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UNCLASSIFIED Vigilant Glider Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit Final Report 23'd July 2009 QinetiQ "Any person finding this document should hand it to a police station or post it to the Group Security Manager, QinetiQ Limited, Cody Technology Park, Farnborough, Hampshire GU14 OLX, with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORISED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT MAY BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS 1911 - 1989." Requests for wider use or release must be sought from: QinetiQ Ltd Cody Technology Park Farnborough Hampshire GU14 OLX Copyright© QinetiQ ltd 2009 UNCLASSIFIED

Transcript of UNCLASSIFIED QinetiQ - WhatDoTheyKnow

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Vigilant Glider Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit Final Report

~~P/CR0901174 23'd July 2009

QinetiQ

"Any person finding this document should hand it to a police station or post it to the Group Security Manager, QinetiQ Limited, Cody Technology Park, Farnborough, Hampshire GU14 OLX, with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORISED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT MAY BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS 1911 - 1989."

Requests for wider use or release must be sought from:

QinetiQ Ltd Cody Technology Park Farnborough Hampshire GU14 OLX

Copyright© QinetiQ ltd 2009

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Administration page Customer Information

Customer reference number

Project title

Customer Organisation

Customer contact

Contract number

Milestone number

Date due

Principal author

FATS1/TRGACQ/01

Vigilant Glider Ageing Aircraft .Structural Audit

Flying Training Support Team Training Aircraft

FATS1/TRGACQ/01/G001

N/A

24th July 2009

JIIIIIIII __________________ 0_1_9_80_6_6_2_12_4 __________________ _

Room 1 03 Building 799

QinetiQ MoD Bascombe Down -Room 1 03 Building 799

QinetiQ MoD Bascombe Down

Approved By

Principle Engineer

Release Authority -Project Manager

Record of changes

Issue Date

Interim 29th May 2009

Final 24th July 2009

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Detail of Changes

Progress Report

Final Report

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Executive Summary This report covers the work carried out on the Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit (AASA) conducted on the Vigilant T MK 1 motor-glider (referred to as Vigilant throughout this report). Whilst conducting this AASA, the emerging policy requirements to conduct both an Ageing Aircraft Systems and Propulsion audit have also been addressed. The audit has been conducted in accordance with the requirement of Joint Air Publication (JAP) 100A-01 [1] with guidance taken from the Military Aircraft Structural Airworthiness Advisory Group (MASAAG) Paper 104 [2]. The audit is also intended to provide feedback to elements of the Flying Training Support Team Training Aircraft (FTST TA) Safety Management System.

The purpose of the AASA is to establish that all of the necessary activities are in place to maintain an aircraft fleet through to the out of service date, and further, to establish whether patterns are emerging that point to incipient structural integrity problems. It is also to confirm that all necessary qualification activities are complete to a satisfactory outcome. Therefore, this AASA has been segmented into twenty discrete work packages to address the following key aspects:

• Management control accomplishment and monitoring of maintenance, inspections, modifications, repairs and configuration control.

• Investigation and review of the use and analysis of fault and maintenance data.

• Review and confirmation of endorsed flying envelope, mass centre of gravity range, operating limitations and restrictions.

• Review of incidents/occurrences reporting systems and the procedures in place.

To enable a comprehensive AASA to be carried out, the audit team visited the following locations that contain stakeholders or personnel who are actively involved with the operation and/or maintainability of the Vigilant, or civilian variant:

• RAF Linton-on-Ouse - FTST T A.

• RAF Syerston - HQ Air Cadets Contract Manager and Technical Coordinator, Serco management team and Depth Support Team, Soaring Oxford Ltd (SOL) and aircrew.

• RAF Cosford - Serco Forward Support Team.

• RAF Wyton - MOD Aviation Engineering and Integrity 1 (MAE I 1 ), Aircraft Structural Integrity (ASI) Team. FTST TA Safety Manager and Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) Team.

• MOD Bascombe Down - RAF Handling Squadron (HS) and QinetiQ Records Cell and archive warehouse.

• QinetiQ Farnborough - Legacy Structural Integrity (SI) activity records.

• Warminster - Airborne Composites (European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 145 accredited civilian maintenance and repair facility).

The audit findings, conclusions and recommendations have been incorporated into this AASA final report. There are a number of areas of concern that have been identified by the audit team, which require further investigation by the FTST TA. These are:

• Use and Maintenance of Log Cards -for the main undercarriage legs.

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• The electronic database that is used for the management, planning, and detailed co-ordination of logistic operations does not comply with the policy for a Logistic Information System in accordance with JAP 1 OOA-01.

• Due to the high number of reported air incidents and the dedicated role of this aircraft, which is to provide glider pilot training and Air Cadet air experience, a formal review should be conducted on the reliability issues with the Grob 2500 engine.

• The Release to Service (RTS) Se.ction B Paragraph 8.4.1.1 should replace the ·Note' with a 'Warning' to reflect the impact of filling the fuel tanks to capacity that could lead to the All Up Mass (AUM) being exceeded with the potential hazard of loss of the aircraft.

• RTS Section D - Maximum Payload Mass needs to define clearly what is included in the maximum mass of an individual pilot. The current statement of 'fully clothed' should include clothing, parachutes and ballast.

• The Weight Chart currently included in the individual aircraft F700 should be given appropriate status and placed within the cockpit of each glider to provide clarity of aircraft AUM and ensure adherence to mass limitations.

• That Mass growth since delivery has eroded the gap between Maximum . AUM and Never Exceed and needs to be given more prominence to the operators. Basic aircraft mass should be reviewed regularly at the Vigilant Structural Integrity Working Group (SIWG).

• The practice of logging several flights as one 'flight' in the MOD F700 Flying Running Log should cease and each flight should be recorded in strict adherence of the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) Sortie Profile Code (SPC).

• The status of the design, static and fatigue type records are unknown. The extent of records maintained by the Designer needs to be understood if the airworthiness of the platform and the validity of design changes is to be assured. Therefore, the AASA cannot be considered complete until the status of these records are known. The Designer is currently working with FTST TA to identify these records.

• The remaining life of each Vigilant is not accurately known. Flying hours need to be appropriately factored as fatigue life is being consumed at a rate faster than that currently recorded. This will have increasingly serious implications as the fleet ages.

• The fundamental material properties used in the construction of the Vigilant is not fully understood or substantiated. Further work and discussion with the Designer is required to conclude this serious matter which is also applicable to the Viking glider.

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List of Contents Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 Policy Requirements

1.3 Vigilant Specific Requirement

Requirements

2.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

2.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule

2.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

2.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

2.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List

2.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

2.7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs

2.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual

2.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

2.10 WP 1 0 Logistic Support

2.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release and Release to Service

2.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

2.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

2.14 WP 14 Concession Recording

2.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

2.16 WP 16 Modifications . 2.17 WP 17 Propeller

2.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

2.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

2.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training

Audit Findings

3.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

3.1.1 Conclusions

3.1.2 Recommendations

3.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule

3.2.1 Conclusions

3.2.2 Recommendations

3.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

3.3.1 Conclusions

3.3.2 Recommendations

3.4 WP 4 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

3.4.1 Conclusions

3.4.2 Recommendations

3.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List

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Conclusions

Recommendations

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WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 1 0 Logistic Support

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 11 Military Aircraft Release and Release to Service

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 14 Concession Recording

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 16 Modifications

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 17 Propellers

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

Conclusions

Recommendations

WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

Conclusions

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3.19.2 Recommendations 57

3.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training 57

3.20.1 Conclusions 58

3.20.2 Recommendations 58

3.21 Age Related Threats to Structural Integrity versus AASA Work Package Matrix 58

Conclusions 68

4.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management 68

4.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule (MMS) 68

4.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects 68

4.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals 69

4.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List (CRL) 70

4.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards 70

4.7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs 70

4.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual 71

4.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage 71

4.10 WP 1 0 Logistic Support 72

4.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release (MAR) and Release to Service (RTS} 72

4.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations 72

4.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting) 73

4.14 WP 14 Concession Recording 73

4.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical) 74

4.16 WP 16 Modifications 74

4.17 WP 17 Propeller 74

4.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management 74

4.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review 75

4.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training 76

Recommendations 77

5.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management 77

5.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule (MMS) 77 5.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects 78

5.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals 78

5.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List (CRL) 78

5.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards 78

5.7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs 79

5.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards (FRC) and Aircrew Manual (AM) 79

5.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage 79

5.10 WP 1 0 Logistic Support 80

5.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release (MAR) and Release to Service (RTS) 80

5.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations 80

5.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting) 80

5.14 WP 14 Concession Recording 80

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WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

WP 16 Modifications

WP 17 Propellers

WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

WP 20 Authorisation and Training

References

List of Acronyms

List of Tables Table 1; Sample aircraft usage compared to fleet leader

Table 2; CRL comparison between Designer and Topic 5A1

Table 3; ERC required for the Vigilant

Table 4; Vigilant Performance Data.

Table 5; Vigilant Configuration Status for AASA

Table 6; History of Vigilant fatigue qualification

Table 7; Ageing effects relevant to civilian design regulations

Table 8; Potential Impact on Ageing Threats

Table 9; Audit Results Showing an Impact on Ageing Threats

List of Figures Figure 1 ; Aircraft Weight Chart

Figure 2; Vigilant Mass Growth

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

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It is a requirement of Joint Services Publication (JSP) 553 [3] that all UK military service aircraft type authorities should implement an AASA when the platform reaches the mid-point in its service life - nominally fifteen years. The primary purpose of an AASA is to (a) comply with MOD policy on sustaining Structural Integrity and (b) provide evidence to support the airworthiness and safety requirement during continued aircraft operations up to the currently declared Out of Service Date (OSD). An AASA will do this by reviewing processes that have been put in place by the Engineering Support Authorities, by the Design Authorities and .their various agencies. An AASA Programme should address the function of the Support Authorities, their agencies and the interfaces between them and the Designer. In fixed wing aircraft the AASA is aimed primarily at airframe structure.

1.2 Policy Requirements

JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations Chapter 5.34 mandates the requirement for ·addressing Ageing Aircraft Audits (AAA). JAP 1 OOA-01 Military Aviation Engineering Policy and Regulation [1] contains the policy for carrying out Ageing Aircraft Audits. Chapter 5.13.1 (of Ref 1) provides details of the requirements in conducting an AASA. Chapter 11.1.2 (of Ref.1) defines the current policy for sustaining structural integrity.

The requirements for the AASA were originally proposed by the joint Industry/MOD MASAAG, in Paper 83 [4] which was raised following detailed review of the National Transportation Safety Board's report of the upper pressure cabin failure on an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737. The requirements of MASAAG Paper 83 were· endorsed by the MOD and incorporated into Air Publication (AP) 1 008-01 as Annex E of Leaflet 315 [5].

As a result of the findings from a number of early AAA, the MASAAG revisited the requirements (and guidance) of Paper 83, drafting a revised AAA recommendations paper (draft Paper 1 04 ). The revised MASAAG Paper 1 04 [2] was endorsed and issued on 5th October 2000. MASAAG Paper 104 is considered by the UK Structural Integrity community to provide the best current guidance for AASA and as such is adhered to/applied by QinetiQ. It is the above requirements and guidance of Paper 104 that have been incorporated into Chapter 5.13.1 (of Ref 1 ).

1.3 Vigilant Specific Requirement

The Vigilant T MK 1 motor-glider (referred to as Vigilant throughout this report) is a self-launched, single-engined, low wing monoplane utilised by the RAF for Glider Pilot training and Air Cadet air experience flights. The Vigilant is manufactured by the German Company Grob Aircraft AG and the civilian derivative is the Grob G1 098. There are currently 64 Vigilant in the RAF fleet which are dispersed throughout the UK and are operated by Volunteer Glider Squadrons (VGS).

The requirement to conduct an Ageing Aircraft Systems Audit (AASyA) and Ageing Aircraft Propulsion Systems Audit (AAPSA) have recently become policy in

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accordance with JAP 1 OOA-01. However, whilst carrying out the AASA on the Vigilant using the 20 Work Packages described in this report, the ageing issues applicable to both the aircraft systems and propulsion unit were also considered.

The FTST TA is the Support and Engineering Authorities for the Vigilant and is located at RAF Linton-on-Ouse. Serco have recently taken over the day to day engineering responsibilities from the RAF and their Chief Engineer, management team and the support team, who provide Depth Support to the fleet, are based at RAF Syerston. In addition, there are also 5 Serco Regional Maintenance Teams providing Forward Support to various regions across the UK. Wing Commander Logistics of the Air Cadet Organisation (Wg Cdr Logs ACO) based at RAF Cranwell is responsible for the Serco contract and has in place at RAF Syerston a Contracts Manager and Technical Co-ordinator.

The Vigilant has been in service since 1991 and the current OSD is 2015, although an option to extend to 2020 has been submitted. The Vigilant is, therefore, subject to the requirements of an AASA as laid down in the JAP 1 OOA-01.

The audit began at RAF Linton-on-Ouse to allow discussion with the FTST TA personnel and to review the relevant aircraft publications and other related documents, both in hard and soft copy. Following on from this initial review the audit then progressed out to RAF Syerston to identify how the aircraft is maintained and supported through the contract with Serco. The HQ Air Cadets on site Contract Manager and Technical Coordinator was consulted, who provided valuable in-depth knowledge and history of the aircraft. The logistics support, which is provided by SOL· through the Contractor Provided Spares Support (CPSS), was reviewed. Aircrew from RAF Syerston and RAF HS based at MOD Bascombe Down were also consulted in order to substantiate a number of work packages. The audit then moved on to RAF Cosford to review the working practices of a Serco Regional Maintenance Team providing Forward Support to a number of VGS. During the visit to RAF Wyton, the ASI team responsible for the glider fleet and the FTST TA Safety Manager were consulted. RCM analysis was completed on the Vigilant in 2000 and this was also reviewed. During the audit, extensive use was made of archived reference material held at both QinetiQ main sites of Farnborough and Bascombe Down.

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2 Requirements

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For efficiency and utilising the experience acquired through previous audits conducted by QinetiQ, 20 discreet work packages (WP) have been developed to address the specific requirements of the Vigilant AASA. It should be noted that WP 19 & 20 do not appear on the original proposal and have been added to further enhance the deliverable of this audit. Whilst systems and propulsion were considered during this audit we have considered and reported some aspects while undertaking the structural audit.

2.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

Review of the operating procedures for the upkeep of the aircraft MOD Form 700 documentation by the FTST TA and operating bases, combined with a sample audit to demonstrate compliance. This will provide confidence that the Master Maintenance Schedule (MMS) and the Component Replacement List (CRL) and Component Life Register (CLR) are under control.

2.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule

Schedules will be audited for confirmation that the schedule reviews have been undertaken and that all Structurally Significant Items (SSI) inspections and airworthiness recommendations have been incorporated.

2.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

Review of the methods used to determine the reliability and maintenance requirements of the platform and its equipment from the gathered data. The use made of statistical surveys of data and trend analysis will also be reviewed.

2.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

Review of the methods used within the FTST T A to maintain and amend the aircraft maintenance manuals. This will be coupled with an audit of operating stations' upkeep of their publications.

2.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List

Review of the procedures within the FTST TA for the upkeep of the CRL and CLR and its translation into the MOD Form 700. A review of the lifing requirements against those published by the Designer and Manufacturers.

2.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

Review of the procedures for the raising, upkeep and maintenance of data for items requiring Engineering Record Cards (ERC), both manually and electronically.

2.7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs

Review of the aircraft repair records along with the procedure for repair scheme authorisation/approval. Conduct a sample audit of airframe repairs to confirm

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compliance with these procedures. Ascertain if records of corrosion and repair damage are maintained. Confirm that the procedures are in place to review repairs, prior to embodiment, for existing repairs previously carried out in the area. Review of any inspection requirements for embodied repairs.

2.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual

Review the upkeep of Flight Record Cards (FRCs) [6] and the Aircrew Manual (AM) [?]along with any outstanding actions with the RAF Handling Squadron. Review operating squadrons' upkeep of these publications. In conjunction with WP 12 review how Military Aircraft Release (MAR)/RTS driven changes are captured and introduced into FRCs and AM.

2.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

A review of the latest edition of the SOIU will be carried out with the assistance from MAE I 1, ASI based at RAF Wyton. Confirm that the operators are familiar with the SOIU and its importance. Confirmation that SPCs adequately reflect the range and type of operations carried out.

2.10 WP 1 0 Logistic Support

Review the logistics support policy for the aircraft and identify all other commodity Support Teams that have a responsibility to supply items to the FTST TA.

2.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release and Release to Service

Review of the MAR and RTS cleared flight envelope for audit trail to test or Designer data. Review of any outstanding Service Deviations (SO) that may impact on flight envelope and the mass and centre of gravity usage. Ensure that systems are in place to ensure that changes to the MAR/RTS are reflected in FRCs/AM.

2.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

Identify procedure used to analyse defects recorded on MOD Form 700 documentation to determine how the collected information is applied to maintenance schedules and for possible modifications to improve reliability and maintainability. Establish whether trends are identified and acted upon.

A review of this collected data for analysis of the type of structural faults relating to corrosion, vibration, cracking, loose and working fasteners will be conducted.

Determine if cross-fertilisation data from other platforms and operators is acted upon, both military and civilian.

A review of MOD Form 760 procedures will be carried out to confirm that defect investigations are completed and that the results of investigations are considered in maintenance schedule reviews and modification meetings. A review of the Mandatory Fault Reporting Instructions and the reason for the item selected for fault reporting will be conducted.

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2.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

Review the Directorate of Aviation Regulation & Safety (OARS) database for incidents relating to age and usage related reports. Determine from the review of these incidents if any were appropriate for entry into the Airworthiness Register. Confirm that these entries are being managed and progressed in an expeditious manner.

Review the Designer process for assessing and recording Air Incidents and the process by which they communicate to the FTST TA incidents from other operators which may have an impact on UK aircraft operations.

2.14 WP 14 Concession Recording

A review of the system for recording concessions to flight safety critical and structurally significant items will be conducted. This will include how these items are life tracked on MOD Form 700 documentation and the effects that any concessions may have on the life and usage.

2.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

A review of the FTST TA procedure for the ra1smg of Special Instructions (Technical) SI(T)s, their issue and implementation will be conducted. MOD Form 700 documentation will be checked to ensure that there is a robust system for confirming compliance and satisfaction of instructions. A review of the FTST TA process following fleet embodiment as to follow-up action such as modification or amendment to maintenance schedules, where applicable.

2.16 WP 16 Modifications

A review of the modification process will be carried out to confirm the process for identifying, controlling, classifying and embodying modifications. An audit of MOD Form 700 documentation will be conducted to ensure that fleet embodiment of a selection of structural and/or flight safety critical modifications is satisfactory.

A review of the process used to cover modifications raised under the current Service Modification (SM) procedure will be conducted. The review will include checking that the appropriate maintenance and aircrew publications have been amended as necessary. Where applicable, the RTS and MAR will be reviewed for their effect on operations and handling, as a result of the modification action

2.17 WP 17 Propeller

During the conduct of the audit, due consideration will be given to the propeller in each appropriate WP.

2.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management .

Review the process and procedures within the FTST TA to determine how the current policy and regulation is being implemented and managed.

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2.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

Provide advice and assistance to the FTST TA and the Designer to define the requirements for an Aircraft Design Substantiation review. Identify sample components suitable for a vertical audit of substantiation evidence and maintenance philosophy.

2.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training

Audit that the Letters of Delegation are being appropriately applied along with Engineering Authorisations·. Review the training records that the individuals carrying out specific tasks have received the applicable training for the particular specialist task.

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3 Audit Findings

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3.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

The Vigilant does not use a formal electronic database for work recording and asset management. The aircraft is maintained using hard copy MOD form 700 documentation. However, as described later, a local electronic system is in use. The Aircraft Maintenance Form (MOD Form 700) is structured in accordance with MOD Form 799/1 (SLG). The MOD Form 700 is retained with the individual aircraft at the various VGS, although Section 7 Maintenance & Component Replacement Control Document is held under a separate cover at RAF Syerston. The MOD Form 702 series supporting documentation for Weight and Balance Data is not used on this aircraft and, therefore, this particular section is left blank. The current weight of the aircraft is recorded on the MOD Form 701 (Vigilant) Leading Particulars and a graph to aid the pilot in calculating aircrew and fuel load is placed at the front of the MOD Form 700.

A sample audit was carried out on 7 aircraft from the current fleet of 64 to ensure that the information contained in the MMS (Topic SA 1) [6] had been transferred accurately into the MOD Form 700. These aircraft were selected due to their current usage compared to the rest of the fleet and are shown in Table 1.

Current Totals Current Usage

Tail Number Flying Average

Landings Hours

Landings Landings Flying Hours Per Hour

Fleet Leader 5997:40 Fleet Leader 25,512

ZH266 21,494 5639:50 3.8 High High ZH 188 22,550 5583:30 4 High High ZH 145 20,698 5539:30 3.7 High High ZH 269 21,955 5440:25 4 High High ZH 147 18,879 4939:10 3.8 Mid Mid ZH 144 17,877 4885:25 3.7 Mid Mid zz 193 7,513 3298:25 2.3 Low Low

Trailing aircraft 2859:00

Trailing aircraft 7,513

Table 1; Sample aircraft usage compared to fleet leader

The aircraft has been given a fatigue life of 12,000 flying hours (based on test, not in-service usage) and the estimated number of landings per hour is 4. As can be seen from the table above, the number of landings compared to the amount of flying hours is close to, or below the original design estimate of 4 landings per 1 flying hour.

Detailed Review of MOD Form 700

The maintenance requirements detailed in the MMS (Topic SA 1) [6] have been accurately transferred into all 7 of the sample aircraft MOD Form 700 log books. The Master Maintenance List (MML) has been displayed in periodic format to cover both the flying hours and the upper calendar limits of the maintenance packages from Primary through to Major. The items that are listed in the CLR are detailed in

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Section 7 on MOD Form 728, which is held centrally at RAF Syerston. Only components that are classified as having a reduced life are then transferred onto the MOD Form 721 B. This form is contained in Section 5 and, therefore, remains integral to the MOD Form 700 'in use' log book which is located with the aircraft. The MOD Form 721 B is used as a short forecast for component replacements and therefore precludes high life items such as the fuselage, mainplane, tailplane and main undercarriage legs. There were, however, two errors found and they have been expanded upon in WP 6 (Engineering Record Cards).

The MOD From 701 (Vigilant) 'Leading Particulars' was found to be at the incorrect revision state for all 7 sample aircraft. The latest revision state is at Feb 08; the actual form in the MOD Form 700 is dated May 04. The amendment to the latest revision of the Leading Particulars includes the specification of the materials to be used when cleaning external composite surfaces. The gel coat finish, for example, has a high weather resistance and must be kept in a clean condition.

As indicated above, in the absence of the Weight and Balance MOD Form 702 series being incorporated into the MOD Form 700 for this aircraft type, the weight and balance data is recorded on the Leading Particulars. The weight and balance data entered in the Leading Particulars, the aircrew aide memoir graph (which is placed at the front of the MOD Form 700) and the MOD Form 751 Aircraft Basic Weight and Moment Record Card (which is retained at RAF Syerston) was found to be correct for all 7 sample aircraft.

Although limited in number, the entries placed in the Limitations Log (MOD Form 703) and the Acceptable Deferred Faults Log (MOD Form 704) were correctly classified and deferred for a reasonable period. Due to the geographical dispersion of the VGS, the personnel who are authorised to place an entry on these forms and the procedure followed is expanded upon in WP 20.

There are numerous entries on the Maintenance Work Order (MWO) where there is no reference made to the work card or maintenance procedure and the amendment state of the publication.

Detailed Review of in-use Maintenance Data Electronic Recording System

A bespoke electronic Logistic Information System (LIS) is used at RAF Syerston by the engineering controllers to manage, plan and co-ordinate logistic operations. This is commonly referred to by the Management Team as the 'Tree of Knowledge'. Taken directly from the JAP 1 OOA-01, a LIS is 'any information system that holds and processes logistic data, such as aircraft maintenance records or asset tracking data'. Example systems are Enhanced Health and Usage Diagnostic System (EHUDS), Logistics Information Technology System (LITS} and Work Recording and Asset Management (WRAM).

Further clarification can be found in Chap 7.3 of JAP 100A-01, which states that 'a LIS is defined as any electronic information system that allows the management, planning, and detailed co-ordination of logistic operations within the Military Air Environment (MAE)'.

Serco have inherited the Vigilant LIS from the previous user (RAF) and input fatigue consumption data (flying hours & landings) for the entire fleet of 64 aircraft. This information is then used by the Maintenance and Document Controllers to co­ordinate maintenance activity in the form of scheduled servicing, component replacement and repair and rectification action. The Regional Maintenance Teams are then tasked accordingly and at the end of the week, details of completed maintenance activities and serviceability states are updated on the LIS. It is

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therefore evident that the 'Tree of Knowledge' is utilised for the purpose described by the JAP and as such there are airworthiness considerations to be taken into account.

Systems such as LITS and WRAM, which are widely used across the MAE, are authorised by the platform support team leaders and are compliant with the policy laid down in Chap 7.3. The LIS employed at RAF Syerston is a bespoke system and is available to users on the Syerston station network only. Therefore, FTST TA Glider Mech 1 a is only in receipt of a monthly Glider Return sent by e-mail from the Docs Controller at RAF Syerston. Chap 7.3 of the JAP 100A-01 details the policy to be implemented when using a LIS and the FTST TA Team Leader is ultimately responsible for any item of hardware or software used for the operation and/or maintenance of the Vigilant.

To ensure that the data integrity between the LIS, Engineering Record Cards and the MOD Form 700 are accurate, the documentation sets from 7 aircraft were audited. Two components were selected and both found to be incorrect. The first was the well documented issue with regards to the main undercarriage legs (see WP 6 for further details) and the second example found that the detail in the MOD Form 700 Short Forecast Sheet Form 721 B was different to the information contained in the LIS.

3.1.1 Conclusions

The aircraft MOD Form 700 documentation is structured in accordance with MOD F799/1 (SLG), which is the controlled by the FTST TA. All 7 of the sample aircraft MOD Form 700 in-use log packs were checked and found to be correct, with the exception that an old version of the Leading Particulars F701 (Vigilant) was found in each of these log packs. Although limited in number, the entries placed in the Limitations Log (MOD Form 703) and the Acceptable Deferred Faults Log (MOD Form 704) were correctly classified, authorised and deferred for a reasonable period. The details from the Master Maintenance Schedule (Topic SA 1) have also been accurately transferred into the MOD Form 700.

It is evident that the 'Tree of Knowledge' is being utilised to manage, plan and co­ordinate logistic operations, which have airworthiness implications across the fleet. Unlike other types of LIS which are used within the MAE and can be accessed by platform support teams, this system is bespoke and can only be viewed by personnel who have access to the Syerston server.

The Technical Information (TI) reference and amendment state are quoted to ensure that the maintenance documentation is explicit and that the work being carried out is completed to the latest version of Tl.

3.1.2 Recommendations

• Replace the old version of the MOD F701 (Vigilant) Leading Particulars contained in Section 11 of the MOD Form 700 with the latest amendment Feb 08.

• The policy laid down in Chap 7.3 of JAP1 OOA-01 is applied to the 'Tree of Knowledge'. This policy details what is required to achieve configuration management, auditing, data integrity, look and feel, Minimum Data Capture Lists, component record creation, archiving and through life management.

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• Or, replace existing 'Tree of Knowledge' with a recognised LIS currently in use in the MAE such as LITS or WRAM.

• If the database is to continue in use then immediate action should be taken to ensure that the all aircraft maintenance data is aligned with the requirements of the Topic 5A 1.

• That all· aircraft lifed items controlled by this system are reviewed and the accuracy of the data on the database compared to that shown on the Engineering Record Cards and forecasts in the MOD Form 700.

• That all fatigue data is being inputted accurately (to include Sortie Profile Codes).

• Ensure that the existing audit mechanism is robust enough to eneapsulate the above recommendations (Self Audit/Management Checks & Internal Quality Audit procedures in accordance with Chap 15.2 of JAP1 OOA-01 ).

• All work carried out on the aircraft is signed for in accordance with the latest Tl.

3.2 WP 2 Topic SA 1 Master Maintenance Schedule

The last formal review of the Topic 5A1 [6] was conducted by a contractor in May 2000, who carried out RCM. The 3rd Edition of the Topic 5A1 was issued in Mar 2000. SIWG minutes dated Mar 09 Item 6 Para 5 states that due to the rundown of the RCM services provided by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) at RAF Wyton, a further schedule review would not be carried out at this time and any updates would be affected by MOD F765 action. The maintenance schedule review appears on the Sl Plan and is to be carried out in the last quarter of each year. However, it is evident that the decision to use MOD F765 action will remain extant until resources become available to conduct a formal, comprehensive review.

The Designer has produced a list of SSis, which was originally issued in Sep 1992 and these SSis have been incorporated into the Topic 5A 1. A recent review of these SSI has been conducted by ASI4a, who has agreed that they include Safety of Flight Structure (SofFS). Although it should be noted that this terminology (SofFS) is being phased out of the JAP 1 OOA-01 and that all such classified items will be regarded as SSis.

There is a directed examination for each SSI contained in the applicable sections of the Topic 5B2&C [9] and 50 [10]. All Minor Star and Major Maintenance packages for all Vigilant are carried out at RAF Syerston by the Aircraft Support Team (AST). In consultation with the maintainers, it is evident that access can be gained by use of Remote Visual Aids (RVA) to conduct a satisfactory examination of all the SSI. SSI examinations, which are required during Primary, Primary Star and Minor Maintenance packages, are carried out by the Regional Maintenance Teams and recorded as required by the Topic 2(R)1 [11].

SSI examinations are carried out in accordance with the relevant AP and also the Topic 2(R)1 Leaflet 020 [11], which details the structural examination requirements. Annex A to this leaflet gives further guidance on the nature of faults on both metallic and composite structures and details the methods of examination. There is also a logical SSI examination flow chart to be used in order to document and record these inspections. If any faults are found during these examinations, the structural sampling report is completed and forwarded to FTST TA via the Docs Controller at

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Syerston. This system of recording SSI examinations has been in place now for 2.5 years. All Min.or Star and Major maintenance packages are carried out by experienced maintainers of the AST based at Syerston. To assist with the identification and reporting of SSI examinations, the team have produced a local Vigilant SSI publication. This is considered to be a useful publication and the first Edition was produced in Jan 07. However, this publication is not currently subject to and linked to the Topic 5A 1 amendment process.

During this initial 2.5 years reporting period, the majority of the SSI record sheets have been cleared with no fault found. With respect to the 4 major threats to Sl, the cause for any damage found has been limited to Accidental Damage/Environmental Damage (AD/ED).

In accordance with Chap 11.1.3 of JAP100A-01, sampling of 'Safe Life- Not At Risk' (SL-NAR) SofFS is necessary when the structure is not examined during scheduled maintenance and is sampled to take into account any unexpected exposure to AD/ED. Def Stan 00-970 advises that structure that is difficult to access and is classified as SL-NAR via RCM analysis should be subject to sampling.

RCM analysis was applied to the Vigilant during the period 1998 - 2000. SSI items were identified and have all been transferred into the Topic 5A 1 [6]. This analysis has been recorded on PM2 worksheets, which were sanctioned by the then incumbent Glider Engineering Authority (EA) & Support Authority (SA). .·

During the RCM analysis, the main spar (SIN 1610003) was correctly identified as an SSI. On reviewing the PM2 worksheets, the RCM team remarked that it would be very difficult to examine the whole spar and recommended that structural sampling of this SSI should be given consideration. The incumbent Glider EA & SA authorised the PM2 worksheet record, however, no further action was proposed to introduce targeted sampling on this SSI. In consultation with the maintainers who conduct depth maintenance at Syerston (Minor Star & Major), they were content that the whole of the spar could be inspected by use of the video probe. The main spar is examined as far as possible with the mainplane removed during Major maintenance work cards 23 and 29.

On completion of the Full Scale Fatigue Test (FSFT), Residual Strength Test (RST) and partial teardown inspection, the life of the aircraft was extended to 12,000hrs. Although this teardown inspection did not include the main spar, the wings did pass the RST.

3.2.1 Conclusions

RCM analysis was applied to this aircraft during the period 1998-2000. All PM2 worksheets applicable to SSI have been reviewed during this audit and each of these worksheets were sanctioned by the then incumbent Glider EA & SA. There has been no formal review conducted on the Topic 5A1 since 2000. SSis have been identified by the Designer and these have recently been validated by ASI4a to include SofFS. The process of carrying out SSI examinations and recording the findings is well documented in the Topic 2(R)1. This process is successfully implemented by both the AST at Syerston and also the Regional Maintenance Teams, who provide Forward Support to the fleet.

Conformation is required that the main spar can be visually examined during Major maintenance as the requirement for sampling of the main spar was recommended as a result of the RCM analysis. Sampling of this structure will not be required if access can be gained by using the appropriate RVA.

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• To combine the information contained in the Topic 2(R)1 and the maintainers locally produced Vigilant SSI examination guide into a recognised Topic 5V.

• On completion of work cards 23 and 29 during the next Major maintenance package, confirmation that the main spar can be examined using existing RVA is to be recorded and discussed at the next SIWG. This will validate the inspection technique and provide an audit trail to close the recommendation raised by the RCM analysis team.

• If access is such that the main spar can not be satisfactorily examined, alternative inspection equipment and/or access holes should be identified as a possible solution. If these solutions are deemed impracticable, a targeted sampling programme is to be planned for and implemented on the mainplane.

3.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

The Vigilant Utilisation & Fault Returns are used to provide the main source of fatigue consumption data for individual aircraft. These returns are completed by the VGS operating Vigilant aircraft and are then sent to the Serco Docs Controller based at RAF Syerston. The procedure and report format can be found in Leaflet 008 of the Vigilant Topic 2(R)1. This information is then used to update the electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) and to task the Serco Regional Maintenance Teams to carry out any scheduled maintenance, repair or rectification. On completion of this work, the Regional Maintenance Teams forward to the Docs Controller a weekly return of the maintenance carried out and the serviceability states, in preparation for the next period of flying (generally the weekend). A monthly return is then despatched to FTST TA Glider Mech 1a by the Docs Controller.

The electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) which is used for the management, planning and detailed co-ordination of logistical operations within the Motor Glider and Glider Fleets, both Vigilant and Viking, can only be accessed by personnel on the Syerston server. Therefore, the FTST TA Glider Mech 1a does not have sight of the type of information required in order to conduct the appropriate level of fault and trend analysis. The current method used to determine the reliability and maintenance requirements of the aircraft and associated equipment is gathered monthly on hard copies sent by Syerston.

Although this platform does not have a Topic 5V, there is a well documented procedure for recording SSI examinations. All completed SSI Record Sheets and any Structural Sampling Report (SSR) forms are forwarded from RAF Syerston to Glider Mech 1 a at FTST T A.

Due to the recent changeover of personnel and the move from RAF Wyton to RAF Linton-on-Ouse, FTST TA have been unable to collate sufficient data in order to conduct any trend analysis of defects and this remains work in progress for the new Glider Mech 1 a. The corporate knowledge held by personnel within the management team at Syerston, who collect the utilisation and fault returns from all users of the fleet, is such that any increase in the rate of change of reliability should be identified.

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3.3.1 Conclusions

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The process for the flow of technical information between the operators at the VGS, the management team at RAF Syerston, who co-ordinate maintenance activities, and the Depth and Forward Support Teams, who carry out the servicing and repairs, is considered robust in view of the limited Information System (IS) resources available. Personnel within the Management Team are also identifying areas for improvement to enhance this flow of information.

The technical information contained on the monthly returns is considered insufficient to enable comprehensive fault and trend analysis required by a platform support team. Due to the move from RAF Wyton to Linton-on-Ouse, there is insufficient data available to the present Glider Mech 1 a to conduct any form of trend analysis of maintenance arisings and defects.

The compilation of SSI record sheets and Structural Sampling Report forms on completion of SSI examinations has recently been implemented. These forms are being forwarded to FTST TA Glider Mech 1 a and will provide data to monitor any structural faults within the fleet. This data will also provide a valuable input when the next review of the Master Maintenance Schedule (Topic SA 1) is carried out.

3.3.2 Recommendations

• Review the technical information and data required by the FTST TA Glider Mech 1 a in order to be able to conduct trend analysis of reliability and defects.

• Access to the electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) at Syerston is made available to FTST TA Glider Mech1a. (See also recommendations in WP1.)

3.4 WP 4 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

It is a requirement that the Support Policy Statement (SPS) contained in the Topic 2(R)1 [11] is to be updated whenever there is a substantial change to the support policy or there ·are any changes that amend the responsibilities of staffs or formations. Due to the changeover of responsibilities within the FTST TA and the move from RAF Wyton to RAF Linton-on-Ouse, and also the changeover from RAF to Serco personnel and the different approach adopted by implementing the Regional Maintenance Teams, the SPS requires updating.

Station/Squadron Aviation Engineering Standing Orders (AESOs) and Aviation Engineering Routine Orders (AEROs) are a method of publicizing low-level engineering instructions from hierarchical organisations to a wider audience. These AESOs & AEROs have been produced by, and for the use of, RAF personnel. Similar to the changes which affect the SPS, the orders in these low level engineering instructions are to be changed to reflect that both the Forward and Depth engineering tasks are now the responsibility of a contractor. All orders and regulations required in addition to the regulations detailed in the contract are to be published on the authority of the Serco Chief Engineer as Company Procedures within a Company Order Book. The core information contained in the AESOs, which are distributed amongst the VGS, remains valid to the safe operation and maintenance of the fleet.

In order to fulfil the aim of providing flying training and air experience to the Air Cadet Organisation (ACO), the VGS are dispersed throughout the UK. As such,

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individual VGS are administrated by RAF Squadrons and/or RAF stations. Therefore, the process for the amendment of Tl, which includes all APs, becomes the responsibility of the local organisation responsible for the 'closed loop' system of Tl amendment. Each VGS, by virtue of being embedded in a RAF station, will be subject to Internal Quality Audits, which is one of the primary auditing mechanisms used within the MAE. The VGS should atso conduct Self Audits, which are local management checks, to verify that all Tl is up to date. A sample audit was conducted at 633 VGS based at RAF Cosford, where the Serco Western Regional Maintenance Team are based, and all publications were found to be at the same amendment state as the master list issued by the FTST T A.

Serco have inherited a number of APs and other forms of Tl from the RAF and continue to operate the same amendment process. The Chief Engineer has highlighted a shortfall in the quantity of Tl available for Serco to sustain the Regional Maintenance Team approach to providing glider support and is in the process of procuring additional Tl.

There are a number of recent MOD F765s which have been submitted by the maintainers. These have been logged by the FTST TA and passed to the Designer for consideration. There is, however, a small number of legacy MOD F765s which the present Glider Mech 1 a is attempting to clarify if any investigation work has been carried out.

There have been regular amendments carried out to the Topic 1 and, in consultation with the engineers at the Aircraft Support Team based at Syerston; the content of the publication is considered to be satisfactory.

A review of the Non Destructive Test (NOT) schedule (Topic 5G) [12] detailed a Laser shearography technique, designed to test the GRP structure. In consultation with the GRP Bay staff and engineers at Syerston, this technique has not been used and it does not appear in the Topic 5A1. In accordance with the Sl Plan, there is only one scheduled review of the validity of NOT techniques and this was due in the last quarter of 2008.

3.4.1 Conclusions

There have been a number of significant changes, both within the FTST TA and the maintenance organisation, which has an impact on how the support to the Vigilant is implemented. As such, the SPS requires updating and the Station AESOs are to be transcribed into a Company Order Book in order to reflect these changes.

There have been a number of amendment requests submitted by the maintainers using the F765 procedure and these are closely controlled by the FTST T A. There is a relatively low number of outstanding F765s and these are being investigated by Glider Mech 1 a.

The amendment process to legacy Tl, either using the formal amendment process or the Advance Information Leaflet (AIL)/Service Amendment Leaflet (SAL), is co­ordinated by the parent station's Technical Publications department, on behalf of the Tl sponsor. Verification of Tl being at the correct amendment state should be conducted during station IQA activity and Squadron Self Audit checks. A sample was carried out at RAF Cosford and the APs were found to be at the correct amendment state in accordance with the list issued by FTST TA.

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Serco are responsible for ensuring that Tl on their charge is to the latest amendment and are currently bidding to increase the quantity of Tl in order to support the Regional Maintenance Teams.

There appears to be no requirement for the laser shearography test.

3.4.2 Recommendations

• The SPS in the Topic 2(R)1 is to be reviewed by the FTST TA given the significant changes that have taken place.

• The RAF Station AESOs need to be replaced by the Contractors Company Order Book, which will detail Company Procedures to be carried out in support of both Forward and Depth maintenance activities.

• The quantity of Tl should be increased to enable the Regional Maintenance Teams to hold the necessary publications in order to carry out and sign for aircraft maintenance.

• At the next Topic 5G review, the use of the laser shearography test should be deleted.

3.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List

There are 22 Schedule Identification Number (SIN) components listed in the CRL. These are sub divided depending on whether the lives are based upon flying hours, calendar or landings. As stated in the introduction, this AASA has also focused on the ageing issues of both the systems and propulsion aspects of the aircraft.

MOD Form 798 'Instructions for Use of the Maintenance and Component Replacement Control Document' details that a reproduction of the CLR list of the Topic 5A1 is to be used to control and forecast component replacements. This reproduced CLR list is contained in Section 7 of the MOD Form 700 and the details of components are transferred across to the MOD F728 Component Replacement Record. There are 8 SIN listed components based on flying hours, which do not appear on the CLR. As a result of regular amendments to the Topic SA 1, these components have been removed from the CLR and are now included in the scheduled maintenance packages.

The table below details components taken from the CRL that have been selected for audit due to their structural integrity requirements. In order to distinguish between the 3 different types of audit which constitute the Ageing Aircraft Audit, these components have been grouped under the headings of structure, systems and propulsion. The life stated in the CRL has been compared with that given by the Designer when the aircraft first entered RAF service.

Serial SIN Item Designer CRL Structure

1 1510001 Fuselage 9000 hrs 12 000 hrs F

2 1610001 Mainplane 9000 hrs 12 000 hrs F

3 1710004 Tailplane 9000 hrs 12 000 hrs F

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4 2010005

5 2010006

6 1910012

7 4710001

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Main Not lifed 300 hrs Undercarriage Scrap attachment bolts x8

Main Not lifed 50 000 Undercarriage Landings leg x2

Systems Elevator upper Not lifed 1500 hrs deflection limiter bolt x2

Pro_p_ulsion Propeller N/K 1600 hrs or assembly 6 Years

Table 2; CRL comparison between Designer and Topic 5A 1

Post FSFT completed in 2004, life of bolts was recommended as 2000 landings. For ease of maintenance, replaced every Minor. Mod 017 legs were fitted fleet wide and in 2005, life set at 50,000 landings post mini OLM on legs.

In response to x2 reported cases of bolt failure, F765 action was sanctioned by the Glider EA & SA to replace bolt every Minor Star.

Life assured through discussion with manufacturer

The engine, which was originally on scheduled maintenance, is now 'On Condition'. Minutes of the Local Technical Committee (LTC) Dated Mar 09 stated that 'after a small number of engine failures, the engines now continue well beyond their former overhaul life, therefore, the engine will stay On Condition.' Leaflet 301 of the Topic 2(R)1 [11] describes why the engine is now 'On Condition'. The core engine has been evaluated for condition based monitoring and the leaflet details the primary failure modes and the effects of failure. The leaflet then goes on to describe what types of condition monitoring techniques are used to counter these primary failure modes. When a fault is found during condition monitoring, further investigation is carried out and the engine will be rejected for overhaul if the fault cannot be rectified.

The engine has suffered badly in the past from poor reliability. In the previous 12 months from Apr 08 to Apr 09, 60 air incidents were reported and 25 of these were attributable to the engine either losing power, fluctuation in RPM or 'rough running'. However, none of the faults have been attributable to the basic mechanical aspects of the core engine, but rather to the ancillary systems (fuel supply and ignition system).

3.5.1 Conclusions

On completion of FSFT, RST and partial tear down, the lifing details for the fuselage, mainplane and tailplane altered. The main undercarriage legs and attachment bolts have now been given a life as a result of the mini OLM carried out post the FSFT. With regards to the aircraft systems, the elevator upper deflection bolt has been given a life of 1500hrs as a consequence of 2 reported failures of these bolts. These changes, along with component lifing details which have remained extant, are detailed in the CRL of the Topic 5A 1. The items listed in the CRL have been accurately transferred from the Topic 5A1 into the MOD Form 700.

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The engine continues to have reliability issues. These can be attributed to the ancillary systems such as fuel and ignition rather, than any faults with the core engine.

3.5.2 Recommendations

• Due to the high number of reported air incidents and the dedicated role of this aircraft, which is to provide glider pilot training and Air Cadet air experience, a formal review should be conducted on the reliability issues with the Grob 2500 engine.

• Explore the option of replacing the engine with a newer and more reliable unit.

3.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

In accordance with the Topic 2(R)1 [11] and Topic 5A1 [6], the following ERG are to be maintained and these are listed in Table 3:

Serial Item MOD Form Reference 1 Airframe I Fuselage F744 Airframe Record Card 2(R)1 & 5A1 2 Mainplane F735A Component Record Card 5A1 3 Tailplane F735A Component Record Card 5A1 4 Main Undercarriage F735A Component Record Card 5A1

Leg 5 Crew Restraint F715 Safety Equipment I Aircrew 5A1

Harness Equipment Assembly_ Record 6 Engine Change Unit F7 49 Assembly Record Card 5A1 7 Magneto F735A Com_ponent Record Card 5A1 8 Propeller F735A Component Record Card 5A1

F7 49 Assembly Record Card 2(R)1 9 Carburettor LH F735A Component Record Card 5A1 10 Carburettor RH F735A Com_l)_onent Record Card 5A1 11 Servicing & Repairs F7 45 Maintenance & Repair 2(R)1

Record Card 12 Embodiment of Mods F746 Modification Embodiment 2(R)1

Record Card 13 STis and Sis F747 SI/STI Record Card 2(R)1 14 Miscellaneous F748 Miscellaneous Record Card 2(R)1 15 Basic Weight and F751 Ac Basic Weight & Moment 2(R)1

Moment Record Card

Table 3; ERG required for the Vigilant

A sample of 7 aircraft, previously identified in WP 1, were used to ensure that the procedures, upkeep and maintenance of data for items requiring ERG, both manually and electronically, were correct. With regards to this sample of 7 aircraft, the majority of data recorded on the ERG, MOD Form 700 and held electronically on the 'Tree of Knowledge' was found to be correct. However, there were a number of discrepancies, which are expanded upon below.

It was found during this sample that the lifing details of a selected item requiring an ERG was correct on the log card, electronic database and Section 7 Maintenance & Component Replacement Document. However, the information contained in the MOD Form 700 on the Forecast Sheet MOD F721 B was found to be different. Further investigation found that, following the component replacement, the

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reforecast was not entered correctly on the MOD F721 B. The Docs Controller at RAF Syerston has since corrected this error.

Log cards for the main undercarriage leg were found to be incomplete. Log cards are being raised as and when RTINigilant/007 A is carried out. This RTI has been issued due to the current protective coating found to be cracking and chipping, which in some cases has led to corrosion of the leading edge of the leg. This has been classified as a long term task and the legs are removed and dispatched to Vector Aerospace at Almondbank. At the time of the initial phase of the audit, 18 aircraft had undergone the RTI and had log cards raised. The remainder of the fleet have no log cards raised for the main undercarriage.

The information contained on the new log cards was also found to be incorrect. The refurbished legs which had been subject to the RTI had the lifing details calculated by adopting the number of landings the aircraft to which they are being fitted has made. Furthermore, the main undercarriage legs are not entered on either the electronic database or the MOD F721 B Forecast Sheet. The legs are lifed at 50,000 landings and the fleet leader in landings is at 25,313, as of 18 May 09. When the legs are removed in preparation for the RTI, no lifing details are entered onto the 'Unserviceable' MOD F731 Equipment Label, which is attached to the legs before they are despatched to Vector Aerospace.

Modification 017 was issued in Jul 03 and has been embodied fleet wide. Service experience, coupled with evidence obtained from the 1st half of the Full Scale Fatigue Test (FSFT), demonstrated that the existing main undercarriage legs were susceptible to fatigue failure. In addition, a reappraisal of the design case calculations, based on loads obtained during an OLM programme also provided evidence that static strength reserves were insufficient to meet the design case. Therefore, this modification introduced a reinforced leg. The recording action on completion of this modification taken from the leaflet was to record satisfaction on MOD Form 746 (Embodiment of Mods) and MOD Form 749 (Assembly Record Card). This information conflicts with the Topic 5A1, which directs users to hold a MOD Form 735 (Component Record Card) for the main undercarriage legs. It was found during a sample that post satisfaction of this modification, a MOD F728 Component Replacement Record was raised for each leg. The MOD F728 is held in Section 7 of the MOD F700 and records the airframe hours and life used (nil landings) when the legs where fitted, and when they are due to be replaced. Unfortunately on completion of this modification, no log cards were raised and no data was inputted into the electronic database or reforecast on the MOD F721 B.

3.6.1 Conclusions

The procedures for the raising, upkeep and maintenance of data for items requiring ERG, both manually and electronically, were reviewed and validated using the previously identified 7 sample aircraft (see WP 1 ). The majority of data checked was correct, however, there were a number of discrepancies.

There was an isolated occurrence found during the sample where the data for a particular component recorded on the ERC was not consistent with the data entered on the MOD F721 B. It was evident in this case that the component had been replaced and that the information on the MOD F721 B had not been correctly revised to reflect this change.

The maintenance and upkeep of the ERG, and the accompanying MOD Form 700 paperwork, for the main undercarriage leg was found to be unsatisfactory. ERG

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have not been raised for this component, unless RTINigilanU007 A has been completed. However, for those legs which have had the RTI satisfied, the lifing details recorded on both the ERC and in the MOD Form 700 have been incorrectly calculated. The reason for this error has been due to the life usage details not being recorded when the legs were initially removed to satisfy the RTI.

3.6.2 Recommendations

• When the main undercarriage legs are removed from the aircraft to undergo RTINIG/007 A and despatched to Vector Aerospace Almondbank, the life usage in landings should be extracted from the MOD F728 and entered onto the 'U/S' MOD F731. Assuming the Quality procedures are in place at Almondbank, the life usage of each individual leg is known before, during and on completion of the RTI and the receiving unit will have recorded on the 'Serviceable' MOD F731 the original life used for that leg. When the refurbished leg is then fitted to an aircraft, the life usage details will then be entered on the log card, MOD F728 of Section 7 and reforecast on the MOD F721 B. The electronic database, which is used by the Docs Controller for scheduling maintenance, will also be updated.

• This process can only be used for aircraft which still have pre RTINIG/007 A main undercarriage legs fitted. Aircraft that have post RTI legs fitted have compromised lifing details and the correct figures cannot be retrieved. Therefore, a Penalty Factor should be applied to these legs. A recommendation would be to identify which of the post RTI aircraft had the highest number of landings when the RTI was carried out, and apply this figure retrospectively to all the other aircraft that have had the RTI carried out.

3.7 WP 7 Topic &Aircraft Repairs

The Vigilant Topic 6 [13] has general repair schemes which have been devised to cover the major structural components of the aircraft. These have been grouped into metal, Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) and Carbon Fibre Composite (CFC) repair procedures. The Vigilant structure is classified as either Primary, Secondary & Tertiary. When estimating the extent of damage, the Topic 6 provides useful information as to how and what to look for in respect of transmitted secondary damage to the surrounding area. The Topic 6 also provides guidance post repairs on Centre of Gravity (CG) limits, control surface balancing and drainage & vent holes. To ensure that repairs do not affect the CG limits, before commencing any repair to the airframe or components, they are weighed. On completion of the repair, the item is re-weighed to ensure that there has been no significant increase in mass, which will then affect the CG limits.

There is no metal repair information given in the Topic 6. When a metal part of the airframe is worn or damaged, these parts are normally replaced.

The majority of repairs carried out by the GRP Bay at RAF Syerston are conducted in accordance with the Vigilant Topic 6 in conjunction with the General Composite Repair Manual [14]. When damage is found which can not be repaired using these publications, a repair request is submitted to the Designer (Grob) via the FTST TA. Due to the expertise and experience of the current GRP Bay Team Leader, a proposed repair solution is also submitted at this time. These repair solutions put forward by the Team Leader are normally accepted by the Designer and accelerate

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the process. Once authorization has been granted by the Designer, the repair is carried out and recorded on the CFC Glider Repair Record Card, which is contained in the Topic 6.

All structurally significant repairs, which have been carried out by the GRP Bay, have been recorded since the Vigilant first entered service. These records can be found in the comprehensive database held by the Team Leader and copies are sent to the Designer. Therefore, when a new repair is to be carried out, this database is consulted to ensure previous repairs in or around the damaged area are known. Minor repairs are also recorded on the database and these are normally used by the Team Leader for data gathering purposes. The Topic 2(R)1 refers to the Data Bank maintained by the Designer for reference purposes and does not include the comprehensive repairs database that is in-use by the GRP Bay Team Leader at RAF Syerston.

There have been a number of cases where repairs to the structure have been carried out by outside agencies and not recorded. If a previously unrecorded repair is found in the damaged area, the old repair is removed and the GRP Bay personnel carry out a recognised repair and record it on the database. However, due to the nature of GRP, the staff of the GRP Bay are reasonably satisfied that any previous repairs can be identified by a skilled tradesman once the gel coat has been removed.

The GRP Bay Team Leader receives repair authorisation in various uncontrolled formats and has raised concerns over the validity of these. These formats include e-mails, faxes, letters, confirmation via telephone and they are retained outside the database. It is evident that although the process is satisfactory, a more robust closed loop repair request and authorization format would be beneficial to all stakeholders.

A large number of aircraft exhibit small hairline cracks in the underwing gel coat. These hairline cracks are not considered significant by the Designer and are classified as allowable damage in accordance with Chapter 14-20 of the Topic 6 [13]. The Topic 6 also states that these cracks in the gel coat 'may be ignored provided that there is no sudden extension of the crack'. If there is a sudden extension of the crack, the fibre structure is to be examined for 'overstraining' and repaired as necessary.

In order to ascertain whether or not these hairline cracks of the gel coat have propagated, the affected areas should be mapped to assist both aircrew and maintainers in identifying the location and size of this known and allowable damage.

3. 7.1 Conclusions

The personnel in the GRP Bay at RAF Syerston have amassed a huge amount of knowledge and skill in the repair of the Vigilant. This expertise and the relatively new repair facility have resulted in high quality repairs to the fleet. All repairs carried out at this facility are well documented and recorded on the comprehensive repair database, although there is no reference to this database in the Topic 2(R)1. Any repairs that have been carried out by outside agencies in the past, which have not been recorded, are identified and removed where necessary to facilitate further repair.

Various formats are used by the Designer to give authorisation to the GRP Bay for repairs to be carried out.

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A high number of aircraft show signs of hairline cracks in the gel coat in the area underneath the wings. In accordance with the Topic 6 this is classified as allowable damage. However, if these hairline cracks suddenly propagate, the underlying fibre structure is to be examined. In order to observe if there has been any increase in the length of these hairline cracks in the gel coat, the damaged area needs to be identified.

3.7.2 Recommendations

• The comprehensive repair database in use at the GRP Bay should be identified in the Topic 2(R)1. Further, the FTST TA should consider if this is a form of LIS and if so then the recommendations made in WP1 should be applied.

• A formal repair request procedure should also be detailed in the Topic 2(R)1 to ensure the repair request and authorisation can be identified as a 'closed loop' procedure. A procedure similar to the MOD F760 Fault Investigation Report format could be considered.

• Hairline cracks in the underwing gel coat should be mapped to enable sudden crack propagation to be identified.

• Outsourcing/Sideloading GRP work to Grob's UK Technical Representative at Airborne Composites, JAR UK 145.01102 accredited repair facility, to alleviate the identified choke point of GRP repairs at RAF Syerston.

3.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual

There is an annual AM [7] Review to ensure that it is fit for purpose and to review its technical content. The last review was in February 09 and RAF HS attended together with the Air Cadet Central Gliding School (ACCGS) Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) as the User Authenticator (UA). Any changes required to the AM or FRCs [6] are verified by RAF HS and subject to acceptance by the UA. Changes introduced by virtue of a modification are assessed against a copy of the Draft Modification Leaflet (DML) from FTST TA. Any comments fed back from RAF HS are included in the DML. There is yet to be a formal FTST TA process to cover modifications, see WP16, but once drafted it needs to address those modifications which impact Aircrew Publications to ensure RAF HS involvement. The auditor was taken through an example of a formal modification to the aircraft, Modification 026, a cover modification for SEMNIG/025, which introduced Mode ·c· capability to aircraft at St Athan and had resulted in changes to the AM Part 1 Chapter 5 pages 4 through to 9. This covered the Pre and Post Modification 026 installation of the Becker ATC 4401 as an alternative to the ATC 2000 model. From the evidence seen, RAF HS has been properly involved and consulted for changes. There appears to be a good working relationship between RAF HS and the UA and there is evidence that the FTST TA encourage RAF HS input with good attendance record at the Glider Project Safety Working Group (PSWG) and Vigilant LTC and Faults Meeting.

In the AM Part 2 Chapter 1 there is a 'Note' at Para 4 on Mass, which states that, "If the fuel tank is filled to capacity the aircraft AUM may exceed 908kg". A letter from the Defence Test & Evaluation Organisation (DTEO) Boscombe Down of 2 Oct 96 [15] recommended that the ·Note' should be a ·warning', as to take off under these conditions could result in loss of the aircraft, but this had not been implemented. RAF HS agreed that a Warning would be more appropriate and that a F765 from

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the Release to Service Authority (RTSA) might be the quickest route to correct the AM.

The statement at Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 5 of the AM refers to "the maximum mass of an individual pilot (equipped) is not to exceed 110kg". However, there is no definition as to what "equipped" means. The RTS further confuses the issue by listing at Para D.2.1 Max Payload Mass as "The maximum mass (fully clothed) of any individual pilot must not exceed 110kg".

There is no all encompassing chart or guidance within the AM to bring all the above factors together. However, during the audit visit to RAF Syerston, where a review of the aircraft MOD F700s was undertaken, there is a weight chart in the front of the aircraft MOD F700 which brings together and clarifies the AUM. The weight chart is particular to each aircraft as it defines the latest aircraft weight statement and has the crew total weight (kg) plotted on theY axis and fuel state (litres) in the X axis­see Figure 1 - Aircraft Weight Chart. The crew weight is defined as P1, P2, luggage, parachutes and headsets. The pilot can then read off the payload against his fuel load and remain within limits. The ACCGS CFI at RAF Syerston advised that all crew are weighed at the beginning of the week so that the crew payload is known for each sortie. Flying is planned around this to maximise the fuel load, which typically sees the aircraft filled to 60 litres at the beginning of the day, although a lower figure could be demanded if required. However, physically removing fuel is not easy to accomplish. The MOD F700 remains in the hanger at RAF Syerston, but at RAF Cosford the MOD F700 is placed in the flight-line caravan on the airfield during flying and, therefore, the weight chart is always available to the aircrew. The audit team were unable to ascertain whether this is generally the case for other Vigilant sites around the UK. Further, the chart has no reference as to its provenance.

Weight ChAd k)r lH269

- -- -~-- ------

---.--,----- - -l - - - ·- -___ i

70 +----,___ -'------ - - l-- -- -+---+------20 30 40 50 - 60 70

Fuel State (ltres) 1---+---_R_S_Ok __ -n + ~ORk~'

Figure 1; Aircraft Weight Chart

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I' J

.1,__.'1

-.

-!

!

100

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CA Release Recommendations given by DTEO (16] recommended at Para 58 that "Approaches in crosswind conditions should be carried out using a crabbed approach before kicking off the drift during the flare. It is recommended that a Warning should be included in the Aircrew Manual that side-slipped approaches should not be continued down to the ground, since this could result in a heavy landing", but no Warning or Note had been introduced to the AM. From discussions at RAF Syerston GRP Bay personnel it has been established that there is a known weakness in the aircraft rear fuselage tail-wheel pick-up area - see WP13. Further, there have been failures of the tail-wheel spigot, which had been linked to heavy landings and resulted in a redesign of the spigot. To avoid potential structural damage RAF HS suggested that they would support a new sub-paragraph in the AM Part 3 Chapter 3 at Para 5 "Approach" along the lines of that contained in the DTEO Report to address this point.

CA Release Recommendations provided by DTEO to increase Wind Limits [17] referred to lack of control locks and observed "snatching of control surfaces when parked in wind speeds greater than 25 kN." Whilst AM Part 7 Para 5 addressed this in terms of restraining the control column with the harness, the audit explored whether any external locks had been considered, but RAF HS advised that the harness was an accepted method of restraint and was not aware of any discussions during his tenure in HS to introduce control locks. Discussions within the FTST TA and at RAF Syerston elicited a similar response.

There is no Operating Data Manual (ODM) for the Vigilant, but the AM Part 5 addresses Operating Data. A cross check between the Grob Flight Manual [18], DTEO CA Release Recommendations Report and the AM was made, although the Grob Flight Manual only addressed an AUM of 850kg. Both the DTEO Report [17] and the AM address the higher AUM of 908kg. The results indicated that in most cases the figures in the AM were conservative - see Table 4 - Vigilant Performance Data. The DTEO Report recommends that for the higher AUM of 908kg after take-off the climb away speed is undertaken at 60kts lAS in a shallow climb, rather than the 49kts Indicated Air Speed (lAS) specified for 850kg AUM in the Grob Flight Manual. DTEO reported that the glider climb performance was poor at the higher mass, but satisfactory for the purposes of this type of aircraft.

Performance Criteria GrobAM CA Release AP 101G-1101-15 Take Off- [1] 850kg 1037ft 2020ft -

908kg - 1900ft 2150ft

Climb - 49kts lAS 850kg 670ft/min 550ft/min 500ft/min 908kg - 429ft/min 500ft/min

Cruise 2300-2500rpm

110kts 92kts lAS 85kts lAS at 4000ft@ 90ktsTAS

Landing -To stop from 50ft Grass 1472ft 1640ft 2300ft AGL- [2]

Paved 1280ft 1440ft 1900ft

Ground Roll Grass 783ft 760ft 11 OOft Paved 673ft 520ft 700ft

908kg - Grass - 1620ft . . 1 - On paved surface from start to 50ft AGL m /SA, sea level, zero wmd condtttons . 2 - 62kts /AS approach, touchdown 43kts, zero wind, engine idling, airbrakes 50%

Table 4; Vigilant Performance Data.

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The upkeep of the aircrew publications and involvement of RAF HS in the verification of the content and in participation in the FTST TA management of changes, (modifications, SI(T}s, etc), through the Glider PSWG and LTC is good. It is also understood that there is good working relations between RAF HS and the operators. However, the way the AM and the FRCs cover mass limitations are considered to be unacceptable, as they do not provide the level of clarity required to avoid exceeding the aircraft limitations. .

The maximum mass of an individual pilot needs to be clearly stated as to what is included in the 11 Okg figure. the DTEO Report [16] Para 60 makes this quite clear, "within this an individual crew member should not have a mass greater than 11 Okg (including clothing, parachutes and ballast)", but it appears not to have been transferred into the RTS. Moreover, the ·Note' at AM Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 4 does not convey the risk to the pilot of the consequences of filling the aircraft fuel tank to capacity. Taking off under these conditions could result in loss of the aircraft and therefore a ·warning' is considered to be essential here.

Given the known weakness in the aircraft rear fuselage, (vicinity of the tail-wheel pick-up), and tail-wheel spigot failures, every effort should be made to minimise the potential for structural damage in this area. The additions of a new sub-paragraph in the AM Part 3 Chapter 3 Para 5 'Approach' should meet this need.

It is suggested that the following words used in the DTEO Report are incorporated ''Approaches in crosswind conditions should be carried out using a crabbed approach before kicking off the drift during the flare. Note: Side-slipped approaches should not be continued down to the ground, since this could result in a heavy landing."

The operators of the Vigilant appear to recognise the shortcomings around the overall mass by utilising the weight chart described above. Within the time limits of the audit, it has not been possible to establish how this chart is utilised at the various sites around the UK, other than RAF Syerston and Cosford. The growth in mass since introduction to service as indicated at WP11 of this report has eroded the level of payload that can be safely carried in the glider. The ability to ensure that the aircraft remains within limits requires a means of conveying this information readily to the crew. This chart would appear to satisfy this requirement provided it is given the appropriate status.

3.8.2 Recommendations

• The AM Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 4 ·Note' is changed to a ·warning' and that Para 5 is amended to bring it in line with the amended RTS (see WP11 ), with respect to the definition of what is included in the 11 Okg figure.

• The AM Part 3 Chapter 3 Para 5 'Approach' a new sub-paragraph is added which states ''Approaches in crosswind conditions should be carried out using a crabbed approach before kicking off the drift during the flare. Note: Side-slipped approaches should not be continued down to the ground, since this could result in a heavy landing."

• The AM Part 1 Chapter 6 Para 14 - "Baggage Max 20kg" is reconciled with Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 6 - " Max permitted baggage is 17kg"

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• The Weight Chart is given appropriate status and placed within the cockpit of each glider, either as a separate placard, (to be updated at each aircraft weigh), or considered as an Addendum to the FRCs. It is also recommended that the AM is amended accordingly dependent upon the methodology adopted.

3.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

The SOIU is currently at Issue 3, dated April1999 [19]. This AASA WP is limited as to the level of contribution that can be made to this Topic as the SOIU has been recently reviewed and updated and is awaiting publication at Issue 4. The review of the document had been undertaken and managed by AS14 and progress reported at the Vigilant SIWG. It is noted that the Designer had not reviewed the original Statement of Intent (SOl). Consequently this WP will limit its scope to the manner of the gathering and managing of the flight data.

Flight record, including SPCs, flying hours and number of landings, are entered onto the MOD F724 (Flying Log and Equipment Running Log) by the aircrew post sortie. However, the SPC is not entered onto the 'Tree of Knowledge' and therefore the flying hours are not factored to take into account fatigue consumption. Further in depth analysis of SPC with regards to the Vigilant is expanded upon in WP 19. ASI4 has, in conjunction with the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), modified an existing database which captures the platform usage metric and calculates the fatigue consumption. This database will be presented to FTST TA by ASI4 and will provide the ability to monitor fatigue consumption accurately across the fleet.

The MOD F724 Flying and Equipment Running Log is kept whilst the aircraft is flying during the day, with flight times, roller and full-stop landings recorded together with the SPC. The intention is to record each flight, but the returns seen indicate that there has probably been several flights, e.g. ZH192 had logged 4 hours 15 minutes with 7 roller and 4 full stop landings, and that was the only "flight" that day. SPC 28 was recorded. To record the use of the aircraft by collecting several flights together is an abuse of the F724 form and does not faithfully represent the way the aircraft was operated. The current SOIU at Issue 3 is not specific, but the new Issue 4 makes quite clear that for SPC 28 there should be 1 Full Stop Landing and no rollers. This does bring into question whether the current Flying Running Logs truly represent the type of flying undertaken and that therefore historical data might well underplay the life consumed.

Discussions with ASI4 and ASI4a confirm that they are well aware of this issue and they advised that there are on-going activities to establish and introduce a new database. This will record and store flight data in the future and there is an aspiration to recover and record historical flight data. These activities are reviewed at the SIWG.

3.9.1 Conclusions

There were limited records inspected due to time available in the audit, but returns seen would appear to indicate that there have probably been several flights, logged as one flight. To record the use of the aircraft by collecting several flights together is an abuse of the F724 form and does not faithfully represent the way the aircraft was actually operated.

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The flight returns seen were a small sample of a large dispersed fleet and this may or may not be true of the wider VGS organisation. There is however, concern that some operators are not recording data as intended and the extent of this should be investigated.

SPC are not being entered onto the Tree of Knowledge and therefore the fatigue consumption data of the fleet is inaccurate. The database, which is being modified by DSTL and presented to the FTST TA by ASI4, should be populated with existing fleet consumption data and reviewed.

3.9.2 Recommendations

• A wider audit of flight returns in the VGS organisation is undertaken and analysed to establish whether recording of multiple flights as one is widespread.

• ASI4 takes the opportunity, when rolling out the new SOIU Issue 4 to brief the operators on the correct manner of recording flights and why this is important.

• HQAC institute regular QA checks to ensure this policy is being followed.

• The database developed by DSTL is populated and the fatigue consumption of the fleet can then be reviewed, managed and discussed at the Vigilant SIWG.

3.10 WP 10 Logistic Support

SOL are contracted by the Designer, Grob to provide spares support to the Vigilant under the Contractor Provided Spares Support (CPSS). SOL has been providing spares for this aircraft since 1992 and is currently bidding to renew this contract. They have also recently been awarded ISO 9001/2008 accreditation as an aviation supply company and have been involved wi"th the designer for over 30 years. Although the Designer has sold the parts inventory to another German company, SOL have established and maintained strong relationships with both of these companies.

SOL hold a full stock of spares at RAF Syerston and there are also consumable pack-ups distributed amongst the 5 Serco Regional Maintenance Teams. All high value items are centralised at the purpose designed premises at Syerston. A list of spares purchased by SOL is sent to the FTST TA Glider Mech 1a on a monthly basis. This data is used predominantly for cost analysis and Glider Mech 1 a has highlighted that a number of spares appear to be expensive in comparison to what is available on the open market.

Skycraft Services Ltd are contracted to provide repair and overhaul of the propeller assembly, which is reconditioned every 1600 hrs or 6 years. On completion of each overhaul, an invoice is sent to FTST TA stating the final cost of the work carried out. This invoice does not detail a strip report or an itemised invoice.

Cannibalisation of components does occur but this is largely due to the geographical constraints placed upon the organisation. In consultation with both the engineering and logistics staff at Syerston, there have been no abnormal consumption rates of spares usage in the recent past that the CPSS has been unable to satisfy. After investigation, no obsolescence issues were found.

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It is evident that due to the long standing close working relationship between the MOD, SOL and Grob, all spares that are procured for this aircraft continue to meet the original specification. To validate the maintenance cycle of the propeller assembly, with a view to possibly extending the periodicity between overhauls and ensuring value for money, a strip report and itemised invoice should be issued by Skycraft Services Ltd. It has been identified that certain spares appear to be valued at a higher cost than would otherwise be expected on the open market.

3.10.2 Recommendations

• Conduct a cost analysis on selected high value items and high usage common spares to ensure value for money.

• Request a strip report and itemised invoice from Skycraft Services Ltd for each propeller assembly overhaul.

3.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release and Release to Service

The aircraft was originally certificated to a Maximum AUM of 850kg. HQ Air Cadets (HQAC) in a signal to MODUKAIR requested urgent action to clear the Vigilant Maximum AUM to 908kg from the then limit of 850kg due to " ... the common occurrence of cadets reporting for glider familiarisation and training who weigh in excess of 90kg" [20]. The Designer, Grob, provided a Never Exceed envelope of 920kg [21] which had been extrapolated from data and advised of the implications on gust/manoeuvre flight envelopes and limit speeds. Grob recommended that this limit be demonstrated by flight trials at a flight test centre. The MOD Procurement Executive, (MOD (PE)), therefore tasked DTEO Bascombe Down to undertake CA Release flight trials and the DTEO CA Release Recommendations Report [16] recommended clearance of the aircraft to an AUM of 908kg. The current RTS [22] clears the aircraft to this limit and provides the audit trail to the DTEO Report.

As the margin between cleared and never exceed AUM is small it is important that the RTS, as currently written, does not inadvertently clear the aircraft to exceed this figure. The RTS at Para D.2.1 Max Payload Mass states "The maximum mass (fully clothed) of any individual pilot must not exceed 110kg". The RTS is the prime source of reference for the ·aircraft limitations; therefore it is paramount that the document accurately defines the limitation. The DTEO Report [17] at Para 60 makes clear, " .. an individual crew member should not have a mass greater than 110kg (including clothing, parachutes and ballast)", but it appears not to have been translated into the RTS in this manner. In addition, the RTS at Para 8.4 Mass and Centre of Gravity Para 8.4.1.1 a Note is given which states "If the aircraft fuel tanks are filled to capacity the aircraft AUM may exceed the maximum take-off mass". The DTEO Report advises that it is possible to exceed the AUM of 908kg, "where take off under these conditions could result in loss of the aircraft." [15]. This has already been mentioned in WPB, and could have serious consequences for the aircraft and crew if the aircraft has been operated at the limit. An e-mail [23] was sent to alert Glider Mech 1 a to the lack of clarity as to what the individual pilot maximum mass of 11 Okg covers and advised him to discuss this with the RTSA. The Glider Mech 1 a had forwarded the e-mail to the RTSA on 1 May 09 and a response has been received which confirms that the RTS will be amended in line with the content of the e-mail.

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At delivery to the RAF in 1990 the average aircraft had a basic mass empty of 658kg. The AASA audit sample of 7 aircraft provided a range between 652kg to 660.3kg. Since delivery, the aircraft has seen a mass growth due to Designer modifications, Service Modifications and Service Engineered Modifications (SEM), although there have been some SEM mass reduction modifications. However, the average mass of the sample 7 aircraft is now 671 kg, which is an increase of 13kg. This has been established by the ERCs of the last weigh of these sample aircraft, typically between 3 and 4 years ago, the mass ranges between 668.3kg and 676.4kg - see Figure 2. A further check of the 4 RAF Cosford Vigilant aircraft confirmed this with an average mass empty of 670.8kg.

Current empty mass of the heaviest sample aircraft is 676.4kg. Add P1 and P2 at max allowed and the aircraft is at 896.4kg. Add the minimum fuel load required in the AM for Take-Off (25 litres - 17.5kg) and the aircraft is already over the cleared limit. If the aircraft is to stay within limits then the fuel load would only be 11.6kg, approx 17 litres which would not meet the minimum landing fuel requirement. Worst case scenario accepted, but the gap between Maximum AUM and Never Exceed is 12kg.

Vigilant T Mk1 Glider- Mass Growth

-ZH147 -ZH193 -ZH269

en -ZH266 ~ 640 -----~------------~---~-------- -ZH188 ::i 630 -'-----------------' -ZH144

Timescale 1990 - 2007 -ZH145

Figure 2; Vigilant Mass Growth

The RTS at Part B Para 82.1 and 2.2 [22] gives Cold and Hot Weather limitations, which are underpinned by a letter from Grab GmbH referenced in the RTS at Annex G3 - Item 6 & 7. This Designer's letter- reference DHNIG/057 dated 15 Feb 96 was not readily available in to the FTST T A. A copy has been requested by Glider Mech 1 a from the Designer and a response is awaited. Glider Mech 1 a provided copies of the Grab Flight Manual and Maintenance Manual [18] to the audit team to review engine limitations and performance data.

There is concern that changes to the RTS do not appear to be subject to independent assessment. A specific example was reviewed by the audit team, although not of a structural nature the potential for future changes of a more complex type to run the same way could undermine the safety of the aircraft. The example in question, Designer Modification 026, introduces a Becker ATC4401 transponder to 2 aircraft, which is a cover modification for SEMNigilant/025, as a Special Order Only for 2 St Athan based aircraft. The RAF HS were involved in assessing the DML, see WP8. However, the RTS lists at Part C 17.1 ATC4401 unit and cites an A&AEE Report TM 1818 dated Mar 93 in Part G as the audit trail.

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However the A&AEE Report makes no mention of the ATC4401. This would appear to be at odds with the policy contained in JSP553 and Def Stan 00-56. Whilst the argument postulated by the FTST TA for the role of an Independent Safety Advisor (ISA) in terms of the safety case may well be valid, it should be recognised that there are 2 elements to independent assessment of the safety case, one being the independent process audit of the safety plan, the other being the independent technical evaluation of the Designer's safety case and analysis of the data evidence supporting it, which may include a qualitative assessment of aircraft handling -JSP553 Para 2.58 refers.

Discussions with the FTST TA Safety Manager at RAF Wyton elicited the fact that he was not aware of any independent assessment made of changes to the RTS. The Safety Case had been constructed by an independent organisation to the Designer and thus the FTST TA considered that there was no requirement to conduct a further independent assessment.

3.11.1 Conclusions

The mass growth to the empty aircraft since entry into service is 13kg and aircrew may not be aware of the underlying steady increase in basic aircraft mass since the aircraft was introduced into service. With the added issue of a national trend in increased body mass, there is a risk that the potential for exceeding the current AUM limit, and even the Never Exceed limit, is real with all the associated hazards, and of course the impact on the life of the aircraft.

The work to verify the limitations in the RTS on temperature are currently awaiting the FTST TA response from the Designer.

The initial concern with respect to mass and the way it is conveyed in the RTS has been addressed to the RTSA by FTST TA following on from the audit team e-mail [23]. Confirmation is still required that the relevant changes have been implemented. It follows that this should initiate similar changes to the Aircrew Publications in relation to clarification of individual pilot mass and of payload. This will require cross checking with WP8.

There is concern that changes to the RTS do not appear to be subject to independent assessment and in consultation with the FTST TA Safety Manager, it is evident that this independent assessment is not conducted. In accordance with JSP 553 Para 2.58, there are 2 elements to independent assessment of the safety case. The first element is the independent process audit of the safety plan, the second is the independent technical evaluation of the Designer's safety case and analysis of the data evidence supporting it, which may include a qualitative assessment of aircraft handling.

3.11.2 Recommendations

• The RTS is amended at Part 8 Para 8.4 Mass and Centre of Gravity Para 8.4.1.1 to change the 'Note'- If the aircraft fuel tanks are filled to capacity ... to a ·warning' [The definition of a 'Warning' is 'where the consequence of not respecting a limitation might be death or injury to the person']. This amendment should also be incorporated into the Aircrew Manual and FRCs. See WP8.

• The RTS is amended at Part D - Role Limitations and Constraints Para D.2.1 to clarify aircrew payload description at Para D.2.1. It is suggested that the words used in the DTEO Report could be used here.

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This amendment should also be incorporated into the Aircrew Manual and FRCs. See WP8.

• The Topic of mass is review~d by the FTST T A with all relevant stakeholders to reduce the risk of operating the aircraft above its AUM.

• The FTST TA process for advising the RTSA of any changes to aircraft limitations to be revised to include the requirements of JSP 553, particularly in relation to independent technical evaluation of data evidence supporting the safety case.

3.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

A sample review of previous MOD F760 Fault Investigations has shown a number of examples where the period between the Originators Report being submitted, and the Fault Investigation Report being completed and implemented by the Designer has been short. At present, there are no MOD F760 investigations outstanding and there are currently no components or structural parts that are the subject of mandatory MOD F760 action.

FTST TA receives on a monthly basis, from the British Gliding Association, a Technical News Sheet, which includes Airworthiness Directives from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Service Bulletins are also published by the Designer via their website on a regular basis.

Due to the high number of engine faults that have been identified as a result of air incidents (also see WP 13), fault reporting of the engine should be considered. Chap 7.5 of JAP 1 OOA-01 stipulates that engine fault reporting is to be carried out in accordance with AP 1 OOE-02.

3.12.1 Conclusions

The MOD F760 Fault Investigation procedure is implemented effectively for this aircraft. FTST TA is also aware of defect arisings from civilian variants and has access to both Service Bulletins, issued by the Designer, and the Technical News Sheet, which is supplied by the British Gliding Association and includes Airworthiness Directives from EASA.

Due to the high number of air incidents related to the engine, fault reporting in accordance with AP 100E-02 should be considered. This would enable trend analysis to be conducted on engine faults with a view to identifying the need for additional maintenance and/or modification to improve reliability, or support the requirement for a replacement engine.

3.12.2 Recommendations

• Engine fault reporting to be conducted in accordance with AP 1 OOE-02.

3.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

FTST TA were able to show how Air Incidents received are entered into a database with fields sufficient to monitor trends. The database was demonstrated with records extending back to 2007. The audit team did not seek to view occurrences before this date but did ask whether all Air Incident signals related to Vigilant had been received. The Glider Mech 1a could not state categorically that this was the case and therefore permission was sought from FTST TA for access to the

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Directorate of Aviation Regulation & Safety (OARS) database by QinetiQ in furtherance of the audit. When the extracted information from the OARS Pandora database was received, post the visit, it was limited to identification of signal reference and aircraft tail number only, with no other data available. Evidently a decision had been made earlier by OARS that only this data would be placed on the database.

The FTST TA Safety Manager at RAF Wyton explained that Occurrence Reports were reviewed at the Glider PSWG for progress. Minutes of the last PSWG were provided and confirmed that the PSWG conducted a thorough review of each of the occurrences.

In response to questions on how the Designer communicates civilian air incidents or airworthiness concerns to the MOD, the auditor was advised that the Designer sends all Service Bulletins applicable to G109 gliders to the FTST TA. The Designer also attends the Vigilant SIWG and LTC meetings. In addition, the FTST TA is on the formal distribution by the British Gliding Association (BGA) of their monthly BGA Engineering News. This lists relevant EASA Airworthiness Directives affecting civilian gliders, from which Vigilant is derived, together with more generic glider issues pertinent to continued airworthiness.

The Serco Chief Engineer at RAF Syerston made available the Vigilant Incident Log. This log listed the aircraft tail number, VGS site number and location, brief description of incident and signal received date, together with Follow-Up signal date. It was noted that the signal Air Incident Number was not logged. This is possibly not an issue as the probability of an incident occurring twice on the same aircraft on the same day is low, but for completeness, and to avoid confusion, this should be logged. The audit followed through a sample of signals received in hard copy that required "Follow Up Action". This entailed, raising a MOD F707 Maintenance Work Order- Serial Number Of Work (SNOW) Reference, identifying work required, fault and action taken. The details of the actual work done and sign­off were recorded. A "Follow Up Report" is drafted by the Chief Engineer in signal format and sent to the Originator and copied to the other signal addresses. An entry in the Vigilant Incident Log of the Follow-Up signal date, together with file reference is recorded. It was noted that the Chief Engineer was aware of the new Defence Flight Safety Occurrence Reporting system and he advised that once the ACCGS Flight Safety Officer returned from sick leave they would jointly discuss, draft and introduce new Serco Company Procedures.

With respect to trends, the Chief Engineer advised that the engine related problems accounted for the majority of incidents, e.g. power loss, rough running, rpm fluctuations. This was borne out by the audit team reviewing the last 12 months of incidents, where the engine related incidents accounted for nearly 70% of all reported incidents.

Since the audit visit a sample cross-check of OARS, FTST TA and Serco records was made. Of 39 entries in the Serco Log, a total of 13 could not be traced in the OARS listing. Of these 5 were recent, i.e. in April 09, but 8 were occurrences going back to Dec 08. The situation with the FTST TA database was similar to that of OARS in that 19 occurrences were not listed. Whilst this was understandable for recent incidents, due to the delay in updating the database, this should not be the case with older signals. The Chief Engineer responds to all those signals received at RAF Syerston which demand follow-up action, but there appears to be no 'Master List' for verification. Unfortunately the ACCGS Flight Safety Officer at RAF

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Syerston was on long term sick during the audit, so the audit team were not able to pursue this within the ACCGS organisation.

3.13.1 Conclusions

The FTST TA has a system in place to record and store Air Incident signals. There is also evidence that they manage the issues arising from the incident through normal business and monitored at the PSWG and LTC meetings once a Follow-Up signal has been issued. From the evidence seen there was no indication that ageing issues had resulted in a steady increase in air incidents.

Audits of the aircraft systems produced a similar result to those for the structure, where there were no specific trends highlighted with respect to ageing. However, the propulsion system is different and requires some focus. There are a significant number of Air Incidents which relate to the engine, 70% of all incidents reviewed under the audit are related to the engine malfunctioning. The investigation of these incidents requires considerable time and manpower. The discussion of Air Occurrence Reports at the PSWG should have alerted the FTST TA to this fact and it may help for the future if trend analysis became part of normal business.

It is noted that there does not appear to be a definitive list of Air Incident signals. One would expect OARS as the primary recipient to have this information, but evidence gained at the audit shows that the OARS Pandora database did not have a record of some signals that were available at RAF Syerston, although OARS may well have hard copies. Given the countrywide dispersal of the glider fleet and therefore the dispersed originators of the signals, the FTST TA may not be aware of all incidents, which undermines their airworthiness management responsibilities as owners of the Safety Case.

3.13.2 Recommendations

• It is recommended that FTST TA conduct an investigation into the high number of engine related incidents, which should address the potential risk of an accident through engine cut-out at critical stages of flight.

• It is also recommended that FTST TA secure a definitive listing of Air Incidents by dialogue with OARS and utilise this information, perhaps through a database to undertake routine trend analysis.

3.14 WP 14 Concession Recording

The audit team sought to explore the extent of any Major Concessions, or Production Permits against the design during the build of the aircraft. The definition of a major concession is any deviation from design that has an impact on the service user, e.g. reduced life, a flight limitation, special spares required, maintenance penalty etc. FTST TA could not advise of any Major Concessions or Production Permits and were not aware of any in existence. They were also not aware of any concessions being offered for approval by the FTST TA as a result of deviations from work undertaken during maintenance at GMS Syerston.

At RAF Syerston, the MOD Contracts Manager provided an oversight of the delivery documentation for each aircraft. These records were available and located in the Archive Office. A sample of 5 separate Delivery Documentation folders was examined. Apart from the delivery documentation, (aircraft and engine airworthiness certificates, certification of conformity, flight test reports etc.) a Major

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Production Permit was found against each aircraft. This covered the maximum permitted cockpit load, which is reduced from 180kg to 160 kg, to accommodate the additional empty weight of 20kg due to embodiment of MOD (PE) modifications in order not to exceed the AUW of 850kg. This applied to every aircraft. The MOD Form 77 Concession had been signed by Grob QA and was attached to the Production Permit signed by Grob Design, Grob Airworthiness and Grob QA.

The Chief Engineer was aware of structural Major Concessions on 4 aircraft related to the fuselage and tail wheel steering lever. Due to deviations in GRP lay-up there was insufficient clearance between the lever and fuselage shell necessitating application of a 50mm diameter packing washer of 2mm thickness. As this washer needed to be retained to maintain clearance an Aircraft Deferred Fault (ADF) MOD F704 had been entered into the MOD Form 700 of each of the 4 aircraft to ensure it was brought to the attention of maintenance personnel. A review of the Engineering Records database through the ADF field highlighted the 4 aircraft and one, ZH 127, was tracked through Engineering Records and to Archive Records to the ZH 127 Folder. The Concession was located, Grob Bauabweichung No 817, which had been signed by Grob Design, Airworthiness and QA.

The audit team queried whether the tail wheel arm strengthening referred to in LTC Minutes was introduced under a Concession. The FTST TA provided a Defence Research Agency (DRA) Report [24] which resulted from a request to investigate the failure of the tail wheel arm on ·Vigilant ZH 271 during landing. The report concluded that the failure was a result of an overload fracture of the spigot in a rearwards direction. The FTST TA advised that to overcome the weakness of the original design Grob had designed a longer internal threaded insert in the arm to provide additional support. This modified arm retained the same Part Number with a Dash 1 and would be provided for any newly demanded replacements ordered. STINIG/011/98 was issued to determine which of the 2 arms were fitted to the aircraft with the aim of replacing any with the shorter threaded inserts. Cover Modification Vigilant 022 for the STI was raised, but as there was no impact on operation or maintenance, form/fit/function unaffected, no DML had been required.

The FTST TA, Serco QA and Eng Records and the MOD Tech Co-ordinator at Syerston were not aware of any Concessions on any of the aircraft systems, the engine or the propeller.

3.14.1 Conclusions

From the evidence seen at RAF Syerston there are only a small number of Major Concessions applicable to the Vigilant fleet. Of those concessions that are known an ADF Log MOD F704 entry had been made in the MOD Form 700, together with details of the concession number in the Engineering Records. This is considered sufficient to alert maintenance crews to any activity required in the vicinity of the concession. None of the Major Concessions seen would impose any structural limitation or any age related issues. However, whilst MOD Tech Coordinator believes that any Major Concessions that arose at the time of production should have been captured in the MOD Form 700 at the time of delivery of the aircraft, it was acknowledged that they had inherited the records and could not definitively state that all concessions were known to them. The audit team has requested that the FTST TA seek a list from Grob of any Major Concessions that apply to the delivered aircraft.

The construction of the glider is such that the usual quantities of minor concessions that are experienced on metal fabricated structures do not apply in this case. Whilst

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there are known variances in the GRP lay-up these do not generally have any impact upon maintenance. Those that do have been covered by the Major Concessions referred to above. Consequently it should not be considered unusual for there to be no concession requests to the FTST TA. That may not be the case for the systems and whilst up to now there is no evidence of any concessions being sought, that may not be the case in the future. The FTST TA may wish to consider a process that recognises this possibility.

3.14.2 Recommendations

• A definitive list of Major Concessions of the delivered aircraft is obtained from Grab and cross checked with the aircraft MOD Form 700 to ensure all have been captured. If the FTST TA experiences difficulties with Grab in undertaking this exercise then a fall-back would be to review the archive delivery documentation records at RAF Syerston.

• The FTST TA put in place a process for vetting deviations to design for structure and aircraft systems that might arise in the future.

3.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

SI(T) are issued by the FTST TA in accordance with the Support Policy Statement contained in the Topic 2(R)1. A number of SI(T) have been fleet embodied and a selection of these have also resulted in subsequent modification action. A sample audit was conducted on a number of aircraft to confirm that completed SI(T) had been recorded on the MOD Form 747 SI/STI Record Card and the electronic database. The information contained in both the ERC and Tree of Knowedge were found to be satisfactory.

The only SI(T) with any significant impact on structural integrity is RTINigilant/007 A. This RTI involves removing the main undercarriage legs from the aircraft, stripping the existing surface finish and examining the leg for any signs of damage. Any damage is usually caused by the breakdown of the surface finish which then leads to surface and pitting corrosion. If this damage is beyond limits, the leg is then rejected. The new or serviceable leg has an improved paint finish applied and is then fitted to an aircraft. This has been classified as a long term routine instruction and is currently being carried out by Vector Aerospace, Almondbank. See WP6 for further detail.

3.15.1

Service Bulletins (SB) are issued by the Designer and any that are classified as mandatory are transferred into a SI(T) and incorporated across the fleet. Depending on the category or nature of the SB, the FTST TA will take the appropriate action and issue an SI(T) as required.

Conclusions

SI(T) are issued by the FTST TA and are implemented in accordance with current policy. There is one RTI that does have a significant impact on Sl and this is being incorporated across the fleet by an outside agency.

3.15.2 Recommendations

• Nil.

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3.16 WP 16 Modifications

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The FTST TA provided a copy of the Master Record Index (MRI) signed by the Designer and the MOD (PE) Project Manager dated 23 February 1990. The MRI listed the Modifications to the G1 09B to meet the RAF requirements which provides the Baseline Build Standard at delivery. The FTST TA also provided a list of Designer Modifications and Service Modifications . introduced since entry into service, which had been embodied, or partially embodied on the Vigilant fleet. The configuration status of the Vigilant during this AASA is identified in Table 5.

Vigilant T Mk 1- Configuration Status for AASA

Modification Modification Title Number

001 Install instrumentation OLM 002 Introduce 1 mm thick cylinder head

shims 004 Remarked ASI & Additional ASI and Slip

Indicator 006 Remove OLM Instrumentation 008 Introduce Re-circulatinQ Fuel Svstem 009 Introduce EnQine LiftinQ Bracket 010 Introduce Redesigned Induction

Manifold 017 Redesigned Undercarriage Mounting

Bracket 018 Replacement of Seat harness with new

QRF 019 Replacement Students throttle cable

020 Redesigned Tail-wheel breakout spring

021 Remove Seat Trim screws

022 Introduce Redesigned Tail-wheel Arm

023 Remove ASI Limitation Placards

026 Alternative Becker Transponder ATC4401

027 Alternative Landing Lamp Clamping Plate

SEMNIG/001 Vigilant Mic Tel Extension Leads SEMNIG/006 Rudder Loom Retaining Plate SEMNIG/009 Modify Engine Manifold for Gunson Gas

Detector SEMNIG/011 Replace Exhaust Manifold Nuts with

Copper ones SEMNIG/012 Modify Lower Earth Point SEMNIG/013 Conspicuitv Patches SEMNIG/014 Mic Tel Pigtails with plug/socket SEMNIG/015 Lower Cowling Rubber Anti-Chafe

grommet SEMNIG/017 No Step No Push SEMNIG/018 Maintenance Free Battery

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Class Remarks

sao ZH271 Only B/2

C/3

sao ZH271 Onlv A/1 C/3 C/3

C/3

B/2

- Cover Mod STINig/006

- Cover Mod STINiQ/007

- Cover Mod STINiQ/010

- Cover Mod STINig/011

- Cover Mod STINiQ/006

- Cover Mod SEMNiQ/025

- Cover Mod Amendment Sheet

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Vigilant T Mk 1 - Configuration Status for AASA

Modification Modification Title Class Remarks Number

SEMNIG/019 Replacement Strobe Lights Power Supply

SEMNIG/020 Remove Fire Extinguisher SEMNIG/021 Improve Labelling of Fuel Cock SEMNIG/022 Reduction in Mass SEMNIG/023 Remove Parachute Static Line Anchor

Point SEMNIG/024 Rear 8/Head Trim Attachment SEMNIG/025 Installation of Mode 'C' Capability sao 2 a/c at RAF St

Athan SEMNIG/026 Mod to Battery Cover SEMNIG/028 Anti-Erosion Measures to LIE of U/C

Legs

Table 5; Vigilant Configuration Status for AASA

This list had been extracted from the 2(R)1. There have been 27 modifications to date. Of these, there are 1 Class A/1, 2 B/2 and 5 C/3 modifications, 6 cover modifications for SI(T) plus 2 SOO modifications and 9 were not introduced. There have been 28 SEM/SM raised to date.

The FTST TA explained that there was a regular Vigilant LTC and Faults Meeting, which the major stakeholders attended, including the Designer and copies of the minutes from these meetings from the previous 2 years were provided. Proposed modification action was discussed and approved through the usual MOD F714/715 process in accordance with JAP100A Chapter 10 and Def Stan 05-123. The FTST TA explained that a step-by-step internal governance process was currently being drafted to ensure compliance with DE&S technical and financial management requirements. This process will be similar to that introduced on Tucano, a copy of which was passed to the audit team. A list of Special Trials Fits (STF), extracted from the Topic 2(R)1, was also provided, but only one had any structural significance, STF01/01, which covered the fitment of OLM for a new design of main undercarriage.

It was explained by the MOD Tech Co-ordinator at RAF Syerston that following authority from HQAC the Modification Kit and DML would be provided by Soaring Oxford Ltd at Syerston. All modification embodiments are controlled at RAF Syerston and planned for specific aircraft and at specific times to minimise downtime, commensurate with the nature of the modification. The majority would be undertaken at Syerston, usually at Minor Star or Major. If undertaken at one of the outstations then it would be recorded in the aircraft MOD Form 700 and the Eng Records at Syerston notified and records updated accordingly. The work would be undertaken strictly in accordance with the DML and certified as satisfactory on a MOD F7078 Maintenance Work Order, including any specified independent checks. Following embodiment the work undertaken would be entered in the aircraft MOD Form 700, the ERC and on the Document Controllers electronic database. Once a modification had been embodied across the whole fleet, then the details would be deleted from the database to maintain the baseline standard for configuration control. ERC did however retain the date of embodiment. Any requirements to alert the aircrew to a specific change are listed in the DML. This has been followed up with RAF HS - see WP8.

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There have been no structural related modifications approved at Class A/1 or 8/2 level. There is a structural Class C/3 Modification 017 - Redesigned Undercarriage Mounting Bracket. This was introduced following Service experience and the FSFT demonstrated that the original undercarriage legs were susceptible to fatigue failure. In addition, an OLM exercise, (coupled with a re-appraisal of the design calculations), provided evidence that the static strength reserves were inadequate. This modification increases the mass by 3.5kg. The modification is now fleet embodied, but there are issues around traceability and life recording which is addressed in WP6

For the aircraft systems there is one Class A/1 Modification 008 - Introduction of Re-Circulating Fuel System to avoid vapour locking. Experience had shown that vapour locks have resulted in power loss during take-off and overshoot. The modification introduced a re-circulating fuel system to prevent fuel remaining in the hot engine bay for long enough to develop vapour locks. This was a major modification with significant changes to the fuel system. A Proof Installation (PI) for this modification was carried out in May 95 and the modification has now been fleet embodied. There are no other significant Modifications or SEM/SM affecting the aircraft systems.

3.16.1 Conclusions

The process for raising and approving modifications to the aircraft in the FTST TA runs on classic lines and meets the requirements of JAP100A and Def Stan 05-123. The initiative of the FTST TA to introduce an internal process to place governance to the decision makers will enhance control and accountability and is supported. From evidence seen at the RAF Syerston the embodiment of approved modifications onto the aircraft appears sound and there is nothing which would indicate any lack of control over instructions or parts, although there is an issue with the traceability and life recording once embodied -see WP6.

There is a reliance on the outstations to inform Central Records at RAF Syerston of any modification embodiment undertaken. At the only outstation visited at RAF Cosford, the Serco team had not undertaken any modification work, although they had the process in place in which to follow should that be required.

The result of modification action on Air Publications has been addressed in WP8 and appears sound. However, there have been, and will be, modifications introduced that require changes to the RTS and there is concern over how these are handled, particularly with regard to independent technical evaluation of data evidence supporting the safety case. See WP11.

3.16.2 Recommendations

• Nil.

3.17 WP 17 Propellers

The variable pitch propeller is connected via a pitch change mechanism to the drive end of the engine crankshaft. The blade assembly is of a joint construction and consists of totally compressed veneers (compreg) at the root and spruce for the rest of the blade. To increase the torsional stiffness the blade is covered with layers of fibreglass epoxy, which is then sprayed with several layers of polyurethane lacquer which insures high resistance to moisture, erosion and mechanical damage. An

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aluminium capping strip is fitted to the outer section of the blade leading edge to provide additional protection against damage.

There is a detailed examination and in-use repair paragraph contained in the Topic 1 [13] and there is also a 'First Response Water Ingress Prevention' order detailed in the local AESO. This order defines an immediate response procedure that can be carried out by VGS personnel that aims to reduce the number of propeller blade rejections caused by water ingress. This re-sealing of the protective coating is deferred as an acceptable defect until the temporary repair can be re-assessed by authorised Serco engineers.

The propeller assembly has a reconditioned life of 1600 hours and 6 years. There have been a number of propeller rejections before the assembly completes this maintenance cycle and these have been due to accidental damage caused by blade strikes and the difficulty of servicing the pitch change mechanism. All cases for propeller replacements are reported to Glider Mech 1 a and the report layout is detailed in the Topic 2(R)1. Skycraft Services Ltd are contracted to provide repair and overhaul of the propeller assembly. As previously reported in WP 10, Skycraft Services Ltd does not produce a strip report on completion of each propeller assembly overhaul.

A request for clarification was made during the last LTC and Faults Meeting, which was held on 18th Mar 09, as to what follow up maintenance action is required on the engine post a propeller strike. The Support Authority was tasked to submit a F765 (Unsatisfactory Feature Report) to the Designer to seek clarification. To date, this F765 has not been submitted. In accordance with the Designer's Operations Manual for the Grob 2500 engine [18], paragraph 8.2 states that 'in case of propeller strikes, the engine must be disassembled and the crankshaft must be checked for cracks'.

3.17.1 Conclusions

The main threat to Sl on the propeller assembly is caused by accidental and/or environmental damage. The 'First Response Water Ingress Prevention' order detailed in unit AESOs aims to reduce the number of blade rejections due to water ingress and these repairs are reassessed by Serco engineers.

Skycraft Services Ltd provide in-depth repair and reconditioning of the complete propeller assembly. However, a detailed strip report is not produced post propeller assembly overhaul and therefore, fault and trend analysis cannot be carried out on this assembly.

The request for clarification on the procedure to be followed post a propeller strike, with specific reference to serviceability checks on the engine, is to be resolved. The Designer's Operations Manual for the Grob 2500 engine paragraph a:2, states that 'in case of propeller strikes, the engine must be disassembled and the crankshaft must be checked for cracks'.

3.17.2 Recommendations

• A detailed strip report is produced by Skycraft Services Ltd post propeller assembly overhaul to aid fault and trend analysis.

• Post a propeller strike, the information contained in the Designer's Operations Manual for the Grob 2500 engine is to be actioned.

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3.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

The on-going management of Airworthiness by the FTST TA should centre on adherence to key plans with review of progress and management of emerging issues at key meetings. This section looks at the way the Support Authority undertakes this work and the following paragraphs address the major elements covered by the audit. The 2 major plans reviewed are the Structural Integrity Plan and the Safety Management Plan. Reference has been made to the FTST TA Minutes of the key Vigilant meetings, i.e. SIWG, PSWG, LTC and Faults Meeting. With regards to the stakeholders who attend these meetings, there was one notable exception and this was the Chief Engineer from Serco. Serco have recently taken over from the RAF and are contracted to carry out Forward and Depth maintenance on the fleet.

The Sl Plan was reviewed against the Generic Sl Plan, which is published on the ASI website [25], and there were a number of observations that are detailed as follows:

The header detail on the Sl Plan states that there are 62 Vigilant, where the current fleet size is 64 gliders.

Under the Establish, Sustain, Validate, Recover, Exploit (ESVRE) phase 'Meetings', the sub-task of Operational Data Recording (ODR) and Manual Data Recording Exercise (MORE) are listed. Both of these types of data recording are only applicable to helicopters and should be removed from the Vigilant Sl Plan. The previous Glider SA has retained ownership of applying for an OLM exemption. An exemption paper has been written, which will be reviewed by ASI4 and reference to this should be included in the 'Comments' column. It was also agreed during the last SIWG that the Sl Plan should be updated to include the biennial requirement to apply for continued exemption from the OLM programme; however this requirement has not been recorded. The sub-task 'Other (LTC)' has no forecast for the next LTC meeting in the calendar section of the plan.

As part of the ESVRE phase 'Fleet Info', the OSD has been correctly recorded as being 2015. Wg Cdr Logs HQAC has submitted an option paper to extend the OSD to 2020 and this reference should be recorded in the comments column. With regards to the 'Project' heading of Airframe Retirement, there is no sub-task to specify if this refers to individual aircraft or whole fleet retirement and the corresponding comment is not applicable for a single line entry.

Contained in the ESVRE phase 'Establishing', there is a sub-task to develop initial issue of the Sl Plan. This entry is no longer required. Listed on the plan is an entry for the SOIU to be reviewed every 3 years. There is a requirement at the project inception stage to formally describe and communicate the aircraft's expected usage to the designer and this is known as the SOl. As this phase is no longer applicable, this line should be removed. To assist with the important task of Structural Configuration Control, it is recommended that establishing the amount and type of build concessions and then recording these onto the fleet usage database would be beneficial. This task can be linked into developing the Structural Arisings Database which should also include modifications, repairs and any AD/ED to individual aircraft. Both of these activities are listed on the Generic Sl Plan.

Under the ESVRE phase of 'Sustaining', there is listed a requirement to review the Sl Strategy Document, although as yet this document has not been produced for this aircraft. Included in the forthcoming JAP 1 OOA-01 amendment to version 20 is a requirement to formulate an Sl Strategy Document. It is therefore advisable to

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establish an Sl strategy using the template document which can be found on the ASI website.

The metric to enable Structural Monitoring and Individual Aircraft Tracking (IAT) to be conducted on this aircraft is flying hours, which should be factored to account for differences in role/sortie severity, and landings. For both safe-life and damage­tolerant structures, IAT is necessary to manage either the retirement or examination of individual airframes, as appropriate. It is also important to note that the fatigue and usage data monitored for IAT for the Vigilant is primarily used only to address the threat to Sl posed by fatigue. Currently, the SPC are not being used to factor the flying hours consumed and therefore this fatigue consumption is not being accurately recorded. AS14, in partnership with DSTL, has developed an in-use database which will allow the accurate recording and trending of fatigue consumption information and this is due to be issued to FTST TA imminently. Therefore, the usage metric monitoring and review of the fatigue formula should be included on the Sl Plan under 'Sustaining'.

Also stated on the plan is a requirement to review the validity the SofFS annually. There have been no alterations to the number of SSI since the RCM analysis was completed in 2000 and, as they are all subject to visual inspection and form part of the Structural Examination Plan (SEP), a formal review of the validity of these SSI on a yearly basis is deemed to be excessive. Therefore, it is recommended that a formal review of the validity of the SSI is conducted triennially.

Structural configuration management is a key activity of an aircraft's Through Life Management Plan (TLMP) and included in the Generic Sl Plan under the phase of 'Sustaining' is Structural Configuration Control. This key activity of reviewing the adequacy, use and effectiveness of Structural Configuration Control databases and/or records of repair has been removed from the Vigilant Sl plan. Structural Configuration Control is a key activity to ensuring the structural integrity of an aircraft throughout the service life and an annual review of the database and/or records of repair are recommended.

Contained in the ESVRE phase of 'Validating', the requirement to review and update the SOIU is absent from the Sl Plan. As usage inevitably develops and changes over the life of the aircraft type, it is necessary to validate the assumptions in the initial SOIU by means of a programme of SOIU reviews and updates. The SOIU is to be reviewed annually by the Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA) in accordance with JSP 553 and the Structures Support Group (SSG) will coordinate the results of this review and will issue SOIU amendments as required. SSG will also undertake a triennial, quantitative review of the complete SOIU, taking into account fleet fatigue and usage data as well as AOA inputs. These requirements are to be included in the Sl Plan.

Also absent from the Sl Plan is the requirement to maintain the Static Type Record (STR) and Fatigue Type Record (FTR). As usage and fatigue evidence evolve significantly over the life of the aircraft, there is an ongoing requirement keep the STR and FTR up to date with relevant information, as and when it becomes available.

Structural sampling is applicable to all SL-NAR and also Damage Tolerant Slow Crack Growth Long - Not At Risk (DTSCGL-NAR) SofFS. Sampling of these 2 categories of structure is necessary because they are not otherwise examined during scheduled maintenance. The Sl Plan indicates that the requirement to review structural sampling is to be carried out at 9600hrs. In accordance with Def Stan 00-970 and Chap 11.1.3 of JAP 1 OOA-01, sampling activity should be

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managed so that 1 00% of NAR structure has been sampled on 20% of the fleet by the time the fleet leader reaches 80% of its original design life. Full advantage should be taken of those occasions when aircraft are sufficiently damaged to enable examination of normally difficult to access structure, or when· individual aircraft are scrapped following major damage. Although these opportunities only provide a limited sample size, and the aircraft concerned may not be representative of the fleet, value may still be obtained from opportunity sampling of these airframes.

A Teardown is defined as a progressive, detailed, controlled and destructive examination of an aircraft structure. There are 2 forms of teardown; the teardown of a FSFT specimen airframe at the conclusion of testing and the teardown of an ex­service aircraft. Teardown of a full-scale fatigue test specimen airframe is normally associated with the production and maintenance of fatigue and damage tolerance qualification evidence, and is therefore an Sl establishing and sustaining activity. Teardown of an ex-service airframe, however, is a vehicle to achieve sampling and is therefore a validating activity. Although there is no Teardown plan listed on the Sl Plan, the aircraft which was selected for the FSFT was also subject to a partial Teardown in 2004. Reference to this recent Teardown of the FSFT aircraft should be included in the comments section for information purposes.

The Safety Management Plan covers the RAF Training Aircraft and the RAF Vigilant and Viking T Mk1 form a discrete element of that plan. The Vigilant safety target for technical faults is 1 x 1 o-7 per FH, but evidence supports a current figure of 3.5 x 1 o-s per FH based upon only one aircraft having sustained Cat 4 damage, with no fatalities, or serious injury from Vigilant operations.

The FTST TA Team Leader manages airworthiness through delegation to the Project Engineer, who is responsible for the Vigilant Safety Case and chairs the Glider PSWG, generally held every 6 months. The Vigilant Safety Case is a ·claim, argument evidence' based case using Adelard Safety Case Editor (ASCE). The Vigilant Safety Case Report identifies the assumptions which underpin the safety case. The first assumption SC2.2 states that "the RTSA provides assurance that the RTS is current, consistent and coherent". The issues around WP11 would suggest that urgent action is required to make this assumption valid. Assumption A2.3.1 states that "Annual Reviews of the SOIU are completed in line with the requirements of the SOIU and JAP100A-01." A review is now complete and a re­issue of the SOIU 1s imminent. Assumption A3.2.1 states that "It is assumed that the Service design change processes assure safety." Whilst there is evidence that SEMNIG/025 was not subject to any independent assessment, despite entries in the RTS that it had, this did not in itself compromise airworthiness. However, there is concern, articulated within WP11 that questions whether the Service design change process meets JSP553. There is no Independent SA appointed to the FTST TA.

The FTST TA is subject to internal audits every quarter, with no outstanding actions, and DMSD conducted the last external airworthiness audit in 2007, and again, it is understood, there were no outstanding actions. The next audit is due in 2010.

Hazards are logged in a Cassandra database and managed through the PSWG Currently there are 39 hazards, 14 of which are at an ALARP status. There are 22 at Risk Class C, 14 at D and 3 under review. There are no Risk Class A or B hazards. It was noted that the PSWG did not have sight of those hazards outside of

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their direct control, specifically those within the operators' organisation hazard log. This issue had been on-going for some considerable time.

The ACO has purchased an additional 9 aircraft from the civilian market. These gliders have all undergone thorough acceptance checks, which have been carried out by personnel from the HQAC. Each newly acquired aircraft is subject to a Major (3000hr) servicing, which is carried out by the Designer, Grob. Before entry into RAF service, all outstanding modifications and SI(T) are incorporated and a physical inspection of the aircraft is conducted prior to acceptance. An export licence is then issued and all lifing details and repair records contained in the previous owners log book are transferred into the Section 7 of the new MOD Form 700, ERC and the repair database.

3.18.1 Conclusions

The Vigilant Sl Plan was reviewed in depth in consultation with ASI4 and with reference to the Generic Sl Plan, which has been produced and developed by MAEI 1, ASI, DE&S, RAF Wyton. It is evident that the Vigilant Sl Plan requires updating and populating with detailed information to ensure it remains a useful document.

The management of safety is at the appropriate level and the means exist through planning and management review within the FTST TA to ensure that safety issues are given the correct level of attention and direction to resolve the problems. The Glider PSWG provides the focus for this, but it requires more rigorous attention to Item 4 of the PSWG agenda to ensure that a regular review of the safety case is undertaken. There is a perception that the PSWG is perhaps devoting a disproportionate amount of time on reviewing progress of Air Occurrence Reports, important as they are. The Vigilant Safety Case is based upon certain assumptions. FTST TA needs to review these assumptions against the output from this AASA to ensure that the Safety Case is still valid.

PSWG does not appear to have sight of those hazards outside of their direct control, despite this being a long running issue at this forum. This undermines the safe operation of the aircraft and needs to be resolved.

Up to 9 aircraft have been purchased off the civilian market to supplement the existing fleet. The process followed to introduce these previously civilian registered aircraft into RAF service has been thorough and has ensured that the necessary modifications have been embodied and that component history is known and recorded,

As a key stakeholder within the Glider community, it would be advisable to invite the Serco Chief Engineer to the SIWG and LTC & Faults meetings.

3.18.2 Recommendations

• Sl Plan to be updated.

• FTST TA to review the Vigilant Safety Case assumptions against the output from this AASA to ensure that the Safety Case is still valid.

• Serco Chief Engineer to attend SIWG and LTC meetings as a key stakeholder.

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3.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

The purpose of the Design Substantiation Review (DSR) is to ascertain whether the original qualification is still valid and was sufficient to ensure the continued safe operation of the aircraft. Assumptions made when the aircraft was brought into service may have been effected by changes in usage, components, maintenance techniques or loss of corporate knowledge due to changes in the project team. The effects of aging have also been considered, as gradual material degradation over time is potentially difficult to predict and note during a regular maintenance regime.

History of Vigilant qualification

Aging can undermine the original qualification if subtle changes in usage or maintenance regimes differ from the original assumptions/estimates. It is therefore important to assess the methods of aircraft lifing and maintenance originally used current usage. The history of the Vigilant fatigue qualification is detailed in Table 6.

Date Substantiation Notes/Outcome exercise

Design Bringing a new The initial qualification was based against civilian Concept civilian aircraft to requirements, from the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA),

market. Germany's National Aviation Authority (NAA). The aircraft design was based on a previous incarnation of the current Certification Specifications for Sailplanes and Powered Sailplanes (CS-22). The Vigilant was certificated against the 1982 standard of CS-22 [26].

1990 Original The initial life of the airframe was 9000 flying hours (FH) as purchase of determined by Grob. This could be increased to 12000FH aircraft and through the use of an increased maintenance/inspection introduction into regime. The basis for this aircraft life was considered by the service with the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE - a former incarnation of RAF. QinetiQ) as inadequate since it did not represent the more

intensive RAF usage, only involved testing of a limited part of the composite structure and did not feature any testing of metal components considered more susceptible to fatigue.

Because of this, the ORA recommended a 1/3 factor, so a life of 3000 FH was adopted. This was based on Defence Standard 00-970, which recommends such a life adjustment when limited features have been tested.

1992- OLM carried out 3000 FH would not allow the aircraft to reach the Out of 1993 to enable a Service Date. In order to provide a more appropriate

FSFT based on airframe life, an OLM exercise was carried out so that the RAF usage. operational environment could be fully understood. This

collected data from a representative spread of sorties from a range of locations around the UK.

The OLM identified that the wing spigots had a predicted life (6550 FH) well under that of the Grob figure of 9000FH and that operations on grass strips were significantly more damaging than sealed surfaces [27].

The OLM was used to develop a loads spectrum on which the FSFT was based.

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Date Substantiation exercise

1996- FSFT carried out 2003 by Grob.

2000 Evaluation of SPC mix

2001- Undercarriage 2002 redesign and

subsequent mini OLM.

2002 Residual Strength Test (RST) following FSFT.

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Notes/Outcome

The FSFT was originally designed to provide a life of 10,000 FH. With a life factor of 5 applied (appropriate for unmonitored structure) the target was therefore 50,000 test hours.

The FSFT was conducted in two halves. The first half of the test allowed an increase from 3000 to 4500FH (90% of the 5000 test hours achieved as no RST had been carried out). An RST is required to show the FSFT had not caused undetected damage and the structure had retained its static strength.

The second half of the test was longer as the opportunity to extend the life to 12,000 FH was taken. This was achieved, with a total duration of over 61000 test hours. Without an RST the 90% restriction was still applicable, so the following the FSFT a life of 11,000 FH was applied. Following a review of the SOIU issue 3 (dated April 1999) it was highlighted to the IPT that the SPC mix had changed since that identified for the OLM and used for the FSFT. The new mix would accrue more damage so a factor on flight hours of 1.1 was introduced to reflect this [28].

The SPC mix of the previous SOIU (issue 2) was also found to be marginally more damaging than the original OLM mix so a smaller factor of 1.02 was applied retrospectively to flight hours from that period. Multiple failures of the undercarriage leg occurred in service and during the FSFT. The main leg and mounting brackets were redesigned and qualified via testing, analysis and a mini-OLM exercise to ascertain the stress levels.

The revised leg had much improved strength, so much so that it was not considered susceptible to fatigue within the life of the aircraft, so wasn't included for the remainder of the FSFT [29]. The analysis also showed that the undercarriage would not suffer failure during the required 50,000 landings (4 landings per hour for the entire 12,000 FH airframe life). The undercarriage life is based on landings rather than flight hours, as this represents the primary static loading condition (the undercarriage legs see minimal load when in flight). The RST was carried out after the FSFT on the test aircraft to identify the remaining strength in the airframe.

The wing centre section failed before reaching the required load, necessitating a teardown investigation (carried out by QinetiQ) to understand the cause of the failure.

Another failure occurred in the engine mounting frame at only 70% of the design limit load [30].

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Date Substantiation exercise

2004 Tear down of FSFT aircraft.

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Notes/Outcome

A teardown investigation [31] was carried out looking into the damage found after the RST and FSFT. The parts examined were the forward and centre fuselage, engine mounting frame, wing roots, spar extensions and spigot fittings.

The successful completion of the teardown and associated investigation found fault with the RST test procedure and not the structure. The full12,000 FH life was therefore adopted [32].

The engine mounting frame failure was found to originate from the FSFT and was not exclusively down to static failure in the RST. A recommendation was made to record the life of the engine frame in more detail given it was not a fail safe design.

Table 6; History of Vigilant fatigue qualification

How the original qualification process may be affected by aging components

The Vigilant falls within the remit of CS-22, as the aircraft fulfils the definition of a motor glider as defined in this document; the characteristics are overall weight, the ratio of weight to the square of the wingspan and maximum number of occupants. Vigilant was not originally qualified against CS-22 as at the time it did not provide for motor-gliders. However, the Designer have stated that CS-22 is appropriate for comparison.

CS-22 defines in depth all aspects of aircraft design. Table 7 features those sections which may be susceptible to change as the aircraft ages.

Para. Subject Relevance 22.23 Load Has extra equipment been

distribution added? Have pilots and limits their carry on kit increased

in weight or has their placement altered? Have any changes been reflected in the SOIU?

22.29 Empty Is this still the same? Has weight the CES increased?

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Conclusion Notes from the SIWG held during May 2002 showed that crew weight has increased over the years, so that the maximum fuel load has to be limited to 70 litres.

Grob was asked at a previous SIWG to raise the AUM to allow for a full load of fuel but no further correspondence from Grob was found. This maximum weight of fuel is not reflected in the current (draft) SOIU issue 4 which allows a fuel load of 72kg to be carried. This equates to a volume of approximately 98 litres. There is, therefore, a risk that the aircraft can run overweight. Modification has increased the empty weight (WP16). Increased weight has been qualified via fliQht trials.

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Para. Subject 22.51 Manoeuvre onwards limitations

22.301 Strength of onwards component

22.483 One wheel landing condition

22.613 Material strength properties

22.627 Fatigue

22.1505 Air speed limitation

22.1917 Propeller material

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Relevance Do the original qualification limitations apply to the current RTS and SOIU? Is the initial qualification still satisfied by evidence contained within the STR? Would it be affected by any airworthiness issues discovered since, such as gel coat cracking?

When the undercarriage was redesigned, was this situation considered?

Does the work done investigating shear allowables affect this?

Fatigue damage of metal components were found during the FSFT. What are the implications? Has this changed at all? Also 1583, information for pilots.

Has this been affected at all over time?

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Conclusion The first CA release limited the aircraft to +3.5g and -O.Og. These conditions have been maintained throughout the life of the Vigilant. The initial qualification was not accepted at face value, but was largely justified after comprehensive OLM and FSFT exercises were carried out.

AAA work carried out on the Viking airframe shows that Grab had considered ageing when calculating their material strengths. However, there is some discrepancy over some of the design values used. The revised undercarriage fatigue loading was based on OLM loads -was this also the case for static? If the landings recorded on the OLM were good, one wheel landings may not have occurred. Regardless of this, one wheel landing was considered in the design case. There is a question over the fundamental design allowables of the composite used for the Vigilant. Agreement has not been reached on what a suitable value for shear allowable is. This matter needs resolving as restricting performance of the Vigilant is not viable. A suitable substantiation process has been followed for failed parts. Parts have been redesigned where required.

The same speed restrictions are in place as those specified in the original CA release. This is also the case for weather conditions, landing, take-off and manoeuvre speeds. Discussions between Hoffman (propeller supplier) and Grab have not been completely fluid in the past. Comments have been raised on lack of communication between the two and the end user when it came to providing lifing information and guidance about leading edge protection. However, QinetiQ did discuss propeller loads and life with Hoffman and it was deemed as suitable in the June 2002 SIWG.

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Para. Subject 22.1947 Propeller

tests

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Relevance These are required on all replacement parts for the prop, or those required during any teardown carried out.

Conclusion The propeller assembly is reconditioned every 1600FH/6 years. The teardown inspection carried out after the RST/FSFT did not include the propeller.

Table 7; Ageing effects relevant to civilian design regulations

Type Record Analysis

The STR and FTR contain substantiation information related to the static and fatigue clearance of the aircraft. It is a JAP1 OOA-01 requirement that a STR is maintained and an FTR if appropriate.

Grob were approached by QinetiQ in mid May 2009 [33] and questions were asked about their design records. The purpose of the request was to show that Vigilant design records conformed to JAP 1 OOA-01 in terms of content and the way they were/are updated, it was assumed that Grab were maintaining an STR and FTR. This followed the March 2009 SIWG, where Grab verbally confirmed they held these records.

Grob declined to provide any information or confirm what records were kept, on the basis that they were not contracted to provide such information to this audit. Grab reiterated that they are a Part 21J registered company (an aerospace quality standard moderated by EASA) but suggested that extracting design records would be a lengthy process.

The contractual agreements between Grob and the FTST TA now and in the past are not known. Therefore, it is not clear whether Grab were ever tasked to produce an FTR or STR, or how comparable any design records held by Grab are to these two documents. It is recommended that a method of obtaining this information (agreeable to all parties) is derived.

Life factor

Each SPC flown consumes a different amount of fatigue life. The rate of consumption for each was calculated after the OLM exercise. This data was used to design the FSFT so that it would be representative of in-service loads. The life calculated as a result of the FSFT is therefore based around a specific split between SPCs.

As long as that percentage split between SPCs remains consistent, fatigue damage would be accrued at the same rate as it was during the FSFT where, in the case of Vigilant, one flight hour represented one hour of accrued fatigue damage.

However, the percentage split between SPCs flown by Vigilant was found to vary, with every SOIU review. The amount of time spent in SPC1 increased, and given that this is the most damaging sortie, damage was being accrued at a faster rate than suggested by the total flying hours. A factor was therefore applied to flight hours to compensate for this and provide an accurate indication of how much fatigue life had been consumed by each airframe.

The Training Aircraft IPT (now renamed FTST TA) applied a life factor, based on analysis performed by QinetiQ, in June 2002 (ES(Air)(WYT)/TRA/5/18/3/4/1 ). This practice has stopped in recent times meaning the total fatigue life consumed is not accurately known. Given the amount of life remaining, even on the fleet leader, this

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is not currently an immediate problem (since the maintenance regime is not based on factored hours) but the factor should be reintroduced.

The factor should be reassessed at every SOIU update. Issue 4 has now been released, which again had changes to the SPC mix. The impact of this further change to the life factor should be investigated. Appropriate factors should be applied retrospectively as necessary as it is likely that the actual consumed life of each Vigilant is higher than currently assumed. If the factor is found to differ significantly, a further OLM exercise may be required.

Aging as part of the original design

The Vigilant uses similar materials and construction techniques to the Viking glider. The Viking had an AASA carried out in 2000. As part of the audit, the DA, Slingsby Advance Composites (SAC, then called Slingsby Aviation Limited) carried out an investigation into the potential degradation of the resin system used in the construction of the glider.

A number of tests were carried out to ensure Grab's original design took into account the effects of aging, such as moisture absorption and degradation due to hot temperatures. As the construction and materials of the Vigilant are similar, the report findings can be read across for the majority of the structure. The investigation carried out by SAC concluded that the strength of the Viking should not be compromised as the aircraft ages and most detrimental affects were taken into account by Grab's calculations. The exception was the design allowable for shear forces [34].

Design allowables are used to define the strength of a material under various conditions. They are defined for all conditions which the material might experience, and then applied by the designer in a manner appropriate to the intended use of the final design. The figure provided by Grab for the shear allowable was significantly higher than that suggested by SAC (i.e. Grab's figures showed the material to be more resistant to shear).

An independent analysis was carried out, which agreed with the figures produced by SAC. The disagreement was never fully resolved; the potential airworthiness risk was managed by restricting the manoeuvring and dive recovery clearance of the Viking.

This is a Topic that requires further discussion with Grab and the MOD. There is no scope for reducing the clearances of the Vigilant; therefore such a practice would not ·be possible. Until this matter is resolved, the strength of the material used for the bulk of the fuselage, wing and tailplane spar webs is unknown.

3.19.1 Conclusions

Owing to shortcomings identified by RAE in the life of Vigilant suggested by Grab when it was initially procured, the aircraft went through a complete substantiation program with constant interaction between the DA, IPT and the RAE/DRA/QinetiQ. The role of the aircraft has changed little and any design changes (such as undercarriage legs) have been appropriately validated throughout the aircraft's service life by all parties.

There are questions surrounding how Grab maintain design records, and what records exist. Grab is a Part 21 registered company but how analogous records kept by Grab are to JAP100A-01 requirements for the STRand FTR is not clear. It is not known what design records exist. Therefore, the AASA cannot be considered

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complete until the status of these records are known. The Designer is currently working with FTST TA to identify these records.

This WP has not found any major airworthiness issues or shortcomings in the design process to-date. However, there is a factor on flight hours that should be applied (as it has been in the past) so that remaining airframe life can be accurately quantified. Currently, the consumed life of the Vigilant is not being recorded correctly.

The fundamental material properties of the aircraft are not fully understood. All the stress calculations originally performed were based on a number of design allowables, some of which may not be justified. If, through further study, the shear allowable is changed this may require a review of any original stressing calculations where shear strength is a factor. Until this matter is resolved the airframe strength is not known.

3.19.2 Recommendations

• The status of the STRand FTR should be confirmed. If civil equivalents are being maintained in lieu of type records, they should be reviewed to ensure that all the information required by JAP 1 OOA-01 is present and appropriately maintained.

• Since the percentage split between SPCs continues to change with each SOIU issue, it is recommended to restart the practice of factoring hours so that the effect on aircraft life can be understood and apply a suitable factor retrospectively. It should be FTST TA policy to review the factor if the SPC mix should change in the future. Significant change may affect any aspiration for an OLM exemption.

• Further work should be carried out to define correctly the design allowables. Currently fundamental strength properties of the materials are unknown. QinetiQ issued a report [35] on the Viking with a series or recommendations for further work which requires collaboration with Grob. Thus report is equally valid for Vigilant and should be acted upon as soon as is practicable.

3.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training

Wg Cdr Logs of the Air Cadet Organisation, who retains QR 640 for the Vigilant glider fleet, has delegated Level K authority to the Serco Chief Engineer. Serco have developed an 8 week induction package that all personnel employed in the maintenance of the Vigilant undergo before they are authorised to sign for work. There was also a period during the handover where RAF and Serco engineers worked together to ensure corporate knowledge of the aircraft was retained. Personnel employed in the 5 Regional Maintenance Teams represent the Forward Support and are authorised and resourced to conduct scheduled maintenance up to and including Minors. They also carry out any fault rectification and minor repairs. The Depth Support is based at RAF Syerston and comprises of a maintenance team who conduct both Minor Star and Major servicing. The personnel who work at Depth are experienced Vigilant engineers who have a vast amount of experience on type. The personnel employed in the GRP Bay are all qualified and experienced GRP and CFC repair specialists who have a wealth of knowledge working on both the Vigilant and Viking glider fleet.

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The Serco Chief Engineer also authorises selected VGS Technical Officers who are then authorised to conduct Flight Servicing Competency Checks (FSCC) on personnel within their own squadron. Nominated VGS ground engineers are also authorised to undertake specified aircraft maintenance tasks, which is normally the 7 day grouped maintenance task.

Due to the geographical dispersion of the VGS and the fact that most of the flying takes place over the weekend, technical cover is normally limited to the Duty Engineer based at RAF Syerston. Therefore, any faults that arise during the weekend flying period, which can not be dealt with by the VGS personnel, contact is made with the Duty Engineer for technical assistance. The Duty Engineer, in consultation with either the VGS OC or Technical Officer, can authorise the fault as an acceptable limitation (F703) or acceptable deferred defect (F704) entry as appropriate. Once the paperwork has been completed, copies are then faxed immediately to Syerston.

3.20.1 Conclusions

All personnel employed in the maintenance of the Vigilant, both Forward and Depth Support, have been trained and are authorised to carry out the various scheduled maintenance and repair activities. Although Serco have only recently taken on the contract to provide maintenance support, there is a large amount of corporate knowledge within the various teams.

The authorisation and training of Serco and VGS personnel to conduct maintenance activities on the Vigilant fleet is a well documented and implemented process that ensures all personnel are deemed competent by the Level K Chief Engineer.

3.20.2 Recommendations

• Nil.

3.21 Age Related Threats to Structural Integrity versus AASA Work Package Matrix

The entries in Table 8, detail an ESVRE (Establish, Sustain, Validate, Recover, Exploit) compliance matrix showing the potential impact of ageing on the four main JAP100A-01 [1] Sl threat headings, namely:

• Overload

• Fatigue

• Accidentai//Environmental Damage

• Maintenance/Supply Error

The findings of the AASA audit, for each WP, are listed against each threat in Table 9.

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174 QinetiQ Proprietary

UNCLASSIFIED

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Work Package Overload

1 • Work Recording and Asset Management (WRAM) Not applicable

2- Topic 5A 1 Master Incorrect source data leads to Maintenances Schedule damage exceedance for SSis, resuHs Sed ion in loss of residual strength

3- Maintenance arising and Statistical Analysis of Defects Not applicable

4- Topic 1 Aircraft Incorrect assembly/installation leads Maintenance Manuals to failure at less than design ultimate

load and permanent deformation at less than proof load (this indudes functionality)

5 - Component Incorrect source data leads to life Replacement List ICRL) exceedance, leads to loss of residual

strength

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174

UNCLASSIFIED QiR&tiQ l?roprjetary

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Potential Impact on Ageing Threats

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

Information entered incorrectly into database leads to life being exceeded

Not applicable

Incorrect source data leads to life Incorrect source data leads to exceedance and fatigue failure corrosion or mechanical damage

going undetected, can accelerate Inappropriate inspection periods for fatigue damage SSis leads to fatigue failure

Lack of defect or maintenance Lack of defect or maintenance analysis fails to recognise unexpected analysis fails to recognise increasing fatigue damage corrosion arisings trend

lncorrecUassembly/installation or Incorrect sealing/protection leads to adjustment leads to increased fatigue corrosion and/or erosion damage loading, fretting and wear damage

Incorrect source data leads to life Incorrect calendar life results in exceedance and fatigue failure corrosion and/or other environmental

damage

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Maintenance/Supply Error

Operator error when inputting basic data onto database

Operator error when inputting maintenance information

Operator error when inputting basic data onto data base

Operator error when inputting maintenance information

Incorrect assessment of defects and trend analysis

Defect and trend analysis not carried out

Risk of maintenance errors if publications not maintained. MOD Form 765 process effectiveness.

Operator error at inputting basic data onto data base along with operator error on inputting maintenance information

Poor control of procurement of spares

Incorrect aoolication of life extensions

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Work Package Overload

6 - Use and maintenance of Incorrect or inadequately maintained Log Gards data leads to life exceedance, leads

to loss of residual strength

7- Aircraft Repairs Topic 6 Incorrect information leads to (Aircraft Repair Manual) poor/inadequate repairs

Interaction with adjacent repairs weakens structure

8 - Flight Reference Cards Incorrect source data leads to flight {FRCs] and Aircrew Manual envelope exceedance Topic 14/15s

Amendment status out of sync with MARIRTS re. limitations

Aircraft configuration incorrectly represented leads to load exceedance

9 - Statement of Operating ln1ent and Usage [SOIU] Topic 155

Not applicable

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174

UNCLASSIFIED QiAetiQ PfeJ'rietel')

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Potential impact on Ageing Threats

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

Incorrect or inadequately maintained Incorrect or inadequately maintained data leads to life exceedance and data leads to calendar backstop being fatigue failure exceeded, leads to corrosion

Incorrect information leads to Incorrect information leads to poor/inadequate repairs poor/inadequate repairs

Interaction with adjacent repairs Interaction with other adjacent repairs creates stress concentrations and/or creates moisture traps and/or higher local loading galvanic cells

Incorrect source data leads to Incorrect source data leads to increased stresses or high vibration operation in unsuitable environments

Amendment status out of sync with Amendment status out of sync with MAR!RTS re. limitations MARIRTS re. limitations

Aircraft configuration incorrectly Aircraft configuration incorrectly represented, leads to represented, leads to water buffeVfluHer/dynamic resonance ingress/erosion/contamination

Anomalous usage data leads to Anomalous source data does not incorrect fatigue lives indicate time spent in

Amendment state does not represent hostile/damaging environments, leads to increase:d risk of undetected

the MARIRTS cleared roles corrosion fatigue or stress corrosion

Aircraft configuration incorrectly represented, leads to incorrect load assumptions

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UNCLASSIFIED

Maintenance/Supply Error

Operator error at inputting basic data onto data base along with operator error on inputting maintenance information

Incorrect application of life extensions

Incorrect repair information/slow response

Poor repair process

Repair prevents or impedes adequate inspection or routine servicing

Interaction with other repairs in surrounding area

MOD Form 765 effectiveness

No1 applicable

Not applicable

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Work Package Overload

1 0 - Logistic Support Incorrect usage information, leads to loss of residual strength

Counterfeit or bogus part not to spec. or subject to improper repair

11 - Military Aircraft Release Incorrect source data leads to mass [MAR] and Release to or envelope exceedance Service [RTS]

Amendment status out of sync. With AM, FRCs and ODM re. load configurations

Aircraft configuration incorrectly represented leads to loading exceedance

12 - Defect Arising Analysis Lack of defect analysis fails to identify and MOD Form 760 Fault age or manufacturing related faults, investigation leads to reduction in or loss of

residual strength

13 - Air Incidents Aircrew actions leading to (Occurrence reporting) overload/overstress goes unreported

Incorrect source data fails to identify engineering information _correctly

Aircraft configuration not communicated to engineers, overstress not identified

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174

UNCLASSIFIED Qi"etiQ Proprietary

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Potential Impact on Ageing Threats

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

Incorrect usage information, leads to Counterfeit or bogus parts made from exceedance of fatigue life poor quality materials r improperly

Counterfeit or bogus parts have processed/protected, leads to accelerated corrosion or

reduction in fatigue strength or environmental degradation manufacturing defects

Incorrect source data leads to loading Incorrect source data leads to anomaly (increased rate of fatigue operation in unsuitable environments damage)

Amendment status out of sync. With Amendment status out of sync. With AM/FRCs re. limitations AM and ODM re. CG and envelope

Aircraft configuration incorrectly limits; and deared roles/envelope extensions not adequately recorded. represented, leads to water

ingress/erosion/contamination Aircraft configuration incorrectly represented leads to loading anomaly

Lack of defect analysis fails to identify Lack of defect analysis fails to identify age or manufacturing related faults, age related degradation, leading to leading to stress concentrations and loss or damage to protective coatings fatigue failures

Aircrew actions leading to high fatigue Aircrew actions leading to damage or loads goes unreported water ingress goes unreported

Incorrect source data fails to identify Incorrect source data fails to identify engineering information correctly engineering information correctly

Aircraft configuration not Aircraft configuration not communicated to engineers, fatigue communicated to engineers, impact not identified possibility of environmental

degradation not identified

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Maintenance/Supply Error

Poor control of procurement process leads to supply of unapproved parts

Not applicable

Lack of effectiveness of MOO Form 760 process fails to prevent defective parts from being procured or installed

Poor use of Mandatory Fault Reporting process fails to identify faults on flight safety critical items

_k.g. VITAL parts)

Incorrectly identified faults/occurrences leads to maintenance supply error or supply/installation of defective components

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Work Package Overload

14 - Concession recording Incorrect source data leads to non-confonning components being fitted with no limitations applied

Aircraft configuration not compatible with approved concession, leads to increased loading

15. Special Instructions Incorrect source data leads to defects (Technical) (Sis, STis, UTis, or incorrect installations remaining RTis) undiscovered or not inspected

Aircraft configuration incompatible with inspection instructions

16- Modification Process Incorrect source data leads to aircraft configuration being incorrect for role, results in over1oadloverstress

17 - Propeller Incorrect source data leads to life exceedance, leads to loss of residual strength

18 - On-going Airworthiness Lack of management procedures Management leads to policy requirements not being

met

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174

UNCLASSIFIED Qi"etie Pre~rietaP;·

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Potential Impact on Ageing Threats

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

Incorrect source data leads to life Incorrect source data leads to limited components being fitted inadequately protected components without restrictions being fitted with no maintenance

Aircraft configuration not compatible penalties applied

with approved concession, leads to Aircraft configuration not compatible inaeased vibratory loads leads to chaffing or galvanic corrosion

Incorrect source data leads to defects Incorrect source data leads to defects or incorrect installations remaining or incorrect installations remaining undiscovered or not inspected undiscovered or not inspected

Aircraft configuration incompatible Inspection/repair guidance with inspection instructions inadequate, leads to chaffing or

environmentaUgalvanic corrosion

Incorrect source data leads to aircraft Incorrect source data leads to airaaft configuration being incorrect for role, configuration being incorrect for role , results in high vibration or fatigue results in water ingress, erosion or loads mechanical damage

Incorrect source data leads to life Incorrect calendar life results in exceedance and fatigue failure corrosion and/or other environmental

damage

Lack of management procedures Lack of management procedures leads to policy requirements not being leads to policy requirements not being met. met

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UNCLASSIFIED

Maintenance/Supply Error

Incorrect source data leads to maintenance errors or procurement of ill fitting components/parts

Aircraft conftguration not compatible with inadequate parts procured

Incorrect source data allows incorrect parts to remain in the spares inventory

Airaaft configuration not modified to reflect SI(T) introduced changes, leads to incorrect spares being procured

Incorrect source data leads to aircraft conftguration being incompatible with the maintenance manuals

Spares procurement out of sync with in-service configuration resulting in IQgistic support problems

Operator error at inputting basic data onto data base along with operator error on inputting maintenance information

Poor control of procurement of spares

Incorrect application of life extensions

Lack of management procedures leads to policy requirements not being met

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Work Package Overload

19 - Design Substantiation The extent of conditions which would Review cause a static overload would not be

understood or fully defined if the design process is not complete.

20 - Authorisation and Incorrect authorisation of F703 & Training F704 entries where the deared

strength may be exceeded.

Table 8; Potentia/Impact on Ageing Threats

Work Package Overload

1 - WorX Recording and Asset Management (WRAM) No significant findings

2 -Topic SA 1 Master Maintenances Schedule Section

No significant findings

QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0901174

UNCLASSIFIED QiRetiQ Pre~rietaF)'

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Potential Impact on Ageing Threats

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

The extent of conditions which would The tolerance of the aircraft structure cause a fatigue failure would not be to damage may not be understood or understood or fully defined if the fully defined if the design process is design process is not complete. not complete.

Incorrect authorisation of F703 & Incorrect maintenance practices lead F704 entries where the maximum to accidental damage of structure, stress allowed may be exceeded which removes surface protection and leading to a fatigue failure. leads to corrosion.

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Threat

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental DamaQe

The LIS (Tree of Knowledge) is to confonn to policy in JAP to ensure data is accurate and controlled, No significant findings preventing any life exceedance.

RCM analysis concluded that main spar was difficult to inspect. During next Major, confirmation is required to

No significant findings ensure whole of main spar can be examined. If not, this SSI may be sub"ect to structural samplina.

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Maintenance/Supply Error

IMthout a fully substantiated design process, maintenance and inspection techniques may not provide the required level of airworthiness. It needs to be demonstrated that parts are designed and constructed to suit the soecific environment.

Incorrect maintenance practices lead to damaged structures, systems and propulsion units.

Maintenance/Supply Error

MOD F701 (Vigilant) Leading Particulars is out of date: therefore correct composite deaning compound is not detailed.

Locally produced SSI examination guide to be linked to SA 1 amendment or preferred option to be combined into a Topic SV.

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Work Package Overload

3 • Maintenance arising and Statistical Analysis of Defects No significant findings

4 -Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

No significant findings

5 - Component Replacement List (CRL] No significant findings

6- Use and maintenance of Log Cards

No significant findings

7 - Aircraft Repairs Topic 6 Hairline cracks in the underwing gel (Aircraft Repair Manual) coat should be mapped to enable

sudden crack propagation to be identified.

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UNCLASSIFIED OiR&+iO Proprietary

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Threat

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Dama~e

Due to the lack of defect or maintenance analysis, effects of ageing and subsequent fatigue No significant findings

problems will be difficult to identify.

No significant findings No significant findings

No significant findings No significant findings

Incorrect lifing of the main Time taken to implement undercarriage legs could lead to RTINigilani/007A (Improvement to fatigue damage. Surface Finish of the undercarriage

legs) could lead to further corrosion damage on leading edge.

Hairline cracks in the undei"Wng gel coat should be mapped to enable sudden crack propagation to be identified. No significant findings

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Maintenance/Supply Error

Defect and trend analysis not conducted due to move to Linton and lack of detailed technical information.

SPS and Company Order Book to be amended to reflect maintenance organisation changes.

Quantity of APs available to maintenance personnel needs to be increased.

Engine reliability continues to be an issue with a substantial number of air incidents reported.

Isolated occurrence of a lifed component being replaced and lifed incorrectly.

Comprehensive repair database to be identified in Topic 2(R)1 and fonn part of the FTST TA configuration control database.

Fonnalise repair request procedure to ensure dosed loop confinnation.

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Work Package Overload

8 - Flight Reference Cards Lack of available infonnation (Weight [FRCs] and Aircrew Manual Chart) in the cockpit leads to AUM Topic 14/15s exceedance.

Incorrect definition in publications of max pilot mass could increase risk of AUM exceedance

Lack of available advice on approach to landing in cross wind conditions leads to potential overload situation.

9 - Statement of Operating Intent and Usage ISOIU]

No significant findings Topic 15S

10- Logistic Support

No significant findings

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Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Threat

Fatigue AccidentaUEnvironmental

Damage

Uncertainty as to whether actual Lack of available advice on approach aircraft AUM remains within limits to landing in cross wind conditions leads to incorrect life assumptions leads to potential overload situation.

Summarising several flights as ·one flight' in the Flying Running Log is an

No significant findings abuse of the process for accurate recording and leads to incorrect fatigue life assumptions.

No significant findings No significant findings

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Maintenance/Supply Error

No significant findings

No significant findings

A strip report detailing reasons for parts that are replaced to be requested from Skycraft Services Ltd for each propeller assembly overhaul.

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Work Package Overload

11 - Military Aircraft Release Incorrect statements in RTS leads to

[MAR] and Release to potential mass exceedance:

Service[RTS] RTS Issue 6 Part 0.2.1 Payload definition is in error. 11 Okg max pilot mass should indude clothing, parachutes and ballast.

RTS Part 8.4.1.1 Risk of AUM exceedance if fuel tanks filled to capacity - Note should be Warning

Risk of AUM exceedance due to mass growth since delivery enaoaches into margin between AUM 9081<g and Never Exceed of 920kg

Lack of independent technical evaluation of data evidence could lead to overload situation.

12 - Defect Arising Analysis Lack of defect analysis fails to identify and MOD Form 760 Fault age or manufacturing related fautts, investigation leads to reduction in or loss of

residual strength

13 - Air Incidents Lack of incident reporting fails to (Occurrence reporting) identify faults, leads to reduction in or

loss of residual strength

14 - Concession recording No significant findings

15 - Special Instructions (Technical) (Sis, STis, UTis,

No significant findings RTis)

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Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Threat

Fatigue AccidentaVEnvironmental

Damage

Inaccurate statements in RTS lead to Lack of independent technical overload exceedance and increase in evaluation of data evidence to fatigue damage. underpin RTS could lead to aircraft

Lack of independent technical not being fit for purpose.

evaluation of data evidence could lead to fatigue damage.

Lack of defect analysis fails to identify lack of defect analysis fails to identify age or manufacturing related faults, age related degradation, leading to leading to stress concentrations and loss or damage to protective coatings fatigue failures

Lack of incident reporting fails to Lack of incident reporting fails to identify faults, leading to stress identify degradation, leading to loss concentrations and fatigue failures or damage to protective coatings

Lack of concession recording fails to identify faults, leading to stress No significant findings concentrations and fatigue failures

Time required to implement

No significant findings RTINigilanV007 A may lead to increase number of main undercarriage leg rejections due to corrosion.

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Maintenance/Supply Error

No significant findings

Engine fault reporting to be carried out to identify corrective action -further maintenance or replacement engine.

No significant findings

Lack of concession recording fails to identify .changes to maintenance regimes, leading to possible failures

No significant findings

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Work Package Overload

16 - Modification Process Lack of independent technical evaluation of data evidence could lead to overload situation.

17 - Propeller

No significant findings

18- On-going Airworthiness Management

No significant findings

19- Design Substantiation The fundamental airframe material Review strength is not fully substantiated.

20 - Authorisation and No significant findings Trainina

UNCLASSIFIED QiFtetiQ Pre"rietar:y

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Threat

Fatigue Accidental/Environmental

Damage

Lack of independent technical Lack of independent technical evaluation of data evidence could evaluation of data evidence could lead to fatigue damage. lead to aircraft being not fit for

purpose.

The main threat on the propeller assembly is caused by accidental and/or enviconmental damage. The 'First Response Water Ingress

No significant findings Prevention' order detailed in unit AESOs aims to reduce the number of blade rejections due to water ingress and these repairs are reassessed by Serco enaineers.

Lack of Independent advice leads to Safety Case assumptions not being

No significant findings valid. Upkeep of the 51 plan is required to manage fatigue threat effectively.

The fatigue life of the Vigilant is not being correctly calculated.

No significant findings

No significant findings No significant findings

Table 9; Audit Results Showing an Impact on Ageing Threats

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Maintenance/Supply Error

No significant findings

Procedure to be followed post a propeller strike, with specific reference to serviceability checks on the engine, to be clarified and introduced into Topic 1 chap 12 Hazardous Incidents.

Lack of Independent advice leads to Safety case assumptions not being valid. Upkeep of the 51 plan is key to the through life management plan of the aircraft.

It is not kn01M'1 what design and type records exist for the Vigilant and how they are maintained by the Design Authority.

No significant findings

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4 Conclusions

UNCLASSIFIED QifletiQ ProJ3Fietary

The following are a summary of the conclusions which, for ease of reference, are also included in the audit findings section.

4.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

The aircraft MOD Form 700 documentation is structured in accordance with MOD F799/1 (SLG), which is the controlled by the FTST TA. All 7 of the sample aircraft MOD Form 700 in-use log packs were checked and found to be correct, with the exception that an old version of the Leading Particulars F701 (Vigilant) was found in each of these log packs. Although limited in number, the entries placed in the Limitations Log (MOD Form 703) and the Acceptable Deferred Faults Log (MOD Form 704) were correctly classified, authorised and deferred for a reasonable period. The details from the Master Maintenance Schedule (Topic SA 1) have also been accurately transferred into the MOD Form 700.

It is evident that the 'Tree of Knowledge' is being utilised to manage, plan and co­ordinate logistic operations, which have airworthiness implications across the fleet. Unlike other types of LIS which are used within the MAE and can be accessed by platform support teams, this system is bespoke and can only be viewed by personnel who have access to the Syerston server.

The Technical Information (TI) reference and amendment state are quoted to ensure that the maintenance documentation is explicit and that the work being carried out is completed to the latest version of Tl.

4.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule (MMS)

RCM analysis was applied to this aircraft during the period 1998-2000. All PM2 worksheets applicable to SSI have been reviewed during_ this audit and each of these worksheets were sanctioned by the then incumbent Glider EA & SA. There has been no formal review conducted on the Topic SA 1 since 2000. SSis have been identified by the Designer and these have recently been validated by ASI4a to include SofFS. The process of carrying out SSI examinations and recording the findings is well documented in the Topic 2(R)1. This process is successfully implemented by both the AST at Syerston and also the Regional Maintenance Teams, who provide Forward Support to the fleet.

Conformation is required that the main spar can be visually examined during Major maintenance as the requirement for sampling of the main spar was recommended as a result of the RCM analysis. Sampling of this structure will not be required if access can be gained by using the appropriate RVA.

4.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

The Vigilant Utilisation & Fault Returns are used to provide the main source of fatigue consumption data for individual aircraft. These returns are completed by the VGS operating Vigilant aircraft and are then sent to. the Serco Docs Controller based at RAF Syerston. The procedure and report format can be found in Leaflet 008 of the Vigilant Topic 2(R)1. This information is then used to update the

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electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) and to task the Serco Regional Maintenance Teams to carry out any scheduled maintenance, repair or rectification. On completion of this work, the Regional Maintenance Teams forward to the Docs Controller a .weekly return of the maintenance carried out and the serviceability states, in preparation for the next period of flying (generally the weekend). A monthly return is then despatched to FTST TA Glider Mech 1 a by the Docs Controller.

The electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) which is used for the management, planning and detailed co-ordination of logistical operations within the Motor Glider and Glider Fleets, both Vigilant and Viking, can only be accessed by personnel on the Syerston server. Therefore, the FTST TA Glider Mech 1a does not have sight of the type of information required in order to conduct the appropriate level of fault and trend analysis. The current method used to determine the reliability and maintenance requirements of the aircraft and associated equipment is gathered monthly on hard copies sent by Syerston.

Although this platform does not have a Topic 5V, there is a well documented procedure for recording SSI examinations. All completed SSI Record Sheets and any Structural Sampling Report (SSR) forms are forwarded from RAF Syerston to Glider Mech 1 a at FTST T A.

Due to the recent changeover of personnel and the move from RAF Wyton to RAF Linton-on-Ouse, FTST TA have been unable to collate sufficient data in order to conduct any trend analysis of defects and this remains work in progress for the new Glider Mech 1 a. The corporate knowledge held by personnel within the management team at Syerston, who collect the utilisation and fault returns from all users of the fleet, is such that any increase in the rate of change of reliability should be identified.

4.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

There have been a number of significant changes, both within the FTST TA and the maintenance organisation, which has an impact on how the support to the Vigilant is implemented. As such, the SPS requires updating and the Station AESOs are to be transcribed into a Company Order Book in order to reflect these changes.

There have been a number of amendment requests submitted by the maintainers using the F765 procedure and these are closely controlled by the FTST T A. There is a relatively low number of outstanding F765s and these are being investigated by Glider Mech 1 a.

The amendment process to legacy Tl, either using the formal amendment process or the Advance Information Leaflet (AIL)/Service Amendment Leaflet (SAL), is co­ordinated by the parent station's Technical Publications department, on behalf of the Tl sponsor. Verification of Tl being at the correct amendment state should be conducted during station IQA activity and Squadron Self Audit checks. A sample was carried out at RAF Cosford and the APs were found to be at the correct amendment state in accordance with the list issued by FTST TA.

Serco are responsible for ensuring that Tl on their charge is to the latest amendment and are currently bidding to increase the quantity of Tl in order to support the Regional Maintenance Teams.

There appears to be no requirement for the laser shearography test.

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4.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List (CRL)

On completion of FSFT, RST and partial tear down, the lifing details for the fuselage, mainplane and tailplane altered. The main undercarriage legs and attachment bolts have now been given a life as a result of the mini OLM carried out post the FSFT. With regards to the aircraft systems, the elevator upper deflection bolt has been given a life of 1500hrs as a consequence of 2 reported failures of these bolts. These changes, along with component lifing details which have remained extant, are detailed in the CRL of the Topic SA 1. The items listed in the CRL have been accurately transferred from the Topic 5A1 into the MOD Form 700.

The engine continues to have reliability issues. These can be attributed to the ancillary systems such as fuel and ignition rather, than any faults with the core engine.

4.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

The procedures for the raising, upkeep and maintenance of data for items requiring ERC, both manually and electronically, were reviewed and validated using the previously identified 7 sample aircraft (see WP 1 ). The majority of data checked was correct, however, there were a number of discrepancies.

There was an isolated occurrence found during the sample where the data for a particular component recorded on the ERC was not consistent with the data entered on the MOD F721 B. It was evident in this case that the component had been replaced and that the information on the MOD F721 B had not been correctly revised to reflect this change.

The maintenance and upkeep of the ERC, and the accompanying MOD Form 700 paperwork, for the main undercarriage leg was found to be unsatisfactory. ERC have not been raised for this component, unless RTINigilant/007 A has been completed. However, for those legs which have had the RTI satisfied, the lifing details recorded on both the ERC and in the MOD Form 700 have been incorrectly calculated. The reason for this error has been due to the life usage details not being recorded when the legs were initially removed to satisfy the RTI.

4.7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs

The personnel in the GRP Bay at RAF Syerston have amassed a huge amount of knowledge and skill in the repair of the Vigilant. This expertise and the relatively new repair facility have resulted in high quality repairs to the fleet. All repairs carried out at this facility are well documented and recorded on the comprehensive repair database, although there is no reference to this database in the Topic 2(R)1. Any repairs that have been carried out by outside agencies in the past, which have not been recorded, are identified and removed where necessary to facilitate further repair.

Various formats are used by the Designer to give authorisation to the GRP Bay for repairs to be carried out.

A high number of aircraft show signs of hairline cracks in the gel coat in the area underneath the wings. In accordance with the Topic 6 this is classified as allowable damage. However, if these hairline cracks suddenly propagate, the underlying fibre structure is to be examined. In order to observe if there has been any increase in

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the length of these hairline cracks in the gel coat, the damaged area needs to be identified.

4.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual

The upkeep of the aircrew publications and involvement of RAF HS in the verification of the content and in participation in the FTST TA management of changes, (modifications, SI(T)s, etc), through the Glider PSWG and LTC is good. It is also understood that there is good working relations between RAF HS and the operators. However, the way the AM and the FRCs cover mass limitations are considered to be unacceptable, as they do not provide the level of clarity required to avoid exceeding the aircraft limitations.

The maximum mass of an individual pilot needs to be clearly stated as to what is included in the 110kg figure. the DTEO Report [16] Para 60 makes this quite clear, "within this an individual crew member should not have a mass greater than 110kg (including clothing, parachutes and ballast)", but it appears not to have been transferred into the RTS. Moreover, the 'Note' at AM Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 4 does not convey the risk to the pilot of the consequences of filling the aircraft fuel tank to capacity. Taking off under these conditions could result in loss of the aircraft and therefore a 'Warning' is considered to be essential here.

Given the known weakness in the aircraft rear fuselage, (vicinity of the tail-wheel pick-up), and tail-wheel spigot failures, every effort should be made to minimise the potential for structural damage in this area. The additions of a new sub-paragraph in the AM Part 3 Chapter 3 Para 5 'Approach' should meet this need.

It is suggested that the following words used in the DTEO Report are incorporated "Approaches in crosswind conditions should be carried out using a crabbed approach before kicking off the drift during the flare. Note: Side-slipped approaches should not be continued down to the ground, since this could result in a heavy landing."

The operators of the Vigilant appear to recognise the shortcomings around the overall mass by utilising the weight chart described above. Within the time limits of the audit, it has not been possible to establish how this chart is utilised at the various sites around the UK, other than RAF Syerston and Cosford. The growth in mass since introduction to service as indicated at WP11 of this report has eroded the level of payload that can be safely carried in the glider. The ability to ensure that the aircraft remains within limits requires a means of conveying this information readily to the crew. This chart would appear to satisfy this requirement provided it is given the appropriate status.

4.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

There were limited records inspected due to time available in the audit, but returns seen would appear to indicate that there have probably been several flights, logged as one flight. To record the use of the aircraft by collecting several flights together is an abuse of the F724 form and does not faithfully represent the way the aircraft was actually operated.

The flight returns seen were a small sample of a large dispersed fleet and this may or may not be true of the wider VGS organisation. There is however, concern that some operators are not recording data as intended and the extent of this should be investigated.

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SPC are not being entered onto the Tree of Knowledge and therefore the fatigue consumption data of the fleet is inaccurate. The database, which is being modified by DSTL and presented to the FTST TA by ASI4, should be populated with existing fleet consumption data and reviewed.

4.10 WP 10 Logistic Support

It is evident that due to the long standing close working relationship between the MOD, SOL and Grob, all spares that are procured for this aircraft continue to meet the original specification. To validate the maintenance cycle of the propeller assembly, with a view to possibly extending the periodicity between overhauls and ensuring value for money, a strip report and itemised invoice should be issued by Skycraft Services Ltd. It has been identified that certain spares appear to be valued at a higher cost than would otherwise be expected on the open market.

4.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release (MAR) and Release to Service (RTS)

The mass growth to the empty aircraft since entry into service is 13kg and aircrew may not be aware of the underlying steady increase in basic aircraft mass since the aircraft was introduced into service. With the added issue of a national trend in increased body mass, there is a risk that the potential for exceeding the current AUM limit, and even the Never Exceed limit, is real with all the associated hazards, and of course the impact on the life of the aircraft.

The work to verify the limitations in the RTS on temperature are currently awaiting the FTST TA response from the Designer.

The initial concern with respect to mass and the way it is conveyed in the RTS has been addressed to the RTSA by FTST TA following on from the audit team e-mail. Confirmation is still required that the relevant changes have been implemented. It follows that this should initiate similar changes to the Aircrew Publications in relation to clarification of individual pilot mass and of payload. This will require cross checking with WPB.

There is concern that changes to the RTS do not appear to be subject to independent assessment and in consultation with the FTST TA Safety Manager, it is evident that this independent assessment is not conducted. In accordance with JSP 553 Para 2.58, there are 2 elements to independent assessment of the safety case. The first element is the independent process audit of the safety plan, the second is the independent technical evaluation of the Designer's safety case and analysis of the data evidence supporting it, which may include a qualitative assessment of aircraft handling.

4.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

The MOD F760 Fault Investigation procedure is implemented effectively for this aircraft. FTST TA is also aware of defect arisings from civilian variants and has access to both Service Bulletins, issued by the Designer, and the Technical News Sheet, which is supplied by the British Gliding Association · and includes Airworthiness Directives from EASA.

Due to the high number of air incidents related to the engine, fault reporting in accordance with AP 1 OOE-02 should be considered. This would enable trend analysis to be conducted on engine faults with a view to identifying the need for

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additional maintenance and/or modification to improve reliability, or support the requirement for a replacement engine.

4.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

The FTST TA has a system in place to record and store Air Incident signals. There is also evidence that they manage the issues arising from the incident through normal business and monitored at the PSWG and LTC meetings once a Follow-Up signal has been issued. From the evidence seen there was no indication that ageing issues had resulted in a steady increase in air incidents.

Audits of the aircraft systems produced a similar result to those for the structure, where there were no specific trends highlighted with respect to ageing. However, the propulsion system is different and requires some focus. There are a significant number of Air Incidents which relate to the engine, 70% of all incidents reviewed under the audit are related to the engine malfunctioning. The investigation of these incidents requires considerable time and manpower. The discussion of Air Occurrence Reports at the PSWG should have alerted the FTST TA to this fact and it may help for the future if trend analysis became part of normal business.

It is noted that there does not appear to be a definitive list of Air Incident signals. One would expect OARS as the primary recipient to have this information, but evidence gained at the audit shows that the OARS Pandora database did not have a record of some signals that were available at RAF Syerston, although OARS may well have hard copies. Given the countrywide dispersal of the glider fleet and therefore the dispersed originators of the signals, the FTST TA may not be aware of all incidents, which undermines their airworthiness management responsibilities as owners of the Safety Case.

4.14 WP 14 Concession Recording

From the evidence seen at RAF Syerston there are only a small number of Major Concessions applicable to the Vigilant fleet. Of those concessions that are known an ADF Log MOD F704 entry had been made in the MOD Form 700, together with details of the concession number in the Engineering Records. This is considered sufficient to alert maintenance crews to any activity required in the vicinity of the concession. None of the Major Concessions seen would impose any structural limitation or any age related issues. However, whilst MOD Tech Coordinator believes that any Major Concessions that arose at the time of production should have been captured in the MOD Form 700 at the time of delivery of the aircraft, it was acknowledged that they had inherited the records and could not definitively state that all concessions were known to them. The audit team has requested that the FTST TA seek a list from Grab of any Major Concessions that apply to the delivered aircraft.

The construction of the glider is such that the usual quantities of minor concessions that are experienced on metal fabricated structures do not apply in this case. Whilst there are known variances in the GRP lay-up these do not generally have any impact upon maintenance. Those that do have been covered by the Major Concessions referred to above. Consequently it should not be considered unusual for there to be no concession requests to the FTST TA. That may not be the case for the systems and whilst up to now there is no evidence of any concessions being sought, that may not be the case in the future. The FTST TA may wish to consider a process that recognises this possibility.

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4.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

SI(T) are issued by the FTST TA and are implemented in accordance with current policy. There is one RTI that does have a significant impact on Sl and this is being incorporated across the fleet by an outside agency.

4.16 WP 16 Modifications

The process for raising and approving modifications to the aircraft in the FTST TA runs on classic lines and meets the requirements of JAP1 OOA and Def Stan 05-123. The initiative of the FTST TA to introduce an internal process to place governance to the decision makers will enhance control and accountability and is supported. From evidence seen at the RAF Syerston the embodiment of approved modifications onto the aircraft appears sound and there is nothing which would indicate any lack of control over instructions or parts, although there is an issue with the traceability and life recording once embodied -see WP6.

There is a reliance on the outstations to inform Central Records at RAF Syerston of any modification embodiment undertaken. At the only outstation visited at RAF Cosford, the Serco team had not undertaken any modification work, although they had the process in place in which to follow should that be required.

The result of modification action on Air Publications has been addressed in WP8 and appears sound. However, there have been, and will be, modifications introduced that require changes to the RTS and there is concern over how these are handled, particularly with regard to independent technical evaluation of data evidence supporting the safety case. See WP11.

4.17 WP 17 Propeller

The main threat to Sl on the propeller assembly is caused by accidental and/or environmental damage. The 'First Response Water Ingress Prevention' order detailed in unit AESOs aims to reduce the number of blade rejections due to water ingress and these repairs are reassessed by Serco engineers.

Skycraft Services Ltd provide in-depth repair and reconditioning of the complete propeller assembly. However, a detailed strip report is not produced post propeller assembly overhaul and therefore, fault and trend analysis cannot be carried out on this assembly.

The request for clarification on the procedure to be followed post a propeller strike, with specific reference to serviceability checks on the engine, is to be resolved. The Designer's Operations Manual for the Grob 2500 engine paragraph 8.2, states that 'in case of propeller strikes, the engine must be disassembled and the crankshaft must be checked for cracks'.

4.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

The Vigilant Sl Plan was reviewed in depth in consultation with ASI4 and with reference to the Generic Sl Plan, which has been produced and developed by MAE I 1, AS I, DE&S, RAF Wyton. It is evident that the Vigilant Sl Plan requires updating and populating with detailed information to ensure it remains a useful document.

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The management of safety is at the appropriate level and the means exist through planning and management review within the FTST TA to ensure that safety issues are given the correct level of attention and direction to resolve the problems. The Glider PSWG provides the focus for this, but it requires more rigorous attention to Item 4 of the PSWG agenda to ensure that a regular review of the safety case is undertaken. There is a perception that the PSWG is perhaps devoting a disproportionate amount of time on reviewing progress of Air Occurrence Reports, important as they are. The Vigilant Safety Case is based upon certain assumptions. FTST TA needs to review these assumptions against the output from this AASA to ensure that the Safety Case is still valid.

PSWG does not appear to have sight of those hazards outside of their direct control, despite this being a long running issue at this forum. This undermines the safe operation of the aircraft and needs to be resolved.

Up to 9 aircraft have been purchased off the civilian market to supplement the existing fleet. The process followed to introduce these previously civilian registered aircraft into RAF service has been thorough and has ensured that the necessary modifications have been embodied and that component history is known and recorded.

As a key stakeholder within the Glider community, it would be advisable to invite the Serco Chief Engineer to the SIWG and LTC & Faults meetings.

4.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

Owing to shortcomings identified by RAE in the life of Vigilant suggested by Grob when it was initially procured, the aircraft went through a complete substantiation program with constant interaction between the DA, IPT and the RAE/DRA/QinetiQ. The role of the aircraft has changed little and any design changes (such as undercarriage legs) have been appropriately validated throughout the aircraft's service life by all parties.

There are questions surrounding how Grob maintain design records, and what records exist. Grob is a Part 21 registered company but how analogous records kept by Grob are to JAP1 OOA-01 requirements for the STR and FTR is not clear. It is not known what design records exist. Therefore, the AASA cannot be considered complete until the status of these records are known. The Designer is currently working with FTST T A to identify these records.

This WP has not found any major airworthiness issues or shortcomings in the design process to-date. However, there is a factor on flight hours that should be applied (as it has been in the past) so that remaining airframe life can be accurately quantified. Currently, the consumed life of the Vigilant is not being recorded correctly.

The fundamental material properties of the aircraft are not fully understood. All the stress calculations originally performed were based on a number of design allowables, some of which may not be justified. If, through further study, the shear allowable is changed this may require a review of any original stressing calculations where shear strength is a factor. Until this matter is resolved the airframe strength is not known.

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4.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training

All personnel employed in the maintenance of the Vigilant, both Forward and Depth Support, have been trained and are authorised to carry out the various scheduled maintenance and repair activities. Although Serco have only recently taken on the contract to provide maintenance support, there is a large amount of corporate knowledge within the various teams.

The authorisation and training of Serco and VGS personnel to conduct maintenance activities on the Vigilant fleet is a well documented and implemented process that ensures all personnel are deemed competent by the Level K Chief Engineer.

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5 Recommendations The following are a summary of the recommendations which, for ease of reference, are also included in the audit findings section.

5.1 WP 1 Work Recording and Asset Management

• Replace the old version of the MOD F701 (Vigilant) Leading Particulars contained in Section 11 of the MOD Form 700 with the latest amendment Feb 08.

• The policy laid down in Chap 7.3 of JAP1 OOA-01 is applied to the 'Tree of Knowledge'. This policy details what is required to achieve configuration management, auditing, data integrity, look and feel, Minimum Data Capture Lists, component record creation, archiving and through life management.

• Or, replace existing 'Tree of Knowledge' with a recognised LIS currently in use in the MAE such as LITS or WRAM.

• If the database is to continue in use then immediate action should be taken to ensure that the all aircraft maintenance data is aligned with the requirements of the Topic SA 1.

• That all aircraft lifed items controlled by this system are reviewed and the accuracy of the data on the database compared to that shown on the Engineering Record Cards and forecasts in the MOD Form 700.

• That all fatigue data is being inputted accurately (to include Sortie Profile Codes).

• Ensure that the existing audit mechanism is robust enough to encapsulate the above recommendations (Self Audit/Management Checks & Internal Quality Audit procedures in accordance with Chap 15.2 of JAP1 OOA-01 ).

• All work carried out on the aircraft is signed for in accordance with the latest Tl.

5.2 WP 2 Topic 5A1 Master Maintenance Schedule (MMS)

• To combine the information contained in the Topic 2(R)1 and the maintainers locally produced Vigilant SSI examination guide into a recognised Topic 5V.

• On completion of work cards 23 and 29 during the next Major maintenance package, confirmation that the main spar can be examined using existing RVA is to be recorded and discussed at the next SIWG. This will validate the inspection technique and provide an audit trail to close the recommendation raised by the RCM analysis team.

• If access is such that the main spar can not be satisfactorily examined, alternative inspection equipment and/or access holes should be identified as a possible solution. If these solutions are deemed impracticable, a targeted sampling programme is to be planned for and implemented on the mainplane.

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5.3 WP 3 Maintenance Arisings and Statistical Analysis of Defects

• Review the technical information and data required by the FTST TA Glider Mech 1 a in order to be able to conduct trend analysis of reliability and defects.

• Access to the electronic database (Tree of Knowledge) at Syerston is made available to FTST TA Glider Mech1a. (See also recommendations in WP1.)

5.4 WP 4 Topic 1 Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

• The SPS in the Topic 2(R)1 is to be reviewed by the FTST TA given the significant changes that have taken place.

• The RAF Station AESOs need to be replaced by the Contractors Company Order Book, which will detail Company Procedures to be carried out in support of both Forward and Depth maintenance activities.

• The quantity of Tl should be increased to ·enable the Regional Maintenance Teams to hold the necessary publications in order to carry out and sign for aircraft maintenance.

• At the next Topic SG review, the use of the laser shearography test should be deleted.

5.5 WP 5 Component Replacement List (CRL)

• Due to the high number of reported air incidents and the dedicated role of this aircraft, which is to provide glider pilot training and Air Cadet air experience, a formal review should be conducted on the reliability issues with the Grab 2500 engine.

• Explore the option of replacing the engine with a newer and more reliable unit.

5.6 WP 6 Use and Maintenance of Log Cards

• When the main undercarriage legs are removed from the aircraft to undergo RTINIG/007 A and despatched to Vector Aerospace Almondbank, the life usage in landings should be extracted from the MOD F728 and entered onto the 'U/S' MOD F731. Assuming the Quality procedures are in place at Almondbank, the life usage of each individual leg is known before, during and on completion of the RTI and the receiving unit will have recorded on the 'Serviceable' MOD F731 the original life used for that leg. When the refurbished leg is then fitted to an aircraft, the life usage details will then be entered on the log card, MOD F728 of Section 7 and reforecast on the MOD F721 B. The electronic database, which is used by the Docs Controller for scheduling maintenance, will also be updated.

• This process can only be used for aircraft which still have pre RTINIG/007 A main undercarriage legs fitted. Aircraft that have post RTI legs fitted have compromised lifing details and the correct figures cannot be retrieved. Therefore, a Penalty Factor should be applied to these legs. A recommendation would be to identify which of the post RTI aircraft had the highest number of landings when the RTI was

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carried out, and apply this figure retrospectively to all the other aircraft that have had the RTI carried out.

5. 7 WP 7 Topic 6 Aircraft Repairs

• The comprehensive repair database in use at the GRP Bay should be identified in the Topic 2(R)1. Further, the FTST TA should consider if this is a form of LIS and if so then the recommendations made in WP1 should be applied.

• A formal repair request procedure· should also be detailed in the Topic 2(R)1 to ensure the repair request and authorisation can be identified as a 'closed loop' procedure. A procedure similar to the MOD F760 Fault Investigation Report format could be considered. ·

• Hairline cracks in the underwing gel coat should be mapped to enable sudden crack propagation to be identified.

• Outsourcing/Sideloading GRP work to Grob's UK Technical Representative at Airborne Composites, JAR UK 145.01102 accredited repair facility, to alleviate the identified choke point of GRP repairs at RAF Syerston.

5.8 WP 8 Topic 14/15 Flight Reference Cards (FRC) and Aircrew Manual (AM)

• The AM Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 4 'Note' is changed to a 'Warning' and that Para 5 is amended to bring it in line with the amended RTS (see WP11 ), with respect to the definition of what is included in the 11 Okg figure.

• The AM Part 3 Chapter 3 Para 5 'Approach' a new sub-paragraph is added which states "Approaches in crosswind conditions should be carried out using a crabbed approach before kicking off the drift during the flare. Note: Side-slipped approaches should not be continued down to the ground, since this could result in a heavy landing."

• The AM Part 1 Chapter 6 Para 14- "Baggage Max 20kg" is reconciled with Part 2 Chapter 1 Para 6 - "Max permitted baggage is 17kg"

• . The Weight Chart is given appropriate status and placed within the cockpit of each glider, either as a separate placard, (to be updated at each aircraft weigh), or considered as an Addendum to the FRCs. It is also recommended that the AM is amended accordingly dependent upon the methodology adopted.

5.9 WP 9 Topic 15S Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

• A wider audit of flight returns in the VGS organisation is undertaken and analysed to establish whether recording of multiple flights as one is widespread.

• ASI4 takes the opportunity, when rolling out the new SOIU Issue 4 to brief the operators on the correct manner of recording flights and why this is important.

• HQAC institute regular QA checks to ensure this policy is being followed.

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• The database developed by DSTL is populated and the fatigue consumption of the fleet can then be reviewed, managed and discussed at the Vigilant SIWG.

5.10 WP 10 Logistic Support

• Conduct a cost analysis on selected high value items and high usage common spares to ensure value for money.

• Request a strip report and itemised invoice from Skycraft Services Ltd for each propeller assembly overhaul.

5.11 WP 11 Military Aircraft Release (MAR) and Release to Service (RTS)

• The RTS is amended at Part 8 Para 8.4 Mass and Centre of Gravity Para 8.4.1.1 to change the 'Note'- If the aircraft fuel tanks are filled to capacity ... to a ·warning' [The definition of a 'Warning' is 'where the consequence of not respecting a limitation might be death or injury to the person']. This amendment should also be incorporated into the Aircrew Manual and FRCs. See WP8.

• The RTS is amended at Part D - Role Limitations and Constraints Para 0.2.1 to clarify aircrew payload description at Para 0.2.1. It is suggested that the words used in the DTEO Report could be used here. This amendment should also be incorporated into the Aircrew Manual and FRCs. See WP8.

• The Topic of mass is reviewed by the FTST TA with all relevant stakeholders to reduce the risk of operating the aircraft above its AUM.

• The FTST TA process for advising the RTSA of any changes to aircraft limitations to be revised to include the requirements of JSP 553, particularly in relation to independent technical evaluation of data evidence supporting the safety case.

5.12 WP 12 Defect Arisings and MOD Form 760 Fault Investigations

• Engine fault reporting to be conducted in accordance with AP 1 OOE-02.

5.13 WP 13 Air Incidents (Occurrence Reporting)

• It is recommended that FTST TA conduct an investigation into the high number of engine related incidents, which should address the potential risk of an accident through engine cut-out at critical stages of flight.

• It is also recommended that FTST TA secure a definitive listing of Air Incidents by dialogue with OARS and utilise this information, perhaps through a database to undertake routine trend analysis.

5.14 WP 14 Concession Recording

• A definitive list of Major Concessions of the delivered aircraft is obtained from Grob and cross checked with the aircraft MOD Form 700 to ensure all have been captured. If the FTST TA experiences difficulties with Grob in undertaking this exercise then a fall-back would be to review the archive delivery documentation records at RAF Syerston.

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• The FTST T A put in place a process for vetting deviations to design for structure and aircraft systems that might arise in the future.

5.15 WP 15 Special Instructions (Technical)

• Nil.

5.16 WP 16 Modifications

• The FTST TA considers a process to address how modifications may impact the RTS such that appropriate independent advice may be sought to maintain the integrity of the Safety Case (see also WP11 ).

5.17 WP 17 Propellers

• A detailed strip report is produced by Skycraft Services Ltd post propeller assembly overhaul to aid fault and trend analysis.

• Post a propeller strike, the information contained in the Designer's Operations Manual for the Grob 2500 engine is to be actioned.

5.18 WP 18 On-going Airworthiness Management

• Sl Plan to be updated.

• FTST TA to review the Vigilant Safety Case assumptions against the output from this AASA to ensure that the Safety Case is still valid.

• Serco Chief Engineer to attend SIWG and LTC meetings as a key stakeholder.

5.19 WP 19 Design Substantiation Review

• The status of the STRand FTR should be confirmed. If civil equivalents are being maintained in lieu of type records, they should be reviewed to ensure that all the information required by JAP 1 OOA-01 is present and appropriately maintained.

• Since the percentage split between SPCs continues to change with each SOIU issue, it is recommended to restart the practice of factoring hours so that the effect on aircraft life can be understood and apply a suitable factor retrospectively. It should be FTST TA policy to review the factor if the SPC mix should change in the future. Significant change may affect any aspiration for an OLM exemption.

• Further work should be carried out to define correctly the design allowables. Currently fundamental strength properties of the materials are unknown. QinetiQ issued a report [35] on the Viking with a series or recommendations for further work which requires collaboration with Grob. Thus report is equally valid for Vigilant and should be acted upon as soon as is practicable.

5.20 WP 20 Authorisation and Training

• Nil.

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6 References

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[1] Military Aviation Engineering Policy and Regulation Joint Air Publication (JAP) (D) 100A-01 Issue 19 March 2007

[2] MASAAG Paper 104, "Recommendation for the future shape of Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit" October 2000

[3] Joint Services Publication (JSP) Military Airworthiness Regulations, 553 1st Edition, Initial Issue July 2003

[4] MASAAG Paper 83, "Recommendation for a Review of the Effects of Ageing on the Continuing Structural Integrity of Service Aircraft" June 1990

[5] RAF Engineering Organsiation and Policy AP1 008-01 (Leaflet 315 -Structural Integrity of RAF Aircraft)

[6] AP 101G-1101-14 6th Edition Al1 Mar 2007 Flight Reference Cards.

[7] AP 101G-1101-15 Amendment 17 Mar 2009 Aircrew Manual

[8] AP 101G-1101-5A1 Mar 2000 3rd Edition AL 16 Master Maintenance Schedule

[9] AP 101 G-11 01-5B2&C Mar 2000 AL 14 Primary and Minor Maintenance Schedule

[10] AP 101G-1101-5D Mar 2000 AL 13 Major Maintenance Schedule

[11] AP 101 G-11 01-2(R)1 Oct 1990 AL 57 RAF Support Authority General Orders and Special Instructions

[12] AP 101G-1101-5G Non Destructive Testing Schedule

[13] AP 101 G-11 01-126 Jan 03 2"d Edition AL 8 Aircraft Maintenance Manual

[14] AP 101A-0601-1 Nov 02 Employment and Repair of Aircraft Composite Materials

[15] Letter DTEO/AT&E/PS/602MF/002 dated Oct 96

[16] DTEO CA Release Recommendations for Vigilant T Mk1 - Ref: D/AE/BD/95/017 dated May 95

[17] DTEO CA Release Recommendations for Increased Wind Limits for Vigilant T Mk1 - Ref: D/AE/BD/95/018 dated May 95

[18] Operations Manual Grob 2500 Edition May 1983 AL Dated Jan 88

[19] Statement of Operating Intent and Usage, Issue 3, April 1999.

[20] Signal HQAC to MODUKAIR 291400Z Jan 91

[21] Letter Grob GmbH dated 27 Nov 90

[22] Vigilant T Mk1 Release to Service - Issued under cover of ACAS letter Ref: ES(Air)Wyt/505540/2/27/1 dated May 07

[23] Email from QinetiQ Audit team to Glider Mech 1a on 21st April 2009, Pilot mass errors.

[24] Examination of Tail Wheel Arm Assembly from Grob Vigilant ZH271, DRAISMC2/B90AD1XX/E2169, 6 March 1996.

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[25] www.asi.dii.r.mil.uk- Website for Aircraft Structural Integrity Team

[26] Email from Grob (R. Vodermeier) 230609 explaining that Vigilant certification is based on CS-22 (and previous incarnations), June 2009.

[27] Vigilant OLM measurement programme: Analysis of Data Recorded Between April 1992 and August 1993 (Gillian I Heather & Tim J Robins). DRA/AS/STD/CR94043/1, February 1994.

[28] Vigilant - implications of changes in usage to the test based life clearance. A Mountfort. DERA/MSS/F/3/1/58, May 2000.

[29] Vigilant Undercarriage - Fatigue Analysis of the New Leg Design. MJ Engelhardt & AJ Mountfort. QinetiQ/FST/SMC/WP022187/2.0, October 2002.

[30] Full Scale Fatigue Test. Paul Antemia, Grob Aerospace Division. GP-G109B-000001, February 2004.

[31] Vigilant Glider Fatigue Test Specimen Teardown. Dennis Taylor. QinetiQ/FST/CR043516, July 2004.

[32] Vigilant Fatigue Life Recommendations. AJ Mountfort, QinetiQ/FST/SMC/RF060088/2, November 2004.

[33] E-mail to Grob, Structural and Fatigue Type Records, Adam Fox, May 2009.

[34] Investigation into the Degradation of the Viking T Mk 1 Glider Resin System under the SIWG Ageing Aircraft Audit Action. NG Foster, Slingsby Aviation, August 2000.

[35] Investigation into the Shear Strength Design allowable of the Viking Glider. M Grassi and MJ Engelhardt, QinetiQ/S&DU/T&P/E&M/TR050221, May 2005.

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7 List of Acronyms AAA AAPSA AASA AASyA ACCGS ACO AD/ED AERO AESO AIL AM AOA AP ASCE ASI AST AUM BGA CFC CFI CG CLR CPSS CRL CS-22 DA OARS DE&S DERA DML ORA DSR DSTL DTEO DTSCGL-NAR EA EASA EHUDS ERC ESVRE FH FRC FSFT FTR FTSTTA GRP HS HQAC lAS IAT IS JAP JAR JSP

Ageing Aircraft Audit Ageing Aircraft Propulsion Systems Audit Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit Ageing Aircraft Systems Audit Air Cadet Central Gliding School Air Cadet Organisation Accidental Damage/Environmental Damage Aviation Engineering Routine Orders Aviation Engineering Standing Orders Advance Information Leaflet Aircrew Manual Aircraft Operating Authority Air Publication Adelard Safety Case Editor Aircraft Structural Integrity Aircraft Support Team All Up Mass British Gliding Association Carbon Fibre Composite Chief Flying Instructor Centre of Gravity Component Life Register Contractor Provided Spares Support Component Replacement List Certification Specifications for Sailplanes and Powered Sailplanes Design Authority Directorate of Aviation Regulation & Safety Defence Equipment and Support Defence Evaluation & Research Agency Draft Modification Leaflet Defence Research Agency Design Substantiation Review Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Defence Test & Evaluation Organisation Damage Tolerant Slow Crack Growth Long Engineering Authority European Aviation Safety Agency Enhanced Health and Usage Diagnostic System Engineering Record Cards Establish, Sustain, Validate, Recover, Exploit Flight Hours Flight Record Cards Full Scale Fatigue Test Fatigue Type Record Flying Training Support Team Training Aircraft Glass Reinforced Plastic Handling Squadron HQ Air Cadets Indicated Air Speed Individual Aircraft Tracking Information System Joint Air Publication Joint Aviation Requirements Joint Services Publication

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LBA LIS LITS LTC MAE MAEI1 MAR MASAAG MORE MML MMS MWO NAA NOT ODM ODR OLM OSD PI PSWG RAE RCM RST RTS RTSA RVA SofFS SA SAC SAL SB so SEM SEP Sl SI(T) SIN SIWG SL-NAR SM SNOW SOl SOIU SOL SPC SPS SSI SSG SSR STF STR Tl TLMP UA VGS Wg Cdr Logs ACO WP WRAM

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Luftfahrt-Bundesamt Logistic Information System Logistics Information Technology System Local Technical Committee Military Air Environment MOD Aviation Engineering and Integrity 1 Military Aircraft Release Military Aircraft Structural Airworthiness Advisory Group Manual Data Recording Exercise Master Maintenance List Master Maintenance Schedule Maintenance Work Order National Aviation Authority Non Destructive Testing Operating Data Manual Operating Data Recording Operational Loads Measurement Out of Service Date Proof Installation Project Safety Working Group Royal Aircraft Establishment Reliability Centred Maintenance Residual Strength Test Release to Service Release to Service Authority Remote Visual Aids Safety of Flight Structure Support Authority Slingsby Advance Composites Service Amendment Leaflet Service Bulletins Service Deviations Service Engineered Modifications Structural Examination Plan Structural Integrity Special Instruction (Technical) Schedule Identification Number Structural Integrity Working Group Safe Life - Not At Risk Service Modification Serial Number Of Work Statement of Intent Statement of Operating Intent and Usage Soaring Oxford Ltd Sortie Profile Code Support Policy Statement Structurally Significant Items Structures Support Group Structural Sampling Report Special Trials Fits Static Type Record Technical Information Through Life Management Plan User Authenticator Volunteer Glider Squadrons Wing Commander Logistics of the Air Cadet Organisation Work Package Work Recording and Asset Management

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Report documentation page Originator's Report Number QINETIQICONIAPICR0901174 --Originator's Name and Location QinetiQ MoD Bascombe Down

Customer Contract Number and Period FATS1/TRGACQI011G001 Covered

Customer Sponsor's Post/Name and ~Glider Mech 1 a, RAF Linton-on-Location us

Report Protective Marking and Date of issue Pagination No. of any other markings references

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Report Title

Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit Final Report

Translation I Conference details (if transla.tion give foreign title I if part of conference then give conference particulars)

NIA

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Authors

-Keywords I Descriptors Vigilant Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit

Abstract

An Ageing Aircraft Structural Audit has been conducted on the processes used by the FTST TA to maintain the airworthiness and structural integrity of the Vigilant T Mk 1 glider. Twenty specific areas of the engineering operating support systems were studied, these ranged from a review of modification standards and configuration control through to information to aircrew such as Flight Reference Cards and the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. The MF700 used to record all maintenance activity on the aircraft was also reviewed. The integrity of the systems was audited and various discrepancies have · been found. These have been detailed in this report along with conclusions and recommendations for their resolution.

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This form meets DRIC-SPEC 1000 issue 7

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