Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in Africa's Great Lakes

7/31/2019 Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in Africa's Great Lakes

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A P u b l i c A t i o n o f t h e A f r i c A c e n t e r f o r S t r A t e g i c S t u d i e S

Con lict in A ricas Great Lakes region persists because o a complex mixture o regional politics,inancial incentives, ethnic polarization, and weak and illegitimate governance.

Previous peace agreements have made important contributions to stabilit but have onl been partlsuccess ul because the have not addressed some ke con lict drivers.

Given the regional nature o the instabilit , international actors, especiall those in Europe and theUnited States that provide signi icant inancial support to governments in the Great Lakes, are vital toachieving a comprehensive settlement.

H i g H l i g H t s

n o . 2 1 / J u l y 2 0 1 2

The provinces o North and South Kivu in theeastern DRC have been the epicenter o the ghting(see map). They are the largest source o recruits or aconstantly shi ting mix o militias. By one count, thereare at least 19 nonstate militias comprising 7,000 to17,000 ghters in the Kivus. 3 Typical o the splinter-ing seen in other extended conficts, United Nations(UN) peacekeeping o cials warn o a urther mush-rooming o new groups.4 Many o these groups arecriminally oriented militias seeking to pro t rom tra -

cking the regions natural resources. Some are led bylocal politicians and others are community sel -de enseorces. Alliances, goals, and leadership among thesegroups are o ten temporary, opportunistic, and at timescontradictory.

Confict in the Kivus also has power ul externaldrivers. Militias opposed to the governments in Bu-rundi, Rwanda, and Uganda are based in the Kivus.In response, these countries have deployed troops and

Landmark peace agreements signed in 2002 by11 A rican governments and various nonstate armedgroups were meant to end 7 years o war that hadravaged A ricas Great Lakes region. A decade later,instability, tightly intertwined with regional geo-politics, persists. Recurring confict has killed tens o thousands, mostly civilians, and displaced millionso others. The extended instability has also led to acollapse o basic social services and economic activ-ity in parts o the Democratic Republic o the Congo

(DRC), resulting in mani old more deaths due tomalnutrition, lack o access to basic healthcare, andscarce livelihood opportunities. 1 Amid this break-down, barbaric orms o violence have emerged. Dur-ing one 4-day period in the summer o 2011, nearly400 women, men, and children were raped by militiaghters. Since 1996, there have reportedly been morethan 200,000 rapes, which are mostly attributed toarmed militias.2


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sponsored militias in the eastern DRC, eeding theproli eration o armed groups. Nearly all o the illicittra c in Congolese minerals that unds armed groupstransits Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Despite numerous initiatives and agreements, nocomprehensive ramework to end this complex conficthas been orged. Rather, international engagementhas continued to be ragmented with an emphasis onsymptoms. Costs to the international community in

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance alone totalmore than $2 billion annually. The persistent state o crisis, similarly, constrains economic investment in Bu-rundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Instability in the GreatLakes, moreover, hinders other security challenges inthe region, including statebuilding e orts in South Su-dan and de eating the Lords Resistance Army militia.

en t renched reg ionAl conf l ic t

As part o its e ort to consolidate control over

post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front(RPF) launched an operation into the eastern Congo

in 1996. The RPF aimed to neutralize the remnantso the ormer Rwandan regimes military, the ForcesArmes Rwandaises (FAR), and the Rwandan Intera-hamwe militia who were key actors in the Rwandangenocide. These ghters, who numbered in the tens o thousands, had fed to the Congo where they enjoyedree maneuver and launched raids into Rwanda.

Soon a ter the initial operations the RPF broad-ened its goals to remove the regime o Mobutu Sese

Seko, president o then Zaire, whom they saw as pro-tecting their enemies. Several other countries, includ-ing Burundi and Uganda, eventually provided ront-line troops and support to build a Congolese rebellion,ostensibly led by Laurent-Dsir Kabila, known aslAlliance des Forces Dmocratique pour la Librationdu Congo-Zaire (AFDL). 5

Kabila assumed power in Kinshasa in May 1997a ter Mobutus disorganized orces were quickly de-eated during a 7-month war o liberation. However,

lacking legitimacy, geopolitical vision, and governanceexperience, his regime was characterized by brutalityand ecklessness. Concerned that this arrangementwould reenergize the ex-FAR in the eastern DRC,Rwanda launched a second invasion, the so-calledwar o occupation rom 1998 to 2003, and estab-lished another militia, Rassemblement Congolais pourla Dmocratie (RCD). Kabila, meanwhile, urged theex-FAR, his erstwhile enemies, to join his government

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Source: The Role o the Exploitation o Natural Resources in Fuelling and Prolonging Crises in the Eastern DRC, International Alert, January 2010, 79. UN O ce or the Coordination o Humanitarian A airs. Both maps modi ed by author.

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in ghting the RPF. In response to this second Rwan-dan gambit, seven other A rican armies deployed tothe DRC either to counter or support the Rwandans.Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 by memberso his presidential guard and was succeeded by his son

Joseph, who led a government based on a transitionalpower-sharing arrangement negotiated in 2002. Mostoreign armies subsequently withdrew in 2003.

Rwandas 1996 invasion o the eastern Congo seta pattern o confict that has since repeated itsel and,in e ect, wholly shi ted Rwandas previous civil waronto Congolese soil. Its reliance on proxy militias inthe DRC and periodic military operations to resolvecomplex political challenges prompted other govern-ments to ollow suit. This has led to the proli erationo armed nonstate groups and instigated a never-end-ing series o crises in the region.6 In recent years, thekey actors have been the Congrs National Pour laD ense du Peuple (CNDP), a militia supported byRwanda, and the Forces Dmocratiques de Librationdu Rwanda (FDLR), which is composed o ex-FARleaders and poses a security risk to Rwanda.

A lasting solution to the ighting in the GreatLakes will take more than the end o the FDLR andCNDP, however. Years o ghting have spawned otherconfict drivers and peace spoilers. Among them arethe eastern DRCs easily accessible natural resources,particularly gold, tin, colombite-tantalite (coltan), andtungsten. Armed groups depend on revenues rom theillicit trade in these resources. For some, it has becomea primary objective. The same holds true or elements

o the Forces Armes du Rpublique Dmocratique duCongo (FARDC), the DRCs national army, whichhave been implicated in mineral tra cking. 7

The minerals trade also eatures prominentlyin decision-making in Burundi, Rwanda, and Ugan-da. Most o the eastern DRCs minerals must movethrough these and other East A rican countries, wherethey are levied with ees and re-exported, o ten by lo-cal businesses. This has become a signi cant source o

economic activity and growth. For example, Rwandasdomestic minerals production is small, but the min-ing sector was a key growth engine or Rwanda in2011 during a year o otherwise subdued regional eco-nomic activity, including a slump in Rwandas agricul-tural sector. 8 In March 2012, the rm A rica PrimaryTungstenone o Rwandas largest taxpayerswascensured by an international mining association a -ter evidence emerged that it was misrepresenting theorigin o its minerals.9 In short, power ul business andgovernment interests pro ting rom the instability inthe DRC have incentives to keep the confict going.

The invasions o the DRC have also catalyzedtensions at the community level. A ter the RPFs mili-tary victory in Rwanda in 1994, nearly 2 million re u-gees rom Rwandas Hutu community, including lead-ers o the Rwandan genocide, crossed into the easternCongo, altering the regions demographic composition.The RPFs tactic o arming various Tutsi-dominatedmilitias has likewise ostered mistrust o the DRC Tutsicommunity. In response to the heightened polarizationand militarization o the region, communitiesinclud-ing the Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Hunde, Shi, Rega,Bembe, and otherscreated armed militias, knownlocally as Mai-Mai, to de end themselves.

Decades o cross-border migration combined withongoing confict-related displacement o 1.4 million

people in the Kivus have also turned the alreadythorny issue o land ownership into a major chal-lenge. With each crisis, property belonging to localswas occupied by new arrivals. Any attempt to recoveror return to this land became an intercommunal casusbelli. The Kivus have among the highest populationdensities in the DRC, with nearly 70 inhabitants/km 2 compared with a national average o 29 inhabitants/km2. The resulting weakening o traditional authori-ties coupled with the governments inability to en orce

property laws have produced a state o permanent con-fict over land ownership.

Conditions in the DRCs neighbors also eed theproli eration o armed groups. In Burundi, the govern-ment has been accused o human rights violations,including extrajudicial executions by the army. Inresponse, the previously demobilized Forces Nation-ales de Libration (FNL) rebel militia has regroupedand rearmed in South Kivu. A new rebellion, Fronatu

Rwandas 1996 invasion o theeastern Congo set a pattern oconfict that has since repeated

itsel


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Tabara, has also based itsel in South Kivu. This hasstoked ears that violence may return to Burundi in ullorce and engul the eastern DRC.

In Rwanda, a minority elite is consolidating a mo-nopoly o political and nancial power and is intoler-ant o opposition voices. Arrests o activists and inde-pendent journalists are common. The post-genocidelegal system has also been tainted by corruption andprocedural irregularities,10 hindering the disarmamento the FDLR and the return o tens o thousands o re ugees rom the DRC.

Meanwhile, hamstrung by weak legitimacy andcapacity, the DRC government has had little successin extending its authority in the Kivus. Evidence thatthe November 2011 elections in the DRC were deeplyfawed, including systematic intimidation and violenceagainst voters by security orces, has ueled mistrust o the government and diminished its ability to mitigatethe confict. Frustrated citizens are turning to CNDPbreakaways, the Mai-Mai, and other groups to protecttheir interests.

gAinS And Shor tcomingS of AnincomPle te PeAce ProceSS

A dozen major peace agreements, negotiations,and reconciliation initiatives, o ten brokered withhelp rom the international community, have been

the primary vehicles employed to resolve confict inthe Great Lakes region. 11 Most o these accords, how-ever, have addressed only some o the causes and con-sequences o the confict and, at times, neglected itsprincipal drivers.

ICGLR approach. The International Con er-ence on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has to datebeen the largest peace initiative. Convened by UNResolution 1291 in 2000 and held under the auspiceso the A rican Union and UN with support rom in-

ternational donors, it brought 18 countries to the ne-gotiating table, 11 o which were directly involved inthe confict. A ter 6 years o political negotiations, thecon erence gave rise to the Pact on Security, Stability,and Development in the Great Lakes Region, signedin December 2006 by heads o state rom Angola, Bu-rundi, the Central A rican Republic, the DRC, Kenya,the Republic o Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,Uganda, and Zambia. The pact entered into orce in

June 2008 a ter it was rati ed by eight signatories. AnICGLR Secretariat was established in Bujumbura toimplement the pacts 10 protocols, including regionalnon-aggression and mutual de ense, good governance,and reconstruction and development. Only limitedprogress toward these objectives have been realized todate, however.

A key contribution o the ICGLR has been thatit took into account the economic dimensions andmotivations o the confict in the eastern DRC. Spe-ci cally, it launched a Regional Initiative on NaturalResources to certi y, ormalize, and track the mineralstrade so as to eliminate tra icking and the role o armed groups. Pilot schemes in Rwanda and SouthKivu have shown some progress.12

The ICGLRs main shortcoming has been that itdid not address the massive human rights violationscommitted by various state actors that intervened inthe DRCabuses that have now been well docu-

mented through UN reports. 13 As a consequence,these actors have had little incentive to end theirreliance on short-term military responses and proxymilitias to meet their immediate security and eco-nomic interests.

The Tripartite Plus Commission. The TripartitePlus Commission was a U.S. initiative launched in2004 dealing mainly with the FDLR presence in theDRC. This initiative culminated in a joint commu-niqu on November 9, 2007, committing the DRC

and Rwandan governments to a common approachto address the threat posed to their common securityand stability by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The Nai-robi communiqu ul lled a undamental aim o theRwandan De ence Forces (RDF) to more aggressivelytarget the ex-FAR remnants that comprise the FDLR.

The FARDC-RDF collaboration has been veryunpopular in the eastern DRC, even though manyin the region dread the FDLR. The joint operations

[various state] actors havehad little incentive to end theirreliance on short-term militarresponses and prox militias to

meet their immediate securit andeconomic interests


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resulted in many civilian casualties and disarmedew FDLR, who have later conducted reprisal at-

tacks against villages accused o aiding the FARDCand RDF. President Kabila is also paying a price orhis expansion o military operations in the easternDRC. In 2006, he received 95 percent o the votein South Kivu and 78 percent in North Kivu, largelybecause he promised to bring an end to the Rwandanpresence and restore peace. In the 2011 elections hegarnered just 45 and 39 percent, respectively, in thesame provinces. Given widespread electoral irregu-larities, his actual support may be even lower. Hisoptions and ability to manage the confict will shrinkurther i he continues to lose support in the east.

The Tripartite Pluss main achievement was tobring the two major antagoniststhe Rwandan andCongolese leadershipto the table. Indeed, the U.S.Government extended much e ort to orce the twoenemies to talk to one another, no doubt drawingrom its extensive relations with and support to bothgovernments. Donor support accounts or 40 percento Rwandas annual government budget. 14 Improvingrelations between Rwanda and the DRC is critical toconsolidating peace throughout the entire subregion,and this approach showed that constructive commu-nication is possible.

This agreement errs in limiting responsibility orthe instability to the FDLR. When the DRC govern-ment once suggested that illicit minerals tra ckingbe discussed within the Tripartite Plus arrangement,

the Rwandan and Ugandan governments declined,indicating that this was not a regional issue. 15 More-over, the Tripartite Plus agreement stipulated that theDRC must o er the FDLR a choice between eithervoluntarily returning to Rwanda without securityguarantees or being relocated and dispersed through-out the Congolese territory. I they accepted neithero these proposals, they aced military operations bythe FARDC and RDF.

This narrow approach ignores a UN assessmentthat at most 2,500 o the remaining 70,000 Rwandanre ugees in the DRC are combatants. 16 Beyond jointmilitary operations, then, cooperation on re ugee pro-tection, repatriation, and resettlement could relievelocal-level tensions and minimize a pool o potentialFDLR recruits and supporters. Nor can the peace pro-cess in the DRC be separated rom the broader contexto democratization in the Great Lakes region. Re ugeesin the DRC rom Burundi and Rwanda will continueto resist returning to a country where they ace a re-strictive political environment. The Tripartite Com-missions initiatives, thus, lacked the con dence-andtrust-building elements essential or success ul disar-mament.

Goma conference. The Goma peace con erencehas been the only one initiated by the DRC gov-ernment. From January 624, 2008, the con erencebrought together 1,500 delegates rom all communitiesand social strata in North and South Kivu. Its generalobjective was to rally stakeholders and involve themin the restoration o peace in the area. Delegates ulti-mately signed an Acte dengagementto cease hostilities.

By giving all communities and most armed groupsa voice, the Goma con erence represented a signi cantstep orward in understanding the confict rom localperspectives. And a high priority or these communi-

ties was to prevent those guilty o committing mas-sacres, sexual violence, or inciting ethnic hatred romholding positions o responsibility, particularly in thesecurity services.17 A ter the con erence, the involve-ment o traditional village chie s and other communityleaders acilitated the disarmament or integration o 22 armed groups into the national armyindicatinga strong desire at the local level to end the ghting.The FDLR were excluded rom the Goma con erence,however.

The Goma con erence de used tensions in theKivus, but months o heavy ghting began in August2008 between the CNDP and FARDC, jeopardizingthe commitment o other signatories to disarm. Bythe end o the year, the CNDP was poised to captureGoma, the capital o North Kivu. Hundreds o civil-ians were killed and hundreds o thousands displaced.

The ghting nally ebbed when, in a surprisingturn o events, Laurent Nkunda, then leader o the

nor can the peace processin the DRC be separated

rom the broader context odemocratization in the Great

Lakes region


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CNDP, was arrested by authorities in Rwanda in Janu-ary 2009. According to some accounts, Nkundas spon-sors in Rwanda began to worry that he was growingunreliable and unresponsive, and there ore they movedto shu fe the leadership in the CNDP. Rwanda wasalso likely motivated by growing international criti-cism o its support to the CNDP.

A lASt ing So lu t ion

To date, peace initiatives to end armed violencein the Great Lakes have addressed only some o thecauses and consequences o the con lict. A multi-pronged ramework drawing rom lessons o previ-ous agreements can rebalance uture peace e orts toachieve sustainable solutions to the confict.

End support to proxy militias. Among the coregroup o states involved in the confict, all have sup-ported a proxy militia. This tactic is o ten intended tomanage valid national security threats, but tends to bea counterproductive expedient that precipitates largercrises. In the end, most bene actors lose control overthese proxies. These groups trans orm and developtheir own agendas, sometimes threatening the veryinterests they were intended to protect. The AFDL,RCD, and CNDP all exempli y this pattern.

Rwanda, in particular, must end its support tothese groups. Its actions in the DRC undermine the re-

gional stability needed to attract urther internationalinvestment. At stake, by extension, is its standing withinternational donors and investors.

For its part, the government o the DRC mustmeet its obligations to disarm or integrate militiaswithin the FARDC. Its ailure to sustain its engage-ment ollowing the consensus achieved during theGoma con erence encouraged groups to pull out o the process and contributed to the 2008-2009 crisis inthe Kivus. At times, it has also pursued temporary al-

liances with some militias, including the FDLR, to tar-get others. It should rather prioritize security throughcommunity partnerships, achieving disarmament bydemonstrating its trustworthiness, and the progressiveisolation o recalcitrant combatants. A particular ocusshould be the senior leaders o the FDLR, both to ad-dress Rwandas legitimate concerns but also becausethe FDLR has been a severe threat to communitiesin the Kivus. Un ortunately, a ter years o seeing its

numbers and maneuverability slowly shrink, the FDLRenjoyed a resurgence in 2012. Fighting in the Kivusbetween the FARDC and another Rwandan supportedmilitia called M23 provided the FDLR some breathingspace in which to recruit and conduct new attacks.

International partners will need to apply morepressure on governments that undermine the peaceprocess through their support o militias. The UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and European Unionprovide substantial budgetary assistance to govern-ments in the Great Lakes, and there ore should ensurethat such support does not go to countries working atcross purposes. Likewise, international partners shouldprovide support to uphold e orts to disarm, demobilize,or integrate combatants.

International engagement should not stop there,however. Militia leaders and their state sponsors whopersist in undermining stability in the DRC shouldace International Criminal Court (ICC) investiga-tions on charges o war crimes and crimes against hu-manity, including systematized murder, rape, torture,recruiting o child soldiers, and pillaging. Currently,General Bosco Ntaganda, ormerly o the CNDP andnow a head o M23, aces an ICC arrest warrant. MajorGeneral Sylvester Mudacumura o the FDLR is alsounder ICC investigation. General Laurent Nkunda,the ormer head o the CNDP under house arrest in

Rwanda, and Colonel Sultani Makenga, an M23 com-mander, should likewise ace ICC investigations ortheir involvement in unsolved massacres and recruit-ing child soldiers. Providing weapons and ammunitionto the FDLR, M23, and or other military activities inthe DRC, moreover, contravenes a United NationsSecurity Council arms embargo. Accordingly, otherFDLR gures in the Diaspora could ace charges andinvestigations, such as Ignace Murwanashyaka, anFDLR political leader and undraiser on trial or war

crimes in Germany. Likewise, top Rwandan o cials,including Minister o De ense James Kabarebe, havebeen identi ed by the UN as having provided troops,ammunition, and weapons to M23. 18

Develop political space as alternative to militan-

cy. Ever since the 2007 Nairobi communiqu, militaryresponses to the confict have been prioritized at theexpense o other approaches. The results have beenvery mixed. Groups targeted in sweeps o ten relocate


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until operations end, then return and attack civilianswhom they accuse o helping state authorities. Mili-tary operations against nonstate armed groups may benecessary, but they should be combined with initia-tives that o er an alternative and a uture to certainmembers o these groups, especially those not guiltyo war crimes.

There is reason to believe that combatants canbe persuaded to stand down. The Goma con erencekindled some con dence among militia groups on away orward. Likewise, during previous negotiations,the FDLR agreed to renounce the use o orce, con-demn genocide ideology, cooperate with the interna-tional tribunal on the genocide, and trans orm itsel into a political party in Rwanda. 19 O ering memberso militias reasonable and secure opportunities in theirhome countries should be a key aspect in peace e orts.Fostering protection o political rights and civil liber-ties, moreover, will undermine the claims o exclusionand persecution that militias such as the FDLR use torecruit among exile communities.

Ensure local community representation. Lo-cal communities in the Kivus are most exposed tothe ongoing confict in the region. Many members o these communities work in the artisanal mines thatuel much o the ghting and some, lacking suitablealternatives, make a living as pro essional militants. As

a result o the lengthy confict, land disputes, ethnictensions, and other intercommunal challenges haveworsened. Accordingly, the local communities o theKivus need to be integrated into any ramework orpeace in the DRC.

As the Goma con erence demonstrated, includ-ing local community representation in the peaceprocess can build consensus, reduce militia activity,and support disarmament. Future ollow-on initia-tives should be pursued, but with critical adjustments.

Leadership rom the Congolese state is essential toreduce the multiple parallel administrative systemsthat currently contribute to weak governance in theKivus. Given the intercommunal tensions that havedeveloped during years o confict, regular meetingsand accessible mechanisms through which communityrepresentatives can channel concerns to responsivegovernment o cials will be critical to breaking the re-liance on militias and violence. Land tenure as well as

displacement and relocation matters should be priori-ties. Finally, given the overriding regional political andethnic dimensions to the instability, strong externalengagement and pressure will be crucial to ensure thatthe Congolese state meets its obligations and earns thecon dence o communities and combatants.

Regulate the minerals sector. Illicit mineraltra cking is currently a key driver o confict in theeastern DRC. However, it can also be a means o co-operation and collaboration. The mining sector hasnumerous stakeholders, rom artisanal miners in theKivus to infuential politicians and businessmen in thecapitals o the DRC, Rwanda, and elsewhere. Nonecan a ord to see it shrink and most would like to seeit expand. Enhancing the transparency and regulationo this trade will help it grow, thereby bene ting all.It would increase tax, customs, and other earnings orthe DRC as well as in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda,which will remain the most viable export routes orthese goods. A more properly regulated sector wouldattract more investment, creating new opportunitiesor communities in the Kivus.

States in the subregion should continue toexpand the progress achieved in establishing min-eral supply chain veri cation systems under the IC-GLR process. Particular attention should be paidto improving the transparency o gold mining, as

illicit tra cking o gold remains widespread and akey source o unding or armed groups. New U.S.laws that require companies to ensure that miner-als sourced rom the Great Lakes are confict reehave also ostered new impetus to improve the secu-rity situation. Several consumers o the regions min-erals have already begun to seek alternative sources.I countries in the region wish to maintain, let aloneexpand, the customer base or the regions resources,they must collaborate to reduce the size and number

o militias in the Kivus.

conc luSion

The prospects or peace in the DRC will unda-mentally depend on the development o an inclusiveapproach that combines the security and economicinterests o the various local and regional actors in theGreat Lakes. A re cannot be extinguished withoutbothering to identi y the arsonist, understand his in-


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tentions, ascertain his plan and his methods, or insti-tute measures to ensure he does not repeat his crime.

Moreover, none o this work can succeed withouta sustained e ort to rebuild a unctioning, legitimatestate in the DRC. 20 At the end o the day, it is up tothe Congolese to assume leadership over their territoryso as to ensure security in the Great Lakes.

noteS

1 Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic

Republic o Congo: An Ongoing Crisis, The International

Rescue Committee and the Burnet Institute, 2007.2 Report o the Panel on Remedies and Reparations or Victims

o Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic o Congo(Geneva:

O ce o the UN High Commissioner or Human Rights, March

2011).3 Jason Stearns, List o Armed Groups in the Kivus,

Congo Siasa, June 9, 2010, available at .4 Jason Stearns, New Armed Groups Appear in South

Kivu, Congo Siasa, September 15, 2011, available at .5 Report o the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most

Serious Violations o Human Rights and International Humanitarian

Law Committed within the Territory o the Democratic Republic o the

Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (Geneva: O ce o the

UN High Commissioner or Human Rights, August 2010), 70.6 Final Report o the Group o Experts on the Democratic

Republic o the Congo (UN Security Council: S/2008/773,

December 2008).7 Ruben de Koning, Con ict Minerals in the Democratic

Republic o the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Inverventions,

SIPRI Policy Paper No. 27 (Stockholm: Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute, June 2011), 17-18.8 Resilience in the Face o Economic Adversity: Policies or

Growth with a Focus on Household Enterprises, Rwanda Economic

Update 2nd

Edition, (Washington, DC: World Bank, November

2011), 3.9 Ivan R. Mugisha, Firms Blacklisted or Illegal Mineral

Tagging, New Times (Kigali), March 7, 2012.10 Justice Compromised: The Legacy o Rwandas Community-

Based Gacaca Courts (New York: Human Rights Watch, May

2011).11 Jean Migabo Kalere, Textes ondamentaux sur le proces-

sus de paix en RDC (Leuven: CPRS, 2008). Rigobert MinaniBihuzo, S.J., Du pacte de stabilit de Nairobi lActe dengagement

de Goma : Enjeux et dfs des processus de paix en RDC(Kinshasa :

Cepas/Rodhecic, 2008).12 Shawn Blore, Project Review: Implementing Certi ed

Trading Chains (CTC) in Rwanda, German Federal Institute

or Geosciences and Natural Resources, March 2011.13 See notes 2, 5, 6, and 19.14 World Bank.15 Morten Bs, Randi Lotsberg, and Jean-Luc Ndizeye,

The International Con erence on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR) Review o Norwegian Support to the ICGLR

Secretariat, Norwegian Agency or Development Cooperation,

June 2009.16 Over 1800 FDLR Armed Rebels in DR Congo

Surrender to UN Peacekeepers in 2010, UN Stabilization

Mission in the Democratic Republic o the Congo, February 3,

2011. UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.17 Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security Sector System

Re orm in the Democratic Republic o the Congo(Brussels: Initiative

or Peacebuilding, 2009), 11.18 Addendum to the Interim Report o the Group o Experts

on the Democratic Republic o the Congo(UN Security Council:

S/2012/348, June 2012). Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War

Crimes Suspect, Human Rights Watch, June 4, 2012.19 FDLR Declaration (SantEdigio peace talks between the

FDLR and the Government o the DRC, Rome, Italy, March 31,

2005).20 Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, 19902007, 17 ans de transition

politique et perspective dmocratique en RDC(Kinshasa : Cepas/

Rodhecic, 2008).

Unfinished Business: A Framework for Peace in Africa's Great Lakes

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