasūtras,iscurrentlyhis best-known work. But historical trends, not anything inherent in Vijñānabhikṣu’sphilosophy,havemostlydeterminedwhichofhisworkswasmostpopular inagivenera. At the beginning of the twentieth century, his most well-known work was hiscommentary on Sāṃkhya, largely thanks to Richard Garbe’s Sanskrit edition andGerman translation of that work. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, T. S.Rukmani has made the Yogavārttika available to practitioners of yoga in India,Europe, and North America thanks to her translation. Rukmani has strong opinionsconcerning the relationship between the Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga strands ofVijñānabhikṣu’sphilosophy.Shebelievesthatinhisheartofhearts,VijñānabhikṣuwastrulyaYogin:

Vijñānabhikṣuwasactiveatatimewhen,ontheonehand,inthephilosophicalfield,Vedāntawasatitsheightand on the other hand, in the religious field, bhakti was gaining supremacy. Vijñānabhikṣu himself was anuncompromising yogī, both by conviction and practice. In the Yogavārttika he argues for Yoga being thephilosophyparexcellenceforattainingliberation.Assuch,inordertoestablishYogainaVedānticatmosphere,it was his first duty to write commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī as was the practice amongst theVedāntācāryas....ComingtoVijñānabhikṣu’syogicbeliefsitmustberemarkedthatVijñānabhikṣuisfirstandforemostayogī.

His interpretationofVedāntaandSāṃkhyahavemainlybeenfromtheyogicangle.Othercommentators likeVācaspati Miśra have been able to comment on the different schools of philosophy objectively. But inVijñānabhikṣuonefindsanintensecommitmenttohispersonalphilosophywhichhetriestofit intotheotherkindredsystems likeVedāntaandSāṃkhya.Thatheconsidersyogasuperior tobothSāṃkhyaandVedāntahasalreadybeenpointedout.1

TwomajorpiecesofevidencefromtheYogavārttikaappear tosupportRukmani’sclaim. First, she points out that Vijñānabhikṣu makes laudatory statements aboutYogathatimplyitssuperioritytoallotherschools.Second,VijñānabhikṣuassertsthatYogaisamoreeffectivemeanstoliberationthananyothersystem.Ofcourse,inthe

earlierhistoryofSāṃkhya-Yogathere isquiteabitofambiguityconcerningwhetherSāṃkhya and Yoga consisted of two systems or were just one. The historicalevidencesupportstheconclusionthatatthetimetheYogasūtraswerewritten,therewas no separate “Yoga” system and that Patañjali’s text is an “exposition ofSāṃkhya” (sāṃkhyapravacana).2 However, Vijñānabhikṣu is one of the many latemedievalcommentatorswhodoesseemtoregardthetwoschoolsashavingdifferentteachings,as indicatedbypassages inboth theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāsya and theYogavārttika.Itis,therefore,alegitimatequestiontoask:DidVijñānabhikṣuconsiderhimselfaYogin(i.e.,anadherentofaseparateYogaschoolofphilosophy)andnotaSāṃkhyaoraVedāntin?Didheconsider theYogaschoolofphilosophysuperior tothose two other schools? Just as in the discussion of God’s existence andnonexistence(chapter5), itwasnecessary toremainsensitive to themanydifferentpossiblemeaningsof theword “God,” so, too,wehave tobecareful to keep fromconflatingthemanymeaningsofthewordyoga.Atstakehereisadoctrinalaffiliationto a distinct school known as “Yoga,” not simply the practice of certain techniquesdescribedby theYogasūtras orVijñānabhikṣu’s celebratory remarks in reference tosomethingcalled“yoga.”AsistraditionalinIndianphilosophicaltexts,Vijñānabhikṣubeginseachofhisthree

commentaries on Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga with laudatory comments directedtoward thephilosophical traditiononwhichhe is commenting.As I discussed in theprevious chapter, these remarks are ambiguous in his commentary on theSāṃkhyasūtras. Although he celebrates theSāṃkhya sageKapila, he also tactfullyadmitsthattherearesomepartsofKapila’stextthatarenotcompletelyaccurate.Inhis introductions to theVedāntaandYogacommentaries,however,nosuchcaveatsaregiven.InhisYogavārttika,asRukmanihaspointedout,hereferstoYogaasthehighestteaching,theoceanintowhichalloftheotherteachingsflow:

2.ThecommentaryonPatañjali’swork,thetreasure-houseofjewelsintheformofknowledge,excavatedbythegreatsageVyāsa, isanoceanofmilk. In it is thenectar that is fit for thegreatYogins todrink.So thatknowledgeableBrahminshereonearth can churn out thenectar fromVyāsa’s commentary, theVārttika isofferedastheMandaramountain,thegreatchurningstick.3.There[inhiscommentary]VyāsadeclarestheessenceofthemeaningofalloftheVedas,disguisedasa

commentaryonYoga.Henceitisthepathforthosewhodesireliberation.4. Just asall the rivers, beginningwith theGanges, exist asparts of theocean, so too thephilosophical

systems,beginningwiththeSāṃkhya,existentirelyaspartsofthisYogasystem.3

Vijñānabhikṣu once again uses the language of disguise (miṣa) and deception todescribe a philosophical teaching. AlthoughVyāsa’s commentary appears simply tobeaworkonYoga,itis,infact,adistillationofalltheVedasandthereforeisthewayto liberation.Vijñānabhikṣualsodescribes itasan“oceanofmilk.”ThemetaphorofthenectarchurnedoutoftheoceanofmilkharksbacktothefamousstoryfromtheMahābhārata and the Purāṇas of the gods and demons vying for the nectar ofimmortality.4 Of course, his Vedāntic commentary, the Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya(Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge) takes its name from that same myth.Vijñānabhikṣu deploys the myth in similar ways in both commentaries. At the

beginningoftheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣyahewrites:

3.Thisnectarofknowledge,drawnoutbychurningoftheseaofmilkthat isthespeechofrevealedtexts,rememberedtexts,andreasoning,IoffertoBrahminstopleasetheteacher.4.HavingdistributedthenectarandusedtheMohinīthatisdiscriminativewisdomtocheatthedemonswho

arebadarguments,letthosewhodesirenectardrinkthis.5.AfterBrahminshavedrunkthisandbecomestrong,conqueringtheleadersofthetroopsofdemonswho

are the infidels (pākhanda), may they reach the abode of the great teacher through knowledge and ritualaction.5

VijñānabhikṣuextendsthemetaphorevenfartherintheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya,alludingto Mohinī, the attractive female form taken on by Visnu in order to distract thedemons fromseizing thenectar that theyand thegodshadchurned fromtheoceanusing the Mandara mountain as a churning-rod and the giant serpent Vāsuki as arope.Thisisnottheonlysimilaritybetweentheintroductionsofthetwotexts.JustastheYogavārttika presents yoga as the path for thosewho seek liberation, so, too,knowledgeofBrahmanisthepathtoliberation,accordingtotheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya:

“TheknowerofBrahmanobtainsthehighest,”“OnewhoknowsBrahmanbecomesBrahman,”“Onlyknowingthat,hereachesbeyonddeath.”IntheseandotherpassagesofrevealedscripturethereisinjunctionregardingknowledgeofBrahman,whichhasbeenproventhe instrument for theattainmentof thehighesthumanend.“Oneshouldmeditateon just the self.” “ThewiseBrahmin, just knowing that, shouldperformknowledgeofBrahman.”Suchistheformof the injunction. Inthesestatements,what isBrahman?WhatarethegroupofqualitiesthatprovethatitisBrahman?Whatsortofthingistheknowledgeofit?Whatsortofthingisitsresult?These kinds of questions are precisely what those seeking liberation wish to know, due to apparentlycontradictorymeanings inscripturecausedby thedifferencesamong theVedic lineages.Hence, inorder tosettletheseissues,thedisciplineofBrahma-Mīmāṃsāisrequired.6

ThisaccountfromtheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣyaissimilarinitsdepictionofknowledgeofBrahman as indispensable for liberation. It differs from the account in theYogavārttika,however, initsabsenceof inclusivistrhetoric.Atthetimeofthewritingof theVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya, Vijñānabhikṣu did not feel the larger rhetorical need toarguethatallof theāstikaphilosophicalsystemsareultimatelyasingleunifiedbodyofdoctrine.Instead,heportraysthevariousphilosophicalsystemsashavingfrequentdisagreements and portrays himself an exponent of the Vedānta. Although thecommentary isrifewithSāṃkhyaandYogainfluences,andVijñānabhikṣuevenfeelscomfortable quotingKapila for support on occasion, nonetheless, he portrays othersystemsofphilosophyasfrequentlydefective.TheYogavārttika andSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya are the work of amoremature

scholar than the Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya, as others have remarked.7 One piece ofevidenceforthisisthemorenuancedattitudethatVijñānabhikṣutakesintreatingthevariousnon-YogasystemsaspartsofagreaterYogicwhole.Inprinciple,therewasnothing to prevent him from treatingVedānta the sameway in his earlierworks. Inmanyways,BhedābhedaVedānta isevenmoreamenable to this typeof treatmentthan Yoga, since its central concept is that of a metaphysical unity that underliesphenomenaldifference.ButVijñānabhikṣuneverexplicitlythematizestheunityofallofthe schools in the language of bhedābheda. Very likely, such an application of

bhedābhedaneveroccurred tohim.Bhedābhedaoperatesonametaphysicalplanedifferentfromthesocial-historicalplaneofdoxographicorganization,andtherelationof the different schools is not a topic of inquiry in the sameway that the nature ofBrahman is. Vijñānabhikṣu certainly does have a systematic understanding of therelationshipandrelativeworthofphilosophicalschools,butithastobeinferredbythereader from his discussions on topics such as Brahman, the individual self, themultiplicityofpuruṣas, theexistenceofGod, thenatureof andmeans to liberation,andsoforth.Of course, it is one thing to celebrate a school of philosophy in the benedictory

versesatthebeginningofatext.Itisquiteanotherthingtosaypreciselywhyonesetof doctrines is superior to another. In the Yogavārttika, Vijñānabhikṣu gives somehints concerning the precise reasons for Yoga’s superiority by bringing into playanotherconnotationofthewordyoga.AlthoughheclearlyunderstandsYogatobeabody of philosophical doctrines distinct from Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, Vijñānabhikṣualsosees theYogasystemashavingaspecialconcernwith thepracticalmeans toliberation. And it is this special orientation, different from all other philosophicalsystems, thatgives it itssuperiority.After listingseveralquotes from theUpaniṣadsandPurāṇasthatseemtoalludetosomeparticularyogicpractices,hesuggeststhattheYogasystemisuniquelycapableofdiscussingsuchpractices:

There[insmrtitextsmentionedpreviously]thosewhodesireliberationwishtoknowthenatureofYoga,whatarethemeanstoitsattainment,howisitthecauseofknowledgeandliberation,etc.IntheVedānta,Sāṃkhya,etc.,onlyknowledgeisusuallydiscussed,andYogaisonlydiscussedbrieflyasameanstoknowledge.ButtheYoga that arises from knowledge is not mentioned there, even briefly. Therefore, Patañjali, who desires toexplainthetwo-foldYogaatgreatlength,inordertogettheattentionofstudents,introducesthetextthatisateachingonYogabysayingatthebeginning,“Now,ateachingonYoga.”8

Vijñānabhikṣuhere refers obliquely to anequation that hewill latermakeexplicit.Since Sāṃkhya and Vedānta are primarily concerned with the correctconceptualization of the individual self (jīvātman orpuruṣa) in its relationship to thematerialworldand(inthecaseofVedānta)toBrahman,thehigheststateattainableto practitioners of these schools is meditation accompanied by conceptual objects(samprajñātasamādhi). In this formofmeditation, the yogin has not yet completelytranscendedworldly conceptions of subject and object. There aremultiple formsofthistypeofmeditation,allinvolvingtheyogin’sconsciousunificationwithameditativeobject.9 So, to take one example, a yogin might meditate on the form of the godKrsna, identifying completely with this god. Although he has attained a state ofunification (samāpatti) with his object of meditation, that object is still conceptuallyavailabletohimasameditativeobject.Whilemeditationaccompaniedbyconceptualobjects(samprajñātasamādhi)representsahighstageofyogicaccomplishment,itisnot thehighest.Thehighestmeditativestateayogincanattain ismeditation freeofconceptual objects (asamprajñātasamādhi). This is the state that Vijñānabhikṣuidentifies closely with the Yoga system of philosophy. Although a follower of Yogaphilosophy has access to both meditation accompanied by conceptual objects and

meditationwithoutconceptualobjects,SāṃkhyasandVedāntinsonlyhaveaccesstothe lowerstageofmeditation. In thisrespect,specifically in termsofpractice,YogacanbedescribedassuperiortothesystemsofSāṃkhyaandVedānta.Butwhat is thespecificrelationof thesetwomeditativestatesto thehighestgoal

ofhumanlife—liberationfromthecycleofdeathandrebirth?Vijñānabhikṣumaintainsthatpractitionersofall threeschools,Vedānta,Sāṃkhya,andYoga,arecapableofachieving liberation. As discussed in chapter 5, Sāṃkhyas are even capable ofreaching liberation without relying on any concept of God (īśvara). Just as in theirsystemGodisnotanecessarypreconditionforliberation,so,too,meditationwithoutconceptual objects (asamprajñātasamādhi) is not a necessary precondition. It issuperior in that it is anexpress route to liberation,whilemeditationwith conceptualobjects (samprajñātasamādhi) takes more time. Specifically, meditation withoutconceptual objects allows a practitioner to skip entirely the state of embodiedliberation (jīvanmukti) and toprogress immediately to final liberation.Tounderstandwhy this should be so according to Vijñānabhikṣu requires some background intophilosophicalcontroversiessurroundingembodiedliberationandthemechanicsoftheIndiantheoryofkarma.

KARMAANDEMBODIEDLIBERATION

One way of classifying actions has to do with the status of results. The theory ofkarma states, in essence, that every positive or negative act (karman) has acommensurate result (phala). In many cases, there is a substantial period of timebetweentheactandthearisingofitsresult.Withthisinmind,Vijñānabhikṣureferstoa threefold typology of acts commonly accepted by most traditions of Indianphilosophy:(1)actsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults(prārabdhakarman),(2)actswhosepositiveornegativeeffectshavebeencollectedbutarenotyetgivingresults(saṃcitakarman),and(3)actsthatarecurrentlybeingperformedsothereforehavenotasyetgiven results (anāgatakarman). The third sort of acts are theonesmost amenable to change, since the actor is currently performing those acts. Actswhoseeffectshavebeencollectedbutnotyetcometofruition(saṃcitakarman)alsoholdoutthepossibilitythattheresultscanbeavoided.Vijñānabhikṣuandmostothertheoristsofkarmaholdthatbymeansofknowledge

of the sort attained in the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta systems, it is possible to cut offsuch “collected” (saṃcita) acts before they come to fruition and to experienceliberation. According tomost Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, andYoga thinkers, however, actsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults(prārabdhakarman)cannotbeavoided—their resultsmust be experienced, even if the onewho experiences these acts hasalreadyachievedliberation(mokṣa).Theyarekarmicresidue,whichmustbeallowedto burn off before the enlightened one can achieve final release, which ischaracterizedasthecompleteandpermanentseparationfromtherealmofsaṃsāraandprakṛti.Thisperiodinwhichtheliberatedbeingwaitsforthisresiduetoburnoff

is called “embodied liberation,” or jīvanmukti. This is the state of all of thoseenlightenedteacherswhowereabletoremainintheworldforatimetoinstructtheirfollowers. Hence the possibility of jīvanmukti is important from a practical andpedagogical standpoint—without it, all worldly teachings would only be thetestimoniesofthosewhohadnotyetbeenliberated.The topicofembodied liberationwas itselfat thecenterof frequentpolemics,as

the Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas rejected this possibility, while many Vedāntins, Sāṃkhyas,andYoginsacceptedit.10BS4.1.15appears tosupport theexistenceof jīvanmukti:“But only those former works whose effects have not yet begun are destroyed byknowledge,becausethatdeathofthebodyistheterm.”Intheircommentariesonthissūtra,VijñānabhikṣuandŚaṅkaraalso citeCh.Up. 6.14.2 as scriptural support forthe view that jīvanmukti is a human possibility: “There is delay here of him only aslongasheisnotfreed,butthenhewillarrive.”Bothcommentatorsunderstandthistomeanthat there isdelayof the liberatedoneas longashe isnot freedofhisbody,due to the necessity of burning off karmic residue. After the residue is exhausted,however, the sage is permanently free of embodiment. The commentators identifyknowledge as thatwhich destroys actswhose results have not yet begun to arise,andthesameknowledgeasbeingincapableofdestroyingresultsthathavebeguntoarise(prārabdhakarman).Areaderonly familiarwithVijñānabhikṣu’sVedānticworkswouldbe ledtobelieve

thatthisisthelastwordinthematter.However,Vijñānabhikṣurevisitsthissametopicnear thebeginningof theYogavārttika.Althoughhestillmaintains thatknowledgeofBrahmanis incapableofcuttingoffactsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults,hesuggeststhatsuchactscanbecutoffbyanothermeans:

Andinthatway,bymeansofthedestructionofkarma,itisestablishedthatlikeknowledge,objectlessyogatooisthecauseofliberation.Andthere,byburningupallsubconscioustracesbymeansofobjectlessyoga,evenprevious acts that have already begun to produce results are left behind. This is how it is different fromknowledge.Knowledgeisunabletodestroyactsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults,asindicatedinthestatements suchas, “There isdelayhereofhimonlyuntil he isnot freed,but thenhewill arrive” (Ch. Up.6.14.2),and thereare revealedscripturesand remembered textson the topicof jīvanmukti.For [objectless]yoga,however,thereisnoinabilitytodestroyactsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults.Onthecontrary,“The yogin who has attained samādhi and burned up the heap of karma by means of the fire of yogaimmediatelyattainsliberationinthatlife”(Vis.Pu.6.7.35).Henceevenactsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults are left behind, just as atonement is described [as destroying] the effects of acts. The result of[objectless]yogais instantaneousliberationalone.Furthermore,whenallmentaltracesaredestroyedbythetwoyogas,due to the lackofanassistingmental traceofexperience,evenpreviousacts thathavealreadybeguntoproduceresultsbecomeincapableofproducingresults.Thistooisaresultofyoga.ThisissaidintheMokṣadharmasectionoftheMahābhārata:“ThereisnoknowledgeequaltoSāṃkhya;thereisnopowerequaltoYoga.”“Power”meansthatbyleavingbehindpreviousactsthathavealreadybeguntoproduceresults,Yogabyitselfisthecauseofquickliberation.11

Vijñānabhikṣu had previously suggested that only Yoga can lead to the stage ofobjectlessmeditation.Andit isonlybymeansofobjectlessmeditationthatactsthathave already begun to produce results (prārabdhakarman) can be destroyed. Itfollows that there are two paths to final liberation. The path of knowledge (jñāna),offered by theSāṃkhya andVedānta systems, can lead tomeditationwith objects

andcanbeefficaciousforenlightenment.ButthefollowerofSāṃkhyaorVedāntawillhave to endure the state of jīvanmukti, as suggested by BS 4.1.15 and Ch. Up.6.14.2.However,Vis.Pu.6.7.35suggests thatYogacancause immediate release,destroyingprārabdha acts and bypassing jīvanmukti altogether.Yoga, according toVijñānabhikṣu, is the fast track to complete liberation. AlthoughSāṃkhya, Vedānta,andYogacanallleadtoliberation,Yogaisthebestofthethreesolelyintermsofitsefficiency.VijñānabhikṣutakesthestatementfromMokṣadharmaquiteseriouslythat“Thereis

noknowledgeequaltoSāṃkhya.ThereisnopowerequaltoYoga.”12Thissuggestsa division of labor between the systems. The Yoga system is the most efficientmeans to enlightenment, but not the highest system in terms of true or ultimatedoctrines. There is little or nothing in the Yogasūtras that would suggest that theultimate relationship between the puruṣa and Brahman is difference and non-difference. Both Sāṃkhya and Yoga function on a lower theoretical level than theVedānta; both are dualistic systems, primarily (or, a modern historian would say,exclusively)concernedwith the levelofdifference.Yet,according toVijñānabhikṣu’sbrandofBhedābhedaVedānta, this level is ultimately sublatedby the state of non-difference,ornon-separation,betweenBrahmanandtheindividualself.Vijñānabhikṣueven uses the terms “conventional” (vyāvahārika) and “ultimate” (pāramārthika) todescribethesetwolevelsinhiscommentaryontheBrahmasūtras.ForVijñānabhikṣu,itwouldhavebeenevenmoreaptforthepassagejustquotedfromtheVisnuPurāṇatoread,“ThereisnoknowledgeequaltoVedānta.”VedāntaacknowledgesGodandteachesofanultimatelevelthatsurpassesthedualityofprakṛtiandpuruṣa.13But inspiteofitsphilosophicalultimacy,itisinferiortoYogaonthelevelofpractice.The larger question at stake in this extremely technical discussion of the

mechanisms that cause jīvanmukti and its cessation has do to with the relativesuperiority of the systems of Indian philosophy. Whether or not we acceptVijñānabhikṣu’sargumentsbasedonscriptureandinference,hisconclusionofYoga’ssuperiorability tobringspeedy liberationmeansthat it isproper tosaythatYoga issuperior toall other systems inat least this one regard.But doeshisargument forYoga as the fastest road to the destination of liberation entitle us to say thatVijñānabhikṣuwasaYogin firstandforemost?Theanswer isalmostcertainly that itdependsonourdefinitionofthewordsyoginandyoga. Inspiteofhisapparenthighregard for theYogasystem, it isnot relevant to introducequestionsofhispersonalpractice of yoga into the discussion. At times, Vijñānabhikṣu offers descriptions ofyogic states, claiming that he has experienced these states himself. Yet, like othermedieval scholastics, he argues primarily from scriptural authority (śabdapramāṇa)and rational inference (anumāna), not on the basis of his personal mysticalexperiencesasayogin(yogipratyakṣa).Itwouldseemconsistentthathe,aswellasearliercommentatorson theYogasūtras,put intopracticeasystemheheld insuchhigh regard. But there is no less reason to think that he practiced the discipline ofinquiry into thenatureofBrahmanthat isacentralpartofVedānta,or theSāṃkhyatechniqueof intellectualdiscrimination(viveka)betweenprakṛtiandpuruṣa.All three

systems are systems of contemplative practice. None are purely theoretical.14 Itwouldseemhepracticedall threesystems,Vedānta,Yoga,andSāṃkhya.There isno indicationfromhiswritingsthatwouldallowustomakeadistinctionbetweenthethree systems based on his own personal practice or lack thereof.15 And it isimportant to remember here that Vijñānabhikṣu considered the divisions betweenthesethreeschoolstobeartificialwhenunderstoodfromthehighestperspective.Anyattempt todistinguish these threesystemsgoesagainst thespiritofVijñānabhikṣu’sfundamental project itself. For him, all three are ultimately aspects of one and thesametruth.Vijñānabhikṣu is certainly not a Yogin if we take a Yogin to mean one who

subscribes to all of the doctrines of Patañjali’s Yogasūtras. Patañjali, unlikeVijñānabhikṣu,believedthatGodhasnoroleinthecreationoftheworldandthattheactivation of prakṛti and puruṣa is amechanical process, like the attraction of ironfilings to amagnet. Vijñānabhikṣu clearly states his belief thatGod is the onewhoactivatesprakṛtiandpuruṣa at thebeginningof creation, citingPurānicversessuchas “Hari enters into prakṛti and puruṣa according to his desire. When the time ofcreation is at hand, he agitates both the mutable and the immutable.”16 However,exclusively associating yoga and yogins with Patañjali’s Yogasūtras is an arbitraryconvention,establishedbysomemodernscholarswhoseektoprivilegeonemomentinIndianintellectualhistoryandusethattoevaluatetheauthenticityofallearlierandlaterauthorswhoclaimedtobepartofa traditionknownasyoga. It is true that formanymedievalsandmoderns,Patañjali’sYogasūtras functionasthesourcebookfortheauthenticYogaschool.ButthankstotheaphoristicambiguitiesoftheYogasūtras,Vijñānabhikṣu can and does identify himself as an inheritor of the tradition ofPatañjali’sYogasystem.Furthermore,unlikePatañjali,Vijñānabhikṣuholdsthatthereis a discrete Yoga school separate from the Sāṃkhya. Because the YogasūtrasmentionGod,yetdonotclarifypreciselywhatGod’sroleis,VijñānabhikṣuandmostmedievalyoginsarefreetounderstandtheGodoftheYogasūtrasasnoneotherthantheGodofVedānta.According toVijñānabhikṣu, thatGod isVisnu, theomniscient,omnipotentcreatoroftheuniverse.

THEUNITYOFYOGAANDVEDĀNTASOTERIOLOGIES

The introductory section of Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya offers ampleevidence that at the time of its writing Vijñānabhikṣu saw Sāṃkhya, Yoga, andVedāntaasconsistingofasingleteaching.Butsomereadersmightarguethathehadabandoned this notion by the time he wrote his works on Yoga. In this section, Idispute this claim by drawing from the final chapter of Vijñānabhikṣu’sYogasārasaṃgraha (Epitome of the Essence of Yoga). This work, probablyVijñānabhikṣu’s last, functions as a summary of hismuch longerYogavārttika.17 Heclearly states the purpose of theYogasārasaṃgraha in its third benedictory verse:“After churning theoceanof yogawith the churning-rod that isYogavārttika, I have

extractedtheessenceofthenectaranddepositedit intothepotthatisthisbook.”18Yet the Yogasārasaṃgraha is more than just a summary of the Yogavārttika. ItsfourthandfinalsectionisalsoasummationofallofhisworksonYoga,Vedānta,andSāṃkhya,abrief finalattempttoarguefortheultimateunityof thethreesystems.19In this section, he does so primarily by arguing for the unity of the end goal of thethreesystems—specifically,thatthestateofaloneness(kaivalya)taughtasthefinalend of all human existence by theSāṃkhya andYoga is the same as the state ofliberation(mokṣa)thatVedāntinsstrivetoattain.As discussed in chapter 3, Vijñānabhikṣu’s early writings uphold a form of

BhedābhedaVedānta thatcanbedescribedasvibhāgāvibhāga,or “separationandnon-separation.” He describes at length the relationship between the jīvātman (orindividual self) and Brahman as one of separation and non-separation in hiscommentary on the Brahmasūtras. However, the concept of separation and non-separationalsoappearselsewhereinhisphilosophicalcorpus.This includesthetwoworks that he probably wrote last, the Sāṃkhyasāra (Essence of Sāṃkhya) andYogasārasaṃgraha, which is evidence that he never abandoned the BhedābhedaVedāntic formulations of his earliest works. On the contrary, these bhedābhedaconcepts underlie his later work in Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Throughout his corpus,Vijñānabhikṣu understands the natural relation between the individual self and theabsolute (or Brahman) to be non-separation. Non-separation is the relation thatobtains between the two entities before the world’s creation. It is also the relationbetween the jīvātman and Brahman after the jīvātman is liberated. Although webeingsintheworldareinarelationofseparation(vibhāga)fromBrahmanbeforeweare liberated, this current state of separation is adventitious and temporary. At thetime of liberation, or mokṣa, we return to our natural state of non-separation(avibhāga).Vijñānabhikṣu claims that all those passages in the Upaniṣads that express non-

differencebetweentheindividualselfandBrahmanshouldbeunderstoodinthesenseofnon-separation.InthishediffersfundamentallyfromAdvaitaVedānta.HefaultstheAdvaitinsfortheirunderstandingoftherelationbetweenthejīvātmanandBrahmanasone of complete identity (tādātmya). Vijñānabhikṣu argues against theAdvaita viewbothbecauseitisinherentlyillogicalandbecauseheconsidersitamisreadingoftheUpaniṣadsand theBrahmasūtras.Vijñānabhikṣu is alsoquite clear that theAdvaitaVedānta is excluded from the concordance of philosophical schools. Like theBuddhists whose theories Advaita so closely resembles, Advaita Vedāntins arenāstikas and, according to him, therefore contrary to Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and trueVedānticteachings.Of course, it may seem that Vijñānabhikṣu’s understanding of mokṣa as non-

separationhas justas little todowith theYogaconceptofaloneness (kaivalya) asdoes theAdvaitaunderstandingofmokṣa as completeoneness.Thewordkaivalyaitselfmayconjureuptheimageofapuruṣa that iscompletelyaloofandcutofffromeverythingelse in theuniverse—cutoffnotonly fromprakṛtibutalso from theotherpuruṣas.Ifthisnotioniscorrect,thenwhatcouldYogapossiblyhaveincommonwith

Vedānticsoteriologiesthatportraymokṣaassomesortofonenessortogetherness?The soteriology of isolation in the Yogasūtras and Sāṃkhyakārikā seems to goagainst thegrainofmostother Indiansoteriologies. Italsopresentsanobstacle formodern practitioners of yoga, who are often surprised at just how lonely the enddestinationdescribedbyPatañjaliappears tobe.YetVijñānabhikṣuunderstands theVedānticconceptofmokṣatobecompletelycompatiblewiththeconceptofkaivalya.HesaysthisexplicitlyinthefourthandfinalchapterofhisYogasārasaṃgraha,wherehediscussestheprecisephilosophicalmeaningofkaivalya.Tounderstandhispoint,itisnecessarytoascertainjustwhat“aloneness”doesanddoesnotmeaninitsYogiccontext.Vijñānabhikṣu’s Yogasārasaṃgraha quotes the well-known definition of kaivalya

fromtheverylastsūtraofPatañjali’sYogasūtras.YS4.34reads,“Isolationisthede-evolutionoftheguṇas,whichservenopurposefor thepuruṣa.Or it is thepowerofconsciousnessbeingestablished in itsownnature.”20Both inhisYogasārasaṃgrahaandinhisYogavarttika,Vijñānabhikṣuoffersanunusualreadingofthisaphorismthatdivides it into two. The “first kaivalya,” in Vijñānabhikṣu’s terminology, is the de-evolution (pratiprasava) of the guṇas. This deevolution or dissolution of the guṇas,leads to the complete disjunction (atyantaviyoga) of the puruṣa and the guṇas ofprakṛti.Thepuruṣa iscompletelyalone, insofaras it is isolated fromtheguṇas.ButVijñānabhikṣuiscarefultonotethatthisdoesnotmeanthattheseguṇashaveutterlyceased toexist.As faras thepuruṣawhohasbecomedisjoined from theguṇas isconcerned, the guṇas no longer exist. But the puruṣas are multiple, and for otherpuruṣas, union with prakṛti continues. He supports this position by citing anothersūtra,YS2.22:“Althoughprakṛtihasceasedtoexistfortheonewhosepurposehasbeen attained, it has not ceased to exist completely since it is the commonexperienceofotherbeingsaswell.”21This is the first kaivalya, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, and it pertains primarily to

prakṛti. He describes it as a property of prakṛti (prakṛtidharma). However, thesecondhalfofYS4.34,describing thephenomenonofkaivalya from thestandpointof the puruṣa itself, is the part most important for the Vedāntic concordance withYoga. Vijñānabhikṣu describes the second kaivalya as “the establishment of thepuruṣa in its own nature” (puruṣasya svarūpapratisthā). But he points out thatphenomenologically, the result is thesamewhetherweare talkingabout the firstorsecond kaivalya. Both entail the cessation of the experience of suffering. He findscommongroundherebetweenSāṃkhyaandYoga,ashepointsouttheassertionofSS1.1thatthehighestgoalofthepuruṣaisthecompletecessationofsuffering.While this concordance with Sāṃkhya will not strike us as especially surprising,

Vijñānabhikṣu’snextstatementintheYogasārasaṃgrahaismorecontroversial.ThereheseekstoestablishcommongroundbetweenYogaandVedānta:

TheVedāntinsspeakofliberation,whichisthedissolution(laya)oftheindividualselfintothehighestself.Butthereisnocontradictionbetweenourtheoryandtheirs.Justasthereisdissolutionoftheriversintotheocean,thereisdissolutionoftheindividualselvesintoBrahman,bymeansofthedissolutionofthelimitingconditions.For themeaning of the word “dissolution” is simply “non-separation.” It has also been determined that the

individualselfisnotstableassomethingapartfromBrahman.22

First note that Vijñānabhikṣu reintroduces the technical term “non-separation”(avibhāga),continuingthethreadofBhedābhedaVedānticinterpretationthatbeganinhisearliestworks.ThispassagemakesitclearthatVijñānabhikṣudoesnotconsiderit necessary to abandon his earlier positions in Bhedābheda Vedānta in order toembraceSāṃkhyaandYoga.Onthecontrary,hestillconsidersthesethreeschoolstobecomplimentarywhenunderstoodcorrectly.Vijñānabhikṣu believes that theword pairpuruṣa and jīvātman are synonyms, as

arethetwowordskaivalyaandmokṣa.Heacceptsthatthejīvātmansaremany.ThisisoneofthewaysinwhichhisBhedābhedaVedāntaisclosertoYogathanisAdvaitaVedānta. At the beginning of his commentary on theSāṃkhyasūtras, VijñānabhikṣumakestheargumentthatwhentheChāndogyaUpaniṣad (6.2.1)declares“oneonly,withoutasecond”(āsīdekamevādvitīyam), itdeclaresthe jīvātmans tobeoneonlyinsofar as they share the same nature: each is constituted by pure consciousness.However, they remain multiple in number, even after they are liberated. WhenVijñānabhikṣu says in the final chapter of the Yogasārasaṃgraha that the worddissolution(laya) simplymeansnon-separation,he resortsonceagain tohiscentralconcept from the commentary on the Brahmasūtras: after liberation, the individualselves are non-separate from Brahman, but they are not absorbed into a state ofcomplete nondifferentiation with Brahman, the Advaita tādātmya relation that herejects.ForVijñānabhikṣu’sBhedābhedaconcordance,thecomplementarityofVedāntaand

Yoga hinges on the second kaivalya, the “establishment of the puruṣa in its ownnature.”NotethatnowhereinPatañjali’sdefinitionofkaivalyaatYS4.34doeshesaythatthisalonenessmeansthecompleteisolationofthepuruṣasfromoneanotheror,forthatmatter,fromBrahman.Thedisjunction,or isolation, inquestionisspecificallythe disjunction betweenprakṛti andpuruṣa. But the other aspect of kaivalya is theabidingofthepuruṣa in itsownnaturalstate (svarūpapratiṣṭḥā).No longerdoes thepuruṣaexistintheadventitious,temporarystateofseparationfromBrahman.Whenitreverts to its natural state, it reverts to the state of being non-separate fromBrahman. Therefore, kaivalya is not just a turning away, as it often seems whentranslated. It isalsoa turning toward.While turningaway fromprakṛti, the liberatedpuruṣa is simultaneously turning towardBrahman, returning to its original relationofnon-separation.Yettherelationofseparationisalsorealforacertainamountoftime.Whenthepuruṣa isyokedtotheguṇas inthephenomenalworld, it isseparatefromBrahman.ButVijñānabhikṣuconsidersthisstateofseparationtobecharacterizedbyinstability (apratisthatva). Thus he says in the quote cited previously from theYogasārasaṃgraha: “The individual self is not stable as something apart fromBrahman.” Note the contrastmade by his choice of Sanskrit terms—at the time ofliberationorkaivalya, thepuruṣa isestablished in itsownnature(svarūpapratistha).During its time in the world as separate from Brahman, the puruṣa is unstable(apratistha).Hence,thereisanunderlyingmechanismtoexplainwhykaivalyaoccurs

from theVedāntic standpoint aswell as from theYogic.All things tend to return totheir natural state of equilibrium. For the puruṣa, that state is non-separation fromBrahman.In the state of kaivalya, the individual self becomes what it is, reverting to its

naturalstate. In theYogasūtras,onedimensionof thisnaturalstate isdescribedasdisjunction from theguṇas ofprakṛti and freedom frompain. Patañjali says nothingaboutBrahmanorabouttheembodiedself’srelationtoBrahman.ForVijñānabhikṣu,this is not surprising—as he says in his commentary on the Sāṃkhyasūtras, tounderstandeachschoolcorrectly,onemustunderstanditsproperscope.ThescopeoftheSāṃkhyaisthephilosophicaldiscriminationbetweenthatwhichisselfandthatwhich is not self. Yoga offers a detailed discussion of the practical means to thedisunionofthesetwo,ofpuruṣaandprakṛti.ButonlyVedāntadescribestheindividualself’s relation to the highest self, or Brahman. It is unnecessary to choose one ofthese three systems as correct and the other two aswrong, for thedarśanas arecomplementary,notcontradictory.VijñānabhikṣuregardedthepracticesoftheVedānta,Sāṃkhya,andYogaschools

to be different but complementary paths. While Yoga is the most direct of thosepaths, the contemplative practices of the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya schools are alsomeanstothesameend.Heregardsthegoalofallthreesystemstobeidentical:itisthereunitingoftheindividualselfwithBrahman,initsnaturalstateofnon-separation.The attempts by modern scholars to portray Vijñānabhikṣu either as an apostateSāṃkhyaorasaYoginwhopaidlipservicetoVedāntaandSāṃkhyagoagainstthefundamental tenet of Vijñānabhikṣu’s late works, the unity of the philosophicalsystems.23Furthermore, thesemodernattemptsare themselvesbasedonhistoricalassumptionsabouttheproperwaysofcategorizingIndianphilosophicalsystemsandidentifying the authentic doctrines of each of the schools. As shown in the briefhistoricalsurveyof therelationbetweenYogaandSāṃkhyapresented inchapter4,these classificatory schemes are by nomeans obvious or without their own set ofproblems. In chapter 7, I show how modern scholars fought over Vijñānabhikṣu’slegacyintheirownattemptstosetdownthepreciserelationshipbetweentheschoolsofIndianphilosophy.

[7]VEDĀNTAANDSĀṂKHYAINTHEORIENTALISTIMAGINATION

INDIANPHILOSOPHYANDTHECRITIQUEOFORIENTALISM

The period from 1550 to 1750 that directly preceded the British rule of the Indiansubcontinent was enormously fertile for philosophical innovation.1 Yet although hecouldnothaveknown it,Vijñānabhikṣu’sgenerationofSanskrit intellectualswasoneofthelastthatremaineduntouchedbycolonialism.Comingneartheendofanancientcommentarial tradition, Vijñānabhikṣus Difference and Non-Difference philosophicalsystem had little lasting impact on Indian intellectual life. Unlike the medievalBhedābhedavādins Vallabha and Caitanya, Vijñānabhikṣus writings did not becomethe theological basis for a popular devotional sect. The demanding nature of hiswritings and the relatively small place he gives to bhakti made such a movementunlikely.Norwashethefounderofamajorschoolofphilosophicalcommentary, likeŚaṅkara and Rāmānuja. There are records of three immediate disciples ofVijñānabhikṣu: Bhāvāgaṇeśa, Prasāda Mādhava, and Divyasimha Miśra.2Bhāvāgaṇeśas Sāṃkhyatattva-yāthārthyadīpana (Light on the True Meaning of theSāṃkhyaPrinciples),forinstance,extendsVijñānabhikṣu’sprojectbyapplyingNavya-Nyāya terminology in a commentary on the Tattvasamāsasūtras, another influentialsūtracollectionintheSāṃkhyatradition.3Vijñānabhikṣu’s final follower in the premodern period is Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa (early

eighteenth century), whose Laghusāṃkhyavṛtti is a condensed version of theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya.4 There is also at least one record of a follower of adifferentschoolcitingVijñānabhikṣu.Purusottama,an importantcommentatoron theworks of the Bhedābheda Vedāntin Vallabha, cites Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya to elucidate the nature of renunciation (tyāga) in theSāṃkhya school.5 There may be yet other writings of the seventeenth and earlyeighteenth centuries that testify to the influence of Vijñānabhikṣu’s ambitiouslysynthetic philosophical project in northern India. Historians have yet to analyze the

greatmajorityofVedānta,Sāṃkhya,andYogatextsofthisperiod.Whentheyfinallydo, thesituationof thesephilosophicalschoolsontheeveofBritishcolonialism,andthe extent of Vijñānabhikṣu’s influence among Sanskrit intellectuals, will becomesubstantiallyclearer.Onecanimaginethatifhistoricalcircumstanceshadbeendifferent,Vijñānabhikṣu’s

workscouldhavebeen thebeginningofaneo-Sāṃkhyacommentarial tradition thataccepted as established fact the concordance of Vedāntic, Sāṃkhya, and Yogicprinciples and enunciated a realist world-view as a counter to the increasinglyillusionistic outlook of Advaitins such as Prakāśānanda. Due in part to externalhistorical forces, however, Vijñānabhikṣu’s most decisive influence was not on hiscountrymenbutontheBritishandGermanOrientalistswhoreadhiscommentaryontheSāṃkhyasūtras.Forallof thenineteenthandmostof the twentiethcentury, thisworkwasVijñānabhikṣu’smost famous.Orientalists T.H.Colebrooke (1765-1837),A. E. Gough (1845-1915), Paul Deussen (1845-1919), and Richard Garbe (1857-1927) were also in a meaningful way the intellectual inheritors of Vijñānabhikṣu’sthought.BeginningwithColebrooke’s1823essay“OnthePhilosophyoftheHindus,”theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣyawasregardedasanindispensablesourcetextforoneof the central controversies of nineteenth-century Indology, the true relationshipbetween the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta systems.6 Perhaps surprisingly, Vijñānabhikṣustood at the center of the Orientalists’ dispute over the true essence of Indianphilosophy. While his general importance among his philosophical contemporariesmight be a matter of dispute, there can be no disputing the strong feelings aboutVijñānabhikṣuheldbytheseearlyhistoriansofIndianphilosophy.British colonial consolidation in India in the eighteenth century caused a decisive

break in India’s intellectual history, and the production of Sanskrit philosophical andliterarytextsneveragainequaledthequalityorquantityofthosecomposedinthelatemedieval period.7 Yet out of the ashes of one textual tradition came a newproliferationoftextualproduction,thewritingsoftheOrientalists.TheseWesterners,such as William Jones, H. T. Colebrooke, and F. Max Müller, sought to apply thephilological methods developed over hundreds of years in the study of Latin andGreektextstouncovertruthsabouttheSanskrittextualtradition.Somerecentcritics,most notably Edward Said, have depicted these men as imperialist agents hardlyinvolved in any meaningful way with the interpretation of foreign ideas. Saidianaccounts understand the creation of the Orient as a mirroring process by whichWestern thinkersprojected theiroppositeontoanEasternOther.Theunderstandingof essentialized binary relationships between West and East likematerialism/spiritualism, this-worldly/otherworldly, science/religion,individual/community, masculine/feminine were more important than empiricalinvestigation.8 Said, who first polemicized the terms “Orientalist” and “Orientalism,”maintains thatwhetherOrientalistscorrectlyor incorrectlyunderstood theobjectsoftheirinvestigationsisbesidethepoint:

The phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally not with a correspondence betweenOrientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient…

despiteorbeyondanycorrespondence,orlackthereof,witha“real”Orient.9

ThisindifferencetotheactualobjectsoftheOrientalists’study,andthebracketingof questions of truth or falsehood regarding Orientalist discourses, has hamperedunderstandingof theOrientalist enterprise. Insteadof themirroringmodel thatSaidpresents,amorecompletemodel issuggested in theworksofCharlesHalliseyandSheldon Pollock, for which Hallisey coins the phrase “intercultural mimesis.”10“Intercultural mimesis” describes a process in which thinkers appropriate certainconcepts or symbols they find in non-Western traditions and then recontextualizetheseconceptsor symbols for ideological reasons specific to theEuropeanculturalsphere.Tociteoneexample,PollockpointstothenewwaythattheBritishRajusedSanskrit dharmaśāstra texts—in particular, their concept of varṇa (often translated“class” or “caste”)—as a tool for the uniform centralized governance of the Indiansubcontinent.11Suchcasessuggestthatrealcontactdidattimestakeplacebetweenthe Orientalists and their objects of study, however compromised by frequentrecontextualizationsandthedistortionsofimperialpower.Furthermore,elitesinAsiansocieties were often complicit in creating and sustaining Orientalist ideas, usingOrientalist discourses as ameans formaintaining their own elite status in the newcontextofcolonialsociety.12We should also approach the classificatory efforts of the nineteenth-century

historiansofIndianphilosophyintermsofinterculturalmimesis.TheearliestEuropeanscholars of Indian philosophy had a need for a means to classify the bewilderingvariety of philosophical doctrines and texts they found in Indian archives. Theynaturally soughtoutandprivilegedSanskrit texts thatwouldallow them toestablishmodelsforclassification.Inparticular,theIndiandoxographiesofthemedievalperiodsuited their needs. These texts, frequently written by Advaita Vedāntins, tended tohierarchize philosophical schools, and these hierarchies likewise influenced theopinionsof eighteenth-andnineteenth-century scholars in theWest.As I discuss inchapter 8, one doxography in particular, the fourteenth-centurySarvadarśanasaṃgraha(CompendiumofAllPhilosophicalSystems)stoodoutamongall others for its influence in medieval India and modern Europe. This led to theelevationofAdvaitaVedāntaaboveallotherschools,especiallyinthewritingsofPaulDeussenandA.E.Gough.13These Indologists’ previous philosophical allegiances within the European cultural

spherealso influenced thechoiceof the Indianphilosophicalsystem theyheld tobethe oldest and, by their logic, therefore themost authentic. The influence of Kant’sand Schopenhauer’s transcendental idealism led many Orientalists to valorize themonismofAdvaitaVedānta,whichseemedtothemclosesttoEuropeanidealismandwhich theyunderstoodas the truemessageof theVedas.RichardGarbe,however,opposed this trend by championing the allegedly atheistic Sāṃkhya system as thetrue representativeofpurephilosophical inquiry in India.WhileGarbe’snarrativedidnothave thewidespread influenceofDeussen’sglorificationofAdvaitaVedānta,hiscentral focus on the atheistic Sāṃkhyasūtras led to the widespread opinion that

atheismisthetruepositionoftheSāṃkhyaschool.ManycriticsofOrientalismoverlookthediversityofopinionamongtheOrientalists

themselves.AlthoughSaidvilifiesOrientalistsfortheirtotalizing,essentializingattitudetoward Eastern cultures, he takes a similar totalizing approach by failing todifferentiate between the diverse opinions of the many Orientalist thinkers.14Orientalists hold many assumptions in common, but they also differ greatly in thedetailsoftheirinterpretations.Forinstance,HeinrichZimmer,whofledNaziGermanywith his Jewish wife to settle in New York, accepted the Orientalist depiction ofaggressive Aryan migrants who invaded India in the second millennium bce andconqueredtheDravidianpeoplestheyfoundthere.YetZimmerinsistedthatultimatelyitwas theDravidianswho conquered thematerialistic,warlikeAryans by infiltratingtheirreligionwiththeBuddhistandSāṃkhyavaluesofpacifism,meditation,andworldrenunciation.15 This contrasts, to put it mildly, with University of Munich ProfessorWalther Wüst, who sought to show in a 1937 lecture that Adolf Hitler’s supposedinsights were part of the “hereditary, long-term tradition … of the great Aryanpersonality of antiquity, the Buddha.”16 Clearly, there are meaningful differencesbetweentheOrientalistsZimmerandWüst.YetnoonehassoughttodojusticetothecomplicatedhistoryofOrientalismitself—adefinitive “historyofOrientalism”hasyettobewritten.17Althoughthatisnotmyprojecthere,Ihopethatbyapplyingthesameintellectual-historicalapproach to theOrientalists that Iappliedearlier topremodernIndian authors, by acknowledging that Deussen and Gough, too, are part of theWirkungsgeschichte of Indian philosophy, I can also do my small part to fill thelacunaeinourknowledgeofthathistory.

COLEBROOKEANDGOUGH:THESTRUGGLEFORTHEESSENCEOFVEDĀNTA

H.T.Colebrooke,presidentoftheAsiaticSocietyofBengalandfounderoftheRoyalAsiaticSocietyinLondon,standsnexttoSirWilliamJonesasoneofthepreeminentOrientalistsof the lateeighteenthandearlynineteenth centuries.18 Like othermajorfigures of his time, he wrote on an enormous range of topics, from Indianmathematics to Prakrit poetry. Colebrooke’s most significant contribution to thehistoryofIndianphilosophycomesinaseriesoflectureshegavefrom1823to1827at theRoyal Asiatic Society, entitled “On the Philosophy of theHindus.” In his firstlectures,heoutlined themainattributesof thesixāstika systems,andsubsequentlyhe covered the “heretical systems” of the JainasandBuddhists, alongwith “certainother Indian sects,” including the Māheśvaras, Pāśupatas, and Pāñcarātras. Hedescribes these last five systemsasexhibiting “someanalogy to theSánc’hyas, orfollowersofCapilaorofPatanjali[sic]”.19Colebrooke’s survey of the philosophical systems is remarkable for howmuch it

adheres to the accounts of his Sanskrit primary sources, and how rarely hemisinterprets or misrepresents the texts he was reading. A beginning student ofIndianphilosophy in the twenty-first century coulddomuchworse than to startwith

Colebrooke’s survey. Inparticular, heavoids thephilosophical accretionsof the latenineteenth-centuryOrientalists,manyofwhomfindintheIndianphilosophicalsystemsidentities and homologies with Greek and German philosophical systems. Unlikethese later thinkers, Colebrooke is generally content to present doctrines withoutexplicit comparison to Western philosophies, and without direct praise ordisparagement.Colebrookehadreadanenormousnumberoftextsfromthedifferentsystems and shows real interpretive insight with his analytical comments. It is nowonderthathisreputationissoimposingamongnineteenth-centuryscholarsandthathislatercriticsshowgreatdeferencetohimevenwhileattackinghisviews.H.T.Colebrooke, likeothernineteenth-centuryOrientalists, iscentrallyconcerned

withthedifferentiationofphilosophicaldoctrines.AlthoughColebrooke,too,dependson Mādhava’s fourteenth-century doxography Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha for his basicenumerationof theschools,muchofhisworkcomesdirectly fromhisunderstandingof the primary texts of the schools in question. In his presentation of the Sāṃkhyasystem, forexample,Colebrookedependsheavilyon two texts: theSāṃkhyakārikāwith Gauḍapāda’s commentary and the Sāṃkhyasūtras with Vijñānabhikṣu’scommentary.HetakestheSāṃkhyasūtras tobeanancient treatiseof theSāṃkhyaschool, although he is skeptical of the claim that the text was authored by Kapilahimself. He also notes that Vijñānabhikṣu must have been a relatively latecommentator.20 Nonetheless, he relies more on Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya thanonanyothertextforhisownexpositionofSāṃkhyaphilosophy.As I discussed in chapter 5, at the start of the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya

Vijñānabhikṣudiscussesanumberofschoolsandprovideshisownvisionofhowtheirdoctrines might be coordinated. This is doubtless one of the reasons Colebrookefound the text so valuable. Following the logic of Vijñānabhikṣu’s text, ColebrookedescribesthesystemoftheSāṃkhyaas“partlyheterodox,andpartlyconformabletothe established Hindu creed.”21 Unlike later Orientalists who simply assert the“orthodoxy” of the “six schools,” Colebrooke sees gradations of orthodoxy, in partdetermined by the degree to which each school bases its teachings on the Vedasthemselves and on the degree to which each school reasons independently of theVedas. On this basis, he describes “the two Mímánsás [sic ]” as “emphaticallyorthodox.”22 Unlike later advocates of the Advaita Vedānta such as Deussen andRadhakrishnan,Colebrooke does not sever the close historical connection betweenPūrvaMīmāṃsāandVedānta.Heemphasizesthatbothschoolshaveastheirprimaryconcernscripturalinterpretationandnotabstractreasoning.Although Colebrooke notes that Sāṃkhya is only “partly conformable to the

establishedHinducreed,”ifanything,thisfactmakestheSāṃkhyaschoolevenmoreintriguing to him.He finds traces of Sāṃkhya ideas in numerous other schools andapparentlynon-Sāṃkhyatexts,andheconsiderstheSāṃkhyathemostinfluentialofthe philosophical schools. He divides the Sāṃkhya system into “two schools; oneusuallyknownbythatname;theothercommonlytermedYóga.”23HealsonotesthatPatañjali’s Yogasūtras themselves bear the title Sāṃkhyapravacana, and that on

mostpointsthetwosystemsarethesame,“differinghoweveruponone,whichisthemostimportantofall:theproofofexistenceofsupremeGod.”24InpresentingKapila’sdisproof of the existence of God, he recapitulates Vijñānabhikṣu’s arguments fromSPB5.2-12.Hedoesnot,however,notethatVijñānabhikṣuconsidersKapila’sprivateviewtobethatGoddoesexist.Besidesthesetwoschools in theSāṃkhyasystem,Colebrookebrieflydescribesathird,PaurānikaSāṃkhya,which“considersnatureasan illusion…. In several of the puránas, as the Matsya, Cúrma and Vishnu, inparticular, the cosmogony, which is an essential part of an Indian theogony, isdeliveredconsonantlytothissystem.”25Colebrooke offers two separate lectures onMīmāṃsā and Vedānta and bases hissummaries on numerous sources, noting Jaimini, Śabara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, andPrabhākara in particular. He is apparently indebted to Rāmānuja in portraying thePūrvaandUttaraMīmāṃsāaspartsofasinglewhole:

The two together, then, comprise the complete systemof interpretation of the precepts and doctrine of theVédas,bothpracticalandtheological.Theyarepartsofonewhole.ThelaterMímānsāissupplementarytotheprior,and isexpresslyaffirmed tobeso:but,differingonmany importantpoints, thoughagreeingonothers,theyareessentiallydistinctinareligiousasinaphilosophicalview.26

ColebrookenotesthatBādarāyaṇa’sBrahmasūtrasareinthemselvesquitecrypticandthereforelendthemselvestomanydifferentinterpretations.Śaṅkarais“themostdistinguished scholiast of these sutras, in modern estimation,” and for that reasonColebrookerestrictshimselftoexplicatingŚaṅkaraandhisschoolinhistreatmentofVedānta. However, Colebrooke also acknowledges varying interpretations of theBrahmasūtras by Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Bhāskara, Madhva, and Nīlakantha.27 In hisexplicationof theVedānta, he is particularly interested inVedāntic polemicsagainstthe Sāṃkhya and in those places in the Upaniṣads where Sāṃkhya doctrines arepresented.28HismostcontroversialassertionregardingtheVedāntacomesinthelastparagraphofhistreatmentoftheschool.Hecriticizestheclaim,widelyheldsinceitspopularization by Schopenhauer, that the idea of the world as illusion is central toVedānticdoctrines:

Thenotion,thattheversatileworldisanillusion(máya),thatallwhichpassestotheapprehensionofthewakingindividualisbutaphantasypresentedtohisimagination,andeveryseemingthingisunrealandallisvisionarydoesnotappeartobethedoctrineofthetextoftheVédánta.Ihaveremarkednothingwhichcountenancesitinthesutras ofVyásanor in theglossofŚancara, butmuchconcerning it in theminor commentariesand inelementary treatises. I take it tobeno tenetof theoriginalVédántin philosophybutof anotherbranch, fromwhichlaterwritershaveborrowedit,andhaveintermixedandconfoundedthetwosystems.ThedoctrineoftheearlyVédántaiscompleteandconsistent,withoutthisgraftofalatergrowth.29

Thisminority opinion, that neither Bādarāyaṇa’sBrahmasūtras nor the commentarybyŚaṅkaracontainsthedoctrineofmāyā,hasoccasionallybeenrepeatedbyotherthinkers.30 In the midst of the idealist system-building of the nineteenth-centuryphilosophers,however, itwastrulya thoughtoutofseason.GoughandDeussen, inparticular, sought to put to rest any possibility that the late medieval and modernfollowersofŚaṅkarahadfundamentallymisinterpretedhisworks.Goughassertsthat

ColebrookecametothismistakenassumptionbyrelyingonVijñānabhikṣu’sperverseandmistakenideasaboutVedāntaphilosophy:

The assertion of the Orientalists that the doctrine of Māyā is a comparatively modern importation into theVedānticsystemisgroundless,andthehypothesisofaprimitiveVedāntainharmonywiththesystemknownastheYogadarśanaordemiurgicSānkhya[sic]isuntenable….ThisbringsustothesourceofColebrooke’serror.His mistake arose from the acceptance of the polemical statement of an opponent of the Vedāntins,Vijñānabhikṣu, the celebrated exponent of the aphorisms of the Sānkhya, the author of theSānkhyapravacanabhāshya…. In his commentary on the Sānkhya aphorisms, Vijñānabhikṣu propounds atheory that theseveralDarśanasorsystemsof Indianphilosophy,aresuccessivestepsofascent to the fulltruthofthedemiurgicSāṃkhyaorYogaphilosophy….Vijñānabhikṣu’sproposaltotreattheseveralsystemsasprogressiveinstalmentsofthetruth,hasnocountenanceintheworksofIndianscholasticism.Thesystemsareinthoseworksexhibitedoneverypageasinopenhostilityagainsteachother.Vijñānabhikṣu’streatmentofthephilosophy of theUpanishads is false from first to last; andColebrooke’s assertion fallswith the fall of theassertionofVijñānabhikṣu.31

There is some plausibility to Gough’s charge that Colebrooke relies onVijñānabhikṣu in his statements about the doctrine ofmāyā as a “later growth.”32Vijñānabhikṣu follows Sanskrit commentarial convention in never referring to anyindividual “crypto-Buddhist” (pracchannabauddha) or “proponent of illusion”(māyāvādin) by name; instead, he refers to all of these opponents as “moderns”(ādhunikas). Although most readers have understood Vijñānabhikṣu’s definition of“moderns”toencompassearlierthinkersincludingŚaṅkara, itwouldnotbeinternallyinconsistent to understandVijñānabhikṣu’s critique as only applying to post-ŚaṅkaraAdvaita.33While Colebrooke notes that Vijñānabhikṣu’s commentary on the Sāṃkhya was

written at a relatively recent date, Gough was the first to depict Vijñānabhikṣu’sprojectasfundamentallyperverse.ColebrookeobservesthatVijñānabhikṣuhasalsowritten commentaries on the Yogasūtras and Brahmasūtras and is inspired byVijñānabhikṣu to refer to Sāṃkhya as “partly heterodox.” But according to Gough,Vijñānabhikṣu’saffiliation ispurelySāṃkhya,andhe isbenton theperversionof thetruedoctrineof theUpaniṣads.LikeColebrooke,Goughparaphrasestheargumentsagainst the existence of God in Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya a s theofficialpositionoftheSāṃkhyaschool,alsofailingtonotethatVijñānabhikṣuhimselfultimately accepts the existence of God. While Colebrooke notes the existence ofnumerous otherVedāntic schools besidesŚaṅkara’s,Gough simply fails tomentiontheseotherschoolsinhisPhilosophyoftheUpanishads.AlsoremarkableisGough’sinsistence that no other author besides Vijñānabhikṣu treats the systems as“progressiveinstallmentsofthetruth,”34especiallyashehadevidencetothecontrarydirectly under his nose—Gough cowrote with E. B. Cowell the most widely readEnglish translation of Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. This Sanskrit text, as Idiscussinchapter8,showsclearaffinitieswiththeworksofVijñānabhikṣuandothermedievalauthorsinitshierarchicalorganizationofdoctrines.Comparing Gough’s Philosophy of the Upanishads to Colebrooke’s “On the

Philosophy of the Hindus,” we see the role of the Orientalist transformed: he hasbecomean openadvocate for one Indian philosophical school over another.Basing

his work closely on Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Gough presents the history ofIndianphilosophyasa fundamentalconflictbetweenSāṃkhyadualismandVedānticnon-dualism. Gough does not wish to complicate matters by introducing otherschools. He neither remarks on a theistic school called the Yoga that is closelyrelated to Sāṃkhya nor a school called Pūrva Mīmāṃsā that is closely related toVedānta.Beginningwith the thesis that theUpaniṣadsare fundamentallyVedāntic innature, without a trace of Sāṃkhya doctrines, Gough concludes that even “theteaching of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad and of the Bhagavadgītā, notwithstandingtheirSānkhyaphrasesandSānkhyareferences, isaspurelyVedānticasthatofanyVedāntic work whatever.”35 Traditionally, there are two particular references toSāṃkhya in theŚvetāśvatara Upaniṣad that Vedāntins have found challenging: the“she-goat,whoiscoloredred,white,andblack”atŚvet.Up.4.5andafigurenamed“Kapila” at Śvet. Up. 5.2. Gough explains the former by recapitulating Śaṅkara’sargumentthatthered,white,andblackrefernottothethreeguṇasbuttothetriadofheat,water,andearth fromtheChāndogyaUpaniṣad.36He interprets the latter inamorehistoricalway:headmitsthatthename“Kapila”mayindeedrefertothefounderoftheSāṃkhya,buthereinterpretsthehistoricalsignificanceoftheSāṃkhyaschoolitself.TheSāṃkhya“wasoriginallyamoreprecisesetof termsfor theenumerationoftheemanationsoutofPrakritiorMāyā,andofthedifferencesbetweenMāyāandPurushaorBrahman.”37 In itsoriginalstate,Sāṃkhya (understoodetymologicallyas“enumeration”)wasinaccordwiththedoctrineofmāyāandwasjustanenumerationofitsunrealtransformations.38Onlyinlatertimesdidithardenintoadistinctlyatheistschoolthatupheldtherealityoftheworldandthepluralityofpuruṣas.

PAULDEUSSENANDTHEINFLUENCEOFGERMANIDEALISM

PaulDeussenwasadiscipleofArthurSchopenhauer(1788-1860),themostnotableEuropean philosopher to claim inspiration from Indian sources. Schopenhauer wasawareofhisownspecialplaceinworldphilosophicalhistoryandwrotethat“Idonotbelieve that my doctrine could have ever been formulated before the Upanishads,Plato,andKantwereabletoallcasttheirlightsimultaneouslyontoahumanmind.”39Deussen founded the Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft in 1911 and sharedSchopenhauer’sconvictionthat thedoctrineofmāyāwasthecentral teachingof theUpaniṣads. His understanding of Vedānta and other Indian doctrines far exceededSchopenhauer’s,whohadaccesstotheUpaniṣadsonlythroughaLatintranslationofDārā Shikoh’s Persian translation of the original Sanskrit text. It was throughDeussen’s writings that nineteenth-century German idealism had its most directinfluenceontheyoungdisciplineofIndologyDeussen acceptedmany of the same premises ofGough—for instance, that the

UpaniṣadsareunambiguouslyVedāntic in theiroutlookand that theSāṃkhyawasaschool that later grew out of the Upaniṣads. But unlike Gough, Deussen struggledwith some of the perplexing historical consequences of these ideas. He also went

farther than his Indological predecessors in treating Indian philosophy in acomparativewayandmakingnormativephilosophical claimsbasedon insights fromEastern andWestern philosophy. HisAllgemeineGeschichte der Philosophie wasthefirsthistoryofphilosophytoattempttocoverIndianphilosophyalongsideandastheequalofWesternphilosophy.HiswidelyreadtranslationoftheUpaniṣadshadanenormouseffectonscholarlyopinionofVedānta in the twentiethcentury,and itwashe more than any single thinker who was responsible for the opinion that AdvaitaVedāntawas thegenuine representativeof theUpaniṣads.However,hedidat leastacknowledgethatother,competinginterpretationsexisted:

In India the influenceof thispervertedandpervasivespiritofouragehasnotyetoverthrown in religionandphilosophy the good traditions of the great ancient time…. It is true, that even here in the sanctuary of theVedānticmetaphysics,therealistictendencies,naturaltoman,havepenetrated,producingthemisinterpretingvariations of Śaṅkara’s Advaita, known under the names Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Śuddhādvaita of Rāmānuja,Madhva,Vallabha,—but India tillnowhasnotyetbeenseducedbytheirvoices,andofhundredVedāntins…fifteenperhapsadheretoRāmānuja,fivetoMadhva,fivetoVallabha,andseventy-fivetoŚaṅkara.40

Part of Deussen’s project involves a philosophy of history based on hisobservationsfromthehistoriesofWesternandEasternphilosophy.ReversingHegel’sdialecticalscheme,inwhichhistoryisarationalteleologicalprogressionofmoreandmore adequate manifestations of Geist, Deussen sees history as a systematicregression from truth toerror.HegeldepictsmonisticHinduismasbeingpartof the“religion of nature,” the first of three religious phases that culminates in absolutereligion, that is,Christianity.Deussenworks in theotherdirection,regardingmonismor “idealism” as the highest doctrine, which he calls the original philosophy of bothancientGreeceandancientIndia.ApplyinghisschemeofdeevolutiontothehistoryofIndianphilosophyheenumeratessixstages:

1. Idealism—Ātmanistheonlyreality;pluralityandchangearemerelyillusion(māyā).2. Pantheism—Theworldisreal,andyetātmanistheonlyrealitysinceātmanistheentireuniverse.3. Cosmogonism—Theātmaniscause,producingtheworldfromitselfasitseffect.4. Theism—Thereisadistinctiondrawnbetweenātmanascreatoroftheworldandātmanenteringinto

creation:thatis,betweenthehighestsoulandtheindividualsoul.5. Atheism—CausalpoweristransferredfromGodtomatteritself.6. Deism—For“practicalreasons”(Opportunitätsrücksichten),thedoctrineofapersonalGodisattachedto

atheism.41

Thefirststage,according tohim,corresponds to theearliestVedānta teachings,asexpressed by Yājñavalkya in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. The second stage isexpressedinthoseUpaniṣadsthatidentifythe“infinitelysmallātmanwithinusastheinfinitelylargeātmanoutsideofus.”42Cosmogonismisusedbythosetextsthattrytoreconcile pantheismwith creationmyths. Theism is expressed by theŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad.AtheismexistsinthedoctrinesoftheSāṃkhya,anddeisminthedoctrinesoftheYogaschool.Deussen’s scheme implies that each of the five subsequent stages of decline

proceeds in orderly succession from the original Indian monism. They are the

inevitable result of theworldly ignorance andmaterialism of themajority of people,who gradually reinterpret and distort the originally pure idealism until it becomesalmost unrecognizable. Deussen also suggests that a similar process occurs inancientGreece,where themonisticdoctrinesofParmenidesandPlatodevolve intothelater,post-Aristotelianschoolsthat, liketheSāṃkhya,soughtmereremediesforthe suffering of existence instead of the highest truth.43 Deussen’s scheme is anattempt to systematize Schopenhauer’s belief that Plato, Kant, and the Upaniṣadswere all expressing the same truth.44 However, the explicitly historical nature ofDeussen’s project is a departure fromSchopenhauer’s stance, sinceSchopenhauerconsideredanyattempttounderstandhistoryasasystematicorregularprocessasfundamentally misguided.45 Yet this is precisely what Deussen does, depicting atranscultural process by which pure idealism gradually succumbs to materialisticinterpretations.Themostobviousfunctionofthissixfoldschemeisasasystematicmeanstoshow

that “thewhole Sāṃkhya system is nothing but a result of the degeneration of theVedāntabymeansofthegrowthofrealistictendencies.”46BothGoughandDeussenseetheconflictbetweenVedāntaandSāṃkhyaasthefundamentalconflictbetweenthe twopolesof Indianphilosophy: idealismversusrealism,monismversusdualism,and the disinterested quest for truth versus the pessimistic flight from the pain ofexistence. Deussen applies his scheme of historical deevolution explicitly in hisinterpretationofŚvet.Up.4.5, “theshe-goat,who iscoloredred,white,andblack.”HeisabletoreconcilethedifferencesbetweenSāṃkhyaandVedāntabyhistoricizingtheirinterpretationsofthepassage:

ThatthisverseexpressesthefundamentalthoughtoftheSāṃkhyadoctrineisnotopentoquestion….Atthesame time however these three expressions, both by the names themselves and by their order, whichaccording to theSāṃkhyadoctrineought tobedifferent,pointback toCh.Up. 6.4,whereeverything in theuniverseisshowntoconsistofthethreeelements…heat,water,andfood….Inthiscontroversybothsidesareright.TheVedāntist, inasmuchas the verseunquestionably refersback toCh.Up. 6.4; and theSāmkhyist,inasmuchasthethreeconstituentelements,whichaccordingtoCh.Up.6.2proceedfromthe“onewithoutasecond,”andofamixtureofwhicheverythingintheuniverseconsists,havebeenpsychologicallytransformedintothethreeguṇas.47

Proceeding from his deevolutionary account of the history of Indian philosophy,Deussen is able to reconcile the obvious Sāṃkhya allusions in the ŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣadwithhiscommitmenttotheprimacyoftheAdvaitaVedānta.UnlikeGough,Deussendoesnot insist thatallof theUpaniṣadsareapureexpressionofmonisticVedānta philosophy. Instead, he reads the different Upaniṣads as representingdifferentdevelopmentalstrata.Pure,originalVedāntic ideasareexpressedprimarilyin theBṛhadāraṇyaka, the oldest of theUpaniṣads. Themore recentŚvetāśvatara,however, contains both theistic and Sāṃkhya elements, and thus it combineselementsofstagesthreeandfourinhisdeevolutionaryscheme.Thisschemeisalsoinspired by Deussen’s admiration for Śaṅkara’s twofold division of ultimate andconventionaltruth.AccordingtoDeussen:

[Śaṅkara]constructsoutofthematerialsoftheUpaniṣadstwosystems,oneesoteric,philosophical(calledbyhimnirgunāvidyā,sometimespāramārthikāavasthā)containingthemetaphysicaltruthforthefewones,rarein all times and countries, who are able to understand it; and another exoteric, theological (sagunā vidyā,vyāvahārikīavasthā)forthegeneralpublic,whowantimages,notabstracttruth,worship,notmeditation.48

Inspired by his ācārya’s tolerance for both absolute and conventionalunderstandings of Brahman, Deussen does not completely condemn the theisticrepresentations ofBrahmanhe finds in various laterUpaniṣads.Hedoes, however,continuetocondemnSāṃkhya,whichheseesaspossessingnoredeemingqualities.PreciselybecausehebelievesthatSāṃkhyaisbarrenandphilosophicallyincoherent,however, he has difficulty in explaining the close affiliation between the Yoga andSāṃkhyaschools.SinceVedāntaprecededSāṃkhyaandisphilosophicallysuperior,it seems impossible thatPatañjali could have chosenSāṃkhya as the philosophicalbasisforhissystemofspiritualpraxis.This leadsDeussentotheuneasyconclusionthat “there seems to have been a time when Vedāntic thought lived only in thisrealistic form of the Sāṃkhya; for when the Yoga took the form of a philosophicalsystem it was built up on the very inconvenient base of the Sāṃkhya system,probably becauseat that timenoother basewasavailable.”49DeussenalsowritestheYogasystemintohishistoricalschemebyplacingitasthesixthandlastphaseof“deism.” He makes the rather counterintuitive claim that the sixth phase of Yogicdeism issomehowderived “fromconsiderationsofpracticalconvenience”outof theatheisticsystemofSāṃkhya.Likemanyhistoriansafterhim,DeussenisultimatelyatalosstoexplainwhyGod(īśvara)makesanappearanceintheYogasystem,sincethe twenty-five Sāṃkhya principles appear to constitute a completely self-sufficientcosmologywithoutanyneedforaGod.Deussen’s interpretation of the history of Indian philosophy is compelling for two

reasons.First,hisattempttoestablishthechronologyofthedifferentUpaniṣadswasambitiousandlargelysuccessful;hisperiodizationisacceptedbyscholarstoday,witha few modifications, and his translation of sixty Upaniṣads is still widely read andcited.50 Second, unlike Colebrooke and Gough, Deussen attempted a genuinelyphilosophical interpretation of the Upaniṣads, and thanks to his access to primarytexts inSanskrithewasabletobringtogetherEasternandWesternphilosophy inaway that Schopenhauer could not. Deussen’s project was unmistakably inspired bySchopenhauer’s vision of a single perennial philosophy. Despite his recognition thatIndiacontainedamultiplicityofphilosophicalvoices,notjustone,throughhishistoricaltypology he was able to uphold the notion inherited from Schopenhauer of a“concordance of Indian, Greek and German metaphysics; the world is māyā, isillusion, saysŚaṅkara;—it is aworld of shadows, not of realities, saysPlato;—it is‘appearanceonly,notthethinginitself,’saysKant.”51Thisunifiedvisionoftheworld’sphilosophies championed by Deussen became enormously popular in the twentiethcentury,anditsinfluenceisstillfelttoday.

RICHARDGARBE:SĀṂKHYAASTHEFOUNDATIONOFINDIANPHILOSOPHY

Indologist Richard Garbe’s name is the one most closely associated withVijñānabhikṣu,and itwashewhobroughtVijñānabhikṣu’sphilosophytotheattentionofthewiderpublic.ButGarbeconsidershimselfascholarofSāṃkhyaandhadlittleornointerestinVijñānabhikṣu’sYogicandVedānticworks.GarbeisanapologistfortheSāṃkhyaandarguesagainstwhatheseesas thebiases in theworkofGoughandDeussen.Atthesametime,heseekstosavetheSāṃkhyafromVijñānabhikṣu.While Gough portrayed Vijñānabhikṣu as an inauthentic Vedāntin who sought tointroduceSāṃkhyarealismintothepurely idealisticdoctrinesof theVedānta,Garbeseeshimasan inauthenticSāṃkhyawhosought to importVedāntic theism into thepurely atheistic Sāṃkhya system. Garbe accepts it as established that AdvaitaVedānta was the true representative of the Vedāntic tradition and only seeks torehabilitateSāṃkhyafromitsunsympatheticportrayals.Intheprocess,Vijñānabhikṣubecomesadoublymarginalfigure:notauthenticallymonisticenoughtobeconsideredatrueVedāntin,andnotatheisticenoughtobeconsideredatrueSāṃkhya.Garbewas responsible for the firstcomplete translationofoneofVijñānabhikṣu’s

works into a Western language, his German translation of theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya in1889.Thiswas followedbyhisSanskriteditionof theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, publishedas thesecondvolumeof theHarvardOrientalSeries in 1895. Both works were based on Fitzedward Hall’s 1856 edition of thetext.52Garbe’sSanskritedition isaworkofpainstakingphilologicaldetail,correctingmany of the errors in Hall’s text with assistance from several manuscripts andSanskrit pandits inBenares.53 It remains the edition onwhich all of the later Indianpublications of the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya have been based. In contrast to hiscool philological professionalism, however, the introduction to hisSanskrit edition ofthetextcontainsascathingindictmentofVijñānabhikṣu’scentralproject:

Vijñānabhikṣu’s point of view has already been set forth by A. E. Gough…. Gough shows the utterbaselessness of the exposition which Vijñānabhikṣu gives of the contents of the Upanishads and of therelationsofthephilosophicsystemstooneanother….InordertobridgeoverthechasmbetweentheSānkhyasystemand his own theism (which he is pleased to styleVedāntic), Vijñānabhikṣu resorts to the strangestmeanstodoawaywithoneofthefundamentaldoctrinesofthegenuineSānkhya,whichisthedenialofGod….ThesecondpointconcernstheUpanishaddoctrineoftheillusorynature(māyā)oftheworldofphenomena

andtheSānkhyadoctrineoftherealityofmatter(prakṛti).Eventhiscontradictionourauthorclearsawaybyanappealtowhathecalls“originalVedānta,”whichteaches,asheavers,therealityoftheworld.SomekindredspirithadalreadyidentifiedthemāyāoftheVedāntawiththeprakṛtioftheSānkhya,namelyintheÇvetāçvataraUpanishad,iv.10;andaccordinglyourcommentatordoesnotscrupletomakethemostofthisidentificationasascripturalone;andrepeatsindiversplacesofhiswork…theexplanationthatbymāyāinScriptureismeantnoughtelsethanrealmatter.Nevertheless, inspiteofallof thefalseassumptionsandtheerrorsofwhichVijñānabhikṣu isundoubtedly

guilty,hisCommentaryontheSānkhyaSūtrasmustbedeclaredtobenotonlythefullestsourcethatwehaveforaknowledgeoftheSānkhyasystem,butalsooneofthemostimportantofsuchsources[sic].54

GarbeacceptsGough’spropositionthatthemonistic interpretationistheonlytrueinterpretation of the Upaniṣads and combines this with his own certainty, gatheredfrom earlier scholars and from the text of the Sāṃkhyasūtras itself, that the trueSāṃkhyaphilosophy isatheistic.Althoughhe identifies theSāṃkhyasūtrasasa latetext and notes its borrowings from theBrahmasūtras, it does not occur to him to

question whether the text’s atheism is truly representative of the earlier Sāṃkhyaschool. While he notes the existence of Vijñānabhikṣu’s commentary on theBrahmasūtrasandhissubcommentaryon theYogasūtras,heseems tohave feltnoneed to familiarize himselfwith theseworks before undertaking a translation of theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, in spite of Vijñānabhikṣu’s frequent references there tohisBrahmasūtrascommentary.Unlikehiscolleagues,he issingularlyobsessedwiththeSāṃkhyasystem.ThisobsessionisrevealedinGarbe’sPhilosophyofAncientIndia,firstpublishedin

1897.LikemanyOrientalistsofhisera,heentertainsculturaldiffusionist ideasofanancientconnectionbetween IndianandGreekphilosophy.ButGarbedoesnotevenconsiderthepossibilitythatIndianphilosophyhasitsoriginsinGreece:

It is a question requiring the most careful treatment to determine whether the doctrines of the Greekphilosophers…were really firstderived from the Indianworldof thought,orwhether theywereconstructedindependentlyofeachotherinbothIndiaandGreece,theirresemblancebeingcausedbythenaturalsamenessofhumanthought.Formypart,IconfessIaminclinedtothefirstopinion.55

For Garbe, those ideas coalesce around the possibility that the Sāṃkhya is thesource for numerous schools of Greek philosophy. After a brief nod to Deussen’sassertion of the unity between Vedāntic ideas and the philosophies of Plato andParmenides,Garbe lists thenumerousphilosophershebelievesareeither strikinglysimilarto,orevencouldhavebeeninfluencedby,Sāṃkhya:Anaximander,Heraclitus,Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus, Pythagoras, the Gnostics, Plotinus, andPorphyry56 While for some of these philosophers Garbe admits that the Indiaconnection is rather tenuous, with others it is absolutely clear—with Porphyry, forinstance, “the Indian influence can be proved directly; for he hasmade use of thetreatise of Bardesanes, from which he copied an important passage about theBrahmans.”57Likewise,thereis“nodoubt”thatPythagoraswasdependentonIndianphilosophyandscience,and fromthere thesimilarities toSāṃkhyawould indicateahistoricalinfluence.58WhatisitthatleadsGarbetochooseSāṃkhya,insteadofVedānta,astheschool

most likely to have had ameaningful impact on themany schools of philosophy inancient Greece? He suggests that Sāṃkhya was more portable than other Indianphilosophical schools, suchasVedānta, because theSāṃkhyawasmoreanalyticaland rational in nature, hence more suitable for the rationally minded Greekphilosophers. Although Garbe acknowledges that the theme of the oneness ofBrahman iscentral to theearliestUpaniṣads,hedoesnotquitedrawtheconclusionthatVedāntaisthereforetheoldestoftheIndianphilosophicalsystemsfor,accordingtohim,Sāṃkhyais“theoldestrealsystemofIndianphilosophy[emphasisadded].”59Unlike Deussen and Gough, Garbe draws a sharp distinction between the primarymethods of Vedānta and Sāṃkhya. While Vedānta is primarily concerned withscripturalinterpretation,theSāṃkhyaalone“attemptstosolveitsproblemssolelybythemeans of reason…. In Kapila’s doctrine, for the first time in the history of theworld,thecompleteindependenceandfreedomofthehumanmind,itsfullconfidence

initsownpowerswereexhibited.”60LikeColebrookebutunlikeDeussenandGough,Garbe rightly stresses that Mīmāṃsakas and premodern Vedāntins consider free-floatingreasonaimlessanddestructive;theycondemnfreethinkerswhodisregardtheVeda in favorof reasonalone. It is this free-thinkingaspectofSāṃkhya thatGarbeholds up as the Greek philosophical ideal, inherited by way of India. Orientalistsseldom picked up on this observation, however, instead following Deussen indownplayingthesedifferencesofmethod in theirquest to findanIndiananaloguetothetranscendentalidealismofKant.Liberatedfromitsculturalcontextasaschoolofscripturalexegesis,twentieth-centurythinkerswerefreetointerpretAdvaitaVedāntaeither in the idealist framework Deussen advocates or, later, in terms of anexperientialmodelinfluencedbyWilliamJames.61Likemanynineteenth-centuryOrientalists,Garbenotesthatitisthe“pessimism”of

theSāṃkhya thatunderlies the later teachingsof theBuddhistsandJainas.62Unlikemost of these thinkers, he also considers theSāṃkhya logically prior, and perhapsevenbyextensionhistoricallyprior,tothesystemoftheVedānta.ThelastparagraphofGarbe’s“OutlineofaHistoryofIndianPhilosophy”isaresponseto“thosewhofeelinclined to look down slightingly from a monistic point of view upon the dualisticconception of the world.”63 According to Garbe, “the knowledge of the differencebetweenbodyandsoul isonecondition,and it isalsoan indispensablecondition,ofarriving at a true monism.”64 This argument reverses the elaborate scheme ofhistorical deevolution proposed by Deussen to explain the emergence of thephilosophically untenable dualism of the Sāṃkhya system. While Garbe tactfullysidestepsthequestionofwhetherdualismormonismisphilosophicallysuperior,thereisnoquestionaboutwherehe thinks the truephilosophicalspirit residesamong thesystemsofIndianphilosophy.This complex of philosophical affiliations helps to explain Garbe’s conflicted

relationship with Vijñānabhikṣu. On the one hand, Vijñānabhikṣu’sSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya is “the fullest source we have for a knowledge of theSānkhya system.”65 On the other hand, Vijñānabhikṣu violates the spirit of theSāṃkhya’s reliance on reason alone by importing concepts that have nothing to dowith Sāṃkhya whatsoever and that are indefensible when argued rationally. TheSāmkhysūtrasargueagainstthepossibilityoftheexistenceofGod,yetVijñāabhiksurejects these arguments in favor of a conception ofGod that he borrows from thePurāṇas.Evenas these theistic tendenciessubtract fromVijñānabhikṣu’svalueasaSāṃkhya commentator, other factors disqualify him as a commentator onVedānta.Themostsignificantoftheseishisinsistenceontherealityoftheworld—sinceGarbefully acceptsGough andDeussen regarding the authentic teachings of theVedāntaschool,VijñānabhikṣucannotbeatrueVedāntinifheteachestheworldisreal.Failingthese two tests, Garbe concludes that Vijñānabhikṣu’s philosophy is unclassifiable,hence perverse. For the nineteenth-century Orientalists, who sought to tame Indiaand its culture by means of classification, unclassifiability was perhaps the mostinexcusableofallintellectualerrors.

ORIENTALISMANDMODERNHINDUTHOUGHT

ThefourthinkersIdiscussinthischapter—Colebrooke,Gough,Deussen,andGarbe—had enormous influence on twentieth-century work on the history of Indianphilosophy. This influence spread back to India and across the ocean to NorthAmerica.For instance, the imprintofDeussen isapparent inEliotDeutsch’sattempttoreadŚaṅkaraasprovidingatranscendentalargument toprovetheexistenceofanoumenal realm called Brahman; the imprint of Garbe is apparent in DebiprasadChattopadhyaya’s attempt to championSāṃkhya as an authentically Indian form ofcriticalatheism.66TheinfluenceofthesethinkershasbeenonIndiansandnon-Indiansalike. The influence of Deussen and Schopenhauer on Swami Vivekananda andSarvepalliRadhakrishnanisunmistakable,forinstanceinVivekananda’sformulationofa “tat tvam asi ethics” of compassion closely modeled after Schopenhauer’sformulation.67 This process by which Europeans reformulated Hindu philosophy andthenexporteditbacktoIndiaastheancientessenceofHinduismhasbeendescribedas“thepizzaeffect”byAgehanandaBharati.68JustaspizzawasfirstexportedfromItaly to theUnitedStates, elaborated on byAmericans, and then exported back toItalytobecomethesignatureItalianfood,theprevalentIndianunderstandingofHinduphilosophyandreligionhasbeensignificantlyinfluencedbyEuropeanelaborations.The danger in emphasizing the European influences in modern Hindu thought,

however, is the tendency by some scholars to conclude from this that modernHinduismisinauthenticandtopositasimplisticbinaryoppositionbetween“traditional”Sanskriticand “modern”European-inspiredHindu thought.69Thisalsohas led to theunwarrantedconclusion that Indians in themodernperiodhavebeenmerelypassiverecipientsofWesternideasaboutthetrueessencesoftraditionalHinduism,pawnsinanimperialistconspiracytorobthemofboththeirculturalandmaterialriches.Butjustas there is no single way of being a “traditional” Hindu, there is a wide range ofvisionsamongmodernHindusaboutwhatthetrueessenceofHinduismis,ifsuchanessenceexists. InfluentialmodernHindu thinkerssuchasGandhi,Vivekananda,andRadhakrishnan, acknowledged that they received inspiration from non-Hindus informing a Hindu self-identity. But their engagement with Hindu traditions was acreativenegotiationbetweenmanydifferentIndianandnon-Indianculturalinfluences,notawholesaleacceptanceofmodernEuropeanvaluesandrejectionofpremodernIndianones.Emphasizingtheheavy influenceof theEuropeanIndologists in themodernperiod

often conceals something else, the influence of premodern Indian texts and nativeIndian scholars on those Europeans themselves. The Saidian model, portrayingOrientalism as a pure product of European imperialism with no engagement withAsian texts and ideologies, is untenable in the face of overwhelming evidence of atwo-wayculturalinfluence.NotonlyweremodernIndianstransformedbytheirBritishrulers into tea-sipping, ersatz Englishmen. In varying ways and to varying extents,European Orientalists also became “Orientalized” through their engagement withAsianculturesandideas.70Thepro-AdvaitabiasesthatDeussenandGoughinscribed

intotheirinterpretationsofthehistoryofIndianphilosophywerethemselvesborrowedfrom the Sanskrit texts that they relied on for their understanding of the relationbetween the systems of Indian philosophy. Medieval doxographies such asMādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgrahacontainwithin themtheseedsof thesereductiveunderstandings of the diversity of philosophical doctrines within India. Deussenaccepted Mādhava’s portrayal of the hierarchy of schools and rejectedVijñānabhikṣu’s portrayal because only the former served Deussen’s ideologicalagenda. To better understand this process of intercultural mimesis, it is alsonecessarytounderstandthewayinwhichIndiandoxographersthemselvesdealtwiththeproblemofdoctrinaldiversityinpremodernIndia.

[8]DOXOGRAPHY,CLASSIFICATORYSCHEMES,ANDCONTESTEDHISTORIES

DOXOGRAPHYASAGENRE

Thehistoryof theclassificationofdoctrines inpremodernIndia iscomplex,andonlyrecently have historians of Indian philosophy begun to see the study of doctrinalclassificationasbeingaworthwhiletopicofinvestigationinitself.IndiandoxographieswerefirsttranslatedintoWesternlanguagesinthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturies,andtheyhelpedearliergenerationsofOrientalistssortthroughtheoverabundanceoftextsanddoctrinestheyfoundinIndianarchives.Thesamecharacteristicsthatmadedoxographies attractive to Western scholars, their simplicity and willingness togeneralize,alsocreateddifficulties.Becausedoxographieswerewrittenbypracticingphilosopherswiththeirownstrongdoctrinalaffiliations,theywerealsovehiclesusedtosubordinatesomeschoolsandelevateothers.Forthisreason,somescholarshaverailedagainstthedoxographersfortheunreliabilityoftheirportrayalsofthedifferentschools.However,whenunderstoodasdocumentswrittenatacertainplaceandtimeby authorswhowere pursuing specific ideological ends through their writing, thesetexts function as important evidence for the historian of ideas. Because of thecentrality of these texts in delimiting doctrinal boundaries in medieval India, tounderstandtheheresiologicalattitudesoflatemedievalauthorslikeVijñānabhikṣuonemustunderstandthedoxographicalproblematicthattheyinheritedfromtheclassifiersofIndianphilosophicaltraditionswhoprecededthem.Inthischapter,Ipresentsomeof the major features of texts important for an understanding of the history ofdoxography in India. These include Cāttaṉār s Maṇimēkalai (sixth century CE?),Bhāvivekas Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (sixth century CE), Haribhadra’sṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya (eighth century CE), Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha(fourteenth century CE), and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Prasthānabheda (sixteenthcenturyCE).Theterm“doxography”isaneologism,coinedbythenineteenth-centuryphilologist

HermannDielsforhisenormousvolumein1879entitledDoxographiGraeci.RecentlythiswordhasgainedcurrencyamongSanskritiststodescribeasimilartypeofwritingthatsummarizesandclassifiestheschoolsofIndianphilosophy.ThemostwellknownamongtheseareprobablyHaribhadra’sṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya(CollectionoftheSixPhilosophicalSystems)andMādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Compendium of AllPhilosophical Systems).1 Like the Latin and Greek doxographers, Haribhadra andMādhava are not historians of philosophy. They represent the systems of Indianphilosophy as completely static, and in most cases they refrain from naming anyactual philosopher. Most often, a philosopher’s doctrines are subsumed under ageneral philosophical category, like “Vaiśeṣika,” “Sāṃkhya,” or “Mīmāṃsā,” andpresentedcompletelyimpersonally.Tensionsbetweenthinkersinthesameschoolordevelopments inasingleauthor’sown intellectualdevelopmentare typicallyglossedover or ignored.2 Although some doxographers in premodern Europe also providebiographical information on the thinkers they present, this perspective is absent inIndiandoxography.TraditionalIndianhagiographies,bycontrast,recountthelivesandmiraculousactivitiesofagivenphilosopherincolorfuldetail,alongwithaccountsofhismost famous triumphs in philosophical debate. These works come closer toportraying philosophy as a human practice, complete with institutional andinterpersonaldynamics.3 Of course, the accretions ofmyth surrounding the famousphilosophersportrayedinthesetextscannotbetreatedasreliableaccountsofthosephilosophers’ lives. Yet Indian hagiographies are themselves valuable historicalrecordsreflectingattitudestowardaphilosopher in thecenturiesafterhisdeathandcanfunctionasacorrectivetosomeoftheimpersonalaspectsofIndiandoxography.IntheEuropeancontext,Dielsinventedthetermdoxographus,“writerofopinions,”

to contrast with another neologism, biographus, “writer of lives.” Diels sought tomake a distinction between the two modes of writing, yet in practice we findnumerous premodern European works combining biographical and doxographicalfeatures.4 For this reason, only a handful of texts written in Greek and LatinmeetDiels’snarrowdefinitionofdoxography.Others,suchasDiogenesLaërtius’sLivesofEminentPhilosophersandCicero’sTheNatureoftheGods,combinedoxographicalfeatureswith biography and polemic, respectively. ForDiels, the tradition ofGreekdoxography must be traced to Theophrastus (fourth century bce), and his workTenets in Natural Philosophy. More recently David Runia and JaapMansfeld haveargued that Theophrastus and later Greek doxography have their origins in thedialecticalmethodofAristotle.AccordingtoAristotle’sOntheSoul(DeAnima),oneshouldbeginaninquirybyfirstrecountingtheopinionsofothers:

Inour inquiryabout the soulweshall have to raiseproblems forwhichwemust finda solution, and inourprogresswemusttakewithusforcomparisonthetheoriesexpoundedbyourpredecessors,inorderthatwemayadopt thosewhicharewell stated, andbeonour guardagainst anywhichareunsatisfactory.But ourinquirymustbeginbylayingdowninadvancethosethingswhichseemmostcertainlytobelongtothesoulbynature.5

Thispracticeofbrieflysummarizingtheopinionsofothersbeforesettingoutonone’s

own inquirywaseventually developedbya fewauthors, suchasTheophrastusandAëtius, into free-standing texts that collect opinions of the natural philosophers.6Althoughtheseworksarenotprimarilypolemicalincontent,theynonethelesscontainoccasionalcriticaljudgmentsfromtheirauthors.7While there are few Greek and Latin works that can be simply classified as

doxography in Diels’s narrow sense, there are many that contain doxographicalsections or can be said to contain doxographical information. The argument amongclassicistsoverwhatshouldandshouldnotbecountedasdoxographyshedslightontheyoungerdebateamongIndologists.DavidRunia,forinstance,differsfromDielsincalling Diogenes Laertius a doxographer, although he also remarks that Lives ofEminent Philosophers is more of a hybrid text due to Diogenes’ biographicalinclinations. Runia is unwilling to call the works of Cicero doxography, although hedescribesTheNatureoftheGodsasbeginningwith“alongdoxographicalsurveyoftheologicalopinionsinsertedinapieceofEpicureanpolemic.”8WhenweturntothesituationinpremodernIndia,wefindmoreexamplesof“pure”

doxographythaninGreeceandRome.Thisisespeciallythecaseinthelatemedievalperiod, by which time doxography seems to have dislodged itself from earliernarrative and polemical contexts, much as Theophrastus did from Aristotle. Whilethere are no hybrid biographical-doxographical works along the lines of that byDiogenesLaërtius inIndia, thereareothersimilarities instructurebetweenhisLivesof Eminent Philosophers and Indian doxographies. Diogenes Laërtius bases hispresentationof theGreekphilosophersaround thedefinitioneachphilosophergivesof “the good.”9 Haribhadra’s Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya orders its account of the sixIndian systems based on the deity each accepts and on the means each schooladoptstoachieveliberation(mokṣa).10Suchconcernsareobviouslyimposedoneachof thephilosophical schools inorder topresentacohesiveoverviewof thedifferentschools’views.IntheIndiancontext,forinstance,itisclearthatthequestionofdeitydoesnotapply to schools that donotacceptanydeity (Bauddha,Lokāyata, Jaina,Mīmāṃsā),nordoesthequestionofmeanstoliberationapplytoschoolsthatdonotaccept liberation as a goal of human life (Lokāyata, Mīmāṃsā). Nonetheless,Haribhadradoeshisbest toassignadeityandameans to liberation to theschoolsthatlackthem.Both Diogenes and Haribhadra work from accepted parameters. The schools of

philosophy are already defined; onlyminor variations of emphasis and organizationareopentothedoxographers.Clearly,theorganizationaltoolHaribhadrachoosestoemployisonethatisextrinsictotheschoolsheisrequiredtocover.Forthisreason,RichardRorty’strenchantdescriptionofdoxographyisjustasapplicabletotheIndianas it is to theEuropeansituation.According toRortydoxography is “theattempt toimposeaproblematiconacanondrawnupwithoutreferencetothatproblematic,or,conversely,toimposeacanononaproblematicconstructedwithoutreferencetothatcanon.”11 Although Greek doxographers were more prone to discuss biographicaldetails of thinkers’ lives while Indian doxographers repeated stock philosophicalargumentsandtendedtoavoidpersonalnamesentirely,bothtypesofdoxographers

werepresentedwithapreviouscanon,thenwereaskedtosomehowmakesenseofthe doctrines therein to create a cohesive account of the schools’ differences on ahandfulofphilosophicaltopics.TheJainadoxographerHaribhadraistheauthoroftheearliestdoxographyinIndia

tobewidelyeditedandtranslatedinthemodernperiod,theṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya.Whether it should be considered the oldest extant doxography depends largely onhow doxography in India is defined. Because premodern Sanskrit intellectuals, liketheirEuropeancounterparts,didnotidentifythefeaturesofadistinctgenreknownasdoxography, it is difficult to know how exactly to approach the issue. OlleQvarnström, the only scholar to write at length on the structure of doxography inIndia,describesdoxographersaswriterswho“endeavouredintheirwritingstofurnishacomprehensiveandimpartialaccountofanopponent’splacita.”12HeclassifiesIndiandoxographiesintothreetypes.Thefirsttwoinvolveaprimafacieviewpoint(pūrvapakṣa)followedbytheauthor’sowncritique(uttarapakṣa).Inthefirsttype,thereisaback-and-forthdialoguebetweenauthorandopponent;inthesecondtype, the pūrvapakṣa takes up the first half of a chapter and the uttarapakṣa ispresented in the second half.Qvarnström’s third type “consists of texts that simplyoutlineonesystemafter theother inseparatechapters”withoutexplicit refutationofthesesystems.13I choose to restrict Qvarnström’s definition somewhat and use the word

“doxography” only for the third type he presents. My reasons for doing this arethreefold.First, I think that ifwewish toretainameaningof theword“doxography”closeto thesenseusedbycontemporaryhistoriansofWesternphilosophy itmakesthemostsensetocountonlythosetextsthatprovidearelativelyneutraloverviewoftheopinionsofmultipleschools.Whilethesetextsoftencontainsubtlecriticismoftheschoolspresented,theirprimaryfunctionistosummarize,nottocritique.Second,myinterest in thestudyof Indiandoxographyarisesprimarily fromthevaluethesetextsprovide in helping us understand the underlying logic behind systems of doctrinalclassification in premodern India.Qvarnström’s interest, by contrast, appears to bethedatathatBuddhistandJainaauthorscanprovideabouttheearlydoctrinesoftheiropponents.14Manytextscanbesaidtocontain“doxographicalinformation”interestingto the modern historian, but not all of these texts are doxographies. Third, if weconstrue the word “doxography” too broadly, it will not be useful as a descriptiveterm.Themajority of philosophical authors in premodern Indiawrite texts using theconventionofpūrvapakṣaanduttarapakṣa, andbyacceptingQvarnström’s first andsecondtypesofdoxography,everytextcontainingmultiplepūrvapakṣasmightqualifyas doxography. Texts such as Haribhadra’s Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya and Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha form a genre distinct from Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya andJayantaBhaṭṭa’sNyāyamañjarīandthereforedeserveadesignationalltheirown.15

EARLYMODELSFORDOXOGRAPHYININDIA:CĀTTAṈĀRANDBHĀVIVEKA

Accountsofthedoctrinesofoneorseveralphilosophicalschoolsarecommonintextsthatarenotnormallyconsideredphilosophy,asreadersofVyāsa’sMahābhārataandAśvaghosa’sBuddhacaritawillbeaware.Anotherexampleof this, remarkable in itscomprehensivetreatmentofmultipleschoolsofthought,comesfromCāttaṉār’sTamilpoemMaṇimēkalai(sixthcenturyCE?).16Maṇimēkalai is thestoryofaSouth Indiantempledancerandcourtesanwhoseekstogiveupherprofessioninordertopursuethe Buddhist virtues of charity and philosophical study and to eventually become aBuddhist nun. The text is extraordinary insofar as it is the only extant Buddhistnarrative written in Tamil. For this reason, it was widely neglected and onlyrediscoveredbyscholars in thenineteenthcentury. It isalsoa text thatdefieseasygenreclassification.AlthoughlargepartsofthetextfollowTamil literaryconventions,the last sections comprise a lengthy compendium of the teachings of the variousphilosophical systems, culminating with a discussion of Buddhist logic. Just as thistextwasoverlookedbyscholarsofTamilbecauseofitsBuddhistcontent,ithasbeenoverlooked by historians of Indian philosophy because it was written in Tamil, notSanskrit. However, chapters 27-29 of the poem have numerous characteristics incommonwithlaterSanskritdoxographyTherefore,MaṇimēkalaicanbedescribedasanIndiandoxographicalsourcethatpredatesHaribhadra’sṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya.17In its sections on the philosophical systems, Maṇimēkalai follows several

conventions of laterSanskrit doxography. For instance, it begins its typology of theschoolsaccordingtothenumberofmeansofvalidknowledge(pramāṇas) thateachaccepts. And, like many texts that followed it, it lists the schools of philosophy(darśanas) as being six. Also like later doxographies, this number seems purelyconventional. Although Cāttaṉār lists six systems, he does so in the midst of adiscussionofmanysystemsand thinkers thatdonot find theirwayonto thisofficiallist. It seems that the notion of the “six systems” predated both Cāttaṉār andHaribhadra,andbothareworkingfromanearlier template.Boththinkersareclearlyaware that there are more than six schools total, but both also feel compelled toincludethisnumber.Cāttaṉār’stextbeginswithadiscussionofthenumberofmeansofvalidknowledge

(pramāṇas).ThismethodofstructuringatextiscommoninIndiandoxography;whatis unfamiliar are the number and kinds of pramāṇas that Cāttaṉār presents. Hedescribes three different thinkers who are followers of the Vedas: Vedavyāsa,Krtakoti, and Jaimini. According to Cāttaṉār, Vedavyāsa accepts ten pramāṇas,Krtakoti eight, and Jaimini six.18 Although Vedavyāsa, author of theMahābhārata,wasinlatertimesidentifiedwithBādarāyaṇa,authoroftheBrahmasūtras,thereisnoreasontoassumethisiswhatCāttaṉārhadinmind;theenumerationoftenpramāṇaswouldalsosethimatoddswithallof theknownschoolsofVedānta.19Krtakoti isarelatively obscureMīmāṃsā commentator, and there is no recordof anyMīmāṃsāschool accepting eight pramāṅas. Jaimini, of course, is the author of theMīmāṃsāsūtras,buthedoesnotgiveanyparticularnumberofpramāṅas.Their firstenumerationintheMīmāṃsāschoolcomesinŚabara’scommentaryonJaimini’stext,whereŚabaraacceptssix.20

After this rather unfamiliar enumeration of pramāṇas, Cāttaṉār provides a morefamiliarlistofthesixschools:

1. TheLokāyataschoolofBrhaspati(onepramāna)2. TheBauddhaschoolofJina(twopramāṇas)213. TheSāṃkhyaschoolofKapila(threepramāṇas)4. TheNyāyaschoolofAksapāda(fourpramāṇas)5. TheVaiśeṣikaschoolofKanāda(fivepramāṇas)6. TheMīmāmsāschoolofJaimini(sixpramāṇas)22

The list of thesix schoolspresentedbyCāttaṉār isextremely tidy, too tidy, in fact.Although Jaimini might plausibly (though anachronistically) be said to accept sixpramāṇas, Kanāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, accepted only twopramāṅas.23Nonetheless,thelogicbehindtheclaimregardingKanādaisclear—eachschool accepts onemorepramāna than the last, for a total of six schools and sixpramāṅas. In this account of the six schools, symmetry is as much a concern asfidelitytotheteachingsofeachofthesixthinkers.The informationpresented in thedoxographical chaptersofMaṇimēkalai is in the

formofencountersbetweenthetempledancerMaṇimēkalaiandtherepresentativesof various philosophical schools. Cāttaṉār presents the basic information about theten pramāṇas and the six schools in Maṇimēkalai’s encounter with a logician(pramānavādin). After her introduction to a few logical categories, Maṇimēkalaiencountersrepresentativesofsectsthatarefoundnowhereinthelogician’slistofthesix systems. In order, she meets a Śaiva (śaivavādin), a Brahmā worshipper(brahmavādin), a follower of theVeda (vedavādin), an Ājīvika, a Digambara Jaina(niganthavādin),aSāṃkhya,aVaiśeṣika,aMaterialist (bhūtavādin), and finally theBuddhistteacherAravanaAdigal.MaṇimēkalaiexpressesdistasteatthedoctrinesoftheĀjīvikasandMaterialists,inparticular.Othersystems,suchastheSāṃkhyasandJainas,aredepictedwithsomesympathy24But thetextrepresentsBuddhismasthehighestteaching,andotherteachingsaredepictedasworthwhileonlyinsofarastheypointtowardBuddhisttruths.25Inthisway,thestructureofchapters27through29ofMaṇimēkalai anticipates later doxographies such as Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha, which also proceeds in graduated steps from lowerdoctrines to the highest truth. Only when Maṇimēkalai listens to the Buddhistdoctrines presented by Aravana Adigal does she find “the truth … free from allinconsistency.”26 Cāttaṉār’s story culminates with Maṇimēkalai’s full acceptance ofBuddhist teachings and of “the life of austerity… that is indispensable for attainingwisdomandbeingfreeoftheburdenoffaultsthatbindustotheinterminablecycleofrebirth.”27Another Buddhist text that has received recent scholarly attention for its

doxographicalcontent is theMadhyamakahrdayakārikā (Verseson theHeartof theMiddleWay). Itwaswrittenby thesixth-centuryphilosopherBhāviveka,alsoknownas Bhāvaviveka and Bhavya.28 Bhāviveka is primarily known for his Svātantrikareading of the Mādhyamika Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. Unlike many other

followers of Nāgārjuna who claim that the proper technique for a Mādhyamika issimply to show the error inherent in any philosophical view, Bhāviveka seeks toprovide independent arguments (svatantra) in order to convince opponents of thecogency of the Madhyamaka school. This orientation encouraged Bhāviveka toengagewithotherphilosophicalschoolsinphilosophicaldebateandinstilledinhimaninterest in understanding opponents’ views that Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas often didnot share. Furthermore, Bhāviveka was inclined to accept those tenets of otherschools that he believed conformed toMādhyamika doctrine. This led him to someextraordinary assertions regarding the Vedānta tradition’s proximity to MahāyānaBuddhism.Bhāviveka’sMadhyamakahrdayakārikā is divided into eleven chapters of widely

varyinglengthsandpurposes.Althoughchapters4through9taketheirtitlesfromthenamesofrivalphilosophicalschools,theotherchaptersaredevotedtoprovingmajortenets of Madhyamaka Buddhism. This is especially the case in the lengthy thirdchapter,whichdealswiththenatureoftheBuddhistdharmas,thepurelyconventionalnatureofcausality,suffering,thetwotruths,thebodiesoftheBuddha,andsoforth.29Only after he has laid out these positive arguments in support of Madhyamakaphilosophy does he engage his opponents’ arguments. These opponents appear inchapters4through9:HīnayānaBuddhism,YogācāraBuddhism,Sāṃkhya,Vaiśeṣika,Vedānta,andMīmāṃsā.Bhāvivekaconcludesinchapters10through11withaproofoftheBuddha’somniscienceandarecapitulationofthemainpointsofMadhyamakaphilosophy.Althoughthistextcontainsagreatdealofinformationaboutotherschoolsbesides

MadhyamakaBuddhism, it straddles the linebetweendoxographyandphilosophicalpolemic.TheMadhyamakahrdayakārikāpresentseachof theopponents’argumentsas objects of refutation, and each chapter is arranged in the formof a prima facieargument (pūrvapakṣa), followed by a lengthy refutation (uttarapakṣa). So theYogācārinonlyhassevenversesandtheSāṃkhyaonly fourversesbeforetheyarerefuted by Bhāviveka in responses over ten times as long as the originalpūrvapaksin’sargument.Bhāviveka’sresponsesoftenshowarealknowledgeofandengagementwith thesystems thathe iscritiquing.As informativeas thesecritiquesare to historians who seek to excavate the doctrines of sixth-century Sāṃkhya,Vedānta, and Mīmāṃsā, however, these are polemics, not attempts to compile anumber of viewpoints in a systematic and orderly fashion.30 In fact, there is noapparent order in the sequence of doctrines he refutes. Bhāviveka begins with thetwo schools that he elsewheremaintained do have some soteriological usefulness,theHīnayānaandYogācāraschools.31Likemost Indianpolemicists,hisportrayalofhisopponentsisnotalwaysreliableasahistoricalsource.Forinstance,heascribestoMīmāṃsā the belief that a God created the world, when in fact most recordedschoolsofMīmāṃsāareatheistic.32Bhāviveka’sportrayalofVedāntaisparticularlyintriguing,ifsomewhatdifficulttopin

down.SomefeaturesofhisportrayalofVedāntaare familiar,suchasthemetaphorof space and the space inside of different pots to explain the non-dual relation

between the Brahman and the individual souls.33 At other times, the Vedānta hedescribes seems to advocate a type of difference and non-difference relation, oreven a theory of Brahman as “person” similar to the views of some later Śaivasects.34 This diversity serves as the basis for one of his arguments against theVedānta:Vedānta isahodgepodgeof ideas,borrowedfrommanydifferentsourcesincludingtheBuddhahimself,andthereforeitsinternal inconsistencyrulesitoutasadoctrineacceptedbyreasonablepeople.35Another aspect of this text foreshadows the inclusivist attitudes of the medieval

doxographers, as well as Vijñānabhikṣu’s project of reading Sāṃkhya and Yoga insuch a way that they will be in concord with Bhedābheda Vedāntic teachings (seechapter 5 in this volume). In the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, Bhāviveka redefinesVedānticconceptsinordertoshowhowtheymightfitintotheconceptualuniverseofMadhyamakaBuddhism.Inchapter4,aHīnayānainterlocutoraccusestheMahāyānaBuddhist of being a crypto-Vedāntin, paralleling later Vedāntins who accuse theAdvaitaVedāntaofcrypto-Buddhism.Thismaybe theearliestacknowledgment inaSanskrit text of the similarity between the two schools. According to the Hīnayānaopponent,“theMahāyānaisnotthewordoftheBuddha,becauseitisnotincludedintheSūtrāntas,etc.,orbecause it isa teachingofanotherpath [than theBuddha’s],similartotheVedāntasystem.”36Bhāvivekarespondsto thisopponentbyconcedingthesimilarity,but thenhe traces thissimilarity to theBuddha’s influence: “Everythingthat has beenwell said in theVedāntawas spokenby theBuddha.”37 Again at theend of his rather scathing critique of the Vedānta doctrine in chapter 8 of theMadhyamakahrdayakārikā,Bhāvivekaremarks:“AcceptingthatthissplendidteachingoftheBuddhaisfreefromfault,theVedāntins,fullofdesire,haveclaimeditastheirown.”38Butwhat in thepre-ŚaṅkaraVedāntaof thesixth centurydoesBhāvivekaseeas

overlapping with Madhyamaka Buddhism? In spite of their many differences, heobservesthat theyappear tosharethedoctrineofnon-origination(ajātivāda),whichstates that nothing really ever comes into or passes out of existence. NāgārjunaattemptstoproveinhisMūlamadhyamakakārikāthatcausalityisonlyaconventionaltruthandcannotbepartoftheultimatenatureofthings.Somethingsimilarappearsinthe Māndūkyakārikā of Gauḍapāda (sixth century CE). For Gauḍapāda, non-originationmeans thatall that isoriginatedmustbeultimatelyunreal (mithyā), sincereal things do not change.As a proto-Advaitin,Gauḍapāda concludes that the onlyreality is the absolute and beginningless self (ātman) described in theUpaniṣads.39This is certainly too much for Bhāviveka to concede. Instead of re-readingMādhyamika denials of causation in terms of an Upaniṣadic ultimate self, asGauḍapādadoes,Bhāvivekaturnsthetablesinrereadingtheselfnotasanabsoluteentitybutastheabstractconceptofnon-origination:

Non-originationisthenature(svabhāva)ofbeings.Becauseit isnotproducedanddoesnotperish,it isalsocalledthe“self”(ātman)….Ifitisjustthissortofselfthatyou[theVedāntin]mean,thenthat[conceptofself]isproperandwithouterror,becauseofthemanycommonpropertiesitshares,suchasitsname.40

This is an extremely reductive, and perhaps even a sarcastic, understanding of theAdvaitaconceptofselfhood.Nonetheless,itisevidencethatinclusivisticstrategiesofco-option were present in Buddhist engagements with rival schools, much as theywere in later Vedānta doxographies. It also shows how inclusivism, sometimeschampionedbymodernscholarsasaformofphilosophicalnonviolence,canbemoreakintoahostiletakeoverofanotherschool’smostcherishedideas.41Cāttaṉār’s Maṇimēkalai and Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahrdayakārikā offer

invaluablecluesfortheoriginsofdoxographyinIndia.WhileBhāvivekadoesdepictanumber of different schools in a fair amount of depth, these numerous schools arepresented as prima facie arguments (pūrvapakṣas) to be refuted point by point indebate.42 For this reason, I have refrained from labeling theMadhyamakahrdayakārikā as a doxography, in spite of its obvious importance tohistorians.43While it ispossible that the Indiandoxographicalgenregrewoutof thepūrvapakṣa/uttarapakṣaformsofamiliarinIndianphilosophicaltexts,thestructureofdoxography offers greater freedom to portray the schools of philosophy as subtleprogressions from lower tohigher truth.Therefutationofapūrvapakṣa, incontrast,portrays mano-a-mano conflict, in which one doctrine triumphs over another.Maṇimēkalaiisremarkablebecauseitisoneofakind,aglimpseofroadsnottakenbylaterdoxographers.Forexample,thelistoftenpramāṇasexpandsthenormallistto include pramāṇas only accepted by followers of the Purāṇas (paurānikas).44’Cāttaṉār is happy tomake room for schools suchas followersof thegodBrahmā,followers of the Veda (vedavādins), and the Ājīvikas. These classifications areforgotten by the later doxographers, even those that identify themselves asexhaustive lists of all of the schools. At the same time, Maṇimēkalai usesclassificatory strategies that become more familiar with the late medievaldoxographies.Inthisway,Maṇimēkalaigivesusaglimpseofwhatpre-sixth-centuryIndian doxography may have looked like, while foreshadowing the structure andcontent of the later, more familiar Sanskrit doxographies. It is also the onlydoxography presented explicitly as a narrative, with an inquisitive main charactermeeting each of the proponents of various schools.45 This presents the intriguingpossibilitythatIndiandoxographyhasitsoriginsinstorytellinginsteadofphilosophicaldebate.Maṇimēkalai,whetherornot its format reflectsanearlierstratumof Indiandoxography,helpsprovidea freshperspectiveaswegoon toapproach later,morefamiliartexts.

HARIBHADRA,JAINISM,ANDTHESIXSYSTEMS

TheJainaauthorHaribhadra’sṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya is theearliest extantSanskritdoxography in India.He uses the enumeration of the schools as six as an orderingprinciple, in a way similar to the enumeration of six doctrines in Maṇimēkalai.Accordingtotraditionalsources,Haribhadralivedinapproximatelytheeighthcentury,not far from the town of Chitrakoot (currently in northern Madhya Pradesh).While

Cāttaṉāracknowledgesotherschoolsasexistingoutsideof theclassificationofsix,Haribhadra initially suggests that his list of six is exhaustive.46 In both texts, the sixschoolsenumerateddifferfromthelistofthesixorthodoxschoolsusuallycitedinthemodern period. For the Jaina Haribhadra, the six schools are Buddhism, Nyāya,Sāṃkhya, Jainism, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā. InMaṇimēkalai, they are Lokāyata,Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā.47 While Cāttaṉār almosttreats Jainism as a preliminary or subdoctrine of Buddhism, Haribhadra gives it aseparateplaceofitsown,attheexpenseofLokāyatamaterialism.48TheseJainaandBuddhistlistsdifferfromlaterAdvaitaaccountsinthattheyinclude

Buddhismand Jainism among the six schools.Haribhadra does this by defining thetermāstika(“affirmer”)differentlythanitisunderstoodbymedievalVedāntinssuchasVijñānabhikṣuandMadhusūdanaSarasvatī.He says that his enumerationof the sixschools, includingBuddhismandJainism, isa“summaryofall theāstika views.”HiscommentatorManibhadra elucidates this by defining theāstika views as those thataffirmtheexistenceofanotherworld(paraloka),transmigration(gati),virtue(puṇya),andvice(pāpa).49JainismandBuddhismqualifyunderthisdefinitionjustasmuchasNyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Mīmāṃsā. Here and elsewhere, āstika does notmean“theist,”or “affirmingtheexistenceofaworld-creatingGod.” If itdid, theonlyoneofHaribhadra’ssixsystemstoqualifywouldarguablybeNyāya.The label āstika would be meaningless without the existence of its antithesis,

nāstika (“denier”). Haribhadra only identifies one school, the Lokāyata, as nāstika.Afterheliststhesixāstikaschools,heappendsamentionoftheLokāyataschool:

78.OthersdonotacceptthatthereisadifferencebetweentheNaiyāyikadoctrineandtheVaiśeṣikas.Intheiropinion,thereareonlyfiveāstikaschools.79. In their opinion, thenumberof the six schoolsof philosophy is completedbyadding thedoctrineof theLokāyatas.Therefore,thatdoctrinewillbedescribed.50

This passage helps clarify just how the enumeration of the six schools functions.Haribhadra is not simply adding up all of the schools that he can find and thenpresentingthisnumberasthetotal.Rather,thenumbersixisanestablishedtotalforthe number of possible schools. Haribhadra’s job is to look at all of the possiblecandidatesandtoseehowtheycanbemostreasonablycategorizedtonumbersix.51Like Cāttaṉār, Haribhadra was familiar with many more than six schools. PerhapsbecausetheLokāyatawasfrequentlymentionedasoneofthesixschools,hecannotsimply pass over the materialist school in silence. Instead, he offers anacknowledgment that thereareotherpossiblewaysofcountingtheschools—notasnumberingfiveorsevenbutasaddinguptosixinsomedifferentcombination.Andhesuggests one possible way of doing so: by combining two closely related schoolssuchastheNyāyaandVaiśeṣikaintoone.ButHaribhadrapersonallypreferstoleavetheLokāyataoutofhisenumeration.The doctrine that Haribhadra considers the best is, of course, Jainism. He

describesitintermsthatheusesfornoneoftheotherschools:itis“freefromfault”(anagha)andcompletelydevoidofcontradictions.52ButhedoesnotportraytheJaina

doctrine lastor imply that it isaculminationofallotherschools. Inhis text itcomesfourth, between Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. Haribhadra’s ordering of the six schoolsappears to be arbitrary. For instance, he presents the closely related schools ofNyāyaandVaiśeṣikaapartfromoneanother.Noristherepresentationinorderofthenumberofpramāṇasacceptedbyeachschool.AlthoughtheṢaḍdarśanasamuccayamentions thepramāṇas accepted by each school, it has amethod for categorizingeach of the schools that is different from Cāttaṉār’s enumeration of pramāṇas.Haribhadrawrites that there are two fundamental criteria for differentiating each ofthesixsystemsofphilosophy:

2.Takingintoaccounttheirfundamentaldifferences,thereareonlysixphilosophies.Theyshouldbeknownbythewiseaccordingtodifferencesindeity(devatā)andprinciple(tattva).53

Thefirstmeansofclassifyingthedifferentschools,deityseemsfairlyself-evident.Different schools have different sorts of gods, although some others do notacknowledgetheexistenceofanygodatall.By“principle”(tattva),Haribhadramightmean the number of fundamental entities each system acknowledges as existing inthe world. For Sāṃkhya, of course, the number is twenty-five; Haribhadra alsodescribes theNaiyāyikasashaving sixteen tattvas.54: The commentatorManibhadraproposesanotherwayofunderstandingHaribhadra’sword tattva.According tohim,tattvas are “the secrets that bring about liberation” (moksasādhakāni rahasyāni).55Thissoteriological readingof the termsuggests thateachschooloffersadistinctiveteachingthatleadstoliberationandthatalongwiththeschool’sdeity,itispossibletoorganizeschools in termsof theirmeans to liberation.Theproblemwith thiswayofclassifyingschools,likeclassifyingintermsofdeity,isthatitimposesanextrinsicsetofissuesoneachoftheschoolsandthensearcheswithineachschoolforateachingthat will fit this problematic. The Mīmāṃsā school, for instance, takes heaven(svarga)ratherthanliberation(mokṣa)astheultimatehumanend.Therefore,itoffersno doctrine or secret teaching that will lead to liberation. Nonetheless,Manibhadraclaims that the study of the Veda as the means of liberation is taught by theMīmāṃsāschool.TheMīmāṃsāisespeciallyproblematicamongtheāstikaschools,sinceinitsearlyformsitacceptsneithertheexistenceofadeitynorthepossibilityofliberation from the cycle of death and rebirth. Nonetheless, it is presented by allpremoderndoxographersasanāstikaschool.It is worthy of notice that Vedānta and Yoga, two schools that came to assume

enormousimportanceinthemedievalandmodernperiods,areabsentfromCāttaṉārandHaribhadra.56TheVedānta’sabsenceisfurtherconfirmationofNakamura’sthesisthat theVedāntawasnotwidelyknownoracknowledgedby theotherphilosophicalschools in the seventh to tenth centuries CE.57 In his commentary on theṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya,ManibhadramaintainsthattheVedānta,orUttaraMīmāṃsā,is considered in Haribhadra’s text as a subdivision of Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā school.HaribhadraseemstohaveinmindtheschoolofMīmāṃsāofKumārilaBhaṭṭa,basedonhis inclusionofnonexistence (abhāva) as oneof thepramāṇas accepted by the

MīmāṃsāandbyhisdescriptionoftheMīmāṃsāasdenyingtheexistenceofGod.58TheinclusionofnonexistenceasapramānaexcludestheschoolofPrabhākarafromHaribhadra’saccountofMīmāmsā.HisdescriptionofthenonexistenceofGodwouldalsoseem toexcludeall of theVedāntaschools frompossiblybeingunderstoodassubschoolsofMīmāṃsā.Remarkably, Mīmāṃsā and Lokāyata are the only two schools that Haribhadra

describes as having no god; according to Haribhadra, the deity (devatā) of theBuddhists is Sugata (i.e., the Buddha), and the god of the Jainas is Jinendra (thesupreme Jaina patriarch). The concept of “deity” (devatā) is especially fluid forHaribhadra,asattestedbytheproblemshiscommentatorManibhadrahasintryingtoglosstheterm.ManibhadrawritesafterHaribhadra’sintroductionoftheconceptthatdeitiesarethose“whosuperintendeachofthesystems.”59YetitisunclearhoweithertheBuddhaorJinendracanfitthisdefinition,sinceaccordingtomanyIndianBuddhistschoolsandmostJainaschools,thesetwogreatsagesceasedtohaveanyconcernwith thephenomenalworldafter theywere liberated.Therefore, in thecasesof theBuddhist and Jaina schools, Manibhadra gives a slightly different interpretation ofdeity.InhistreatmentoftheBuddha,hewritesthat“theBuddhaisthedeity,i.e.theoriginalcreatorofthe[Buddhist]system.”60Jinendrais“thedeity,theoriginatorofthe[Jaina] system, the original person.”61 This interpretation of the word “deity” isproblematic, however, since virtually every system can claim an originator. At otherplaces, therefore,Manibhadra gives a different interpretation ofdevatā. HaribhadradividestheSāṃkhyaintotwocamps:“SomeSāṃkhyasareatheists(nirīśvara),whileothers have Īśvara as their God. But for all of them, there are twenty-fiveprinciples.”62 Taking the meaning of “deity” as “originator of the system,” it wouldseem logical to say that all Sāṃkhyas accept Kapila as their deity. However, hereManibhadra once again understands the meaning of deity as superintendent(adhiṣṭhātṛ).63An alternative definition of deity that the commentator Manibhadra does not

suggest, but which might make better sense of Haribhadra’s assertion that bothBuddhismandJainismaretheistic,isthenotionthatadeityisabeingwhosespeechis infallible, who in himself functions as a pramāna.64 Haribhadra describes theMīmāṃsāschool in these terms: “The followersofJaiminisay that there isnodeity(deva)whohasqualitiessuchasomniscience,andwhosespeechwouldbeameansof knowledge (māna)”.65 In Buddhism and Jainism, the words of the Buddha andJinendra, respectively, functionasameansof knowledge.Theyarealsoobjectsofdevotion for practitioners of the respective schools. In this way, wemight make amoreplausibleclaimthatthesetwoschoolsaccepta“deity.”Althoughitischallengingtocomeupwithasingle,consistentdefinitionofthiswordthatwillbesuitabletoeachoftheschoolsHaribhadrasurveys,itisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyhewasinclinedtoarguethatBuddhismandJainismwerenotgodless,asoftenclaimed.Rejectionofgod isawell-knowncharacteristicof theLokāyataschool,aschool thatHaribhadrawanted to disassociate from Jainism at all costs. By understanding the Jainas asacceptingagod,hemovesthemclosertoschoolsliketheNyāyaandfartherfromthe

Lokāyatas.66

MĀDHAVAANDTHEINFLUENCEOFADVAITADOXOGRAPHY

TheSarvadarśanasaṃgrahaisthemostinfluentialandwidelyreadofalloftheIndiandoxographies. There are a number of reasons for this. The first is the depth of itspresentationsofthevariousschools.Unlikethetwodoxographiesjustdescribed,theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha presents actual arguments of the various philosophicalschools and presents them with a fair degree of detail. Besides its depth, theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha also offers more breadth in the number of schools that itcovers. Unlike the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, which treats only six schools (plus anappendix on Cārvāka), the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha offers chapters on sixteendifferentschools.TheSarvadarśanasaṃgraha istraditionallyascribedtotheAdvaitaVedāntaphilosopherMādhava,wholivedinthefourteenthcenturyasaministeroftheVijayanagara empire and eventually became the head of the Advaitamonastery atŚṛṅgeri reputedly founded by Śaṅkara.67 Mādhava’s text is more than simply acompleteandobjectivedescriptionofallofthephilosophicalschools.Itisanidealizedrepresentationofthestateofphilosophicalaffairsaccordingtotheworldviewofoneof themost famous exponents of Advaita, according to tradition also the author ofenormously popular Advaita texts such as the Pañcadaśī and the Śaṅkarjaya.Although it has been praised in the past for the clarity with which it presentsphilosophicaldoctrines,formypurposesitismostinterestingforitsideologicalslant,and the techniques it employs to subordinate its fifteen other schools to AdvaitaVedānta. It is a testament to the seamlessness of these techniques and thedominance of Advaita philosophy in the modern period that theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha has often been considered an accurate depiction of theIndian philosophical schools, so much so that Deussen’s volume on India in hisAllgemeineGeschichtederPhilosophieislargelybasedonMādhava’stext.68Like many other Indian doxographies, the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha begins with

lesserphilosophicalschools,progressing inorderof theiracceptability,until it finallyculminates in the highest philosophy, Advaita Vedānta.69 Mādhava presents eachphilosophicalschoolasacorrectivetotheonethatcamebeforeit.So,for instance,theCārvākaschoolpresentstheviewinchapter1thatthereisonlyonevalidmeansof knowledge, perception. Immediatelyat thebeginningof chapter 2, theBuddhistschallenge this view, offering arguments in support of an additional means ofknowledge,rational inference.Mādhavacontinueswiththisconceitforapproximatelythe first eight chapters of his work, but he uses it less and less as its artificialitybecomes increasinglyapparent.HowdoesVaiśeṣikaatomismfunctionasthe logicalcorrective to the Raseśvara Śaiva sect, for instance? Nonetheless, the overallimpressionofhis text is that theschools function together inadialecticalprocess—althoughmostof thecentraldoctrinesof theBuddhistsareunacceptable toAdvaitaVedānta, the Buddhists’ refutation of Cārvāka views can be accepted without

reservation.Thisprocess issometimesproblematic,since thegroundsbywhich theBuddhist disproves some Cārvāka theories are not acceptable to an Advaitin. Arefutation of Cārvāka hedonism on the basis of the Buddhist doctrine ofmomentariness, for instance, isunacceptable,sinceAdvaitadoesnotaccept thatallentities in the world only exist for amoment before they pass out of existence. Inother cases, however, Buddhist arguments are acceptable—such as the Buddhistargumentsaboutthevalidityofrationalinference(anumāna),ameansofknowledgeacceptedbyboththeBuddhistsandVedāntinsbutrejectedbytheCārvākas.Although the category of the Vedānta does appear in Mādhava’s

Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, it does not appear on the same terms that it appears inmostmodernhistories of Indianphilosophy.Mādhavaonly accepts theexistenceofone school of Vedānta, the Advaita. Other schools that self-identify as Vedānta—mostobviouslytheschoolsofRāmānuja(ViśiṣṭādvaitaVedānta)andMadhva(DvaitaVedānta)—are not listed as such in Mādhava’s enumeration. Instead, they areincluded at almost the bottom of Mādhava’s hierarchy just above the Cārvākas,Buddhists, and Jainas and below the Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The reason to groupthemthereistoimplythattheyarelogicallyinadequateevenamongtheirpeers,thetheisticsystemsof theŚaivasandVaiṣṇavas.Mādhava’sonlynodto theirstatusasalternative systems of Vedānta is the statement that “Madhva established a newsystem under the pretext of an interpretation of the Brahma Mīmāṃsā.”70 TheSarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not even acknowledge that Rāmānuja, too, haspretensionsofbelongingtotheBrahmaMīmāṃsā,orVedānta,school.The reason for the subordination of Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta in the

Sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaisfairlyobvious.Thesetwoschoolsrepresentedthegreatestthreat to theAdvaitaVedānta in the fourteenth centurywhenMādhavawaswriting,andhencetheirdismissalasminor theisticschools isaneffectiverhetoricalstrategyfordefendingAdvaitaastheonlytrueschoolofVedāntaphilosophy.Thisstrategyhasbeenagreatsuccess.AnearliergenerationofIndologistswhoreliedontextsliketheSarvadarśanasaṃgrahatoouncriticallycametoregardAdvaitaastherealandmosthistoricallyaccurate interpretationof theintentionoftheUpaniṣads’authors,andthisviewstill persists inNeo-Vedāntic religious circles in spite of ampleevidence to thecontrary.Followingthewell-knownverseatManu.2.11wherethenāstika isdefinedas a “reviler of the Veda” (vedanindaka), Mādhava and other medieval VedāntinsunderstoodBuddhistsandJainasasbeingincludedwithCārvākasinthecategoryofnāstika. Therefore, Mādhava could not put Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita at the verybottom of his hierarchy. Instead, he lists them directly after the nāstika schools,signifying, according to the internal logic of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, that theviews of Rāmānuja andMadhva represent the lowest of the āstika teachings. TheviewsofBhedābhedathinkerssuchasBhāskaraandNimbārkaareomittedfromtheSarvadarśanasaṃgraha and from other Advaita doxographies. Bhedābheda wasliterallywrittenoutof thehistoryofIndianphilosophy; indeed, inpartbecauseofthedecisionofMādhavaandotherAdvaitadoxographersthatBhedābhedawasnotevenworthmentioning, it remainsrelativelyunknownamongscholars inEuropeandNorth

Americatoday.71The two schools that Mādhava elevates to the penultimate and antepenultimate

positionsinhisdoxographyjustbelowtheAdvaita,arethesystemsofPatañjaliandoftheSāṃkhyas.Thischoice, too,hassomehistorical logic.Neither theSāṃkhyanorthe system of Patañjali represented an actual challenge to the Advaita by thefourteenth century. Both systems were no longer considered alternatives to theAdvaitaVedāntaatall.Totheextenttheystillexisted,theyexistedascomplementarysystems to the various Vedānta schools of the medieval period. Central conceptsfrom Sāṃkhya had been appropriated and altered to do the work of the AdvaitaVedānta.So, for instance, the termprakṛti inmedievalAdvaitaeventuallybecameasynonymformāyā.Aslongasitwasunderstoodthatprakṛtiwasnotultimatelyreal,andwasnotset intomotionby itself, therewasnoseriouscontradiction inadoptingthenotionofaprakṛtidividedintothreeguṇas.Sixcenturiesearlier,Śaṅkarasteadfastlyrefusedsuchrelativelybenignacceptance

of Sāṃkhya categories. So, for instance, a Sāṃkhya pūrvapaksin in Śaṅkara’sBrahmasūtrabhāṣyasuggeststhatwhentheUpaniṣadreferstothe“manyoffspring”colored red, white, and black (Śvet. Up. 4.5), it was in fact referring to the threeguṇas, agitation (rajas), purity (sattva), and lethargy (tamas). Śaṅkara rejects thisinterpretationofthepassagecompletelyinhiscommentaryonBS1.4.9.Accordingtohim, the primary meaning of the “red, white, and black” off spring are the threeelements of fire, water, and earth. The passage could only be taken to refer in asecondary sense to the Sāṃkhya guṇas.72While early Vedāntins such as ŚaṅkaraandBhāskara refuse to cede a single argument or Upaniṣadic interpretation to theSāṃkhyas, later Vedāntins took a much softer line and in some cases were quiteeagertoshowhowSāṃkhyacouldbesympatheticallyreinterpreted.VijñānabhikṣuisthemostextremeexampleofthistrendinmedievalVedānta,butheisnotanomalousin his general acceptance of Sāṃkhya teachings on a conventional (vyāvahārika)level.Another reason forMādhava to place the Sāṃkhya andYoga just under Advaita

VedāntainMādhava’stext isthatit isratherplausibletoseetheAdvaitaofŚaṅkaraasadirectresponsetothemistakenviewsofSāṃkhya.AdvaitaVedāntapresentsacritiqueofandanelaborationonSāṃkhyatheoriessuchassatkāryavāda(thetheorythattheeffectpreexistsinthecause).73AlthoughSāṃkhyawasnotstillaviableanddiscrete philosophical system in the fourteenth century when Mādhava wrote theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha,atearlier timesitwasathrivingschoolofphilosophyandareal threat to Vedānta.74 Many of Bādarāyaṇa’s Brahmasūtras are themselvesresponses to a Sāṃkhya interlocutor, and theVedānta commentators Śaṅkara andBhāskaraexplicatethesepassagesasrejectionsoffundamentalSāṃkhyaconcepts,like the existence of an autonomous prakṛti.75 Unlike later Vedāntins, they are notevenwillingtoadoptSāṃkhyaphilosophical termsassynonymsforfamiliarVedāntaconcepts—forexample,prakṛtiasasynonymformāyā,orpuruṣaasasynonym forjīva.There is some controversy regarding the authenticity of the sixteenth and final

chapter of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, which deals with Advaita Vedānta. SomemanuscriptsoftheSarvadarśanasaṃgrahaendabruptlyafterdealingwithPatañjali’sSeśvara Sāṃkhya system with the statement that “the system of Śaṅkara, whichcomes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has beenexplained by us elsewhere; it is therefore left untouched here.”76 AlthoughundoubtedlytherearetextsascribedtoMādhavathatdotreatAdvaitaatsomelength(e.g., the Pañcadaśī), such an ending would be anomalous among doxographies.Advaita doxographies generally end with an exposition of Advaita philosophy,complete with Advaita critiques of the other systems.77 Recent editions of theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha do include such a chapter, which begins with a critique ofSāṃkhya that is reminiscent of the critique in Śaṅkara’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,specifically of prakṛti as an independent causal agent.78 Although it is not certain,HajimeNakamuraandKlausKlostermaierhaveobservedthatstylistically,chapter16could very well be Mādhava’s work and that perhaps Mādhava wrote the chapterslightlylaterthantherestofthetext.79

MADHUSŪDANASARASVATĪFOREIGNNESSANDTHEPHILOSOPHICALOTHER

Even later in the medieval period are the Prasthānabheda (The Various ReligiousSources) and the Vedāntakalpalatikā (The Creeper Vine of Vedāntic Views), twoworkswritten by the influential Advaita VedāntinMadhusūdana Sarasvatī (sixteenthcentury).80 The latter is a lengthy point-by-point refutation of the views of the non-Advaita schools, enumerated in a way similar to their presentation in Mādhava’sSarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha.81Theformer,thePrasthānabheda,isremarkablebecauseinstead of enumerating six, ten, or sixteen philosophical schools (darśanas),Madhusūdanaorganizeshistextaroundtheeighteen“sciences”(vidyās)or“sources”(prasthāṇas). This was an alternative scheme employed by some Advaitadoxographies, including theSarvamatasaṃgraha and theSarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha,anditisanexpansionfromolderliststhatspeakoffourteen“sciences.”82Oneoftheimportantdifferencesbetweentheanalyticaltermsdarśanaandvidyāis

that“sciences”arenot inherentlyatodds in thewaythat“philosophicalschools”areoften depicted. Instead, they can represent different, and often complementarybranchesofknowledge,muchinthewaythatmodernbiology,chemistry,andphysicsare understood as complementary. Furthermore, in Madhusūdana’s works,prasthāṇas are primarily understood as different varieties of texts, not differentphilosophicalpositions.83Madhusūdanadivides thevidyās into fourVedas,sixVediclimbs (vedāṅgas), four additional limbs (upāṅgas), and four additional Vedas(upavedas).HehelpfullyexplainsthattheVedāntaandMīmāṃsāfitundertheupāṅgaknownasexegesis (mīmāmsā); theNyāyaandVaiśeṣikaunder theupāṅgaof logic(nyāya);SāṃkhyaandYoga,alongwiththeMahābhārata,Rāmāyaṇa,andthetextsof the Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas, fit under the broad upāṅga of legal texts(dharmaśāstra).

Thenāstikas, writesMadhusūdana, have their own six sources (prasthāṇas): thefour sects of Buddhists, theCārvākas, and theDigambara [Jainas]. Althoughwhenspeakingof theāstikas,Madhusūdana takesprasthāna tomean “foundational text,”the word prasthāna’s semantic fluidity allows him to understand it simply as asynonym for darśana when he refers to nāstika schools. Indeed, his standardenumeration of Cārvākas, Jainas, and four schools of Buddhists (Madhyamaka,Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāsika) seems to be based on Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha and Pseudo-Śaṅkara’s Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha, not onoriginalworksfromtheseschools.Likelybecausetheydonotfitintotheoverarchingclassificationoftheeighteenschools,MadhusūdanagivesthembrieftreatmentinthePrasthānabheda.Heisalsothefirstdoxographertoexplicitlyassociatethebeliefsofthenāstikaswith thoseof foreigners (mlecchas): “Tosumup, thenāstikashavesixsources (prasthāṇas). We disregard them because, like the teachings of thebarbarians, they are external to the Vedas (vedabāhya), and because they areuseless even for the indirect attainment of human moral ends.”84 Madhusūdana’scriteria for classifying a text as nāstika are pragmatic in part: while the texts offoreignersandnāstikasarewhollyuselessforanyhumanend(purusārtha),heclaimsthatallāstikatextsdoleadtotheseends,eitherdirectlyorindirectly.MadhusūdanaconcludesthePrasthānabhedabyorganizingtheāstikaschoolsinto

threehierarchicalcategories,basedontheirtheoriesofthecreationoftheworld.TheNyāya,Vaiśeṣika,andMīmāṃsābelongtotheārambhavāda,anatomistic theoryofcreation.85TheSāṃkhya,Yoga,andthetheisticschoolsbelongtothepariṇāmavāda,the theory of the real transformation of primal matter. The highest of the threecosmogonies is thevivartavāda, the theoryof theunrealmanifestationofBrahman.ThistheoryisheldonlybytheVedāntins:

According to the thirdviewpoint, thatof thebrahmavādins,Brahman,which isself-luminous,supremebliss,andwithoutasecond,arrangesitselfbymeansofitsownillusorypower(māyā)intheformoftheworldinawaythatisultimatelyfalse(mithyā).Thetruepurposeofallthesageswhohavecreatedthesystemsisinthecentral purport, theunique, highest Lord, sinceall the systemsultimately issue into thevivartavāda. Thosesagescannotjustbeconfused,sincetheyareomniscient.However,theaccesstohumanmoralendsisnotimmediately possible for those who are preoccupied with external objects. The sages teach the varioussystemssothatsuchpeoplewillnotbecomenāstikas.Notknowingthetruepurport(tātparya)of thesages,people follow thosevariouspaths,grasping forends thatarecontrary to theVedasandoverlooking the truepurportoftheVedas.86

The fourteenth-century Advaita doxographies Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha andSarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha hint at a possible union of allāstika philosophical schoolsby portraying the schools as a dialectical progression culminating in the Advaitaschool.Inthesixteenthcentury,Madhusūdanagoesfurtherbyclaimingthatallofthegreat sages of the āstika schools outside of the Advaita knew that some of thedoctrinestheytaughtwerefalse.Theytaughtwhattheydidinordertokeephumansfrom gravitating toward nāstika doctrines and instead taught systems designed tograduallyleadthesepeopletotheultimatetruthsintheAdvaitaVedānta.Hisclaimisremarkably similar to Vijñānabhikṣu’s strategy for rationalizing Kapila’s apparent

atheismintheSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya.JustasVijñānabhikṣumaintainsthatKapilawas aware that he taught an untruth when teaching the nonexistence of God,Madhusūdana believes that allāstika sages outside of the Vedānta knew that theirteachingswerepartialandflawed.Inbothcases,sagessawtheirteachingsasusefulinhelpinganaudiencewith limitedunderstandingavoidmoreseriouspitfalls.Suchastrategyisonepossiblewayofsolvingavexingproblemtoanythinkerwhosoughttovaluetheāstikaschoolsover thenāstikas inanunambiguousway.ForŚaṅkaraandthinkers of his era who had no particular concern with showing that the nāstikaschoolswere inferior to all of theāstika schools, the simple solutionwas simply todeny that Kapila, the sage of the Sāṃkhyas, was truly a reliable source. ForMadhusūdanaapproximatelyeighthundredyears later,discreditingKapila,Patañjali,and the other āstika sages was not a viable alternative. Instead, he adopted anexplanatorystrategycommonlyfoundinthePurāṇasbywhichthesesagescouldbothbe said to be omniscient and to be the originators of schools that were flawed insomeway.We can regard Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Vijñānabhikṣu as the culminating

points at the end of a long tradition of discourse about the “other” in Indianphilosophy.Mostoften forVedāntins,whetherAdvaita,Bhedābheda,or someotherbranch, thewordusedtodescribesuchanoutsider isnāstika.By the latemedievalperiod, the word nāstika had become little more than a vague pejorative. Asdiscussed here, Jainas and Buddhists rejected the epithet nāstika as applicable tothemselves and, instead, claimed that the Cārvāka materialists were the truenāstikas.MadhusūdanaSarasvatīexpandsthesemanticrageofnāstikaevenfurtherwhen he blurs this concept with the concept of “foreigner” or even “barbarian”(mleccha).Accordingtohimin thePrasthānabheda, there isapracticalequivalenceofbothgroups,asbothareextra-Vedic.Inchapter9,Ipresentahistoryofthewordpairāstikaandnāstika.

[9]AFFIRMERS(ĀSTIKAS)ANDDENIERS(NĀSTIKAS)ININDIANHISTORY

TOWARDACOMPARATIVEHERESIOLOGY

While it iswidelyacknowledgedthatheresiography,“writingaboutheresy,”wasoneof the central preoccupations of ancient andmedieval Christian authors, little workhasbeendone to reflecton theconceptualanalogues to thecategoriesof “heresy”and“heretic”inpremodernIndia.1ThishasnotstoppedscholarsfromusingChristianheresiologicaltermsastranslationsforindigenousIndianconcepts,however.Authorsin India used two terms in particular, āstika and nāstika, to classify insiders andoutsidersamongphilosophicaland theological traditions.TheseSanskrit termshavebeentranslatedvariously,andthearbitrarinessofthesetranslationsisanindicationofhowunsophisticated Indologistshavebeenonheresiologicalmatters ingeneral.Thepair of terms does not mean “theist” and “atheist,” although some have translatedthem this way, perhaps under the influence of the modern Hindi words āstik andnāstik.2Asimpleglanceat the listsofāstikaschoolsmakes thispointclear:amongthecommonlyenumeratedāstika schools,Vaiśeṣika,Mīmāṃsā,andSāṃkhyahaveall propounded atheism of one form or another.3 Themost common translations ofāstikaandnāstikaare “orthodox”and “heterodox.”Although this isan improvement,use of these two terms transposes Indian discourses of theOther into a Christianheresiological context that inevitablyobscuresasmuchas it elucidates.Becauseofthe different heresiological presuppositions in Indian doxography and in Christianheresiography, it is best to avoid as much as possible such terms drawn fromChristiantraditions.ThepluralisticandpolycentricrelationofthemanyGreekandRomanphilosophical

schools is closer to thesituation inpremodern India.Historiansof Indianphilosophyhave tended to draw on Western religious categories when approaching Indianphilosophybecauseoftheoft-repeatedviewthat,unlikeWesternphilosophyallIndianphilosophers have a religious or soteriological focus.4 Whatever the merits of this

interpretation,formostofthehistoryofIndianphilosophyupuntilthemodernperiod,the institutional relationships of the schools of Indian philosophy have been muchcloser to the structure of the Greek and Roman philosophical schools than thecentralized, apostolicmagisterium of theChristian church. This does notmean thatIndian or Greek schools were “secular” or uninterested in theological matters. TheEpicureans,likeearlyVaiśeṣikaphilosophersinIndia,gavethegodslittleroletoplayin their atomistic cosmogony. But other Greeks, such as the Stoics, had a morerobustunderstandingofGod’splace in thecreationof theuniverse,and theprecisenatureofthegodswasacommonpointofdebateamongGreekschools.AccordingtoMarcelSimon,among theGreekphilosophical sects “thereexistednouniversallyrecognizedcriterionofauthoritybywhichtoclassifythemintwoopposingcategoriesand to distinguish truth and error.”5 Simon’s observation could apply equallywell toIndianphilosophyformostof itshistory.Upuntil thelatemedievalperiod,therewasnosingleuniformunderstandingof themeaningofāstika or auniversally agreed-onlistoftheāstikaandnāstikaschools.The classifications āstika and nāstika were of central significance to the late

medieval doxographers discussed in chapter8, who sought to provide a system ofclassification that unambiguously distinguished insiders and outsiders. While thefourteenth-century Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha and Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha used thetermssparingly,theconceptsarenonethelessfundamentaltothetexts’organization,astheCārvāka,Buddhist,andJainasystemsalwaysappearatthelowestendoftheAdvaita hierarchies.6 Hierarchically arranged texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaand Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha have a fundamental tension to deal with, since thebinary āstika/nāstika classification is implicitly at odds with a gradual, hierarchicalprogression of truths. In the sixteenth century, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī andVijñānabhikṣu endeavored to show that the differences betweenāstika and nāstikawere realandunbridgeable,whiledifferencesamong theāstika schools themselveswere small or nonexistent. Before the medieval period, this systematic attempt tounify all āstika doctrines was hinted at but never fully enunciated as the goal of asystematicphilosophicalproject.

THEMEANINGOFĀSTIKAANDNĀSTIKA

How is it that a school qualifiesasāstika?What essential propertymust it have toavoidfallingintonāstikatva?Theetymologyofthesetermsisimportant:theāstikaissomeonewhosaysthat“thereis”(asti),whilethenāstikasays“thereisnot”(nāsti).Thecentralquestion, then, iswhatprecisely isbeingaffirmedordenied.Historicallycommentators have given a number of different answers to this question. Whenattemptingtojustifytheirownuseoftheseterms,modernintroductorytextsonIndianphilosophy generally cite Manu. 2.11: “Any twice-born who disregards these tworoots[śrutiandsmṛti]onthebasisofthescienceoflogicshouldbeexcludedbytherighteousasanāstika,arevileroftheVeda.”7Thisdefinition,howeversimpleitmay

appear,requiresanalysis.The southern Indian commentator Medhātithi (ninth century) provides a revealing

gloss on some of the terms in Manu’s famous verse. He is concerned to identifyprecisely what it means to scorn the Veda on the basis of the science of logic(tarkaśāstra).Shouldthis implythatthosewhofollowtheinjunctionsof theVedaarebeing illogical?8Heunderstands the “scienceof logic” just to refer to “theworksonlogicwrittenbynāstikas,namelytheworksoftheBuddhists,Cārvākas,andsoforth,in which it is proclaimed again and again that the Veda is contrary to dharma.”9Medhātithi understands Manu’s injunction primarily in the context of ritual action. Ifsomeone does something forbidden by the Vedas and the smrti, and even whenwarned that it is prohibited by the Veda he says that he does not care since theVedas lack authority, then he should be excluded (e.g., excluded fromofficiating atsacrifices). It is important tonotehere that “therevilerof theVeda” isnotsomeonewhosays that theVeda isuntrue,butsomeonewhosays that theVeda is immoral.Medhātithi’sglossofthewordnāstikaitselfalsoreflectshispreoccupationwithritualaction.CommentingonManu.8.309,hewritesthat“anāstikaisonewhosays,‘thereis no other world; there is no [purpose in] gift-giving; there is no [purpose in]sacrificing.”10 For Medhātithi, a nāstika is someone who refuses to participate inVedicritualsbecauseheseesthemaspointlessorevenimmoral.Medhātithi seems tohave inmind inparticular theBuddhistandJainacritiquesof

Vedic ritual on the basis of the doctrine of nonviolence (ahimsā). Elsewhere in hiscommentary on Manu, he explicitly argues for the necessity of violence in certaincontexts.11YetitwasnotonlytheBuddhistsandJainaswhoopposedthetraditionofVedic ritualism and its practice of animal sacrifice; the Sāṃkhya andYoga schoolswere also at the forefront of this debate.12 Themostwell-known expression of theSāṃkhyarejectionofVedicsacrifice,and,byextension, therejectionof thesanctityoftheVedas,comesatSāṃkhyakārikā2:“Scripture,likeperception,[isineffectiveinrelieving suffering] since it is associatedwith impurity, destruction, andexcess.Thebestmeansistheonethatistheoppositetothosetwo,sinceit istheknowledgeofthemanifest,theunmanifest,andtheknower.”13Fromanearlyperiod,āstikaschoolswere split on the question of animal sacrifice. While the Sāṃkhya position onnonviolencemayhaveoriginallybeentheminorityopinionamongtheāstikaschools,iteventually gained credence, even among Brahmins who specialize in ritualperformance. The acceptance of the principle of nonviolence has been so thoroughthatanimalsacrificeamongHindustodayisuncommon,andmanyIndiansareoftheopinionthatsuchthingsascowslaughterwereneverpracticedinancientIndia.14AlthoughSK4admits that thereare threemeansofvalidknowledge—perception

(drsta), rational inference (anumāna), and reliable testimony (āptavacana)—Īśvarakṛṣṇa isunambiguous that rational inference is thepreferredmethod,sinceofthethreeonlyitispureandfreefromdestructionandexcess.15Inthis,theSāṃkhyaandYogaschoolsareopposedtoMīmāṃsāandVedānta,whicharguethatscripturalauthority is the primary means of knowledge, and all others are subordinate tothese.16 This priority of rational inference in Sāṃkhya explains why appeals to

scripturalauthorityarerelativelyrareinSāṃkhyaliterature.Therearecertainlymanypassages in theUpaniṣads that theSāṃkhyacouldemploy indefenseof itscentralconcepts.ThechoicenottodosohasenabledVedānticcommentatorstoportraytheUpaniṣadsasuniformlycontrarytoSāṃkhyateachings.17LatemedievalAdvaitadoxographies typicallyrankSāṃkhyaandYogahighonthe

listofāstikadoctrines,likelybecauseSāṃkhyaandYoga,conceivedbythenastwoseparate but related schools, had been thoroughly tamedand their terminology co-opted as part of a larger Vedāntic cosmology. Yet of all systems later listed asāstika, it isSāṃkhyaandYogathatcomeclosest toManu’sdescriptionofa“revileroftheVeda.”Certainly,Sāṃkhyaacceptsscripturalauthorityasoneofthemeansofvalid knowledge, and if the minimum requirement for being an āstika is only this,Sāṃkhyaqualifies.18ButSāṃkhyaisunlikeVedānta,whichsawreasonasonlyableto function properly when anchored to the truths revealed by scripture.19 Sāṃkhyadenies that reason by itself is inherently aimless and unstable.On the contrary forSāṃkhya it is scriptural authority that needs to be checked by reason, since blindadherence to Vedic injunctions without critical evaluation leads to immorality anddemerit. Therefore,Medhātithi’s description of a nāstika text as one “in which it isproclaimed again and again that the Veda is contrary to dharma” fits theSāṃkhyakārikāand itsearlycommentariesperfectly.By thestandardsof theVedicritualist tradition, the tradition whose principles the authors of theManusmrti hadinternalized,theSāṃkhyaandYogaarenāstikatraditions.Theheresiologicalwritingsof the influentialMīmāṃsakaKumārilaBhaṭṭa (seventh

century CE) fully corroborate the idea that during his time there was no generalconceptionof theāstikadarśanas over and against thenāstika Buddhist and Jainaschools. In the Tantravarttika, Kumārila writes that “the treatises on righteousnessand unrighteousness that have been adopted in Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra,Pāśupata,andBuddhistworks…arenotacceptedbythosewhoknowtheVeda.”20AsVincentEltschingerremarks:

Kumārila is far from attempting to federate all the denominations which post-classical Indian andWesternscholarshiphavebeenusedtoclassifyas“hinduistic”andeven“orthodox.”Accordingtohim,Sāṃkhya,Yoga,Pāñcarātra,andPāśupataarenolessheterodoxthanBuddhismandJainism….Moreover,mostoftheclichésthathad longbeenassociatedwithheretics recur inKumārila’sdescription, themostsignificantonehavingthemresorttoautonomous,non-scripturallybasedreasoningandargumentation.AsKumārilasays,thesearethe revilers of theVeda (vedanindaka), the “sophists” (haituka) and the deniers (nāstika) who according toManushouldbecarefullyavoidedbyrighteousBrahmins.21

It should be no surprise that, in the worldview of the PūrvaMīmāṃsā school, a“revileroftheVedas”issimplyasynonymforaritualskeptic,someonewhorefusedtoperform rituals or acknowledge their efficacyAccording to theMīmāṃsakas,wedonotlistentotheVedasforinformationabouttheworld;rather,theessenceoftheVedas is injunction(vidhi).Ofcourse,somepassages in theVedaappear to impartfactual information about the world, for instance, statements such as “Vāyu is theswiftestdeity.”Infact,thesolefunctionofthese“statementsofpraise”(arthavāda)isto encourage ritual action,22 not to impart knowledge about time-bound states of

affairs in theworld. TheVedas cannot do this because they are eternal. Since theVedaswouldalreadyhavehadtoexistbeforeanyparticularstateofaffairscametopass, it isa logical impossibility that theyshouldgive informationaboutanyevent intime.23Instead,theonlyfunctionoftheVedasistoprescribeaction.A“revileroftheVeda,” then, can only mean someone who refuses to do the things that the Vedaprescribes.AlthoughtheVedāntaschool’sinterpretivetechniqueswerethemselvesgroundedin

the techniques of thePūrvaMīmāṃsā (and hence theVedāntawas also knownasUttaraMīmāṃsā,“LaterMīmāṃsā”),theyhadsomesubstantialdifferences.24Oneofthesedifferenceswas theabandonmentof the idea that theVeda isprimarilyaboutritual injunctions and does not impart knowledge about the world. Instead, theVedāntinsdivided theVeda into twoparts, thesectiononritualaction(karmakāṇḍa)andthesectiononBrahman(brahmakāṇḍa).Althoughtheinjunctionstoritualactioninthekarmakāṇḍaareimportant,theyareonlyaprerequisitetohigherknowledge.ForVedāntins, the Veda—and the Upaniṣads in particular—should be understood as atext that imparts information about highest truths, epitomized by great statementssuchas“Youarethat.”Wheninterpretedproperly,thesestatementsareinstrumentalforachievingliberation,theultimateendofhumanexistence.ThedifferentschoolsofVedāntahavedifferingunderstandingsofthemeaningofthegreatstatementsandtheprecise role of ritual activity in relation to knowledge of highest truths. But allVedāntins agree that the most important function of the Veda is as a vehicle forknowledgeofthehighesttruth.25Theearliermeaningofnāstika, the reviler of theVeda,wasprimarily an issueof

orthopraxy (correct ritual performance) instead of orthodoxy (correct opinion).Overtime,however,thesecondissuedisplacedthefirst.Thiscoincided,Ibelieve,withthegradual rise of the Vedānta school and decline of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. We seeevidenceof the lackofgeneralacknowledgmentofaschoolknownas “Vedānta” inthe JainaṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya and the BuddhistMaṇimēkalai. This corroboratesHajime Nakamura’s observations that before the tenth century, Vedānta was rarelyacknowledgedbyJainas,Buddhists,andotherBrahmanicalschools.WhenVedāntawasacknowledged,itwasnotŚaṅkara’sVedāntabutoftensomepre-Advaitaversionof Vedānta that subscribed to the theory of real transformation (pariṇāmavāda) toexplainthenatureofreality.26Bythelatemedievalperiod,thissituationhadchangedcompletely. The Mīmāṃsā weakened and lost influence, although it never lost itsfundamentalinterpretiveimportance.Totheextentthatitdidsurvive,ittookontheisticideasfromtheotherschools.27However, theVedānticunderstandingof theVedaasimparting information about ultimate truths became the primarymodel for scripturalinterpretation, just as Nyāya logical principles became common currency for anyschool that sought to engage in rigorous logical argumentation. By this period, thewordnāstikawasunderstood in termsoforthodoxy rather thanorthopraxy.Thus,areviler of the Veda was someone who denied that the Vedas’ depiction of ultimaterealitywasaccurate.

PERSPECTIVESFROMTHEJAINAS,BUDDHISTS,ANDGRAMMARIANS

In the previous chapter I highlighted another understanding of the word pairāstika/nāstika, from the Jaina doxographer Haribhadra and his commentatorManibhadra.Haribhadra’s understanding of the terms seemsworlds apart from theManusmrti,sincehedoesnotconsiderreverencefortheVedatobethemarkerofanāstika.YetManibhadra’scommentaryshows thesameconcernwithorthopraxy thatwefind inMedhātithi, thecommentatoron theManusmrti. It is in thecontextof thisearlier,orthopraxsenseof“revileroftheVeda”thatwecanbestmakesenseoftheterm nāstika as presented by the Jainas Haribhadra and Manibhadra. Medhātithidefinesanāstikaasonewhosays,“thereisnootherworld;thereisno[purposein]gift-giving; there is no [purpose in] sacrificing.”28 Compare this with Manibhadra’sunderstanding of āstika views as those that affirm the existence of another world(paraloka), transmigration (gati), virtue (puṇya), and vice (pāpa).29 For bothHaribhadra and Manibhadra, these two designations have to do with ritual/ethicalaction(karman).Theyagreethatsomeactionsleadtomeritandthatothersresultindemerit. Differences arise when each school begins to categorize various actionsaccordingtotheirkarmicresults.Thisismostobviousinthecaseofviolence(himsā),whichalways leads todemeritaccording toJainas,whereasMīmāṃsakashold thatincertainritualcontexts,violencecanhavepositiveresults.Thesignificanceinbeliefin“otherworlds”(paraloka)isalsointhecontextofritual/ethicalaction:otherworldsare important because only by recognizing the existence of other worlds can weacknowledgethatactionsinthislifehavefutureconsequences.BesidesthetwointerpretationsofthewordnāstikarepresentedbyMedhātithiand

Manibhadra,athirddefinitionfromtheSanskritgrammaticaltraditioncomplicatesourunderstanding. The words āstika and nāstika are derived from Pānini’s rule atAstādhyāyī 4.4.60.30 Pānini simply provides the derivation of the two words (alongwithathird,daṣṭika)withoutsuggestingwhatexactlyisbeingacceptedbytheāstikaor rejected by the nāstika. The first substantive definition of the two words in thePāninian tradition comes in the Kāśikāvrtti, a commentary by the seventh-centuryauthorsJayādityaandVāmana.Theywrite,“Theāstika istheonewhobelievesthat‘thereexistsanotherworld.’Theoppositeofhimis thenāstika.”31Thisdefinitionhasobvious similarities to Manibhadra’s and Medhātithi’s interpretations, since bothincludeexistenceofanotherworld(paraloka)asoneoftheaffirmationsoftheāstika.Butthestripped-downdefinitionfromthegrammaticaltraditionomitsthebelief intheefficacyofritualactionfoundinMedhātithi,aswellasthebeliefinmeritanddemeritfoundinbothManibhadraandMedhātithi.We should not conclude from a single seventh-century passage that the

grammarians’ definition was the original understanding of the two words and thatManibhadra’s and Medhātithi’s interpretations were further developments. But thepassage does offer proof that there were multiple and related but competingdefinitions of these terms and that Manibhadra’s definition was not simply abastardization of Manusmrti 2.11 or an example of wishful thinking among the

Jainas.32 Although there is no conclusive evidence to rule in favor of any of thesethree interpretations as the oldest meaning of the term nāstika, these ambiguitiesshouldleadhistorianstoreexaminethecertaintywithwhichtheyproclaimManusmrti2.11tobetheoriginalandauthenticsourceforthemeaningofthetermnāstika.ForSanskritgrammarians in theseventh through theseventeenthcenturies,anāstika issimply one who believes in a life hereafter, and a nāstika is one who does not.33While the existence of a life hereafter usually implies the existence of an ethicalsystemrewardingvirtueandpunishingvice,thisisnotalwaysthecase.34TheJainasManibhadraandHaribhadraconsiderthemselvesrepresentativesofan

āstikaphilosophyandapplytheepithetnāstikaexclusivelytothematerialistLokāyataschool.TextualevidencesuggestsasimilarsituationamongtheBuddhists,specificallythat the word nāstika was a pejorative that no Buddhist wanted to be associatedwith.Thiscomesacrossclearly in theBodhisattvabhūmi (Stagesof theBodhisattvaPath), a section of the encyclopedic Yogācārabhūmi traditionally ascribed to theYogācara Buddhist philosopher Asaṅga (4th c. ce).35 In this text’s “Chapter onKnowing Reality” (Tattvārthapatalam), theBodhisattvabhūmi critiques two types ofBuddhists,bothofwhomdistort theBuddha’steachings. Indoingso, it recapitulatestheunderstandingoftheYogācāramind-onlydoctrineasamiddlewaybetweentwoextreme Buddhist viewpoints. The text first criticizes those who are guilty ofundernegation,affirming theexistenceof thatwhichdoesnotexist.Although itdoesnot give names, this presumably refers to the Hīnayāna Abhidharma schools’acceptance of constituent elements (dharmas) as having a real existenceindependent of the mind. The text’s harshest critique, however, is aimed at theBuddhistswhoareguiltyofuniversalnegation (sarvavaināśika), thosewhosay thatnothingwhatsoeverexists.AccordingtotheBodhisattvabhūmi,thisisthe“worstkindofdenier”(pradhānonāstikah):

Whensomepeoplehear thedifficultandprofoundMahāyānasūtras thatdealwithemptinessandconveyameaningthatneedstobe interpreted, theydonotdiscernthecorrectmeaning, theydevelopfalseconcepts,they have unreasonable views based only on logic (tarka), and they say: “All of reality is nothing but adesignation;whoeverseesitthisway,seescorrectly.”Forthesepeoplethereisnorealthingtoserveasthebasisofdesignation.Thismeans that therecannotbeanydesignationatall.Howcanrealitybenothingbutdesignation?Bysayingthistheydenybothdesignationandreality.Someonewhodeniesdesignationandrealityshouldbeknownastheworstkindofnāstika.Thosewhoarewiseandpracticeareligiouslifeshouldnotspeakorsharelivingquarterswiththiskindofnāstika.Hecauseshimselftofall,andthosewhoagreewithhisfalseviewsfallaswell.36

ThispassageoftheBodhisattvabhūmi isremarkableforhowmuchitadoptsfromManusmrti 2.11. Like the passage in theManusmrti, it criticizes thenāstika for hisrelianceonlogic(tarka)alone.ForManu, thenāstika’s reasoning is flawedbecausehe ignores the teachingsof theVedas. In theBodhisattvabhūmi, this “worst kindofnāstika”ispresumablyguiltyofusinghisownreasoningindependentoftheteachingsof the Buddha. Both passages also suggest that nāstikas should be subject to acomplete social isolation so that otherswill not be infected by their dangerous andpotentially damning beliefs. For Brahminical ritualists following theManusmrti, this

meant exclusion from sacrifice; for Buddhists who accepted the words of theBodhisattvabhūmi, this would have entailed shunning by other monks or evenexpulsionfromthemonasticcommunity.Inbothcases,thechargeofbeinganāstikawasarealthreattosocialstandingandlivelihood.Although the worst sort of nāstika is nowhere identified by name in the

Bodhisattvabhūmi, later Buddhists clearly understood the text to be attackingMadhyamakaBuddhism.Theeighth-centuryMādhyamikaphilosopherBhāvivekatookquite seriously this injunction by the Yogācāra Buddhists calling for the monasticexpulsionofMādhyamikas.AfterquotingthispassagefromtheBodhisattvabhūmi inhis MHK, Bhāviveka responds: “These angry words are like vomit: they showundigestedpride.”37Heelaboratesonthissimileinthetext’sautocommentary:

Yourangrywordsshowpride justasvomit showsundigested food.Hereanger is compared to vomit, yourwordsarecomparedtotheactofvomiting,andprideiscomparedtoundigestedfood.Someonewhovomitsshowsundigestedfood.Whenyouexpressyouranger,youshowyourprideinexactlythesameway.Butyoudonotrefuteourview.38

ThisdyspepticdisputebetweenBuddhistsleavesnodoubtthatthechargeofbeinganāstika was quite severe, suggesting not only lapses of doctrine but also severedefectsofethicalcharacterseriousenough towarrantsocialostracism.39BuddhistsandJainaswerenomorewillingtoacceptthislabelappliedtothemthanwereothergroups, and theBodhisattvabhūmi’s use of the term suggests that Buddhists, too,were concerned about erecting symbolic boundaries between communities.Modernhistoriographers of Indian philosophy have largely been blind to the numerousintertextually related definitions of the terms āstika and nāstika. This oversight isfurther evidence of our own credulity and overreliance on a handful of texts for ourunderstandingofacomplexsituationinthehistoryof ideas.Anengagementwiththeentire Indian intellectual tradition—including thewritingsof thegrammarians, Jainas,andBuddhists—isnecessary foranadequateunderstandingof thehistoryof Indianphilosophy.Thepre-tenth-centuryhistoryofthewordnāstikashowshiddencontinuitiesamong

commentators in theJaina,Buddhist,anddharmaśāstric traditions.Manu’sdefinitionofnāstikaas “revilerof theVeda”seemsat first tohavenothing todowithaJainadefinition of a nāstika as one who rejects the existence of other worlds,transmigration, virtue, and vice. Yet when analyzed further, these two thinkersgenerallyagreethatthedistinctionbetweenāstikaandnāstikaisprimarilyethicalandnotdoctrinal.40Thisexplainswhy thedistinctionwasso fundamental.Brahmins,andparticularly the intellectual elites who had the most access to textual production,naturally hada great deal of interest in upholding the ritual/ ethical order, since thealternativewaschaosandsocialdislocation.Yetinlaterperiods,whenacceptanceorrejection of theVedawas understood primarily in terms of affirming or negating itsassertions about fundamental philosophical truths, the logic underpinning theimportance of the categories also began to fall away. Why should the mereaffirmationoftheVeda’sauthorityhaveanygreatsignificance?TheSāṃkhyaschool

technicallyaffirmstheVedabutat thesametimebelittles itscontentsas impure,soas to undercut the claims of other schools that rely on the Veda as their primarysourceof knowledge.From the standpoint of aVedāntin, schools like theSāṃkhyathat profess to base their teachings on the Veda yet rely on false interpretationsshould inmany ways bemore dangerous, since they claim true teachings as theirownandtheninsidiouslypervertthem.BuddhistsandJainas,whodonotthreatentheintegrityofthemessageoftheVeda,areaminorthreatinthisregard.Thenwhydolate medieval Vedāntins take such pains to discredit Buddhists and Jainas, whilegivingSāṃkhyas,originallytheirworstenemies,afreepass?41

BEYONDORTHODOXYANDHETERODOXY

The words āstika and nāstika are difficult to translate. One reason for this is thefluctuations in the meanings of the terms themselves between different periods oftimeanddifferentsocial contexts in India.ThisdifficultybecomesevenworsewhenwelookatthosewordsinEnglishthathavebeenusedtotranslatethesetwoterms.DespitethebesteffortsofhistoriansofIndianphilosophy,thetermsusedtotranslateSanskrit philosophical concepts are imbued with Eurocentic (and specificallyChristian-centric) meanings. The two words most commonly used to translateāstika/nāstika, “orthodox” and “heterodox,” come out of the Christian theologicaltradition and hence carry historical connotations that distort the understanding ofnativeIndiancategoriesofthought.For latemedievalVedāntins, thewordāstika denotesschools thatnowadaysare

oftendescribedas“Hindu,”andthenāstikascorrespondtothenon-HinduschoolsoftheJainas,Buddhists,andmaterialists.Yet thetermsorthodoxiaandheterodoxia intheir early Christian usages did not simply correspond to Christian versus non-Christian doctrines. Rather, orthodoxia referred to true Christian doctrine, andheterodoxia,tobothfalseteachingswithinthechurch(e.g.,GnosticismandArianism)and the teachings of pagan philosophical schools. By the medieval period, a thirdterm,hairesis (heresy),came tobeunderstoodasdistinct fromheterodoxy:heresydenoted false Christian teachings, heterodoxy false teachings outside the church.42YetthroughoutChristianhistory,orthodoxiareferredtonotjustanyChristianteachingbuttotheoneChristiansystemthatwasconsideredtheologically impeccable.43Thiscontrastswith theSanskrit termāstika,whichcan refer toanyschoolwithincertainsectarian boundaries, even if some of its teachings are flawed. It is this stricterdefinitionoforthodoxythattheearlyIndologistH.T.Colebrookehadinmindwhenhereferred to the Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā as “emphatically orthodox,” whereas theSāṃkhya’s reservations about Vedic authoritymade it “partly heterodox, and partlyconformabletotheestablishedHinducreed.”44ForChristianheresiology,heresy isby fara larger threat thanheterodoxy (in the

medieval sense of heterodoxy: a false teaching external to the church). Augustineremarks inTheCityofGod that “it isworse tobeadeserter fromthe faithand,by

reasonofdesertion,anenemyofthefaiththantobeonewhohasneverlostwhathenever had.”45 The logic behind this view suggests that it is precisely those whomisinterpret scripture thatare themostdangerous to thestabilityandcoherenceoforthodoxy. There are hints of this attitude in early Vedānta’s attitude towardSāṃkhya.Butthelatemedievaldoxographersturnthisattitudeonitshead.Itisthoseschools that deny the authority of scripture that are themost worthy of contempt,whereas any school that accepts scripture must have at least some sort ofpreliminary value toward a complete understanding of the doctrines of the highestschool.Theinstabilityofthispositionamonglatemedievalthinkersisadirectconsequence

oftheshiftofthemeaningofnāstikadescribedearlier.Ifthenāstikaisonewhosays“thereisnopurposeinritual/ethicalaction,”heisanobviousthreattothesocialorder.In thisworldview, characteristic of theBrahmanical ritual specialists, divergences indoctrine can be overlooked as long as there is complete agreement about theefficacy of ritual action.However, latemedieval Vedāntins inherited the structure ofthis earlier scheme even as the meaning of the central āstika/nāstika dyad hadshifted. Although it is clear that āstikas were praiseworthy and nāstikas were athreat, it is not clear why the nāstikas’ mere lack of interest in the Veda as ascripturalsourceshouldcausesomuchconsternation.Thesixteenth-centuryauthorsAppaya Dīkṣita, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, and Vijñānabhikṣu shared a need toemphasize the similarities among the āstika schools and to overemphasize thedifferences between nāstikas and āstikas. Vijñānabhikṣu is the most extremeexample of this tendency, arguing that whereas all differences of opinion amongāstikaschoolsareillusory,differencesbetweenāstikasandnāstikas (especially thecrypto-nāstikaAdvaitaschool)areprofoundandunbridgeable.OnewayoflookingatVijñānabhikṣu’s move to unify these schools is as an attempt to resolve this newunderstandingthattheessenceoftheVedasaretheirphilosophicaldoctrinesandnotthepracticestheyenjoin.46The word heresy, often used by Christians to refer to erroneous theological

positionswithinChristianity,isderivedfromtheGreektermhairesis,“choice.”Innon-Christiancontexts,thiswordhadnonegativeconnotation.So,forinstance,duringhisreignMarcusAureliusendowedfourchairsofphilosophy inAthenscorrespondingtothe fourgreatphilosophical “sects” (haireseis):Platonism,Aristotelianism,Stoicism,and Epicureanism. In the context of the philosophical sects, hairesis was notcounterposedwithorthodoxia,awordrarelyemployedtodescribeGreekandRomanphilosophyuntilthenineteenthcentury.TheEpicureanorStoicwasmakinga“choice”after using his or her reason to discriminate among the competing tenets of thedifferentschoolsofphilosophy.ForDiogenesLaërtius,hairesiswasevena termofesteem, since only systems of thought that met certain criteria were allowed thisdesignation.47 But Christians saw the Christian heretic’s “choice” in a more sinisterlight.Thehereticchooses to turnaway from the fullnessof theChristian revelation,sometimes by following a heresiarch away from orthodox teachings or, in othercases, distorting Christianity by emphasizing some parts of the Christian message

over and against other parts. These were some of the reasons that Irenaeus,Augustine,andEpiphaniusweresomuchharderonChristianhereticsthantheywereonpagans.Ofcourse,Christianheresiologyhasthebenefitofhindsight,whilethoseChristiansmakingtheirtheologicalchoicesdidnot.Arianism,forinstance,themajoritypositionamongChristiansinthemid-fourthcentury, istodaycategorizedasheresy48Hadhistoricalcircumstancesbeendifferent,Arianismwould todaybeunderstoodasthetrueteachingofthegospels,andAthanasianismjustapopularearlyheresy.Ultimately,nosingleEnglishwordcando justice to therichnessandcomplexityof

the Sanskrit terms āstika and nāstika. This is not to say that the two terms mustremain untranslated. Any candidate must retain the inherent ambiguity in the twoterms.Theāstikasays“thereis”andthenāstikasays“thereisnot,”sotheobjectofaffirmationornegationisunclear.Itcouldbetheefficacyofritual/ethicalaction,asinMedhātithi’searliergloss,orsimplytheepistemicauthorityoftheVedaasunderstoodbythelatemedievaldoxographers.“Believer”and“infidel,”thoughtempting,arealsotoo fraughtwithWesternconnotationsof right theologicalopinion (and the latter tooclosely associatedwithmedieval struggles betweenChristians andMuslims).49 Theterms “affirmer” and “denier” are better, since these are neutral with regard to thequestionofrightopinionversusrightpractice.Anaffirmer(āstika)mightbeonewho“affirmsthevalueofritual”(Medhātithi),onewho“affirmstheexistenceofvirtueandvice”(Manibhadra),onewho“affirmstheexistenceofanotherworldafterdeath”(thegrammarians), or one who “affirms the Vedas as the source of ultimate truth”(Vijñānabhikṣu, Mādhava, etc.). The typical translations for the terms āstika andnāstika, “orthodox” and “heterodox,” succeed to a certain extent in expressing theSanskrittermsinquestion.Themoredetailedanalysisofhistoryofthetwoconceptspresented here points to the impossibility of fully capturing the ambiguity of theoriginal Sanskrit words. This should be no surprise, of course, since any act oftranslation strips the original words of some meanings and introduces newconnotations in their place. Keeping this inmind, I suggest the English expressions“affirmer”and“denier”asbetterapproximationsofāstikaandnāstika.

ĀSTIKAANDNĀSTIKAINTHELATEMEDIEVALPERIOD

UnlikeMādhavaandMadhusūdanaSarasvatī,Vijñānabhikṣuneverattemptedtowritea doxography Yet his systematic attempt to unify all āstika systems containsstrategies for limiting and ranking the truths of various systems of philosophy thatexhibitwhatmightbecalled “doxographicconcern.”The latemedievaldoxographiesof theAdvaitaVedāntins,structured inhierarchical fashion fromtheCārvākasat thebottom to the Advaita Vedānta at the top, display an unresolved tension. Thegradualist, hierarchical format of these texts conflicts with the binary āstika/nāstikadistinction. In these texts, we see two different strata of ordering principles. Thehierarchical progression of schools appears in the sixth-century Maṇimēkalai ofCāttaṉār and likely has its origins in earlier doxographical models. Although the

āstika/nāstikadistinctionisprobablyevenolder, itsoriginsarenot indoxographybutinVedic ritualists’ concernsabout normativebehavior.Even though theyheap scornon the nāstikas (even associating them in the Prasthānabheda with foreignbarbarians), the late medieval doxographies ultimately cannot justify the qualitativebreakbetweenthehighestofthenāstikaschools(typicallytheJainas)andthelowestof theāstikas. Attempts at justification for this break are sometimes based on theāstikasbeing “external to theVedas” (vedabāhya).More typically,noexplanation isgiven. By the sixteenth century the term nāstika had become a frozen categorydenotingmaterialists,Buddhists,andJainas.Authorsavoidexploringthelogicbehindthis distinction. But as Mādhava suggests, the Buddhist and Jaina doctrines aresuperior to thematerialists and canbeunderstoodas thebeginningof adialecticalprocess in which each lower doctrine is sublated by the next.50 Contrary toMadhusūdana’sassertioninthePrasthānabheda,then,someofthenāstikadoctrinesdoserveahumanend,astheyactaspreliminarystagesonthewaytotheultimatetruth.Vijñānabhikṣu’s project of theunificationofāstika doctrinal systemsholds out the

possibility of resolving this conflict if it can illustrate why nāstika doctrines have noplace in the human effort to reach ultimate truth and liberation. Vijñānabhikṣufrequently deploys the terms āstika and nāstika in his writings, often at criticalmoments when he must distinguish between insiders and outsiders in his generalscheme. The nāstikas he is most concerned with refuting are the Buddhists,especially theschoolshecallsŚūnyavāda (Madhyamaka,alsoknownas theschoolofemptiness)andVijñānavāda(Yogācāra,alsoknownasMind-only).51Hisinterestinthe Vijñānavāda is especially interesting, since he associates the Buddhist school’spositionoftheillusorynatureoftheworld(māyāvāda)withtheschooloftheAdvaita.Refutingone,hesays,refutestheother.52ItisthisidentificationbetweentheAdvaitaVedāntaandaBuddhistschoolthatallowshimtovilifytheAdvaitinssothoroughly.Ifthe Advaitins were real āstikas, logic would force Vijñānabhikṣu to admit that theirteachings possess some kind of preliminary value, like the Naiyāyikas. AdvaitaVedānta is theonly school thatVijñānabhikṣusinglesoutasnāstikas masqueradingasāstikas,anindicationofhisextremeantipathytowardthatschool.53Vijñānabhikṣu does not use the word āstika as often as nāstika, and he uses it

mainlywhen acknowledging that despite appearances, all theāstika schools’ viewscanbereconciledandnonelackauthoritywhenunderstoodaslimitedtotheirproperscope of inquiry. In thisway, Vijñānabhikṣu tries tomake sense of a very troublingpassage from thePadma Purāṇa that lumps numerous āstika systems in with thenāstikas, labeling them all as teachings of “darkness” (tāmasa), which by merelyhearing thiscandestroy thewise.54 Itmakessense that theBuddhists, Jainas,andCārvākasareincludedinthislist.ButtheinclusionofSāṃkhya,Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,andPūrvaMīmāṃsā creates difficulties forVijñānabhikṣu’s project of unifying theāstikaschools. In this regard, the Padma Purāṇa’s presentation of schools is morereminiscentoftheVedāntins’ŚarṇkaraandBhāskara’stake-no-prisonersapproachtotherefutationofSāṃkhyaintheeighthcentury.Inordertoframethisquotationfrom

thePadmaPurāṇaproperlyVijñānabhikṣudeclares,

Oritmaybethatinordertoimpedetheknowledgeofthosewhoarewicked,incertainpartsofthebelievers’systems(āstikadarśana), teachingshavebeensetdown thatarecontrary toscripture.Thesesystems lackauthorityjustinthoseparts.Butontheirmaintopics,whicharenotopposedtorevealedscriptureortraditionaltexts,theyareauthoritative.OnlyonthisgroundisthePadmaPurāṇajustifiedinitscriticismofallschoolsotherthanVedāntaandYoga.55

VijñānabhikṣudepictseachoftheāstikasystemsotherthanVedāntaandYogaasperforming a double function. Their teachings are designed both to aid the good intheir quest toward liberationand tohinder thewicked inwhatever their goalsmightbe.Forexample,Nyāya’steachingofthesoulasexperiencingpleasureandpainandSāṃkhya’s teachingof thenonexistenceofGodaredesigned toaid thepractitionerwho is not yet fully advanced enough for the complete āstika teachings. Theseteachings should instead be understood as a “temporary concession”(abhyupagamavāda)usedtokeepthegoodbutconfusedfromstrayingfartherfromthepath.56False teachingsalsoserve the functionofdeluding thewicked,muchasVisnudeludedthedemonsbydisguisinghimselfastheBuddha.57Itisunclearwhetherasingle falsedoctrinecansimultaneously function inbothways fordifferentgroups.For instance,couldtheBuddha’steachingofno-self(anātman),whichhadsuchdireconsequences for thedemonsof theVisnuPurāṇa, alsohaveaproductive functionfor other listeners? It is conceivable that itwould help theegotistical let go of theirattachmenttoanephemeral,falseselfandinsteadpavethewaytowardacompleteunderstanding of the true, eternal self. These speculations are academic, given thesimple way to avoid relying on the potentially misleading teachings of the āstikaschools.Bybecomingfamiliarwiththeproperscopeofeachsystem’sauthority, it iseasytoignorethosestatementsthatfalloutsideeachsystem’sproperpurview.Thisrequires the guidance of an exegete such as Vijñānabhikṣu, who can instruct hisaudienceastowhichinterpretationsofscripturearevalidandwhichareerroneous.Itis remarkable that even in his commentary on the Sāṃkhyasūtras, Vijñānabhikṣuevaluatesdoctrinesprimarilybywhethertheycontradictrevealedandtraditionaltexts(śrutiandsmrti).Vijñānabhikṣu showshisVedāntic roots by repeatedly returning totheideathattruthisamatterofcorrectscripturalinterpretation.Ihaveargued that “orthodox”and “heterodox”arepoor translationsofāstikaand

nāstika. Nonetheless, it can be a useful thought-experiment to apply the threeChristian heresiological terms “orthodox,” “heterodox,” and “heretical” to thepremodern Indiansituation.ForVijñānabhikṣu, theonlycompletely “heretical”schoolisAdvaitaVedānta.Itisanāstikaschool,aschoolthatclaimstheVedaasitssourcebutcompletelymisinterpretsscriptureandthereforeleadstothedestructionofthosewhochooseit.Theotherāstikaschoolscontainteachingsthatmightbedescribedasheretical, but Vijñānabhikṣu chooses to deemphasize this, instead stressing theirpositiveuses.Themajordifferencebetween IndianandChristianheresiology in thisregardisthatwhereasmedievalVedāntinswerelikelytofocusonthepartsofNyāyaand Sāṃkhya that were free from error, Christian heresiologists maintained that a

singledropofdoctrinalerrorwouldirrevocablytaintanentireschool.Followersofthelesserāstikaschoolsmightstillobtainliberationinthisorfuturelives,butamemberof a heretical Christian sect squanders his or her only opportunity to reach thekingdomofheaven.ForVijñānabhikṣu,“heterodoxy”correspondstothenāstikaviewsheoutlines.Althoughheisdismissiveoftheseviews,Vijñānabhikṣuregardstheerrorof the Advaitins’ heresy as far more urgent than the mistakes of the heterodoxBuddhists.AsappliedtotheIndiancontext,“orthodoxy”doesnotrefertoanyschoolthat calls the Vedas a valid means of knowledge but to only those schools thatcorrectlyinterprettheVedas.ForVijñānabhikṣu,theonlyfullyorthodoxāstikaschoolsare the Vedānta and Yoga. Although he is heavily influenced by the Sāṃkhya andNyāya schools, they contain elements of “heresy” and thus cannot be calledcompletelyorthodox.Although the terms “orthodoxy,” “heterodoxy,” and “heresy” are not native Indian

categories, they can be used in such a thought-experiment. Together, these termsofferaslightlymorenuancedconceptualschemethatcanbeusedtoreanalyzesomeoftheinstabilitiesinthebinarypairāstika/nāstikaasitisconceptualizedintheworksof Vijñānabhikṣu, Mādhava, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Although Vijñānabhikṣu’sargument of the unity of all āstika schools holds out the promise of resolving theambiguitiesarising inMādhava’sandMadhusūdana’sexplicitlyhierarchicalschemes,ultimatelyhetooreliesonhierarchicalclassificationtoreconcileexplicitcontradictionsamongtheāstikaschools.ForMādhavaandMadhusūdana,onlytheAdvaitaVedāntaschool can properly be described as “orthodox,” yet for Vijñānabhikṣu bothBhedābhedaVedāntaandYogaare free from interpretiveerror.These twoschoolseachaddressdifferenttopics.Vedāntaistheonlyschoolthatcompletelyrevealsthehighest knowledge, the nature of Brahman, whereas the practices outlined in theYogaschoolare themost immediatemeans to liberation fromthecycleofbirthanddeath.Sinceneitherschoolimpingesontheotherormakeserroneousclaimsbeyonditsproperscope,bothqualifyasorthodox,thatis,asnon-hereticalāstikaschools.Madhusūdana’sandMādhava’s concernwithexcludingnāstikas datesback toan

earlier stage of Vedic ritualism. Although they uphold the structure of theāstika/nāstika distinction, the logic behind the distinction disappeared with theVedāntic reinterpretationof theVedas’ function.Hence,MadhusūdanaandMādhavastruggle to explain why the threat from nāstikas is so grave. Furthermore, thehierarchical structure of their doxographies undermines the binary separation theystrive tomaintain.Despite theirdenigrationof theBuddhists, thisstructure inevitablymakes Buddhism a preliminary step toward ultimate truth, and therefore Buddhismcannot be depicted as completely useless. Vijñānabhikṣu primarily relies on thecategoryofnāstikaasapolemical toolagainstahereticalschool thatportrays itselfas āstika while secretly propagating Buddhist views. His arguments in theSāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣyaagainstBuddhismareanextensionofhispolemicsagainstAdvaitaVedānta.Whileheavoids the instabilities inherent in thedoxographicgenre,he too uses hierarchical categories to subordinate the Nyāya and Sāṃkhya toVedānta and Yoga. For Vijñānabhikṣu, the differences between Nyāya, an āstika

school,andBuddhism,anāstikaschool,arequantitative,notqualitative.Bothschoolscontain misleading teachings, and although Buddhism contains many more, he isforcedtoadmitthatevenitisnottotallycorrupt.Therefore,thedoorremainsopentoargue that Buddhism, Jainism, and even the schools of the barbarians (mlecchas)functionasapreliminarysteptowardthehighesttruthofVedānta.Noneofthepremoderndoxographersisboldenoughtowalkthroughthatdoor,to

suggestthatthebarbariansects,suchasChristianity,Judaism,andIslam,areusefulon the path toward knowledge of Brahman. But these three latemedieval thinkerspavedthewayfornineteenth-andtwentieth-centuryinnovatorssuchasVivekananda,Aurobindo, andRadha krishnan,who transformedVedānta into a global philosophy.Radha-krishnan portrays it as the essence of Hinduism or even as the essence ofreligion:“Vedāntaisnotareligion,butreligionitselfinitsmostuniversalanddeepestsignificance.”58Manyrecentstudieshavepointedtoan“inventionofHinduism”duringthenineteenthcentury.ThesestudiestypicallyportrayRadhakrishnanandotherNeo-Vedāntins as alienated from the past, inauthentic representatives of a Sanskriticintellectual tradition towhich theyhad littleaccess.While there issome truth in thisdepiction, this thesis exaggerates the role of colonialism in the creationof a unifiedHinduphilosophicalmessage.ItistothesemodernheirsofVedānticdoxographythatIturninchapter10.

[10]HINDUUNITYANDTHENON-HINDUOTHER

INCLUSIVISMANDHINDUTOLERATION

ThetendencyofthinkersinIndiatocreatehierarchiesofsystemsofbelief,withtheirownaffordedthehighestposition,wasnotspecifictothelatemedievalperiod.Manyscholars have remarked on this tendency toward assimilation throughout Indianhistory, such as in the Purāṇas’ attempts to portray the Buddha as an avatar ofVisnu.1 Sri Aurobindo writes candidly that “[Hinduism] is in the first place a non-dogmatic inclusive religion and would have taken even Islam and Christianity intoitself, if they had tolerated the process [my emphasis].”2 This tendency to absorbphilosophical,theological,andculticdiversityaspartofalargerwholeissubstantiallydifferent from the “toleration” sometimes cited as one of Hinduism’s essentialfeatures.AspresentedbyEuropeanliberaltraditionsfollowingJohnLocke,tolerationinvolves the privatization of theological claims. Each sect is treated equally andallowed to thrive or wither on its own without either the support or censure of alaissez-faire state.3 The citizens of the state are likewise expected to tolerate theprivate religious convictions of others, with the understanding that these others willalsoallowthemfreedomofworship.4Vivekananda,forinstance,wasamodernHindureformerwhorecognizedthelimitationsofthediscourseoftolerationandtaughtthatthe trueHinduattitude isanactiveembraceofother religionsandgods.5 Theword“inclusivism,”popularizedinHindustudiesbyPaulHacker,isabetterapproximationofthe process in India bywhich amultitude of various sects, philosophies, gods, andmodes of worship are united under a single overarching concept, whether the latemedievalideaofsixāstikadarśanasorthemoderntermHinduism.Thephenomenonof inclusivism was also a way of establishing a hierarchy of gods in a polytheisticsociety.IntheBhagavadGītā,KrsnaexplainsthatheistheprimordialGod(ādideva)andtheGodofthegods(devadeva).6Heistherecipientofallsacrifices:

Whendevotedmensacrifice

tootherdeitieswithfaith,theysacrificetome,Arjuna,howeveraberranttherites.Iamtheenjoyerandthelordofallsacrifices;theydonotknowmeinreality,andsotheyfail.7

When Kṛṣṇa later reveals his true form to Arjuna, Arjuna sees that Kṛṣṇa is thewholeandtheothergodsarehisparts:

Iseethegodsinyourbody,OGod,andhordesofvariedcreatures:Brahmā,thecosmiccreator,onhislotusthrone,alltheseersandcelestialserpents.8

Kṛṣṇa is the supremeGod insofar as all the other gods depend on him for theirexistence. In thisscheme, theothergodsdoexist,albeitmerelyaspartsofKṛṣṇa.Seen in itssociohistoricalcontext, thestrategyof inclusivismallowedworshippers inan extremely pluralistic theological environment to coexist and acknowledge oneanother’s gods, though typically not as equals. For the Vaiṣṇava, all the benefitsbestowedon theworshipperofŚivacomeultimately fromVisnu.And for theŚaiva,thefruitsofdevotiontoVisnuhavetheirultimateorigininŚiva.TheĪśvaraGītā(SongofLordŚiva),a later text thatreworkscentral themesof theBhagavadGītā fromaŚaivapointofview,illustratesinclusivism’sreciprocality.InthistextŚivaproclaims,“Iamtheenjoyerofallsacrificesandtheonewhobestowstheirfruits.Takingtheformof all theGods, I am everywhere, the self of everyone.”9 Usingmany of the samewords and concepts, Śiva and Krsna each announce that the other god is just amanifestationofhimself.Paul Hacker, a scholar of Vedānta and apologist for RomanCatholicism, argues

that the rhetoric of “Hindu tolerance” is little more than a disingenuous attempt tosubordinate Western religions to Hinduism. He sees exclusivism as admirablystraightforward and free from the type of rhetorical ploys found in modern Hinduapologetics. Because “toleration” is a misnomer, Hacker proposes the alternativeterm“inclusivism,”whichhedefinesas“claimingfor,andthusincludingin,one’sownreligion what really belongs to an alien sect.”10 Hacker makes particular historicalclaims about inclusivism, asserting that it is a uniquely Indian form ofAuseinandersetzung and typically the result of feelings of inferiority11 According toHacker, “the most outstanding example” of inclusivism comes from Tulsīdās, thesixteenth-centuryauthoroftheRāmcaritmānas:

InBanaras,acityinwhichthecultofŚivawaspredominant,heproclaimeddevotiontoRāma.Hisingenioussafeguard against possible hostility from the alien sectwas his teaching thatworship of Śivawas all right,becauseŚivahimselfwastheforemostandnoblestworshipperofRāma.InthiswayTulsīdāsdidnotencroachon the religion of Śiva but claimed it in its entirety for his own. It seems that this method was employedespeciallybysuchreligiousgroupsasfeltthemselvesinferiortotheirenvironment.12

Like some othermodern Indologists, Hacker sees the concept of Hinduism as arecent phenomenon, andmodern claims of Hindu unity as a “fiction.”13 Hinduism isnothing more than a “collective label” (Sammelbezeichnung) created by Westernscholarstofindaconvenientwayofdescribing“theinnumerable,partlyrelated,partlydivergentreligiousphenomenaofonegeographicalandhistoricalregion.”14Inmanyofthese claims, Hacker is guilty of generalizing features of modern Hindu-Christianpolemics topremodern Indianhistory.But the term“inclusivism” isusefuldespitehisuseofthetermtocriticizeHinduismingeneralandwhathelabels“Neo-Hinduism”inparticular.Hackermaybecorrectthatinthemodernperiod,Hindususedinclusivisticstrategies todefend their religion frommissionaries’ attempts toproveChristianity’ssuperiority.ButthroughoutIndianhistory,suchstrategiesalsowereusedasatoolforassimilation from a position of strength, such as in ongoing attempts to absorbJainism,Buddhism,andevenSikhismintoHinduism.15Hackercoinedtheproblematicterm“Neo-Hinduism”todistinguishthinkerssuchas

Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, and Gandhi from “surviving traditionalHinduism.”Hemakes little attempt to conceal his dislikeofNeo-Hinduism,whichhedescribes as “stillborn” and as having lost all continuity with earlier forms ofHinduism.16 Although both “Neo-Hindus” and “traditionalHindus” practice inclusivism,Hacker maintains that only traditional Hindus were able to do so while retainingHinduism’s previous vitality.17 If, as Hacker insists, “Hinduism” is an invention ofmodernscholarswithoutanypremodernequivalent, then the label “Neo-Hinduism” isdoublymisleading.While “Neo-Vedānta”maybeuseful tocall attention to importantdifferences between modern Vedānta thinkers such as Vivekananda andRadhakrishnan and their premodern precursors, “Neo-Hindu” serves as little morethan a pejorative. A more serious problem is Hacker’s definition of the term“inclusivism,” as “claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own religion what reallybelongs to an alien sect.”18 His definition presupposes that the actual boundariesbetween religions are clear and self-evident and that historians are the properadjudicatorsofeachreligion’struebelongings.DoesthisapplyequallytotheChristiantheology’s illicit borrowing of the theological concepts of the immortal soul and theinfinityofGodfromGreekphilosophy?SuchconceptsarenotfoundinChristianityinitspure,Semitic,pre-Hellenizedform.Thewidespreadtendencyof“claimingforone’sown what really belongs to another” is a primary means of change, growth, andinnovationinallphilosophicalandtheologicaltraditions,notjustinHinduism.Hacker’sdefinition of inclusivism thus shows his deep historicist biases, which lead him tocondemnHinduinnovationsofthemodernperiodasinauthentic.Moreover,Hacker’sportrayalofinclusivismasauniquelyIndianphenomenonisthe

workofaChristianpolemicist,notanimpartialscholarofIndianreligions.Inclusivism

is a tendencymorewidespread in Hinduism than in Judaism,Christianity, or Islam.But it appears in the religions of the book as well, for example, in the ChristianinclusivismofNicholas ofCusa andKarlRahner.19 Hacker’smyopic focus onHinduinclusivism also obscures widespread exclusivist trends in pre-twelfth-centuryHinduism, such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s rejection of Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra,Pāśupata, andBuddhist interpretations ofdharma. It is best to think of exclusivismand inclusivism as existing side by side in a variety of different traditions. The latemedieval thinkers discussed in this book exhibit marked inclusivist tendencies, butnone is a thoroughgoing inclusivist. In all the examples from premodern India that Ihave cited, ultimately a line is drawn between insiders and outsiders, āstikas andnāstikas.The reversesideofVijñānabhikṣu’s inclusivisticattitude toward theschoolsof the

affirmers(āstikas)ishisexclusivisticrejectionoftheschoolsofthedeniers(nāstikas).Vijñānabhikṣu’s exclusivism regarding one school in particular, the Advaita Vedānta,has earned him even more notoriety than his views on the God of Sāṃkhya andYoga.20 In contrast, Vijñānabhikṣu’s critiques of Buddhists and Jainas have hardlymerited any comment, since his negative attitude was widely shared by the otherāstika schools.21 When discussing the Buddhists and Jainas, Vijñānabhikṣu reliesheavilyon thedistinctionbetweenāstikaandnāstika. Inspiteofhis “differenceandnon-difference” stance toward the multiple āstika schools, non-difference does notcome into play when discussing the nāstikas. Vijñānabhikṣu’s charge that AdvaitaVedāntins are “crypto-Buddhists” (pracchannabauddhas) assimilates Advaita toBuddhism and, by extension, argues that the Advaita is actually a nāstika school.Vijñānabhikṣu’sprimaryneed for thecategoryofnāstika isasawayofdenigratingAdvaita. He spends little time in polemics against the other groups of deniers.AlthoughVijñānabhikṣunowheretheorizesaboutthebasisororiginsofthedistinctionbetweenāstikaandnāstika, it is nonetheless central to his project: the categoryofāstika is ultimately meaningless without an opposite. He believes that certaindoctrines are simply beyond all acceptability and serve no positive function. Thecategoryofnāstika isessential tohim in findingaplace forsuchgroupsasAdvaitaVedānta.Vijñānabhikṣu’s near-contemporaryMadhusūdanaSarasvatī clearly articulates the

connection between the project of the inclusion of āstikas and the exclusion ofnāstikas.HeimplicitlydrawsonManusmrti2.11,whichdefinesanāstikaasa“revileroftheVeda.”ForthelatemedievalVedāntins,“revileroftheVeda”hadcometomeana reviler of the doctrines taught in theVeda. The understanding of a “reviler of theVeda” as onewho reviles thepractices of theVedahadbeeneclipsed, just as thenormsofpracticeenjoinedbytheVedahadbeeneclipsedbylatermodesofworshipandastheMīmāṃsāhadbeeneclipsedbytheVedānta.AccordingtoMadhusūdana,

Those[āstika]sagescannotjustbeconfused,sincetheyareomniscient.However,theaccesstohumanmoralends isnot immediatelypossible for thosewhoarepreoccupiedwithexternalobjects.Thesages teach thevarious systems so that such people will not become deniers (nāstikas). Not knowing the true purport(tātparya)ofthesages,peoplefollowthosevariouspaths,graspingforendsthatarecontrarytotheVedasand

overlookingthetruepurportoftheVedas.22

Sanskrit doxographers in the late medieval period were concerned with theconcordance of the āstika systems in a way that pre-twelfth-century authors werenot.Thecorollaryof thiswasan increasingconcernwithandsystematizationof thecategory of nāstika. According to both Madhusūdana and Vijñānabhikṣu, merelyacknowledgingtheVedas’authorityisnotenough;onemustalsointerprettheVedascorrectly without “overlooking the true purport.” Vijñānabhikṣu’s critique of theAdvaitins is that they do just this, misinterpreting the Upaniṣads to say that thephenomenalworldisanillusion.

DECODINGLATEMEDIEVALDOXOGRAPHY

By the latemedieval period, of course,Buddhismwas virtually nonexistent in India,and Jainism hardly a threat. Therefore, the need to use inclusivistic or syncreticmeans to unify āstika doctrines would have been less, not more, urgent. So whywould thinkers of the latemedieval period havebeenmore concernedwith definingtheboundariesoforthodoxythantheirpredecessorshadbeenintheclassicalperiod?Vijñānabhikṣu is often labeled by hismodern detractors as a “syncretist.” Although“syncretism” in modern English usage refers to the merging of religions orphilosophies thatareproperly separate, theoriginalGreek termsynkrētismós usedbyPlutarchmeantsomethingdifferent.ItreferredtoacustomofpeopleontheisleofCrete to overcome local feuds and to form a sacred alliance in order to withstandforeignaggression.23Could thisputtingasideof intramuraldifferences in the faceofan external threat have been the fundamental impulse that led to attempts to unifyāstikaknowledge-systemsand findprincipledreasons toreject thenāstikas? If so,what was the particular threat that led to the synkrētismós in the medieval Indianexample?Theobviousanswertothisquestion—thesinglemostpronouncedhistoricalchange

betweentheeighthandsixteenthcenturies—wasthemigrationofMuslims into Indiathat led to the eventual political domination of northern India, first by the DelhiSultanate (1206-1526) and later by the Mughal Empire (1526-1707). Living in latemedieval northern India as subjects of the Mughal Empire, Vijñānabhikṣu andMadhusūdana Sarasvatī must have encountered Islam. There is even a widelydisseminatedstoryofMadhusūdana’svisittoAkbar’scourtatFatehpurSikri.24YetinMadhusūdana’s Prasthānabheda (The Various Religious Sources), ostensibly anexhaustive catalog of all doctrines, Islam is never mentioned.25 Among Islamicintellectuals, Akbar andDārā Shikohwent to great efforts to try to understand thesystems of Indian philosophy, going so far as to translate the Mahābhārata,Rāmāyaṇa,Purāṇas,andUpaniṣadsintoPersian.26Butthoseontheothersidemadenoattempt to translatephilosophicaland theologicalworks fromPersianandArabicinto Sanskrit, indicative of a worldview that did not see any value or purpose ininterculturalor interreligiousunderstanding.27ForAkbarandother like-mindedrulers,

there was obvious practical benefit from creating a court religion that combinedHinduismand Islam.By creating a distinctively Indian religion incorporating symbolsthat resonated with all his subjects, Akbar might have been able to strengthenallegiances and solidify his support among groups that might have been uneasysubmittingtoaMuslimruler.Nosimilarutilityexistedfromthestandpointoftheśāstricscholars of that era. The traditions of Sanskrit grammar, Mīmāṃsā, andDharmaśāstra would have convinced them of the a priori uselessness of all extra-Vedic traditions. At the same time, though, among Sanskrit authors there was noexplicitideologicalresistancetoIslam.UnlikelaterHindunationalistintellectuals,whosometimes recorded their fantasies of heroic and violent resistance to Muslimoppression, Sanskrit intellectuals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuriesrespondedwithsilence.28Is itpossible that theCārvākas,Jainas,andBuddhists functionedasplaceholders

forIslaminlatemedievalSanskritdoxographies?Afterall,fivehundredyearsbeforeMadhusūdana and Vijñānabhikṣu wrote, the Buddhist philosophers had ceased toofferanymeaningfulcompetitiontotheschoolofVedānta.Whatcouldpossiblyhavebeen the use of vilifying a school that had disappeared almost completely from theIndian subcontinent?29 The answer to this question requires an understanding ofdoxographyasagenreandaspartofthelargerśāstricimaginary.Thefrustrationofmany modern scholars in dealing with the Indian doxographies comes frommisunderstanding theirpurpose.Thedoxographieswerenotempiricalaccountsofastate of affairs on which we can base reliable and comprehensive accounts of theIndian philosophical schools.Rather, theywere an idealized vision of the doctrines:clear,unambiguous,distinct,andprogressing inevitably from lower tohigher.This isevident in the earliest known doxographies. We see it, for instance, in the logicalprogression of schools in Maṇimēkalai from one pramāna (Lokāyata), to two(Buddhists), to six (Mīmāmsā), with only a passing concern with fidelity to eachschool’s actual position on the issue. In the classical period Buddhistpūrvapaksinshad been etched into the collective śāstric memory, and for that reason BuddhismwasgivenaparttoplayonlistsofdoctrineslongaftertheBuddhiststhemselveshadleft the stage. In this textual universe, the question “how was it the Buddhistsremained in the doxographic record long after they had ceased to exist on theground?” is based on a foreign understanding of doxography. A more relevantquestion might be, “Under what conditions might Buddhism be removed from thedoxographicrecord,andanotherdoctrine(e.g.,Islam)takeitsplace?”The purpose of doxography in Indiawas clearly not the cataloging of all existing

schoolsofphilosophicalthought,oralltheschoolsthathadexistedthroughouthistory.DespiteHaribhadra’s assertion that “there are only six schools of philosophy”30 andthe apparent promise of some doxographies’ titles to survey “all systems,” thesedoxographers knew quite well that there were other systems that fell outside theirdescriptivepurview.Thelatemedievaldoxographersnaturalizedastateofaffairsthatwas many centuries beyond their own historical situation, in what amounted to asuppressionof historical change.31 Only a fundamental shift in the understanding of

thepurposeofdoxographycouldhaveremoved theBuddhists fromtheir fixedplaceamong nāstika schools. They served an important function in doxography as theprototypical nāstika school, allowing āstikas to define themselves over and againsttheBuddhists.

THEABSENCEOFISLAM

Thenearlytotal lackofmentionofMuslimsinSanskrit textshasledsomehistorianstosuggestthattherewaslittlecontactbetweenSanskritintellectualsandMuslims,orif there was contact, there was no awareness of Islam as a religion or system ofbelief. Sanskrit texts were very late to adopt the wordmusulmāna, instead oftendescribingMuslimswith thenamesofother foreignerswhohadarrivedmore thanamillennium earlier: yavanas (Ionians) or śakas (Scythians).32 In other cases, theSanskrit authors were more accurate, labeling the foreigners they encountered asturuskas (Turks), yet they still did not acknowledge that many of these foreignersshared a single religious identity. Sanskrit intellectuals focused on their (imagined)placeof origin, not their beliefs. The logic ofmedieval Indian xenology followed thepatterns of doxography andśāstra generally, applying categories fromamillenniumearlier to changing sociocultural conditions without concern for their descriptiveadequacy.Medieval texts in Indian vernacular languages, however, offer ample evidence to

refute the idea thatmostmedieval Indianswereunawareof thegeneral tenetsofareligion shared by the group of people known as Muslims. That this conventionalwisdom has persisted for so long is an indication of a heavy reliance on Sanskrittexts, accompanied by ignorance or a lack of interest in works in other Indianlanguages.Inparticular,theevidencefrommedievalbhaktitextssuggeststhatHindusandMuslimswerequiteawareoftheirmutualdifferencesandevenindicatesalivelytradition of theological debate between the two groups. One remarkable text waswritten by theMarathi poet Eknāth (1553-1599). In this work,Hindu-Turk Samvād(DialogueBetweenHinduandTurk),EknāthexpressesanawarenessoftheMuslims’andVaiṣṇavas’differences inbothpracticeand theology.Hisgoal, like thatofmanyother latemedievalbhaktipoets,was to transcendsectariandifferences inorder torealizethetruthoftheoneuniversalGodworshippedbyallpeople,HinduandMuslimalike.Eknāth begins his work by proclaiming the oneness of all religions: “The goal is

one;thewaysofworshiparedifferent./Listentothedialoguebetweenthesetwo!”33Themiddlesectionofthetextdepictstwocharacters,aBrahminandaTurk,dwellingon theirmutualdifferencesandmockingeachother.TheTurksuggests,predictably,that Hindus engage in idolatry and demeanGod by portraying him as a keeper ofcows. The Brahmin responds: If God is omnipresent, why does He not exist instatues?

Turk:OBrahmin,listentowhatIhavetosay:

Yourscriptureisamysterytoeveryone.Godhashandsandfeet,yousay—Thisisreallyimpossible!

Brahmin:Listen,yougreatfoolofaTurk!SeeGodinalllivingthings.Youhaven’tgraspedthispointAndsoyouhavebecomeanihilist(śūnyavādka)34

The Brahmin labels his opponent with the remarkable Marathi epithet “nihilist”(śūnyavādka).Thispejorativetermhintsavestigialculturalmemoryofamuchearlierdebate between Vedāntins and Mādhyamika Buddhists. The Mādhyamikas, alsoknown inSanskrit asśūnyavādins,maintained the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā),teachingthatthereisnoultimatelyexistentreality,noGodorultimateprincipleservingasthefoundationoftheworld’sexistence.Thispassageshouldnotbeinterpretedasindicating that Eknāth really believes the Muslims subscribe to the same atheistdoctrinesastheMādhyamikaBuddhistsdo.Rather, thisword isanotherexampleofthe extraordinary adaptability of Indian terms used for othering. These words,emptiedofallhistoricalanddoctrinalspecificity,intimebecomelittlemorethanvaguepejoratives. This is what also happens to the term nāstika, whose meaning variedwidely across historical epochs, eventually becoming associated with foreigners aswell.EvenaMuslim,whoaffirmstheexistenceofasupremeGod,alifeafterdeath,andaspecificpathofethicalbehavior,canbeputinthesamecategoryasBuddhists.In Sheldon Pollock’s article “Rāmāyaṇa and Political Imagination in India,” he

illustratesanotherwaythatmedievalHindusemployedculturalmemorytocategorizeMuslims.HepointsoutthatinnumerousmedievalcommentariesandretellingsofthestoryofRāma,thedemons(rākṣasas)ofthestoryareidentifiedwithMuslims.35Forinstance,intheRāmāyaṇasectioninwhichthedemonVirādhaaskstobeburiedinapit after his death rather than cremated, two eighteenth-century commentatorsremark that the Muslims, “who are the rākṣasas of the Kali age, still follow thiscustom.”36 Pollock is particularly interested in medieval kings who fashioned theirpublic image in the likenessofLordRāma,using the text’snarrative logic toportrayMuslim opponents as demons. But demonization can be found in other contexts aswell. Cynthia Talbot notes that although there is little explicit use of royal symbolsfrom the Rāmāyaṇa in the medieval inscriptions of Andhra Pradesh, Muslims aredemonized inasimilarway37 Iwouldaddthat that themotifofone’sadversariesasdemons has very early roots in India. In particular, the portrayal of philosophicalopponentsasdemonsdatesbackat leastas faras theChāndogyaUpaniṣad.ThestoryoftheGodIndra,hisasura rivalVirocana,andtheir teacherPrajāpatiappearsat Ch. Up. 8.7.1-8.12.6. In order to test the pupils, Prajāpati teaches Indra andVirocanathatthetrueself(ātman)isnothingotherthanthebody.WhileIndrarejectsthis teachingandcomesbackagainandagain toPrajāpati toeventually receive thetruth,Virocana,delighted,sharesthisflawedteachingwiththeotherdemons.

Now, Virocana, his heart totally content, went back to the demons (asuras) and announced to them thiscorrespondence(upanisad):“It isthebody(ātman) thatoneshouldextol in thisworld. It is thebodythatoneshouldcarefor….Therefore,eventodaypeopleheresayofamanwhogivesnogifts,hasnofaith,andoffersnosacrifices:“Whatademonic(āsura)fellow!”38

This theoryof theselfcorresponds roughly to the recordedviewsof theCārvākamaterialists,whomaintainthattheselfisidenticaltothebodyandperisheswhenthebody perishes.39 The materialist school was widely reviled by other Indianphilosophers, including Jainas and Buddhists. But Buddhists and Jainas were notimmunefromdemonization;theRāmāyanaandPurāṇasdepictBuddhistsandJainasindemonicform.Vis.Pu.3.18tracestheoriginofBuddhismandJainismtothefalsedoctrinestaughtbyLordVisnutotheasuraswhothreatenedthegodsinbattle.Oncetheyhadgivenup their sacrifices andembraced the false tenets of oneof the tworeligions, they lost the powers they had gained through their austerities and weremassacred by the gods.40 Remarkably, this version of the story of Visnu’s Buddhaavatar has been all but erased from the culturalmemory ofmodernHindus. It hasbeenreplacedwithavagueacceptanceofthebasicvalidityoftheBuddha’steaching,andespeciallyhisteachingofnonviolence,asapositivephilosophicalcontribution.Vijñānabhikṣu’sworksarenotfreefromthelanguageofdemonization.Hisfavorite

myth is the tale of the churning of the ocean of milk to acquire the nectar ofimmortality.Hebeginsthreeofhisworkswithallusionstothemyth,andofcoursehiscommentary on the Brahmasūtras, the Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya (Commentary on theNectar of Knowledge), takes its name from the story. It, too, is a tale of strugglebetween the gods and demons. After the demons steal the nectar for themselves,Visnuassumes the seductive female formMohinī to trick thedemonsandkeep thenectaramongthegods.Thisisfollowedbyagreatbattleinwhichthegodsprevail.41In the benedictory verses of his commentary on the Brahmasūtras, Vijñānabhikṣumetaphoricallyidentifieshisactivityasacommentatorwiththechurningoftheoceanofmilk:

3.Thisnectarof knowledge,drawnoutbychurningof theseaofmilk that is thespeech of revealed texts, remembered texts, and reasoning, I offer toBrahmins topleasetheteacher.4.Havingdistributed thenectarandused theMohinī that isdiscriminativewisdom

tocheatthedemonswhoarebadarguments,letthosewhodesirenectardrinkthis.5. After Brahmins have drunk this and become strong, conquering the leaders of

thetroopsofdemonswhoaretheinfidels(pākhanda),maytheyreachtheabodeofthegreatteacherthroughknowledgeandritualaction.42

Bythelogicofthismetaphor,Vijñānabhikṣu’stextisitselfthenectarofimmortality.TheoriginaltellingofthisparticularstoryinthePurāṇasdoesnotcodetheasurasasBuddhists, Jainas,or infidelsgenerally.But this typeofdemonization is socommonthat when Vijñānabhikṣu follows the logic of his extended metaphor, demons are

alternatively “bad arguments” (kutarkas) or the infidels (pākhaṇḍas) whom theBrahminswillhavetofaceindebate.43LikemanytermsusedforotheringinmedievalSanskrit, the identity of the infidel is kept extremely vague, and in the Purānic andśāstric context inwhichVijñanabhiksu isworking, theBuddhists and Jainas are themost obvious groups that might fit this definition. Divining the intention behindVijñānabhikṣu’swords isultimately impossible.But there isevery reason tosuspectthat his readers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not confine thecategory of demonic Other to Buddhists and Jainas alone. Because of theadaptabilityandvaguenessofsuchcategories,manyreaderswouldhaveunderstoodthecategoryofpākhandatoapplyequallytoMuslims,whosemilitaryandideologicalthreat was a much more pressing concern than imagined verbal assaults fromBuddhistphilosophers.

HINDUISM:AMODERNINVENTION?

“Hindu” was not originally a Sanskrit word but a Persian term used byMuslims todescribe a regional or ethnic identity: the people living near the Indus, or Sindhu,river.44 Only at a relatively late date was the term adopted by Indians to refer tothemselves, typically as distinguished from outsider groups known as turuskas(Turks)ormlecchas (barbarians).CynthiaTalbothasrecordedtheearliestusageofthe word “Hindu” in an Indian language from inscriptions in mid-fourteenth-centuryAndhra, in which some Vijayanagara kings were described with the epithet “SultanamongHindu kings” (Hindu-raya-suratrana).45 Talbot cautions, though, that in theseinscriptions, “Hindumeant Indicasopposed toTurkish,not ‘of theHindu religion’asopposedto‘oftheIslamicreligion.’”46 InGaudīyaVaiṣṇavatextswritteninBengali inthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,“Hindu”wasoccasionallyusedtodistinguishnatives from yavanas ormlecchas.47 Although the context makes clear that theseforeignerswereMuslims,GaudīyaVaiṣṇavawriters did not state this explicitly untiltheeighteenthcentury,when the termmusulmāna fnally becamecommonusage inBengali.Inthiscasetoo,thewordmayhavedesignatedethnicitygenerallyandnotaspecificsetofreligiousbeliefs.Therarityofwordssuchas“Hindu”and“Muslim”hasledanumberofhistoriansto

conclude that Hinduswere not aware of fundamental religious differences betweenthe two groups. Even more remarkably, some historians claim that before thenineteenth century, there was no native understanding of a single unified Hindureligion.Perhapsthemost forcefulexponentof thisview isHeinrichvonStietencron.In an article entitled “Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the ModernConceptofHinduism,”hestateshisthesis:

Ithasbeenshownthattheterm“Hinduism”isarelativelyrecentone.Notonlyisthetermmodern,asIhopetoshowinthispaper,butalsothewholeconceptoftheonenessofHindureligionwasintroducedbymissionariesandscholarsfromtheWest….Historically,theconceptofHindureligiousunityisquestionablewhenappliedtoanyperiodpriortothenineteenthcentury.BoththereligiouspracticeandthetheologicaldoctrineofimportantHindureligioustraditionsgoagainstit.48

Fewscholarsdisputethattheword“Hinduism”wascoinedinthemodernperiod.49Stietencron, however, is arguing a much stronger thesis: before the nineteenthcentury,therewasnoideaofaunityofpracticeordoctrineamongthegroupslabeledin themoderneraas “Hindus.” Inhisarticle, he seeks toprove thisalleged lackofunity through his analysis of the Somaśambhupaddhati, a work on Śaiva ritualcompiledbythelateeleventh-centuryauthorSomaśambhu.ThisworkportraysallthereligioussubsectstodayincludedundertheumbrellaofHinduismasbeingdistinctandeven antagonistic. Somaśambhu says that if a person wishes to achieve liberation(mukti), he must be a member of one Śaiva sect. For other groups—includingBuddhists, Jainas, Bhāgavatas, Pāśupatas, Naiyāyikas, Sāṃkhyas, PūrvaMīmāṃsakas, and Vedāntins—the only opportunity for the highest liberation isconversiontoŚaivism.50Tothisend,theSomaśambhupaddhatidescribesaritualthatremoves the invisible mark (liṅga) on the person who follows one of these othergroups, allowing him to start over again, his karmic slatewiped clean, and able toearnritualmerit(puṇya)asaŚaiva.Stietencron’s analysis of the Somaśambhupaddhati proves that in at least one

eleventh-century textual community, there was little or no conception of a unifiedHindureligious identity.ButStietencronsuggests that theattitudeof this textcanbegeneralized toall groupsofpeople in India inall epochsuntil thenineteenth-centuryinvention of a unified Hindu religion by Europeans. To substantiate this very broadassertion, Stietencronwould need to cite a number of other texts, both earlier andlater, that persuasively reflect this same understanding of the disunity of “Hindu”religiousgroups.Moreimportant,hewouldneedtoshowthatpre-nineteenth-centurytexts that have been seen by others as postulating a unified Hindu or proto-Hinduidentitydonotactuallydoso.Withoutmuchmoreevidence fromarangeof texts inother time periods, the description of religious conversion to Śaivism in theSomaśambhupaddhatilendsitselftovarioushistoricalinterpretations,someofwhichdirectlycontradictStietencron’sassertion that “thewholeconceptof theonenessofHindureligionwasintroducedbymissionariesandscholarsfromtheWest.”The historian David Lorenzen has questioned the modern invention of Hinduism

hypothesis.Inhisarticle“WhoInventedHinduism?”LorenzenchallengesStietencron:

ThisessayarguesthattheclaimthatHinduismwasinventedorconstructedbyEuropeancolonizers,mostlyBritish, sometimeafter 1800 is false. The evidence instead suggests that aHindu religion theologically anddevotionallygroundedintextssuchastheBhagavadGītā,thePurāṇas,andphilosophicalcommentariesonthesixdarśanas,graduallyacquiredamuchsharperself-conscious identity throughtherivalrybetweenMuslimsandHindusintheperiodbetween1200and1500,andwasfirmlyestablishedlongbefore1800.51

To defend this thesis, Lorenzen cites examples from a number of late medievaltextsthatdoshowasenseofself-consciousreligiousidentityamonggroupswenowcall Hindu. While these authors did not use any equivalent of the term “Hinduism”(hindutā and hindutva are, of course, modern neologisms), they do show a clearunderstanding that those people known as Hindus shared religious practices thatdiffered from those of other groups, particularly Muslims. Lorenzen draws his

evidence from late medieval vernacular literature, including the poetry of Eknāth,Anantadās,Kabīr,andVidyāpati.Vidyāpati(early15thc.)understandsthattherearedifferencesbetweenHindusandTurks,andthatthesedifferenceshavetheirbasisinreligion.HeevenusestheApabhraṃśatermdhammeinthesenseof“religion,”muchastheworddharmafunctionsinmodernIndianlanguages:

TheHindusandTurksliveclosetogether.Eachmakesfunoftheother’sreligion(dhamme).Onecallsthefaithfultoprayer.TheotherrecitestheVedas.Onebutchersanimalsbybleeding.Theothercuts(offtheirheads)…TheTurkscoercepassersbyintodoingforcedlabor.GrabbingholdofaBrahminboy,theyputacow’svaginaonhishead.Theyrubouthistilakandbreakhissacredthread.Theywanttorideonhorses.Theyusericetomakeliquor.Theydestroytemplesandconstructmosques.52

InthispassageweseeakindofvilificationofMuslimssimilartothe“demonization”ofMuslimsdescribedbyPollock andTalbot.More important, here this vilification iscoupledwithadistinctsenseofaHindu religious identity,asense thatmostHindusshare a set of practices and that these practices contrastwith those of the Turks.Although these late medieval works most often identify religious similarity ordifferenceonthebasisofpractice,theyalsoacknowledgedifferencesofbelief.ManybhaktipoetscontrasttheHindubeliefthatGodexistsinall livingthings,animateandinanimate,withIslam’semphasisoniconoclasmandGod’stranscendence.Thecelebrated fifteenth-centurypoetKabīralsocomposednumerouspoems that

depict two distinct religious groups, Hindus and Muslims, engaged in theologicaldisagreement. Like many other nirguna bhakti poets, Kabīr ridicules both sects,faultingthemfortheirpettinessandpossessiveattitudetowardGod:

IfthemosqueistheplacewhereGodresides,thenwhoownstherestoftheland?Ramlivesinimagesandholylocations?—Thenwhyhasnooneeverfoundhimthere?Hindus,Muslims—Wheredidtheycomefrom?Whogotthemstarteddownthisroad?53

Kabīr’s neither-nor attitude toward the two religions is possibleonly if heandhisreaders perceive two sects that should be rejected, each presenting a distinct andunifiedsetof religiousclaims.KabīrhasbeenclaimedbybothmodernMuslimsandmodernHindustobeoneof theirown,whereasmodernsecularistsregardhimasaproto-secularadvocateofHindu-Muslimharmony.Butperhapsit isbettertoseehimasanequal-opportunityvilifierofthetwodominantreligionsoflatemedievalnorthern

India.Kabīr’sobjectwasnottodemonizeMuslimsbuttomockallthemanifestationsoforganizedreligionthathesawinthesetwocompetinggroups,bothofwhichfailtobringworshippersanyclosertoGod.54Theincreasingavailabilityoftranslationsofvernaculartextsfromthelatemedieval

period should finally put to rest the notion that there was no conception of aspecifically Hindu religious identity that differed from the beliefs and practices ofMuslims. Although early uses of the word “Hindu” in fourteenth-century inscriptionsseem to use the word in a geographical or ethnic sense, Cynthia Talbotacknowledges that ethnicity is a composite of many factors—including “language,costume,marriage customs and fighting styles”—someofwhich have their basis inreligiouspractice.55Justasobservationledtheauthorsofvernaculartextstoremarkondifferencesof foodordress,eventually it led toanappreciationof theprincipledreligious differences underlying some of themore superficial differences in custom.“Hindu”wasoriginallyanethnicdesignator.Buttheampleevidencefromfifteenth-andsixteenth-centurywritersshowsthatbythattime,theword“Hindu”hadbeenadoptedby vernacular-language authors and had in some contexts taken on a morespecificallyreligioussense.Although Stietencron would surely resist this idea, his analysis of the eleventh-

centurySomaśambhupaddhatiisaccidentalevidenceinsupportofLorenzen’sthesis.Both LorenzenandPollockmark the period shortly after theSomaśambhupaddhaticentury as a time of important shifts in Hindu self-representation. For Pollock, thetwelfth centurywas the beginning of the invention of a new tradition inwhich kingsbecame Rāma by adopting his symbols and applying them to their own historicalcircumstances.56ForLorenzen, theperiodbetween1200and1500was the time inwhich rivalry between Hindu andMuslim created a newly self-conscious identity ofHinduorproto-Hinduunity. In thisbook Ihave focusedonagroupof texts from thesame time period: philosophical works written in Sanskrit. The evidence frommedieval philosophy and doxography corroborates the thesis that Lorenzen hasadvanced. Before the twelfth century, the category of “affirmer” (āstika) is a blurryone, potentially admitting groups such as the Buddhists and Jainas, who affirm theexistence of worlds after death. But sometime during a critical period between thetwelfth and fourteenth centuries, the category of āstika began to harden into theclassification of the “six systems” as they are recognized today. At the same time,Buddhists and Jainas became permanently classified as “deniers” (nāstikas) ininfluential Advaita doxographies. Also in the late medieval period, the category ofnāstika underwent a subtle blurring with categories like “barbarian” (mleccha),allowing foreigners tobeclassed togetherwithBuddhistsandJainas.57ThisblurringalsoallowedtheepicandPurānicstrategiesof“demonization,”onceappliedsolelytoBuddhists,Jainas,andCārvākas,toextendtoforeigners,andespeciallytoMuslims.Philosophicalauthorswriting inSanskritdonotacknowledge Islamexplicitly.But theperceived threat of Islam motivated them to create a strictly defined category ofāstika philosophical systems, systems that professed belief in the authority of theVeda.Thiscategorywaslaterreformulatedaccordingtofurtherdevelopmentsinthe

nineteenth century and the medieval list of āstika darśanas became known as the“schoolsofHinduphilosophy.”

COMMUNALISM,UNIVERSALISM,ANDHINDUIDENTITY

Therearedangers inrecognizingtheexistenceofHindu-MuslimdivisionsinmedievalIndia.MygreatestconcernisthatmythesismightbetakenoutofcontexttosupportaHinducommunalistpoliticalagenda.RomilaThapar,amongothers,haspointedoutthecommunalists’needtopresentaunified,homogenousgroupidentity:

“Communal” … in the Indian context has a specific meaning and primarily perceives Indian society asconstituted of a number of religious communities. Communalism in the Indian sense therefore is aconsciousnesswhichdrawsonasupposedreligiousidentityandusesthisasthebasisforanideology.Itthendemandspoliticalallegiancetoareligiouscommunityandsupportsaprogrammeofpoliticalactiondesignedtofurther the interests of that religious community…. Such identity tends to iron out diversity and insists onconformity,foritisonlythroughauniformacceptanceofthereligionthatitcanbestbeusedforpoliticalends.58

Theratherarcanehistoricalcontroversyoverphilosophicalandtheologicalidentitiesin medieval India has ramifications for contemporary Indian political debates.ArgumentsforaHinduself-identityoraunifiedHindutheologicalvoiceinthemedievalperiodcanbeco-optedbyHinducommunalistpoliticalactors.59Accordingly,IsuspectthatapartofthemotivationofStietencronandotherstoassertthatHinduidentityispurely a nineteenth-century colonial construction is to weaken Hindu communalism.Forif“Hinduism”ismerelyanartificialconstructionthatoutsidersimposedonIndiansinthenineteenthcentury,simplistichistoricalnarrativesofmedievalHinduunityintheface ofMuslim oppression would be proved false. By acknowledging a process ofsynkrētismósbywhich latemedievalHindus formulatedanewreligious identityoverand against aMuslimOther, seeingmedieval history through a religious, communallensonceagainbecomespossible.The evidence presented in this book suggests that there was no single

understandingofwhatitmeanttobeaHinduinmedievalIndia.“Hinduunity”wasnotastructurecreated in the latemedievalperiodthathasexistedunchangedfromthatpoint to the present day. “Unifying Hinduism” is a process, not an entity. Indianintellectuals have been engaged in this process for at least seven hundred years.Althoughtheyoftenhaveagreedthatthisunityexists,thedemonhasalwaysbeeninthe details. We see a debate over the details of this unity in the confrontationbetweenAdvaitaVedāntinsandtheirBhedābhedavādaopponentsinsixteenth-centuryIndia. Although both groups provided hierarchical accounts of the āstika s chools,their understandings of themetaphysical groundofāstika unitywere very different.OnevisionofHinduunity, theAdvaitaVedāntaview,hascome todominatemodernHinduism. But Hindu philosophical minorities refuse to be silenced and continue toassertalternativeinterpretationsofwhatitmeanstobeaHindu.ThisevidenceofagraduallydevelopinganddeeplycontestedHindu identity in the

medievalperiodcannotbeusedtoreduceregionalpoliticalstrugglesinmedievalIndia

to a global Muslim-versus-Hindu clash of civilizations. Nor can it be adduced asevidence for Hindu communalist arguments that Muslims were engaged in religiousgenocideagainstHindusforexplicitlytheologicalreasons.AsThaparnotesregardingmedievalreligiousidentities,

Eventherecognitionofareligiousidentitydoesnotautomaticallyestablishareligiouscommunity….Clasheswhich on the face of itwould nowbe interpreted as betweenHindus andMuslims,would require a deeperinvestigationtoascertainhowfartheywereclashesbetweenspecificcastesandsectsandtowhatdegreedidthey involvesupportandsympathyfromothercastesandsects identifyingwith thesamereligionorseekingsuchidenity.60

Religious motivations for violent behavior by Muslims against Hindus and Hindusagainst Muslims in the medieval period cannot be ruled out, as Stietencron mightwish, on the grounds thatHinduismdid not exist.But formost incidents of violencebetweenHindusandothergroups,theevidencepointstomotivesmorepoliticalthantheological. This applies to the widely publicized destruction of Hindu temples byMuslims61 and also to the history of Śaiva violence against Jainas and Buddhists,oftenelidedbythosewhoseektoemphasizeHinduism’ssuperiorhistoryofreligioustoleration.62Despite textualevidencepossiblysuggesting thatHindussaw itas theirdutytowageholywaragainstdemonicfollowersoftheBuddhaandMahāvīra,thosestrugglestooweregroundedmoreofteninrealpolitikthaninreligiousprinciple.63The first way of classifying the Other in Sanskrit doxography is binary and

exclusivist. ItdeniesthatthedoctrinesoftheOtherhaveanyvalue,evenpreliminaryvalue,inachievingthegoalofliberationfromthecycleofdeathandrebirth.Thislogicunderlieseither-ordistinctionssuchas“affirmers” (āstikas)and “deniers” (nāstikas).Inextreme instances, thissame logichas led to the literaldemonizationofopposinggroups,asinVijñānabhikṣu’scodingofhisphilosophicalopponentsastheasuraswhoattempted to steal the nectar of immortality. The second way of categorizing theOther is hierarchical and inclusivist. It is the impulse leadingMādhava toportrayalldoctrines besides Advaita as preliminary means to a higher truth or leadingVijñānabhikṣu to suggest that Kapila taught Sāṃkhya to help those who were notready for the truth of God’s existence. Typically, these two modes, binary andhierarchical, coexist in latemedieval Indiandoxographies ina complexandunstablerelationship, both asserting and denying that theOther is completely different fromtheinsidersinone’shomecommunity.The inclusivistic logicofhierarchizationhas led tosomeremarkabledevelopments

inmodernHinduism,particularlyamongHacker’sso-calledNeo-Hindus.64WriterslikeVivekananda and Radhakrishnan, often criticized for their Westernized, inauthenticunderstandingofIndianphilosophicaltraditions,drewinlargepartonthehierarchical,inclusivistic tendencies exhibited in medieval Indian doxographies. Radhakrishnan’senunciation of Vedānta’s relation to the other branches of Hinduism is a modernreformulationofMādhava’sandMadhusūdanaSarasvatī’shierarchies:

AllsectsofHinduismattempttointerprettheVedāntatextsinaccordancewiththeirownreligiousviews.TheVedāntaisnotareligion,butreligionitselfinitsmostuniversalanddeepestsignificance….Whilenocreedsand

noscrupleswereforcedtodisappearasunsuitableoroutofdate,everyoneofthemdevelopedonaccountoftheinfluenceofthespiritoftheVedānta,whichisbynomeanssectarian.65

VedāntaistheessenceofHinduism.ButitismorethanthisforRadhakrishnan.Itisthe essence of religion itself, and the most promising foundation for “a universalreligionofwhich thehistorical faiths are but branches.”66 The religions of the book,despite their exclusivistic tendencies, are for Radhakrishnan also branches of thisuniversalfaith.Hefollowsthelogicofinclusivismtoitsabsoluteconclusion,extendingand universalizing Vedānta as a path for all human beings. Unlike Vijñānabhikṣu,whose inclusivism ends abruptly with a binary division between the āstikas andnāstikas suchasBuddhists (andcrypto-BuddhistAdvaitins), forRadhakrishnan truthandliberationareopentoalltheworld’smajorreligions.PaulHackerandHeinrichvonStietencronarecorrecttopointoutthatthistypeofuniversalismwasneverembracedby any school of Vedānta in premodern India. Yet the critics fail to acknowledgeRadhakrishnan’s fidelity to the underlying logic of inclusivism, which at its mostabstract level is a privileging of unity over difference, seeing all apparentcontradictionsaspartofahighersynthesis.Fromthishistoricalperspective,boththeuniversalizingtendenciesofNeo-Vedāntic

reformers and the demonizing tendencies ofHindu communalists have their roots inmedieval discourses of self and Other, of unity and difference. The unification ofHinduism is a continuing process as different groups struggle to define a Hinduessence and to tame the unruly excess of beliefs and practices today groupedtogetherasHindu.Hinducommunalismhasat its ideological foundation theneed tocompletely elide differences within specifically circumscribed Hindu parameters. Atthesametime, itexaggeratesdifferencesbetweenHinduandnon-Hindu,particularlywithregardtotheMuslimsandChristianswhohavereplacedBuddhistsandJainasinthe discourses that enable Hindu self-identity.67 Yet contemporary Hinduism alsocontains universalizing, globalizing tendencies: the global Hinduism of the heirs ofRadhakrishnanandVivekanandaisonethattranscendsnationalboundariesandthatunderstandsHinduphilosophicaltruthasalegacythatbelongstoallnationsequally68AsVivekanandawrote,“Noman,nonation,myson,canhateothersandlive;India’sdoomwassealedtheverydaytheyinventedthewordmlechchha[sic]andstoppedfromcommunionwithothers.”69Perhaps thereareevenstirringsofa thirdway,onethatacknowledgesdifferencesbetweenreligionsasreal(unliketheuniversalists)butsees these differences as potentially enriching Hinduism, rather than threatening todestroyit(asthecommunalistsdo).Theprocessof theunificationofHinduismcontinues today.SomemodernHindus

havefoundstrengthandsustenanceindiversity,acknowledgingthatdifferenceswithinHinduismultimatelyfrustrateallsystematicattemptstoportrayitasreducibletoanysinglephilosophicalsystem.Othershavedeniedthisdiversity,rewritingIndia’shistoryinanefforttopresentHinduismasatimeless,univocalindigenoustraditionthreatenedby foreign intruders. The dynamic tension betweenunity and difference has existedsince the beginning of philosophical speculation in India. Understanding the current

stateofHinduismanditsfuturepossibilitiesrequiresustodelvemoredeeplyintothispast.Most of all, as scholarswemust fight against theprojectionof contemporarypolitical ideologies onto Indian history in order to fully appreciate the riches of theintellectualtraditionsknowntodayasHinduism.

NOTES

1.INTRODUCTION

1.Forexample,“Thereisamightylawoflife,agreatprincipleofhumanevolution,abodyofspiritualknowledgeandexperienceofwhichIndiahasalwaysbeendestinedtobeguardian,exemplarandmissionary.Thisisthesanatanadharma,theeternalreligion”(AurobindoGhose2005[1909]:219).

2.Mishra(2009:20).PankajMishragivesthissummaryofthehypothesisofthemoderninventionofHinduisminareviewofWendyDoniger’sTheHindus:AnAlternativeHistory,failingtonotethatDonigerherselfhascriticizedthishypothesisastoosimplistic(Doniger1991a).

3.Formore,seeHobsbawmandRanger(1983).4. This thesis,which Idevelopatgreater length inchapter10, is largelyanelaborationonand restatementof

DavidLorenzen’sthesisinthearticle“WhoInventedHinduism?”(Lorenzen2005:53).5. yāny etāni trayīvidbhir na parigṛhītāni …

sāṃkhyayogapāñcarātrapāśupataśākhyagranthaparigṛhītadharmādharmanibandhanāni. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’sTantravārttika,commentaryonMS1.3.4,inAbhyaṅkaraandJośī(1970,2:112).Foranin-depthdiscussionofthispassage,seeEltschinger(forthcoming).

6. For instance, Vyāsa’s commentary onYS2.33 states that Vedic ritual specialists (e.g., Mīmāṃsakas) willaccruedemerit for theirperformanceofanimalsacrifices. Inthisregard, followersofYogaandSāṃkhyaarecloser to thenonviolent traditionsofBuddhismandJainism than toVedic ritualism.Formore, seeHalbfass(1983).

7. Stietencron (1995:60).AsStietencronpointsout, suchexclusivist textscontradict theoft-repeated idea thatHinduismbelievesallspiritualpathsarevalid.

8.InintroductiontoGarbe(1895:xiii).9.Ibid.,xiv10.Forexample,Rukmani(1981).11.OnVijñānabhikṣuasaVedāntin,seeRam(1995).12.Iprefer“affirmer”and“denier”astranslationsforāstikaandnāstika,respectively(seechapter9).13. Marx(1969[1853]:89).OnthequestionofhistoricalconsciousnessandpremodernIndia,seePollock(1989)

andHalbfass(1988:349–50).14.VedāntinsoftheeighthcenturyandearlierwereespeciallyconcernedwiththerefutationofSāṃkhya,aschool

widelyregardedasāstikabylaterdoxographers(Nakamura1989:473–74).15. Only one scholar disputes this, Udayavīra Śāstrī, who claimsVijñānabhikṣu lived in the fourteenth century

(Rukmani1981).16. P. K. Gode attempts to identify Bhāvāgaṇeśa as Bhāvaganeśa Dīkṣita, a Citpāvan Brahmin who lived in

Varanasiinthelatesixteenthcentury(Gode1944).Whilethisargumentisplausible,itisalsobasedonseveralconjectures. Names of two other students of Vijñānabhikṣu have been recorded: Prasāda Mādhava andDivyasiṃhaMiśra(Upādhyāya1994:36).

17. Gode puts Bhāvāgaṇeśa’s dates between 1550 and 1600 (Gode 1944:28); Śrīvāstavya claims 1583–1623(Śrīvāstavya1969:44).

18.Śrīvāstavya(1969:43);Rukmani(1981).19. Śrīvāstavya (1969:24). Suspiciously, Śrīvāstavya, a professor at the University of Allahabad, claims that

VijñānabhikṣulivedinAllahabad.20. For a chronology of Vijñānabhikṣu’s works, see Rukmani (1981:6–7). She does not list Vijñānabhikṣu’s

commentaryontheBṛhadāraṇyakaUpaniṣad,whichhasbeenrecentlyeditedbyNoriakiHosodabutdoesnotappearinmanuscriptcatalogues(Hosoda1998).VijñānabhikṣualsoclaimstohavewrittenatreatiseonNyāya,butithasneverbeenfound(Jha1995:125).

21.etenabhagavadgītāvyākhyāpekṣā‘piyāsyati/śabdādibhedamātreṇagītāyāarthasāmyataḥ//SeetheeditioninNicholson(2005:300).

22.ThepublishedworkistheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣya,whichhasbeenpublishedbothbytheChowkhambaSanskritSeriesOffice(1901)andmorerecentlybytheBenaresHinduUniversityPress(1979).

23. Although sometimes he cannot avoid these issues, such as his assertion of the existence of God in hiscommentaryontheatheisticSāṃkhyasūtras.

24.Bh.Pu.3.25.1–3.33.37.25.MadhusūdanaSarasvatī([16thc.ce]1850:23–24).26.Inparticular,seeHalbfass(1988:349–68)andQvarnström(1999).27. For a concise definition and summary of different types ofWestern doxographies, see Runia (1998) and

Mansfeld(2004).28.Rorty(1984:62).29.Runia(1999:34).30.CowellandGough(1978)andŚaṅkara(1983[14thc.ce?]).OnesuchlinkisPaulDeussen’spresentationof

Indian philosophical schools in his Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie (Deussen 1899). TheSarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha,adoxographyonceattributedtoŚaṅkara,isnowgenerallyacceptedtobeaproductofananonymousauthorbetweenthefourteenthandsixteenthcenturies(Halbfass1988:535;Pande1998:99–130).

31.Onthecategoryof“themystical,”seeKing(1999:7–34).32.Dyson(2006:309).33.Foronehistoryofsuchmix-and-matchcomparisons,seeTuck(1990).34.DonaldDavidson(2001)arguesagainstthecoherenceoftheideaof“radicallydifferentconceptualschemes”

betweenculturesorlanguages.ForacritiqueofDavidson,seeForster(1998).35.Theearly listofthe“sixschools”enumeratedbyCāttaṉārandHaribhadradiffersfromthelistofsixschools

madepopularbyhistoriansinthemodernperiod.36.Krishna(1991:14).37. The exception to this is the school of Advaita Vedānta. Although generally classified as an āstika school,

VijñānabhikṣuunderstandsitinrealityasaformofBuddhismandthereforeatoddswiththeāstikas.38.Rorty(1984:69).39. Besides references to him by his disciples, Vijñānabhikṣu is also cited by Puruṣottama, a Vedāntin in the

Vallabhacommentarialtradition(Smith2005:436).Vallabhahimselfwroteadoxographicalwork,theBālabodha,thatsharessomefeatureswithAdvaitadoxographies(Smith2005:422–24).

40. For example, “My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possiblyunderstandtheenormouslysystematicdisciplinebywhichEuropeanculturewasabletomanage—andevenproduce—theOrientpolitically,sociologically,militarily, ideologically,scientifically,and imaginativelyduring thepost-Enlightenmentperiod”(Said1978:3).

41. One such statement from Said acknowledges a real place, yet argues for its irrelevance for the study ofOrientalism: “There were—and are—cultures and nations whose location is in the East, and their lives,histories,andcustomshaveabruterealityobviouslygreaterthananythingthatcouldbesaidaboutthemintheWest.AboutthatfactthisstudyofOrientalismhasverylittletocontribute,excepttoacknowledgeittacitly.Butthe phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence betweenOrientalismandOrient,butwiththeinternalconsistencyofOrientalismanditsideasabouttheOrient(theEastascareer)despiteorbeyondanycorrespondence,orlackthereof,witha‘real’Orient”(Said1978:5).

42.Dirlik(1996:99).43. This trend includes the recent closing of two of the oldest Sanskrit programs in the Western world, at

CambridgeandBerlin.WhileSouthAsianStudiescontinuesatbothuniversities,thereisaclearefforttorecasttheirprogramsintermsofmodernSouthAsianstudies.

44.Cohen(2000:3).45.Onthedyadofreligious/secularanditsvexedplaceinSaid’sthought,seeAnidjar(2006).46.Burckhardt(1990[1860]:98).47.Ontheallegedly“dividual”natureofIndiansubjectivity,seeMarriott(1976).48. Davis (2008).On the readingof Indianhistory in termsofsucha lackof the featuresofmodernEuropean

consciousness,seeChakrabarty(2000:32).49.SeePaulHacker’stypologyinHalbfass(1995:229–52).50.OntheOrientalists’periodizationofIndianhistory,seePrakash(2000).51. Themost serious recent attempts to do constructive philosophyby looking for inspiration fromoutside the

EuropeanphilosophicalcanoncomenotfromcontinentalphilosophyorpostcolonialtheorybutfromanalyticalphilosopherssuchasMarkSiderits,DerekParfit,andJonardonGaneri.

52.Chakrabarty(2000:5–6).53.Onesuchideais“differenceandnon-difference”(bhedābheda),discussedatlengthinchapters2and3.

54.Forinstance,Smith(2004:241).55. This is the crux ofDonaldDavidson’s argument against radically different conceptual schemes (Davidson

2001:195–98).56. Richard King suggests that Buddhist philosophy, with its simultaneous insistence on the fragmentary and

impermanentnatureoftheselfanditsuniversalmessageofescapefromsuffering,offersonepossibilityforawayoutofthistheoreticalimpasse(King1999:198–99).

2.ANALTERNATIVEHISTORYOFVEDĀNTA1.Formore,seePrakash(1990:388).2. PaulDeussenwasperhaps themost influentialadvocateof thismodelof Indianculturaldegeneration (see

chapter7).3.ForonepresentationanddefenseofthisNaiyāyika“commonsenserealism,”seeMatilal(1986).4.Deussen(1912).OnthevarietyofphilosophicalteachingsontheselfpresentedintheearlyUpaniṣads,see

Black(2007:29–44).5.Forexample,Dasgupta(1922,3:105).6. “Bādarāyaṇa’s philosophy was some kind of bhedābhedavāda or a theory of the transcendence and

immanenceofGod(Brahman)”(Dasgupta1922,2:42).SeealsoNakamura(1989:500).7.Nakamura(1989:432–36).8.BS1.3.34–39arguesthatonlytwice-bornsareallowedtostudyVedānta.9.Dasgupta(1922,2:42);Nakamura(1989:489–90).10.aṃśonānāvyapadeśādanyathācāpi.Formore,seeNakamura’sanalysisofŚaṅkara(Nakamura1989:450).11.aṃśaivāṃśonahiniravayavasyamukhyo‘ṃśaḥsaṃbhavati(Śaṅkara1996[8thc.CE.?],1:829).12.Nakamura(2004:137).13.bhedābhedātmakaṃsarvaṃvastu(Nakamura2004:137).14.Nakamura(2004:139).NakamuratakesthislistfromĀnandagiri’ssummaryofBhartṛprapañca.15.tenāmarūpeavyākṛtesatīvyākriyamāṇetasmādetasmādātmanaākāśanāmākṛtīsaṃvṛtte.taccākāśākhyaṃ

bhūtaṃanenaprakāreṇaparamātmanaḥsaṃbhūtaṃprasannādivasalilānmalamivaphenam.nasalilaṃnacasalilādatyantaṃbhinnaṃphenaṃ salilavyatirekeṇādarśanātsalilaṃ tusvacchaṃanyaccaphenānmalarūpāt(Upadeśasāhasrī2.1.19inŚaṅkara1978[8thc.CE]:127);mytranslationisbasedonHacker’s(1949)Germantranslation.

16. With regard to thedepictionof theprocessofworld-creation inŚaṅkara’sUpadeśasāhasrī, Hackerwrites:“Dieses Bild veranschaulicht das Übergangstadium, in dem sich Śaṅkara zwischen der realistischenAuffassungderB.S.(nachderBrahman‘materielleUrsache’derWeltist)unddemausgeprägtenIllusionismusdesspäterenAdvaita(welchesdasBrahmanalsdasrealeSubstrateinerScheinmanifestation,vivarta, lehrt)befindet”(Hacker1949:19).

17.Rao(1996).18.OnBhāskara’sdates,seeNakamura(1989:65–72)andIngalls(1967:61).19. sūtrābhiprāyasaṃvṛtyā svābhiprāyaprakāśanāt / vyākhyātaṃ yair idaṃ śāstraṃ vyākhyeyaṃ tannivṛttaye //

(Dvivedin1903:1).20.Forinstance,RāmānujacriticizesAdvaitabysayingthatifonepersonisliberated,allshouldbeliberated,since

Advaitins believe the self is one, notmany. This argument also appears in Bhāskara’s commentary on theBrahmasūtras.

21.Tapasyananda(1996):174–83).TheMādhavawhowrotethishagiographyisprobablynotthesamepersonwhowrotetheSarvadarśanasaṃgraha.

22.sarvāpekṣācayajñādiśruter.ŚaṅkarainterpretsthisinawaydiametricallyopposedtothoseoutsidetheAdvaitatradition,includingRāmānuja,Vijñānabhikṣu,andthelike.

23.Forexample,BhG2.47,3.8.24.Forexample,Śaṅkara’scommentaryonBhG3.3–9inSadhale(1985:269–87).25.IhaveinmindthesortsofdifferencesinsocialconventionbetweenSmārtaandMādhvaBrahminsasdepicted

inU.R.AnanthaMurty’snovelSamskara(AnanthaMurty1978).26.Dasgupta(1922,3:108).27.Thisisanillustrationofthephenomenonof“proximatedifference,”inwhichsmalldifferencesbetweenclosely

relatedgroupsareoftenexaggeratedinordertomakesocialdistinctions(Cohen1985).28.Dasgupta(1922,3:101);Carman(1974:28–30).29. This is theprojectGerhardOberhammerundertakes inhisexcellentstudyofYādavaprakāśa(Oberhammer

1997).30.Oberhammer(1997:10).

31.Ibid.,14.32.Smith(1998)and(2005).33.Gupta(2007).34.Nicholson(2002:578–83).35.Itmightmakesensetounderstand“Bhedābhedavāda”asawidercategorythan“BhedābhedaVedānta,”sincea

thinker such as Kumārila seems to fall under the former rubric, but clearly not the latter (since he had noparticular interest inBrahman).However,since innormalusage these two termsaresynonyms, Iuse theminterchangeablytorefertoaparticulargroupofVedāntins.

36.Dasgupta(1922,3:194).37. Most of these recent studies havebeenon latemedieval theisticBhedābhedaVedānta, suchasFrederick

Smith’sworkonVallabha(Smith1998,2005)andRaviGupta’sonJīvaGosvāmī(Gupta2007).

3.VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU’SDIFFERCEAND“NON-DIFFRENCE”VEDĀNTA1. Alternatively, thewordbhedābheda can be analyzed as amadhyamapadalopin, a compound in which the

middletermhasbeenomitted:“non-difference[thatdoesnotexclude]difference.”Philosophically,however, itmakeslittledifferencewhetherthecompoundisadvandvaoramadhyamapadalopin.

2. Even if we take bhedābheda as a saptamī tatpuruṣa compound rather than as a dvandva ormadhyamapadalopin,themeaningofthecompoundwouldbe“identity-in-difference”ratherthan“difference-in-identity.” I take it that theWestern tradition is called “difference-in-identity” because difference is ultimatelysubsumedby identity, asamultiplicityof phenomenaareultimately shown tobeaspectsof a largerwhole.Therefore,“identity-in-difference”wouldmeansomethingsubstantiallydifferent.

3.VedāntaDeśika(1974[14thc.ce]:11).4.ForadefensefromcriticswhoclaimthatJainasviolatethelawofcontradiction,seeMatilal(1981:59–61).5.Bhāvāgaṇeśa(1969[16thc.ce]).6. A notable exception to this are so-called Neo-Vedāntins such as Vivekananda, who rank inference and

“immediateexperience”(anubhava)abovescripture.7. Nakamura argues that, contrary to common assumption, the “prior” Mīmāṃsā school is not meant as

chronologically earlier than theUttaraMīmāṃsā. Rather, the PūrvaMīmāṃsā is logically prior to theUttaraMīmāṃsā: all Vedāntins agree thatmastery of ritual is a prerequisite for study of the sections of the VedaconcerningBrahman(Nakamura1989:412).

8.ThisreferstotheAdvaitadoctrineoflimitationism(avacchedavāda),typicallyascribedtotheBhāmatīschoolofAdvaita.Onthismodel,Brahmanislikenedtospace(ākāśa)generallyandtheindividualselftoaspacelocatedinsideapot.Thepotisanartificiallimitingcondition(upādhi)thathasnorealeffectonthespacethatislocatedinsideofit,sinceinrealitythereisnodifferencewiththespaceinsideoroutsideofapot.

9. ādhunikās tu jīvabrahmaṇor akhaṇḍatayā jīve ‘pi brahmaśabdo mukhya eva ākāśaśabda iva ghaṭākāśe.jīvasyābrahmatvaṃ tvajñānakalpitam. tathāhi tat tvamasiahaṃbrahmāsmianena jīvenātmanā ‘nupraviśyanāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi nānyad ato ‘sti draṣṭā ity ādy abhedaśrutiśatebhyo jīvo ‘pi brahmaivacinmātratvāviśeṣāt. aíśvaryabandhayoś copādhidvayadharmatvāt. na ca dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyāsamānaṃ vṛkṣaṃ pariṣasvajāte nityo nityānāṃ cetanaś cetanānām eko bahūnāṃ yo vidadhāti kāmān. tamātmasthaṃye‘nupaśyantidhīrāsteṣāṃśāntiḥśāśvatonetaresāmātmanitiṣṭhanātmano‘ntaraḥsameātmetividyāt triṣudhāmasu yad bhogyaṃ bhoktā bhogaś ca yad bhavet. tebhyo vilakṣaṇaḥ sākṣī cinmatro ‘ hamsadāśivaḥ. ityādibhedaśrutiśatānupapattir iti vācyam aupādhikabhedānuvādakatvena tādṛśavākyopapatteḥ(Tripāṭhī1979:20).

10. tatrocyate abhedavākyānurodhena bhedavākyānām aupādhikabhedaparatvaṃ yathā kalpyate tathābhedavākyānurodhenābhedavākyānām avibhāgādilakṣaṇābhedap aratvaṃ kathaṃ na kalpyate.avirodhasyobhayathaivasambhavāt(Tripāthī1979:21).

11.Potter(1977:51–53).12. śrūyate cāvibhāgādirūpābhedo ‘ pi yathodakaṃ śuddhe śuddham ākṣiptaṃ tādṛg eva bhavati evaṃ muner

vijānata ātmā bhavati gautama na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato ‘nyad vibhaktam ityādiśrutiṣu. smṛtiṣu ca—avibhaktaṃcabhūteṣuvibhaktamivacasthitam/vyaktaṃsaevavā‘vyaktasaevapuruṣaḥparaḥ//ityādiṣu.pratyutāvibhā gādilakṣaṇābhedasya pāramārthikatayā tatparatvam evocitam. aupādhikabhedasya tumithyātvenatatparatvamnocitamiti(Tripāṭhī1979:21).

13. na cāvibhāgaparatve satyabhedaśabde lakṣaṇā ‘sti bhidir vidāraṇe iti vibhāge ‘pi bhididhātor anuśāsanāt(Tripāthī1979:21).

14.nanuyaetasminnudaramantaramkurute‘thatasyabhayaṃbhavatītyādiśrutau.tasyātmaparadeheṣusato‘pyekamayaṃhiyat/vijñānaṃparamārtho‘saudvaitino‘tathyadarśinaḥ // ityādismṛtaucabhedanindāśravaṇān

nabhedaparatvaṃ śrutīnāṃ sambhavatīti cen na abhedavākyānām avibhāgaparatayā bhedanindāvākyānāmapi vibhāgalakṣaṇamedaparatvāt pratipādyaviparītasyaiva nindārhatvāt. anyathā manasaivedam āptavyaṃneha nānāsti kiṃcana mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyatītyādiśrutisu jaḍavargeṣv apibhedanindanādabhedaḥsyāt(Tripāthī1979:22).

15.Usingthestrategyofrelativizingdifferenceandnon-differencetorefertodifferenttimesislogicallyindependentofVijñānabhikṣu’sprimarystrategyforreconcilingthetwo.Insomewaysitappearstobeanafterthoughtinhisdiscussion of difference and non-difference in VAB 1.1.2 and is likely borrowed from earlier Bhedābhedathinkers.

16. “Part” and “whole” refer to the self and Brahman. aṃśāṃśinoś ca bhedābhedau vibhāgāvibhāgarūpaukālabhedenāviruddhau.anyonyābhāvaścajīvabrahmaṇorātyantikaevatathāśaktiśaktimadavibhāgo‘pinityaevetimantavyam(Tripāṭhī1979:26).

17.OnidentityandmutualabsenceinNavya-Nyāya,seePotterandBhaṭṭacharyya(1993:18).18.Tripāthī(1979:26).19.SeeVijñānabhikṣu’sexplanationinGarbe1895:1.20. tasmād siddhau jīveśvarayor aṇśāmśibhāvena bhedābhedau vibhāgāvibhāgarūpau. tatrāpy avibhāga eva

ādyantayoranugatatvātsvābhāvikatvātnityatvāccasatyaḥ.vibhāgastumadhyesvalpāvacchedenanaimittikovikārāntaravad vācārambhaṇamātram iti viśeṣaḥ. tad evam ātmādvaitaṃ vyākhyātaṃ sāmānyatobrahmādvaitavākyāni ca tṛtīyasūtre vyākhyāsyāmaḥ. tad evam anyonyābhāvalakṣaṇabhedena jīvādatyantabhinnaeveśvarobrahmaśabdārthaitisiddham(Tripāṭhī1979:32).

21.aṃśonānāvyapadeśātanayathācāpidāśakitavāditvamadhīyataeke.22. Nakamura (1989:500).However,Nakamuraclaims that,basedon internalevidence from theBrahmasūtras

themselves,BādarāyaṇawasnottheauthoroftheBrahmasūtras(Nakamura1989:405–7).23.Śaṅkara(1996[8thc.CE]:728–29).24.Theseviewsaretraditionallyascribedtothetwomajordivisionsofpost-ŚaṅkaraAdvaitins,theBhāmatīschool

holdinglimitationismandtheVivaraṇaschoolreflectionism.Forfurtherdiscussion,seePotter(1963:172–82).25. kiṃ cākhaṇḍaikātmye sati muktasya punarbandhāpattiḥ ekāntaḥkaraṇaviyoge ‘pi muktāṃśa

evāntaḥkaraṇāntarasambhavāt. yathaikaghatāvacchinnākāśasya tadghaṭabhaṅge ‘pi ghaṭāntareṇa punaḥsambandhobhavati tadvat (Tripāthī1979:23).Advaitinscancounterbyarguing thatalthoughboth ignoranceandtheselfareomnipresent,theunion(saṃyoga)oftheliberatedselfwithignoranceisnoneffective,whereasthe union of the bound self with ignorance is an effective union (Shree Narayan Mishra, personalcommunication).Mishraoffers theexampleof the relationshipbetweena recently retiredprofessor (the jīva)andhisformervicechancellor(ajñāna).Althoughtheretiredprofessormayonceagaincomeintocontactwiththevicechancelloratoccasionalsocialfunctions,thevicechancellorwillnolongerhaveanypoweroverhim!

26. api ca candrajalacandrākāśaghaṭākāśāgnivisphuliṅgacchāyātapastrīpuruṣādidṛṣṭā ntaiḥpratibimbāvacchedāmśādivādāḥ parasparavirodhena sarve na sambhavantīty eka eva vāda āśrayaṇīyaḥ.itarās tu vivakṣitatattadaṃśamātre dṛṣtāntā ity abhyupeyam. tathā ca sati aṃṣavāda evāśrayituṃ yuktaḥ(Tripāṭhī1979:26).

27. aṃśatvaṃ casajātīyatvesatiavibhāgapratiyogitvam tadanuyogitvaṃ cāṃśitvaṃ. yenaca rūpeṇāṃśatāyatravivakṣyate tenaiva rūpeṇa sājātyaṃ tatra grāhyaṃ yathā ātmāṃśalakṣaṇe ātmatvenaiva sājātyaṇsadaṃśādilakṣaṇeṣucasattvādirūpeṇaivetyatonātiprasaṅgaḥ(Tripāṭhī1979:26).

28.Iborrowthetranslations“adjunct”(pratiyogin)and“subjunct”(anuyogin)fromMatilal(1968:32).29.ExplanationprovidedbyShreeNarayanMishra(personalcommunication).SeealsoPotter(1993:18)andMatilal

(1968:31–34).30.Inafollowingstatement,however,Vijñānabhikṣuseemstosuggestthat,strictlyspeaking,onlyātmatvashould

beconsideredthecommonpropertyofBrahmanandtheselves:“Or,moreprecisely,itshouldbeunderstoodashavingthesameclassbymeansofaclassthatisdirectlypervadedbythepropertyofbeingasubstance(dravyatvasākṣādvyāpyajāti)” (Tripāṭhī 1979:16). This refers to the nine substances (dravyas) of theNyāya-Vaiśeṣikaschool.Beingpervadeddirectlybythepropertyofbeingasubstance,inthiscase,wouldmeanthatboththeselfandBrahmanarepervadedbyātmatva,sinceātmanisoneoftheninesubstances.

31.Tripāṭhī(1979:34).VijñānabhikṣufrequentlycitestheSāṃkhyasūtrasandtheYogasūtrasinhiscommentaryontheBrahmasūtras, an indication that even in his earliest works he frequently saw the doctrines of theseseparate schools as complimentary. Nevertheless, he opines in the Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣyam that Vedānta issuperior toSāṃkhya,sinceSāṃkhyaconcerns itselfwith theconventional (vyāvahārika) selfwhileVedāntaconcernsitselfwiththeultimate(pāramārthika)self.

32.Ram(1995:33).33.Tripṭhī(1979:27).34. Accepting the manuscripts’ reading of vetanāḥ (“possessions”) instead of Tripathi’s substitution cetanāḥ

(“consciousnesses”).35.Duringtheperiodofdissolution,thejīva’sconsciousnessislatent:thatis,notinuse.Atthetimeofcreation,its

consciousnessbecomeseffective(ShreeNarayanMishra,personalcommunication).36. nanu niravayavasya brahmaṇaḥ kathaṃ mukhyo ‘ṃśaḥ syād iti cen na

yathoktalakṣaṇāṃśatvasyāvayavatvābhāve‘pidarśanāt.yathāśarīrasyakeśādiraṃśorāśeścaikadeśo‘ṃśaḥpituścaputra iti.sarvecajīvāḥpitariputravetanā(putracetanā) ivacinmātrebrahmaṇi nityasarvāvabhāsakeviṣayabhāsanarūpaṃsvalakṣaṇaṃvihāyapralayelakṣaṇānanyatvaṃgacchanti.sargakāleca tadicchayā tataeva labdhacaitanyaphalopadhānāāvirbhavantipitur ivaputrāḥ.ato jīvābrahṃāmśābhavanti.ātmāvai jāyateputraḥ iti śrutyāputrepituravibhāgalakṣaṇābhedavaj jīve ‘pibrahmaṇo ‘vibhāgalakṣaṇābhedasyabahusyāṃprajāyeyetyādiśrutyāsiddheriti.atojīvābrahṃāmśāmukhyāevabhavanti(Tripāṭhī1979:27).

37.Mostcommentatorsusethethreefolddivision,althoughVijñānabhikṣuactuallywritesinhiscommentaryonBS1.1.2that“origin,etc.”referstoasixfoldsetofworld-stages:arising,existence,growth,development,decline,andpassingaway.jāyate‘stivardhatevipariṇamate‘pakṣīyatevinaśyatītyevaṃrūpaṃjanmādiṣaṇkaṃ(Tripāṭhī1979:19).

38.SrinivasaRaoclaimsthatŚaṅkaradidnotactuallysubscribetovivartavāda(Rao1996).HedoesnotdisputethatthispositionoftheunrealityofthephenomenalworldwastakenbyvirtuallyallsubsequentAdvaitins.

39.ThisisthestandardpositionoftheBhāmatīandVivaraṇaschools.40.InthecaseoftheAdvaitins,onecentralaporiaistheontologicalstatusofignoranceitself:Isitreal?Isitunreal?

Where did it originate?What is its locus?TheAdvaitins attempt to resolve this problemby positing a thirdcategoryofentitiesthatareanirvacanīya,neithertotallyrealnortotallyunreal.Formore,seeIngalls(1953)andPotter(1963:163–67).

41.TranslatedbyOlivelle(1998:247).42.Thedepictionofdifferenceandnon-differenceasdifferenceofeffectandnon-differenceofcauseisespecially

characteristicofBhāskara’sthought(Dasgupta1922,4:329).43. Although the two different groups share the epithet satkāryavādin, their views lead them to construe the

Sanskritcompoundsatkāryaintwodifferentways.WhileSāṃkhyasandrealistVedāntinsunderstandittobeakarmadhārayacompoundexpressing“aneffectthatisreal,”Advaitinstakeittobeaṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣacompound,“theeffectofthatwhichisreal.”“Thatwhichisreal,”ofcourse,referstoBrahman.

44.Unlessotherwisestated,Iusethewordprakṛtitorefertotheoriginalprakṛti(thatis,mūlaprakṛti,pradhāna),althoughtechnicallyitcanrefertoanyoftheeighttattvaswhichthemselvescauseanothertattva.Inthissense,mūlaprakṛti, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and the five tanmātras are the prakṛtis. The remaining sixteen evolutes ofmūlaprakṛtiaretermedvikāras.

45.Tripāṭhī(1979:17).46.kāryāvibhāgādhāratvasyaivopādāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇatvāt(Tripāṭhī1979:17).47.tadevādhiṣṭhānakāraṇaṃyatrāvibhaktaṃyenopaṣṭabdhaṃcasadupādānakāraṇaṃ(Tripāthī1979:17).48. yathā sargādau jalāvibhaktāḥ pārthivasūkṣmāṃśās tanmātrākhyāḥ jalenaivopaṣṭambhāt pṛthivyākāreṇa

pariṇamantaityatojalaṃmahāpṛthivyāadhiṣṭhānakāraṇamiti(Tripāṭhī1979:17).49.Rao(1996:272–77).50.Tripāṭhī(1979:18).51.Inthisregard,BhāskarawasclosertoŚaṅkara,whoalsomaintainedthatBrahmancouldbematerialcauseof

the world without undergoing any essential change. It is possible that early Vedāntins only understood“unchanging”tomean“unchanginginessence.”Formore,seeRao(1996:275).

52. In later Advaita, the termsmāyā andavidyā are closely connected, though not interchangeable. Typically,avidyāisthecauseofconcealment,whilemāyāisthecauseofprojection.

53.KarlPotter,forinstance,opinesthatŚaṅkaramadea“deliberatedecisiontoavoid”thecausalconundrumswithwhichhis successorsoccupied themselves (Potter1963:165).SrinivasaRao takesamorepositiveattitudetoward what he sees as Śaṅkara’s clear and logical account of Brahman’s causality, and he faults laterAdvaitinsfordivergingfromŚaṅkara’sviews(Rao1996).ButbothPotterandRaoagreethatlaterAdvaitinshadquiteadifferenttakeonsuchquestionsthanŚaṅkaradid.

54.ThisissummarizedfromShastri(1989:72–79).55.SeeArthurVenis’sdiscussionofPrakāśānanda’sdatesinhisintroductiontoVedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī(Venis

1975:vii–xii).56.tadetadbrahmāpūrvamanaparamanantaramabāhyam(Brh.Up.2.5.19).Itranslateapūrvamandanaparam

as having “no cause, no effect,” since Prakāśānanda understands these words causally, and not merelytemporally.

57. yad uktaṃ jagatkāraṇatvaviṣayaśrutyor ajñānabrahmagocarayor mitho virodha iti tan na. brahmājñānājjagajjanma brahmaṇo ‘kāraṇatvataḥ / adhiṣṭhānatvamātreṇa kāraṇaṃ brahma gīyate // 38 //

dṛśyatvādyanumānasiddhānirvacanīyasya jagato ‘nādyanirvacanīyā avidyaiva kāraṇaṃ na brahma tasyakūtasthasyakāryakāraṇavilakṣaṇatvāt tad etad brahmāpūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam ayam ātmābrahma sarvānubhūr iti śruteḥ. kathaṃ tarhi brahmaṇo jagatkāraṇatvaṃ śrutau prasiddhaṃjagattatkāraṇādhiṣṭhānatvenakāraṇatvopacārāt(Venis1975:116–17).AlthoughthispassageisthelikelysourceofAppayaDīkṣita’ssummaryofPrakāśānanda’sviewoncausality, it isnotPrakāśānanda’s lastwordonthesubjectbutonlyaprovisionalview.Helaterwritesthatspeakingprecisely,ignoranceisalsonotthecauseoftheworld.TheverynotionofcauseandeffectiserroneousandoutsidethescopeoftheUpaniṣads.Therefore,anAdvaitinonlysaysthat ignorance is thecauseof theworldtoputanendtotheawkwardsilencethatresultswhen asked, “What is the cause of the world?” (kiṃ jagataḥ kāraṇam iti pṛṣṭe prāptāpratibhānivṛttimātraprayojanatayāajñānaṃkāraṇamitiabhihitatvācca)(Venis1975:117–18).

58.Inhiscolophon,PrakāśānandahimselfacknowledgeshisdoctrinaldifferenceswithotherAdvaitinsofthesametimeperiodand implies thathe issomehowrecovering the true teachingsofanearliereraofAdvaita: “Thisentire essence of Vedānta taught byme is unknown tomodern thinkers” (vedāntasārasarvasvam ajñeyamadhunātanaiḥ/aśeṣeṇamayoktaṃ)(Venis1975:186).

59.Dasgupta(1922,2:221);Timalsina(2006:115–27).60.Dasgupta(1922,2:224).61. The later Advaitins list six entities as being anādi: the self (jīva), the Lord (īśa), pure consciousness

(viśuddhacitta), the difference between the self and the Lord (jīveśvarabheda), ignorance (avidyā), and therelationbetweenignoranceandconsciousness(avidyācittasaṃyoga).

62.Iwouldaddthatifitislegitimatetosaythatsomethingis“changeless”simplybecauseitdoesnotchangeitsessentialnature,thenforsatkāryavādinseverythingischangeless.Sāṃkhya-Yogacaneasilysaythatprakṛti,too,isaschangelessastheBrahmanoftheVedāntins.

63.Formore,seeNakamura(1989).64.SeeŚaṅkara’sinterpretationofŚvet.Up.4.5inhiscommentaryonBS1.4.9(Śaṅkara1996[8thc.ce?]:477–

78).65.kālārkabhakṣitaṃsāṃkhyaśāstraṃ(Garbe1895:1).

4AHISTORYOFGODINSĀṂKHYAANDYOGA1.Garbe(1895:xii).2.Ibid.,xiii–xiv.3.Larson,forexample,istypicalinunderstandingthe“classicalSāṃkhya”asbeginningwiththeSāṃkhyakārikā;

themiddleUpaniṣads,Buddhacarita,andBhagavadGītāforhimrepresent“proto-Sāṃkhya”(Larson1998:75).4. ajāmekāṃlohitaśuklakṛṣṇāṃbahvīḥprajāḥ sṛjamānāṃ sarūpāḥ /ajohyeko juṣamāṇo ‘nuśete jahātyenāṃ

bhuktabhogāmajo‘nyaḥ//Śvet.Up.4.5(Olivelle(1998:424),mytranslation.5.BSB1.4.9inŚaṅkara(1996[8thc.ce],1:55).6.Śvet.Up.5.2(Olivelle1998:426).7.BSB2.1.1inŚaṅkara(1996[8thc.CE],1:533–39).8.BSB2.1.1inBhāskara(1903[8thc.CE]:87–88).9.Forexample,BS2.1.4–6(Śaṅkara1996[8thc.CE],1:545–52).10.Forexample,Śvet.Up.4.1–7(Olivelle1998:422–24).11.Forexample,Johnston(1974:85).12.Forexample,SenGupta(1981:75).13. pradhānaṃpurūṣaṃ caiva praviśyātmecchayā hariḥ / kṣobhayām āsa samprāpte sargakāle vyayāvyayau

//(Viṣ.Pu.1.2.29),quotedinTripāṭhī(1979:18).14.OnthecharacterofproofsforGod’sexistencesituatedwithintheistictraditions,seeClayton(2006).15.Chattopadhyaya(1969).16.FranklinEdgertonexaminesatlengthpassagesintheMokṣadharmaParvanthatHopkinsandOldenburghave

claimedexpressanatheisticposition.Edgertonconcludeshisexaminationof thesepassagesbyasserting,“Where, then,dowe find that ‘original’atheisticviewexpressed? Ibelieve:nowhere.Astudyof theepicandother earlymaterials (mostly collectedbyHopkins) has convincedme that there is not a single passage inwhichdisbeliefinBrahmanorGodisattributedtoSāṃkhya”(Edgerton1924:8).Inparticular,themeaningofthewordanīśvaraatMbh.12.289.3ahasbeen thesiteofcontroversy (seeEdgerton1924:8–14).Most recently,JamesFitzgeraldhasarguedthatthecorrecttranslationis“HowcanonewhoisnotapowerfulLordbecomeAbsolutelyFree?”(Fitzgeraldforthcoming).

17.Ontheprecisemeaningofanvīkṣikī,seeHalbfass(1988:275–86).JacobiandotherIndologistsunderstooditastheSanskritwordclosesttotheWesternconceptof“philosophy.”

18.OntheprecisemeaningofBhG5.4anditsrelationtootherusagesofsāṃkhyaandyogaintheBhagavadGītā,

seeMalinar(1996:194).Sheconsidersitalaterinterpolation(ibid.,405).19.ThispointisarguedatlengthinEdgerton(1924).20.loke‘smindvividhāniṣṭhāpurāproktāmayānagha/jñānayogenasāṃkhyānāṃkarmayogenayoginām//BhG

3.3inSargeantandChapple(2009:160),mytranslation.SeealsoMalinar(1996:155).21.Edgerton(1924:6):“ThetermSāṃkhyadidnot, inandofitself, implyany‘teaching’atall inthesenseofany

speculativeformulationofmetaphysicaltruth,butmerelytheopinionthatmancouldgainsalvationbyknowingthesupremetruth,howeverformulated.”

22. Forthediversityofmeaningsofsāṃkhyaandyoga in theBhagavadGītā itself,seeMalinar (1996:155,194,405).

23.QuotedinK.Chattopadhyaya(1927:854).24.Ibid.ThesamepassageiscitedinBronkhorst(1981:310).BronkhorstalsoarguesthatKumārilausedtheword

yogatorefertoNyāya-Vaiśeṣika(ibid.,312).25.BimalMatilalwritesinafootnotewhendiscussingthispassagefromVātsyāyanathat“accordingtosome,yoga

refers to thedualschoolofNyāyaandVaiśeṣika….The termYogadoesnotmeanhere theYogaschoolofPatañjali.Itmighthavemeantlogic—thescienceofreasoning(yukti)”(Matilal1977:77).

26.BesidesŚaṅkara,onlyahandfulofpremoderncommentators,includingMādhavasarasvatīandVijñānabhikṣu,use“yoga”asadesignationforPatañjali’sphilosophy.SeeBronkhorst(1981:311,315).

27.Bronkhorst(1981:311).28.Olivelle,followingBöhtlingk,translatesthephraseas“theapplicationofSāṃkhya”(Olivelle1998:628).29.LarsonandBhaṭṭacharya(1987:317–18).30. Exceptions to this tendency to refuse to take thePurāṇasseriouslyasphilosophical texts includeSheridan

(1986)andDasgupta(1922,3:496–511,4:1–50).31.Bh.Pu.3.25.1–3.33.37inGoswami(1971:247–83).32.Dasgupta(1922,3:496).33.Bronkhorst(1983:149–64).34.WezlerandMotegi(1998:160).35. iṃ cānyat śruteḥ śrutir api cāsya mūrtim ācaṣṭe kṛttivāsāḥ pinākahasto vitatadhanvā nīlaśikhaṇḍī ityādi.

tadabhyupagamātsvapakṣahānir iti cet. syānmatam. yadi tarhi śrutivacanānmūrtimān īśvaraḥ parigṛhyatetena siddham asyāstitvam. kasmāt. na hy asato mūrtimattvam upapadyata iti kṛtvā. etad apy ayuktam[kasmāt]. abhiprāyānavabodhāt. na hy ekāntena vayaṃ bhagavataḥh śaktiviśeṣaṃ pratyācakṣmahemāhātmyaśarīrādiparigrahāt.yathā[tu]bhavatocyate.pradhānapuruṣavyatiriktastayoḥprayoktānāstītyayamasmadabhiprāyaḥ. tasmād etasya bādhakaṃ. ato na pradhānapuruṣayor abhisambandho ‘nyakṛtaḥ. WezlerandMotegi(1998:159),mytranslation.

36.kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣṭahpuruṣaviśeṣaīśvarah(Maas2006:35),mytranslation.37.Bronkhorstunderstandstheexpressionīśvaramaharṣi(WezlerandMotegi1998:100,lines4–6)asexpressing

“agreatseer,whoisanincorporationofGod.”Thisinterpretationwouldbeinlinewiththeidea,frequentlystatedinSāṃkhya,thatKapilaishimselfanincarnationofGod(Bronkhorst1983:152–53)

38.Gauḍapāda(1964:153).39.Jha(1965:93).40. Forexample,Miller(1998:36):“ForPatañjali, theLordisnotacreatorGodwhograntsgrace;rather,heisa

representationoftheomniscientspirit(puruṣa)asthearchetypicalyogi.”41.CommentaryonSK23inM.Jha(1965:93).42. Bronkhorst(1981:316). Iamdeeply indebtedtoBronkhorst’swork formostofmyarguments in thischapter

regardingtherelationshipbetweenSāṃkhyaandYoga.43. Translated inBronkhorst (1981:309).Thecolophonof the firstsectionof theYogasūtras reads: iti pātañjale

yogaśāstresāṃkhyapravacanesamādhipādaḥprathamaḥ(Maas2006:87).44. IntheintroductionofthenewcriticaleditionofthefirstpādaoftheYogasūtras,PhilippMaasclaimsthat the

commentaryascribed toVyāsawas in itsoriginal formanautocommentaryby theauthorof theYogasūtrashimself(Maas2006:xii–xix).Iftrue,thisisevenstrongerevidencethatthetextwasconsideredaSāṃkhyaworkfromitsinception.

45.athayogānuśāsanaṃ(Maas2006:1).46.athātodharmajijñāsā(AbhyaṅkaraandJośī(1970:25).47.athātobrahmajijñāsā(Śaṅkara1996[8thc.ce]:55).48.QuotedinBronkhorst(1981:309).49. sāṃkhyānirīśvarāḥ kecit kecid īśvaradevatāḥ / sarveṣāmapi teṣāṃ syāt tattvānāṃpañcaviṃśatiḥ // (Murty

1957:46).50.QuotedinBronkhorst(1981:316–17).51.Ibid.,315.

5.READINGAGAINSTTHEGRAINOFTHESĀṂKHYASŪTRAS1.Garbe(1895:xi).2. tat tvam eva tvam evaitad evaṃ śrutiśatoditaṃ / sarvātmanām avaidharmyaṃśāstrasyāsyaiva gocaraḥ //

(Garbe1895:1).3. This is not theonlydifferenceVijñānabhikṣu identifies.For instance, in theYogavārttika, hewrites that the

precisephilosophicalmeaningofthewordavidyādiffersbetweenthetwoschools(Rukmani1981:26).4.kālārkabhakṣitaṃsāṃkhyaśāstramjñāṇasudhākaram/kalāvaśiṣṭambhūyo‘pipūrayiśyevacomṛtaiḥ//(Garbe

1895:1).ThisisobviouslyanallusiontothemythofRāhu,thedemonresponsibleforeclipses.Kālārkamightalsobetranslatedas“blacksun.”

5.nārāyaṇaḥkapilamūrtir(Garbe1895:1).6.G.Jha(1995:125).7. nanu nyāyavaiśeṣikābhyām apy eteṣv artheṣu nyāyaḥ pradarśita iti tābhyām asya gatārthatvam

saguṇanirguṇatvādiviruddharūpair ātmasādhakatayā tadyuktibhir atratyayuktīnāṃ virodheno ‘bhayor evadurghaṭaṃ prāmāṇyam iti. maivam. vyāvahārikapāramārthikarūpaviṣayabhedena gatārthatvavirodhayorabhāvāt.nyāyavaiśesikābhyāṃhisukhiduḥkhyādyanuvādatodehādimātravivekenātmāprathamabhūmikāyāmanumāpitaḥ ekadā parasūkṣme praveśāsambhavāt. tadīyaṃ ca jñānaṃ dehādyātmatānirasanenavyāvahārikaṃtattvajñānaṃbhavatyeva…vivakṣitārthe…bādhābhāvāt, yatparaḥ śabdaḥ saśabdhārtha itinyāyāt(Garbe1895:1–2).

8.atrāpivyavahāraparamārthabhāvenaivavyavasthāsambhavati.asatyamapratiṣṭhaṃtejagadāhuranīśvaramityādiśāstrair nirīśvaravādasya ninditatvād asminn eva śāstrevyāvahārikasyaiveśvarapratiṣedhasyaiśvaryavairāgyādyarthaṃ na pratiṣidhyeta tadāparipūrṇanityanirdoṣaiṣvaryadarṣanenatatracittāveṣatovivekābhyāsapratibandhaḥsyāditisāṃkhyācāryāṇāmāśayaḥ(Garbe1895:2).

9. For example, Gadamer’s critique of psychological hermeneutics (Gadamer 1989:186–97) and Wimsatt’scritiqueofthe“intentionalfallacy”(Wimsatt1954:3–20).

10.OnthiscriticismoftheMīmāṃsāinterpretivetheory,andKumārilaBhaṭṭa’sreply,seeChari(1990:168).11.TheimportanceofindifferencetogodlikepowersisemphasizedatYS3.50.IntheTattvakaumudī,Vācaspati

enumeratestheaiśvaryasaseight:aṇiman (ability tobecomeextremelysmall), laghiman (ability tobecomeextremely light),gariman (ability to becomeextremely heavy),mahiman (ability to become extremely large),prāpti (ability toacquireanyobject),prākāmya (the fulfillmentofalldesires), īśitva (lordshipoverallmaterialthings), and kāmāvasāyitā (infallibility of purpose) (commentary on SK 23 in M. G. Jha 1965:15). Lists ofaiśvaryasvaryslightlyindifferenttexts.

12. nāsti sāṃkhyasamaṃ jñānaṃnāsti yogasaṃambalam /atra tesaṃśayomābhūj jñānaṃ sāṃkhyaṃ paraṃmatam//ityādivākyaṃ tadvivekāṃśaevasāṃkhyajñāṇasyadarśanāntarebhyautkarṣaṃpratipādayatina tvīśvarapratiṣedhāṃśe‘pi(Garbe1895:3).

13.Austin(1975:94–120).14. tasmād abhyupagamavādaprauṛhivādādinaiva sāṃkhyasya vyāvahārikeśvaraprati ṣedhaparatayā

brahmamīmāṃsāyogābhyām saha na virodhaḥ. abhyupagamavādaś ca śāstre dṛṣṭo yathā viṣṇupurāṇe etebhinnadṛśaṃdaityāvikalpāḥkathitāmayā/kṛtvābhyupagamaṃ tathā.saṃkṣepaḥ śrūyatāṃmameti.astuvāpāpināṃ jñānapratibandhārtham āstikadarśaneṣv apy aṃśataḥ śrutiviruddhārthavyavasth āpanam. teṣu teṣvaṃśeṣv aprāmāṇyaṃ ca śrutismṛtyaviruddheṣu tu mukhyaviṣayeṣu prāmāṇyam asty eva. ata evapadmapurāṇebrahmayogadarśanātiriktānāṃdarśanānāṃnindā‘pyupapadyate(Garbe1895:4).

15. The wordprauḍhivāda appears twice in the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya; the variant spelling prauḍhavādaappearsonce.

16. RaghavanandThakur(1969).Jayanta’sunderstandingofabhyupagamasiddhānta, in itsbasicoutlines,wasalso accepted by Pakṣilasvāmin. The other major interpreter of abhyupagamasiddhānta, Uddyotakara,understoodthistypeoftenetnotassomethingonlytemporarilyacceptedforthesakeofargumentbut,rather,as something that is already implicitly accepted by one’s own school, although not explicitly stated in theschool’ssūtras. I recountJayanta’spositionbecause it ismore relevant toVijñānabhikṣu’sunderstandingof“temporaryconcession” (abhyupagamavāda). For amuchmore detailed analysis ofabhyupagamsiddhānta,seeMarui(forthcoming).

17.IborrowthedetailsofthisscenariofromMarui(forthcoming).Jainalogicianssometimesusedlessplausible,moreplayfulexamplesfortheirtemporarytenets,suchas“thefireiscold,”“thereisaherdofelephantssittingon a blade of grass,” and “the donkey has a horn.” These examples come from Parśvadeva’sNyāyapraveśavṛttipañjikā(inDignāga1930[5thc.ce]:44,line26).SeealsoIngalls(1955:164).

18.tasmāttadviśeṣaparīkṣaṇārthaḥaparīkṣitābhyupagamaḥprauḍhavādinākriyamāṇaḥabhyupagamasiddhāntaitisūtrārthaḥ.itthamevacatatratatrapravādukānoāṃvyavahāraḥ(RaghavanandThakur1969,2:550).

19.UnlikeWesternlogic,Indianlogicisnotaformallogic.ThereforeitdoesnotdistinguishvalidityfromtruthinthewaythatmostWesternlogiciansdo.Formore,seeMatilal(1998:16–17).

20.Garbe(1895:119).21.QuotedinSchroeder(2001:15–16).22.Ibid.,9–19.23.Lamotte(1988[1949]:16–23).24.Lamotte(1988[1949]:21);King(1995:120–26).25.Garbe(1895:2).26.Bronkhorst(1983:157).27. AlthoughVijñānabhikṣudidhaveknowledgeof theSāṃkhyakārikā,hequotes from it far less than from the

PurāṇasandtheUpaniṣads.28. astu vā pāpināṃ jñānapratibandhārtham āstikadarśaneṣv apy aṃśataḥ śrutivirud dhārthavyavasthāpanam

(Garbe1895:4).SeeGarbe’sreactiontothispassageinhisintroductiontothiswork(ibid.,xii).29.ForathoughtfuldiscussionofViṣṇu’sBuddhaavatar,seeO’Flaherty(1976:187–211).30.Forvariationsonandprecedentsofthismyth,seeEltschinger(forthcoming).31.yeṣāṃśravaṇamātreṇapātityaṃjñānināmapi(Garbe1895:4).32.Obviously,BuddhistsarehereconflatedwithJainas.33.SummaryofGarbe(1895:4).34. śrutismṛtyaviruddheṣu tu mukhyaviṣayeṣu prāmāṇyam asty eva. ata evapad mapurāṇe

brahmayogadarśanātiriktānāṃdarśanānāṃnindā‘pyupapadyate(ibid.).35.Ibid.36.adhikaṃtubrahmamīmāṃsābhāṣyeprapañcitamasmābhiriti(ibid.).37.idaṃbrahmātmajñānaṃviviktajīvajñānātsāṃkhyoktādapiśreṣṭhaṃnāto‘dhikaṃjñānamasti(Tripāthī1979:28).38.viśeṣastvatrocyateprakṛtisvātantryavādibhyāṃsāṃkhyayogibhyāṃpuruṣārthaprayuktāpravṛttiḥsvayameva

puruṣeṇaādyajīvenasaṃyujyataityabhyupagamyateayaskāntenalohavat.asmābhistuprakṛtipuruṣasaṃyogaīśvareṇakriyataityabhyupagamyate(ibid.,18).

39. āstikaśāstrasya na kasyāpy aprāmāṇyaṃ virodho vā svasvaviṣayeṣu sarveṣām abādhād avirodhāc ceti(Garbe1895:4).

40.yogadarśanetvābhyāmabhyupagamavādapratiṣiddhasyeśvarasyanirūpaṇenanyūnatāpariharo‘pīti(ibid.,5).41. TheMīmāṃsāandtheearlyVaiśeṣikasystemalsoseemtohaveexcludedGod.Allof theremainingāstika

systems,however,aretheistic.42.ItisforthisreasonthattheMīmāṃsā,anatheisticsystem,positstheexistenceofapūrva. It functionsasan

invisiblecausallinkconnectingtheoriginalactanditseventualeffect.ItisnecessarybecausetheentireIndianphilosophicaltraditionagreesthataneffectmustimmediatelyfollowitscauseintime.IfGodexisted,however,hecouldtakenoteofaperson’sactionsandcreatepositiveornegativeresultswheneverhedeemsitsuitable,justasaparentmightsometimesdeferpunishmentofhisorherchild.

43.īśvarāsiddheritiyaduktaṃtannopapadyatekarmaphaladātṛtayātatsiddheritiyepūrvapakṣiṇastānnirākarotineśvarādhiṣṭhite phalanispattiḥ karmaṇā tatsiddheḥ (SS 5.2). īśvarādhiṣṭhite kāraṇekarmaphalarūpapariṇāmasya niṣpattir na yuktā āvaśyakena karmaṇaiva phalaniṣpattisambhavād ity arthaḥ(Garbe1895:117).

44. For instance, in his commentary on SS 5.2, Vijñānabhikṣu indicates that the thing that the sūtra calls“superintendedbyGod”(īśvarādhiṣṭhite)isthecause(kāraṇe).

45.ThetranslatorNandalalSinhaclaimsthattheSāṃkhyasūtrasdonotarguethatGoddoesnotexistbutonlythatGod’sexistencecannotbeproven.Inhisterminology,Sāṃkhyaisnirīśvara,butnotnāstika:“Itisnirīśvara,lit.god-less, as it explains all and every fact of experience without reference to, and without invoking theinterventionof,adivineagency.Thosewhoimaginethat,intheSāṃkhya,thereisadenialofGod,obviouslyfailto recognize thedistinction between the twowords, nāstika andnirīśvara” (Sinha1979:xiv).Sinha’s readingintroduces confusing and historically arbitrary new meanings of these two terms (nāstika simply means“atheist” for him, while nirīśvara means “one who believes in God but denies the possibility of proving hisexistence”).ItalsoignoresthedisproofsofGodpresentedinSS5.2–9.

46. īśvarasyāpyupakārasvīkāre laukikeśvaravadevaso ‘pi samsārī syātapūrṇakāmatayāduḥkhādiprasaṅgād(Garbe1895:117).

47.pradhānaśaktiyogāccetsaṅgāpattiḥ(ibid.,118).48. kiṃ ca prakṛtiṃ praty aiśvaryaṃ prakṛtipariṇāmabhūtecchādinā na sambhavati anyonyāśrayāt

icchotpattyanantaraṃprakṛtipravartanamprakṛtipravrttyanantaraṃcecchādiriti.nityecchādikaṃcaprakrtauna

yuktaṃśrutismṛtisiddhasāmyāvasthānupapatteḥ(ibid.).49. For example,Miller’s interpretation ofYS1.24 inMiller (1998), or Eliade’s conception of the “metaphysical

sympathy”betweenĪśvaraandtheyogin(1970[1958]:73–76).50. ayaṃ ceśvarapratiṣedha aiśvarye vairāgyārtham īśvarajñānaṃ vināpi mokṣapratipādanārthaṃ ca

prauḍhivādamātram iti prāg eva vyākhyātam. anyathā jī vavyāvṛttasyeśvaranityatvādergauṇatvakalpanāgauravaṃ. aupādhikānāṃ nityajñānecchādīnām mahadādiparināmānām cāṅgīkārenakautasthyādyupapatterityādikaṃbrahmamīmāṃsāyāṃdraṣṭavyamiti(Garbe1895:119).

51.Garbe(1889:271)andSinha(1979:397)offertwodifferentinterpretations.Garbe’sinterpretation,suggestedtohimbytheVaranasipanditRāmmiśra,seemsthemoreplausible.

6.YOGA,PRAXIS,ANDLIBERATION1.Rukmani(1981:8,13–14).2.pātañjalasāṃkhyapravacanayogaśāstra(Bronkhorst1981:309).3. śrīpātañjalabhāṣyadugdhajaladhir vijñanaratnākaro vedavyāsamunīndrabuddhikhanito yogīndrapeyāmṛtaḥ /

bhūdevairamṛtaṃtadatramathituṃvijñānavijñairihaśrīmadvārttikamandarogurutaromanthānadaṇḍo‘rpyate//sarvavedārthasāro‘travedavyāsenabhāṣitaḥ /yogabhāṣyamiṣeṇātomumukṣūṇām idaṃgatiḥ //gaṅgādyāḥsaritoyadvadabdheraṃśeṣusaṃsthitāḥ / sāṃkhyādidarśanānyevamasyaivāṃśeṣukṛtsnaśaḥ // (Rukmani1981:20).

4.Mbh1.16.1–40,1.17.1–30;Viṣ.Pu.1.9(amongmanyotherPurānicsources).5. śrutismṛtinyāyavacaḥkṣīrābdhimathanoddhṛtam / jñānāmṛtaṃ guroḥ prītyai bhūdevebhyo nu dīyate //

pariviṣayyasadbuddhyāmohinyevāthadānavān/kutarkānvañcayitvedaṃpīyatāmamṛtepsubhiḥ //pītvaitadbalavantastepākhaṇḍāsurayūthapān/vijityajñānakarmabhyāṃyāntuśrīmadguroḥpadam//(Tripāthī1979:1).Thereferenceto“knowledgeandritualaction”isarejectionoftheAdvaitaviewthatknowledgealone,separatefromaction,leadstoliberation.

6. brahmavid āpnoti paraṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati tam eva viditvāti mṛtyum etiityādiśrutisiddhaparamapuruṣārthasādhanatāke brahmajñāne vidhiḥ śrūyate ātmety evopāsīta sa ma ātmetividyāt tam eva dhīro vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ ityādirūpaḥ. tatra kiṃ brahma kiṃvā tasyabrahmatānirvāhakam gunajātam kīdṛśam vā tasya jñānam kīdrśam vā tasya phalam ityādikaṃ viśiṣyamumuksūnām jijñāsitam bhavati śrutiṣv āpātato ‘nyonyaviruddhārthatāyāḥ śākhābhedena pratibhāsanād iti.atastannirṇayāyabrahmaṃīmāmsāśāstramapekṣitam(Tripāṭhī1979).

7.Rukmani(1981:6).8. tatra yogaḥ kiṃsvarūpaḥ kimupāyaḥ kena vā dvāreṇa jñānamokṣayoḥ kāraṇam ityādikaṃ mumukṣūnāṃ

vividiṣitaṃbhavatibrahmamīmāṃsāsāṃkhyādiṣuca jñānaṃevavicāritaṃ bāhulyena jñāṇasādhaṇamātras tuyogaḥ saṃkṣepataḥ jñānajanyayogas tu saṃkṣepato ‘pi teṣu nokto ‘tivistarena dvividham yogam pratipipādayisurbhagavānpatañjaliḥṣiśyāvadhānāyādauyogānuśāsanaṃśāstramārabhyatayāpratijñātavānathayogānuśāsanam(Rukmani1981:22).

9. On samprajñātasamādhi, see YS 1.17; on asamprajñātasamādhi, see YS 1.18. For a close reading ofVijñānabhikṣu’sanalysisofthetwoterms,seeFort(2006:273–87).

10.Foranin-depthdiscussionofjīvanmuktiinIndianphilosophicaltraditions,seeFort(1998).11. tathā ca karmakṣayadvārā jñāṇasyevāsamprajñātayogasyāpi mokṣahetutvaṃ siddhaṃ. tatra

cāsamprajñātayogenākhilasamskāradāhakena prārabdhakarmāpy atikramyata iti jñānādviśeṣaḥ jñāṇasya hiprārabdhanāśakatve bādhikāsti tasya tāvad eva ciram ityādiśrutir jīvanmuktiśrutismṛtayaś ca. yogasyaprārabdhanāśakatvebādhakamnāstipratyutadagdhakarmacayo‘cirādityevasmaryateataḥprārabdhamapikarma karmavipākoktaprāyaścittādivad evātikramya jhaṭiti mocanam eva yogasya phalam. anyac cayogadvayenākhilasaṃskārakṣaye bhogasamskārākhyasahak āryabhāvāt prārabdhaṃ karmāpi yatphalākṣamaṃ bhavati idam api yogaphalam. tad uktaṃ mokṣadharme nāsti sāṃkhyasamaṃ jñānam nāstiyogasamaṃbalaṃiti.balaṃprārabdhasyāpyatikrameṇasvecchayāśighramokṣahetuḥ(Rukmani1981:29).

12.nāstisāṃkhyasamaṃjñānaṃnāstiyogasamaṃbalam(Mbh12.304.2,citedinGarbe1895:3).13. Itmight be suggested thatVedānta has its ownproblemswith this dualismof insentient (jaḍa)matter and

conscious(cetana)selves.Specifically,howisitthatsomethinginsentient,likeprakṛti,couldhavearisenfromBrahman,whichispureconsciousness?Thisisanoldproblem,onethatisposedbytheSāṃkhyainterlocutorinBS2.1.4.

14.MostoftheIndianphilosophicalsystemswerealsoformsof“spiritualexercise”inthesensethatPierreHadot(1995)hasdescribedthephilosophiesofancientGreeceandRome.

15.Feuerstein(1989:197),forinstance,attimessideswithVijñānabhikṣuandagainstVācaspatiMiśrabecausehe

believestheformerwasamoreadvancedpractitionerofyogathanthelatter.Iseenoclearindicationthatonewas more spiritually advanced than the other simply based on their writings. Furthermore, philosophicalarguments fromprivateexperienceare virtually impossible to verify.Medieval commentatorsappear tohaverecognizedthisandthusargueprimarilyfromscripturalauthorityandrationalinference.

16. pradhānaṃpuruṣaṃcaivapraviśyātmecchayāhariḥ /kṣobhayāmāsasamprāptesargakālevyayāvyayau //(KūrmaPu.1.4.13).

17.OnthechronologyofVijñānabhikṣu’sworks,seeRukmani(1981:6–7).18.vārttikācaladaṇḍenamathitvāyogasāgaram/uddhatyāmṛtasāro‘yaṃgranthakumbhenidhīyate//(Jha1995:1).

Vijñānabhikṣualludes to thestoryof thechurningof theoceanof themilkby thegods in the introductionofnumerousworks.

19.VijñānabhikṣualsoreiteratesinthefourthsectionoftheYogasārasaṃgrahathatNyāyaandVaiśeṣikaarepartofthis largerconcordance.Formoredetail,he refers readersback toa treatisehehaswrittenonNyāya (Jha1995:125).Unfortunately,thatworkhasneverbeenfound.

20.puruṣārthaśūnyānāṃguṇānāṃpratiprasavaḥkaivalyaṃsvarūpapratiṣṭhāvācitiśaktiriti.21.kṛtārthaṃpratinaṣṭamapyanaṣṭaṃtadanyasādhāraṇatvāt.22.vedāntinastuparamātmanijīvātmalayomokṣaitivadantitaiḥsahāsmākaṃnavirodhaḥ.samudrenadīnāmiva

brahmaṇi jīvānām upādhilayenāvibhāgasyaiva layaśabdārthatvāt tasya ca pararūpeṇa apratiṣṭhatva evaparyavasānāt (Jha1995:119).The finalsentenceof thispassagehasbeenmistranslated in theonlyEnglisheditionoftheYogasārasaṃgrahaas“Andthisreturnfinallyleadstothenon-existence(oftheHumanSelf)intheformofsomethingother(thantheSupremeSelf)” (Jha1995:121).This translation implies thatVijñānabhikṣubelievesthatdissolutionleadstocompleteidentitybetweenindividualselfandBrahman.ButVijñānabhikṣuhasmadeclearintheVijñānāmṛtabhāṣyamthatnon-separation(avibhāga)issomethingdifferentfromthecompleteidentity(tādātmya)advocatedbyAdvaitins.

23.Fortheformerinterpretation,seeGarbe(1895).Forthelatter,seeRukmani(1981:1–17).

7.VEDĀNTAANDSĀMKHYAINTHEORIENTALISTIMAGINATION1.Pollock(2001a,2001b).2.Upādhyāya(1994:36).3.SanskrittextinBhāvāgaṇeśa(1969[16thc.ce]).SeealsoLarsonandBhaṭṭacharya(1987:413–16).4.LarsonandBhaṭṭacharya(1987:429).5.ThiscitationisdiscussedinSmith(2005:436).Purusottama’sdatesareeither1657or1668to1725ce,making

himacontemporaryofNāgojīBhaṭṭa(ibid.,425).6.Colebrooke(1977[1837]:143–269).7.Pollock(2001a:393–94).8.ForonesuchSaidiancritiqueofIndology,seeInden(1990).9.Said(1978:5).10.Hallisey(1995:33),Pollock(1993a:97–98).11.Pollock(1993a:98).12.ArifDirlik(1996:112–17)suggeststhatitisbyanalyzingthese“contactzones”betweenOrientalistsandtheir

Asian informants that we can begin to understand the extent to which Asians themselves contributed toOrientalistdiscourses.

13. Gough cotranslated themost influential of these Advaita doxographies,Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha(Cowell and Gough 1978). Deussen’s Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie (1899) draws heavily onMādhavainitsaccountofIndianphilosophicalsystems.

14. WilhelmHalbfassmakes this point eloquently: “In his polemical zeal against Orientalist constructions andessentializations,[Said]overlookscompletelytheextentofessentialistconstructionsinhisownpresentation….Ontheonehand,hedisregardsinternaldifferenceswithincultures;ontheotherhand,heoverlookscommondenominatorsbetweencultures…hedoesnotwanttorecognizetherealmofsharedmeaningsinwhichevensome of the more distorted views of the Orient took place, and without which neither understanding normisunderstandingwouldbepossible”(Halbfass1997:8–9).

15.Zimmer(1969:378–80).16.QuotedinPollock(1993a:90).17. Said largely ignoresGermanOrientalismbecause itviolatessomeofhiscentral theses—among them that

OrientalismisinseparablefromimperialdominationandthatallOrientalistsposittheOrientastheontological“Other.”GermanyhadnocoloniesinAsia,andGermanOrientalistsoftensoughttoidentifythemselvesasthetrueheirs to “Aryan” intellectual traditions,denying India’sotherness.More recently,GermanOrientalismhas

beenexaminedfromavarietyofanglesbyHalbfass(1988),Pollock(1993a),andKontje(2004).18.FormoredetailedbiographiesofH.T.Colebrooke,seeMüller(1890)andRocherandRocher(forthcoming).19.Colebrooke(1977[1837]:378).Ofcourse,Sanskrittransliterationschemeshadnotyetbeenstandardizedatthe

timeColebrookewaswriting.20.Colebrooke(1977[1837]:231–32).21.Ibid.,228.22.Ibid.,227.23.Ibid.,228.24.Ibid.,236.25.Ibid.26.Ibid.,324.27.Ibid.,334.28.Ibid.,348–50.29.Ibid.,377.30.MostrecentlybyRao(1996).31.Gough(1882:258–60).32.Anotherpossibility,althoughslight,isthatColebrookewasawareofthesixteenth-centuryauthorPrakāśānanda,

oneof the fewpremodernAdvaitinswhoactually held that the phenomenalworld has the sameontologicalstatusasahallucinationordream(Dasgupta1922,2:221).

33.Inmyopinion,thisreadingisincorrectsinceearlierBhedābhedavādinswhoclearlyhaveŚaṅkarainmindalsorefrain from naming him directly (e.g., Bhāskara in Dvivedin 1903). It would be understandable, however, ifColebrookewasnotawareofthisconvention.

34.Gough(1882:258–59).35.Ibid.,200–201.36.Ibid.,223.37.Ibid.,228.38. Fora critiqueof the commonlyheld view thatsāṃkhya should beunderstood tomean “enumeration,” see

Edgerton(1924:35–37).39.QuotedinHalbfass(1988:107).40.Deussen(1907:45–46).41.SummarizedfromDeussen(1899:213–15).42.Ibid.,214.43.Ibid.,230.44.Ibid.,44.45.Schopenhauer(1958[1856]:439–46).46.Deussen(1907:39).47.Ibid.,251–53.48.Ibid.,47–48.49.Ibid.,40.50.Forexample,Olivelle(1998:12–13).51.Deussen(1907:227).52.ThefulltitleofHall’seditionisremarkable,giventhetheisticcharacterofVijñānabhikṣu’stext:TheSankhya-

pravachana-bhashya:ACommentaryontheAphorismsoftheHinduAtheisticPhilosophy(Hall1856).53.GarbetactfullyalludestotheseerrorsinhisintroductiontoVijñānabhikṣu(1895:x).54.Ibid.,xii–xiv.55.Garbe(1897:37).56.Ibid.,33–52.57.Ibid.,51.58.The“analogiesbetweentheSāṃkhyasystemsandthePythagoreanphilosophy”beginwith“thenameofthe

Indian system, which is derived from the word saṃkhyā, ‘number,’ and from the fundamental importanceattachedtonumberbyPythagoras”(Garbe1897:39).

59.Garbe(1897:10).60.Ibid.,30.61.OnJamesian“experiential”interpretationsofIndianphilosophy,seeHalbfass(1988:395).62.Garbe(1897:11).63.Ibid.,30.64.Ibid.,30–31.65.Garbe(1895:xiv).

66.Deutsch(1969);D.Chattopadhyaya(1969).67.Formore,seeHacker(1978:554).68.Bharati(1970:273–77).69.Forinstance,HackerinHalbfass(1995:231–32).Alsoseechapter10.70.Onthisprocessof“Orientalization,”seeDirlik(1996:101–3).InsomecasesthatSaidrefusedtoacknowledge,

the Orientalization process even included the political awakening of those European Orientalists who, insympathywiththeobjectsoftheirstudies,spokeoutagainsttheEuropeanimperialprojectinAsia(e.g.,JamesLegge, E. G. Browne, and W. S Blunt). In the context of the history of Indian philosophy, the process ofOrientalizationIamconcernedwithisnotoneofpolitics,dress,orculturalmores.ItisoneinwhichIndologistsunwittinglypickedupandtransmittedthebiasesoftheSanskrittextsthattheyreliedon,representingthebiasesasdisinterestedscientifictruthsaboutnon-Westernculturesandphilosophies.

8.DOXOGRAPHY,CLASSIFICATORYSCHEMES,ANDCONTESTEDHISTORIES1. Other Indian works that Halbfass (1988:350–51) classifies as doxography include Prasthānabheda of

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (1850[16th c. ce]), Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha of Śaṅkara (1983) [14th c. ce ?],Sarvamatasaṃgraha (anonymous),Sarvadarśanakaumudī of Mādhava Sarasvatī, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya ofRājaśekhara, Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya of Merutunga, Ṣaḍdarśanīsiddhāntasaṃgraha of Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita, andSarvasiddhāntapraveśaka (anonymous). On other Buddhist and Jaina doxographers, see Qvarnstöm(1999:176–79); on Bhāviveka as a Buddhist doxographer, see Eckel (2009); and on Jaina doxography, seeFolkert(1993).

2.Thereare,ofcourse,exceptionstothistendency.Forinstance,whileHaribhadraconflatesthePrabhākaraandBhāṭṭaschoolsofMīmāṃsā,Mādhavadoesbrieflyacknowledgeoneof thedifferencesbetween theschools(Abhyankar:286–87).

3.Sometimesasingleauthorwouldwritebothadoxographyandahagiography,coveringsimilarmaterialfromtwodifferentangles.ThisisthecasewithMādhava;inadditiontohisSarvadarśanasaṃgraha,Śaṅkaradigvijayaistraditionally,thoughprobablyincorrectly,ascribedtothesameauthor(Tapasyananda1996).

4.CitedinRunia(1998).5.AristotleDeanima1.2,403b20–25(1936[4thc.bce]:19).6.Mansfeld(2004),Runia(1999:49–51).7.Runia(1999:46).8.Runia(1998);seealsoRunia(1999:52).9.DiogenesLaertius(1925[3rdc.ce]).10.D.Goswami(1905:3).11. Rorty (1984:62).Rorty’sdefinitionofdoxographyoccurs inapolemicagainst thedoxographicalgenre itself.

Unlike three other genres in the history of philosophy—which Rorty labels as historical reconstruction,Geistesgeschichte,andintellectualhistory—heclaimsthatdoxographysimplyservesnolegitimatepurpose.By“doxography,”Rortyseems tohave inmindwidely readmodernworkssuchBertrandRussell’sAHistoryofWestern Philosophy and Frederick Copleston’s History of Philosophy. He castigates this genre as beingintellectuallytimid,andasthe“genrethatinspiresboredomanddespair”(ibid.).DavidRuniatakesexceptiontothispejorativeredefinitionofdoxography(Runia1999:34). IcontendthatalthoughRortyperhapsoverextendsthe term “doxography” in applying it to Copelston and Russell, nonetheless his analysis of their structuralsimilarities isan importantobservation.Asstudentsof Indianphilosophyarewellaware,modernhistoriesofIndianphilosophyareguiltyofpreciselythesametedioustreatmentoftheirtopic,withtheaddeddrawbackthattheauthorsareoftenwritingintheirsecondorthirdlanguage,nottheirnativetongue.

12.Qvarnström(1999:173–74).OthernotabletreatmentsofIndiandoxographyareFolkert(forJainadoxography)(1993:113–45,341–409)andHalbfass(1988:349–68).

13.Qvarnström(1999:174).14.See,forinstance,hisexcellentaccountofBhāviveka’scritiqueoftheVedāntaschool.HedescribesBhāviveka’s

Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (6th c.) as “the earliestSanskrit doxographicalwork that has comedown to us”(Qvarnström1989:98).Presumablyheunderstandsthistexttobeadoxographyofthesecondtype,sinceeachchapterbeginswithapūrvapakṣa,followedbyanuttarapakṣa.

15.Rāmānuja’stextincludesalengthyAdvaitaVedāntapūrvapakṣa,andJayanta’salengthyBuddhistpūrvapakṣa.Both might plausibly be labeled “doxography” using Qvarnstöm’s typology. As far as I know, Halbfass(1988:349–68)wasthefirsttoapplytheword“doxography”toIndiantexts.Ibelievehisintentionwaspreciselytohighlight thisdistinctgenre,whichhadgenerated little interestbeforehiswork. InFolkert’sworkonJainadoxographies,heusestheword“compendia”(Folkert1993:113–46).

16.OnthedifficultquestionofMaṃimēkalaisdates,seeRichman(1988:160–61).

17.InthecontextofhisworkonBhāviveka’sMadhyamakahṛdayakārikā,seeEckel’sdiscussionofMaṇimēkalai(Eckel2009:15–17).

18. Cāttaṉār’s tenpramāṇasarepratyakṣa,anumāna,upamāna,āgama,arthāpatti, svabhāva,aitihya,abhāva,pariśeṣa,andsambhava.Thefirstfiveandtheeighth,abhāva,arefamiliarandtogethermakeupthepramāṣasacceptedbytheBhāttaMīmāṃsakas.Althoughsvabhāva(inherentnature),aitihya(traditionalbelief),pariśeṣa(implicationbycorrelation),andsambhava(probability)areunfamiliarinlaterdoxographicalaccounts,somedooccur as pramāṇas in earlier contexts. See for instance Bh. Pu. 11.19.17: śrutiḥ pratyakṣam aitihyaṃanumānaṃcatuṣṭayam/pramāṇeṣvanavasthānādvikalpātsavirajyate.

19.ThetheorythatVedavyāsaandBādarāyaṇaarethesameauthorappearsforthefirsttimeinVācaspatiMiśra’sBhāmatī and probably came about long afterMaṇimēkalai was written (Nakamura 1989:404–5). Vedānticschoolseitheracceptthreepramāṇas(e.g.,Viśiṣṭādvaita,Dvaita)orsix(Advaita).

20.Śabara,commentaryonJaimini1.1.4(Jha1933).21.Jina,“victorious,”hereseemstobeagenericepithetreferringtotheBuddha,whowasvictoriousoverMāra’s

attemptstothwarthisenlightenment.22.Myaccountofchapter27ofMaṇimēkalaireliesonthesummaryinVaradachari(1971).Unfortunately,thereare

noreliabletranslationsofthepoeminprint.23.Kaṇāda,Vaiśeṣikasūtra9.2.5,inK.Sharma(1972:210–11).24. After the Sāṃkhya teaching, Cāttaṉār says that “Maṇimēkalai listened to this account with lively interest”

(DaniélouandIyer1993:135,139).Maṇimekalai’sBuddhistteacherremarksthatBuddhistlogicisitselfbasedontheteachingsoftheJainateacherJinendra,whowasthefirsttoestablishthatthetwomeansofknowledgeareperception(pratyakṣa)anddeduction(anumāna)(ibid.,152).

25.Monius(2001:66).26.DaniélouandIyer(1993:172),AlainDaniélou’stranslation.27.Ibid.28. On the question of the name of Bhāviveka/Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, see Eckel (2009). Recent scholarship

suggeststhat“Bhāviveka”wastheoriginalnameoftheauthoroftheMadhyamakahṛdayakārikā.29.OnBhāviveka’sinterpretationsofMadhyamakainthethirdchapteroftheMadhyamakahṛdayakārikā,seeEckel

(1978).30. On Bhāviveka’s portrayal of Vedānta in theMadhyamakahṛdayakārikā, see Nakamura (1989:206–17) and

Qvarnström(1989).31. In another text,Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Bhāviveka establishes a three-tiered hierarchy of truths. At the

bottom is erroneous conventional truth (mithyāsamvṛtisatya), exemplified by schools such as Vedānta andMīmāṃsā. Next comes the correct conventional truth (tathyasaṃvṛtisatya) of the Hīnayāna and YogācāraBuddhists. The highest level, the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya), is solely the province of MadhyamakaBuddhism(Qvarnström1989:100–101).

32. Lindtner (2001:102–5).TheschoolsofKumārilaBhaṭṭaandPrabhākaraareatheistic to theextent that theyrejecttheideaofacreatorgodandarguablyrejecttheideaofanygodatallasatypeoflinguisticfiction.WefindtheisticinfluencesinsomeofthelatemedievalMīmāṃsakas,suchasLaugāksiBhāskara.

33.Onthesignificanceofthis“limitationist”metaphorinAdvaitaVedānta,seechapter3inthisvolume.34.Nakamura(1989:208–12).35.Qvarnström(1989:91,101–4).36.nabuddhoktirmahāyānaṃsūtrāntādāvasaṃgrahāt/mārgāntaropadeśādvāyathāvedāntadarśanam//(MHK

4.7,inLindtner2001:50).37.vedāntecahiyatsūktaṃtatsarvaṃbuddhabhāṣitam(MHK4.56,inLindtner2001:55).38.tāthāgatīṃavitathāmmatvānītimimāṃśubhām/tasmāj jātaspṛhaistīrthaiḥ kṛtaṃ tatramamāpi tat // (MHK

8.86,inLindtner2001:89).39.King(1995:138–40).TheGauḍapādawhocomposedtheMāndūkyakārikāismostlikelynotthesameperson

whowrotetheGauḍapādabhāṣya,acommentaryontheSāṃkhyakārikā.40. ajātatā hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo ‘kṛtrimatvataḥ / anapāyitvataś cāsāv ātmety api nigadyate // īdṛśo yady

abhipretaātmāhi bhavatāmapi / nāmādibahusādharmyānnirdoṣaḥ sopapattikaḥ //(MHK 89, 95, in Lindtner2001:89–90).

41.OnBhāviveka’shierarchyofsystemsandthequestionofhis“inclusivism,”seeEckel(2009).42.Qvarnström(1989).43.Itisessentialtorememberthatpremoderndoxographerswerenothistoriansofphilosophyandshouldnotbe

evaluatedbytheirsuccessorfailureinaccuratelypreservingahistoricalrecordofthesituationinagivenera.44.Varadachari(1971:13).45.AlthoughAśvaghosa’sBuddhacaritadepictsSiddhārthaGautama’smeetingwithśramaṇateachersbeforehis

awakening,theonlyteacherswhosedoctrinesarepresentedatlengtharethoseofĀrāḍaKālāma,whoseviewsare similar to the views ascribed to the Sāṃkhya school in the Mahābhārata (Kent 1982). Obviously,Maṇimēkalai’s quest for ultimate truth parallels Siddhārtha’s quest, although not necessarily the versionpresentedintheBuddhacarita.

46. darśanāni ṣaḍ eva. The commentator Maṇibhadra clarifies that the word eva is in the sense of limitation(avadhāraṇa):thereareonlysixsystemsofphilosophy,althoughtheycanbefurthersubdivided,forinstance,intotheeighteenschoolsofBuddhismorthemanydisciplesofJaimini’sMīmāṃsā(Goswami1905:3).

47. Another list of six is provided by the Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s play Āgamaḍambara, also known asṢaṇmatanāṭaka.Theplay’s six schoolsareBuddhism,Jainism,Cārvāka,Mīmāṃsā,Nyāya, andPañcarātra(Raghavan and Thakur 1964). Like Cāttaṉār’sMaṇimēkalai, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s play illustrates the possibleconnectionsbetweendoxographyandstorytelling.

48.DaniélouandIyer(1993:130–31);D.Goswami(1905).49.D.Goswami(1905:70).50. naiyāyikamatād anye bhedaṃ vaiśeṣikaiḥ saha / na manyante mate teṣāṃ pañcaivāstikavādinaḥ //

ṣaḍdarśanasaṃkhyātupūryatetanmatekila/ lokāyatamatakṣepātkathyate tenatanmatam // (D.Goswami1905:71).

51.Thistendencytofirstestablishthenumberofdoctrinesorsectsandthenfitknownsectsintothisschemewasa widespread technique in the premodern world. For instance, Islamic scholars used the number of theseventy-twohereticalsectsasestablishedbytheprophetinthehadithastheprincipleforevaluatingthesectsoftheirowneras.Todothis,insomecases,theydouble-countedthesamesectbyusingtwodifferentnames;inothercases,theyexcludedsectsontherationalethatthesesectsweresohereticalthattheynolongercouldbeconsideredMuslims(Henderson1998:125–26).

52.D.Goswami(1905:59).53. darśanāni ṣaḍ evātra mūlabhedavyapekṣayā / devatātattvabhedena jñātavyāni manīṣibhiḥ // (D. Goswami

1905:3).54.Ibid.,(1905:13–14).55.Ibid.,4.56.Bhāvivekaistheexceptiontothistrend.HeacknowledgesVedāntaasaphilosophicalschoolofitsownandis

thereforeofgreatinteresttohistoriansofearlyVedānta(Nakamura1989:206–19).57.NakamuraseesoccasionalacknowledgmentofVedāntaamongBuddhistsandJainasfrom600to900ceasa

peripheralschoolofthought,althoughtheyhadnoapparentknowledgeofAdvaitaVedānta.OnlyafterthetenthcenturydoesAdvaitabecomeacentraltargetofJainapolemics.Rather,“forsomecenturiesafterthedemiseofŚaṅkaratheinfluenceofBhāskarawasstrongerthanthatofŚaṅkara”(Nakamura1989:263,294–95).

58.D.Goswami(1905:64).59.devatādarśanādhiṣṭhāyakāḥ(ibid.,3).60.buddhodevatā…darśanādikaraḥ(ibid.,5).61.devatādarśanapravartakaādipuruṣaḥ(ibid.,39).62.sāṃkhyānirīśvarāḥkecitkecidīśvaradevatāḥ/sarveṣāmapiteṣāṃsyāttattvānāṃpancaviṃśatiḥ//(ibid.,32).63.Ibid.64.Folkert(1993:125–26)arguesalongsimilarlineswhenheidentifiesdevatāinHaribhadrawithāptatva. Inthis

bookhealsocomparesHaribhadratothelaterJainadoxographersRājaśekhara,Merutunga,andJinadatta.65. jaiminīyāḥ punaḥ prāhuḥ sarvajñādiviśeṣaṇaḥ / devo na vidyate ko ‘pi yasya mānaṃ vaco bhavet // (D.

Goswami1905:64).66. Yet forHaribhadra,notallāstika schoolshaveadevatā, evenby his broadunderstanding of theword.He

identifiesboththenirīśvaraSāṃkhyaandtheMīmāṃsāasbeingdevoidofadevatā.67. Some recentscholarsdisputeMādhava’sauthorshipof theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha. The fourteenth-century

dateofthetext,however,isnotdisputed.SeeprefacetoKlostermaier’seditionoftheSarvadarśanasaṃgraha(Klostermaier1999:v–vi).OnthequestionofwhofoundedtheŚṛngerimaṭha,seeClark(2006).

68.Strictlyspeaking,ofcourse,Mādhava’stextisnothistoricalatall,asitpresentsIndianphilosophicaldoctrinesasexistingsidebysideinstaticandunchangingforms.

69. TheSarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha, ascribed to Śaṅkara, is similar to Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgraha in itsstructure.However,itabandonsanyexplicitclaimthateachlatersystemrefutestheformerinitsfifthchapter(outoftwelve)(Śaṅkara1983[14thc.ce?]).

70.brahmamīmāṃsāvivaraṇavyājenaānandatīrthaḥprasthānāntaramāsthiṣata(Abhyankar1978:128).OnemustavoidconfusingthephilosophersMādhava(thefourteenth-centuryAdvaitaVedāntin)andMadhva(thethirteenth-centuryfounderoftheDvaitaVedāntaschool).

71. YetMādhava, ifhewasalsoauthorof theŚaṅkaradigvijaya, knew theBhedābhedavādinBhāskaraand the

basic Bhedābhedavāda viewpoint. Mādhava portrays Bhāskara in debate with Śaṅkara in that work(Tapasyananda1996:174–83).

72.Śaṅkara(1996[8thc.ce?]:477–78).73.MayedaevenarguesthatŚaṅkara’snotionof“unevolvedname-and-form”ismodeledontheSāṃkhyanotionof

prakṛti(Mayeda1992:19–22).74.OnthestrengthoftheSāṃkhyaschoolintheeighthcentury,seeNakamura(1989).75. Even Rāmānuja, less than two centuries earlier than Mādhava, follows Bhāskara’s and Śaṅkara’s

interpretations,rejectingSāṃkhya inhiscommentaryontheBrahmasūtras. In thiscase,Rāmānuja followedcloselytoearliercommentariesincraftinghisown,leavinglittleroomforthewholesalereinterpretationoftherelationship between Vedānta and Sāṃkhya that we find in the works of medieval Advaitins. For a closecomparison of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja’s interpretations of the Brahmasūtras, see Nakamura(1989:451–65).

76.CowellandGough(1978:273).77.Halbfass(1988:353–54).78.Abhyankar(1978:389).79.Nakamura(1989:242);Klostermaier(1999:1).80.PrasthānabhedaispartofMadhusūdanaSarasvatī’smuchlongerMahimnastotraṭīkā,butitisoftentreatedasa

stand-alonework.Foracompletelistandchronologyofhisworks,seeS.Gupta(2006).81.Madhusūdanaactuallyenumeratestwenty-oneviewpoints,includingtheAdvaitaVedānta.Althoughopponents’

viewsarefirstpresentedinbrief,mostofMadhusūdana’stextisdevotedtolengthyrefutationsofsomeoftheseviews,includingrejectionofBhedābhedaarguments(Karmarkar1962:36).

82.Halbfass(1988:353–54).83.Śaṅkara’sSarvasiddhāntasaṃgrahaalsoincludesalistoftheeighteensciences.UnlikeMadhusūdana,though,

Śaṅkaradoesnotshowhowthedifferentdarśanasfitintothecategoriesofvidyās.84. evaṃ militvā nāstikānāṃ ṣaṭ prasthānāni. tāni kasmān nocyante. satyam. vedabāhyatvāt teṣāṃ

mlecchādiprasthānavatparamparayāpipuruṣārthānupayogitvādupekṣaṇīyameva(Madhusūdana1850[16thc.ce]:13).ItisnotclearwhetherMadhusūdanaalsoconsidersmlecchateachingsascompletelyuselessforanyhumanend.Hemightpossiblyacknowledge,as theMīmāṃsakaŚabaradoes, that foreigners’knowledge isoftenusefulinsomeinstrumentalway,suchastheirskillinthebreedingandcapturingofbirds(Śābarabhāṣya1.3.10,inAbhyaṅkaraandJośī1970:149–54).

85.Ofcourse,mostMīmāṃsakaswouldbesurprisedtofindthattheysubscribetoārambhavāda.86. svaprakāśaparamānandādvitīyaṃ brahma svamāyāvaśān mithyaiva jagadākāreṇa kalpata iti tṛtīyaḥ pakṣo

brahmavādinām. sarveṣāṃ prasthānakaṛtnāṃ munīnāṃ vivartavādaparyavasānenādvitīye parameśvara evapratipādye tātparyaṃ na hi te munayo bhrāntāḥ sarvajñatvāt teṣāṃ kiṃtu bahirviṣayapravaṇānām āpātataḥpuruṣārthepraveśonasaṃbhavatītināstikyavāraṇāya taiḥprakārabhedāḥpradarśitāḥ. tatra teṣāṃ tātparyamabuddhvā vedaviruddhe ‘py arthe tātparyam utprekṣamāṇās tanmatam evopādeyatvena gṛhṇanto janānānāpathajuṣobhavanti(Madhusūdana1850[16thc.ce]:23–24).

9.AFFIRMERS(ĀSTIKAS)ANDDENIERS(NĀSTIKAS)ININDIANHISTORY1. JohnB.Henderson’suseful comparativestudy is silentabout Indianheresiology,perhapsbecausehewas

awareofitscomplexity(Henderson1998:3).2.Forexample,Doniger(1991b:18);Sharma(1987:63–64).TheSanskrittermsseśvaraandnirīśvaraareabetter

approximationof“theist”and“atheist.”3. As Idiscuss inchapter4,however,nirīśvaraSāṃkhyahasnotbeennearlyascommonasmosthistorians

suggest.4.ForareexaminationofthesupposedsoteriologicalcharacterofIndianphilosophy,seeKrishna(1991:16–34).5.Simon(1979:104).6.Mādhava’sSarvadarśanasaṃgrahaonlyusesthetermnāstikatwice,bothtimesasanepithetfortheCārvāka

school,“thecrestgemofthenāstikas”(nāstikaśiromaṇin)(Abhyankar1978,2:255).Āstikadoesnotoccurinthetext.Śaṅkarabegins theVaiśeṣikachapterof theSarvasiddhāntasaṃgrahabyemphaticallymarkingabreakfromthedoctrinesthatcamebefore:“NowtheVaiśeṣika,whoacceptstheteachingsoftheVedas,refutestheBuddhist, Lokāyata, and Jain schools,whoarenāstikas, external to theVedas” (nāstikānvedabāhyāṃs tānbauddhalokāyatārhatān/nirākarotivedārthavādīvaiśeṣiko‘dhunā//)(Śaṅkara1983[14thc.ce?]:19).

7.yo‘vamanyetatemūlehetuśāstrāśrayāddvijaḥ/sasādhubhirbahiṣkāryonāstikovedanindakaḥ//Manu.2.11(Olivelle2006:404).

8.Forananalysisofthispassageandthedangersofreason“ungrounded”andfunctioningasanendinitself,seeGaneri(2001:7–9).

9. nāstikatarkaśāstraṃbauddhacārvākādiśāstraṃ yatra vedo ‘dharmāyeti punaḥ punar uddhuṣyate (Jha 1999,1:72).

10.nāstiparalokonāstidattaṃnāstihutamitināstikaḥ(Jha1999,2:203).11.ForMedhātithionManu4.162and8.349–51,seeJha(1999,4:430–31and6:374–79).12.Halbfass(1983:1–26).13.dṛṣṭavadānuśravikaḥsahyaviśuddhaḥkṣayātiśayayuktaḥ/tadviparītaḥśreyānvyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāt//SK

2,inWezlerandMotegi(1998:47).14.OneindicationofthisisthefurorsurroundingD.N.Jha’sMythoftheHolyCow(D.Jha2002),abookbanned

byacourtinHyderabadforitsthesisthatancientIndiansslaughteredandatecows.15.SeeYuktidīpikācommentaryonSK2(WezlerandMotegi1998:47).16.ThelocusclassicusofYoga’srejectionoftheviolenceenjoinedbytheVedasisVyāsa’scommentaryonYS

2.33.Hewritesthattherearethreemotivationsforkilling:greed,asinthecaseofonewhokillsananimalforitsmeatandskin;anger,asinthecaseofonewhohasbeenharmedbyanother;anddelusion,asinthecaseofonewhobelieves thatmeritwill accruebykillingananimal insacrifice.Vyāsa’scommentary is inG.Śāstrī(1989:255).

17.Forexample,ŚaṅkaraandPaulDeussen.18.AccordingtoSāṃkhyacommentators,“reliabletestimony”(āptavacana)refersbothtothetestimonyofreliable

personsandtothetestimonyofscripture(e.g.,M.Jha1965).19.Clooney(2001:29);Ganeri(2001:7).20. yāny etāni trayīvidbhir na parigṛhītāni …

sāṃkhyayogapāñcarātrapāśupataśākhyagranthaparigṛhītadharmādharmanibandhanāni.SeeKumārilaBhaṭṭa’sTantravārttika,commentaryonMS1.3.4,inAbhyaṅkaraandJośī(1970,2:112).

21.Eltschinger(forthcoming).22.PMS2.1.1,2.1.7,inAbhyaṅkaraandJośī(1970,2:333–54,2:380).23.Ibid.,2.1.6(2:379–80).24.OnVedāntaas“UttaraMīmāṃsā,”seeClooney(1993:23–29).25.WhilesomeschoolsofVedāntabelievethatthepathtoliberationrequiresacombinationofknowledgeandritual

action (jñānakarmasamuccayavāda),Advaitinsmightbedescribedassomewhathostile to ritual, since theymaintainthatatacertainstage,ritualactivitycanbeabandonedcompletely.

26.Nakamura(1989:206–16).27.Bythefifteenthcentury,thisprocessofadaptationhadgonesofarthatsomeMīmāṃsakasevenacceptedthe

existenceofGod(e.g.,LaugāksiBhāskarainGajendragadkarandKarmarkar1998:69).28.nāstiparalokonāstidattaṃnāstihutamitināstikaḥ(G.Jha1999,2:203).29.āstikavādināmihaparalokagatipuṇyapāpāstikyavādināṃ(D.Goswami1905:70).30.āstināstidiṣṭaṃmatiḥ(TripathiandMalaviya1985,5:265).31.paraloko‘stiitiyasyamatiḥsaāstikaḥ.tadviparītonāstikaḥ.Kāśikā1801(TripathiandMalaviya1985,5:265).32.Possiblescripturalevidenceforthegrammarians’understandingoccursatKaṭhaUp.1.20:“Thereisthisdoubt

about amanwho is dead. ‘He exists’ (asti), say some, others, ‘He exists not’ (nāyam asti)” (translation inOlivelle 1998:379). To the best of my knowledge, no premodern commentator has cited this passage asjustificationforthedefinitionofnāstikaandāstika.

33.ThisunderstandingisreiteratedinthegrammarianBhaṭṭojiDīkṣita’sSiddhāntaKaumudī(Vasu1962).34. The Ājīvika school, for instance, accepts rebirth while denying that good or bad actions have any

consequences.35.WhetherornotAsangawastheauthorofYogācārabhūmi,thistextwaslikelycomposedinthefourthorfifth

centuryCE.36.Asaṅga(Dutt1966:31);thistranslationisbyEckel(2009:65–66).37.Eckel’stranslation(2009:282).FortheoriginalSanskritandTibetanofthispassage,seeibid.,432.38.Eckel(2009:432).39.TheBodhisattvabhūmi’sconcernwiththeovernegationoftheMadhyamakaandrelativelackofconcernwiththe

undernegation of Hīnayāna is itself an indication of the importance of ethical action among Buddhists. AHīnayānaBuddhist,althoughhemaynotunderstandtheultimatetruthsofBuddhism,willcontinuetobelieveinkarmaandtofollowtheBuddhisteightfoldpath.ButanihilisticinterpretationofMadhymakaBuddhismwillentailthe complete nonexistence of agent, action, and effect and will likely lead to the abandonment of Buddhistpractice.ThisiswhyNāgārjunaacknowledgesatMMK24.11thatthemisperceptionofemptinesscanleadtocompletedestruction,thesamewayasnakewhenmishandledcanleadtothedeathofthehandler:vināśayatidurdṛṣṭāśūnyatāmandamedhasam/sarpoyathādurgṛhītovidyāvāduṣprasādhitā//(Kalupahana1986:335).

40.Ofcourse,atasecond-orderlevel,bothoftheassertionsthat“thereareconsequencesforouractions”and“there are no consequences for our actions” can be understood as statements of doctrine. But the real

significanceofthesestatementsisonthepracticallevel.41.Nakamura(1989:473)arguesthattheSāṃkhyaschoolwasthemaintargetofBādarāyaṇa’sBrahmasūtras,as

wellasofitsearlycommentatorsŚaṅkaraandBhāskara.42.Henderson(1998:17).43.Ibid.44.Colebrooke(1977[1837]:117–228).45.Henderson(1998:138).46.Bythesixteenthcentury,manyoftheśrautaritesenjoinedintheṜgVedaandtheBrāhmaṇashadfallenpartly

orcompletelyoutofpractice,andnewerritualsdescribedintheĀgamasandTantrashadtakentheirplace.ItwouldhavebeenhardtomaintainthattheessenceoftheVedasweretheirritualinjunctionswhen,infact,fewoftheseritualswerebeingperformed.

47.Forinstance,therewassomedebateastowhethertheskepticismofSextusEmpiricusshouldberecognizedasahairesis;Sextusarguedthat itshould,sincealthoughtheskepticsdonotrelyondogmaticpropositions,theydofollowacertainmethodofreasoning(Simon1979:110–11).

48.Henderson(1998:43–44).49.ThepolemicalusageofthesetwoSanskritwordsshowsomesimilaritiestothewaythewords“optimist”and

“pessimist”areusedincontemporarypoliticaldiscourseintheUnitedStates.Everypoliticiandeclareshimselfan“optimist”andlabelshisopponenta“pessimist.”Yetdevoidofcontext,“optimist”and“pessimist”areemptyterms,everybitasunderdeterminedasāstikaandnāstika.

50.MādhavainAbhyankar(1978).By“sublation,”IhaveinmindsomethingsimilartotheHegelianAufhebung—notmerelyanegationbutalsoafulfillmentofthedoctrinesthatcamebefore.InanexplicitlyAdvaitacontext,alsocfEliotDeutschsnotionof“subration”(Deutsch1969:15–36).

51.Garbe(1895:20–22).52.etenādhunikānāṃvedāntibruvāṇāmapimataṃvijñānavādatulyayogakṣematayānirastam(ibid.,21).53.BhedābhedaVedāntinshavealsobeennegativelyassociatedwithanāstikaschool.TheViśistādvaitinVedānta

Deśika called Yāda vaprakāśa “a Vedāntin who smells like a Jaina” (vedāntijainagandhin) (Vedānta Deśika(1974)[14thc.CE]:11).

54.Garbe(1895:4).55.astuvāpāpināṃjñānapratibandhārthamāstikadarśaneṣvapyaṃśataḥśrutiviruddhārthavyavasthāpanam.teṣu

teṣv aṃśeṣv aprāmāṇyaṃ ca śrutismṛtyaviruddheṣu tu mukhyaviṣayeṣu prāmāṇyam asty eva. ata evapadmapurāṇebrahmayogadarśanātiriktānāṃdarśanānāṃnindāpyupapadyate(ibid.,4).

56.ThisissimilartoMadhusūdana’sargumentinthefinalsectionofthePrasthānabheda(Madhusūdana1850[16thc.ce]:23–24).

57.Vis.Pu.4.18.Onvariationsofthisstory,seeO’Flaherty(1976:187–211).58.Radhakrishnan(1927:23).

10.HINDUUNITYANDTHENON-HINDUOTHER1.Forexample,Biardeau(1989:160).2.Ghose(2000:143).3. Following this logic, the first amendment of theU.S.Constitution states that “Congress shallmakeno law

respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof For a contrast of this“Jeffersonian project” of the privatization of religionwith the public debate (vāda) of the Indian philosophicalschools,seeClayton(2006).

4.“Noprivatepersonhasanyrightinanymannertoprejudiceanotherpersoninhiscivilenjoymentsbecauseheisofanotherchurchorreligion.Alltherightsandfranchisesthatbelongtohimasaman,orasadenizen,areinviolablytobepreservedtohim.Thesearenotthebusinessofreligion.Noviolencenorinjuryistobeofferedhim,whetherhebeChristianorPagan”(Locke2004[1689]:10).

5.“WhyshouldItolerate?TolerationmeansthatIthinkthatyouarewrongandIamjustallowingyoutolive.IsitnotablasphemytothinkthatyouandIareallowingotherstolive?Iacceptallreligionsthatwereinthepast,andworshipwiththemall;IworshipGodwitheveryoneofthem,inwhateverformtheyworshipHim.IshallgotothemosqueoftheMohammedan;IshallentertheChristian’schurchandkneelbeforethecrucifix;IshallentertheBuddhistictemple,whereIshalltakerefugeinBuddhaandinhisLaw”(Vivekananda1970–1972,2:374).

6.Forinstance,atBhG10.12and10.15(respectively).7.BhG9.23–24,translatedinMiller(1986:86):ye‘pyanyadevatābhaktāyajanteśraddhayānvitāḥ/te‘pimāmeva

kaunteyayajantyavidhipūrvakam//ahaṃhisarvayajñānāṃbhoktācaprabhurevaca/natumāmabhijānantitattvenātaścyavantite//

8.BhG11.15,translatedinMiller(1986:99):paśyāmidevāṃstavadevadehesarvāṃstathābhūtaviśeṣasaṃghān

/brahmāṇamīśaṃkamalāsanasthamṛṣīṃścasarvānuragāṃścadivyān//9.KūrmaPu.2.4.8,mytranslation.(TheĪśvaragītamakesupthefirstelevenchaptersofthesecondsectionofthe

Kūrma Purāṇa). ahaṃ hi sarvahaviṣāṃ bhoktā caiva phalapradaḥ / sarvadevatanurbhūtvā sarvātmāsarvasamṣthitaḥ//(A.Gupta1971:389).CfBhG9.24.

10.Hacker(1978:599).11.Hacker(1983:21;1978:600).12.Hacker(1978:600).13.Ibid.,239.14.Ibid.,480.15.Inthemodernperiod,V.S.SavarkarhasarguedthatJainism,Buddhism,andSikhismarefacetsofHinduism

(Savarkar1989[1928]:123–26).16.HackerinHalbfass(1995:231–32).17.HackerinHalbfass(1995:232).18.Hacker(1978:599).19.InNicholasofCusa’sfifteenth-centuryDePaceFidei,forinstance,Cusaportraysallfaiths,includingHinduism

andIslam,asimperfectbutgenuineexpressionsoftheChristiangospel(Hopkins1995).Hackerisacriticofinclusivist trends in twentieth-century Catholicism, exemplified particularly by Karl Rahner’s concept of the“anonymousChristian”(formore,seeHacker1978:793–819).

20. LarsonandBhattacharyawrite thatVijñānabhikṣu’s “syncretism ishardly complete, for it isquite clear thatVijñānabhikṣu has very little patience with the māyāvāda or Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers”(LarsonandBhaṭṭacharya1987:375).

21. Indeed, the Advaitins frequently manufacture superficial differences between their views and those of theBuddhists, evenon issueswhere their position is closer to theBuddhists than to otherāstika schools. Forinstance,onMandanaMiśra’santi-BuddhistpolemicsintheBrahmasiddhi,seeH.Nicholson(2002:577–78).

22. nahi temunayobhrāntāḥsarvajñatvātteṣāṃ kiṃtubahirviṣayapravaṇānāmāpātataḥpuruṣārthepraveśonasaṃbhavatītināstikyavāraṇāyataiḥprakārabhedāḥpradarśitāḥ tatrateṣāṃ tātparyamabuddhvāvedaviruddhepy arthe tātparyam utprekṣamāṇās tanmatam evopādeyatvena gṛhṇanto janā nānāpathajuṣo bhavanti(Madhusūdana1850[16thc.ce]:23).

23.Assmann(1996:34).24.Halbfass(1988:186–87).25.Ibid.26.Ahmad(1999:167–81,191–96,218–23).27.ForareviewoftextstranslatedfromSanskritintoPersianduringtheMughalperiod,seeErnst(2003:178–87).28. Themain exception to this silence seems in to be in Jaina texts such asHīrasaubhāgya, a biography of

HīravijayaSūri(1527–1595)(Dundas1999).Inthemodernperiod,BankimcandraChatterji’sĀnandamatḥ(2005[1882])tellsastoryofviolentsaṃnyāsinresistanceagainstMuslimsoldiersworkingfortheBritishEastIndiaCompany.“VandeMātaram,”nowthenationalsongofIndia,appearedforthefirsttimeinthiswork.

29.Thequestionofthedoxographers’portrayalsofJainasisinsomewaysevenmorevexingthantheirportrayalofBuddhists.Mādhava,forinstance,wouldhavehadcloseacquaintancewithJainasandJainisminhispositionasaministerintheVijayanagaracourts.YethistreatmentofJainismintheSDSshowsnomoreinsightthanhissummariesoftheBuddhistsorCārvākas.Thisagainhighlightstherestraintsthatthegenreofdoxographyputonitsauthors.

30.darśanāniṣaḍeva(D.Goswami1905:3).31.Onthelogicofśāstra,seePollock(1985:516).32.Thapar(1989:223).Obviously,yavanacametoberegardedasagenerictermfor“foreigner”or“barbarian.”On

yavanaandśaka,seeHalbfass(1988:176–77).CaseswhereMuslimsarerecognizedassuchinSanskrittextsare often nineteenth-century interpolations. For instance, the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa refers to mahāmada(Mohammedans)andalludestothestoryofAdamandEve(Halbfass1988:194).

33.Zelliot(1982:177).34.Ibid.,178.35. There are different classes of demons in Hindu mythology. In particular, we should distinguish between

rākṣasas,flesh-eatingcreaturesofthenight,andasuras,aclassofcelestialbeingswhowerecreatedbeforethedevasandwhoantagonizedthem.PollockshowsthatMuslimsaredescribedasbothasurasandrākṣasas.InthedemonizationofBuddhistsandJainas,theyaregenerallydescribedasasuras.ForatypologyofdemonsinIndia,seeSutherland(1991:49–61).

36.Pollock(1993b:287).37.Talbot(1995:696–97).38.Ch.Up.8.8.4–8.8.5;translationfromOlivelle(1998:283–84).

39. One important difference, however, is that while Virocana believes that caring for the body leads to theattainmentofthenextworld,Cārvākasdenythatsuchaworldexists.

40. Mādhava alludes to this story in his hagiography ofŚaṅkara, theŚaṅkaradigvijaya. He depicts theAdvaitaphilosopherasanincarnationofŚivasenttoearthtocounteractallofthefalseviewscausedbyViṣṇu’sownincarnationastheBuddha(Tapasyananda1996:4).

41.Forexample,Vis.Pu.1.9,Mbh1.15–17.42. śrutismṛtinyāyavacaḥkṣīrābdhimathanoddhṛtaṃ / jñānāmrtam guroḥ prītyai bhūdevebhyo nu dīyate //

pariviṣayyasadbuddhyāmohinyevāthadānavān/kutarkānvañcayitvedaṃpīyatāmamṛtepsubhiḥ //pītvaitadbalavantastepākhaṇḍāsurayūthapān/vijityajñānakarmabhyāṃyāntuśrīmadguroḥpadam//(Tripāṭhī1979:1).

43. Onthedefinitionandchangingmeaningofpāṣaṇḍa(andpākhaṇḍa,which isavariantspelling),seeThapar(1978:66)andEltschinger(forthcoming).

44. Halbfass (1988:192–93); Thapar (1989:222). The only authors to deny this areHindu nationalists such asSavarkar,Golwalkar,andtheirfollowers.

45.Talbot(1995:700).46.Ibid.47.O’Connell(1973:341).48.Stietencron(1995:51).49. DermotKillingleytracestheword“Hindooism”toatextbytheBengali religiousreformerRammohanRoyin

1816 (Killingley1993:62).GeoffreyOddiehaspointedoutearlierusageof theword in thewritingsofeighth-centuryBritishmissionaries(Oddie2006:70–72).

50.Stietencron(1995:60).51.Lorenzen(2005:53).52.Ibid.,73.53.HawleyandJuergensmeyer(1988:41).54. For evidence of Kabīr as an equal-opportunity reviler of Islam and Hinduism, see complaints against him

recordedbythesixteenth-centuryauthorAnantadās:“HehasabandonedthecustomsoftheMuslimsandhasbrokenthetouchabilityrulesoftheHindus”(quotedinLorenzen2005:71).

55.Talbot(1995:720).56.Pollock(1993b:263).57.AtManusmṛti2.11,nāstikasaredefinedastwice-bornswhoreviletheVeda.Sincetwice-borns(membersof

thethreehighestvarṇas)areonlyindigenoustoIndia,thisexcludesforeignersfromthecategoryofnāstika.Inlaterdefinitions,thisstipulationseemstohavebeendropped.OntheSanskrittermmleccha,seeThapar(1971)andHalbfass(1988:175–89).

58.Thapar(1989:209–210).59. For instance,Cynthia’sTalbot’spainstakingworkonfourteenth-centuryVijayanagarainscriptionshasalready

beentakenoutofitshistoricalcontextandco-optedbytheRSS(RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh):“Theword‘Hindu’hasaninspiringhistoricalbackground.Ithasbeenthemotivatingconceptforourindependencestruggleforthelastonethousandyears….TheproudepithetappliedtothegreatemperorswhofoundedtheVijayanagarempirewas‘Hindurayasuratrana,’i.e.,theprotectorsoftheHindusandtheirvaluesoflife”(Sheshadri2009).

60.Thapar(1989:225).61.Eaton(2000:314–15);Talbot(1995:718).62. For example, “in India there never was any religious persecution by the Hindus, but only that wonderful

reverence,whichtheyhaveforallreligionsoftheworld”(Vivekananda1970–1972,1:391).OnthedestructionofJainaandBuddhistmonasteriesbyŚaivas,seeThapar(1989:219–20).

63.Thapar(1989:219–20).64.Ontheterms“Neo-Hindu”and“Neo-Vedāntin,”seeHalbfass(1995:8).65.Radhakrishnan(1927:23).66.Radhakrishnan(1940:347).67.V.S.Savarkar,founderofthehindutvaideology,ignorestheprecedentofthePurāṇasbyarguingthatJainas,

Buddhists,andSikhsareHindus, insofaras their religionsarenative to India (Savarkar1989[1928]:123–26).OtherformativethinkersforHindunationalism,suchasDayanandaSaraswati,werelessembracingofthesegroups.

68.Forinstance,theglobal,transnationalphenomenonofmodernposturalyogathreatenstheideaofyogaasalegacybelongingtoHinduismortothenationofIndiaalone(formore,seeAlter2004).

69.Vivekananda(1970–1972,5:52).

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INDEX

abbreviationsābhiprāyika(intentional)abhyupagamasiddhānta.Seetenetsabhyupagamavāda.Seetemporaryconcession(abhyupagamavāda)absence,mutual.Seeidentityandmutualabsence(tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva)abstentionsandobservances(yamasandniyamas)Acintyabhedābheda(InconceivableDifferenceandNon-Difference)schoolacintyatva(inconceivability)adhominemargumentsadhiṣṭhānakāraṇa.Seelocuscause(adhiṣṭhānakārana)adhiṣṭhātr(superintendent)assynonymfordeity(devatā)ādhunikas(“moderns”)advaita.Seedualityandnon-duality(dvaitaandadvaita)Advaita(Non-Dualist)VedāntaschoolattackonBrahman,causalityofBuddhistschool,likenedtoas“crypto-nāstika,”developmentofdoxographiesGodandidealistschoolasIllusionisminstitutionalizationliberationandlimitationismOrientalismandPadmaPurāna,whipping-boyofthePūranasandreflectionismscripture,falsestatementsofsuperiorityofthreatstoviewsvivartaand.SeealsoŚaṅkara;dualityandnon-duality(dvaitaandadvaita);Sarvadarśanasamgraha;Sarvasiddhāntasamgrah;Vivaranasub-school;Bhāmatīsub-school

Aëtius“afirmers.”Seeāstikasagent(kartr)ahimsā(nonviolence)aiśvarya.Seelordliness(aiśvarya)ajātivādaākāśa.Seespace(ākāśa)Akbar,Emperorakhandatā.Seeundividedness(akhandatā)AllgemeineGeschichtederPhilosophiealoneness(kaivalya)aṃśaandaṃśin.Seepartandwhole(aṃśaandaṃśin)anādi(“beginningless”)Ānandagiriānanda(bliss)anātman(“no-self”)anekāntavāda.Seeperspectivism(anekāntavāda)animalsacrifice,oppositiontoAniruddhaanirvacanīya(“indescribable”)“anotherworld”(paraloka)Anubhāsyaanugraha(grace)anumāna.Seerationalinference(anumāna)anuyoginandpratiyogin(subjunctandadjunct)anvīksikī(investigation)anyonyāśraya(mutualdependence)anyonyābhāva.Seeidentityandmutualabsence(tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva)aphorisms(sūtras)SeealsoBrahmasūtras;Tattvasamāsasūtras;Yogasūtras

AppayaDīkṣitaSeealsoSiddhāntaleśasamgrahaapratisthatva(instability)āptavacana(“reliabletestimony”)ārambhavādaAristotleArthaśāstraarthavāda(statementsofpraise)asamprajñātasamādhi(objectlessmeditation)AsangaāstikasBuddhistandJainaschoolsasclassificationdoctrines,falseenumerationhistoryinclusivismandlogicmeaningsMedievalperiod,lateorthodoxyandheterodoxyandpreferredtranslationof“sixsystems”ofHinduphilosophytextsSeealsoMīmāṃsā(Exegesis)schoolNyāyaschool;Sāṃkhyaschool;Vaiśeṣikaschool;Vedāntaschool;Yogaschool

asurasSeealsodaityasAśvaghosaatheismandtheism.Seetheismandatheismātman.Seeself(ātman)AugustineAupādhikaBhedābheda(ConditionalDifferenceandNon-Difference)Austin,J.L.avacchedavāda(limitationism)avaidharmya(non-differenceofessentialqualities)avasthāvatandavasthāavayava,aṃśaversusavibhāga.Seeseparationandnon-separation(vibhāgāvibhāga)avidyā(ignorance)avikārikāraṇa(unchangingcause)

“badarguments”(kutarkas)BādarāyaṇaSeealsoBrahmasūtras“beginningless”(anādi)bhāgaandbhāginSeealsopartandwhole(aṃśaandaṃśin)BhagavadGītā,commentaryGod,acceptanceofinclusivismandBhāgavataPurāna,commentaryKapilaandbhakti.Seedevotion(bhakti)Bhāmatīsub-schoolSeealsoVācaspatiMiśraBharati,AgehanandaBhartṛprapañcaBhāskaraConditionalDifferenceandNon-DifferenceviewsBhāvāgaṇeśaSeealsoSāṃEkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana(LightontheTrueMeaningoftheSāṃkhyaPrinciples)BhāvivekaSeealsoMadhyamakahrdayakārikābhedaandabheda.Seedifferenceandnon-difference(bhedābheda)bhedābheda.Seedifferenceandnon-difference(bhedābheda)Bhedābheda(DifferenceandNon-Difference)Vedāntaschoolbhaktiandcharacteristic,definingearlyfutureofGodandinterpretationsmetaphysicsofnegativeconnotationofriseofŚaṅkara,aftertraditionversusschool

bhedavākyasandabhedavākyas.Seestatementsofdifferenceandnon-difference(bhedavākyasandabhedavākyas)

bliss(ānanda)bodhisattvaBodhisattvabhūmi(StagesoftheBodhisattvaPath)“bodyofdignity”(mahātmyaśarīra)“boldassertion”(prauḍhivāda)“bolddebater”(prauḍhivādin)Brahma-Mīmāṃsā(ExegesisofBrahman)schoolSeealsoVedāntaschoolbrahmakāndaBrahman:attributesofcausalityofknowledgeoflimitingconditionsandmutualabsencewithselfnatureofselfandasspaceunchangingaswhole

“Brahmanisconsciousness”(prajñānambrahma)Brahmasūtrabhāsya,influencesubcommentaryBrahmasūtras,aphorismsBrahmanandselfincommentaryillusion,lackofinterpretationofSāṃkhyaclaims,

refutationofBrhadāranyakaUpaniṣad,commentaryonmonismofBronkhorst,JohannesBuddha,theVisnu,incarnationofbuddhi.Seeintellect(buddhi)BuddhismAdvaitaVedāntalikenedtoasāstikadeitieswronglyascribedtodoxographies,roleinashighestteachingnonviolencerationalinferenceandteachings,intentionallyfalse“universalnegation,”accusedofSeealsoMadhyamaka(Emptiness)Buddhistschool;Vijñānavāda(Mind-Only)Buddhistschool;HīnayānaBuddhism

Burckhardt,Jacob

Caitanya:biographyinfluenceschoolofCārvākaschoolatheism“demonization”andhedonismrefutedIslam,placeholderfornāstika,true“teachingsofdarkness,”viewsSeealsoLokāyataschool

castes(varnas)Brahmasūtraslessaccessiblebylower,clashesbetween“interculturalmimesis”andCatholicism,RomanCāttaṉārSeealsoMaṇimēkalaicauseandeffect(kāraṇaandkārya)Brahman,causalityofGod,causalityofignoranceascauseoftheworldmanifestationandself,causalityofSeealso“effectpreexistsinthecause”(satkāryavāda);changingcause(vikārikāraṇa);instrumentalcause(nimittakāraṇa);locuscause(adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa);materialcause(upādānakārana);rootcause(mūlakāraṇa);subordinatecause(dvārakāraṇa);unchangingcause(avikārikāraṇa)

Chakrabarty,DipeshChāndogyaUpaniṣad,interpretationofmonismchangelessnesschangingcause(vikārikāraṇa)Chattopadhyaya,DebiprasadChristianity“absolutereligion,”Hinduismversusinclusivismofmissionariesof,defenseagainst.Seealsoorthodoxyandheterodoxy

churningoftheoceanofmilkCiceroclass(jāti)Cohen,JeffreyColebrooke,H.T.influenceVedānta,essenceofcollection(samuccaya)colonialism,impactof“combinationofknowledgeandritualaction”(jñānakarmasamuccayavāda)commentary(bhāsya)onBhagavadGītā,onBrahmasūtras,onĪśvaragītā,onNyāyasūtras,onSāmkhyakārikā,onSāmkhyasūtras,onṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya,onUpaniṣads,onYogasūtras,SeealsoKāśikāvrtti,Yogavārttika,Sāmhyapravacanabhāsya,Vijñānāmṛtabhāsya

communalismcompendium(saṃgraha)“completelyunreal”(tuccha)complexity(gaurava)conceptualobjectsconclusions.Seetenets(siddhāntas)conditionallyreal(vyavahārasat)contingent(naimittika)contradiction,principleofconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)Copleston,Frederickcosmogonismcreationtheories“crypto-Buddhist”(pracchannabauddha)Advaita(Non-Duality)Vedāntaschoolas“crypto-nāstika,”“crypto-Vedāntin,”culturaldegeneration

daityasSeealsoasurasDārāShikoh

darśanas.Seeschools,philosophical(darśanas)Dasgupta,SurendranathDavidson,DonaldDayanandaSaraswatideceptioninteachingsdeismdeities(devatās)classificationofschools,usedindemonizationdemons(daityas)asmetaphorsSeealsoasuras,daityas,rākṣasas“deniers.”SeenāstikasDeussen,PaulhistoryofIndianphilosophy,interpretationofinfluenceinfluenceofMādhavaonworksdevatās.Seedeities(devatās)devotion(bhakti)BhedābhedaandknowledgeversuspoetsrejectionofVijñānābhiksuanddharmaVedacontrarytodharmaśāstra(legaltext)Diels,Hermanndifferenceandnon-difference(bhedābheda)categoriesofessentialqualities,non-differenceoflanguageoflogicandmetaphysicsofmultiplemeaningsofbhedāandabhedānegativeconnotationofpartandwholeseparationandnon-separationasstatementsofSeealsoAupādhikaBhedābheda(ConditionalDifferenceandNon-Difference);SvābhāvikaBhedāheda(EssentialDifferenceandNon-Difference)

DiogenesLaërtiusDirlik,Arifdisciplineofaction(karmayoga)disciplineofknowledge(jñānayoga)disguise(misa)disjunction(viyoga)dissolution(laya)divided(vibhakta)DivyasimhaMiśradoxographersSeealsoHaribhadra;Mādhava;MadhusūdanaSarasvatīdoxographiesdefinedhistoryofinfluenceofIslam,absenceoflimitationsofmodels,earlypurposeoftypesofSeealsoŚaḍḍdarśanasamuccaya(CollectionoftheSixPhilosophicalSystems);Maṇimēkalai;Madhyamakahrdayakārikā;Sarvadarśanasamgraha;Sarvamatasamgraha

dravya(substance)drstisrstivāda,doctrineofdualism,monismversusdualityandnon-duality(dvaitaandadvaita)Brahmanasdualandnon-dualdifferenceandnon-differenceasdualism,historicaldeevolutionfrommonismtorealityandSāṃkhyaandYogaandSeealsoŚuddhādvaita(PureNon-Dualist)school;Advaita(Non-Dualist)Vedāntaschool;Dvaita(Dualist)Vedāntaschool;Viśiṣṭādvaita(QualifiedNon-Dualist)Vedāntaschool

dvaita.Seedualityandnon-duality(dvaitaandadvaita)Dvaita(Dualist)VedāntaschoolSeealsoMadhvadvandvacompoundsdvārakāraṇa(“subordinatecause”)Dyson,Freeman

Edgerton,Franklin“effectpreexistsinthecause”(satkāryavāda)critiqueofekavākyatā,principleofEknāthelements,constituentEltshinger,Vincentembodiedliberation(jīvanmukti)“eternalandunchanging”(kūtasthanitya)“eternalreligion”(sanātanadharma)ethnicity,religionversusEurocentrismexclusivismexegesis(mīmāmsā).SeeMīmāṃsā(Exegesis)school

externaltotheVedas(vedabāhya)

foreigners(mlecchas)Muslimsasnāstikasas

Gandhi,MohandasGarbe,RichardinfluenceSāmkhyasūtrasandworksgati(transmigration)Gauḍapāda(Sāṃkhyacommentator)Gauḍapāda(Vedāntacommentator)SeealsoMāndūkyakārikāGaudapādabhāsya,SeealsoSāmkhyakārikāgaurava(complexity)GermanidealismGhose,AurobindoGod(īśvara)“bodiesofdignity”assumedbycausalityofdefinitionofdesire,freefromdisprovingexistenceofgraceofkarma,requiredbyknowledgeofliberationand,106;logicalsuperfluityofmanifestationsofmatter,mutualdependencewithpassivityofpowers,God-likepuruṣa,firstthreeguṇas,freeofYogasūtrasandSeealso“withGod”(seśvara);“withoutGod”(nirīśvara);lordliness(aiśvarya);theismandatheism

Gough,A.E.Vedānta,essenceofgrace(anugraha)grammarians,Sanskrit“greatstatements”(mahāvākyas)Greekphilosophyguṇas:allegoriesforequilibriumofGodfreeofisolationisdevolutionofthenon-differenceofrejectionofSeealsoSāṃkhyaschool

Hacker,PaulinclusivismandHall,FitzedwardHallisey,CharlesHaribhadraāstikasandnāstikasunderstandingofSeealsoSadddarśanasamuccaya

heaven(svarga)Hegel,G.W.F.heresiology.Seeorthodoxyandheterodoxyheresy.Seeorthodoxyandheterodoxy“hermeneuticsofcharity,”heterodoxy.Seeorthodoxyandheterodoxyhimsā(violence),necessityofHīnayānaBuddhism“Hinduidentity,”HindureformersHindurenaissance“Hindutoleration,”Hindu-TurkSamvād“Hinduunity,”allegedfiction,SeealsounificationofHinduismHinduism:allegedinventionbyBritish“eternalreligion,”inclusivismNeo-Hinduismversusself-identityhistoriesofIndianphilosophy“HistoriographyofPhilosophy,Te:FourGenres”

idealismrealismversusidentityandmutualabsence(tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva)Brahmanandtheselfcompleteidentityasnon-differencedifferenceasmutualabsence

ignorance(avidyā)illusion(māyā)asassistant“beginningless,”falsedoctrineofmatter,syonymouswithmeaningUpaniṣads,centralteachingofworldas

inclusivisminconceivability(acintyatva)“indescribable”(anirvacanīya)Indianphilosophy:deevolutionaryschemeGreekphilosophyandindividual(vyakti)individualself(jīva)puruṣa,synonymouswithpluralityofjīvasIndologistsinfluenceofSeealsoOrientalisminference,rational.Seerationalinference(anumāna)

infidels(pākhandas)injunctions(vidhis)instability(apratisthatva)institutionalizationinstrumentalcause(nimittakāraṇa)intellect(buddhi)intellectualhistory,premodernIndianintentional(ābhiprāyika)“interculturalmimesis,”“inventionoftradition”hypothesisinvestigation(anvīksikī)Islamdemonizationofdoxographies,absenceinSanskritHinduismversusMadhyamakaBuddhistschooland“otherness”ofTurks,Muslimslabeledasvilificationof

isolation.Seealoneness(kaivalya)Īśvara(God).SeeGod(īśvara)ĪśvaragītāĪśvaragītābhāsyaĪśvarakrsnaSeealsoSāmkhyakārikā

Jainism:asāstikaattackondeitieswronglyascribedtofalseness“freefromfault,”nonviolence(ahimsā)teachings,intentionallyfalse

James,Williamjāti(class)JayādityaJayantaBhaṭṭaSeealsoNyāya(Logic)school;NyāyamañjarīJinendraSeealsoMahāvīrajīva.Seeindividualself(jīva)jīvātman.Seeindividualself(jīva)jīvanmukti(embodiedliberation)jñānakarmasamuccayavāda(“combinationofknowledgeandritualaction”)jñānayoga(“disciplineofknowledge”)jñāna.Seeknowledge(jñāna)Jones,William

KabīrKāśikāvṛttikaivalya.Seealoneness(kaivalya)Kamalaśīlakāmya(“optional”)Kapilaatheismquestionedearliestmentionofīśvara,embodimentofNārāyana,incarnationofSāmkhyasūtras,questionedauthorshipoftemporaryconcessionwicked,knowledgeofGodwithheldfromtheSeealsoTattvasamāsasūtras

kāraṇa.Seecauseandeffect(kāraṇaandkārya)karmaSeeritualaction(karma)karmayoga(disciplineofaction)kartr(agent)kāryaSeecauseandeffect(kāraṇaandkārya)KāśikāvṛttiKlostermaier,Klausknowledge(jñāna)devotionversusdisciplineofmeansofKrishna,DayaKrsnaKrtakotiKumārilaBhaṭṭaSeealsoMīmāmsā(Exegesis)school,PūrvaMīmāmsā(PriorExegesis)schoolKūrmaPurānakutarkas(“badarguments”)kūtasthanitya(“eternalandunchanging”)

Laghusāmkhyavṛtti

laukikeśvara(“worldlylord”)laya(dissolution)legaltexts(dharmaśāstras)liberation(moksa)aloneness,synonymouswithdoxographicalorganization,elementofembodiedGodandjñānakarmasamuccayavādaandknowledgeasinstrumentofmeditationandtattvasasmeanstoYogaschooland

līlā(play)limitationism(avacchedavāda)limitingconditions(upādhis)BrahmananddestructionofdifferenceofdualityduetoselfandLocke,Johnlocuscause(adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa)locutionaryversusperlocutionaryactslogic(nyāya)bhedābhedaandnāstikasandscienceofLokāyataschoolSeealsoCārvākaschoollordliness(aiśvarya)distractionbyindifferencetoprakṛtiandSeealsoGod(īśvara);“worldlylord”(laukikeśvara)Lorenzen,David

MādhavaSeealsoSarvadarśanasamgraha(CompendiumofAllPhilosophicalSystems)MadhusūdanaSarasvatīāstikaconcordance,positiononSeealsoPrasthānabheda(TheVariousReligiousSources)

MadhvaSeealsoDvaita(Dualist)VedāntaschoolMadhyamaka(Emptiness)BuddhistschoolIslamandMadhyamakahrdayakārikā,SeealsoBhāvivekaMahābhārata,authorofclassifiedasdharmaśāstraSāṃkhyaconceptsandtranslations.SeealsoMoksadharmaParvan

mahātmyaśarīra(“bodyofdignity”)mahāvākyas.See“greatstatements”(mahāvākyas)MahāvīraSeealsoJinendraMāndūkyakārikāManibhadranāstika,understandingofManimēkalai,āstika/nāstikahierarchyMansfeld,JaapManusmrtiMarcusAureliusMarx,Karlmaterialcause(upādānakāraṇa)changingversusunchanginglocusasMātharavṛttimaṭhas(monasteries)matter(prakṛti)consciousnessandGod,mutualdependencewithmāyā,synonymouswithinsentienceoflordlinessandSeealsoSāṃkhyaschool

māyā.Seeillusion(māyā)“meansofvalidknowledge”(pramāna)enumerationofMedhātithimedievalismmeditation:typesofSeealsoobjectlessmeditation(asamprajñātasamādhi)metaphorsBrahmanandselfmetaphysicswithconceptualobjects(samprajñātasamādhi)Mill,JamesMīmāṃsā(Exegesis)schoolatheismoffocusinfluenceonVendāntaritualactionandSeealsoPūrvaMīmāṃsā(PriorExegesis)school;KumārilaBhaṭṭaMīmāmsāsūtrasmisa(“disguise”)mithyā.Seeultimatelyfalse(mithyā)mlecchas.Seeforeigners(mlecchas)“moderns”(ādhunikas)moksa.Seeliberation(moksa)MoksadharmaParvanmonasteries(maṭhas)monism:dualism,historicaldeevolutiontoas“highestdoctrine,”UpaniṣadsMughalEmpiremūlakāraṇa(“rootcause”)Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,SeealsoMadhyamaka(Emptiness)Buddhistschool;Nāgārjuna

Müller,F.MaxMuslims.SeeIslammutualabsence.Seeidentityandmutualabsence(tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva)mutualdependence(anyonyāśraya)

NāgārjunaSeealsoMadhyamaka(Emptiness)Buddhistschool;Mūlamadhyamakakārikānaimittika(“contigent”)Nakamura,HajimeNārāyana,KapilaasincarnationofnāstikasAdvaitaVedāntaasattractionto,falseclassificationofexclusivismandforeigners,associatedwithGod,denialofhistoryidentificationofIslam,placeholderforlogicandmeaningsMedievalperiod,latenegativeconnotationorganizationoforthodoxyandheterodoxyandpreferredtranslationofSāṃkhyaandYogaschoolsastemporaryconcessiondoctrineandSeealsoCārvākaschool;Buddhism;Jainism;Lokāyataschool;“revileroftheVeda”(vedanindakah)

NatureoftheGods,TheNavya-Nyāyaschoollogicofterminology“Neo-Hinduism,”Neo-VedāntaneyārthaandnītārthasūtrasNicholasofCusanihilists(śūnyavādkas)SeealsoMadhyamaka(Emptiness)BuddhistschoolNimbārkaAdvaitadoxographies,viewsomittedfromBrahman,onnaturalstateofnimittakāraṇa(instrumentalcause)niravayava.See“partless”(niravayava)nirīśvara(“withoutGod)nītārthaandneyārthasūtrasnitya(“obligatory”)Seealsoritualaction(karma)niyamas.Seeabstentionsandobservances(yamasandniyamas)“no-self”(anātman)non-differenceofessentialqualities(avaidharmya)non-origination(ajātivāda)non-separation(avibhāga)asnon-differenceselfandBrahman,betweennonviolence(ahimsā)nyāyaSeelogic(nyāya)Nyāyaschool:GodandkarmascopeofuniversalandparticularSeealsoNavya-Nyāyaschool;Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikaschool

Nyāya-VaiśeṣikaschoollosttreatiseonNyāyabhāsyaNyāyamañjarī,SeealsoJayantaBhaṭṭaNyāyasūtras,commentary,typesoftenets(siddhāntas)

objectlessmeditation(asamprajñātasamādhi)obligatory(nitya)Seealsoritualaction(karma)“OnthePhilosophyoftheHindus”(lectureseries)PhilosophyoftheUpaniṣads,comparedtoOntheSoul(DeAnima)

optional(kāmya)Seealsoritualaction(karma)Orientalism:AdvaitaVedāntaandcritiqueofdoxographiesandmisconceptionsopinion,diversityofperiodizationofIndianhistorypremodernintellectualtraditions,impactonŚaṅkara,perspectiveonstereotypesandVijñānābhiksu’sinfluenceonworksSeealsoColebrooke,H.T.;Deussen,Paul;Garbe,Richard;Gough,A.E.

orthodoxyandheterodoxy“emphaticallyorthodox,”orthopraxyversusorthodoxy“partlyheterodox,”orthopraxy,orthodoxyversus“otherness,”Islamandoutcastes

PadārthatattvanirnayaPadmaPurāna,“teachingsofdarkness,”pākhandas(infidels)PañcadaśīPāñcarātras

PāniniPanjikāpantheismpāpa(vice)paraloka(“anotherworld”)pāramārthika.Seeconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)pariṇāma.Seerealtransformation(pariṇāma)PariṇāmavādaBhartṛprapañcaandŚaṅkaraandSeealsoBhedābheda(DifferenceandNon-Difference)Vedāntaschool

partandwhole(aṃśaandaṃśin)differenceandnon-differenceofKrsnaaswholeselfandBrahmanasterminology,alternate

“partless”(niravayava)Pāśupatas.SeealsoŚaivasPatañjalicreationandGodandkaivalya,definitionofSeśvaraSāṃkhyayoga,philosophyof.SeealsoYogasūtrasperception(pratyakṣa)knowledge,meansofperennialphilosophyperiodization,historicalperlocutionaryversuslocutionaryactsperspectivism(anekāntavāda)demons,taughttophilosophy,Indian.Seealsointellectualhistory,premodernIndianPhilosophyofAncientIndiaPhilosophyoftheUpanishads,“pizzaeffect,”play(līlā)politics,“Hinduidentity”andPollock,Sheldonpracchannabauddha.See“crypto-Buddhist”(pracchannabauddha)praise,statementsof(arthavāda)Prakāśānanda.Seealsodvstisṛṣṭstivāda,SiddhāntamuktāvalīPrakāśātman.SeealsoVivaranasub-schoolprakṛti.Seematter(prakṛti)pramānas.See“meansofvalidknowledge”(pramāṇas)prārabdhakarmanobjectlessmeditationasmeanstocutoffSeealsoritualaction(karma)PrasādaMādhavaPrasthānabheda(TheVariousReligiousSources)Islam,absenceof.SeealsoMadhusūdanaSarasvatīprasthāṇas(“sources”)prasthānatrayīpratibimbavāda(reflectionism)pratiyogin.Seesubjunctandadjunct(anuyoginandpratiyogin)pratyakṣa(perception)prauḍhivāda(“boldassertion”)prauḍhivādin(“bolddebater”)primafaciearguments(pūrvapakṣas)principles(tattvas)liberation,asmeansto“provincializingEurope,”Pseudo-Śaṅkara,10.SeealsoSarvasiddhāntasamgrahapuṇya(virtue)PurānasdeceptioninSeealsoPadmaPurāna;KūrmaPurāna;VisnuPurāna;BhāgavataPurānaPurānicSāṃkhyapuruṣaGodasfirstjīva,synonymouswithmatterandpluralityofPurusottamaPūrvaMīmāṃsā(PriorExegesis)schoolembodiedliberationrejectedbyinterpretivetechniquestheoriesofmeaningandSeealsoMīmāṃsā(Exegesis)school

pūrvapakṣas.Seeprimafaciearguments(pūrvapakṣas)pustimārgasect

qualified(saguṇa)Qvarnström,Olle

Radhakrishnan,Sarvepalliinfluences“neo-Hindu,”Vedāntaschool,viewsonRahner,Karlrākṣasas

RāmānujaBhedābheda,attackonbliss(ānanda),understandingofColebrooke,H.T.,influenceonRāmāyanaRāmcaritmāṇasRao,Srinivasarationalinference(anumāna)knowledge,meansofSāṃkhyaandscriptureversusrealtransformation(pariṇāma),theoryofrealismidealismversusrealityandunreality:“completelyunreal”(tuccha)“conditionallyreal”(vyavahārasat)dualityandnon-dualityandoftheworld

relectionism(pratibimbavāda)reliabletestimony(āptavacana)renunciation(tyāga)“revileroftheVeda”(vedanindaka)ritualaction(karma)embodiedliberationandperformanceofskepticoftypesofVedas,prescribedby.Seealso“combinationofknowledgeandritualaction”(jñānakarmasamuccayavāda)

rootcause(mūlakāraṇa)Rorty,Richarddoxography,descriptionof“intellectualhistory”andRukmani,T.S.Runia,DavidRussell,Bertrand

śabdapramāna.Seescripturalauthority(śabdapramāna)sacredtexts(śruti)Saddarśanasamuccaya(CollectionoftheSixPhilosophicalSystems)classificationofschoolsandcommentaryorganizationofVedāntaschoolignoredin

saguṇa(“qualified”)sahakārin(assistant),illusionasSaid,EdwardŚaivastextstheismof.SeealsoPāśupatassajātiya.Seeclass(jāti)sāmānyaandviśeṣa(universalandparticular)samāpatti(“meditativeunification”)saṃgraha(compendium)Sāṃkhyaschoolaphorismsbliss(ānanda),understandingofclassicaldeceptionindualistschoolearlyGod,accountsforGreekphilosophy,allegedinfluenceon“highestknowledge”“partlyheterodox”theismandatheismofVedāntaschoolversusYogaschool,differentiationfromYogasūtrasanexpositionof.SeealsoKapila;PurānicSāṃkhya;Sāmkhyasūtras

Sāmkhyakārikā:canonicalstatusofcommentaryGod,nodiscussionofmetaphysicalprinciplestenetsin.SeealsoTattvakaumudī,Yuktidīpikā,Gaudapādabhāsya

Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya,Buddhism,argumentsagainstcondensedversioncontroversyGod,existenceofKapila’satheismquestionedliberationmetaphysicsofSanskriteditiontranslationofvalueofYogaschooland.SeealsoSāmkhyasūtras,Vijñānabhikṣu

Sāmkhyasāra(EssenceofSāmkhya)Sāmkhyasūtras,atheismofBrahmasūtrasandcommentaryGod,disprovingexistenceof.SeealsoSāmkhyapravacanabhāsya

Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī,.SeealsoVācaspatiMiśraSāmkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana(LightontheTrueMeaningoftheSāmkhyaPrinciples).SeealsoBhāvāgaṇeśasāṃkhyayoga,meaningofSamksepaśarīrakasamprajñātasamādhi(meditationwithconceptualobjects)samuccaya(collection)sanātanadharma(“eternalreligion”)ŚaṅkaraBhāskara,attackbyBrahmasūtras,interpretationofColebrooke,H.T.,influenceonmanifestationandOrientalistperspectiveontransformationand.SeealsoŚaṇkaradigvijaya;Advaita(Non-Dualist)Vedāntaschool;Upadeśasāhasrī

ŚaṇkaradigvijayaSāṅkhyaschool.SeeSāṃkhyaschoolŚāntarakṣita

SarvadarśanakaumudīSarvadarśanasamgraha(CompendiumofAllPhilosophicalSystems)Colebrookeandhierarchyofschoolswithininfluencetranslation.SeealsoMādhava

SarvamatasamgrahaSarvasiddhāntasamgraha,.SeealsoPseudo-Śaṅkarasarvatantrasvatantra,definitionofsarvavaināśika(universalnegation)satkāryavāda.See“effectpreexistsinthecause”(satkāryavāda)schools,philosophical(darśanas)sciences(vidyās)versustraditionsversus.Seealsoāstikas;nāstikasSchopenhauer,Arthur“scienceoflogic”(tarkaśāstra)“sciences”(vidyās),philosophicalschoolsversusscripturalauthority(śabdapramāna)inferenceversusinterpretationof.Seealsosacredtexts(śruti);traditionaltexts(smrti)

self(ātman)asagentbodyasBrahmanandchangelessnessofconceptualizationofillusionandnon-originationas.Seealso“no-self”(anātman)

separationandnon-separation(vibhāgaandavibhāga)differenceandnon-differenceandselfandBrahmanasseśvara.See“withGod”(seśvara)SeśvaraSāṃkhyaseśvara(“withGod”)Siddhāntaleśasamgraha(BriefCompendiumofDoctrines).SeealsoAppayaDīkṣitaSiddhāntamuktāvalī,.SeealsoPrakāśānanda,Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalīsiddhāntas.Seetenets(siddhāntas)SikhismSimon,MarcelŚiva“sixsystems”ofHinduphilosophy.Seeāstikasskillfulmeans(upāya)smrti.Seetraditionaltexts(smrti)SomaśambhuSomaśambhupaddhati“sources”(prasthāṇas)space(ākāśa):BrahmanasmeaningoriginŚrīvāstavya,S.C.statementsofdifferenceandnon-difference(bhedavākyasandabhedavākyas),statementsofpraise(arthavāda)stereotypesStietencron,Heinrichvonstrawmanarguments“subjectofastate”and“stateitself”(avasthāvatandavasthā)subjunctandadjunct(anuyoginandpratiyogin)Subodhinī,.SeealsoVallabhasubordinatecause(dvārakāraṇa)substance(dravya)SudarśanasūriŚuddhādvaita(PureNon-Dualist)schoolSeealsoVallabhasuffering,cessationofSugata.SeeBuddha,theśūnyavādkas(nihilists).SeealsoMadhyamaka(Emptiness)Buddhistschoolsuperhumanpowers(vibhūtis)superintendent(adhiṣṭhātr)assynonymfordeity(devatā)Sureśvarasūtras.Seeaphorisms(sūtras)SvābhāvikaBhedābheda(EssentialDifferenceandNon-Difference)svarga(heaven)ŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad,dateofcompositionSāṃkhyaconceptsandtheismofVedāntaschoolandsyncretismdistinctfromearlierterm“synkrētismós,”Muslim“otherness”and“synkrētismós,”

tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva.Seeidentityandmutualabsence(tādātmyaandanyonyābhāva)TaittirīyaUpaniṣad

Talbot,Cynthiatāmasaśāstras(“teachingsofdarkness”)Tantravarttikatarkaśāstra(“scienceoflogic”)tattvamasi.Seegreatstatements(mahāvākyas)Tattvakaumudītattvas.Seeprinciples(tattvas)Tattvasamāsasūtras,God,nodiscussionof.SeealsoSāmkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana(LightontheTrueMeaningoftheSāmkhyaPrinciples)

TattvasamgrahaTattvavaiśāradī“teachingsofdarkness”(tāmasaśāstras)temporaryconcession(abhyupagamavāda)tenets(siddhāntas):examplestypesThapar,RomilatheismandatheismfalsedoctrineofatheismhistoryofIndianphilosophy,withinKapila’satheismquestionedMīmāṃsāschool,atheismofmistranslationof“āstika”and“nāstika,”SāṃkhyaschoolSāmkhyasūtras,ŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣad,theismofVijñānābhiksu,theismof.SeealsoGod(īśvara)

Theophrastustheoriesofmeaning“ThisselfisBrahman”(ayamātmābrahma)toleration,inclusivismversustradition(s):inventionof(hypothesis)schoolsversustraditionaltexts(smrti)transmigration(gati)truth:“progressiveinstallments”of.Seealsoconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)tuccha(“completelyunreal”)TulsīdāsTurks(turuskas).SeeIslam“twotruths.”Seeconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)tyāga(renunciation)

udāharaṇa(example)ultimate(pāramārthika).Seeconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)ultimatelyfalse(mithyā)originated,allthatisworldunchangingcause(avikārikāraṇa)undividedness(akhandatā)asnon-differenceunificationofHinduism,processofuniversalandparticular(sāmānyaandviśeṣa)universalnegation(sarvavaināśika)universalismunrealmanifestation(vivarta),theoryof.SeealsoAdvaita(Non-Dualist)Vedāntaschoolupādānakāraṇa.Seematerialcause(upādānakārana)

Upadeśasāhasrīupādhis.Seelimitingconditions(upādhis)upakāra(desire)Upaniṣads,BhedābhedainterpretationscommentariesGod,acceptanceofgreatstatements(mahāvākyas)ofmāyāascentralteachingofmonismof.SeealsoŚvetāṛvataraUpaniṣad;BṛhadāraṇyakaUpaniṣad;ChāndogyaUpaniṣad;TaittirīyaUpaniṣad

upāya(skillfulmeans)UttaraMīmāṃsā(LaterExegesis)school.SeealsoVedāntaschool

vācārambhaṇamātra(verbalexistence)VācaspatiMiśra.SeealsoBhāmatīsub-schoolVaiṣṇavasVaiśeṣikaschool.SeealsoNyāya-VaiśeṣikaschoolVallabhainfluenceschoolsofworksVāmanavarna.Seecastes(varnas)

vedabāhya(externaltotheVedas)vedanindaka(“revileroftheVeda”)VedāntaDeśikaVedāntaAdvaita-centrichistoriesofalternatenamesforclassifiedasmīmāmsāfocusMadhyamakaBuddhistschoollikenedtoOrientalistmisconceptionsabout“progressiveinstallmentsofthetruth,”PūrvaMīmāṃsāinfluenceonritualpracticeandSāṃkhyaschoolversusstereotypessuperiorityofŚvetāśvataraUpaniṣadand,.SeealsoAdvaita(Non-Dualist)Vedāntaschool;Bhedābheda(DifferenceandNon-Difference)Vedāntatradition;Dvaita(Dualist)Vedāntaschool;Viśiṣṭādvaita(QualifiedNon-Dualist)Vedāntaschool

Vedāntakalpalatikā(TheCreeperVineofVedānticViews)Vedāntāloka,.SeealsoVijñānabhikṣuVedāntasāraVedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī(Pearl-StringofVedāntaDoctrines).SeealsoPrakāśānandaVedas:essencefunctioninterpretationsanctitysentence,assingleextendedVedavyāsa.SeealsoVyāsaverbalexistence(vācārambhaṇamātra)vibhāgāvibhāga.Seeseparationandnon-separation(vibhāgaandavibhāga)vibhakta(divided)vibhūtis(superhumanpowers)vice(pāpa)vidhis(injunctions)Vidyāpatividyās(“sciences”),philosophicalschoolsversusVijñānābhiksuāstikas,concordanceofbhedābheda,defenseofcontroversycriticismofdates,estimationofdemonizationanddevotionanddoxographicmotivationfollowershierarchyofteachingsinfluencescripturalinterpretationandworksasyogin.Seealsolocuscause(adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa);Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāsya;Vijñānāmṛtabhāsya;Yogasārasamgraha;Yogavārttika

Vijñānāmṛtabḥsya,.SeealsoVijñānabhikṣu,BrahmasūtrasVijñānavāda(Mind-Only)Buddhistschool.SeealsoYogācāra(Mind-Only)Buddhistschoolvikārikāraṇa(changingcause)violence(himsā),necessityofvirtue(puṇya)viśeṣa.Seeuniversalandparticular(sāmānyaandviśeṣa)Viśiṣṭādvaita(QualifiedNon-Dualist)Vedāntaschoolinstitutionalization.SeealsoRāmānujaVisnuBuddhaasincarnationofYogasūtrasandVisnuPurāna,creationandVivaranasub-school.SeealsoPrakāśātmanvivarta.Seeunrealmanifestation(vivarta),theoryofVivartavādaVivekananda,Swami204viyoga(disjunction)vyakti(individual)Vyāsa.Yogasūtras,commentaryon.SeealsoVedavyāsa;Mahābhārata;Yogabhāsyavyāvahārika.Seeconventionalandultimate(vyāvahārikaandpāramārthika)vyavahārasat(conditionallyreal)

wholeanditsparts.Seepartandwhole(aṃśaandaṃśin)Wirkungsgeschichte“withGod”(seśvara)“withoutGod”(nirīśvara)world“another,”asfalseasillusion“worldlylord”(laukikeśvara)

Yādavaprakāśainfluenceviewsyamasandniyamas(abstentionsandobservations)yoga(term)Yogaschoolallegeddeismofdualistschooleight-limbed“highestpower,”liberation,practicalmeanstopossibleunitywithSāṃkhyaandVedāntaschoolsSāṃkhyaschool,differentiationfromsuperiorityoftheismandatheism

Yogabhāsya,.SeealsoYogasūtras

Yogācāra(Mind-Only)Buddhistschool.SeealsoVijñānavāda(Mind-Only)BuddhistschoolYogasārasamgraha(EpitomeoftheEssenceofYoga)Yogasūtras,aphorismsBrahmasūtrascomparedtocommentaryconclusionsofcreationinGodandisolationinSāṃkhyaschool,asexpositionofsubcommentary

Yogavārttika,metaphysicsofSāṃkhyaandYogaschools,differencebetweentranslationof.SeealsoVijñānabhikṣu;Yogasārasamgraha

yoginVijñānābhiksuasYuktidīpikā,God,portrayalof.SeealsoSāmkhyakārikā