Understanding the Relative Influence of Local Government Interest Groups within the Domain of Land Use Policy

A Presentation Prepared for the 2012 European Real Estate Society Conference

By

Eric Heberlig, PhD Suzanne Leland, PhD Dustin C. Read, PhD/JDAssociate Professor Associate Professor DirectorDept. of Political Science Dept. of Political Science Center for Real EstateUNC Charlotte UNC Charlotte UNC Charlotte

Theoretical Linkages Between Local Interest Groups and Land Use Policy

Power Elite Theorists

Developmental Theorists

Regime Theorists

Growth Machine Theorists

Political Markets Theorists

ReformedGovt. Structures:

Council/AdministratorNon-Partisan Elections

At-Large Elections

1. Are pro-development interest groups perceived to have privileged access to the local land use policymaking process?

2. Do partisanship and local government structure mitigate interest group influence over land use policy decisions?

3. Do partisanship and local government structure mitigate the influence of some interest groups more than others?

Research Questions

• Survey data collected from 1,444 American Planning Association members

• Respondents asked to rate the political influence of different interest groups

• Descriptive statistics calculated to rank groups by perceived influence

• OLS regression models estimated to:• Measure mitigating effects of government structure and partisanship• Consider both aggregate and individual interest group influence• Controls for characteristics of the community where a planner works• Controls for planners’ characteristics such as age, gender, education, etc.

Data & Research Methodology

Average Influence Ratings of Interest Groups (4.0=High; 1=Low)

Businesses 3.00

Neighborhood Groups 2.77

Economic Development Agencies 2.64

Home Builders Associations 2.53

Environmental Groups 2.43

Non-profit organizations 2.36

Realtors® Association 2.23

Descriptive Statistics

B SE

(Constant) 2.246 .199

At-large -.192** .070

District -.149 .078

Income2000 -1.383E-6 .000

Pol. Influence .134** .043

Elect. Influence -.057 .038

White -.032 .102

Male -.119* .056

Liberal -.028 .060

Conservative -.031 .091

POP2000 2.024E-7* .000

Non-partisan, GOP mayor .209** .083

Non-partisan, Democratic Mayor .212** .083

Partisan, Democratic Mayor .32** .10

Partisan, GOP Mayor .138 .122

Independent Mayors .027 .009

N=423; Adj. R2=.157; *p<.05, **p<.001

Aggregate Interest Group Influence, OLS Results

Analysis of Planners’ Ratings of the Influence of Individual Interest Groups, OLS Regression

Realtors®Association

BusinessInterests

Home BuildersAssociations

FT PT NO FT PT NO FT PT NO

Political StructuresPartisan GOP mayor .085 .160 NA -.282 .095 Na .186 -.229 NA

NP GOP mayor .526* .100 NA -.308 -.106 Na .535 .409 NA

NP Dem mayor .154 .156 NA -.355* -.188 Na .056 .155 NA

Partisan Dem mayor .140 .049 NA -.374* -.067 Na .226 .81* NA

Partisan NA NA -.351* Na Na -.374* Na Na -.549

At large Council .039 -.26* -.126 .173 .223* -.097 -.075 -.45* .78

District Council -.045 -.064 .040 .034 .120 -.295 .102 -.275 .584

Political Influence -.010 .038 -.306** .008 .076 -.016 .282 .227 -.219

Electoral Influence .150 .048 -.002 .015 -.059 -.091 .039 .13

R2 .006 .09 .10 .08 .064 .005 .18 .09 .048

N 143 200 87 143 200 87 143 200 87

Analysis of Planners’ Ratings of the Influence of Individual Interest Groups, OLS Regression

Economic DevelopmentAgencies

Neighborhood Associations

Environmental Groups

Non-Profits Organizations

FT PT NO FT PT NO FT PT NO FT PT NO

Political Structures

Partisan GOP Mayor -.296 .280 NA .473* .080 NA -.375 -.646** NA .366 .331 NA

NP GOP Mayor -.360* .073 NA .351 .040 NA -.303 -.331* NA .158 -.105 NA

NP Dem mayor -.172 .023 NA .347 .020 NA -.136 .087 NA .279 -.115 NA

Partisan Dem. mayor -.289 -.242 NA .378 .114 NA -.160 -.150 NA .388 -.6** NA

Partisan Council Na Na .335* Na Na .035 Na Na .028 NA NA -.23

At large Council -.210 -.013 .009 .185 .225 -.639** -.070 .149 .367 -.065 .118 -.082

District Council -.032 .162 -.188 -.058 -.079 -.022 .046 .069 .313 .110 .142 .037

Political Influence .032 -.106 .009 .066 .070 .152 -.053 -.152* -.016 -.083 -.109 .098

Electoral Influence -.019 -.050 .003 .008 -.063 .063 -.141 -.047 -.036 -.025 .019 -.238

R2 .031 .015 .13 .031 .18 .186 .01 .08 .04 .035 .17 .01

N 143 200 87 143 200 87 143 200 87 143 200 87

• Business interests and neighborhood organizations are perceived to have considerable influence over land use policy.

• Reformed government structures, such as at-large elections and professional managers, reduce aggregate interest group influence.

• Local governments with full-time mayors are particularly susceptible to interest groups when land use policy is made irrespective of partisanship.

• Traditional political alliances continue to mitigate the influence of both business and environmental interests in the land use policy domain.

Conclusions