The Underdevelopment of the Moroland: A Case Study inAnthropology of Development

By: Nelson Sixto H. Ganancial

Chapter IIntroduction

The underdevelopment of Mindanao particularly in the Muslim dominated areas or the “Moroland” is alleged to have triggered the so-called “Mindanao Crisis” in the 1960s and the present “Secessionist Movements.” Although it is basically confined in the Muslim areas but just the same it is associated as the underdevelopment of Mindanao as if Mindanao is really the “Moroland.”1 The underdevelopment of the Moroland has a ripple effect that the whole country is also suffering. Solutions after solutions were tried but until the present the desired development is still a dream. This is because the big guns in the government are not really interested to give a lasting solution to the problem. All that they are doing is basically palliative and short termed only. Not necessarily that they do not want to give the solution but they really do not know how because they do not understand the history of the on-going conflict. They thought that it is political but it is not. It has a deeper reason that only the knowledge of the historical bases and anthropological analysis that it can be solved.

This is bias as my discipline is history and this research is in anthropological, be that as it may but that is the reason why there is no effective solution to the problem in Mindanao because of ignorance. Dependence to foreign trained technocrats is another reason. These people do not know what is happening in the rural areas. They are prisoners of their air-conditioned offices and they likewise depend on people who are not trained to analyze culture. As a result all their proposed solutions are all piece meal and ineffective. This study will try to look into the history of the resurgence of Moro Resistance and how the anthropology of development can help in analyzing the problem.

1 This work uses the term Moro because of its historical basis and the acceptance of the Muslims of the term as their badge of honor. Hence, they use such terms as Moro National Liberation Front and Moro Islamic Liberation Front. To use the term Muslim will elevate their struggle as religious in nature though they are just political or even criminal sometimes.

The succeeding pages will show that Mindanao crisis is not only a product of what sociologist’s term as “ethnocentrism” but also of what I term as the local cultural-imperialism and neo-colonialism. I will try to illustrate how agrarian unrest in Luzon and the Visayas in the 1950s led to the renewal of the Muslims “Jihad”2 (Holy War), popularly called “secessionist movement.” In spite of the efforts made, lives lost, and money spent for the development of Mindanao, the conflict is still raging that is further aggravated by external influences from the Muslim world. The use of religion and tradition as the heart of their struggle vis-à-vis the government’s use of the constitution as their legal basis suggest that there is no compromise that could be reached.3 Even the fall of Camp Abu Bakr did not change the situation but even escalated the atrocities. It will also try to explain why peace and order in Mindanao is vital for the total development of the Philippines

What is an Ethnic Community or Indigenous Peoples An ethnic minority or community, recently called the Indigenous Peoples (IP) is a

group of people that differs in race or color or in national, religious, or cultural origin from the dominant group often the majority population of the countries in which they live. These differences are displayed in any number of ways, ranging from distinctive customs, lifestyles, language or accent, dress, and food preferences to particular attitudes, moral values, and economic or political beliefs espoused by the members of the community or group. In the case of the Moros, it is their religion that made them differ from the majority; their culture though perceived to be different from the majority is actually one of the remaining Filipino cultures that persisted in spite of the influx of westernization and even Islamization. Hence, if the Christian majority had a folk-Catholicism they have also folk-Islam.4

As practiced, the IP is recognized, but not necessarily accepted by the larger society in which its members live. The nature of the relationship of the IPs to the larger society tends to determine whether the minority group will be assimilated in the larger society, or toward self-segregation. In some cases ethnic minorities have been simply excluded by the majority, a striking example being the IPs in Luzon, Visayas and

2 History shows that Sultan Kudarat was the first ever to proclaim a Holy War against the colonizers.

3 The Moros claim that they are not Filipinos because they were never conquered by Spain. The neglect of the historians to correct the wrong Philippine History that placed the Moros in the negative side of the struggle of the natives of the Philippine colony against the colonizers advanced the Moro concept of the legitimacy of their demand. The government and the historians alike could not give a clear answer to the legitimacy of the Moro demand resulting in the proliferation of the idea that they are not at all Filipinos. Further, this idea that they are not Filipinos was advanced more with the Islamic Resurgence all over the world during the 1970s though initially advocated by the Moro politicians who belong to the traditional elites that were affected by the Marcos political agenda in the south, i.e., Lucman, Alonto, Matalam and a number of small sultanates ruled over by Christian appointees prior and during the Martial Law Regime.

4 Please refer to the work of Esmail R. Disoma entitled The Meranao: A Study of their Practices and Beliefs (Iligan City: Ivory Printing and Publishing House, 1990) that will show how the folk beliefs of the Meranao (Maranao) is still practiced and some even took Islamic tones even though it is basically folk in nature.

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Mindanao (particularly the Moros), where the Christians were the ones appointed in key positions although they are not indigenous in the area.5

Ethnic PluralismEthnic pluralism is a consequence of colonization. When the Spaniards colonized

the Philippines they destroyed our traditional village system by the infamous polo system when men were required to render services away from their families especially those from the Visayan Islands. Most of them never returned home. Some died because of sickness or accidents others stayed because their income was not enough to pay their fare while others got married and stayed for good. These explain why there are similar family names from one region to another, though they appeared not to be relatives considering the distance, but the similarity of their physical features that is unique to kin groups would prove otherwise. Another factor for ethnic pluralism was the rise of the middle class, Spanish and Chinese mestizos. Still another, were those uprooted or displaced from their homes as a result of the Moro offensive operations (pejoratively called Moro Raids) in the Visayas and Luzon. Majority left their places of origin to escape from the Moros, thus, creating a sub-culture within their new residence. Actually, some towns in the Bicol area were totally erased from the maps because of these Moro activities.

Recent studies show that cultural or national minority communities or what is now termed as Indigenous Peoples,6 may be divided into three major categories: The first consists of minority immigrant population, like the Huks and the peasants from the Visayas that were relocated to Mindanao; The second is represented by groups such as the Aborigines in Australia, the American Indians, etc., or the Lumads and other non-Muslims Indigenous Peoples in the country; and the Third category results from incorporating autonomous peoples under an alien authority, or from diminishing the sphere of authority of local and regional groups under a policy of unification and centralization under a national government. The Moros or the Muslims belong to this category.

5 The claim of the Moros of not being accepted in the bureaucracy after the country gained its independence was caused by their lack of qualifications for the available positions due to their refusal to be educated, believing that being educated means Christianization or westernization. However, lately, as a result of education, Muslims could be found in offices and professions all over the country. But this does not mean for them their integration into the national-body politics but as a training ground for future positions in the independent Islamic State of Mindanao.

6 According to the United Nations the Indigenous Peoples are: If indigenous peoples are considered "aborigines", this means that they were the first to settle in the country. However, a "national primogeniture" can only be defined with respect to later immigrants (settlers) but not as an absolute state. The term thus refers to a chronological relation. For the indigenous peoples in America this concept is rather appropriate as the year 1492 can be determined with sufficient precision as the beginning of foreign rule by Europeans in America. Pre-Columbian imperialism, for instance by Aztecs or Incas, is only relevant for American early history and not for current questions related to development policy. The "Working Group on Indigenous Peoples" of the United Nations refers to "pre-existence" as the characteristic of indigenous people. This categorization however is not applicable in the Philippines because we are all Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines. The terminology suggests that the natives of the place became the minority population like the case in America and Australia when the so-called aborigines who were once the majority and the original or indigenous of the continents became the minority (Fact Sheet, Personal File).

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Among these groups, especially those that belong to the third category, separatism is perceived not only as having socio-historical logic but also as being a practical possibility because of the coincidence of geography, cultural plurality, distance from the center of authority, and the support of sympathetic groups outside the state.7 This is what is happening in Mindanao. The Moros always argue that they had never been conquered by Spain or even by the United States therefore, they are not Filipinos.8 This is further aggravated by the fact that they are away from the central authority that they (except for a few politicians) do not recognize. The relocation of the Christian farmers and migration of prospectors into their territories is considered by the Moros as still a part of the neo-colonization process. The support of the Organization of Islamic Conference further complicated the situation, transforming the Philippine internal problem in Mindanao into an international issue.

Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism or ethnic chauvinism is the tendency to consider the beliefs, standards, and code of behavior of one’s own culture or subculture as superior to those found in other Indigenous Peoples. Because of this cultural bias is universally present. Ethnocentrism also encourages cohesion and solidarity among group members. However, it may also contribute to attitudes such as superiority, intolerance, and even disdain for groups different than they are. In the 19th century, for example, “ethnocentrism served to reinforce colonial rule in Asia and Africa.”9 Because European society considered non-Western cultures inferior to its own, and because this superiority they felt it was their duty to teach Western traditions and techniques to non-European peoples. To do this they implemented the divide and rule policy within their colonies, which further segregated a multi-ethnic society like what happened in the Philippines.

Theoretical Perspectives of Ethnic Solidarity:

There are a number of perspectives on ethnic solidarity from different disciplines and point-of-views. Three of these are relevant in this research:

First: Reactive Ethnicity:

7 In the case of the Muslims or the Moros, they got their support from the OIC and other Muslims countries.

8 Records however, will show that they were later conquered, particularly during the American regime. Hence, the Moros will not refer to America when claiming that they are an unconquered people. It must be noted further, that Moro Resistance was also shown during the Japanese Occupation.

9 Forbes, H. D., Nationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Personality (1986); Reynolds, V., The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism (1986); Robertson, W., The Ethnostate (1993). Copyright (c) 1999 Grolier Interactive Inc. Please see also the work of W.K. Che Man on Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), pp. 1-16.

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Internal colonialism (or neo-colonialism) and the Cultural Division of Labor Theory: Ethnic solidarity or mobilization is seen as a reaction of the culturally distinct periphery against the exploitative core. In other words, the ethnic groups are considered only as reactionaries in the right sense of the words, not as the initiators of any action. This theory predicts reactive ethnic solidarity when economic activity within periphery is concentrated in the hands of the core ethnic majority or when a pattern of structural or even cultural discrimination exists. This is true among the Moros. The migration of the large number of Christians into their homeland is seen as internal colonization. Hence, the Christian dominated government is considered as the neo-colonizers. This attitude is indicated by the phrases like: “Kayong mga Christians must get out of Mindanao because Mindanao is for the Muslims,” “We are not Filipinos because we were not conquered by Spain,” and many more clues that suggest ethnocentrism. These terms suggest that the Moros do not even recognize other ethnic communities in Mindanao like the Lumads as co-inhabitants of Mindanao. It also appeared that they consider themselves as superiors to other ethnic groups in Mindanao who never even experienced being under a colonial power like what the Moros experienced under the Americans.

Second: Competitive Perspectives of Ethnicity. This suggests that a large part of the conflict is the result of competitions of different ethnic groups for positions in the national bureaucracy and in the armed forces. The Moros earlier could not understand why they could not be hired within the government bureaucracy in the Moroland when it is their own homeland. Even if they are hired, they occupy the menial jobs, even those belonging to the traditional ruling class.10

Third: Ecological Competition Theory: This theory states that ethnic conflict is also the result of intense competition between ethnic groups for the occupation of social niches. Before coming of the Christians the Moros did not care for their land, for them the land is God’s gift to humankind or since it is their ancestral homeland, they are the only rightful owners of that land. In my interview with Prof. Punduma Sani, he said, that the “Muslims believe that all lands are owned by Allah, and no man should own them.” However, he continued, “it is also stated in the Qur’an (Muslim Holy Book) that anyone who neglects the land that Allah bestowed on man, that man lost his rights over it.”11

10 Take for the case of the janitors of MSU who will only work when there are no more students for fear that they would be taunted and looked down because of their menial jobs when they are occupying a respected position in their community. It must be noted further that during the Commonwealth period, the traditional political and title system were outlawed. It was only during the time of Marcos that they are recognized again.

11 Interview by this author with Punduma S. Sani at his establishment (HRM-Bakery) on January 10, 2000. Prof. Sani was the former Regional DILG Secretary of the ARMM.

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The Christian migrants grew in number and acquired lands by legal or illegal means. The transformation of the once idle lands into productive farms made the Moros realize the importance of their ancestral lands. They also resented the presence of the new settlers.12 Experienced in rice farming the new settlers’ harvests increased and new roads and bridges were opened. A case in point is in Dominorog, Bukidnon. The area is an abandoned logging concession populated by a mixture of Higaunon, Tala-andig and Maranaos. The depleting farmlands in Bukidnon forced the provincial government to open it for homesteaders, with a free monthly supply of rice and canned goods. But the Christians in Wao, Lanao del Sur,13 and in Kalilangan, Bukidnon, did not respond positively because of the problems in transportation. The feeder roads were later improved when Mt. Pinatubo erupted, because Dominorog was selected as one of the resettlement sites of the victims. The victims were brought to Dominorog where an area was assigned for their resettlement where houses were already built ready for occupancy. The Wao and other seasonal peasants from Bukidnon followed suit with the arrangement that until their farm productions can support them, the government will continue to give them their ration of rice and canned goods. The Muslims living in the area felt bad about the arrangement and considered this as modern form of colonization in the guise of helping the Pinatubo victims.14 Muslims cannot understand why the Christians are supplied with rice by the government, and they were not. The only reason for the lesser reaction at present in Dominorog is that, because of the Christians and the victims of Mt. Pinatubo, some investors put up regular public utility transportation that eased the problem of transportation. In spite of this improvement they still feel some resentment because, for them these are done to benefit the Christians rather than them.15

In short, the agrarian problems in Luzon and the Visayas, ethnocentrism and the resurgence of the Moro resistance are closely related. The problem of the resurgence of Moro resistance became complicated during the 1970s and with the Islamic Resurgence all over the world; it was elevated to international level and from agrarian to religious problems. The interference of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Libya and Pakistan is a concrete proof of this assumption. In sum, the reactive ethnicity and competition perspective models appear to be useful in explaining the persistence and the emergence of ethnic solidarity16 as a consequence of agrarian problems.

What is cultural Imperialism

12 According to the accounts of the early settlers that include some of my relatives, the natives in Cotabato had willingly exchange or barter if not sold their lands to the migrants. Actually, the Moros do not want to do manual labor because for them it is only good for the slaves or what they call as “Bisaya.”

13That includes this author’s in-laws were not interested to come to the area. 14Later on, the Pinatubo victims who brought with them their capital from the aid of the

government transferred to Valencia Bukidnon and find other job that they knew - rice farming. Others are not engage in small business.

15This feeling is true because the opening of the new roads into the hinterland, made their area not only smaller for the next generation but they could now be pursued by the authorities if they will continue their traditional practice of abduction and other criminal activities. The area was formerly their entry and escape route when doing crime in Cagayan de Oro City.

16 W.K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989), pp. 3ff.

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Edward Said in his work stresses how the past feeds into the present, and that imperialism is a reflexive process. He reflects on the nature of imperialism and about the ways it is expressed in culture, hence the term cultural imperialism. Looking at its definition, Cultural Imperialism covers a wide area. It involves many aspects of the society, like technology, customs of music and clothing, the language and the worst: the way of life. According to Said, “My own theory is that culture played a very important, indeed indispensable role. At the heart of European culture during the many decades of imperial expansion lay what could be called an undeterred and unrelenting Euro centrism.17

However, cultural imperialism as it is applied now refers to the role played by the United States in influencing the culture of the world. If the modernization and technological advancement help in propagating this concept into a reality through television, communications and the super highway, in the case of the Philippines this was brought about to Mindanao early in the last century through the civilizing mission. The more Christians in the Moroland, the more that it is possible that they can overwhelm the Moros. Even in education, textbooks are approved using the Christian standard without any participation of any Muslim in the decision-making when their children are also using these books. Unknowingly, whenever Muslim students read these books, they can imbibe the Christian values, that for them undesirable, this is how local cultural imperialism works.

What is development“Development can be defined as the transformation or change of society, a

movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to a more scientific” or “modern” means, more appropriately called as social development.18 In other words, development is change. “Change is not an end in itself, but a means to other objectives. The changes that are associated with development provide individuals and societies more control over their own destiny. Development enriches the lives of individuals by widening their horizons and reducing their sense of isolation. It reduces the afflictions brought on by disease and poverty, not only increasing life spans, but improving the vitality of life.”19 Development then is measured in the economic terms, GNP or GDP or in what is called as modernization.

The development of the Philippines cannot be fully implemented because of the aforementioned ethnocentric attitude. If development means change to modernism, the trouble of Mindanao that pauses problems in terms of GNP or GDP caused stagnation, therefore, underdevelopment. According to Walter Whitman Rostow there are five stages of growth:

1: Traditional society

17 Edward Said, “Overlapping Territories, Intertwined Histories,” Empire, Geography, and Culture (Fact Sheet, n.d.), pp. 3-14.

18 Joseph Stiglitz, 1998 Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland, October 19, 1998, http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/index.htm, (September 1, 2000).

19 Ibid.

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The settlements at this stage are self-sufficient and many depend on subsistence farming, and agriculture is the main form of employment, etc.: power is centered on the local elites.

2: Preconditions for take off

Rostow says that there must be a shock, perhaps in the form of a civil war or a leap in technology when people need to review their way of life and recognize the need for change; the financial sector emerges and savings and investment grow to 5% of the country's GDP; and trade is encouraged by advancement in transportation.

3: The take off

At this stage markets become established and replace the traditional subsistence farming, when rapid income growth is experienced and savings as well as investment ratios increase up to 15% of GDP.

4: The drive to maturity

Later on growth or development spreads to all parts of the country and the traditional society becomes extinct because of industrialization and encourages migration from rural to urban areas.

5: High mass consumption

This last stage is described as having high output levels with more productions and increased consumptions; there is also an increased ownership of televisions, cars, etc.; personal incomes are high, goods and services are readily available and people no longer worry about being able to secure the basic necessities of life. People at this stage devote a greater proportion of their time to leisure.20

With the aforementioned stages, the country cannot even reach the take off stage because our GDP is below the ideal 5% of the investments and savings as preconditions to take off. Much more if we ever reach the take-off stage that requires the GDP to reach 15%. We remained on the second stage because the shock brought about by the EDSA People’s Power was suppressed by the never-ending story of Mindanao crisis. This is not however the only reason but one of the factors that caused the inability of the Philippines to take-off. The money spent in the war in Mindanao, the destruction of agricultural production contributed to our being nailed to the second stage. Of course our immature political culture causes all these things to happen.

Hypothesis

20 Walter Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), pp. 4-10.

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Lasting peace and development of Mindanao and the Philippines in general can only be achieved if efforts will be exerted to understand the Mindanao Crisis through the use of historical knowledge and an analysis of the cultural aspects of the conflict and the development through anthropological process.

Chapter IIHistorical Background

The MorosThis part shall give a short history of the Moros in order for us understand the

justification of their demand for independence. History is claimed to be incomplete it has gaps. Philippine history is also

incomplete particularly that part concerning the Moros not because nobody would like to write it but more on the insufficiency of documents regarding their role in the development of the Filipino nation. If ever there are portions that are included in history books, either written by Muslims or Christians alike, these are tinted with biases. Historians claiming to have written in the Filipino point-of-view failed in placing the Moro Resistance in the right perspective in Filipino history, the naval history in particular. Perhaps this is caused by their reservations, biases or simply their ignorance of what comprise Philippine history. The basic problem however, is the corroboration of data from the Spanish sources with that of Moro records. Particularly on the part of the Maranaos, data are very scanty because of their refusal to share their Salsilahs to scholars for fear of misinterpretations. Further, the model of Manila based historians in analyzing the role of the Moros in Philippine history is influenced by western historiography21 that is in complete contrast to the Islamic-historiography that puts emphasis in Islam at its core.

21 By western historiography, I refer to the superiority of the whites and the much dependence on written sources, and the inferiority of Oral history. Though Oral History had been institutionalized in the 70s, in the United States of America, in the Philippines documents stand superior to Oral History. Lately, Oral History became one of the subjects which show that Oral History is getting the attention that it needs, particularly in a country where people are not a writing people.

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The so-called Moro slave raids22 and piracy are seen as barbaric acts against the hapless Christians in the coastal areas of the archipelago, without considering the purposes of such activities. Thus, the term Moro became a derogatory or pejorative title of the Muslims in the Philippines. This negative image that was further reinforced by the Spanish friars is very difficult to erase after more than three centuries of being the accepted nature of the Muslims in the Philippines. Hence, Moro piracy and raids are interpreted as criminal activities, not as heroic resistance against colonization. Not because it was not a resistance per se, but because the victims of their resistance were the Christianized Indios from northern Mindanao to the shores of Luzon, especially the Bicol area. Thus, Albay was then referred as a Moro Gulf.23 An in-depth analysis is not yet achieved for fear of misunderstanding and re-opening of the old wounds as well as the sensibilities of both groups. However, as we had just celebrated the Centennial of the Declaration of Independence of the Philippines,24 it is imperative that the Moro Resistance be placed in the right perspective of our history to set the records straight.

Coming of Islam

22 The work of Luis C. Dery entitled The Kris in Philippine History: A Study of the Impact of Moro Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1571-1896 (n.p.), is a good reading in the case of Moro Raids.

23 Francisco Mallari, “Maritime Response, 1793-1818,” Philippine Studies Journal Vol. 34, (1986), p. 471.

24 I would like to differentiate the Declaration of Independence of the Sang-Katagalogan by Andres Bonifacio from the Declaration of Independence of the Philippines by Aguinaldo. Although, it refers to the same country but the first was complete independence while the latter as under “the protection of the benevolent government of the United State of America.”

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To understand the Moro psychology, it is proper to know their short history. According to Najeeb Saleeby, the first scholar to do a study on the Moros, “Islam penetrated the Philippines through Makhdum who came to northern Mindanao and Sulu sometime in 1380.”25 He was an Arabian scholar who reached Malacca in circa 1350. Later, he went to Mindanao and Sulu in 1380, and made a few converts. He was believed to have built the first mosque in Bwansa, formerly the capital of Sulu. However, Saleeby continues, the “Moro history and nationality owe their beginning in the Philippine Islands to two persons: Abu Bakr and Sarip Kabungsuwan in Mindanao.”26 Abu Bakr or Sayed-Al-Hashim Abubakar27 came from Mecca and arrived in Bwansa (the ancient capital of Sulu) in 1480. He married Paramisuli, the only daughter of Rajah Baginda (also spelled as Baguinda) and became the judge and a high priest. After the death of Baginda, Abu Bakr assumed leadership and assumed the title sultan, as well as introduced the sultanate system to the Tausugs. He proceeded to organize his kingdom, taught former priests with the Quran. The Quran contains the words of God; they call Allah, which were revealed to Mohammad through Archangel Gabriel (Jibrael). 28 In this Holy Book is embodied the basic teachings of Islam which are:1 Profession of Faith; that there is no other God than Allah and Mohammad is his Prophet;2 Praying five times a day;3 Fasting during the month of Ramadan;4 Alms giving (ten percent of anyone’s income);

5. Pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.

Abu Bakr also built mosques, converts people to Islam, levied taxes and tribute and published the first code of laws and a system of courts. He organized the whole archipelago of Sulu into one nation.

Spanish ColonizationIt is claimed that from 1460, the Sulus lived unmolested and prospered. But after this date, they seemed destined for a different experience. The Moros watched the progress of Legazpi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon, saw how the pagan chiefs were subjugated and witnessed the expulsion of their brother Muslims in Manila. Their love of home and family prompted them to fight the Spaniards.29

25 Najeeb Saleeby, The Early History of the Moros, (Typescript, a reprint by W. Mijares, MSU URC, from the personal files of Mamitua Saber, ), p. 3. In early February 2000, the MSU Mamitua Saber Memorial Research Center was razed to the ground when someone put it to the torch. If the arson was done for purposes of forcing the university officials to give the security volunteers jobs, it is understandable considering that it is the normal means of the Maranaos to press their demands ever since this author entered the MSU. But there is a common notion that it was burned because it contains the newly acquired documents from the US National Archives that would have negated the claims of the Maranaos or the Muslims in general that they had not capitulated to the Spaniards.

26 Ibid., p. 1. Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs, pp. 45-50.

27 Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs, pp. 50-68.

28 Saleeby, p. 3.29 Saleeby, p. 2.

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The Moros were and still are obstinate, daring, tenacious and adventurous, but highly ethnocentric. These would explain the conflicting motives of their piratical activities and slave raids. Because of cultural diversity they did not have central government, but faith as their unifying factor, the Dar-ul-Islam (house of Islam). Though they did not have any standing army and navy, they had boats, forts, and firearms as well as able-bodied men as their soldiers and sailors, armed and ready to fight when called to duty. It is a shame for a Moro and his family to surrender. “Life itself meant nothing to them, as against Islam and honor. No defeat could bend such people to submission.”30 They prefer death than dishonor of surrender. They are greatly disunited because of their cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences, yet, cohesive because of Islam and their retention of the datu system. But this disunity was their asset rather than liability. Once a tribe or a datu surrendered, the others were not obliged to follow because they were not politically united (unlike other places that when their leader/s of the superior tribe, the rest surrendered as well).31 On the other hand, this disunity was also a factor of the miseries of the individual ethnic group because they were easily forced to compromise.32 But these compromises were not considered as defeat because these were in a form of treaties. Hence, they did not consider themselves as Filipinos because they were not totally conquered or subjugated.33

The failure of the Spaniards to influence or subjugate the Moros was due to the following reasons:1. Intolerance and impatience (of the Spaniards);2. Non-occupation of Moroland with forces sufficient to maintain Spanish supremacy in the South;3. Failure to rule the people through their chiefs and to give proper respect to native authority;4. Failure to understand the “Agama System,” for the basis of the Moro laws and government.34

American Colonizers

30 Mayo, p. 290.31 Take for example the signing of the Peace Accord between the GRP and the MNLF. Though

there are a number of Maranaos who are benefited by the agreement-majority felt that it was between the Tausog and the GRP only. Hence, the organization of the MNLF-ICC only indicates the Moro diversity. The MNLF-ICC is a Maranao led MNLF wing, MILF is by a Maguindanaon and the Abu Sayaff by the Yakans.

32 Let us be reminded that an agreement or treaty of peace for the Spaniards it signify surrender, but for the Muslims it is only a strategy to consolidate their forces for another possible offensives.

33 This is the same argument that the Cordillerans raised in order to demand their autonomous status. They too never surrendered or defeated. They prefer to run into the hinterland than being subjects to the Spaniards as to the Moro’s preference to die than surrender.

34 Saleeby, p. 4.

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The American colonizers on the other hand had succeeded in neutralizing the Moros. Though, the Moros did not consider it as subjugation, because of the number of treaties signed, but just the same the Moroland became part of the American Philippine colony. First, they did not force the Moros to follow the religion of the Americans; Second, they used force to persuade them to surrender and compromise; and Third, they had a strong force to counter any attempt of the Moros to counterattack.35 Ultimately, the Moros were subdued but undefeated. They accepted friendship offers of the Americans. Treaties after treaties were signed which for all intents appeared that they (Moros) were treated as their (Americans) equals. This could be seen in the number of letters sent to General John J. Pershing by the different Datus of Lanao. In a letter of Datu Aliyodan of Pualas (Lanao) and his brother Pagabangan, it reads:

In view of our father’s death (Ami Pakpak) and as this your friend we notify you of his leaving us with the object that you may not that his children have not notified you of the fact and at the same time we offer you our friendship, as same as you have professed to our father.

Received June 28, 1902. 36

The Moros were duped. They got infuriated and demanded that they will not be ceded to the Philippines when independence will be granted in 1946. Among the spokesmen of the Maranao opposed to the inclusion of the Moros is the Philippines was Ami [Amai – father of] Binaning. During the visit of Quezon in Lanao in June 1923 to campaign for the independence, he did not receive the support of the Moros because “he attacked the Moro’s friend [Gen. Wood] and threatened them with ‘grave consequences.’” Quezon said on that meeting, “America’s day is done, her government in the Philippines to-day is a fable. It is the Filipino Legislature that governs you Moros. This man Wood is a figurehead. It is only a question of a little time and every American in the Islands will be chased out. You Moros will do well to submit to us now.” Amai Binaning in front of Quezon and the Constabulary declared, “You shall not govern us. We stay with America.”37 Later, he was attacked by the Constabulary, and was killed together with his family. “They simply died-for honour and for America.”38 The Moros sent letters and letters of appeal to be excluded from the Philippines, but it never reached America or Gen. Wood. One of such letters runs:

United States of America,Philippine Islands,Province of Zamboanga

35 Mark Twain in a newspaper article accused the American government to use brutality while claiming to be Christians. This is because of the letters of volunteers in the Philippine Campaigns that had been published in the New York Times telling how they shot women and children to force the Tausugs to surrender if not they will kill their women and children including their helpless olds.

36 John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Box 319.37 Mayo, pp. 308-309.38 Ibid., p. 310.

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Datu . . . . being duly sworn, upon his oath states:That he has been informed that his alleged signature is attached to a petition asking for Philippine Independence and containing statements said to be derogatory to his Excellency Governor-General Leonard Wood. That the affiant has never signed any such petition, but that he has always, during the many years he known Governor-General Wood, had the greatest respect and admiration for him, both as a man and as a public official.

That he has never been a party to, nor has he ever signed a petition or document criticizing the Governor-General in the slightest degree. The affiant is in favor of the segregation of Mindanao and Sulu and Palawan from the Philippine Islands and the re-organization of same under the American Flag as an unorganized territory of the United States or otherwise as Congress may deem best.39

The American congress did not know of all these. In the House Committee’s hearing on March 6, 1924, then Speaker Roxas said:

With reference to the assertion made by the Secretary of War that the Moros are opposed to Independence, we beg to differ with him. If there is any such opposition, it comes from those few who, as a result of the organized activities of American enemies of Independence in getting the Moros to express themselves as opposed to Independence, salaried agents being employed for this purpose, have been persuaded . . . to express opposition.40

Whether the U.S. Congress had investigated the assertions of the Secretary of War and verified the allegations of Roxas, we would never know. But what is clear is that “the Moros resisted, since their historical enemies now had formal state power”41 over them. The Congress of the United States of America included the Muslim Mindanao into the Philippine Republic (but retained what were useful to them, the Marianas group of islands and later gave Saipan and other islands, supposed to be part of the Philippine territories).

39 Ibid., p. 318. 40 Ibid., p. 331.41 Nuñez, p.17.

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The Muslims did not do anything during the early years of the Commonwealth period. Their response for being ruled by the people they considered their enemies42 - the Christians, was suspended by the Japanese Occupation. Although disgusted with the decision of the American government some in a way or the other fought against the Japanese.43 Moro guerrilla leaders like Pendatun, Dimaporo, Mindalano, and many others defended their homeland not because of anything but for freedom. In Lanao for example there was an uprising against the Japanese. The Japanese were afraid to go out in their camps without many escorts,44 in spite of the order to “lie low.” This suggests that the Moros made their own decision.

After the war, the government divided Lanao into two provinces and Cotabato into three, to give way to the clamor of the Muslims for leadership of their homeland and as a response to the ever-increasing Christian migration. Lanao was divided into two, Lanao del Norte was given to the Christian leaders and Lanao del Sur was given to the Muslims. However, though Lanao Sur was already a separate province, there was no election until the Marcos regime. All provincial as well as municipal executives were appointed from the prominent families of the province and the towns respectively. Cotabato was divided into three; North Cotabato (mostly Ilocanos), South Cotabato (mostly Ilongos) and Maguindanao (mostly Maguindanaons). It was after the war that the Christian prospectors, industrialist, loggers, and politicians, in collaboration with Moro elite, dispossessed the Moros and the Lumads of their lands through legal and illegal processes.45 This was particularly true in South Cotabato. Then the Martial Law Regime came.46

Agrarian Unrest

This traces how agrarian unrest in Luzon and Visayas affected Mindanao that ignited the resurgence of the Moro resistance.

42 Mayo, p. 298.43 Accounts of USAFFE soldiers who survived during the surrender of Gen. Guy O. Fort show that

the Maranaos bought the arms of the soldiers and some even stole them. 44 Please see Nelson Ganancial, Guts and Common Sense: Intelligence During the Japanese

Occupation 1941-1945 MA Thesis UP Diliman, Q.C. , 1994.45 Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslin Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Manila: Filipinas Foundation,

1977), pp. 113-114. Further discussions will be done in another chapter.46 For a summary of the important events in the History of the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu,

please refer to the appendices.

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Agrarian problem in the Philippines started when the Spaniards set foot on Philippine soil. The numerous petty rebellions as history would show are proofs that agrarian problem is not new. Yet our government has never learned from history. The insatiable desire of the landed few to amass more lands never ends. The laws to benefit the colony were never implemented by unscrupulous Spanish officials. The friar’s longing for funds from their large estates to support their missionary zeal added to this dilemma.47 The coming of the Americans did not change the situation. The American collaborators were given the opportunity to enrich themselves while telling the world of their benevolence assimilation policy.48 The years prior to the Japanese Occupation witnessed agrarian related unrest in Luzon and in the Visayas.49

The Japanese Occupation

Just as the Huks were able to make the war with the Japanese as their actual training opportunity in armed struggle and to gather up arms, the same was true in Mindanao. The Moros were also able to gather as many arms that they could.50 Since majority of the Moros who fought against the Japanese were not inducted into the USAFFE but as recognized guerrillas only (except for the group of Pendatun and a few others), the government had no way of knowing the number of arms and ammunition they were able to acquire. Except the arms and ammunition issued to the USAFFE members the Moros did not surrender their weapons that became part of their armory used against the Christians later.

Postwar

The agrarian problem was so severe that it became the rallying point of the postwar Huk or HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan) rebellion that (according to exaggerated reports) almost topple down the established government. Yet, the Moros just like during the time of the Philippine Revolution did not do anything because there was no agrarian problem in Mindanao.51 When the Huk or HMB rebellion was over, the government resettled the rebels who surrendered to Mindanao through their resettlement program to ease the tension in Central Luzon. This solution was similar to what the Americans implemented early in the century order to neutralize the unrest in Luzon and the Visayas. The Moros did not react right away for they found an easy source of farm workers. But the number of new settlers grew that they became only a minority in their own territories. The migrants prospered in their midst, while they remained impoverished. Thus, they accuse the government of neglecting them.

47 To neutralize the unrest in Luzon, political, religious or agrarian rebels, the Spaniards exiled the enemies of the state to Mindanao. Rizal was one these political exiles.

48 What the Spaniards did to their political enemies, the Americans also did it. The only difference is that it was more precautionary on the part of the Americans than reaction on the part of the Spaniards.

49 During the Japanese Occupation, USAFFE soldiers from Luzon and the Visayas were sent to Mindanao to defend the last defense line of the American forces. Some never returned home. They stayed in Christian dominated areas and got married and made Mindanao their permanent residence.

50 The Americans did not arm the Moros for fear that they might rise in arm sooner or later. They were organized only as bolo battalions.

51 It should have been the opportune time to press their demand for independence since the government that time could not fight two war fronts, distant away from each other.

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Land Reform Laws

The following are the different laws passed from the American period until Martial Law Regime. If we have to analyze carefully the implications of these laws we will realize that they were intended to serve the landed few and not the landless majority.

1. Philippine Bill of 1902 – This bill limited private individual landholding to 16 hectares and 1,024 hectares to corporate landholdings. However, it gave the Americans the right to acquire and own agricultural lands giving them the opportunity to control large tracts of lands for large-scale farming.

2. Land Registration Act of 1902 – Landowners were required to register their landholdings and acquire Torrens titles. However, small farmers were not aware of the law or too poor to pay for the documentation failed to register their ownership of their lands. Since their lands were not registered, unscrupulous individuals applied for ownership through fraudulent surveys.

3. Friar Land Act of 1903 - Taft Commission purchased from the religious orders of the so-called friar estates that amounted to $7 million for 400,000 acres. Small portion were sold to 60,000 tenants and the bigger portion were allocated to the veterans of the 1896 Revolution. This was intended to diffuse the unrest that resulted in the 1896 Revolution. However, the greatest beneficiaries of these laws were the men of Aguinaldo, while the small farmers could not understand why they have to pay for the land that their fathers owned.

4. Public Lands Act of 1903 – This Act offered Filipinos up to 16 hectares of uncultivated public land through the homestead program. However, there was no financial assistance to the settlers and the government was also slow in conducting surveys. Because of this, the settlers could not show any document that would prove his ownership of the land he is farming. Again, unscrupulous individuals took the opportunity to register these lands.52

5. Land Registration Act of 1905 – An Act for issuing land titles that limits to three titles only. The hidden agenda behind it was to determine the limits of private lands and classify those beyond them as public lands under their arbitrary disposition and control;

6. The Cadastral Act of 1907 – was passed to carry out further the U.S. seizure of land. This is just another way of knowing what lands are cultivated but were not registered.

7. Commonwealth Act 4113 or the Sugar Tenancy Act of 1933 – was approved to regulate the sugar tenants and landlord relationships. Tenants were not aware of this law or dismissed if they demand so much rights under this law. The Negros and Panay tenants were the ones affected by this.

52 Before the American rule ends, tenant’s and peasant’s uprisings increased sporadically, Colorums in northeastern Mindanao, Tagbulans in Pangasinan and the Sakdalista in Laguna.

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8. Commonwealth Act No. 21 in 1936 – The law authorized Quezon to purchase home sites on large landed estates for resale to occupants and called for the appropriation of one million pesos for the purpose. Only in 1939 when he created the Rural Progress Administration to implement it and was dissolved in 1950. It acquired 37,736 hectares only.

9. Republic Act No. 31 – Provided for 70-30 sharing if the tenant provided for his own work animal (70% of the harvest goes to the tenant and 30% to the landlords).

10. Rice Tenancy Act in 1933 (Act No. 4054) - Provided for 50-50 sharing, but it only took effect in 1946.

11. *National Land Resettlement Administration was organized in 1939 in order to operate two settlement projects in Southwestern Mindanao and one in Cagayan Valley that were designed as exile areas for rebellious peasants.

12. *Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO) in 1950 was also created to resettle landless peasants in Mindanao.

13. *Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) was also a resettlement project that brought farmers and peasants to Mindanao.

14. Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (RA No. 1199). This was the land reform program of Pres. Ramon Magsaysay concerned with rent and interest rate reduction and the resettlement of the Huk rebels. It limited rent to 30 percent at eight to ten percent a year, but it was a failure under his successor.

15. *National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) in 1954. The creation of the NARRA is one of the provisions mandated by RA No. 1199 under the government of Magsaysay in order to neutralize the agrarian unrest in the Huk covered areas in Luzon. Those who surrendered were uprooted from their lands and resettled in Mindanao and somewhere else.

16. Agrarian Relations Act of 1954 is the law that sets the 30% sharing of the harvest after deducting the expenses.

17. Land Reform Act or 1955. It created the Land Tenure Administration for expropriating landed estates whose size exceeded the maximum retention limit of 300 and 600 hectares. But it was not able to leap off because of the lobbying of the landlords in congress. This is the famous “Land for the Landless” Law.

18. The Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 (RA No. 3844). It sets an order of priority in expropriating lands but it only covered rice and corn lands:

a. idle or abandoned lands;

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b. those whose area exceeds 1,024 hectares;c. those whose area exceeds 500 hectares but is not more 1,024 hectares;d. those whose area exceeds 144 hectares but is not more than 500 hectares; and e. those whose area exceeds 75 hectares but is not more than 144 hectares.

Under this code the offices of the National Land Reform Council and the Land Authority were created. Three years after the approval of the Land Reform Code that the Land Bank was organized that later received only 13.6 million pesos out of the 400 million pesos that was supposed to have been appropriated to it. From 1966-1969, the bank was only able to buy 10 agricultural estates of about 997.6 hectares.

The National Agricultural Council was created and abolished the Share Tenancy and replaced it with Leasehold System that is merely similar with the Share Tenancy System.

Credit institutions like the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration and private rural banks were established but all of these offices served the landlords, merchants and politicians than the peasants.

The Agricultural Credit Administration has taken the function of the ACCFA but no fundamental changes happened.

The Agricultural Land Reform Code assured the farm works of the daily minimum wage that the hacenderos did not follow

19. Code of Agrarian Reform in 1971 - Marcos changed the Land Reform Code to Code of Agrarian Reform through Rep. Act. No. 6389. Rep. Act. No. 6390 on the other hand created an agrarian reform’s special account that encourages the creation of cooperatives later known as Samahang Nayon.

20. PD No. 2 on 26 September 1972 – declares the entire Philippines as a land reform area.

21. PD No. 27 on 21 October 1972 –declares all share and lease tenants as owners of “family-sized farms of five hectares if not irrigated and three hectares if irrigated.”

22. PD No. 57 on 19 November 1972 – exempts the landowners from taxes the proceeds from land transfer.

23. DAR Memorandum on 2 January 1973 –declares that leasehold should prevail over all rice and corn lands pending land transfer and that share tenancy is illegal for these said lands.

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24. 21 October 1973 Land Transfer – which was previously covered landholdings over 50 hectares of rice and corn lands, was extended to holdings from 50 down to 24 hectares.

The different laws and memoranda outlined above show the weakness of the agrarian and land reform laws in the Philippines. The oligarchs that controlled the legislative body through the sponsorship of the Americans saw to it that their land holdings will never be affected. But the programs that made a great impact on the Moros were implemented by the following offices; 1) the National Land Resettlement Administration in 1939, 2) Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO) in 1950, 3) Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) a resettlement project, and 4) National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) in 1954 was created in line with RA 1199. These offices implemented the resettlement programs of the government that brought more people in Mindanao. These resettlement sites are in Lanao and in Cotabato (in the present North and South Cotabato areas). The influx of tenants, peasants and seasonal workers in these areas awakened ethnocentrism due to “intense competition between ethnic groups for the occupation of social niches.”

Neo-colonizersThe resettlement programs of the government as part of the “civilizing mission”

increased tremendously the population of Mindanao from 2,010,223 in 1948 to 6,294,224 in 1970.53 However, this was not the start of the migration to Mindanao as argued earlier. As early 1913 internal immigration to Mindanao was encouraged through official resettlement programs of the Americans. There were 357 people per year that moved to Mindanao through the National Land Settlement Administration. More people came later as a result of improved roads and other infrastructures. After 1935, resettlement was encouraged not just to relieve the going tension and the population growth in Luzon but it was also conceived as a means of “civilizing” the Muslims and other indigenous peoples in Mindanao54 through what I called as internal “cultural imperialism,” and internal colonization or neo-colonization. Evidence of social tension was already emerging in the early decades of the 20th Century because of internal migration.

53 Che Man, p. 60. 54 May, R.J, p. 127.

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The EDCOR resettlement scheme was basically a strategy of the government to soften the Huk supporters. But it also encouraged more people from other parts of the country to migrate to Mindanao, so that by late 50s there were more Cebuano speakers in Mindanao than in Cebu itself,55 and by “1975 census 6 million of Mindanao’s 9.7 million people had their origins in Luzon or the Visayas.”56 By 1960s some 3,200 migrants per week arrived in Mindanao. The prewar settlers, the Lumads and the Moros found themselves dispossessed of their lands through dubious collaborations of community leaders with the newcomers. These new settlers found themselves being taxed by local datus simply because the area was formerly their ancestral lands. To get away from this problem the new settlers applied for the titles of the land they are tilling making them owners of the lands they are farming. As stated somewhere in this study, the Muslims did not understand this. For them all lands are God (Allah) given. Tension between the new settlers and the Moros began to surface. There were those who took the opportunity of the tension prevailing in the resettlement sites by raiding isolated Christian settlers and robbing them of their harvest and their working animals. Illegal logging operations that also flourished during this period destroyed the natural resources of the traditional homeland of the Indigenous Peoples. Those who were able to amass big landholdings and succeeded in entering politics, hired goons and private armies; while the Muslims and tribal groups (i.e., Pulangions) organized themselves along kinship system. Thus, the cattle-rustlers and farm raiders were known by the names of their families or tribal group rather than by their group’s names.

Chapter IIIThe Mujahidin (The Holy Warriors)

55 See Gowing, Muslim Filipinos… 56 May, , R.J., p. 128.

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The roots of the encounters between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao started even way back during the Spanish regime when the colonizers sent to Mindanao the Christianized Indios to fight the Moros. The present started when the government sent to the south the peasants, farmers and the Huks (HMB) who surrendered after their uprising in Luzon and the Visayas. As stated earlier, majority of those who settled in what is now North and South Cotabato came from the Ilocos, Panay and Negros. The Maguindanaons at first welcome them and some even bartered their lands with goods from the new settlers. However, tension arose when the natives of the area started demanding that they would like to get back their lands since they are already productive, which the settlers refused because they had already spent so much money and efforts to develop their farms.57 The Moros started harassing them and stealing their harvest and work animals. The Christians responded and they organized the Ilaga (rat or pejoratively, Ilongo-Ilocano LAnd Grabbing Association).58 The organization of the ILAGA coincided with the training of the MNLF Top Ninety in Malaysia, so much so, that when the offensives of the MNLF started, their baptism of fire happened to be against the Ilagas and not with the government forces.59 Because of the hatred of the Ilagas against the Moros and their skills in battles, politicians hired them in their private armies.

But in the eyes of the Moros this is not the cause of the present problem in Mindanao. For them this present Jihad or Holy War is divided into three phases:

First Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Spanish invasion (1521-1898) 377 years.

Second Phase: the Moro Jihad against the American colonizers (1898 - 1946) 47 years.

Third Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Philippine crusade (1970 - present).

Since the granting of the Philippines Independence in the year 1946, the Manila government launched “settlement programs” for the Christians from Luzon and Visayas in the Moroland. Prior to that the Moro Muslims had been enjoying the administration of the region by themselves as the Provincial governors, the Municipal mayors and the Barangay captains were among themselves. The Christian settlers, with the assistance of the Manila government, started to take over the strategic politic and socio-economic posts soon after their influx into the Moroland.60

57 Account related to me by the descendants of the settlers. 58 Account related to me by the bodyguard of Commander Ligaya, the sister of Commander

Toothpick. As part of the so-called low-intensity-conflict strategy, the Ilagas were used at the frontlines, because they were familiar with the terrain and the style of fighting of the Moros. It is on record that the Ilagas were the ones who neutralized the Moros not the Military. Please see also the work of Nuñez, p. 22.

59 The fear of the Maranaos to the Ilagas was shown by their distrust on Ilongo students in MSU as they were also considered as Ilagas.

60 Interview with Hashim Salamat, http://muslimedia.com/ARCHIVES/sea99/intv-milf1.htm.

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It is clear from this statement of Hashim Salamat that they have a different view of Philippine history and their history. There is no commonality of the struggle of the Filipinos and their struggle. Thus, the least importance of history as a subject in schools appeared to have contributed to the Mindanao problem. The opening of Madrasahs (private Islamic Schools), further advances these teachings. These and other factors, i.e. neglect of the government, dragged the problem too long with no solution at hand as shown by the emergence of the new MNLF splinter group, the MNLF-ICC (Islamic Command Council).MNLF

According to Rudy B. Rodil, a member of the GRP-MNLF negotiation panel, The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)-led revolution:

was the maturation of a series of Moro protests against the discriminatory treatment that they experienced within the Republic, the most infamous being the Jabidah massacre wherein an undetermined number of young Moro recruits undergoing secret military training in Corregidor were massacred for alleged mutiny. . . but the groundswell of Moro protests spiced with reports of secret military training became one of two excuses for President Marcos’ declaration of martial rule. Martial law for its part provided the valve for the eruption of the Bangsamoro armed struggle for national liberation from the clutches of alleged Philippine colonialism.61

61 Rudy B. Rodil, Mindanao Development, Kalinaw Mindanao. http://Mindanao.com/kalinaw/dev/tri-people.htm.

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The trainees code named Jabidah Forces, were composed of Muslim youth, trained in Corregidor Island for marine maneuver and attack to penetrate and reclaim Sabah,62 as well as to split the Islamic ranks. This was the last option of Marcos if the Malaysian government rejects the peaceful settlement of the Sabah Case. The lone survivor of the Jabidah Massacre on March 18, 1968, 63explained that the trainees were shot after they refused to invade Sabah. This incident was the eye-opener of the Muslims that the government did not care for them if it is for the security of the state. The first to react to this incident was Datu Udtog Matalam of Cotabato. He declared the Mindanao Independence Movement or MIM.64 Other Moro aristocrats and politicians thought of organizing a guerrilla type organization to defend Mindanao. Then Congressman Rashid Lucman, according to Nuñez “responded to a Malaysian offer to train and arm dedicated young Moros for war against Manila.”65 Negotiations were done and the first trainees, according to instructions must come from the villages.66 However, the trainees were all “City boys,” called the “Top Ninety.”67 The Moro aristocrats and politicians were mad upon learning that the trainees were educated ones. But they could not do anything because they already left. This group later on is known as the MNLF or the Moro National Liberation Front. It is perhaps the reason why Lucman organized the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization,68 in anticipation of the possible moves of the educated Moro youths sent for training to Malaysia. However, in the study of Taher, he wrote that “the selection of the Top Ninety was based on the recruit’s physical and intellectual capabilities to spearhead and implement guerrilla-type warfare in their respective territorial jurisdictions with the ultimate goal of maintaining the nationhood and independence of the Bangsa Moro Homeland.”69 I was told by a member of the Top

62 Even the Christians were also being prepared for the repercussions. Young men were called for reservist training for the defense of Mindanao, in case Malaysia would retaliate.

63 Omar Taher, “Marawi City Uprising in 1972,” Undergraduate Thesis. AB History, MSU Marawi City. p. 13.

64 Nuñez, p. 20. Then Lucman organized his Blackshirts. The Black Shirts according to Prof. Punduma Sani were actually the MNLF too.

65 Ibid. According to my respondent whose name will be withheld, Senator Domocao was also involved because the wife of Rashid Lucman was Princes Tarhata Alonto, the sister of the senator. This offer is comprehensible as a token of gratitude that the young members of the Jabidah Forces whose main target was their territory in Sabah.

66 The interviewee did not give any reason of the instruction. However, we could surmise that, village people are less educated and are bound to obey what they are ordered to do by their superiors, particularly from prominent Muslims and Royal Titleholders.

67 The Top Ninety according to my own knowledge are: Nur Misuari, Abulkhayr Alonto, Dimas Pundato, Jamil Lucman, Datu Ali, Ronnie Malaguiok, Al Kaluang, Native Membisa, Camar Riga, Indar Tampi, Sali Wali, Maas Bawang, Punduma Sani, Ali Alibon, Otto Salahuddin, Julhambri Misuari, Suboh Gayanandang, Toni Malaguiok, Asrap Tayuan, and Abdul Alonto. Others, I do not know.

68 Nuñez, p. 21. Founded in 1970 by Congressional Representative Rashid Lucman, who intended it to be an umbrella organization for all liberation forces, the BMLO was dominated by Muslim traditional leaders with conservative policies. After losing to the MNLF in a competition to attract aid from the OIC, the BMLO agreed to co-operate with the Marcos regime, which recognized Lucman as Paramount Sultan of Mindanao and Sulu. It re-emerged in the late 1970s after the breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement. On Rashid Lucman’s death, the leadership passed to other members of his family. Nothing has been heard from the group since.

69 Taher, pp. 13-14.

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Ninety, that they were not the only group being trained for clandestine operations. There were other nationalities too, and their trainers were mostly British Army Officers.70

What the Moro aristocrats and politicians were afraid of happened. The trainees organized themselves into the Moro National Liberation Front, with Nur Misuari, Hashim Salamat and Abulkhayr Alonto as the prominent figures. Misuari was a UP professor, Hashim Salamat, an active student leader in Cairo University and Alonto, the son of former Senator, Domocao Alonto Sr. It was at first, Muslim National Liberation Front, but since their ultimate aim is the liberation of the whole Mindanao from the imperial Manila, they changed it to Moro because anybody coming from Mindanao is considered by Manilans as a Moro, whether he is a Muslim or not.71 The organization of the MNLF implied the breakaway of the youth from the traditional-politicians who happened to be their benefactors of their training. Another feared event that came true was the proclamation of Martial Law. But, the politicians did not read Marcos right. Marcos solicited for their help. Hence, Princess Tarhata Lucman was appointed Governor of Lanao del Sur, but soon relieved by Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, because Jamil Lucman and Abulkhayr Alonto refused to surrender. Sooner, however they surrendered. Alonto (1978) was appointed as ambassador and Pundato72 (1982) was given a position under Marcos. One MNLF commander lamented that they were left fighting while they (the children of prominent aristocrats and politicians) enjoyed appointments in the Marcos government.73

70 No wonder that the American government did not really take hand in solving the problems in the south, except in case of CPP-NPA, because their close ally, Britain was responsible for the training of the Moro rebels. Once they are going to interfere, they would be in quarrel with each other.

71 This is according to one interviewee, an MNLF Commander, name withheld. 72 The Reformist Group, led by Dimas Pundato, head of the Ranao Revolutionary Committee of

the MNLF, broke away from the rest of the organization in 1982. At this time, following the failure of the Marcos regime to implement the Tripoli Agreement, Misuari had revived the demand for independence. Pundato believed the MNLF should continue to aim for autonomy, but Misuari rejected his proposals. It reached a settlement with the Aquino government, and its leaders received posts in the government’s Office of Muslim Affairs.

73 Name withheld, because he is now also working in the government after the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord was signed.

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The people of Manila and other parts of the country were made to understand that the first encounter between the government and the MNLF was during the October 21st, 1972 Marawi City Uprising. It was not! The MNLF in Lanao was still consolidating their forces and giving training to new recruits at this time. The Marawi City Uprising was the response of the people who did not know about Martial Law to the call of the unscrupulous politicians and the black propaganda of the Muslim religious organizations. These unscrupulous appointed politicians knew already that they would be arrested because of their graft and corruption cases. To solve their problem, they approached the two big Muslim organizations and asked for assistance. After that, the religious organizations started to air over the radio that since Martial Law was proclaimed, the soldiers would come and Christianize the Moros by force. The Maranaos responded and rose in arms with “Allah o Akbar” (Allah is great) as their war cry. Prominent Christian landowners and businessmen in Lanao Sur died in this uprising. The government had no way of apprehending the unscrupulous politicians because they became instant rebel commanders, thus, escaping from the graft and corruption cases. Since then until 1996 the uprising was known as the start of the MNLF offensive operations, though it was not. Sani noted that Misuari capitalized on the Marawi Uprising as an encouragement for the Tausogs to rise in arms.

The rest is history, peace negotiation after peace negotiations were done but nothing tangible happened. Then the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) and Libya intervened that elevated an internal problem to international status. The Tripoli agreement was signed in 1976 but Marcos implemented it according to his own interpretation of the provisions of the agreement and issued a decree creating the autonomous region of Mindanao composed of twelve provinces and ten cities. But the Muslims demanded that it should be thirteen provinces but Marcos did not budge. Marcos appointed his loyalist Dimaporo to the post while holding the positions as the governor of Lanao del Sur and Acting-President of Mindanao State University. Differences of policies they claimed are the main reason for the breakup of the MNLF into factions. Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao organized his Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984), which is fundamentally Islamic in outlook, and the MNLF Reformist Group (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao, that supported autonomy.74

Aquino deposed Marcos and the contribution of her government in peace process was her initial dialogue with Misuari. Her 1987 Constitution provided for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the signing of the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734). Peace negotiations started and for several years consultations were made. According to Rudy Rodil:

GRP-MNLF Peace Process

74 It is interesting to note that, when Misuari finally signed the Peace Accord in 1996, all the Top Ninety members were given a Tamaraw FX each.

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As we all know, the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed on September 2, 1996. The opening line of the document clearly states: "the final agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement." It represents the product of four years of exploratory and formal peace talks. It reflects an honest to goodness attempt on both the GRP and the MNLF to come to an agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement signed nearly twenty years ago on 23 December 1976.

Participants in the talks were the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic conference. Indonesia as Chair of the Committee of the Six presided over all meetings.

Agenda of the Talks

As agreed upon in Par. 14 of the Statement of Understanding between the GRP and the MNLF, signed in Cipanas, Indonesia, on 16 April 1993, "the agenda for the formal talks will focus on the modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter and spirit, to include specifically:

a. Those portions of the Agreement left for further or later discussion; and b. Transitional implementing structure and mechanism.75

During the early and mid-1990s, the southern Philippines was the site of renewed guerrilla violence by the so-called Muslim separatist forces. In September 1996 the government reached a peace agreement with one of the largest rebel groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The agreement established the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZPD), consisting of 14 Mindanao provinces. It also provided economic assistance to develop the impoverished region. The following are the stages of the implementation of the peace accord:

Terms of Agreement

After three years of peace negotiations, the two parties signed what is now popularly known as the Peace Agreement of September 2, 1996. There are 154 points of consensus in the Agreement. Let me quote pp. 7-8 of the document itself.

I. "Implementing Structure and Mechanism of this Agreement

75 Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet.

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Phase 1 shall cover a three (3) year period starting after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly.

During this phase, the process of joining in of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The integration of MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment process will also take place in this phase.

Phase 2 shall involve an amendment to or repeal of the Organic Act (RA6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through Congressional action, after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy thereof.

While peace and development programs are being implemented in the SZOPAD, a bill to amend or repeal the RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1 (1996-1997). The bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the Final Peace Agreement and the expansion of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite in the affected areas, within two (2) years from the establishment of the SPCPD (1998).

The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy (1998). It may be provided by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous-Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region.76

But the Peace Accord or the SPCD did not end the war in Mindanao. When one surrenders others continue the struggle until their goal is attained.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

76 Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet.

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As earlier mentioned, differences of policies were the main reason for the division of the MNLF into factions. Hashim Salamat a Maguindanao organized his Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984). MILF is fundamentally Islamic in outlook. And the MNLF Reformist Group (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao, supported autonomy. In 1978, shortly after the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement, a group led by Central Committee member Salamat Hashim broke away from the MNLF. At first, it called itself the ‘New MNLF’, but in 1984 it formally established itself as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Hashim Salamat explains what really happened:

While the “Front” was still at the stage of organization, a conflict between Misuari and one of the then Cairo graduates (a doctor) broke out as both expressed aspirations to the chairmanship of the “Front.” Sheikh Salamat Hashim, who was the leader of the whole group, did not insist to the chairmanship to avoid further dispute and eventual failure. So Misuari became the chairman of the “Front.”

After a few years of the start of the struggle Misuari's inefficiency had unveiled itself and most, if not all, of the field commanders signed a petition that Misuari should step down and give way for Salamat Hashim to assume the chairmanship, but Misuari cunningly insisted to stay and Salamat Hashim has to lead the "front" in accordance with the choice of the majority.

In order to avoid confusion, the members of the Central Committee had decided to replace the word “National” with the word “Islamic” so the true “Liberation Front” aiming at the re-establishment of a sovereign Moro Islamic State was given the title “Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”77

But who is Hashim Salamat that he could have been the chair of the MNLF.

Salamat Hashim was born on July 7, 1942 in the municipality of Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He comes from a religious family of seven: four boys and three girls.Salamat’s first teacher was his mother. . . . At the age of six he started his formal education in the Philippine public school. He finished his elementary education in 1954 with honors and his secondary education in 1958 also with honors. . . . While pursuing his formal education, he enrolled in the village madrasah where he attended classes during Saturdays and Sundays. He finished ibtida’iyah at about the same time that he graduated from high school.

In 1958, Salamat joined the pilgrims from the Philippines in journeying to Makkah for the hajj. He took this opportunity to stay behind and study in Makkah under the care of Sheik Jawawi. He attended regularly the halakat held at the Masjidul Haram and enrolled at the Madrasatu As-Sulatiyah ad-Diniyah.

77Sheikh Abu Zahir, Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim, Amir of the Moro Mujahideen, Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines, http://www.Islam.org.au/articles/23/ph2.

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In 1959, he went to Cairo, . . . graduated from Al-Azhar’s Ma’had al-Buuth al-Isslamiyah as-Sanawiyah in 1963. Then he enrolled at Al-Azhar’s College of Theology for a bachelor’s degree program majoring in Aqidah and Philosophy and graduated in 1967. Pursuing his scholastic inclination further, he took up his postgraduate courses in the same university and finished his master’s degree in 1969. He completed the academic requirements for a doctoral degree, but he was unable to write his dissertation because he had to return to the Philippines by then to organize the Moro revolutionary movement.Salamat also became interested to learn the English language so he enrolled at the British International Correspondence School and the American University in Cairo.

Salamat was an active student leader. His active participation in different student activities exposed him to various revolutionary trends, both Islamic and secular, which Cairo was known for at that period. This exposure brought him awareness of the colonial oppression his Muslim brothers and sisters were suffering back home, an awareness which gradually transformed him from a scholar to an Islamic revolutionary later on in his life. …It is interesting to note that among the contemporary Muslim thinkers who influence Salamat, two Muslim personalities made a lasting impression on him: Syed Qutb of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaati Islami. It was, however, Syed Qutb’s writings which shaped his Islamic outlook and political beliefs. The impact that Syed Qutb and Mawdudi made on him was what inspired him to plant the seeds of Islamic revolution in the Bangsamoro homeland. . . . As a cover for his mission, Salamat found a convenient employment as provincial librarian of North Cotabato.

In the organization of the MNLF, Salamat served as the first chairman of the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee (KRC), a Committee in charge of foreign relations. Using his contacts and connections in the Middle East, Salamat was able to bring to the attention of the Muslim world the cause of the Bangsamoro struggle for de-colonization of their homeland, thus gaining for the MNLF moral, political and material support.As a person, Salamat is serious in everything he does. He is well organized with regards to his family and his work. His personal discipline was developed during this spiritual sojourn with Sufism.

As an alim, he loves learning so much that even in his jungle base he maintains a library. He is also a prolific writer and lecturer in Arabic, English and Basa Magindanaon, his native language.78

78 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, The Peace Process: Salamat Hashim’s Concept of Bangsamoro State and Government, http://www.Mindanao.com/kalinaw/peaceproc/salamat-2.html.

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Hashim actually comes from an upper class Maguindanaon family. As stated above, he was a leader of the Philippine Students’ Union in Cairo in the 1960s when studying at Al-Azhar, a prestigious centre of Islamic learning. After returning to the Philippines in 1970, he became a founder member of the MNLF, and eventually challenged Misuari for the leadership. Hashim was a member of the MNLF panels negotiating with the Marcos government in 1975 and 1976. The organization puts much greater emphasis on Islam than the MNLF, and most of its leaders are Islamic scholars from traditional aristocratic and religious backgrounds.

The following are the stand of Salamat on the issue of Mindanao problem:

1. Salamat Hashim believes that "Any solution [to the Mindanao problem] less than full independence of the Bangsamoro Muslims will not work." To Salamat and the MILF, their objective is the reestablishment of the Bangsamoro state, and to continue the building of the political institutions in accordance with the supremacy of the law of God which was impeded with the coming of the Western colonizers. In one occasion he made it clear:

2. All what the Muslims are asserting are their legitimate rights to self-determination that is independence of the Bangsamoro homeland.

3. Salamat envisions establishing not a secular state but an Islamic state founded on the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, an Islamic government in the Bangsamoro homeland.

4. Salamat believes that government is an instrument for realization and perfection of man’s worship to God. The function of government is to regulate the affairs of humankind so that individually and collectively they can perform their worship to God. Government should ensure that justice prevails and should eradicate all forms of evils and encourage all forms of virtue and excellence.

5. Salamat’s model which shall be considered in the establishment of the Bangsamoro government is the government organized by the Prophet, peace be upon him, when he migrated to al-Madinah. Likewise, the rule of his four immediate successors, al-Khulafa al-Rashidun, shall also be considered.

6. The Qur’an does not recommend a definite form and structure of government. Salamat’s position is that this should be decided through consultation with the people. Experiences of other people, Muslims and non-Muslims, have to be studied to determine what form and structure that may be suited to the political culture of the Bangsamoro.

7. Salamat made known his personal view in favor of a federal system where the Muslims, indigenous inhabitants of Mindanao and the Christian migrants will reach constitute separate autonomous states.

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8. In practice, the organizational structure of the MILF is similar to the structure of the Philippine government. The executive functions are exercised by the Office of the Chairman, the legislative functions by the majlis as-Shura (Consultative Council) and the judiciary by the Shari’ah Court.

9. The position of Salamat is that government should ensure that its citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims, enjoy freedom, justice, equality and democracy, and their human rights are protected and promoted.

10. To the non-Muslims of Mindanao who do not want to join the Bangsamoro state, Salamat commits that the MILF is duty-bound to help them if they opt to be free from the oppression and exploitation of the Manila government.

11. Salamat is of the opinion that the imam shall be elected. However, the manner of election will depend upon the situation and level of political maturity of the people. If the condition is so that the people can freely choose the leader and they can judge fairly who is the most qualified among the nominees, he is for direct election. If not, the election of the imam shall be delegated to a council called ahl al-hal wa ‘al-aqd, composed of scholars, professionals, thinkers and sectoral leaders.

12. The foundations of governance, according to Salamat, are shura (consultation), justice and equality. In his view, justice is the natural consequence of shura and equality is the natural consequence of justice. There will be no equality if there is no justice, and there will be no justice unless the affairs of men are conducted through consultation.79

The preceding presentation is very clear that Salamat’s goal is to establish a Bangsamoro Islamic State and government. His theocratic state is no doubt contradicts the constitutional provision that sovereignty resides in the people, because in theocracy God is sovereign. For the MILF autonomy as an alternative political solution to the problem in Mindanao is no longer feasible and viable as shown by the events that followed after the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord was signed. Salamat believes that the only way that the Bangsamoro Muslims will attain prosperity and development is the implementation of an Islamic government.

In the late 1990s, the MILF claims to have 120,000 armed and unarmed fighters and many more supporters. Recent Philippine government estimates put the MILF strength at 8,000 while western intelligence sources put it at 40,000. Most members come from the Maguindanaon and Iranun ethnic groups, although Maranao recruits seem to be increasing. Vice Chair for political affairs, Ghazali Jafaar, says that although the MILF respects the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), ‘the Bangsamoro has the final say.’

79Ibid.

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This is the problem that the Philippine government has to deal with seriously if it has to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. But the government is confident that they can hurdle this obstacle because the MILF is not supported by the OIC. According to Malacañang:

Malacañang maintained Wednesday that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) does not recognize the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as the representative Muslim group in the Philippines and said any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering in the country’s internal affairs.

Presidential spokesman Jerry Barican made this clear in response to reports that the MILF is seeking support from Islamic governments worldwide for international recognition. In a statement, Barican said the only Muslim group in the Philippines recognized by the OIC is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Gov. Nur Misuari .of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

In 1996, the MNLF forged a peace deal with the government brokered by the OIC, a grouping of more than 40 Muslim countries. "In fact, the MNLF still has observer status in the OIC," Barican added, noting that it was the OIC that facilitated the peace process between the government and the MNLF in 1996. Barican pointed out that the peace process with the MILF is purely an internal affair of the Philippines.

"Therefore, any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering with the internal affairs of the Philippine government, aside from contradicting the position of the OIC," he said. The MILF is negotiating a peace agreement with the government, following the success of peace talks between the Ramos administration and the MNLF.80

What Malacañang is hiding from the public is the fact that the OIC can help the MILF officially or unofficially.81 Official means the help is approved by the body while the unofficial support is done by individual member nation like Libya.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Another group that is also giving headaches to the government is the Abu Sayyaf Group that is believed to have some links with the MILF. According to an official report of the US Department as of April 1999:

Description

80 Daily Inquirer Internet Edition. 81 Lately, the Estrada administration decided to attack the biggest camp of the MILF. But the

problem got more complicated because they adopted guerrilla strategy that made it hard for the military to find them for they know they have the control of their attack and they are nowhere to be found for their camps were already occupied by the government forces.

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Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Arab mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan.

Activities

Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings and kidnappings in 1998.

Strength

Unknown, but believed to have about 200 members.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG operates in the southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila.82

The Abu Sayyaf83 (‘father of the sword’) group was founded in the mid-1980s to propagate Islam through jihad or Holy War. Its founder and leader was Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, an Islamic scholar and previously a member of the MNLF but was killed in an encounter with the AFP in December 1998.

Few details are known about this group (as shown by the intelligence report from the United States of America), whose main base is on the island of Basilan. They appear to have little popular support because of their criminal activities. Most non-members describe it as Islamic fundamentalist, and many violent incidents in Mindanao have been attributed to the members. These include an attack on the town of Ipil in 1995 killing 50 people, several bombings in churches and a grenade attack in a Zamboanga department store just before Christmas in 1998, injuring 60 people.84

Members of the group are said to be former MNLF guerrillas who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s. Edwin Angeles, a convert to Islam who commanded Abu Sayyaf military operations in the early 1990s, was later revealed to be deep penetration agent. He left the Abu Sayyaf in 1995, and was killed in January 1999, soon after Janjalani.

82 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998. April 1999. 83 It is alleged that the ASG was formerly CIA trained mercenaries sent to Afghanistan to help the

Afghan rebels. 84 Lately they were involved in the kidnapping of foreign nationals in Sabah. The victims were

released five months later. But before they were all released another African American was also abducted. The government decided to attack their lair.

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MNLF-ICC

Recently, the newspapers headlined the birth of MNLF-ICC or MNLF Islamic Command Council. The mass media appeared to be surprised of the emergence of this group. They claim that they have members from the 13 different Moro tribes in Mindanao. The truth is that, the MNLF was not totally disbanded after the signing of the Peace Agreement with the Philippine government. It did not end the trouble in Mindanao, because the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf grabbed the attention of the media. And now when the government and the MILF are on the way to find solutions to end hostilities through negotiations, the MNLF-ICC was launched.85 The following is the complete analysis by the Stratfor:

STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update16 March 2000

Warning: Civil War Could Resume Throughout Philippines

Summary

At a recent leadership conference in the southern Philippines, the Islamic Command Council (ICC) announced that it will resume its guerrilla war against the government after nearly four years of tenuous peace. By itself, this single organization cannot re-spark the country's dormant civil war. But there is widespread guerrilla dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 1996 peace accord. The country is also stressed by economic and political problems. The group's announcement appears to presage the return of full-scale civil war to the Philippines.

AnalysisOn March 12, the Islamic Command Council (ICC) announced at a

press conference in the southern province of Lanao del Sur that it would resume its guerrilla war against the Philippine government. The council is a faction of the country's former rebel front, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). At the press conference, a spokesman for the group claimed that it comprised nearly 90 percent of the original 20,000-25,000 MNLF forces. About 100 heavily armed members appeared before the media.

On an immediate level, the ICC is calling for an independent

85 Though the MNLF-ICC just came out in March 2000, their existence was already known. The most recent is the Maranao Islamic Statehood movement that came to public attention in January 1999 with a raid on the market in Marawi City.

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Islamic state in Mindanao. The group notes that that the Philippine government co-opted MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who signed a 1996 peace accord with the government putting an end to the civil war in exchange for autonomy - not independence - for the Moro people. At the conclusion of its leadership conference, an ICC spokesman warned that "aside from self-determination and the establishment of an Islamic state, the only way out here is through mutual destruction," according to the Manila Times.

By itself, the ICC presents a limited military threat. But theannouncement may trigger the resumption of a long-simmeringconflict in the southern Philippines; dissatisfaction has risenamong other former MNLF guerrillas because of the slow pace inwhich the peace accord has been implemented. Talks with other

separatists have been stalemated. On many fronts, the 1996 peace accords appear to be failing. The government in Manila is striking an increasingly harder line, as well.

Despite claiming thousands of members, the ICC has in fact been a small militant faction since 1995. Government estimates place membership in the low hundreds. The ICC split from the larger front in 1995 during the final stages of peace talks. While the MNLF, led by Misuari, pressed for peace, the ICC, led by Melham Alam – a former chief of staff under Misuari - rejected the government's offer of autonomy. In April 1995, the ICC and the Muslim terrorist group Abu Sayyaf attacked the predominantly Christian town of Ipil in Zamboanga Del Sur Province. More than 100 were left either dead or wounded. Misuari expelled Alam from the front after the attack. In 1996, Alam claimed that the ICC had 300 fighters trained in Afghanistan and Syria, plus 3,000 Muslim rebels.

This small group, however, has a keen sense of timing. The group is stirring as another round of peace negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) nears a June 30 deadline. Announced by President Joseph Estrada, the deadline calls for a working peace deal - or the launch of a full-scale military assault against the MILF. Some in the Philippine government and military men are reportedly dissatisfied with Estrada's tough line, likening it to the activities of former President Ferdinand Marcos before declaring martial law in 1972.

There is considerable concern about the balance of forces, in case it comes to renewed civil war. Government forces are stretched comparatively thin. Deployments in Mindanao include 35,000 soldiers and 35,000 paramilitary militia - the largest single deployment in the Philippines. There are calls for a further 15,000 members to be added to militia forces, known as the Citizen's Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). The Philippine military includes only 74,000 army troops and 9,000 marines.

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In comparison, the MILF has about 15,000 fighters and government figures indicate that they have greater access to weapons with 11,350 firearms - up nearly fourfold since 1997. The MILF may also be able to count on other insurgent groups and former guerrillas who have since been brought into the armed forces - but whose loyalties are questionable. The list of other active insurgencies includes Abu Sayyaf, with 1,500 members and 500 weapons, the ICC and other former MNLF fighters, and the Communist New People's Army (NPA), with 10,600 members. Though they are not allied, these groups have been known to operate together.

The single most important cause of unrest among the thousands of former Philippine insurgents is the slow pace of implementing the four-year old peace accord. The process of integrating former guerrillas into the military and national police, as the accord demands, has been slow due to mistrust on both sides. In October 1999, 500 ex-MNLF soldiers left their military training facility, complaining that they were mistreated and inadequately paid.

Straining the tenuous peace in the south, MNLF leaders also hold that the government has not fulfilled its part of the 1996 agreement, by failing to issue weapons to MNLF fighters who are now in government units. The government's reticence to arm the integrated former MNLF troops was justified in December 1999 when the first 1,000 ex-MNLF fighters promptly disappeared after being issued weapons. The military also has suspended the distribution of weapons to the remaining troops integrated into the armed forces.

For the government, the question is clear. Where do the loyalties of these men lie, with the government or the Moro cause? In February, two former MNLF fighters-turned-government troops were found among six Muslim guerrillas killed in a clash between marines and the Abu Sayyaf on Jolo Island. Brig. Gen. Orlando Buenaventura, commander of the marines in the area, reportedly said that the military suspects "some MNLF integrees [sic] have been spying on us and telling the enemy about our anti-insurgency plans." He added, "We cannot trust them anymore." Guerrillas who have not entered the military present a clear threat. In January, 100 armed, former MNLF guerrillas occupied a port, demanding that the government hire them as security guards.

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Misuari himself has several times warned that if the peace process isn't accelerated, the MNLF may re-launch hostilities. Misuari himself has little desire to break off the peace process but he may have little choice if he wishes to remain in power. Muslim leaders have called for his replacement, claiming he has not fulfilled his role as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. There has been little economic or social progress in the area since the peace accords.

The chief active guerrilla group, the MILF, appears headed toward broader open conflict with the government. The MILF is building its membership. Estrada's June 30 deadline for peace is spurring this growth. The MILF is also capitalizing on the numerous rumors of an impending military coup against Estrada, recently announcing that it had captured three government agents who were part of a coup plot. Reportedly, the agents admitted to a plan that would have pressured Estrada into launching a full offensive against the MILF; Estrada would have then been relieved of his presidency.

For the MILF such a scenario would serve several purposes: placing blame for attacks on the government, fueling rumors of a coup and engendering distrust between the military and government. These rumors also appear to be undermining confidence between the government and the armed forces. The tactic appears to be working. Armed Forces Chief Gen. Angelo Reyes has insisted that the armed forces remain loyal and warned, "We will not baby any coup plotters." Nevertheless, the government called in the navy's Vice Adm. Luisito Fernandez to account for the loyalty of the navy, reported the Manila Times. In addition, the military is increasingly active on the domestic front. Roles likely include stepped up surveillance.

Each of the separatist groups will likely take advantage of this situation. The possibility of all-out civil war is growing, as are prospects for stepped up operations by the MILF, MNLF and Abu Sayyaf in the south, the Communist army in the central region and the north. The ICC's chief area of operation is the urban setting, quite possibly Manila itself.86

86 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/.

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There can be no peace in Mindanao unless full understanding of the role played by culture in the history of the Moros is achieved. It could not be possible too unless the Moros themselves will accept the fact that Mindanao had been already lost for them already and they have to accept the realities that there is still peace in co-existence and in diversity. The Moros believe that they are victims of “internal colonization” or neo-colonialism process that they were not able to anticipate because they believe that education is a Christianizing agent or what is termed as local cultural-imperialism. This left them behind from the rest of the major groups in the Philippines. If there are a few qualified and educated among the Moros or Muslims, it could not be blamed on the government and the Christians but they themselves. As their fallback, they resorted to Islamic fundamentalism and ethnocentrism to get the support of the Muslim world and their people who only want peace. Nobody, I mean nobody among the Muslims when interviewed by the media would say that they support the MILF but in reality they provided financial and human resources to the group for fear of retaliation. However they are already fed up and frustrated of the use of religion in the trouble in Mindanao but they could not do anything of the manipulation of their unscrupulous politicians and their religious leaders. Some of those who can afford left their area and find a peaceful job outside Mindanao to be free from the politicization of their religion.

Chapter IVGovernment Response and External Support

The Mindanao problem or the resurgence of Moro Resistance brought about by the different land reform programs is complicated because the government was slow in responding to the needs of the people and in understanding the role played by cultural encounters. The recognition of Mindanao crises was only given attention in the 1987 Constitution by its provisions on ancestral domain of the indigenous peoples. Though the Philippine Government as perceived by the Moros as their enemies and a neo-colonialists and local cultural imperialists, yet, it did not scatter them all over the islands that would have hindered their organization into a mighty force. Unlike the Huks or HMBs who surrendered that was relocated to other places in the country, particularly in Mindanao, the Muslims (like the MNLF and the Reformist Group) were allowed to remain in their areas. This is to the disadvantage of the unarmed Christian population. The centuries-old Moro practice of Pangayao or piratical and slave raiding activities, took the present practice of abductions and extortion activities. While the Moros are aggressive, the Christians are patients, hoping and waiting for the time to come when the Muslims accept them as their co-Filipinos as they do.

Philippine history is replete with examples of the importance of external supports given to Filipinos. It can be gleaned from the allege support of the Japanese, British and the Americans to the revolutionaries, and the American support of the guerrillas during the Japanese Occupation. The dogma of guerrilla warfare states that there is a need of an external or even supports in order for the guerrillas to succeed. What the government implemented in order to address the peace process as discussed in the preceding chapters and how external support influences the resurgence of Moro Resistance is the focus of this chapter.

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SPCPD

The implementation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development or SPCPD is believed to be one of the attempts of the Philippine government to address the resurgence of Moro Resistance in Mindanao. It is the stepping-stone for the full implementation of the “Tripoli Agreement.” The Peace Agreement as earlier discussed describes the area covered by the SPCPD, as stipulated by the Tripoli Agreement. These areas shall be the focus of intensive peace and development efforts, where public and private investments shall be channeled to stimulate economic development and uplift the conditions of the people therein. However, only five areas (at most) have majority Muslim population.

According to the implementing guidelines of the SPCPD, the SPCPD is composed of one Chairman, one Vice Chairman, and three deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Lumads (non-Christian indigenous people, Manobo, Bagobo, Higaunon, etc.). As an indication of trust and confidence, President Ramos appointed Misuari as the Chairman in spite of the oppositions from other sectors because he is the incumbent governor of the ARMM, and the law states that no person shall hold two government positions at the same time. But Ramos prevailed.

The SPCPD is not a provisional government as the majority of the Muslims are thinking of. It has no governing authority, and law-making power, neither, an autonomous region or, a political subdivision of the country, nor a public corporation. It has no separate judicial personality; hence, it cannot sue or be sued. It is a transitory administrative arm under the control and supervision of the President of the Philippines; in other words, it is the alter ego of the president when it comes to the solution of the Mindanao problems. The SPCPD has the following power and functions:

1. To take charge of the promotion, monitoring, and coordination of the improvement of peace and order in the area;

2. To focus on peace and development efforts, especially in the depressed areas and initiate the implementation of appropriate projects; 3. To support the local government units, when needed;

4. To use other powers needed to implement its mandate as may be delegated by the President;

5. To assist in the holding of elections, referenda, or plebiscite, and peoples' initiative in the area, if deputized by the Commission on Elections upon the recommendation of the President; and

6. To recommend the creation of such offices or instrumentalities necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the

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area. There shall be approval from the Office of the President for budgetary purposes.87

In other words the SPCPD is only a coordinating body in order to promote the improvement of peace and order, and development in the area or in the implementation of programs for peace and development. Further, since the SPCPD is under the direct control of the President of the Philippines, it cannot posses a power or functions beyond the authority of the President to delegate, or which only Congress by law can grant to the Council.

Under the same implementing guidelines is the creation of the Consultative Assembly which is not a law-making body but a forum for consultation and discussion of issues and concerns, formulation and recommendation of policies to the President, and provides appropriate advice to the Council. It is composed of 81 members as follows:

1. The Chairman of the Council shall be the head and presiding officer of the Assembly;

2. The Governor and the Vice Governor of the ARMM, the 14 Governors of the provinces and the 10 City Mayors therein the area;

3. 44 members from the MNLF; and

4. 10 members from various sectors recommended by NGOs and POs after due consultation with the MNLF.88

However, majority of the members of the Council and the Assembly are former MNLF, to the resentment of the politicians in the areas covered by the SPCPD. In turn, the MNLF agreed to: 1) drop their demand for a provisional government; 2) recognize the need for a plebiscite in establishing a new autonomous government; 3) accede that the new area of autonomy will be determined by the choice of the people in the said plebiscite; and 4) implicitly recognize the Constitution.

The Consultative Assembly has the following functions and powers:

1. To serve as forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns; 2. To conduct public hearings as may be necessary and to provide appropriate advice to the SPCPD; and

3. To formulate and recommend policies to the President through the Chairman of the Council and make rules and regulations to the extent

87 SPCD Brochure.88 Ibid.

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necessary for the efficient and effective administration of the affairs of the area.89

However, the secession issue did not end with the signing of the Peace Agreement and the implementation of the SPCPD. This solution as the government response to solve the perennial peace and order problem in the Mindanao is impotent in the sense that the source of funding is not clear. It also depends on the chairman which area will the program be implemented. With Misuari as the chairman of the SPCPD, all the improvements are focused in Sulu. However, I was informed that the men of Misuari are engaged in laundering funds in order to buy arms for an eventual severing of ties with the government. A former MNLF commander confirmed this information.

External Support

The Moro religion Islam is an internationalist religion. They adhere to the so-called dar-ul-Islam or the House of Islam. Every Muslim then for that matter, has the obligation to help other Muslims in other countries or states or groups in their fight against all their enemies. A Muslim must kill or die for the sake of their faith. Divide and rule strategy could not prosper among the Muslims. They may quarrel with one another, but when a common enemy comes, they suspend their differences and fight against their adversaries as one. Take the case of the MNLF and the MILF. Misuari and Salamat may not agree on political grounds but when it comes to religion they call themselves brothers. It is a common knowledge in Mindanao that those MNLF members who were not integrated into the PNP and the AFP were absorbed by the MILF.

In the case of the OIC, its participation was vital to the strength and resurgence of the Moro struggle. However, it was also the weak point of the Moro Resistance because the OIC are still dependent from the world powers for their needs, hence, they have also to look at their own welfare. How the OIC got involved in the resurgence of Moro Resistance could be explained by the Islamic concept of Dar-Ul-Islam. But what is more interesting is their participation in the peace process while at the same time they are also giving assistance to the Moro fighters. The participation of the OIC in the peace process according to Rodil is:

Another aspect that requires some explanation is the participation of the OIC which is two-fold. First, there is the consistent presence of either the Secretary General himself or the Assistant Secretary General in all Rounds of Talks at the Panel level and at the Mixed Committee Level. Second, there is the constant presence of an Indonesian presiding officer in all levels of the talks, from the Panel to the last Support Committee meetings.

89 SPCPD Brochure.

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A little historical backgrounder here is in order. The Quadripartite Ministerial Committee was established by the OIC in the implementation of Resolution No. 4/4 of the Fourth Islamic Conference of Ministers (ICFM) of Foreign Affairs at Benghazi, Libya, 24-26 March 1973. The Chairman of this Committee was Libya, and members were Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Senegal. Its role was to guarantee the security of the Muslim community in the Philippines as well as to secure the respect of their basic rights. A decision to expand the number to six was reached at the 19th ICFM on July 31-August 4, 1990. Bangladesh and Indonesia were added. This is now known as the Committee of the Six with Indonesia as the Chair. The participation of the OIC has been a permanent fixture in all the formal GRP-MNLF negotiations since 1975. We all know that at the height of the MNLF-led Bangsamoro armed struggle in 1973, there was also the Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East. The Arabs discovered at the time that there was political power in oil. They succeeded in influencing the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which controlled more than 80% of the world known petroleum resources, to impose an oil embargo on all countries supportive of Israel. The Philippines was one of them. The country only had, reportedly, three months supply of oil; it was said to be 94% dependent on the Middle East for its oil needs; the military had allegedly run out of ammunitions and could not get any immediate replenishment from the United States. The drain on foreign exchange would have been enormous. The country's survival was clearly at stake. And so, there was the move to negotiate with the Arab leaders to lift the oil embargo. We are told that when the Saudi decision to lift the embargo came, it was with the condition for the Philippine government to negotiate with the MNLF with the participation of the OIC. Perhaps, it was for the better (italics added).

For one, it has made us, as a country, realized that we have to decisively harmonize our relationships not only with our Muslim citizens in the country but also with Muslim countries abroad. And this in a manner that is mutually acceptable, based on the acceptance of each other's identity and dignity.Further, the OIC had, from the very beginning to the present, consistently taken the position that the Moro rebellion in southern Philippines was a domestic problem and should be resolved within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

It was the Quadripartite Commission under the chairmanship of Libya that took part in the making of the Tripoli Agreement. Now, it is the Committee of the Six with Indonesia as Chair that is actively pursuing the final stages of the implementation of the same agreement.

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The participation of the OIC and Indonesia has contributed immensely to the creation of a positive climate in the GRP-MNLF Talks. Through the guidance of the Indonesian facilitators, the talks in all levels have been able to maintain a high level of cordiality. As hosts of the talks in Jakarta, they ensure that all the amenities and requirements to keep the talks moving forward were in order. As presiding officers, their neutrality was most admirable.90

With the preceding role played by the OIC, it would appear that the aggression of the MILF at present could be solved internally because of the involvement of the OIC in the peace process. According to the official pronouncements of Malacañang, the OIC does not support the MILF. Hence, the government is confident that the MILF will eventually come to the negotiating table. What the government did not realize is that history will show that between politics and religion, Muslim countries change positions when religion is at stake. A case in point was the delegation of Muslim foreign ministers in 1974 in Mindanao to see for themselves the allegations of the MNLF that the government forces committed genocide. The arrangement was, if there was really genocide then they will support the MNLF. They found none when they visited Mindanao.91 Yet, when the MNLF invoked Islam, the OIC supported the MNLF. What is alarming is the creation of the Christian Liberation Militia because of the escalation of hostilities. These men are the remnants of the notorious Ilaga Militia that neutralized the MNLF during the 70s. Once this group is revived Mindanao will once a crucible of fire between the Moros and Christians. This is what the Moros are waiting for. They need a justification to demand the support of the Muslim world. It will create another problem because what is internal will again become international. This was the strategy that the MNLF used in the 70s.

In the later development, we read in the papers that the MILF and the NPA are forging powers to fight against the government. This is intended to get the attention the attention of the OIC. Since the NPA are communists, they hope that the OIC will eventually support them because they could allow the Moros to be dealing with communists that do not believe in God.

1815 GMT, 990712 – Manila Attempts to Address Rebel Problem from the Edges

Peace talks between the Philippine government and the rebel National Democratic Front (NDF) broke down without a settlement on May 30. Now the Philippine government has announced its intentions to follow a policy of local engagement with respect to negotiations. Rather than attempting to negotiate with the national umbrella organization of the communist insurgency, the Philippine government plans to open discussions with rebel groups on a local and regional level. These areas will be targeted wherever "there is an armed group that shares the government’s desire conduct peace negotiations," according to Philippine Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.

90 Rodil, (Fact Sheet). 91 I was there during their arrival.

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The prospects for the success of this policy are dubious. The amount of time, energy and manpower required to deal constructively with so many local rebel groups would be prohibitive even if the rebel groups intended to cooperate fully. Dealing with individual groups means dealing with different, and potentially conflicting, demands. Additionally, the individual units most likely to negotiate with the government are those that are the least effective militarily, making the ensuing settlements little more than propaganda in the overall conflict. Deals made with individual groups are largely unenforceable, since with other groups continuing to fight, there is no way of knowing if a particular rebel unit has ceased military activity. And the national NDF command is unlikely to sit back and allow the edges of the group to crumble away. Rather, it will likely attempt to subvert the local-level negotiations.

The NDF as a whole is not Manila’s greatest problem, making deals with individual NDF units even less significant. Moreover, the Philippines’ other major rebel factions could, like the NDF command, take exception to peace treaties with individual NDF commands. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – which has been reinforced by former members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and cooperates with the communist New People’s Army (NPA) – would not be pleased with the prospect of more government resources and manpower freed to counter their actions if the NDF were to bow out, even on a qualified regional level.

The Philippine government, having found small scale talks with a large organization untenable, is attempting to hold large scale talks with small organizations. The results are not likely to be any more encouraging than the blanket NDF talks, but the expenditures of political and diplomatic capital will skyrocket. With luck, the result will be a fragmented and weakened NDF, but the elements that made national talks unworkable will not disappear on the local level. They will simply be more difficult and more expensive to deal with.92

Whether this alliance prospers or not, the victims are not only the Christians, but also the Moros themselves, their young and old as well as their women. However, it is worthwhile noting that in order to hold on to power, war must be maintained as well, in order to hinder education. Education makes individuals rational and rational beings do not want war. Perhaps this is the reason why the emphasis on Islam in the Madrasah schools to teach not only Islamic faith but the difference between the Christians and the Muslims, thus, prolonging the solution of the problem in Mindanao. On the other hand, the Moros felt that the Visiting Forces Agreement is also a part of the external support of the Philippine government from the US government. The following news will illustrate this point:

Philippine Rebels Accuse U.S. of Instigating Fighting2 February 1999

Summary92 Stratfor.

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On February 1 a senior Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) spokesman in the southern Philippines said that the United States was behind the recent outbreak of violent clashes between rebels and the military. He accused the U.S. of using the violence as a way of convincing the Philippines Senate to ratify a new Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the U.S. military. While the reason for the sudden accusation that the U.S. is directly involved in instigating the conflict may be to shift the blame away from the rebels themselves, it appears that the latest government offensive has raised concerns within MILF that the balance of power in Mindanao may be shifting. Worried that the VFA would result in an even stronger Philippine army backed up by U.S. training and technology, MILF is trying to undermine proposed U.S. support in the ongoing Senate debates over the VFA. Whether MILF is successful in stopping the VFA or not, the mere possibility of U.S. involvement in the conflict threatens U.S. interests and businesses in the Philippines.

Analysis

On February 1, Mohaquer Iqbal, a senior Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) spokesman and leader, said that the United States was behind the renewed outbreaks of fighting between the MILF and the Philippine military. Iqbal said, "The U.S. engineered the conflict in Mindanao to justify the approval of the Visiting Forces Agreement. The U.S. has vested interest in the Philippines, particularly Mindanao." Iqbal’s statements come at the beginning of a renewed cease-fire between MILF and the military, and as the Philippine Senate debates ratification of the VFA.

While MILF, as a militant Moslem organization, has joined in the condemnation of the U.S. for last year’s bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan and of the "murder of Islam" for U.S.-led air strikes in Iraq, it has previously not involved the U.S. in its struggle for an independent Moslem state. There are several factors that may have initiated the sudden accusation of involvement of the U.S. by MILF at this time: MILF may be trying to shift the blame for the recent spate of violent confrontations; it may be trying to derail the passage of the VFA; and it also may be including the U.S. on its hit list as a quid pro quo for obtaining arms and training from outside sources. Whatever the reason, MILF may now consider U.S. citizens and businesses in the Philippines as legitimate targets.

The recent fighting in the southern Philippines has displaced between 40,000 and 90,000 civilians from their homes. Last week, while retreating from a clash with government troops, MILF members held a school full of children and refugees hostage to facilitate their escape. The rapid increase in military confrontations and the massive government offensive have resulted in a barrage of accusations as to which side was responsible for the renewed fighting. With territory lost and displaced civilians seeking assistance from the government, MILF may be using the accusations of U.S. involvement to shift the blame away from its own forces.

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A major reason for the MILF statement may be the recent offensive by government troops. The past few weeks of fighting have resulted in gains for the Philippine military, with the MILF having been pushed back or held in place. Within MILF, there seems to be a growing realization that its 12,000 soldiers are insufficient to defeat the government troops. Philippine President Joseph Estrada’s hard line stance against the MILF and other rebel organizations is beginning to see results. On January 31, MILF spokesman Ghazali Jaafar said that MILF was no longer fighting for independence, but merely seeking fair treatment for the Moslem minority in the Philippines. While this apparent reversal of MILF’s position is not likely to be anything more than talk, it does demonstrate the effectiveness of the government’s new offensive against the rebels. MILF is now feeling that the government may be a stronger force to contend with than previously assumed. If government forces were to receive updated training and technology from the U.S. under the VFA, they may be able to launch an offensive that would effectively eliminate the MILF.

By implicating the U.S. in instigating the fighting, MILF is adding a new twist to the debate in the Senate over the ratification of the VFA. Already, many Senators are worried that signing the new VFA would result in a return of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines. While desiring U.S. weapons and military back up, a permanent U.S. base is not something that many want to see again. The debate in the Senate is fierce, bringing up issues of nationalism and neo-colonialism on one hand, and national and regional security on the other. If the U.S. were implicated in the renewed fighting in the south, the VFA would almost certainly fail.

Another possible reason for MILF to accuse the U.S. of instigating the fighting is to legitimize U.S. interests in the Philippines as viable targets. While the MILF has been involved in kidnappings of foreigners, it has largely left Americans alone. For the MILF to target Americans is a major move, and may be a response to its weapons suppliers. MILF has admitted receiving training and supplies from Moslem interests outside the country, and it is suspected that Osama bin Laden has contributed to MILF along with Abu Sayyaf and other Moslem terrorist organizations in Asia. By explicitly targeting the U.S., MILF may be repaying its debt to those that supplied and trained its fighters.While there are many possible overlapping reasons for MILF to accuse the U.S. of instigating the fighting in the Philippines, it is clear that MILF has made a bold statement. Iqbal blatantly stated, "The Americans were behind the conflict in the south that led to the fighting between our forces and the Philippine military." By making this statement, MILF is threatening that U.S. interests in the Philippines may be targeted. Despite the gains made by the Philippine military against the MILF, and the peace talks scheduled for February 8, U.S. citizens, businesses, and government representatives in the Philippines need to be even more vigilant in light of MILF’s new stance (emphasis added).93

93 Stratfor. February 02, 1999. http://www.stratfor.com/asia/aiuarchive/a990202.htm.

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The preceding discussions show the failure of the SPCPD, the government’s response to the resurgence of Moro Resistance and how external support influences the internal problem in the Philippines. But they did not realize is the dragging of the solution to the resurgence of Moro Resistance only helps the oligarchs in enriching themselves more than solving the root of the problem that is basically agrarian in nature. While the attention of the government is focused on the hostilities in Cotabato and in the Muslim dominated areas, the rich are acquiring tracts and tracts of land in other parts of Mindanao. Take for example the thousands of hectares that Danding Cojuangco acquired in Bukidnon. While the war in Cotabato is raging as a result of agrarian unrest in the 50s, acquisition of lands is still going on. How could there be an agrarian problem when there are still others who are buying lands by the thousand hectares. The piece meal solution to the peace and order problem and the external support only obscures the cultural aspect of the problem and add the slow response of the government in addressing the clamor of the people for real agrarian reform program, development is still nowhere in sight.

CONCLUSION

SummaryThe preceding chapters discussed the history of the Moro Resistance in Mindanao

from the coming of the Spaniards until its present resurgence. The underlying reasons for is resurgence can be traced back to the time when the Americans encouraged the migration to Mindanao of the peasants who were victims of agrarian unrest from Luzon and the Visayas. This migration was aimed as a civilizing mission in order to influence the Moros and ultimately bring them into the national body politics. The Americans did not force the Moros to be integrated into the majority hence they were able to maintain their culture under their own leaders. Later during the Commonwealth period Christian officials were assigned in the bureaucracy of then Moro Province. The Moros resented this but they remained loyal to America. This policy was followed by the commonwealth period.

Luzon and Visayas just month before the Second World War were still being disturbed by agrarian unrests that led to the organization of the “Partido Sosyalista ng Pilipinas,” and “Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas.” These two organizations merged shortly after the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines and became the famous “Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon” or Huks. Their mass actions against the landlords were suspended because of the war. However, the war gave them the chance to gather arms and ammunition and became their hands-on training on warfare. During the war, just like Huks, the Moros got the chance to collect arms and ammunition as well because the Americans were successful in disarming them during their occupation in Mindanao.

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After the war, the agrarian problems in Luzon and the Visayas resurfaced when the dreaded landlords got back to power. Although the peasants tried the peaceful means by having Taruc and other leaders run for office, this did not solve the problem. Taruc and rest were not even allowed to serve their office. The tension escalated and atrocities erupted in Luzon and spread in the Visayas. The Huks were reorganized and became the “Hukbong Mapaglaya ng Bayan” or just plain Huks. This movement nearly toppled down the government. It was Magsaysay who was able to convince Taruc to surrender. Some of those who surrendered with him were relocated to Mindanao (in Lanao del Norte and in Cotabato), through the resettlement programs called the EDCOR and NARRA. This did not escape other peasant and prospectors. Massive migration followed that there were even more speakers of Cebuano in Mindanao than in Cebu itself. More resettlement areas were opened later in Bukidnon and Zamboanga. Migration continued until the 1960s.

Difference in cultural background is expected to cause sporadic conflicts during the prewar period but not so disturbing that they were not given attention. However, it was another story after the war because the Moros were now armed from the arms and ammunition during the war, while the resettled Huks and other prospectors as well as other peasants were unarmed. Encounters were observed from time to time and they reached the peak when as a result of Moro harassments the Christian settlers organized themselves into self-defense units, defended their settlements and retaliated against the Moros. One of the biggest group of these bands was the so-called - ILAGA. Armed encounters from then on happened between the Moros and the Christians that even in areas where there no Ilagas, Ilagas were hired as goons of some politicians.

Marcos at this time was planning to invade Sabah if Malaysia will not give it back to the Philippines. Young Tausogs were recruited and trained for the purpose. Knowing their mission after the training they refused. Because of their refusal they were instead massacred to silence them but one escaped and told the story. This was the infamous Jabidah Massacre. Datu Udtog Matalam was the first to respond and organized the Mindanao Independence Movement. Upon knowing of the cause of the massacre as revealed by Benigno Aquino, Malaysia offered the Moro politicians to help train young Moro leaders for possible guerrilla operations against the government. The offer was accepted and the successful graduates of this training were later organized as the Moro National Liberation Front. Their baptism of fire was against the Ilagas. Because of the conflict of policies, the MNLF broke up into different factions. One faction mostly Maranaos was led by Dimas Pundato, and the other by Hashim Salamat and were mostly Maguindanaons.

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These differences did not affect their struggle. They fought it out against the Ilaga and the government forces. The Moros could not find the appropriate means to press their demands for recognition except to declare an open war against the government and used religion to get the support of the rest of Muslims in Mindanao and the world. The Christian settlers also responded and the trouble dragged on. Later, Pundato and Alonto surrendered but the hanged on with the support of the OIC until an agreement of peace was signed. Of the three factions, only the MILF remained and renewed hostilities just after the Peace Agreement between the government and the MNLF was signed. This continued until the present. Although the government claims that they destroyed majority of the MILF camps fighting is still raging. A criminal group took the advantage that added to the problem, and they even claim to have an alliance with the MILF. There was also a reported alliance with the NPA that made the crisis more complicated. Aside from these, another rebel group in Lanao appeared. This is the MNLF-ICC.

Trying to solve the situation negotiations were attempted but until the present the chance is still bleak because it appeared that there is no compromise that could be reached. An agreement could not be achieved because how can the government negotiate with a group that does not recognize its authority. The reason behind this is the claim of the Moros that, they had never been conquered so, they are not Filipinos. This is an indication of cultural underpinnings of the crisis and not simply a political problem. Judging the present situation, there could be no development in Mindanao and the Philippines in general. Conclusion

The Moros or the Muslims are the biggest IPs in the Philippines. They are not assimilated in the “larger society” of the Filipinos because they do not accept that they are Filipinos in the first place. This is the basic result of colonization - the so-called Ethnic Pluralism. They felt that they are “under an alien authority,” of what they considered as neo-colonialist. For them anything that the Philippines government is doing is part of cultural imperialism that is intended to overwhelm their culture. Further, they felt that they are superior over the rest of the Filipinos because since they were unconquered. This attitude is termed as ethnocentrism that “encourages cohesion and solidarity among group members.” As a result, the migration of the Christians in Mindanao is considered as internal colonization. Internal colonization or neo-colonization likewise enhances competition either in the political arena or “in the occupation of social niches.” The demand of the Moros for secession or independence indicated their desire to regain what had been lost from them in this internal colonization – their ancestral homeland. Since they cannot regain it legally they adopted the extreme measure – War. Where there is war, peace and order is a problem and when peace and order is a problem development is likewise impossible to achieve.

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The problem of peace and order in the Mindanao is the product ethnocentric attitude, that likewise developed distrust in a perceived neo-colonialist government and resistance to any form of change is the only way to show such outlook. Since development is a “transformation or change of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to a more ‘scientific’ or ‘modern’ means,” therefore development is a social one or in a more holistic term cultural in nature. Since development if measured economically is seen in the increase of the GNP or GDP the present crisis in Mindanao could be considered as contributory to the underdevelopment of the country. This is aside from other problems within the bureaucracy, i.e. graft and corruption. With the very slow growth of our economy in spite of the effect of modernization of the urban areas, we still cannot reach the third stage of growth (Take-Off) according to Rostow. We remain in the precondition for take-off stage because instead of using a portion of our national budget (assuming that there is no graft and corruption) for the different development programs and projects, this is spent in buying arms and ammunition as well as war materiel in order to subdue the Moros (of course including the NPAs). The effect is not only felt in Mindanao but the whole country in general and this is unfair to the rest of the people because they are the ones carrying the burden of paying more taxes. Nobody expects the people in the affected areas to pay their taxes for they have no income in the first place.

However, unless the Moros (or the Muslims) and the Christians will accept the fact that they can co-exist in harmony and understanding, Mindanao will remain as a crucible of fire than a “Land of Promise” for prosperity and development. Mindanao is a “shared territory,” not of one group of people but the whole Mindanawans notwithstanding cultural differences.

Therefore, the Mindanao crisis (or what is popularly known as the Moro secessionist movement) can only be solved by understanding its causes and to place it in the right perspective in the development process not only of Mindanao but the Philippines in general then we will realize that while the cry of the IPs (like the Moros) for their rights must be given attention, proper fiscal management should be done in order that we can reach our target GNP and GDP growth percentage to qualify us for the take-off stage. The trouble and the fighting that is going on in Mindanao can be given the right solution if it is viewed as a cultural problem rather a mere political one and since anthropology is concerned on culture then more studies by anthropologists is needed to reach a viable solution to this problem.

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