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AD NUMBER

AD873232

NEW LIMITATION CHANGE

TOApproved for public release, distributionunlimited

FROMDistribution authorized to U.S. Gov't.agencies and their contractors; CriticalTechnology; 18 AUG 1970. Other requestsshall be referred to Army Office of theAdjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.

AUTHORITY

oag, d/a, ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYOFFICi OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

-,;A kMý (12 Aug 70) FOR OT UT 7Q??7Q 18 August 1970

"" B.IEC Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 7thPsychological Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April,1970

(, ,t iE DISFRIBUTION

i. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordancewith paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as aresult of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate>- benefitLs in the future from lessons learned during current operations andCL. -may be adapted for use in developing training material.CD

- BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:L•-J

C-• 6_) L Inl nNT. G. WIcmAM

Das ,patom General, US1)1S!RIB N The Adjutant General

Cor Ganding GeneralsUS• Continental Army Command D~ 117L'S Army Combat Developments Commrand 4U 117

Cormmandant sUS Army War CollegeUS Army Command and General Staff College "

US Army Armor School

US Army Civil Affairs School -.

US Army Infantry School 3 to VA'US Army Institute for Military Assistance ,•,i -•6

US Army Intelligence School C -o" *0, tie

Copies furnished: s'9 er% or OT

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army _' e% 010

Deputy Chiefs of Staff o" 0.4 e 0 '

Chief of Research and Develo, -SAocw" ep CLASSIFIED REPORT

.Mks ?RBUTION NO FOREIGN WITHOUT APPROVAL OF'1• r %ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT._T (ARMy) ATTN: FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

I I m i +m i , +

DEPARTME1 OF THE ARMYTZADQUARTFRS, 7TH PSYCHOLOGICAL CPERATILMS BATTALIUi•

APO SAP• .RANCISC(C 96349

AVGM-7C 11 EY7e 1970

SVBQJ-Tt Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period gndinr 3C April 19-1), RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

•RU, Commanding General 4 0OXXIV CorpsATTN, G5APO 96549

TO, Commanding Officer4th Psychological Operations CroupATTN: AVGM-C

APO 96227

1. REFZEl:IESs

a. USARV Regulation 525-15, a•xbjct as above, iprnl 19(•.

b. 4th PSYOP Group Reg 335-3, sub.4ect as i.ove, D>cep-er 19e .

2. Submitted herewith Is the ýuarterlv- Lýeratjrnal .e- ort - LessonsLearned, for the period I February 1970 to 5C .. ril 1970, j-re2.yredin accordance with the aboe reference3.

4 Incl Ji.iLIC

C omm~and inrgFoR oT 7-L)7

Inclosure

i

AVGM-7C 11 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

SECTION I OPERATIONS - SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. During the reporting quarter, the 7th PSYOP Battalion engaged in 26hours of mandatory training, including weapons familiarization and CBRrefresher training administered to newly assigned personnel as part ofthe replacement training program. In addition, each new arrival wasbriefed on the unit's organization, mission, and capabilities, and itsPSYOP support role in the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). In 89 days ofcontinuous operations the battalion produced 77,297,737 6" x 3" leafletequivalents. The number of requests for development and printing supportfluctuated from a low of 55 in February to a high of 113 in March. Thesmall number of requests for local development and printing supportreceived during February is attributed to the large volume of off-shoreprinted materials disseminated in support of the TET campaign during thatperiod. An increase in rallier appeal leaflet requests and in the numberof items developed in support of the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program accountedfor the increased support rendered by the battalion in March.

2. Enemy activity continued at a low level during most of the reportingperiod. A slight increase in enemy activity was experienced during theTET season but a major enemy offensive did not develop. Enemy activitythen dropped to the low level experienced during the end of 1969 and re-mained at that level until the beginning of April when attacks by fire andterrorist activity in populated areas increased. The increase continuedthrough the first 15 days of April when it again declined to a low rate forthe remainder of the quarter.

3. On 9 March, the 7th PSYOP Battalion was placed under operationalcontrol of XXIV Corps after the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)relinquished control of US forces in the ICTZ. There were no significantchanges in battalion operations.

4. Support of the TET-1970 Campaign, which began in September 1969, wasconcluded on 20 February 1970. The campaign had as its broad objective theinducement of the maximum number of VC/NVA ralliers.

5. The campaign was conducted in three phases:

a. During the planning phase (I September - 31 October 1969) the7th PSYOP Battalion reviewed after-action reports from previous TET cam-paigns and planned for development and printing of locally produced PSYOP

INCL

AVGM-7C 11 May 1970SBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

materials. Additionally, advice was provided to the III MA PSYOP(,Cficer or. the quantity, target audiences, and themes that should beincluded in the off-shore printed material that would be provided by

MACV.

b. During the preparation phase (1 November - 31 December 1969) theTOT counter-offensive Campaign conducted in 1969 was reviewed and thosematerials that could be updated and re-used were identified. The PSYOPofficers of all supported units and the field detachment commanders werebriefed on the scope of the campaign and were offered an opportunity tobring up problem areas experienced during previous TET campaigns. Copiesof TOT stationary (4-81-69) and locally developed stationery were distrib-uted with instructions on preparation of traditional TET letters. Othermaterials in support of this campaign were also developed and stocked, andlimited quantities of off-shore produced TST materials were received fordissemination during the exeoution phase.

0. The execution phase was originally scheduled to last from 1January to 31 March 1970. However, this unit's support of actual TETactivities was concluded on 20 February. During the execution phase,the remaining off-shore and Saigon-aroduced materials were received anddisseminated. Special TST tapes for air and ground broadcast were dis-tributed to supported units and field teams. The dissemination of ThEleaflets and broadcast of TET tapes comamnced on 16 January and wan com-pleted on 20 February. During this period, 89 million leaflets weredisseminated and 144 hours of aerial broadcasts were conducted.

d. A detailed after-action report of TET activities was preparedand forwarded to 4th PSYOP Group on 24 February.

6. In April the Joint Propaganda Development Center was redesignated theCombined Piopaganda Development Section (CPs).

7. The 7th Battalion's Propaganda Development Section greatly increasedits propaganda testing activities during this past quarter. Testing isnow being conducted at local Chieu Hoi Centers, several POW holding areas,and in rural hamlets. An office has been established by the Testing andEvaluation Section of PDS at the I Corps Regional Chieu Hoi Center in Da-nang, to assure ready access to Hoi Chanhe for use in testing and evaluationof propaganda items.

8. During this report 4 ng periol, the 7th Battalion supported the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program in its campaign to induce the local populace to report

INCL 2

AVGM-7C 11 May 1970SUBJBT, Operational Renort - Lessons Learned, 7th PsyohelogicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPFM-65 (R2)

the location of VCI thr ugh the use of "wanted" posters. The coloredborder on the standard poster design provided by 4th PSYCP Group, usingthe Vietnamese national colors to frame the photograph of the wantedVCI, was not used. It was determined after careful evaluation that inWpersons in rural areas, especially those who are illiterate, would reoeg-nize the national colors and gain the initial impression that the personpictured is a GVN official or that he represents the GVN. Posters witha colored border were used only in the production of general advertisementswhich called or the people to provide information on VCI. In one reportedcase, one of the posters led to the capture of a wanved criminal within24 hours after it was posted. Attachee as inolosure #1 is an example ofthe new style wanted poster produced by the 7th Battalion.

9. The Battalion provided PSYOP support to the 101st Airborne Divisionin its campaign to induce more VC ralliers through the use of persenallsedletters. Under this program, personnel of the Division PSYCI Section andprovincial advisory teams gathereed family photos of knomn Viet Cong "peratingin the area. The families were then asked to prepare personalized meaageseto their VC relatives. The message, tog-ther with the family photo, wasthen printed on leaflets and Irooped in areas where VC were known to beoperating. During the reporting period, items were developed in supportof this campaign. Catalog sh--ti of two of these items are attached asinclosure #2.

10. During this quarter the Batttlion's field detachment., with thesuTport of two photographers from 4th Group, took photos for elide shewn.of their respectiv areas of operation. Photographs were taken of localGVN officials, province capitals, government proi'rams and military efforts.When the processed elides are received from 4th Group, written script* willbe arranged to produce locally oriented slide shows, for use by audio-visualfield teams. The itinerary of suggested subjects attached an inclosure #3was provided to the detachments by the 7th Battalion CPDl.

11. During February, ARVN forces of the Quang Da Special Zone scor•ed asignificant victory over three Commrunist battalions in "Operation DuengSon," in which more than 200 IVA and VC main force soldiers were killed.Both the ARVN and the US 1st Marine Division expressed interest in exploit-ing this incident with Pro-GVN and Anti-VC/NVA propaganda. Recognizing theneed to take maximum psychological advantage of ARYN, RP and P8W capa-bilities, especially in view of the US troop replacement, the 7th Battalunaeveloped propaganda items directed at both the local populace and VC/AIAunits. These items stressed the theme of the enemy's declining tactical

INCL 3

11 May 1970iJ CT: Op-rational Report - Lessons LeariL-d, 7th Fsychological

Cp-ratinns Battalion, Perioo r1nding 30 April 1970, RC6 CSFOR-(-5 (R2)

-ýf-ct,6vness and the AIVN's capability to defeat -nemy forces. une ofthý-- items exeomplifies th- prow#ess of juang Nam lerionql F'orces byr-latinbr a major victoryv they achieved in Di-n Ban District and another"xlains to the local populace th- advantages of establishing ard ntilizin 1 '.ecple I 3elf bf,-ense Forc-s to def-nd their •-amletp from VT terrorism.nd zabrrtage. Th- cata og sheet of the leaflet i.!v-lcpe' ii, 3,voort uft'.is .•cif victo:-,' is attqc~ied as inc. ,qure *4.

1. In response to a request from the Civil Aff Ia s T-din ir.1 I.g Iho..'1rict, '.uang Tnr Irovince, th- 7th 13attwlion is 'Iv.1o:i:#, A 107U,

ampaign targ-ted toward the 3r' iIontae-narn tribe. "2h- c'pa4 gr. is

.esigned to Ancoura,-t health, -Ar,itktion knd imap'oved farring nethod,".ncnp the Bru.

IS. G5 XXIV Corps has initiated dev&o[pmrent of a combined i Cor-ý-, X.oros Chieu Hoi campailvn plan. The 7th Battaliumn IDl reviewed ',i- '.l-~z;.nd forwarded recommend-d revisions to XXIV 2orps. `-,e plan ou~lin-s_roce-ures for t.,- corAnlct of psy-holopical ozeritions in suEcrt of tr -

-'ieu Hoi Irrogrem and provides •iidqnce ann dir-ction to insur- .. e;,,

-fficient uhilization of US and TIN kSY1/i'OLWAR resources. A :o'iy ofthis plan will be forwarded to 4th 1'3YQ' Group upon approval by I Corps.nd XXIV ;orps.

14. fh- sucoess of the Chieu Hoi Program in th. I3TZ was demonstratedThen 74 Viet Cong prisoners of war requested, and were accorded, }[oi Chanhstatus. A public ceremony in which the status jl the former ?Ods wasJharppd, was cond,ictid on 26 March to coincide with the observance ofthe new national holiday for land reform. During the ceremony, which was.,ttended by the Mayor of Dan&.ig and other hit, level civic officials,the new Hoi Chanhs presented signed statements in which they declaredthat they were acting voluntarily and from motives of personal conviction.

15. (,n 4 Larch, an interrogator from the Battalion's lPropaganda Develop-aent jection questioned two NVA officers (both Hoi Chanh) concerning the*xistence of a "Code of Conduct" for NVA prisoners of war. Both men assertedthat there does exist a Code of Conduct for NVA soldiers which is based on.)arty loyalty toward the Communist Party of the Democratic Republic ofVietnam (Lao Dong). The code is commonly reiterated in regular indoctrin-ation periods, and is applicab.e to all soldiers including non-party members.5oth officers also ass-rted thwt internal controls do exist among NVA

risoners, and that NVA soldiers are encouraged to lie to enemy interviewersto mislead them and to protect military information. Njeither of the officersinterviewed had ever received any instriaction on counter4nterrogationtechniques other than the directive that they should lie if forced to talk.

4

AVGM-7C ii May 1970SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

The two officers were interrogated separately and had no opportunityto communicate with each other.

16. On 23 February 1970, LCDR Jampoler (MAC/J3-11) briefed represent-atives of the various PSYOP agencies in the ICTZ on a new PSYOP reportingsystem. The new system, which became effective I March, is called thePsychological Operations Information System (PSYOPSIS) and re~,laced thePSYOP Surmmary Reporting System which employed MACV Form'-S. The newsystem is designed to provide simplified and streamlined input from thefield to MAC/J3-11 where it is used in automated compilation, storage,and analysis of psychological operations on a country-wide basis. As aresult of this simplified method of reporting, this unit has experienceda considerable reduction in the number of man-hours expended in thereporting of PSYOP activity.

17. A national holiday was declared to coincide with President Thieu'sannouncement of the new Land Reform Program on 26 March 1970. Leafletdrops and tape broadcasts announcing the new program and briceiy out-lining its intent were conducted throughout the ICTZ to coincide with thecelebration. Leaflet and tape broadcast missions were flown by 110thSquadron (VNAF) with back-up support from "A" Flight, 9th Special OperationsSquadron (9th SOS). Support by this unit was limited to coordinating theefforts of 110th Squadron and 9th SOS.

18. CPDS development for the period ending 30 April 1970 is as follows:

a. LEAFLETS:

Chieu Hoi III

Pro-GVN 3

Rewards 8

Anti-NVA 32

Anti-VC/NVA 13

167

b. HANDBILLS:

Pro-GVN 21

5

AvGM-7C 11 may 1970SL-3JET! Operational Report -L'ossons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations hattalion, Periodl FndIng 30 April 1970, RCS CSMO-65 (R,)

He wurd :- 3

Anti-VC 2

216

c. PL13T1MS:

Chieu Hoi 1

Pro-GVN 5

Rewards 12

knti-VCfNVIA5

54

d. N-WSrAPEIRS.

Ban Tin 10

10

e. TAPES:

Chiopu Hci 25

Fro-GVN 2

Anti-lIVA 5

Anti-WVC/NV5

37f. I1IXBS:

Rewards I

Anti-INVA 12

6

AVGM- 7C 11 may 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological

Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

19. Reduction in the 7th i.SYOP Battalion's troop strength by "stand-

doew" for Phase III Redeploymern. necessitated a reorganization of somestaff sections. The S2 iSctian, whose functions had long overlapped withthe Propaganda Development Sec ion's analysis responsibilities, waa com-bined with PIX3 into a single staff section. The S2's document regiscrationand safeguarding functions are now performed by a single enlisted man(MCS 96B; E6) with staff responsibility belonging tu one of PIE's officersas a secondar-y or additional duty. Intelligence acquisition and analysisactivities are currently being reevaluated to determine which should becontinued as essential to the Battalion's propaganda development effort.The XXIV Corps, which recently replacer III M'AF as the US comm-nd elementin the ICTZ, has assumed an increasesd role in supplying prepared intelli-gence to the 7th Battalion through its G5/PSYCP Intelligence Sejtion.

20. During this reporting period, a partial suspension of all requisi-tions for equipment under the "G" series TO&E was announced. Since theactivation of the "G" series in December 1969, a number of discrepancieshave arisen concer•ning quantities and identification of certain line -.temsof euilpment. Until such time as these problems a-e cleared up, no 'urtherrequisitioning action will be takei by this unit, with the -xception ofcertain items that are cons- 4Ared essential, and are available from in-country resource .1

21. In the area of PSYOP expendable support from our direct support unit(334th Supply and Service Co., 'BOth General Fsupport Group), this uni t hasIvarnerd that QRR requisitions no longer have an interim procesaing stepat Qui Nhon Support Depot,but pass directly from Danang to the InventoryControl Center (ICCV) at Long Binh. In the past, our experience has beenthat many of the PSYOP expendable requisitions are rejected at qui Nhon,thereby confusing demand data at our Direct Support Unit (DSU) and restrict-ing thi percentage of fill on a number of items. To counteract this problem.the DSU instructed this Battalion to place al.l expendable requisitions onan C5 priority and if low stookage levels justify it, to use an 02 priority.Because Qui Nhon Depot is no longe," in the "Chain," this unit will zeturnto 12 priority requisitions for all expendables, except when low stockagelevels would justify an 05 priority.

SECTION II C A!&NDE'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMiDATIONS

1. Personnel: None.

2. Intelligence: None.

7

NOT REPRODUCIBLEA'J•-I I1 Ma 19703',ýJET: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological

Cperations Battalion, ierio' Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

3. Cpration•s

a. Methods of Te ing, iroupagandat

(1) & I.(•lub,: ,-n testing propaganda the use of non-Landa~rd Lustion~naLr~s do' i.ot .] 2,, for quick and accurate tabulation

(4 ~V \�>�•,•, J ue: L(e , tit ereat volume of propaganda testirgand evaluator. ,ione by th- Tet±n•fg and Lvalluation Section of the lCombinedirvpapanda Development >e;tion, it is necessary to be able to rapidly.c=,ile the t-st resuls. These test results must then be tabulated

quickly, correctly, and in an orderly fashion.(s) RkU~~d,• 2lDl:;: When testing any large volume of propaganda

a standard questionnal,ý should be used.

b. De-Am-rica~nization of Printed Propaganda Materials:

(1) CBSERVATI(d.- Leaflets and other printed mate;: als whichappear to originate with LE organizations lend credence to the Commumistlie that the GVN is only a puppet of the US.

(2) EVALUATION: All printed propaganda material printed by thisunit contains an identification/control number. When the figure "7'app..rs in the control number, or in any other part of the leaflet, itbezomes evident to a target audience that the material was originated bya foreign source, since Vietnamese write this same figure as "P'.

(3) %R.:C W:DA-IONt That when the number "'r appears in printedpropa,•ania materials, the Vietnamese version of this figure be used toel. irnate any foreig imprint.

c. Repetition of familiar themest

(1) CBSERVATION: Ground loudspeaker teams experience theprobler, that the continued broadcast of familiar themes often has anei.tive effect on the •-sirc audience.

(Z) EVALUAT JN: Hi 6id HB teams that operate in the same AOeach we--k often fail to attract or are unable to elicit enthusiasticresponse from the local pcpulace. In an effort to correct this situation,th- teams are making progress in gathering selections of popular music,

AVGi(-7C 11 May 1970SUBJECTs Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSF1l-65 (R2)

tape recording these selections, and then reading short propagandastatements between the selections when they are broadcasting.

(3) RJDCFNDATIC•s Tape recordings of popular music canserve as an "attention-getter" prior to the dissemination of psycholo-gical propagande. Most of the people who live in small villages andhamlets have no radios, television, or newspapers. With the use of theloudspeaker system, combined with tape-recorded music to draw the crowd,PSYOP can have a much greater effect and appeal to the Vietnamese people.

d. Feedback:

(1) OBSERVATION: Uhile broadcasting from the MSQ-85 it has beennoticed that a considerable amount of feedback is inevitable if the taperecorder or speaker is placed in front of the speakers.

(2) EVALUATION: For the sake of comfort, especially duringfoul weather, audio-visual teams on ground loudspeaker missions attemptto broadcast from the covered cab portion of the truck. The proximity efthe speakers directly over the cab creates feedback of an extremely dis-tracting nature. An understanding of the characteristics of feedbackdictates a simple solution to the problem.

(3) RMCQH] DATION: Feedback can be eliminated by simply movingthe microphone and broadcast source to the rear of the speaker system. Inthe case of the MIQ-85, broadcasting from the electrical shelter accomplishesthis. If feedback should persist, shifting the microphone to the left orright may yield the desired effect.

e. Receipt of Off-Shore Leaflet Shipments,

(1) OBSERVATIONs Eighteen million of a total of 88.9 millionleaflets that this unit was scheduled to receive were missent and onlythrough the efforts of the 4th PSYCP Group was the shipment located andthe leaflets air-shipped to this unit in time to support the TET PSYCPcampaign. Additionally, only 18$ of the total leaflets was received bythis unit prior to 1 January 1970.

(2) EVALUATION, The late receipt of leaflets from off-shoreasurces has been a problem for the laat two TET campaigns. The short fallin shi imts this year was not as signifivant as in previous years. For

9

AV•M-7C 11 May 1970STIUJT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

the first two weeks of the campaign, eighteen million leaflets were notavailable to support the campaigi.

(3) REC(124MDATICN: That all off-shore leaflets be scheduledto arrive on station one month prior to the starting date of the campaign.This procedure will allow for the location and transshipment of misreouteditems. It will 0Jso allow a more orderly targeting and dissemination ofthe materials to the respective target audiences.

f. TET stationerys

(I) 03SERVATlO01: The TFT stationery (4-81-69) that was printedoff-shore contained the Ghieu Hoi symbol, thus reducing its usefulness.

(2) EVALUATIO•s TET stationery is used by GVN officials tocommunicate TE'r greetinps to the people. Although some of these lettersdo contain a Chieu Hoi appeal, many are directed to the local populaceand stress such themes as the strength and prosperity of the GVN, pacifi-cation progress, etc. Such themes do not lend themselves to stationerywhich includes the Chieu Hoi symbol.

(3) ROCx)WNDATICs TNat, in the future, two types of stationerybe develoned, one with and one without the Chieu Hoi symbol.

g. D-velopment of Recording Rooms at Detachment Levels:

() OBSERVATION: Locally oriented and developed PSYCP tapeshave greitly supplemented the pacification effort, especially withrea-rds to th- !UB Teum employment.

(2) VALUATION: By using a closet and sound proofing material,2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, has developed a recording room whichproduces quality tapes of a quick reaction nature. The facill r was instru-mental in developing recent tapes for use in the exploitation ý" ARVNvictories at FB Anzio and FB Nancy. Its use has also been extended todubbing music tapes and news broadcasts.

(3) REG•S•. ATIUM: That field units reGeive sound proofing tileand, if necessary, building materials so that a recording area can be devel-oped for locally initiated ane oriented taped broadcasts.

h. .Rallies and Lountry Fairs:

10

AVGM-7C 11 May 1970

SUBJECTt Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th PsychologicalOperations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFCR-65 (R2)

(1) OBSERVATION: The use of rallies and country fairs todisseminate psychological materials is an efficient means of utilizinglimited resources.

(2) EVALUATION: Effective use of popular psychol')gical operationsresources is the key to fulfilling pacification objectives when so fewresources are available. The Pro-GVN Rally and Country Fair are two opera-tions which increase the audience and make them more susceptible to indoc-trination. Yet, these resources are effective largely in their abilityto gather crowds and this may rely heavily upon the timing of the operation.While the rioe harvest is being conducted, the farmers have little free timeduring the week. Sunday is perhaps the only day which is not spent in thefields and therefore makes it ideal for scheduling rallies and fairs.

(3) R•(-•ENDATIC'a That when possible, scheduling for ralliesand fairs should coincide with a convenient Sunday so that maximum partici-pation can be achieved.

i. Use of Ground PSYOP Teams:

(1) OBSERVATION: The use of ground PSYCP teams can be aneffective means of deterring enemy probes and ground attacks.

(2) EVALUATIONt The enemy is most effective when he operateswith the element of surprise. The use of PSYCP ground broadcasts has beenutilized to harrass and confuse the enemy du.ing the hours of probablemovement, falsely Siving the enemy the impression that we are aware ofhis movement. The use of funeral music, bugle fanfares and recordedmessages with reverberating characteristics are several of the availabletechniques which have resulted in the des Lred effect. In one recordedincident, the location of the enemy was ilentified when he fired wildlyat the broadcast scene.

(3) RECCUEEDATICW, Current tape libraries are net well-stackedwith material suitable to use around a US base camp perimeter. Experi-mentation should be encouraged in order to develop the harrassing andconfusing sound which makes base defense PSYCP missions effective.

3. Inquisitive Children and Thievess

(1) OBSERVATION: All audio-visual teams have a common problem

I I I. .. . , • •1,

AVCM-7C 11 May 1970TUBJETs Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological

Operations Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

which involves the control of inquisitive children and thieves.

(2) WVALUATIM: Showing movies is net a small task for a two-man team and requires uninterrupted effort during vital periods of thepresentation. Curious children and thieves have a tendency to disrupt theteam and create a control problem, dangerous as well as annoying.

(3) RMCG9ENDATION: The use of local defense forces (?Fls, PSDF's,RD's) has proven to be an extremely effective means of crowd control. Con-stant surveillance and the use of chains and locks are the only remediesfor thievery and looting found so far.

4. OrEganizations None.

5. Trainings None.

6. Logisticss None.

7. Communicationst None.

8. Material: None

9. Others None.

12

iiii • i ii ii • -• • i I ii• i " ii l ii , 1 • B .- -

AVI--G.. (I I May ..;UBJiiCT Opernt. r eport Lesse nzi iearned, 7th Psychological Opera-

tions 9ttalio., Per.'d ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65(R2)

:A.1, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 20 May 19m70

np. Offic!er, 4th Psychological Operations Group, ATTN:,. F)O 96227

.c.eview of the subject reportthis headquarters concurs with thec,,t' ots -nd recommendatlors contained therein, and considers no adam.

'..b' ,*,:s•.t.n efessary

9PAZI 0 Th.AXLERCPT, AGOA13A AG

1.3

AV14-C (25 May 1970) 2nd IndSUBJECTt Operational Report Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations

Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-7)

Department of the Army, HQ, 4th Psychological Operations Group, APO San

Francisco 96227 4 June 1970

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST APO 96375

This headquarters concurs with the comments and recommendations containedin the subject report.

FOR T• COMMANDER:

MICHE V. TALL14AN

CPT, ADA TL'AAdjutant

14

AVHGC-DST (11 May 70) 3d IndSUBJECTi Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 7th Psychological Operations

Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 2 j •N 'N97r

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTNs GPOP-DT,APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learnedfor the quarterly period ending 30 April 1970 from Headquarters, 7thPsychological Operations Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsingheadquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Indoctrination of NVA", page 4, paragraph15. This item has been extracted for inclusion in the next issue ofUSARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC isrecommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Receipt of Off-Shore Leaflet Shipments",page 9, paragraph 3e, concur. local commanders and 4th PSYOP Groupwill have to coordinate and program off-chore production requirements toensure that scheduled in-country receipt dates are achieved. Unit hasbeen so advised.

c. Reference item concerning "TET Stationary", page 10, paragraph 3f'concur. The request to print Chieu Hoi symbology on all items was requiredby MACV. Coordination is required between battalion and 4th Grouppropaganda development teams and MACV PSYOP personnel. This ORLL is beingforward to MACV for information.

FOR THE COMMANDR

J. in ePT, AGC

/As,Ti~ant AdJtrt GeneralCy furn,4th PSYOP Gp7th PSYOP Bn

15

GPOP-DT (11 May 70) 4th IndSUi•JECT: Operational Report of HQ, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

for Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 10 ;'JL '8

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CRIEF:

,iT, AGO

Ar, t AG

16

I.CT 'I A T FDSec,.sty Cla~sficaIIt-

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & 0(S-cwiY rlo.sificetiýof. ttltt..body -of abstrmct a.d ind-emng.nafs I-(nth.~trd It- he ~. a;7

I. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Coitpoat-uthot) aEC. -clO T U Csllcl , -

UNCLASSIFIEDHQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 1b. ROUP

3 REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

A. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES 7(rpa of •rporl .ind Inclsived •lem)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Feb to 30 Apr 70.S. AUTH4ORISI (First n-an. ot. Inmtialo laet naa.. )

CO, 7th Psychological Operations Battalion

1. REPORT DATE 7m. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES ý7b. NO. OF REFS

ill May 1970 20C ONTRACT OR GRANT NO. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(SI

6. PROJECT NO. N/A 702269

T¢. NAJb. -OTIER REPORT NO(SI (Any othartnasb#r. that ••sy be iaI•nsgnd

D - OISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

I1. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

N/A 0ACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

I.. ABSTRACT

17

DD .o.1473 UNCLASSIFI EDS•U eurt CIassfi(ca-ion

BU. S. GOVERNMENT PRITINGC OFFICE: 1970