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UNIFIL’s Mandate and Rules of Engagement

by Eugene Yukin

Ever since the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was

established in 1978, the force has received countless accusations of ineffectiveness and

inability to fulfill its mandate. Though revised on a few occasions, UNIFIL’s mandate

has directed the force to oversee Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory

and to ensure the state of Lebanon’s constitutional and military control in the south of the

country. Analysts and critics have attributed various factors to explain UNIFIL’s failure

to accomplish its mandated goals. Some blame UN bureaucracy, others blame UNIFIL’s

command structure and there are continuing accusations of bias of UNIFIL troops

towards Israeli or Lebanese parties involved in the conflict. However, to truly understand

what hinders a peace keeping force to accomplish its objectives one must take a careful

look at the force’s mandate and its rules of engagement (ROE).Certain questions must be

asked. Do the rules given to the force allow it to properly enforce its mandate? Is the

force properly equipped to do its job? Finally is the force free to use all available means

to enforce its mandate? Answering these questions will quickly prove that often there is a

large discrepancy between the mandate and the ROE given to implement it. This essay

will argue, that while the aforementioned causes do have influence on UNIFIL’s

performance, the underlying cause of the force’s failure has been an inadequate mandate

and equally problematic ROE, which unless adjusted, will continue to undermine

UNIFIL's credibility and effectiveness in South Lebanon.

Nowhere is the juxtaposition between mandate and ROE made clearer than in the

newly restructured UNIFIL currently serving in south Lebanon since 2006. Even though

the enhanced UNIFIL has been praised for new and robust ROE, its performance has not

been without criticism. Despite the increased robustness of the force, it has received the

same accusations of ineffectuality as all the preceding UN troops before it. Nevertheless,

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before taking a look at the new force's mandate and rules of engagement one must take a

brief look at UNIFIL’s history.

UNIFIL was established in 1978 after Israel launched an invasion into Lebanon to

battle Palestinian militant groups. Resolution 425 was passed on 19 March 1978 and

stated that UNIFIL should “confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international

peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its

effective authority in the area.”1 UNIFIL’s size at first was mandated to be 5,000 lightly

armed soldiers and was later enlarged to 6,000 troops. The first force was structured as a

traditional peace keeping mission. This meant several things, namely that UNIFIL was

supposed to have the consent of all warring parties, was to be very lightly armed and

could use force only in cases of self defense. In theory of traditional peace keeping, if you

have the consent of all parties you should not become a military target.

Nonetheless, UNIFIL arrived to Lebanon in a civil war situation when having the

consent of all parties was impossible. Thus the rules of engagement were a far cry from

the reality on the ground and the force soon became a target for various groups. Brian

Urquhart, who was at the time the UN-Undersecretary General, was reluctant to send a

UN force because of those exact circumstances. Later he wrote, “Government authority,

an important condition for successful peacekeeping, did not exist in southern Lebanon,

where a tribal, inter-confessional guerilla war was raging…Southern Lebanon would

almost certainly be a peacekeeper’s nightmare.”2 Urquhart was correct in his assessment;

Southern Lebanon in the time of Civil War was not a place to send a traditional

peacekeeping mission.

Traditional peacekeeping missions differ from the peace enforcement missions

that are widespread in the world today. According to Frederick H. Fleitz, traditional

peacekeeping missions are a “mechanism to manage conflict and facilitate and supervise

truces. Traditional peacekeeping forces are unarmed or lightly armed multilateral troops

deployed with the consent of state-party disputants. They are impartial and use force only

1 Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt ed. Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2000), 48. 2 Clawson p.48

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in self-defense.”3 Beginning in the 1990’s and following the collapse of the Soviet

Union, the United Nations, the United States as well as other European countries became

fond of the idea that world conflicts, especially those in third world countries, could be

solved by peacekeeping missions. This led to what was called “second generation” or

expanded peacekeeping, whose mandate did not demand the consent of both parties and

whose rules of engagement allowed the use of more force than that allotted to traditional

peacekeeping missions.

UNIFIL’s failure to acquire the consent of all warring parties was the cause of its

earlier disappointments. Sent as a traditional peacekeeping mission, the force’s ROE

prevented the force from properly defending itself against combatants. In his article

entitled, “The Role of UNIFIL after an Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon”, John

Hillen wrote that “… UNIFIL was given unrealizable objectives as a peacekeeping force

operating with a traditional peacekeeping modus operandi.”4 As a result by 1999, 222

UNIFIL soldiers had lost their lives and UNIFIL had become the UN’s second costliest

mission. Two examples among many particularly show how UNIFIL’s rules of

engagement and lack of necessary equipment hindered it.

A year after the force was established in 1979, UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura

came under direct attack from Major Hadad’s militia. Later known as the South Lebanon

Army, the militia consisted of Christians who were under direct Israeli control. The

attack on the headquarters was repeated a year later in April 1980. As mortar after mortar

came flying into the Naqoura camp, UNIFIL commanders were paralyzed despite having

the full authority to implement force. Even if UNIFIL did respond militarily it would

have lacked the equipment and arms needed. So afraid were UNIFIL force commanders

to involve themselves militarily, they took no action to protect themselves and were

almost overrun.

When Israel launched another major invasion into south Lebanon in 1982,

UNIFIL’s mandate stipulated that it was to stop the advancing Israeli army. According to

its rules of engagement, UNIFIL was allowed to use force not only in self-defense but

also “…when attempts are made to prevent them from performing their duties under the 3 Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s, (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 3. 4 Clawson p.50

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mandate of the Security Council”. But the force was so poorly equipped that most

battalions simply stood by and watched as the Israeli army came marching in. A few

attempts were made by Nepalese troops to blockade Israeli soldiers from crossing certain

roads. Other units attempted to stop the advancing Israeli tanks. Apart from several

attempts here and there, Israel’s 1982 invasion completely overrun UN troops,

demonstrating the futility of its mandate. In this case UNIFIL was impotent and if its

mandate was taken seriously, the force should have been provided better equipment and

should have been heavily armed.

The new enhanced UNIFIL force in place today with its heavy armor, well trained

troops, tanks and anti aircraft weapons is a far cry away from the old UNIFIL.

Established following the 2006 summer war between Hizbullah and Israel, UNIFIL was

charged with additional tasks and was given a new set of engagement rules. By the time

the war had started in July 2006, UN troops on the ground had already dwindled down to

about 2,000 soldiers. The 33 day war was sparked when Hizbullah captured two Israeli

soldiers in a cross border raid. In response Israel embarked on a massive aerial

bombardment campaign, inflicting enormous infrastructure damage. Once again Israeli

troops occupied large swathes of southern Lebanon, but suffered many casualties and

failed in destroying Hizbullah. The failure of Israel’s military strategy in the war forced it

to quickly settle for UN resolution 1701 which called for a cessation of hostilities and a

plan to stop the violence.

The new mandate required UNIFIL to carry out its previous mandate under

Resolutions 425 and 426 as well as enforcing the new mandate under Resolution 1701.

Apart from ensuring the IDF’s complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory, assisting

the Lebanese Army in taking control of the South, the new UNIFIL is now to prevent any

Hizbullah armed presence south of the Litani river. However, the mandate also

authorized UNIFIL to:

Take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within it

capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations in not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to

resist by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties…and to protect United National

personnel… to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel,

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humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon,

to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;5

The resolution also emphasized that UNIFIL should “coordinate its activities” with both

Lebanon and Israel, and should assist the Lebanese Army and State “at its request”.

The new mandate given under resolution 1701 was expected to give the force

more aggressive rules of engagement. Knowing that UNIFIL was largely unable to carry

out its mandate in the previous two decades, Israel and other countries pressed hard to

make the new UNIFIL force more robust and to give it “teeth”. Member states who were

concerned to send their peacekeeping troops into a volatile area wanted to ensure that

these troops would not be inhibited in any way by traditional peace keeping rules. Israel

especially looked forward to operational rules that would allow UNIFIL to forcefully

engage Hizbullah militants and disarm them at will.6 Many desired the new force to be an

expanded peacekeeping force. Therefore the new UNIFIL now numbering around 13,000

military personnel arrived into Lebanon well armed and with a new set of ROE.

The enhanced force’s operational rules made it clearer that military force should

be used in any case where peace keepers were hindered in the course of enforcing their

mandate. One senior diplomatic official said that the new ROE would allow UN troops to

freely open fire at Hizbullah and called it “the most explicit expression of the upgrade to

the UNIFIL force that has yet been received.”7 Till now the whole list of the

peacekeeper’s operational rules remains a secret, in part to prevent any party in the

conflict from exploiting the peacekeeping force. However, a UNIFIL press report dating

to October 2006 reads as follows:

Should the situation present any risk of resumption of hostile activities, UNIFIL rules of

engagement allow UN forces to respond as required. UNIFIL commanders have

sufficient authority to act forcefully when confronted with hostile activity of any kind.

UNIFIL has set up temporary checkpoints at key locations within its area of operations…

In case specific information is available regarding movement of unauthorized

weapons or equipment, the LAF will take required action. However, in situations where

5 Resolution 1701 (2006): 11 August, 2006 6 According to the Jerusalem Post article, Israel expected UN Secretary General to have rules of engagement that would allow the force to “open fire on Hizbullah where necessary”. 7 Herb Keinon "Annan to give UNIFIL ‘teeth,’" Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2006.

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the LAF are not in a position to do so, UNIFIL will do everything necessary to fulfill its

mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701.

In implementing their mandate, all UNIFIL personnel may exercise the inherent right of

self-defense. In addition, the use of force beyond self-defense may be applied to ensure

that UNIFIL’s area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities…8

Due to the fact that the enhanced UNIFIL came well armed with certain units boasting

anti aircraft weapons and tanks, one could assume that the UN troops who arrived in

Lebanon following the 2006 summer war were prepared to use force decisively to carry

out their mandate.

Despite the hope that a “robust force” would be able to disarm Hizbullah and

effectively deal with the crisis, it was easier for those with more experience in the region

to see that disarming Hizbullah would not be an option. After all, even if UNIFIL’s rules

of engagement allowed the UN to use arms to disarm Hizbullah, what would have been

the result? Richard Norton noted correctly in his speech in front of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee that “it is completely unrealistic that the new international

contingents will succeed either in disarming Hezbollah or in diminishing its appeal…If

UNIFIL is going to succeed, it will need the cooperation, not the animosity of

Hezbollah.”9

Two and a half years later this new robust armed force is facing the exact same

accusations of ineffectiveness and inability to accomplish its mandate. Israeli forces still

occupy pieces of Lebanese land, its aircraft violate Lebanese airspace, and Hizbullah’s

strength is reported to be three times that of what it was before the 2006 war. The

question that remains to be asked is why is UNIFIL still unable to enforce its mandate

despite its new engagement rules and armed strength? A look at three recent situations in

which UNIFIL soldiers have found themselves will shed light on some of the flaws

inherent in both the Mandate and the rules of engagement.

On the night of the 30th of March, 2008 a UNIFIL patrol detected a truck which

was towing a trailer in UNIFIL’s area of operations. According to the Secretary-

8 UNIFIL Press Statement: Naqoura October 3, 2006 – www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/PS3oct.pdf 9 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: September 13, 2006 – Opening Statement of Augustus Richard Norton – Lebanon: Securing A Lasting Peace

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General’s report on 1701,“As the patrol turned around and started to follow the truck, two

cars with five armed elements arrived at the scene and blocked the road.”10 When the

peacekeeping troops “challenged” the men in the car, they did not respond. After three

minutes the two cars left, but when the patrol attempted to pursue the truck and the

trailer, they were not able to locate them. The UN troops immediately contacted the

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), but when both the UN troops and the LAF tried to find

the perpetrators they were also unsuccessful. In this event there were two obstructions of

UN resolution 1701. One was the presence of armed groups other than UNIFIL and the

LAF below the Litani river. The other was the fact that the two armed cars not only

presented a threat to the UN patrol, but also prohibited it from exercising its freedom of

movement.

UNIFIL’s Rules of Engagement as well as its mandate address situations of this

kind. According to the press release statement from the UN, peacekeeping troops have

the authority to apply force beyond self defense, if their freedom of movement is blocked

or if their area of operation is being utilized for possible hostile actions. Accordingly, the

UN patrol if it was to exercise its ROE properly could have engaged the armed elements,

tracked down the truck and trailer and launched an investigation into the identity of the

armed elements and the contents of the trailer.

Another incident that shed light on the reality of UNIFIL operations on the

ground took place on the 12th of May 2008 in South Eastern Lebanon. A UN patrol

passed by a construction site where “suspicious” cables were being laid in the ground.

After photographing them UNIFIL troops were accosted by local civilians at the site, who

blocked the road with two of their vehicles. The civilians threw rocks at the peacekeeping

troops and the situation was tense until UNIFIL troops agreed to destroy the pictures they

had taken.11 Yet again UN resolution 1701 was violated as UN troops were denied

freedom of movement and the right to investigate what could have very possibly been

some kind of military apparatus belonging to Hizbullah.

10 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) June 27th, 2008 p.5-6 11 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) June 27th, 2008 p.6

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UNIFIL’s Rules of Engagement would have allowed the patrol to use more force

to properly handle this situation. Its mandate would have dictated to the patrol to properly

investigate the cables and make sure they were not being used for any malicious or

hostile intent. Short of engaging the civilians militarily, UN peacekeepers could have

used mob control and isolated the site from civilians.

Another incident happened shortly after the enhanced UNIFIL began its operation

in south Lebanon. On the 31st of October, 2006 Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese

airspace and proceeded to nosedive over French peacekeeping positions. The French

troops felt threatened by the Israeli F-15 fighter jets and were “seconds” away from

shooting them down.12 However the French troops practiced restraint despite Israel’s

threatening behavior and did not fire at the jets. Though the incident was not reported for

ten days, the French government put a lot of pressure on the Israeli government to cease

its mock raids, especially over UNIFIL positions. This incident is but one example of

how Israel has continued to defy UN resolution 1701 by violating Lebanese airspace.

According to its mandate and ROE, UNIFIL has the right to defend itself against these

aerial infringements and could use force to shoot down any Israeli manned or unmanned

aircraft. Nevertheless, UN troops have so far taken no forceful action to stop Israeli

flights over Lebanese territory which happen on a daily basis, and have instead resorted

to verbal protestation such as the Secretary-General’s complaint that such violations are

“undermining the credibility of UNIFIL…”13

What all of these incidents demonstrate is UNIFIL’s inability to use force

effectively despite its rules of engagement allowing it do so when facing violations of its

mandate. UNIFIL failed to exercise force in the first two incidents because it is dealing

with an unconventional army and cannot afford to lose the trust of the common people.

The last incident involving Israeli flyovers illustrates that UNIFIL commanders are often

unable to make urgent decisions without previously clearing it with their home

governments, despite having a UN mandate to do so.

12 Angela Chalton, "French troops ‘came close to shooting down Israeli jets,’" The Independent, 10 November 2006. 13 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) November 18th, 2008 p.25

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Any peacekeeping mission is meant to promote peace between two or more

opposing military factions. In most peacekeeping missions, opposing factions can be

easily marked or identified, yet, what does one do when a military faction is invisible and

is unmarked? Of all guerilla groups, Hizbullah is best known for its ability to hide and

conceal its troops and military equipment among the terrain and civilian population.

Hizbullah’s enormous support base in South Lebanon provide it with an incredible

amount of intelligence and cover for any clandestine maneuver being carried out in

UNIFIL’s area of operation. A civilian blocking UN troops on a road can very possibly

be a Hizbullah member and be acting on orders, but UN troops have no way of arresting

him and proving his relation with the party.

Hizbullah’s skill to disguise its military capability was a result of necessity, the

party’s military wing had become an expert in clandestine operation in almost twenty

years of battling Israeli troops and the SLA in south Lebanon. In his book Hizbullah: The

Story from Within, the party’s deputy leader, Naim Qassem discusses some of the

military tactics the party specializes in. “Secrecy” he writes, “was the key to success on

the jihad battlefield…Combat equipment was easily carried, transported and hidden.”14

Qassem also describes how the party’s fighters were able to form “secretive circles” and

thus function covertly from the enemy. He addresses this when saying, “Practical

procedures were taken to build a resistance movement that is different from a formal

army organization… This allowed for flexibility and permitted members to resume their

normal daily lives across the various towns and villages, whether these were situated on

front or back lines.”15 While Hizbullah as a party is very visible in South Lebanon, its

military units do not wear uniforms when not engaged in fighting and do not show off

militarily. This is what Qassem refers to when saying that guerilla soldiers could easily

return to their “normal lives” as civilians at any given time. Hizbullah’s expertise in this

area explains why UNIFIL has so far been unable to find “…any evidence of new

military infrastructure or the smuggling of arms into its area of operations.”16

14 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within,(London: Saqi, 2005), 69-70.

15 Qassem p.70 16 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) November 18th, 2008 p.9

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UNIFIL’s failure to disarm Hizbullah south of the Litani river reflects not so

much the incompetency of the force (most of the soldiers are well trained), but rather the

fault of the mandate which fails to understand the reality on the ground. When Fleitz

addresses mandate problems in his book, he writes: “Expanded peacekeeping missions

often had ambiguous mandates because UN members could not agree on coherent

strategies to address the conflicts these missions were sent to address. Many missions

also had unstated political objectives that contradicted official mission mandates and

goals.”17 Following the 2006 war, Hizbullah did not voice intense opposition to claims

that UNIFIL troops would actively seek to disarm Hizbullah. Quite the opposite,

Hizbullah agreed that any of its members discovered carrying arms can be apprehended

and disarmed.18 In an interview following the 2006 war, Nasrallah promised that there

would be “no armed manifestations at all” of Hizbullah south of the Litani river.19 Israeli

worries that UNIFIL troops are failing to stop the rearmament of Hizbullah can be

understood in this context. Yet the real failure lies ultimately in Resolution 1701 whose

mandate did not take into account that disarming Hizbullah would be impossible in

operational terms.

Unclear rules of engagement and an unclear chain of command is another

problem that continues to plague UNIFIL operations. Why didn’t the UN patrol engage

the truck mooring the trailer or the French unit go ahead in firing at the Israeli planes who

were aggressively nose diving at the units? One reason is that UN resolution 1701 states

that only the LAF can take required action against the “movement of unauthorized

weapons or equipment”. This means that if a UN patrol stumbles into a stock pile of

weapons or has reason to believe that there are armed elements in its area of operations, it

is necessary to notify the LAF first and wait for the Lebanese army’s presence before

continuing any investigation. What this amounts to is that despite the fact that the rules of

engagement allow UN troops to use force beyond self defense, peacekeeping troops are

prevented from utilizing that force due to their own mandate.

17 Fleitz p.118 18 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 13, 2006 – Opening Statement of Augustus Richard Norton – Lebanon: Securing A Lasting Peace 19 Nasrallah’s interview with New TV on August 27th, 2006: Nicholas Noe, ed. Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. (London: Verso, 2007), 386.

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The tendency of UN officers and commanders to have their orders cleared with

their national government represents another problem plaguing UNIFIL and many other

peacekeeping missions. If a unit is ordered to undertake action which involves the use of

force, the unit commander might hesitate and seek approval from his government before

carrying out the action. The immediate result is an indirect chain of command which

often results in peacekeeping troops hesitant to carry out necessary orders.

Too many national contingents in the enhanced UNIFIL add to the problem of

chain command and as result miscommunication between different contingents has a

negative influence on the ability of UNIFIL to function in unison. It has long been a UN

tradition to have balanced and multi ethnic coalitions of peacekeeping troops. Secretary

General Hammarskjöld believed that such wide representation would further a mission’s

image and reputation of impartiality.20 Instead, having too many multi ethnic contingents

introduces badly trained troops to a peacekeeping mission. Mixing well trained European

troops with those of African nations can weaken a peacekeeping mission and this has

been a consistent problem with the current troops serving in South Lebanon.21

The lack of clarity in UNIFIL’s mandate and rules of engagement have without a

doubt been at the root of the peacekeeping force’s inability to achieve its goals. But are

the mandate and the operational rules really that necessary for a peacekeeping force’s

success? According to Victoria Holt’s and Tobias Berkman’s book, The Impossible

Mandate, the mandate and the rules of engagement are absolutely essential in

guaranteeing success to a peacekeeping operation. They write: “Soldiers must make split

second decisions about whether and how to use force in the face of immediate threats to

themselves or others… Political and military leaders use two main tools to guide such

determinations: the mandates provided for the mission and the rules of engagement

(ROE) – legally binding instructions on when, where, and how soldiers may use force.”22

They also argue that “robust” and “well-understood” rules of engagement can matter

20 Fleitz p.61 21 Fleitz p.61

22 Victoria K Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 79.

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more to the success of a mission than a properly worded mandate.23 Holt and Berkman

discuss the major problems that peace enforcement missions experience such as lack of

training and preparation, vaguely worded mandates and unclear ROE. Despite these

difficulties, the authors are convinced that peacekeeping mandates are possible to enforce

as long as there is clear understanding of the mission goals, clear rules of engagement and

well trained troops who are familiar with the realities on the ground and their ROE.

UN troops in southern Lebanon could certainly benefit from some of the

suggestions that Holt and Berkman argue for. UNIFIL troops, even if they have good

knowledge of operational rules, have shown consistent lack of desire to enforce them. A

better worded mandate could give UNIFIL troops a better and more coherent

understanding of their mission goals and do away with some of the hesitation

experienced by commanders in the field when split decisions must be made. Furthermore,

sufficient training of the peacekeeping troops in the ROE prior to serving would greatly

benefit the effectiveness of the troops and could do away with UNIFIL’s reputation as a

costly and hopeless mission.

On the other hand “robust” missions with ROE which allow the use of force

beyond self defense, such as UNIFIL’s can spell disaster for peacekeeping missions. In

his book, Peacekeeping Fiascos of 1990’s, Frederick Fleitz argues that expanded peace

keeping missions and peace enforcement missions have been proven to be failures. Fleitz

finds that the only legitimate form of peacekeeping is the traditional peacekeeping

mission. Because expanded peace keeping missions are more robust and are usually

impartial, they alienate the civilian population and often make civilians hostile towards

peacekeeping troops. By bringing up examples of the failures of expanded peace keeping

missions around the world, Fleitz concludes that any mission conducted without a

traditional framework represents a “dead end”24. Even Holt and Berkman admit that

“When forces employ a more aggressive approach, they may spawn an increase in

violence against themselves, against international workers, or even against civilians in the

short term.”25

23 Holt and Berkman p.82 24 Fleitz p.8 25 Holt and Berkman p.54

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Despite the enhanced UNIFIL having “robust” rules of engagement, it has always

remained a traditional peacekeeping mission in terms of its conduct and use of force.

Furthermore, conditions in South Lebanon have never been better for a traditional

peacekeeping mission than now. Unlike its earlier years, UNIFIL is now accepted by all

parties involved in the conflict and it maintains cordial relations with both parties. Even

though its credibility has been tarnished by inaction and military impotence, UNIFIL can

achieve much more by remaining a traditional peacekeeping mission rather than

becoming more aggressive and utilizing its increased firepower to fulfill its mission

goals.

Perhaps UNIFIL’s failure to be an effective military force has actually had more

positive than negative influence on the situation in southern Lebanon.26 By not pursuing

its goals aggressively, UNIFIL has been able to garner understanding and cooperation

from local civilians and has through the process become part of the local economy. A

press statement dating to the 5th of October 2006 clearly summarizes the benefits that the

local economy reaps thanks to UNIFIL forces. According to then acting Chief

Administrative Officer Jean-Pierre Ducharme, “The soldiers spend a lot of money here,

they visit local attractions, eat out, travel and this, in the end, helps to stimulate the

economy.” Over the years 2003-6, UNIFIL spent 60 percent of its budget on getting food

from local companies and in 2006, 40 million dollars went to the Lebanese economy.27

UNIFIL’s failure in the media’s eyes has not been the force’s conduct on the

ground but rather the unachievable goals that are cited in its mandate. In its earlier stages

UNIFIL failed because it was given unachievable goals and rules of engagement that

paralyzed the force, preventing it from even protecting itself properly in the dangerous

environment that was Southern Lebanon during the Civil War. Writing in 2000 Hillen

correctly noted that “…UNIFIL was created and has survived as a stop-gap political

measure, not as an operational tool for the execution of its mandate on the ground.”28 The

enhanced UNIFIL has tried to overcome its reputation as ineffectual by becoming better

equipped and by adjusting its operational rules to be better protected on the ground.

Despite these “improvements” UNIFIL has found itself paralyzed yet again because its

26 See Clawson p.47 27 UNIFIL Press Release: [UNIFIL]How it Benefits the Lebanese Economy. 5th October, 2006. 28 Clawson p. 46

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stated goals and operational rules cannot be enacted on the ground in any realistic and

constructive manner. The South Lebanon of today requires a traditional peacekeeping

force to protect the peace and despite its appearance UNIFIL has been playing that role

all along. As long as UNIFIL’s mandate and rules of engagement mirror that of an

expanded peacekeeping mission, it will forever be seen as ineffectual and useless. Yet, if

its mandate and ROE be adjusted to that of traditional peacekeeping force UNIFIL will

continue to benefit Southern Lebanon while at the same time fulfilling the expectations of

its mandate.

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Works Cited:

Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within.

London: Saqi, 2005.

Noe, Nicholas, ed. Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed Hassan

Nasrallah.

London: Verso, 2007.

Clawson, Patrick and Eisenstadt, Michael ed. Implications of an Israeli

Withdrawal from Lebanon.

Washington: The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, 2000.

Fleitz, Frederick H. Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s.

Westport: Praeger, 2002.

Holt, Victoria K. and Berkman, Tobias C. The Impossible Mandate?

Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

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Eugene Narsesyan Yukin

eugeneyukin@yahoo.com

cell: 70182153

American University of Beirut: Center of Arabic and Middle East Studies,

Masters Program.

Theme: South Lebanon and UNIFIL