UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after - ReliefWeb

UN Mediation and the Politics ofTransition after Constitutional Crises

FEBRUARY 2012Charles T. Call

I N T E RNAT I ONA L P E AC E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: A Kyrgyz opposition

supporter hands a national flag to a

fellow demonstrator standing on a

military truck during an anti-govern-

ment protest in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,

on April 7, 2010. ©VYACHESLAV

OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images.

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Adam Lupel, Editor and Senior FellowMarie O’Reilly, Publications Officer

Suggested Citation:

Charles T. Call, “UN Mediation and

the Politics of Transition after

Constitutional Crises,” New York:

International Peace Institute,

February 2012.

© by International Peace Institute,

2012

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CHARLES T. CALL is Associate Professor in the School of

International Service at American University. He is the

editor with Vanessa Wyeth of Building States to Build

Peace (Lynne Rienner 2008).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper was originally prepared for the Policy Planning

Unit of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs.

The author is grateful to a number of UN officials,

especially desk officers in the Department of Political

Affairs and members of the Policy Planning Unit and

Mediation Support Unit who reviewed more than one draft,

and persons at regional organizations and other institu-

tions who provided helpful information and guidance. Many

thanks also to Vanessa Wyeth and Paul Romita at IPI for

their assistance and to Leah Gates, Adam Lupel, and Marie

O'Reilly for their careful editorial eyes.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Concepts and Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Kenya (2007-2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

OVERVIEW AND TIMELINE

MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THE EVOLUTION OFTRANSITION

CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSITIONALARRANGEMENT

LESSONS FROM KENYA

Mauritania (2008-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10


MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THE EVOLUTION OFTRANSITION


LESSONS FROM MAURITANIA

Guinea (2009-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14


MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSITION


LESSONS FROM GUINEA

Madagascar (2008-2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19




LESSONS FROM MADAGASCAR

Kyrgyzstan (2010-2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23




LESSONS FROM KYRGYZSTAN

Trends Across the Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

LESSONS REGARDING TRANSITIONAL POLITICALARRANGEMENTS

LESSONS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL MEDIATIONAND OTHER ROLES

Annex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND CONSULTED

FURTHER READING

1

Executive Summary

Recent coups d’état, unconstitutional changes ofgovernment, and other constitutional crises haveconfronted the UN with a number of recurrentchallenges. Chief among them is the need to ensurea principled, coherent, and effective response thatwill prevent the escalation of violence and facilitatea country’s return to constitutional order. However,the lack of comparative research on transitionalarrangements, clear policy guidance, and policyoptions—let alone mechanisms for strategic coordi-nation—makes this difficult. While the UN hasmany decades of experience in helping to mediateand implement peace agreements after civil wars, ithas comparatively less experience dealing withnon-civil war transitions, and the experience that itdoes have has not been systematically recorded oranalyzed.

This study examines the UN’s experience indealing with five cases of unconstitutional changesof government between 2008 and 2011: in Kenya,Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, and Kyrgyzstan.

International actors seeking to respond to consti-tutional crises face a basic dilemma: condemn theparties responsible, thus taking a principled stancethat may limit capacity to respond; or remain silent,risking criticism but maintaining access and roomfor maneuver that may prove instrumental inhelping to resolve the crisis. In recent years,regional and subregional organizations haveadopted norms rejecting departures from constitu-tional rule. The UN has not.

Regardless what form the constitutional crisistakes, its resolution almost always involves somekind of transitional political arrangements to bridgethe period until a sustainable political settlement isreached or constitutional order restored.Increasingly, some form of international mediationis involved in helping parties reach an agreementon the nature of the transition. Only a decade agothe UN rarely undertook mediation in cases ofcoups and other constitutional crises. However, inrecent years, it has been involved in several suchcases, usually in partnership with regional andsubregional actors.

In each of the cases studied, internationalmediation played an important role in moving theactors towards compromise, and the UN was vitalto these mediation efforts. Despite a relatively weak

mandate to act in cases of constitutional crisis, theUN system has provided crucial technical andpolitical expertise during such crises. Ironically,regional organizations that have led the way indeveloping stronger norms in support of constitu-tional order are often relatively thin on specializedtechnical staff to accompany these processes. UNcapacity and legitimacy are thus likely to lead to acontinued role for the organization in responses tothese types of crises. In many of the cases, the UN’sability to field technical experts to advise mediatorsand parties to the crisis proved extremely valuable.

The cases also reveal a remarkable ability of theUN to work collaboratively and effectively withregional and subregional organizations inmediation efforts. Intergovernmental organizationsoften face real difficulties in working together. Yet,these cases show how successful the UN, the AU,the EU, the OSCE, and ECOWAS have become inresponding to political crises through joint orcollaborative efforts. The cases also reveal a rangeof possibilities for UN mediation support: the UNcan act as primary mediator; provide support toregional, subregional, or bilateral mediators; orprovide electoral and technical assistance orfinancial and logistical support.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize thelimits of international mediation efforts. Wheredetermined leaders come to power with widespreadpopular support through mass mobilization againstan unpopular president, internal support for theircause may trump even strong external pressures.International mediators can influence the menu ofoptions for transitional political arrangements, andeven the selection process; however, such influenceis uncommon. The content of transitional arrange-ments and electoral systems tend to be shapedheavily by precedent. International mediation,however, can influence electoral processes and thecreation of special commissions of inquiry intoviolence or elections, often on the basis of technicaladvice.

In particular, commissions of inquiry offeropportunities to facilitate the restoration of consti-tutional order without sacrificing justice. InGuinea, Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan, commissions ofinquiry were formed to investigate incidentsinvolving mass violations of human rights.

Such commissions helped create an authoritativeaccount of past events. They also helped assure the

2 UN MEDIATION AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION

public that justice had not been entirely set aside,and that some public account of the parties’ respon-sibility would be forthcoming. They facilitated themediation process by “bracketing” the heatedcontroversies over these disputed events, removingthem from the purview of immediate negotiations,and entrusting them to a body that would offer amore impartial and reliable account. Despite theirflaws, these commissions facilitated greater publicacceptance of the transitional arrangements in allthree cases.

The cases suggest that the use of power-sharingmechanisms to resolve either unconstitutionalousters of elected presidents or electoral disputesraises questions for legitimacy, democracy, andstate-society relations. In particular, suchmechanisms risk undermining the legitimacy of theconstitution and elections, risk underminingincentives to participate in future elections, andintroduce the moral hazard of encouraging otherswithin the country and externally to adoptunconstitutional tactics. National and internationalactors, therefore, confront tensions between theshort-term resolution of a constitutional crisis andlong-term support for constitutional and legitimatepolitical processes.

The cases also suggest that electoral disputes posemore risks for legitimation than unconstitutionalousters of duly-elected governments. First, theelectoral processes themselves are directlyimpugned, further undermining the legitimacy ofelectoral processes as mechanisms of representa-tion, expressions of policy preferences, and tools forholding rulers accountable. Second, electionsbecome problematic remedies for restoring consti-tutional order after an electoral dispute. The experi-ences of Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire in recentyears underscore these difficulties, along withKenya. Time and effort is required to restore faithin electoral processes after electoral disputes,making non-electoral remedies, such as temporarypower sharing, more likely in the short run. Third,if power sharing is adopted as a remedy for electoraldisputes, it may endure for a few years. Powersharing after electoral disputes effectively kicks thecan down the road in terms of resolving not justwho has the legitimate right to rule, but whatprocess of selecting rulers will be widely acceptableto the main groups in society. While unconstitu-tional ousters can also encounter this problem, it is

intrinsic to electoral disputes.Finally, the report offers several recommenda-

tions to the UN to ensure that preventive diplomacyand mediation support are coherent and adequatelyresourced: • DPA’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and its

Standby Team of six thematic experts havebecome a hub of accumulated knowledge andhave been successfully deployed in several cases.These capacities are relatively new, and should bestrengthened and institutionalized.

• UN regional offices made singular contributionsto the mediation efforts in several of the cases,particularly Guinea, Mauritania, and Kyrgyzstan.Such offices should be recognized, expanded (aswith the new UN Regional Office for CentralAfrica), and adequately resourced.

• Senior mediators’ prior professional experiencesin other multilateral organizations contributed tothe effective collaboration among internationaland regional organizations. Such crossoverbackgrounds should be considered in futuresenior appointments.

• In strengthening its preventive diplomacy andmediation support capacities, the UN systemshould prepare itself as systematically as possiblefor addressing electoral disputes.

• DPA should enhance its general level ofcommunication with resident coordinators and,in conjunction with UNDP, help ensure that UNcountry teams are as well prepared as possible forthe sorts of challenges likely to arise during apolitical crisis. DPA and UNDP should also findways to expedite the process of appointing anddeploying peace and development advisers.

• The UN system should find ways to createeffective mechanisms to monitor transitionalarrangements, including power sharing and otherefforts at reconciliation, justice, and inclusive,conflict-sensitive development. Monitoringpower-sharing arrangements would offer areference point for national and civil societyactors seeking to ensure inclusion and broadenelite deals to the wider population.

• Finally, the UN should address constitutionalcrises on a case-by-case basis, and be cautiousabout adopting a blanket policy of denouncing alldepartures from constitutional order.

Introduction

Recent coups d’état, unconstitutional changes ofgovernment, and other constitutional crises haveconfronted the UN with a number of recurrentchallenges. Chief among them is the need to ensurea principled, coherent, and effective response thatwill prevent the escalation of violence and facilitatea country’s return to constitutional order. A gooddeal of scholarship is available on issues of closerelevance, including (a) transitions from authori-tarian regimes toward democracy; (b) transitionalarrangements after civil wars; and (c) power-sharing arrangements, including consociation-alism. However, less research is available on transi-tional political arrangements after coups and othercrises that do not occur after warfare.

Several developments make it especially timely toreview the UN’s experience in dealing with suchpolitical crises and the transitional politicalarrangements that emerge from them. First, thepast few years witnessed an apparent resurgence ofthe toppling of sitting presidents, either throughcoups or as a result of mass popular demonstra-tions. The recent political crises in the Arab worldand northern Africa underscore this trend.

Second, a number of disputed elections havesparked crises, leading to violence, displacement,and international intervention. The crisis in Côted’Ivoire following the 2010 elections in that countryis perhaps the most prominent example. Given theUN’s longstanding and unique role in supportingnational elections, and with twenty-three electionsforeseen in 2012 in Africa alone, it is important tolearn from these recent experiences to developbetter strategies for preventing election-relatedviolence.

Third, intergovernmental organizations haveadopted new standards and norms, includingexpulsion and sanctions, that discourage unconsti-tutional changes of government more firmly thanever. These new norms place pressure on leaderswho come to power through unconstitutionalmeans to create inclusive transitional politicalarrangements; to organize open, free, and competi-tive elections promptly; and (often) to excludethemselves from standing for elective office.

Finally, the UN system, including UN countryteams, has increasingly played a role in mediation

efforts after unconstitutional changes of govern-ment, and should therefore be well-prepared todevelop coherent and effective responses, informedby past experience. Only a decade ago the UNrarely undertook mediation in cases of coups andother constitutional crises. This role is relativelynew and follows largely from the innovativeexpansion by regional and subregional organiza-tions of norms rejecting departures from constitu-tional rule. As with other instances of preventivediplomacy and mediation, UN action in constitu-tional crises rests on a weaker mandate than ininterstate or civil wars. Despite this relatively weakmandate, the UN system has ironically providedcrucial technical and political expertise duringconstitutional crises. It has drawn, albeit in an adhoc manner, on emerging and strengthened institu-tional capacities such as the Department of PoliticalAffairs’ (DPA) Mediation Support Unit and itsStandby Team; peace and development advisersthat reflect the strategic partnership between DPAand the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP); special political missions at the regionallevel; DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division; as well asother Secretariat staff, the agencies, and the coordi-nating leadership of the UN country teams.Conversely, regional organizations that have led theway in developing stronger norms in support ofconstitutional order are often relatively thin onspecialized technical staff to accompany theseprocesses. UN capacity and legitimacy are thuslikely to lead to a continued role for the organiza-tion in responses to constitutional crises.

Related to these developments, the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in 2009 called for amore coherent UN response to unconstitutionalchanges in government. There is a pressing need forthe UN to learn from past experiences, tounderstand the constraints and dilemmas faced byUN leadership in the field and at headquarters insuch situations, and to develop guidance for aprincipled and coherent response to future coupsand political crises. Although the current politicalcrises in northern Africa and the Arab world aregenerating their own lessons, earlier experiences indifferent regions are also useful for reflecting on theUN’s capacities and approaches to unconstitutionalchanges of government. Such crises will likelyemerge in diverse regions of the world in the future.

Charles T. Call 3

This report seeks to provide a concise analysis ofUN responses to five cases of unconstitutionalchanges of government selected with input fromDPA’s Policy Planning Unit. The cases were chosenfor three reasons: they were relatively recent consti-tutional crises (since December 2007); the UNplayed an active political role in each; and theyoffered varied political dynamics and experienceswith counterpart organizations. Presented inchronological order, the cases are Kenya (after anelection dispute and related violence in2007–2008), Mauritania (after a military coup in2008), Guinea (after a military coup in 2008),Madagascar (after mass political demonstrationsand military involvement in 2009), and Kyrgyzstan(after mass civilian demonstrations in 2010).

The report offers neither a comprehensive studyof the mediation processes, nor an analysis of thefull range of the causes, character, andconsequences of each transitional arrangement.Instead, it describes the basic elements of the transi-tional arrangements and a brief account of the roleof the UN system, including its relation to otheractors, in the emergence of those interim arrange-ments. The study is not based on interviews withthe full range of international and national actors ineach case, but on a mixture of desk research andinterviews with key UN officials and a handful ofothers involved in post-transition mediation. Eachbrief case study analyzes the transitional politicalarrangement and the mediation efforts, and thendraws lessons from the case. This paper opens bydiscussing some important concepts and termsbefore turning to the case studies and conclusions.

Concepts and Terms

Constitutional crises may derive from varioussources: opposition parties, security forces, massdemonstrations; extrastate armed interventions; orfrom a combination of these. Departures fromconstitutional order may also occur when a sittinggovernment refuses to hold a constitutionallyrequired election, when that election fails to meetconstitutional standards, or when the authoritiesrefuse to recognize the results of a constitutionally-required election process and stay in power.

In other words, departures from constitutionalorder—or constitutional crises—can occur through

either, • an unconstitutional change of government (e.g.,

Guinea’s successful 2008 coup); or • an unconstitutional continuity of government

(e.g., the alleged electoral fraud in Kenya in2007). Contemporary coups and other unconstitutional

ousters of heads of state are almost always followedby a transitional political authority. Transitional orinterim authorities can be national, international,or some combination of the two. They can reflectpower-sharing principles, or not. And sometimes“power sharing” can be limited to like-minded orallied parties, excluding their main opponents or anousted president’s party.• Transitional political authority refers to the

institutional configuration that exercises stateexecutive powers, usually in an extraconstitu-tional formulation, and that has declared itstenure to be limited until rule can be regularized,usually in the form of national elections.Sometimes legislative and judicial powers are alsoincluded in this configuration.

• Transitional political arrangements refer not justto the transitional institutional actors(“authority”) but also to the mechanisms relatedto interim governance and its legitimation. Thesemay include popular consultations, electoralprocesses, referenda, the creation or reallocationof powers of provincial or local authorities,constitutional reforms, and pertinent legalchanges.

• Power sharing refers to a system of governance inwhich minority groups are guaranteed a role intheir own governance through representation inthe state, either through allocated positions orthrough administrative, electoral, or appointiveprocedures (such as mutual vetoes or electoralsystems that favor minorities). Historically,power sharing has referred mainly to “political”power sharing (referring to government posts orprocesses in the legislature or the executivebranch), but recent scholarship has emphasizedfour types of power sharing: political, security(referring to the military, police, or securityforces), economic (referring to access toresources or processes of economic decisionmaking), or territorial (referring to forms of


territorial autonomy).1 Despite the growth ofmultiple forms of power sharing in peaceprocesses, constitutional crises involving coupsand electoral disputes tend to center on politicalpower sharing. Having defined transitional political arrange-

ments following departures from constitutionalorder, what do we know about them? Coups d’étatand political protests themselves have receivedextensive attention. However, less scholarship hasbeen devoted to comparing the disparate politicalarrangements and authorities that follow coups ormass protests.2

The literature on political transitions after civilwars is of value, but with some important caveats.3In a coup d’état, there are no opposing armed partiesthat can be brought to the table based on their claimto legitimacy or control of territory. It is both politi-cally perilous and legally questionable for outsideactors to introduce their military forces, eitherbilaterally or multilaterally. More broadly, outside ofthe civil war context, the role of external mediatorsand intergovernmental organizations tends to bemore diverse and rooted in uncertain mandates.

The democratization literature offers a number ofinsights, and there is an extensive literature ontransitions from authoritarian rule.4 Althoughexternal actors make a difference, transitionalpolitics are driven mainly by national actors andexhibit great uncertainty.5 Where the armed forcesare involved in regime transitions, hardliners andsoftliners within the officer ranks shape whether atransition to civilian rule occurs and how.

However, recent transitions differ from the “third

wave” of democratization in important ways. First,unlike military dictatorships or communistregimes, most of the constitutional orders discussedbelow already met formal definitions of democracy.The logic of international efforts to restoredemocratic constitutional order differs from thelogic of encouraging movement away from priorauthoritarian rule toward democracy.

Second, the restoration of constitutional orderreflects recent norms and commitments adopted byintergovernmental organizations in Africa andLatin America.6 Although European regionalorganizations have long embraced such norms,7 theAfrican Union (AU) and the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) have played much moresalient roles in responding to constitutional crisesof the past few years than they did during the thirdwave of democratization.

Third, recent transitions occur in a very differentglobal milieu in terms of state repression andpopular protest. In contrast to the transitions of thelate 1980s and early 1990s, states today face greaterscrutiny of, resistance to, and accountability forhuman rights violations. Repression of urbanprotests are less likely to stifle dissent and morelikely to provoke greater internal and externalbacklash against a regime. Popular access totechnology and mass communications mean thatnonviolent protests can have wider impact and thatviolence is both documented and denounced undera strengthened human rights framework. Thesedifferences reveal the need for greater scholarlyinquiry into the phenomenon of political transi-tions after constitutional crises.

Charles T. Call 5

1 See Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park, PA: PennsylvaniaState University Press, 2007); Stefan Wolff, “Complex Power-sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in Contemporary Conflict Settlements,”Ethnopolitics 8, No. 1 (2009): 27-45; Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, “Fostering Peace after Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design,”International Studies Quarterly 53, No. 3 (2009): 737-759; Anna K. Jarstad, “Power Sharing: Former Enemies in Joint Government,” in From War to Democracy:Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, edited by Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 105-133.

2 On coups, see Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations (Austin, Tx: University of TexasPress, 2006); and Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard UniversityPress, 1957); A.B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, African Military History and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Patrick J. McGowan, “African MilitaryCoups d’Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41, No. 3 (2003): 339-370.

3 See Michael W. Doyle, “Transitional Authority,” in Stephen Stedman, Elizabeth Cousens, and Donald Rothchild, Ending Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner,2002); Timothy Sisk, “Pathways of the Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War,” in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, The Dilemmas of State-building (New York:Routledge, 2009), pp. 196-224; Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk, From War to Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

4 Some of the more salient works include Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Volumes I-IV(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996);Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in ComparativePerspective (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

5 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions, Volume IV.6 Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); K.O. Kufuor, “The OAU and the

Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analyzing its Practice and Proposals for the Future,” American University International Law Review 17, No. 2 (2002): 369;Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, “A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d’État,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transitional Law 44 (2001): 123-155.

7 Paul J. Kubicek, The European Union and Democratization (New York: Routledge, 2003); Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Kenya (2007-2011)


More than one thousand people died and morethan 350,000 were displaced in the violence thaterupted after national elections in Kenya inDecember 2007.8 Isolated instances of violenceinitially broke out once the Electoral Commissionof Kenya (ECK) announced that President MwaiKibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) hadwon re-election, despite challenger Raila Odinga’sindications that he had a large lead.9 Suspicions ofvote tampering ran high given that Odinga’s OrangeDemocratic Movement (ODM) had garnered asubstantial portion of the parliamentary seats. Asviolence escalated and mediators offered their

services, an AU-mandated Panel of EminentAfrican Personalities chaired by Kofi Annan tookleadership of the mediation effort on January 22,2008. After forty-one days, a settlement wasreached involving a “grand coalition” power-sharing arrangement. President Kibaki wouldremain alongside Odinga as newly empoweredprime minister, with shared cabinet posts and somemutual vetoes on those posts. Although theperceived losing candidate persisted in office,further mass violence was averted. The arrange-ment was ratified by a parliamentary vote and,under a new constitution approved by referendumin 2010, is slated to endure until elections are held,which are now due by March 2013. Further negoti-ations on social and structural issues emerged fromthe negotiations and continued afterward.


8 Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence, "Final Report" (also known as the "Waki Commission Report"), Nairobi, Kenya, October 16, 2008, pp. 351, 383.9 The Kenya case study draws heavily on Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Lianna Kaye, “A Choice for Peace?: The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya,”

New York: International Peace Institute, August 2009.

Kenya: Timeline of Events

December 27, 2007 Presidential and parliamentary elections are held. Interethnic violence erupts as theresults of the presidential election are disputed.

January 10, 2008 Parties to the dispute—the governing Party of National Unity and the OrangeDemocratic Movement—consent to the appointment of Kofi Annan to chair the AUPanel of Eminent African Personalities.

January 22, 2008 The Annan-led panel takes leadership of mediation.

February 28, 2008 The parties sign the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the CoalitionGovernment.

April 1, 2010 The Kenyan National Assembly passes a new constitution.

August 27, 2010 President Kibaki promulgates the constitution after it is approved by 67 percent ina referendum.

March 2013 Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled, but may be held earlier ifthe government is dissolved before then.

MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THEEVOLUTION OF TRANSITION

Several prominent figures offered to mediate withindays of the elections, including Archbishop Tutu,four former African heads of state, and AUChairman Kufuor. By January 10th, the parties hadconsented to the appointment of Kofi Annan aschair of the AU panel that also comprised formerTanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and formerEducation Minister of Mozambique and children’srights advocate Graça Machel. At Mr. Annan’srequest, the UN Development Programme agreedto be the principal mechanism for managing thedonor funds and the personnel contracts for hismediation effort. In addition, he drew principallyon two or three DPA officials to staff his effortswhile in Kenya, plus a staff member from the AUand two or three persons from the Geneva-basedCentre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre).

The ODM’s initial position was that Odinga hadrightfully won the presidential election, andnothing less than his occupying the presidency wasacceptable. The government’s position was that theelectoral commission had spoken, and Kibaki wassworn in within hours of its announced results.Within two weeks, Kibaki had appointed a vicepresident and sixteen cabinet members, accusingthe ODM of criminally inciting mass violence.Kibaki continued to act as president throughout themediation period and has done so to date.

The transitional political arrangement that waseventually embraced emerged from the recognitionthat some sort of power sharing was the only wayforward. The first two hurdles were the questions ofwhat to do about the elections and their results, andabout the consequent violence. These issues fellunder Agenda 1 (the violence and civil liberties)and Agenda 2 (humanitarian crisis and reconcilia-tion) of the talks. The parties variously proposed arecount, the disqualification of votes from certaindistricts, appointment of a new electoral commis-sion, and a prompt repeat of presidential elections.The mediators believed that it would be next toimpossible to ascertain an election result that wouldnot be rejected by one party, and that the massviolence and enormous displacement of peoplewould complicate the process of a new election somuch that it would discredit that option. Themediation team worked closely with, and reliedheavily on, the electoral experts from the UN’s

Electoral Assistance Division in their strictlytechnical capacity, to carefully explain thesecomplications to the parties. This deployment oftechnical expertise was crucial to convincing theparties to abandon their insistence on the electoraloutcome they had worked so hard to secure,perforce opening them to consider alternativegovernance options for the country.

The notion of the “grand coalition” emerged fromdiscussions within the mediation team, includingfrom Mr. Annan himself, and from some Kenyancivil society actors. It came to be seen as the onlyoption that would not lead to renewed bloodshed.These discussions of transitional governance cameunder Agenda 3. Although some among the parties’negotiators resisted the applicability of othercountries’ experiences to the Kenyan context, theuse of international experts on power sharing andits features helped the parties become moreacclimated to the grand-coalition concept andunderstand the technical components of how itmight work.

Signed on February 28, 2008, the Agreement onthe Principles of Partnership of the CoalitionGovernment recognized the stalemate: “Given thecurrent situation, neither side can realisticallygovern the country without the other.” Although aninitial proposal called for the accord to last for twoyears, a five-year timeline was eventually agreed,ending in elections in 2012. The Kenyan HighCourt has now scheduled the elections for March2013, unless the government is dissolved beforethen.

To enact the accord, the National Assemblywithin a month passed a law that added the post ofprime minister and two deputy prime ministers tothe country’s executive. The prime minister wasmandated “to coordinate and supervise theexecution of the functions and affairs of theGovernment of Kenya including those ofMinistries,” but he was not designated as the headof government or of the civil service, introducingambiguity about his authority. Because the processof constitutional reform would be contentious andtime-consuming, the mediators were pleased tohelp the parties find a way to approve the newarrangement by law, without revising the constitu-tion.

AU panel member Graça Machel played a crucial

Charles T. Call 7

role in ensuring the participation of women in themediation process, although women’s issues wereneither mandated nor prominent.10 Women wereprominent in the talks themselves, but the advocacyby women’s groups in civil society had more impacton the inclusion of women’s issues in theagreement. Women’s groups organized themselvesactively, and Ms. Machel facilitated discussions thatrendered them more unified and effective. Diversewomen’s groups also initiated reconciliation initia-tives at the local level, and pressed for victims’perspectives to be included in the inquiry into thepost-election violence and in measures to redressthe wrongs committed.

In addition to these negotiations overgovernance, Agenda 4 took up “long-term issues,”including legal and institutional reforms, landreform, poverty and inequality, national cohesion,and impunity. Pursuant to these negotiations, andderiving largely from the involvement of Kenya’sactive civil society, numerous measures wereadopted to address these long-term “Agenda 4”issues, such that the phrase even gained broadrecognition in Kenyan public discourse. Theseincluded the creation of a Truth, Justice andReconciliation Commission (TJRC) and,subsequently, of the National Cohesion andIntegration Commission (NCIC), and theCommission of Experts for drafting the new consti-tution. The panel also created, in consultation withthe parties and civil society, a Coordination andLiaison Office (CLO) in August 2008 to monitorand support the implementation of the agreements.

A new constitution was drafted and discussed in2009 and 2010, passed by the National Assembly inApril 2010, and upheld in a referendum by 67percent of the vote. It took effect in August 2010following its promulgation by President Kibaki.The new constitution institutionalized many of thereforms that emerged from Agenda 4 of the priornegotiations. It expanded the number of seats in theNational Assembly, adding a woman memberelected from each of roughly forty-seven counties;created a senate representing the regions; devolved

power from provinces down to the counties, each ofwhich will have a directly-elected governor; createdcounty assemblies; required that women compriseone-third of all elected bodies; and recognized newsocioeconomic rights. A November 2009“harmonized draft constitution,” drafted by acommittee of experts after popular consultations,had recommended that the prime minister post beretained as head of government, as stipulated in theFebruary power-sharing accord. However, the finalversion passed by Parliament dropped the primeminister post and embraced a presidential system,albeit one with reduced powers for the presidentand more checks and balances.CONSEQUENCES OF THETRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT

The transition from the constitutional crisis willremain incomplete until the 2013 elections install anew elected government. Nevertheless, themediated power-sharing arrangement in Kenya iswidely seen as having prevented a resumption ofmass ethnic violence and possibly civil war orgenocide. Admittedly, justice for election-relatedviolence has not been achieved; impunity andcorruption persist;11 civil society sees many missedopportunities for enhancing their role ingovernance and holding the state more account-able; and little headway has been made inaddressing Kenya’s socioeconomic problems. Thepower-sharing arrangement may even collapsebefore the elections are due to be held.12 However,the mediation effort and the grand-coalitionarrangement reversed the rising tide of ethnicviolence in the wake of the election. It alsogenerated a series of promising reform initiativeson justice, reconciliation, and tolerance, whoseresults are not yet clear.

The mediation experience was positive for theUnited Nations as an organization, as it was for theAfrican Union, influencing subsequent responsesin Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire. It showed that theUN could provide its technical expertise inmediation support to other organizations and do soin collaboration with others like the HD Centre,


10 This paragraph draws mainly on Meredith Preston-McGhie and E. Njoki Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers: Women’s Participation in the Kenya National Dialogue,”HD Centre report, March 2011, available at www.hdcentre.org/publications/beyond-numbers-womens-participation-kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation .

11 Some criticize the creation of forty ministries, undertaken to accommodate the parties’ interests in holding government posts, for making it more difficult tomonitor corruption. Jim Fisher, “Clinton, Africa Experts Laud Kenya Constitution Reform Process Ambassador Ranneberger hopes ‘historic opportunity’ is notlost,” December 8, 2009, available at www.america.gov/st/democracyhr-english/2009/December/200912081350591EJrehsiF6.330073e-02.html .

12 On January 30, 2011, Mr. Annan publicly expressed concern about the need for greater consultation in senior cabinet appointments by the Kibaki administration.

http://eng.24.kg/community/2010/08/19/13188.html

www.hdcentre.org/publications/beyond-numbers-womens-participation-kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation

without concern for being in the lead. LESSONS FROM KENYA

The panel’s mediation was well executed andoffers numerous positive lessons. Kofi Annan wasa high-profile choice as mediator, unifying theAfrican Union mandate and his past as UNSecretary-General. He insisted on exclusivity asmediator, and exhibited sound judgment at keymoments. He insisted that the parties not revert toseparate mediators, and managed public relationsextremely well, placing public pressure on theparties without giving them a chance to walk away,all the while cognizant that mass violence mightbreak out if the talks were seen to falter. When theparties seemed to reach an impasse on February26th, his decision to suspend the talks and engageexclusively with the two principals placed the onuson Kibaki and Odinga, who stood to lose supportand standing if the talks failed, but to reap consid-erable power and acclaim if they succeeded. A power-sharing arrangement is more feasible

and likely where each side holds a card that isindispensable to governance, providing compa -rable or mutual vetoes. Odinga’s ODM enjoyed awidespread perception that it had won the vote,whereas President Kibaki held the levers of statepower (including the armed forces and the courts)and had the ECK’s decision in his favor. TheIndependent Review Commission (IREC) on the2007 elections, which arose out of the mediationprocess, concluded that the electoral process andresults were so polluted that it was impossible todetermine who won the presidential elections. Thissituation contrasts sharply with societies where asitting president flees the country or has lostcontrol of the coercive forces or other state organs.Electoral assistance and monitoring can play

vital roles in mediating governance disputes. Thegreater accuracy and certainty that independentexit polling and electoral monitoring can achieve,the greater the confidence with which internal andexternal actors can address competing claims tovictory. In addition, the technical expertise of the

DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) officialsin Kenya was crucial to concluding that neither arecount nor a rerun of the balloting would producea conclusive outcome in the wake of the violence.The political accord and an end to election-

related violence were achieved without providingamnesties or embracing impunity. The creation ofmutually acceptable mechanisms to investigate thepost-election violence and the electoral systemwere crucial to opening the way for a politicalagreement. In turn, despite some setbacks, Kenya’sinterim power-sharing arrangement has facilitateda number of steps toward improving communalrelations and human rights under Agenda 4. Mediation efforts to address constitutional

crises benefit from incorporating women’s partic-ipation and concerns, including inquiries intomass atrocities. Civil society organizations were animportant ally in this effort. One participantsuggested that the incorporation of civil society’sviews would have been improved with a moreformal mechanism for relating to the mediationprocess and with a full-time staff memberdedicated to supporting engagement with civilsociety, as well as a gender adviser. The continued existence of the panel, and the

creation of a mechanism for monitoring andfollow-on engagement with civil society, havecontributed to the implementation of the accord,especially Agenda 4, and the life of the transitionalarrangement. The Panel, under Mr. Annan’sleadership, has issued implementation reports andmade statements at crucial moments to remind theparties of their obligations and support civilsociety’s monitoring efforts. The Coordination andLiaison Office (CLO) has sponsored anindependent Kenyan organization to issue regularreports on the implementation of the accord.Although some civil society organizations wouldlike to see the CLO take more initiative to stimulatereforms, rather than support Kenyan processesthrough monitoring, the CLO has positivelysustained attention on the accords.

Charles T. Call 9

Mauritania (2008-2010)


On August 6, 2008, a bloodless coup deposedPresident Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, who hadbeen elected following a 2005 coup. GeneralMohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, one of four militarygenerals fired by President Abdallahi earlier thatday, led the coup and became the head of the newjunta, called the High Council of State (HCE).Abdallahi was held prisoner until international andnational pressure led to his release in December2008. Major donors and the AU condemned thecoup and called for the release of the president andhis active participation in resolving the crisis andrestoring constitutional order.

After months of little progress, the HCEproposed that Aziz resign in favor of a transitionalgovernment and that elections be held in June 2009.

This plan was initially rejected by the opposition.Talks mediated by Senegal’s President AbdoulayeWade, with active UN support, led to the declara-tion by Abdel Aziz in April 2009 that he wouldresign as head of the HCE and stand for elections tobe held in June. When no opposition candidatesconsented to participate, further negotiation effortson the part of the UN, the AU, and the Arab League,led to the Dakar Agreement, in which the HCEwould recognize Abdallahi as president in order forhim to resign that position in favor of an interim“national unity” administration headed by theSenate President Ba Mamadou Mbaré, the country’sfirst black head of state. The presidential electionwas postponed until July 18, 2009. Abdel Aziz wonthat election with a 52 percent majority, obviating asecond round, and leading to his swearing in aspresident in August 2009. International sanctionswere dropped, and the AU restored Mauritania’sstatus.


Mauritania: Timeline of Events

August 6, 2008 President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi is deposed in a bloodless coup by GeneralMohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who (along with three other military generals) hadbeen sacked by Abdallahi earlier that same day. Abdel Aziz takes charge of the newjunta, called the High Council of State (HCE).

February 2009 The AU adopts targeted financial and travel sanctions on coup leaders.

April 2009 Abdel Aziz offers to resign as head of the HCE and stand for elections scheduled forJune, but no other candidates agree to participate.

June 2, 2009 The Dakar Agreement is signed after intensive mediation efforts led by SenegalesePresident Abdoulaye Wade on behalf of the AU. The agreement calls for a coalitionof national unity upon the “voluntary” resignation of President Abdallahi.

June 27, 2009 Abdallahi resigns.

July 18, 2009 Presidential elections are held, with General Abdel Aziz claiming a first-roundvictory with 52 percent of the vote in a peaceful balloting process, thus obviating theneed for a second round. Subsequently, the AU drops its sanctions.

August 5, 2009 Abdel Aziz is sworn in as president.

MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THEEVOLUTION OF TRANSITION

Immediately after the August 6, 2008, coup, aneleven-member High Council of State (HCE) wasformed entirely of senior military officers,including Abdel Aziz. It placed President Abdallahiunder house arrest without access to mediators. OnSeptember 14th, a majority of the National Assemblyadopted a resolution effectively recognizing theHCE, calling for a broad dialogue process thatwould include the international community and thepolitical opposition, and proposing a roadmap for areturn to constitutional order that includedpresidential elections within fourteen months, therevitalization of the Independent National ElectoralCommission (CENI), and a broad-based coalitiongovernment. Once it was clear that the HCE wouldnot provide guarantees that its members wouldabstain from standing in the proposed newelections, the members of Parliament (MPs) of the“legal opposition” Rally of Democratic Forces(RFD) led by Ahmed Ould Daddah split from thepro-coup majority of the ninety-five-memberParliament. In addition, members of civil society,supporters of President Abdallahi, and othergroups opposed to the coup formed the NationalFront for the Defense of Democracy (FNDD). Thisconstant and significant, albeit minority, oppositionto the coup marked a departure from the relativelyweak response to Mauritania’s several previouspost-independence coups.

The international community reacted swiftly tocondemn the coup. The AU suspended Mauritania;and the UN, the EU, and the AU called for theimmediate release of the president and a return toconstitutional order. The EU, its member states, andthe USA suspended non-humanitarian aid, and theAU Peace and Security Council eventually adoptedtargeted financial and travel sanctions against thecoup leaders in February 2009. The UN Secretary-General expressed regret over the coup and calledfor the immediate restoration of constitutionalorder. Said Djinnit, in his capacity as SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) forWest Africa, and head of the Dakar-based UNOffice for West Africa (UNOWA), promptlyembarked for the Mauritanian capital Nouakchottafter the coup to assess the situation and provideguidance to the UN country team. The president ofthe AU Commission on Peace and Security also

traveled there to assess the situation, as did theArab League and La Francophonie. In the contextof Article 96 of the Cotoneau Agreements, the EUalso invited the HCE to engage in consultations onthe return to constitutional order in October 2008.The talks failed miserably. An international contactgroup for Mauritania was formed, chaired by theAU, which convened outside of Mauritania butreceived strong lobbying from the FNDD and theHCE each time they met.

In the absence of much flexibility on the part ofthe HCE, no official mediation was initiated in theweeks following the coup. SRSG Djinnit urged theHCE to send a high-level delegation to a consulta-tive meeting of the AU Commission in AddisAbaba on November 10th, which the governmentdid, along with a statement of its position. Thisexchange of views provided the HCE with a clearerunderstanding of the international community’sexpectations. In December, under intense interna-tional pressure, the HCE transferred PresidentAbdallahi to the village of Lemden and permittedhim to receive visitors and speak as the country’spresident but not to exercise other duties. This stepopened the way for Abdallahi to make a January2009 proposal for new elections conditional on theend of military rule, and for him to eventuallybecome part of a resolution of the crisis.

On February 12th, the HCE proposed conditionsfor a June 6, 2009, election, including the plan toappoint an Independent National ElectoralCommission; for the Senate president to act asinterim president; for the prime minister andcabinet to formally resign but continue running thestate for forty-five days before the balloting; and forthe limitation of the functions of the HCE tonational security issues. Mr. Daddah’s RFD rejectedthe proposal as undertaken without consultationand locking in the election of Gen. Abdel Aziz. Itproposed instead the creation of a transitionalnational unity government to replace the militaryin power, and the non-candidacy of the HCE forelections to be scheduled later. Pursuant to theseproposals in early 2009, the AU Chair MuammarQaddafi undertook mediation efforts, which failed.

Subsequently, Senegal’s President Wade and hisforeign ministry engaged the parties seeking a basisfor agreement. In May the AU, the UN, and theArab League became involved in these efforts,which eventually led to the Dakar Agreement of

Charles T. Call 11

June 2, 2009. Much of the government’s proposalwas contained in the accord, except the date of theelections was postponed until July 18, 2009, and acoalition of national unity appointed by PresidentAbdallahi would take effect upon the “voluntary”resignation of President Abdallahi. The accordstipulated that the government portfolios would bedistributed fifty–fifty between the parliamentarysupporters of Gen. Abdel Aziz and those of theopposition FNDD and RFD. The prime ministerwas proposed by Abdel Aziz, whereas the ministersof the interior (overseeing the police and elections),finance, and communication were proposed by theopposition factions. The CENI would be composedof fifteen members, of whom eight would be fromthe two opposition “poles,” four from the HCE, andthe president, vice president, and another memberproposed by civil society. The accord stipulatedother measures to ensure full participation and freecompetition in the campaign period. It alsostipulated continued national dialogue on otherpoints, including preventing future unconstitu-tional changes of government, security-sectorreform, good governance, human rights, reconcili-ation, and socioeconomic development.

After three weeks of further negotiations over therelegation of the HCE to a national security bodysubordinate to the transitional government,Abdallahi resigned on June 27th. The electionsoccurred as agreed, with Gen. Abdel Aziz achievingfirst-round victory (his nearest competitor from theFNDD received 16 percent) in a peaceful ballotingprocess. The CENI declared the elections free andfair and recognized the results, although its RFD-nominated president resigned over concerns aboutfraud. While Gen. Abdel Aziz did resign from boththe government and the military, his candidacydiverged from a recent AU pattern of discouragingtransitional leaders brought to power throughcoups from standing in presidential elections.Although the FNDD and the RFD complained ofelectoral irregularities, the internationalcommunity followed the CENI findings andrecognized the election as having restored constitu-tional order. Subsequently, the Abdel Aziz govern-ment showed reticence in implementing theprovisions on national dialogue in the DakarAccord.

In terms of the UN role, SRSG Djinnit and theresident coordinator supported the AU chair, the

AU Commission, Senegal, and the internationalcontact group throughout the process. A high-levelUN panel was also deployed for a weeksurrounding the July 18th elections, to assess theenvironment for the elections, monitor the processand its results, and report back to the Secretary-General. Although a UN peace and developmentadviser (PDA) was slated to be deployed in April2010, this process was delayed by UN procedures,leading to only a one-month deployment in July2010. Another PDA was slated to deploy toMauritania in spring 2011. In addition, theDecember 2008 decision by the UN CredentialsCommittee to accept the credentials of the HCEgovernment’s officials proved an embarrassingincident that might have complicated the UN’sstance vis-à-vis the opposition in mediation efforts.CONSEQUENCES OF THETRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT

During the first four months after the 2008 coup,the HCE held firm, unrelenting in its insistence ondetaining the elected president and overseeing aprocess of normalization without regard for theinternal opposition or international criticism. Thesupport of the National Assembly helped provide aveneer of legitimacy inside Mauritania, althoughthe HCE’s desire for external legitimacy andfinancial support ultimately proved decisive. Thecountry’s finances were seriously threatened by thecutoff of non-humanitarian aid, and in its dealingswith international actors the HCE emphasized itsinterest in combating Islamic extremism andterrorism.

The mediated transition redounded positively onthe UN, especially UNOWA and the UN countryteam, as well as the AU. At the same time, theinternational community and the oppositionparties all chose, largely because they had few otherrealistic options, to participate in a transitionprocess that defied the prevailing norm ofpreventing transitional leaders after coups frombenefitting electorally from their role in unconsti-tutional rupture. LESSONS FROM MAURITANIA

Coup-generated rulers, even where the priorpresident has been ousted, can still be persuadedto undergo a negotiated transition to restoreconstitutional order.Although President Abdallahihad not left the country, he was held prisoner and


could no longer readily mobilize political followersor units of the armed forces. Nevertheless, aftermonths of little movement in talks, General Azizwas persuaded to accept constitutional reforms, tostep down and to stand for new elections. Similarly,the political opposition acceded to an impossiblyquick timetable for elections, seeming to believethat a fraud-free election, even with an onerouslyshort campaign on a questionable playing field, wasthe best among bad options. Its demands for thenon-eligibility of coup leaders in the elections wentunheeded.Although the transition was highly orchestrated

under a power dynamic heavily favoring the HCE,the format of the transitional government ofnational unity holds some lessons. The agreementby the HCE to split the ministries with the opposi-tion in the run up to elections, including theopposition’s control over functions of keyconcern—the electoral commission and theministers of interior and finance—represented areal concession. It successfully brought the opposi-tion into a political process to restore constitution-ality and to ensure, at least on paper, continueddialogue over the important challenges facinggovernance and Mauritanian society. At the sametime, once the international community recognizedthe restoration of constitutionality and diminishedits scrutiny, the government largely disregarded thedialogue promised in the Dakar Accord, jeopard-izing the possibility of addressing the governance,socioeconomic, and other problems that underlaythe coup.The UN played a supportive and facilitative role

in the mediation, despite the lack of a mediationmandate. SRSG Djinnit shuttled among the actors,worked to persuade the de facto authorities of thebenefits of a return to constitutionality, helpedcoordinate the international community, andoffered advice to the AU-led mediation. His priorfamiliarity with the actors, knowledge and supportof the AU, and willingness to assist the AU andPresident Wade and his mediation team facilitateda cohesive international effort and communicationamong all actors. The UN country team, and specifically the

resident coordinator, played a helpful role. Thecountry team provided a convening space for thediplomatic delegations; met frequently with keyopposition leaders, political authorities, and civilsociety leaders; facilitated exchange of their views;kept UNOWA apprised of events as they unfolded;all while managing the UN’s political profilecarefully to continue the country team’s projects.Resident Coordinator Maria de Valle Ribeirodeployed political skills to keep channels openamong the political actors, drawing on a compara-tive advantage in a country where few othersubregional or international actors had an in-country presence. Earlier UNDP projects facili-tating dialogue, both after the 2003 coup attemptand again after the 2005 coup, laid the groundworkfor UNDP to play this role again in 2008. UNDPhad carefully framed its earlier dialogue effortsaround the MDGs in order not to inflame politicalsensitivities. The 2008 experience showed strongcollaboration among the UN country team, theSecretariat, and UNOWA, as well as EAD.

Charles T. Call 13

Guinea (2009-2010)


On December 23, 2008, six hours after the death ofGuinea’s longtime ruler Lansana Conté, a coupd’état was announced by Capt. Moussa DadisCamara on behalf of a group called the NationalCouncil for Democracy and Development(CNDD). The military junta dissolved the institu-tions of government and suspended the constitu-tion and all political and union activity. Partly dueto longstanding fears that Conté’s death wouldusher in civil unrest and the belief that the return toconstitutional rule would be swift, the coup initiallyenjoyed some support, with large crowds taking tothe streets to welcome the new rulers.

Negotiations commenced between the CNDDand the Forces Vives, a collection of civil society andpolitical groups, with mediation led by the AU andEconomic Community Of West African States(ECOWAS) as co-chairs of an international contactgroup. The talks enjoyed active UN support underthe leadership of regional SRSG Said Djinnit. InApril, Dadis Camara seemed to renege on earlierpledges that members of the CNDD would notstand for elections, leading to protests. Governmentforces suppressed a demonstration in September2009 with violence, leading to mass atrocities andmore than 150 deaths. In response, the UNestablished a commission of inquiry. As theinquiry’s report neared release in December, DadisCamara blamed a lieutenant for the atrocities, and


Guinea: Timeline of Events

December 23, 2008 Longtime ruler Lansana Conté dies. Capt. Moussa Dadis Camara takes control ofthe state on behalf of a coup junta called the National Council for Democracy andDevelopment (CNDD), dissolving government institutions and suspending theconstitution and all political and union activities.

April 2009 Dadis Camara publicly begins to suggest that CNDD members may participate inelections later in the year, reneging on an earlier promise, while also continuing todelay the promised formation of a national transitional council.

September 28, 2009 Military and security forces suppress demonstrations convened by the Forces Vives,committing mass rapes and mutilation, and killing more than 150 people.

October 16, 2009 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon establishes a commission of inquiry to investi-gate the atrocities, supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR).

December 3, 2009 Lt. Aboubacar “Toumba” Diakité shoots Dadis Camara in the head, leading to hisevacuation to Morocco for medical attention, after Dadis Camara blamed Diakitéand others for the September killings and abuses. Defense Minister Sékouba Konatéassumes power as interim president in Dadis Camara’s absence.

December 2009 The commission of inquiry’s report names members of the security forces thatcommitted serious violations of human rights in September.

January 15, 2010 The Ouagadougou Accord is signed, providing a roadmap to return to constitu-tional order.

June 27, 2010 The first round of presidential elections is held. Cellou Dalein Diallo receives 44percent of the vote; Alpha Condé receives 18 percent.

November 7, 2010 The second round of presidential elections is held amid violence and after contro-versy over the electoral commission and process. Alpha Condé is declared thevictor, and Diallo concedes.

December 21, 2010 Alpha Condé is sworn in as president with legislative elections still pending.

the latter then shot Dadis Camara in the head. Thede facto leader was flown out of the country, andDefense Minister Sékouba Konaté assumed poweron an interim basis.

The next month, in January 2010, Konaté, DadisCamara, and the Forces Vives reached an agreementbrokered by Burkina Faso’s President Campoaré,who had assumed the lead mediator role after theSeptember violence. The Ouagadougou Accordprovided for presidential elections, whose firstround took place in June. After delays andcontention over the electoral process and electoralcommission, a second round occurred in the wakeof incidents of violence. Opposition leader AlphaCondé was declared the winner, a result accepted bythe defeated candidate and recognized by theinternational contact group. Condé assumed powerand has ruled without a parliament, pendinglegislative elections which were scheduled for lateDecember 2011, before being postponed.MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THEEVOLUTION OF TRANSITION

The AU and ECOWAS condemned the coup, whichwas also the path by which Conté himself had cometo power twenty-four years earlier. Both organiza-tions suspended Guinea from participating in theiractivities, and the US and other donors suspendedall but humanitarian assistance. The AU andECOWAS, with the support of the United Nations,established the International Contact Group onGuinea, comprising Guinea’s external partners. Thegroup was co-chaired by the AU and ECOWAS,who respectively named as envoys ProfessorIbrahima Fall, the special envoy appointed by theAU for Guinea, and Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas,the president of the ECOWAS Commission. SRSGDjinnit played a facilitating role in the mediationfrom January through September 2009. UNOWAstaff and other UN agencies provided importanttechnical support for the mediation effort. Guinea’sForces Vives, representing the country’s very activecivil society and political parties, played animportant role in the negotiations as the mainorganized force seeking a return to civilian rule.

The first phase of the mediation efforts, fromJanuary to April 2009, seemed to hold promise forrestoring constitutional order. The CNDD showeda willingness to consent to the three main demandsof the Forces Vives and the international

community: (a) the establishment of a nationaltransitional council (CNT) with civilian andmilitary participation; (b) the establishment of aconsultative forum involving civil society; and (c)the non-participation of the military, including themembers of the CNDD, as candidates in theelections. The contact group met monthly with themain protagonists in Conakry. Beginning in April,however, Dadis Camara began to suggest that hemight present himself as a candidate in theelections. This became a sticking point in thetransition, as the Forces Vives insisted on the non-candidacy of the members of the junta in elections.Very little progress was made by the junta on theestablishment of a transitional council. The negoti-ations, staffed mainly by ECOWAS (including anofficial posted permanently in Conakry) withoccasional support from AU staff members, madelittle headway in resolving this standoff about theconditions for ending the unconstitutional rule.

In the context of increasing frustration at theCNDD’s resistance to forming a transitional councilor abstaining from candidacy, the Forces Vivesconvened street demonstrations. On September 28,2009, elements of the defense and security forcesfired on protesters gathered in Conakry’s mainstadium and committed gross human rightsviolations including mass rapes, mutilation, andtorture. More than 150 people were killed. Nationaland international outrage ensued, leading to ahardening of positions by the opposition forces.ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo in October,and appointed a sitting head of state, PresidentBlaise Compaoré, to lead the mediation effort, incontinued collaboration with Dr. Chambas ofECOWAS, the AU’s Professor Fall, and SRSGDjinnit. The UN, the EU, and the USA imposedtargeted sanctions on CNDD leaders.

The UN played a crucial role in the wake of theSeptember killings. The Secretary-Generalimmediately established a commission of inquiryinto the events, led by the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) withthe support of the Department of Political Affairsand the Office of Legal Affairs. The inquiry,completed by December 2009, concluded thatvarious soldiers and security forces had committedcrimes against humanity as part of systematicattacks, for which the government bore responsi-bility. It also named certain individuals as bearing

Charles T. Call 15

direct responsibility and recommended that they befurther investigated with a view to beingprosecuted. In anticipation of the report that wouldimplicate himself and junta members, DadisCamara stated that Lt. Aboubacar “Toumba”Diakité held responsibility and had acted on hisown authority.13 On December 3, 2009, Diakité shotDadis Camara in the head, leading to his evacua-tion for medical treatment in Morocco.14 Thedefense minister, Sékouba Konaté, assumed theinterim presidency of the country during DadisCamara’s absence.

This change of leadership, amid heightenedinternational and national pressure, opened the wayto the crucial Ouagadougou Accord of January 15,2010, which would provide a roadmap for thereturn to constitutional order. Dadis Camara, whohad boarded a plane in Morocco expecting to arriveto cheering supporters in Conakry, instead arrivedin Ouagadougou. There, President Compaoré wasable to facilitate an agreement between Konaté,Dadis Camara, opposition figures, and members ofthe contact group. The agreement provided for anational transitional council, including a primeminister named from the Forces Vives, a first roundof presidential elections by June 2010, internation-ally-supported security-sector reforms, and thenon-participation in elections by officials in theCNDD, active military officers, or members of thetransitional council. Dadis Camara endorsed theaccord and indicated he would remain outside thecountry receiving medical treatment. In recogni-tion of this breakthrough, and despite misgivingsabout the CNDD’s continued participation in thetransitional council and its continued control overthe security forces, France and the US restoredsome bilateral assistance, while the EU eased sometargeted sanctions. The Electoral AssistanceDivision and UNDP helped mobilize funds forelection preparations. The first round of electionsfor president were held on June 27, 2010, in whichMr. Cellou Dalein Diallo received 44 percent of thevote and Mr. Alpha Condé, a longtime opponent ofConté, received 18 percent.

After the first round had been held, themediation effort focused largely on the electoralprocess. The parties and other observers raisedquestions about the National Independent ElectoralCommission (CENI): its role in fraud in certainareas of the first round, its favoritism toward onecandidate or ethnic group, whether its leader orentire membership should be replaced, and bywhom. The Condé campaign alleged problemsdistributing ballots and incidents of fraud,demanding reforms to the CENI. Three monthsafter the first round of voting, a Guinean courtsentenced the CENI’s president, Ben Sékou Sylla,and its planning director to a year in jail for fraud.Cellou Diallo denounced Sékou Sylla’s replacementas president of the CENI, Louceny Camara, forhaving stolen 109 electoral registers during the firstround, and in October a court sentenced this latestCENI president to a year in jail for fraud as well.These accusations and legal problems over theelectoral commission delayed the second roundconsiderably. Neither Diallo nor Condé could agreeon a new head for the commission, partly becauseof disagreements over the ethnicity of the personsproposed. Throughout this period, the EADprovided technical assistance, coordination, andmobilization of resources. Because Condé’scampaign had been less well organized andprepared than that of Diallo, some observersbelieve the former saw benefit in delaying thesecond round, whereas Diallo pressed to hold thesecond round promptly. Eventually Malian Gen.Siaka Sangaré, an elections expert who had beenassisting the electoral commission, was appointedto lead the CENI through the second round.

The second round occurred on November 7,2010, following instances of violence, and Mr.Alpha Condé was declared the winner. The militarydeclared a state of emergency, and some Diallosupporters, many from the Fula ethnic group,blocked streets in protest of the result. Dialloeventually conceded defeat, and President Condéwas sworn into office on December 21, 2010,marking the successful return to constitutionalorder.


13 John Lee Anderson, “Downfall of a Dictator,” The New Yorker, April 9, 2010.14 Two weeks later, Diakité said he had shot Dadis Camara because the latter had betrayed democracy and because “He [Camara] tried to blame me for the events of

Sept. 28.” See “Guinea Aide Admits Shooting Moussa Dadis Camara,” The Guardian, December 16, 2009, available atwww.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/16/guinea-aide-shoot-camara .

www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/16/guinea-aide-shoot-camara

CONSEQUENCES OF THETRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The transitional arrangements held importantconsequences. Initially the coup inspired reliefinternally and externally at the prospect that thelong-awaited succession after the nearly 25-year-rule of President Conté would not lead to massviolence or civil war. However, within a few monthsthe putschists had reignited apprehensions thatthey would not permit a democratic process andwould cling to power. Insecurity amid militiasnewly formed by the government and heightenedethnic tensions emerged in 2009, as no progresswas made in the negotiations.

The transitional arrangements that emerged fromthe Ouagadougou Agreement reflected concessionsto the Forces Vives but also a compromise, as severalmilitary members of the CNDD remained incabinet positions. The initial positive reception ofthe Guinean coup poses the question of whether aprotocol that locks the UN system into denouncingcoups is desirable. At the same time, the failure ofthe UN to issue a statement in response to the couplent support to the notion that the UN recognizedthe CNDD when it initiated contact with it formediation. The UN’s role in the mediation wascharacterized by positive collaboration withECOWAS and the AU, instilling support for acollaborative style and a technical assistance rolefor the subregional and regional organizations insuch situations. The return to constitutional orderis largely attributable to external mediation, ofwhich the UN was a crucial component.LESSONS FROM GUINEA

The death of the sitting president proved adeparture point for the initial crisis. This is oftenthe case, where succession opportunities lead tofear and institutional uncertainty, and people act totake advantage of such windows preemptively, outof fear that others will. Planners should anticipatesuch moments.When the coup occurred, the lack of an

incumbent in the presidency, or even a clearlyorganized political force dominating the state,meant that no salient counterweight or alternativeexisted for either internal opponents or externalactors condemning the departure from constitu-tional rule. The fact that the coup plotters issuedfrom the armed forces and were able to prevent

open dissent within those forces, even as theysacked senior commanders, helped consolidatetheir power and reduce violence. But it also leftthem largely unchallenged in their control of thestate.

While a clear violation of law and internationalstandards, the shooting and effective disabling ofthe junta president, Dadis Camara, proveddecisive in removing the main roadblock to anegotiated agreement on the return to constitu-tional rule. Dadis Camara’s mixed signals about hiswillingness to stand for office had become the mainobstacle to an agreed-upon electoral path. When,after Dadis Camara’s departure from Guinea,Konaté returned to the CNDD’s earlier commit-ment not to stand for office in presidentialballoting, the mediation moved forward andresulted in the Ouagadougou Accord of January 15,2010, which ultimately served as the roadmap forthe successful return to constitutional rule.The highly coordinated and smooth mediation

efforts among ECOWAS, the AU, and the UNproved crucial. The mediation effort was unifiedfairly quickly, building on the strong responseagainst the coup by the regional and subregionalactors and major donors. The UN played animportant role in facilitating the mediation effortsuntil the appointment by ECOWAS of PresidentCompaoré, whom Mr. Djinnit then played an activeand key role in supporting. Mr. Djinnit and his staffproposed mediation strategies to the othermediators, keeping them informed of develop-ments, calling them frequently, picking them upwith the UN airplane that proved crucial for hiswork, and ensuring the support of the diplomaticcommunity for a united regional-subregional-UNeffort.The Guinea case showed that transitional justice

can complement and reinforce, rather thancontradict, mediation efforts. Much of the litera-ture on democratic transitions and onpeacebuilding points to the danger of threateningpolitical elites with prosecution for human rightsabuses, which may leave them little incentive torelinquish power or make concessions. However, inGuinea the commission of inquiry proved crucialin dividing and weakening the CNDD (albeitunintentionally and indirectly), and in ending therule of Dadis Camara while hardening the resolveof the opposition. The inquiry responded to

Charles T. Call 17


popular outrage over atrocities, and was a necessarymeasure to signal international condemnation andintolerance of such acts. It also represented apositive instance of collaboration between theOHCHR, UNOWA, UNDP, and the Forces Vives.The UN Office for West Africa offered a useful

mechanism for joint mediation efforts and anofficial of sufficient rank and standing, whose writrequired maintaining ongoing contacts in thecountry and monitoring political developments.The specific characteristics of SRSG Said

Djinnit also constituted a positive element for anumber of reasons worth considering for futurecomparable appointments. Aside from being aknown, respected, and accomplished diplomat inthe region, Mr. Djinnit embodies many recentdevelopments in African multilateralism, region-alism, and good governance. He was commissionerfor peace and security of the AU, and played a rolein creating the AU Peace and Security Council, theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism, and theDeclaration on the Framework for an OAUResponse to Unconstitutional Changes ofGovernment. This background, as well as crossoverappointments (to regional, UN, and subregionalorganizations), in the person of an SRSG facilitatedcollaborative relationships among the differentactors. The AU envoy, Ibrahima Fall, also reflectedthis crossover experience, having served as UNregional coordinator for the Great Lakes region andheld a number of other senior UN posts.Basing representatives of the international

mediating organizations in Conakry, including asenior mediation adviser deployed by UNOWA,proved helpful in apprising the principalmediators of developments and advising them onstrategy. In June 2010, after a delay of three months,Mr. Bakary Dabo was deployed as senior mediationadviser to UNOWA, based in Conakry. PresidentCompaoré appointed his former army chief of staff,Ali Traoré, to be his special representative in

Guinea. These postings, which also required a smallnumber of support personnel, were funded througha grant from the UN’s Peacebuilding Fund in auseful collaboration. The Guinea case also shows the importance of

international mediation on issues related to boththe politics and the technical details of a nation’selectoral tribunal or commission. The technicalexperts played an important role in explaining whyrenewed elections would not provide a technicallysatisfactory election outcome, much less one thatwould be above reproach politically.The International Contact Group on Guinea,

created after the AU consultative meeting inJanuary 2009, considerably facilitated dialoguebetween the Forces Vives and the military junta.The international contact group worked to elicitfirm commitments from the military junta for theorganization of elections and a return to constitu-tional order. At the same time, the contact groupworked to communicate with the Forces Vives andensure that the transition was a broadly consensualprocess.The political negotiations benefitted from

including a broad array of actors from withinGuinean society. During the negotiations, themediation team and the UN country team soughtto include actors from Guinean society beyond toppolitical and military leaders. This effort includedregular meetings with women’s organizations,support for civil society platforms and localdialogue spaces, and mobilization of funds andtechnical support for peacebuilding initiatives indifferent parts of the country. In addition, theinclusion of security-sector reform in themediation agenda served as a confidence-buildingmechanism, reassuring the armed forces ofcontinued support while holding the promise ofpositive changes to the security sector for the ForcesVives.

Madagascar (2008-2011)


In December 2008, Madagascar’s President MarcRavalomanana closed the TV station belonging toAndry Rajoelina, the popular thirty-four-year-oldmayor of the country’s capital, Antananarivo. Thisdecision prompted mass demonstrations and weeksof protests. By late January, demonstrators callingfor democratic reforms had shifted to demandingan ouster of the “dictator” president and theformation of a transitional government to convenenew elections. Violence and vandalism increased,and Ravalomanana announced the removal ofRajoelina from his post on February 3, 2009. Fourdays later, Rajoelina announced the formation of aHigh Transitional Authority (HAT) to govern thecountry. Tensions deepened after the presidentialguard killed several demonstrators, bringing thenumber of dead from the protests and vandalism tonearly 130. The coup was complete after a group ofcolonels took over the military and forced the

president’s resignation. Ravalomanana initiallyhanded power to a group of army officers on March17th, but these were then persuaded to recognizeRajoelina and the HAT.

The international community was relativelyunited in rejecting the unconstitutional change ofgovernment. The African Union, Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), andOrganisation internationale de la Francophonie(OIF) all suspended Madagascar’s participation intheir activities, and most donors suspendedassistance, although the UN did not condemn thecoup. Drawing on political events after the 1991coup, the de facto authorities foresaw a transitioninvolving a national consultation, the drafting of arevised constitution to be voted on by referendum,and the holding of new elections for Parliament andthe presidency. In the face of such strong interna-tional condemnation, however, the HAT reluctantlyagreed within weeks to engage in mediation efforts.Despite coming close to reaching agreement on atransitional authority acceptable to all the main

Charles T. Call 19

Madagascar: Timeline of Events

December 2008 President Marc Ravalomanana closes the television station of the popular youngmayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina.

Late January 2009 Demonstrators calling for democratic reforms begin demanding the ouster ofRavalomanana and the formation of a transitional government to convene newelections. Ravalomanana asks the UN to mediate.

February 3, 2009 Ravalomanana removes Rajoelina from his post as mayor of Antananarivo.

February 7, 2009 Rajoelina announces the formation of a High Transitional Authority (HAT) togovern the country. Presidential guards kill protesters marching on the presidentialpalace.

March 17, 2009 After Rajoelina gains control of key army commanders, Ravalomanana handspower to a group of army officers. These officers are then forced to recognizeRajoelina and the HAT.

July 2009 Four main international organizations—the UN, AU, Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC), and Organisation internationale de laFrancophonie (OIF)—form a joint mediation team for Madagascar, supportingformer Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano.

August 2009 The Maputo Agreement is signed, but is ultimately rejected by several HAT officials,including Rajoelina himself, over the allocation of top posts.

March 2011 The SADC team brokers an agreement among a majority of, but not all, principalparties; recognizes Rajoelina as interim president; and provides for schedulingelections in which he can run.

parties, the mediation collapsed in December 2009.In November 2010 a popular referendum approvedconstitutional changes proposed by the HAT, but allthree main opposition factions rejected the results.A new agreement was reached among manypolitical parties and the government in March2011, but rejected by the main opposition parties. Itrecognized Rajoelina as interim president, with anopposition-approved prime minister, and providedfor subsequent scheduling of parliamentary andpresidential elections, in which Rajoelina couldoffer his candidacy. In September 2011, aftermonths of SADC-led mediation efforts, a roadmapto restore constitutional order was agreed on by theHAT and all but one of ten opposition parties. MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THEEVOLUTION OF TRANSITION

In January 2009 the UN Secretariat received arequest from the government of President MarcRavalomanana to provide good offices. TheSecretary-General sent two senior UN officials, thefirst arriving on the day of the February 7th killings.Initially supported by the UN country team and aSouth African expert, the entire UN mediationteam turned over in early March with the arrival ofa senior political adviser, an expert, and a stafferfrom DPA’s Mediation Support Unit. Sensitive tocharges that it was appointing too many specialenvoys, the Secretariat decided not to create aspecial political mission or name an envoy, nor todevote resources to a dedicated office for theseefforts. The UN instead appointed a consultantwith the title “senior political adviser,” which meanthe was later seen by the AU and SADC as havingless status than their envoys—a perception whichcast doubt on the overall importance the UN wasattaching to its role in Madagascar. Initially and upthrough the coup, the UN mediation team decidedto follow a precedent created after the 1991 coupand supported mediation between Rajoelina andRavalomanana, led by the Malagasy Council ofChristian Churches (FFKM).

Up through the March 17th coup, the UN led theinternational mediation support, and continued todo so in the immediate aftermath of the coup. TheUN mediation team was instructed by headquartersto negotiate an inclusive, consensual solution to thecrisis. It organized the negotiation structure aroundthe HAT and the three political groups associatedwith the former president—the “four movements”

structure. This structure was intended to create amore politically diverse process and to ensure thatthe political negotiations extended beyond thehighland elite—which includes both Ravalomananaand Rajoelina—to the majority coastal peoples.However, some Malagasies and others laterquestioned that approach as “bringing backdinosaurs” and for unnecessarily offering vetopowers over transitional arrangements to twoformer presidents who no longer had much of aconstituency.

The UN made significant substantive andprocedural contributions to the mediation up untilMaputo III and the dissolution of talks. It providedstaff for the mediation effort under the AU, andthen under SADC and the four-organization JointMediation Team; it maintained staff on the groundfrom the outset and did much of the drafting ofagreements; it initiated the legwork necessary topersuade SADC to join the AU-UN approach inJune; and it suggested compromises that ultimatelyled to the agreements of Maputo and Addis Ababain November 2009. Complicating the UN role wasa routine but ill-coordinated invitation from aseparate part of the UN system to the de factogovernment, asking them to join a donor confer-ence on Somalia to be held in April 2009. The HATpublicly interpreted this invite as a recognition ofits authority, undermining the UN’s role vis-à-visthe other parties and mediators.

The formula for transition eventually agreedupon by the parties in late 2009 had been proposedearly after the coup, drawing on the 1991 experi-ence. Some civil society actors coincided with theHAT on the key elements: national consultations,constitutional revision and referendum, and newelections. On other points, such as a strongerparliament vis-à-vis the presidency, they did notagree. During the 2009 mediation, the HATbrought in some representatives of other parties,but balked at including representatives ofRavalomanana. Salient sticking points includedwhether Ravalomanana could return; whether he,Rajoelina, or other transition officials could standfor elections; and whether the former heads of statewould receive amnesty for past alleged abuses.

The mediation efforts merit some attention. Thecoup was followed by forum shopping by the newde facto authorities, and by the absence of a clearlead mediator. Whereas before the coup the UN


had supported a national mediation process, theUN’s Tiébilé Dramé informally led the mediationafter the coup, even though the OIF and the AU hadeach appointed their own envoys. On April 30th, theAU officially took the lead in mediation, althoughthe former prime minister of Swaziland, AbsalomThemba Dlamini, outranked the AU envoy uponhis appointment as SADC envoy in mid-May, andhe in turn was trumped by his SADC replacementon June 20, 2009, ex-President Joaquim Chissano.In July, the four main international organizations—the UN, AU, SADC, and OIF—formed a jointmediation team for Madagascar supportingChissano. Throughout this post-coup period, untilits withdrawal in March 2010, the UN provided theonly constant staff presence in Antananarivo for themediation process. The AU Executive became thelead mediator in January 2010, but SADC onceagain took the lead in March 2010, which itretained in 2011.

In August 2009, the four parties signed theMaputo Agreement with President Chissano’sfacilitation, although the main points had alreadybeen fleshed out in prior months. The partiesagreed on an amnesty for former PresidentsRavalomanana and Ratsiraka, and the formerconsented not to return to the country untilconditions were “appropriate.” The accordstipulated that the prime minister and vicepresident be named by other parties, even asRajoelina remained as president. However, otherHAT officials (some of whom stood to lose theirposts) rejected the deal. Finally, in November 2009,the parties accepted the creation of a “collectiveexecutive,” including Rajoelina and two othersnamed by the other parties. Rajoelina waspersuaded to name a “consensus prime minister.” At3:00a.m. on the fourth day of negotiations, theparties had finally agreed on the allocation of some455 government posts, except for 3 cabinet posts.Despite pleas by staffers to remain until the finaldetail was settled, President Chissano had to departfor other obligations and concluded the meeting.The parties continued to haggle over a handful ofcabinet slots, without reaching agreement.Chissano organized a third Maputo meeting inDecember, but Rajoelina refused to attend andrenounced the Maputo Agreement. He thenreplaced the consensus prime minister and rejectedparticipation in the next round of multilateral

mediation, in which the three opposition partiesproposed to form a government on their own.

The EU extended its suspension of aid, and theUS suspended Madagascar from the AfricanGrowth and Opportunity Act (which offers tangibleincentives for African countries to continue theirefforts to open their economies and build freemarkets). The AU imposed its promised sanctionson 108 individual members of the HAT. Rajoelina’sHAT brought in additional opposition figures,initiated its own dialogue with civil society, andproceeded without international mediation of thetransition. The HAT proposed a new constitution,whose changes focused on the succession issue—lowering the age requirement from forty to thirty-five years of age and extending the interimpresidency through the next elections—rather thanrevising governmental powers or structures. Thereforms taken up in the constitution, which passedin a November 2009 referendum, were determinedby Malagasies rather than by the UN or otherinternational mediators.

SADC-led mediation efforts began to gaintraction in early 2011, after SADC proposed aroadmap to constitutionality. The proposalpermitted recognition of Rajoelina as president,stipulated an interim government leading toelections in which Rajoelina could run, andprovided for appointment of a consensus primeminister to oversee an interim national-unitygovernment that would include elements of theopposition. However, the three main oppositionparties refused to sign the roadmap in March.Following unilateral implementation of some of theroadmap by the de facto authorities, furthermediation led in September 2011 to the signing ofthe roadmap by all parties except former PresidentRatsiraka. The signed roadmap provided for therestoration of exiled President Ravalomanana tooversee the interim administration through parlia-mentary and presidential elections in 2012.CONSEQUENCES OF THETRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT

The transitional arrangement consisted of anunconstitutional junta that has governed withoutinterruption since the coup of March 2009. Itsinitial popularity has ebbed. Although 74 percentvoted in favor of the HAT’s constitutional reforms,the process was marred. Some of the military and

Charles T. Call 21

civilian supporters of the HAT have resigned orexpressed their dissent from the undemocraticconduct of the Rajoelina-led authority. Accordingto some mediators, the UN’s reluctance to issue astatement expressing reservations or condemnationof the coup helped preserve a role for the organiza-tion in the mediation, in contrast to the perceptionof bias alleged against SADC and the AU after theirnorm-driven condemnation of the unconstitutionalchange of government.

The High Transitional Authority’s managementof the constitutional referendum undermined itslegitimacy, but the HAT may also have correctlysurmised that the Malagasy people were fed up withthe transition and willing to move on to a firmerconstitutional footing. The UN’s role becamediminished politically after the breakdown of talks,although it continued to play a role bridging theMalagasy parties and SADC after the MaputoAgreement fell apart. LESSONS FROM MADAGASCAR

A number of factors combined to produceprotracted failure in altering the de facto transi-tional government’s unconstitutional rule. First, the situation on the ground favored the

opposition’s ability to retain power and resistpower sharing and elections. The flight of thesitting President Ravalomanana was crucial increating a balance of power that significantlyfavored Mr. Rajoelina and the relatively unitedopposition forces. The decision of the armed forcesnot to suppress the demonstrators also provedcrucial both to minimizing violence and to embold-ening and ensuring the security of the demonstra-tors. The military’s continued support, along withthe earlier constitutional requirement that thepresident be forty years of age, provided a disincen-tive for Mr. Rajoelina to schedule elections withoutlowering the constitutional age requirement. Second, the international mediation was poorly

coordinated and exhibited some flaws at crucialmoments. The rotating lead in the internationalmediation led to inconsistency in the goals andprocess, tensions among the mediators, mixedsignals by external actors in exercising leverage, andthe ability of the parties to evade commitments.Crucial decisions seem ill-conceived in hindsight:SADC’s threats of potential coercive force; thefailure to secure final agreement on all the 455

appointments in Addis Ababa; and the decision toconvene Maputo III in December without theparticipation of Rajoelina, producing a one-sidedoutcome that sparked Rajoelina’s outraged renunci-ation of the Maputo Accord and ended the entiremediation.Some UN decisions contributed to flawed

mediation. The UN made some suboptimal choicesin the early weeks of the crisis. These included (1)the failure to conduct a quick assessment in relationto the need for an initial mediation strategy,admittedly difficult in the face of quickly evolvingevents; (2) the decision to forego appointment of anenvoy or creation of a special political mission, andthe appointment of a UN principal mediator whoseconsultant status undermined his standing amongthose inside and outside the UN system; and (3)initial deference to a national-level mediationwithout accounting for its technical deficienciesand its openness to charges of bias.

The invitation of the de facto government to anofficial event, falsely conveying recognition, compli-cated the UN’s role and the mediation itself. Theentire UN system must be guided by consistency inits actions and protocol in order to ensure aneffective mediation and uphold the organization’sprinciples.The Madagascar case shows the dilemmas

facing international actors after protractedunconstitutional rule, especially when claims ofhaving restored constitutional order are rejectedand the transitional arrangements seem to enjoysome popularity. Although the popularity of Mr.Rajoelina and the HAT had ebbed by 2010, itremained relatively high. The positive referendumon the HAT’s constitution, disputed by the threemain opposition groupings, deepened thequandary for external actors whose non-humani-tarian aid remained suspended.

International actors should be wary of bringing inactors who may exercise a veto over the process. SomeMalagasies and international analysts believe it wasa mistake to have brought the two earlier ex-presidents into the negotiations, and especially tohave insisted on their participation in mid-2010efforts to resuscitate the talks, when Rajoelinaexpressed a willingness to make a bilateral deal withRavalomanana.


Kyrgyzstan (2010-2011)


In February 2010, demonstrators in the north of thecountry launched protests against price hikes due tothe privatization of utilities. These spread in thesubsequent weeks, with protestors raising theirdemands to include the resignation of PresidentBakiev. On April 6th, protesters stormed thegovernor’s offices in the northern town of Talas anddeclared a “people’s government.”15 Governmentforces took back the building, but protests swelledand spread to other cities the next day, fueled by thearrest of several opposition political leaders.Protesters overwhelmed security forces in somecases, and took the presidential offices in the capitalBishkek. President Kurmanbek Bakiev fled to hissouthern stronghold of Jalalabad. Unlike the ousterof President Akaev in 2005, state forces usedviolence against protestors, killing eighty-fivepersons and injuring hundreds.

On April 8th a new interim government wasannounced under the leadership of former ForeignMinister Roza Otunbaeva, with pledges of newelections and a new constitution later in 2010. Aftera week of intensive negotiations involving variousexternal actors, Bakiev resigned and fled into exile.Following rising incidents of ethnic violence, masskillings and displacement broke out between June10 and 14, 2010, in the south, mainly betweenKyrgyz and Uzbeks. Roughly 2,000 people werekilled and 300,000 displaced in the space of a fewdays, before some degree of calm was restored.Voters approved a new constitution and confirmedOtunbaeva as president in a referendum on June27th, despite the recent mass violence and displace-ment. This vote allowed for the establishment of atechnically constitutional government, once parlia-mentary elections were held in October 2011. Acoalition government took office two months later,ushering in the new constitution’s mixed parlia-mentary system, the first in Central Asia.Presidential elections were slated for late 2011, in

Charles T. Call 23

15 On these events, see International Crisis Group (ICG), “Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses,” Asia Briefing No.102, April 27, 2010.

Kyrgyzstan: Timeline of Events

February 2010 Demonstrators launch protests against price hikes resulting from the privatizationof utilities. They eventually demand the resignation of President Bakiev. In theweeks that follow, the repression of protests costs eighty-five lives and injureshundreds.

April 6, 2010 Protestors storm the governor’s offices in Talas, declaring a “people’s government.”Government forces retake the building.

April 7, 2010 Protests swell and spread to other cities, fueled by the arrest of several oppositionpolitical leaders. Protestors take the presidential offices in Bishkek.

April 8, 2010 A new interim government is announced under the leadership of former ForeignMinister Roza Otunbaeva.

June 10-14, 2010 Ethnically-based mass killings and displacement occur primarily in the southbetween Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Some 2,000 people are killed and 300,000 displaced.

June 27, 2010 A new constitution is approved in a referendum, legalizing the interim government,instituting a parliamentary system with safeguards against majoritarian excess, andslating presidential elections for 2011.

October 2010 Parliamentary elections are held.

October 30, 2011 Presidential elections are held without signifidant violence. As agreed, Otunbaevadoes not run. Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev wins with 63 percent of thevote.

which Otunbaeva pledged not to run.MEDIATION EFFORTS AND THEEVOLUTION OF TRANSITION

Early on April 8, 2010, Roza Otunbaeva met withthe prime minister. She then announced that thelatter had resigned, that his cabinet had beendismissed, and that the legislature had beendissolved as it was not legitimately elected.16 Shealso announced the formation of an interimgovernment, which would hold power untilpresidential elections could be held six monthslater; stated that international law and treaties(including agreements on US and Russian bases)would be respected; and said that a new constitu-tion would be drafted and popularly approved.

On April 8th, the day after the oppositionannounced its takeover, the UN Secretary-Generalappointed the director of the UN EconomicCommission for Europe, Jan Kubiš, as special envoyfor Kyrgyzstan. Having specialized in Central Asiaand served in senior positions for the EU and theOrganization for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE) and as SRSG in Tajikistan, Kubišwas familiar with both the Kyrgyz and regionalplayers. The OSCE appointed ZhanybekKaribzhanov as special envoy on the same day.Karibzhanov spent several days in Kyrgyzstan,issuing a statement calling for “setting the politicalsituation on a firm legal footing” and for a “rapidand peaceful transition towards constitutionalreform and new elections on the basis of dialogueand inclusiveness.”17 The EU special representativefor Central Asia, Pierre Morel, also arrived swiftly.

Concerned that Bakiev would initiate an armedconflict from his stronghold in the south and thatthis could spark violence throughout Central Asia,the three envoys engaged in active diplomacy. FromApril 10th to 14th, SRSG Kubiš engaged in sustainedtalks with the interim government, civil society, thediplomatic corps, and other intergovernmentalorganizations’ envoys and representatives. Amongenvoys, he maintained the most frequent andcontinuous communication with Mr. Bakiev andhis supporters during the first week after the change

of government.Some organizations accused the Russian govern-

ment, in frustration at Bakiev’s decision to extendthe treaty governing the US Manas airbase, offomenting the change in government; othersblamed the US government, given its embrace ofpro-Western leaders including Roza Otunbaeva.18Otunbaeva had served as Kyrgyz ambassador toLondon and Washington, and was head of the UNoffice in Abkhazia when the “Rose Revolution”brought pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili to powerin Georgia. The American diplomat in charge ofCentral Asia, Robert Blake, traveled to Bishkekafter the uprising, declaring on April 14th thatOtunbaeva’s leadership offered “a unique andhistoric opportunity to create a democracy thatcould be a model for Central Asia and the wideregion.”19 Both the Russian and the Americangovernments sought to avoid violent conflict thatmight destabilize the country (the only in the worldcontaining both US and Russian bases) and theregion, including nearby Afghanistan.

As tensions mounted in the south amid signs thatBakiev’s supporters might mobilize violence on hisbehalf, bilateral and multilateral efforts also intensi-fied. The president vowed to defend himself, andthe interim government lifted his presidentialimmunity from prosecution on April 13th becauseof his government’s killing of peaceful protesters.The government also disbanded the constitutionalcourt, which had acted politically favorably toBakiev in the past.

On April 15th, troops loyal to the interim govern-ment surrounded Bakiev’s forces in Jalalabad. Laterthat day the chair of the OSCE, KhazakstaniForeign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, announcedthat,

as a result of joint efforts of Kazakhstan’s PresidentNursultan Nazarbayev, U.S. President Barack Obamaand Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev, as well asactive mediation by the OSCE, along with the UnitedNations and the European Union, an agreement wasreached with the Interim Government of Kyrgyzstanand President Kurmanbek Bakiev on his departurefrom the country.20


16 Jim Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,June 15, 2010, p. 4.

17 “OSCE Special Envoy Calls for Return to Legal Framework in Kyrgyzstan.” OSCE Press Release available at www.osce.org/cio/69154 .18 M. K. Bhadrakumar, “Kzrgyzstan: A Russian-Uzbek challenge to the US,” Voltairenet.org, April 23, 2010, available at www.voltairenet.org/article165142.html .19 Ibid.20 Quoted in Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup,” p. 5.

www.voltairenet.org/article165142.html

www.osce.org/cio/69154

Charles T. Call 25

Bakiev flew to Kazakhstan, where he resignedbefore continuing to Minsk. On April 21st, herepudiated his resignation, alleging that the interimgovernment had reneged on its pledge not toprosecute his family members.21 Upon Bakiev’sresignation and departure, Mr. Kubiš announcedon April 16th that his mission to avert an escalationinto armed conflict was completed, and handed theUN lead to the UN Regional Centre for PreventiveDiplomacy for Central Asia under SRSG MiroslavJenča. On May 14, 2010, a month after Bakiev’sresignation, the Collective Security TreatyOrganisation (CSTO) condemned the unconstitu-tional ouster.

National-level actors, especially Vice ChairOmurbek Tekebaev and others within the interimgovernment, drove the constitutional reformprocess. On April 26th, less than three weeks afterthe takeover, the interim government released adraft constitution that it characterized asintroducing a parliamentary system.22 A constitu-tional commission of seventy-five personscompleted a final draft that was released in May,when Otunbaeva praised the shift to parliamentar-ianism and limits on majority rule: “the experienceof our country during the years of independenceshows that a strong presidency inevitably leads tofamily authoritarianism.... We should not allow anyof this to happen ever again.”23 On May 20, 2010, theprovisional government issued a decree stating thata new constitution would be put to a referendumalong with the interim president’s tenure throughDecember 2011, and that parliamentary electionswould be held in October 2010. Under the decree,the interim president could not stand for office norcould she belong to any political party or supportany faction. Interim officials depicted Otunbaeva ashaving sacrificed her political candidacy in order toprovide stability by serving the country as interimpresident.The June 2010 Violence

Kyrgyzstan is unusual among recent cases ofunconstitutional changes of government in that it

was followed two months later by a wave ofethnicity-based killings, cleansing, and arson.Ethnic Uzbeks there constitute roughly 15 percentof the national population, but in Osh and Jalalabadthey comprise 50 percent and 25 percent of thepopulation, respectively.24 Some in the south felt thecoup reflected northern Kyrgyz reassertingthemselves, and many Uzbeks welcomed theinterim government’s promises of greater democra-tization as helping them, perhaps threateningsouthern Kyrgyz.25

In mid-May, Bakiev supporters took over thecentral administrative building in Osh, promptingtheir ouster by mobs led by two political parties,including one majority-Uzbek party led by Batyrov.Subsequent clashes heightened ethnic tensions anda perception among Kyrgyz that Uzbeks were actingaggressively.26 Arrests were made, and a curfew wasimposed on Jalalabad. In response to these events,SRSG Jenča and others expressed their concernabout the need for a more energetic provision oforder by the interim government.

On June 11, 2010, nine days after the curfew inJalalabad was lifted, groups of Uzbek and Kyrgyzyouth in Osh engaged in fights. Over the next threedays, ethnic violence spread across the southernregion, eventually with armed mobs of mainlyKyrgyz exercising control. The security forces didnot stop the violence, and in most cases did not try.Subsequent analyses strongly suggest that the mobswere organized and supplied, probably by security-service personnel.27 Weapons were reportedlydistributed to the Kyrgyz mobs by other civilians,by Osh city officials, and by police and militarypersonnel.28 The violence significantly dropped inscale after June 14, 2010.

Upon the outbreak of violence, the three specialenvoys (from the UN, OSCE, and the EU) jointlyissued a statement declaring they had prepared aplan for a return to public order and urgingestablishment of a humanitarian corridor in thesouth. Although interim leader Otunbaeva on June12th called for Russia to send peacekeepers, Russia

21 This paragraph is from Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup,” pp. 4-6.22 Ibid., p. 6. Tekebaev, along with interim-government member and former Prime Minister Atambaev, had unsuccessfully worked to revise the constitution in 2009. 23 ITAR-TASS, May 3, 2010, quoted in Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup,” p. 7.24 Ibid., fn. 1.25 Ibid.26 ICG, “The Pogroms of Kyrgyzstan,” Asia Report No. 193, August 23, 2010, pp. 7-10.27 Ibid., pp. 11-14.28 Ibid., p. 14.


declined and suggested the Collective SecurityTreaty Organisation (CSTO) might send troops.29Otunbaeva also mobilized military reservists onJune 12th, although many believe the interimgovernment was slow to both anticipate andrespond to the crisis. The official death count was393, but investigations subsequently estimated that2,000 persons died, and some 300,000 people weredisplaced, including over 100,000 who fled toUzbekistan, mainly Uzbeks in the southern part ofthe country.30 Hundreds of homes and businesseswere burned.

In July the OSCE approved sending a policeadvisory group to support stabilization efforts.However, the group never deployed as the govern-ment faced resistance and criticism of foreigninterference, including from the mayor of Osh, whohas questioned the authority of the provisionalgovernment. Otunbaeva’s calls for the deploymentof Russian or CSTO peacekeepers or police forceswere likewise never approved.

The violence had far-reaching impacts, not onlyon the southern part of the country, but also onregional fears of instability and on the politicaltransition. Dissatisfaction with the provisionalgovernment’s inability to handle the ethnic violenceundermined support for the parties that hadbacked the unconstitutional change of government,and fueled the creation of new parties critical of theinterim government. One of these parties, Ata-Zhurt, which includes a large number of formerBakiev supporters and called for overturning thenew parliamentary system, won a plurality in theOctober parliamentary elections and formed partof the governing coalition.

Following SRSG Kubiš’s role in the collectivemediation of Bakiev’s departure, the UN seems tohave had more influence on technical and humani-tarian issues than on political questions linked topotential violence. SRSG Jenča’s visits led him toexpress concerns to the interim government aboutrising ethnic tensions in the south. The governmentwas proving inchoate and unable to exercise muchauthority across the territory, especially in thesouth where the army and police officials owed

President Bakiev their positions. Before theviolence broke out, some UN advisers arguedagainst the prohibition of identity-based politicalparties, as this would undermine representation ofethnic Uzbeks and Russians, potentially deepeningtheir political alienation. However, this position didnot find uniform support, even among interna-tional actors.

Before the outbreak of widespread violence inJune, DPA deployed two UN standby experts onpower sharing and constitutional law. Based onfield research from May 18th to June 13th, theyprepared a conflict analysis and an assessment ofthe potential for reconciliation for the DPA’sMediation Support Unit (MSU).31 With thedeepening of the crisis, DPA deployed a seniorreconciliation adviser who arrived in July 2010 tosupport SRSG Jenča’s work. The adviser, supportedby a political affairs officer from the United NationsRegional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy forCentral Asia (UNRCCA), worked closely with thepolitical parties to facilitate dialogue and promotetolerance, as parliamentary elections approached.In addition, two technical advisers from EADassisted the Central Election Commission inpreparing for the parliamentary elections, workingin conjunction with the OSCE after it identifiedproblems in the June referendum. In October, at thebehest of the UN’s Policy Committee, the UNcountry team and the UNRCCA began preparing apeacebuilding strategy to be undertaken in coordi-nation the with the EU, OSCE, and Commonwealthof Independent States (CIS). The UN RefugeeAgency (UNHCR) played an important role inresponding to the problems of refugees andinternally displaced persons (IDPs) created by theviolence.Constitutional Referendum

A national referendum on the constitution hadbeen scheduled for June 27, 2010. The outbreak ofviolence and the massive displacement that ensuedcaused many to call for a delay in the referendum,which would also formalize the interim govern-ment and the tenure of Roza Otunbaeva as interimpresident through December 2011. However, the

29 Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup,” p. 1.30 “Official death toll climbs to 393 in Osh and Jalal-Abad,” 24.kg news site, August 19, 2010, available at http://eng.24.kg/community/2010/08/19/13188.html . See

also ICG, “The Pogroms.”31 Brendan O’Leary, Christie Warren, and Atajan Yazmuradov, “Draft Report of the Mediation Support Unit Mission to the Kyrgyz Republic,” Period of Mission

May 18-June 13, 2010.

http://eng.24.kg/community/2010/08/19/13188.html

interim authorities decided to proceed with thereferendum on June 27th, and the constitution wasapproved by some 90 percent of voters, with anofficial turnout of 72 percent.32 The OSCEpronounced the balloting transparent and fair, butopposition parties said the turnout figures were notcredible.33

The drafters of the constitution, which went intoeffect three days after the referendum, explicitlysought to institutionalize power sharing and toprevent the emergence of a new autocrat. Unlike itspresidentialist neighbors, the country adopted amixed parliamentary system with a president whoholds important powers. The prime minister headsthe government on a day-to-day basis, but thepresident can veto all laws except those related tothe budget and fiscal policy. No political party canbe created on religious or ethnic grounds, andmembers of the army, police, and judiciary may notjoin a political party. The constitution alsoincreased the size of Parliament from 90 to 120seats to increase the chances of broader inclusion.No party can hold more than 65 of those seats,making coalition rule highly probable.

External actors played a minimal role outside ofnominal consultations. Although the Russiangovernment expressed doubts about the parliamen-tary system, it permitted the draft to go forwardwithout impediment.34 The vice chair of the interimgovernment, Omurbek Tekebaev, led the drafting ofthe constitutional revisions and presented them inearly June to a session of the European Commissionfor Democracy through Law (the VeniceCommission).35 The commission animatedlydebated the draft. Some members expressedreservations about such a division of powers in thereforms, seeing it as too divided between a parlia-mentary and presidential system, and about theabsence of a constitutional court, common toEurope’s parliamentary systems. However,Tekebaev defended the reforms as necessary toprevent the reappearance of powerful autocrats,

citing the past role of Kyrgyzstan’s constitutionalcourt in ratifying autocratic rule.36

Elections in October 2010 left five parties holdingbetween twenty-eight and eighteen seats each, anda coalition government came into effect onDecember 22, 2010. Acting President Otunbaeva’sSocial Democratic Party formed part of a three-party coalition with the Ata-Zhurt party, which hadbeen formed three months before elections byformer high officials of Bakiev, promising to restorethe old presidentialist constitutional system. Thus,the new government included both a party associ-ated with Bakiev and parties that ousted him.Presidential elections took place without significantviolence in October 2011 with Prime MinisterAlmazbek Atambayev winning with 63 percent ofthe vote.CONSEQUENCES OF THETRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT

The interim government was initially viewed withalarm by the international community, not becauseof its unconstitutional status, but because of itsincoherence, its ineffectiveness in much of theterritory, and its potential corruption by virtue ofincluding many former officials. One sourcedepicted it as “unruly and disunited” and“stumbling from one crisis to another,” claimingthat “the pogroms further damaged the alreadysinking credibility of the Kyrgyz government.”37However, in terms of restoring its constitutionalbasis, the interim government showed more skill,speed, and determination than most post-couptransitional governments. That path meant thatoutsiders had little influence, but also that theconstitutional reforms and new parliamentarysystem were adopted without being significantlywatered down. Those reforms establishedimportant constraints on the ability of futuremajorities to rule alone, virtually forcing parties toform coalitions and share power. These changesmay prove to represent a significant step forwardfor inclusion and a political culture of negotiation.38

Charles T. Call 27

32 ICG, “The Pogroms,” p. 19.33 “OSCE Observers Back Kyrgyzstan Referendum,” BBC News, June 28, 2010, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/10432243 . 34 Ibid.35 “Venice Commission Positively Values New Kyrgyz Constitution,” AKIpress, June 7, 2010.36 Ibid.; Charles Recknagel, “How Strong Is Kyrgyzstan's New Constitution?,” Radio Free Europe, June 30, 2010.37 ICG, “The Pogroms,” pp. 4, 5, 20.38 One ironic illustration of the power-sharing imperative of the new system is that its architect himself, Omurbek Tekebaev, fell victim to it. Tekebaev’s Ata-Meken

party was slated to form part of a three-party ruling coalition, but the coalition rejected his appointment to be speaker of the unicameral assembly. Consequently,that coalition broke down, and another was formed that included the pro-Bakiev Ata-Zhurt party in place of Tekebaev’s party.

www.bbc.co.uk/news/10432243

However, the ouster of Bakiev contributed, eitherdirectly or indirectly depending on one’s analysis, tothe ethnic-based violence two months later.Political reactions by Bakiev supporters underlayinitial attacks, and the new interim authoritiesshowed an inability to control the army and policeforces’ role in that violence, much less to deployforces to quell the violence. Although the interimgovernment included southerners in its leadership,the perception that northern Kyrgyz werereasserting their power at the cost of southernKyrgyz played into insecurities that fueled attacks,including attacks on Uzbeks who might havebenefited from the uncertainty of the transition.Finally, the interim government included very fewethnic Uzbeks and Russians, and showed disinterestin attending to the concerns of these communities,even after receiving international counsel to do so.

The smooth implementation of the steps torestore constitutional order have not led to adeepening of concern, but rather to greater interna-tional acceptance of the outcome of the process. Atthe same time, international actors remainconcerned about the potential for a renewal of massviolence and about the capacities of the interimgovernment and its successors. The transitionalarrangements held few consequences for the UN orother regional or international organizations,which all played supporting but subordinate roles.The absence of a significant response from the UNSecurity Council to the violence of June 2010,despite pleas from senior UN officials in New Yorkand on the ground, may have undercut the idea thatthe organization can reliably help to stop or preventmass atrocities.LESSONS FROM KYRGYZSTAN

The interim government decided on, made public,and implemented a process for returning toconstitutionality with speed and determination.In doing so, it addressed problems of pastnepotistic and family-based autocracy, butneglected some international concerns aboutaggravating ethnic tensions.

The plan for restoring constitutional rule wasannounced at the same time as the initiation of theinterim government itself. A new constitution withsignificant guarantees against one-man autocracywas drafted with broad input and approved by thepublic within three months of Bakiev’s ouster.

Parliamentary elections were held within sixmonths, in which a new party that included manyformer supporters of Bakiev received the second-most votes and seats.

At the same time, the new government createdinsecurities among southern Kyrgyz, and did littleto protect ethnic Uzbeks once violent incidentsbegan in June. It went forward with constitutionalprohibitions on identity-based parties that wereseen by ethnic minorities as reducing, rather thanenhancing, the responsiveness of the new politicalsystem to their concerns. Departures from constitutional rule may open

the way to mass violence that does not correspondto the lines dividing the prior regime and the newprovisional authorities, but to other ethnic orreligious divides. The UN system should preparefor this eventuality, even when interim authoritiesdo not.

Despite warnings from UN SRSGs Kubiš andJenča, the interim government discounted thechances of ethnic violence in the south. It failed toattempt either political dialogue addressing ethnictensions (despite its dialogue with the Bakiev camp)or to ensure that state security forces would beprepared to maintain public order in the face ofpotential mass violence. Although it did warn ofwider violence on the basis of observing increasinginstances of ethnic violence against Uzbeks, the UNsystem could have mobilized information moreinsistently. Although some elements of the UNcountry team responded quickly to the crisis, manywere slow to respond. The political elites of thecountry had long played down ethnic identity, andthe UN country team’s work shared this perspectivesomewhat, reflecting an attitude that avoidingacknowledgement of ethnic issues (even in itshiring practices) would be best for developmentand even for mitigating conflict. Some criticizedthis approach as putting one’s head in the sand,inadequately analyzing the potential for conflict,and being ill-prepared for the rise of ethnicviolence.The influence of mediators can be quite limited

under certain circumstances. Many factorscircumscribed the influence of mediators: theresignation and flight of the president, the initialwelcome given to the change of government, thefear of what would follow if the interim government


failed, and the signals from powerful states thatthey would not support an energetic internationaleffort to reverse the unconstitutional change ofgovernment. International actors had their greatestimpact in the initial days of the constitutional crisis,helping dissuade President Bakiev and hissupporters from digging in for a civil war, andfacilitating Bakiev’s air transport out of the countryinto exile.Political and other strategic factors will lead

international actors to assist some unconstitu-tional interim governments, rather than cut offnon-emergency aid, as occurs in other cases.Russia promptly recognized the interim govern-ment, and within days offered $50 million inassistance and 25,000 tons of petroleum products.After some hesitation, the US also expressedsupport for the change of government as offering achance for democracy. In May, before the Juneviolence, the US announced it would release $15

million to the interim government in leasepayments for the Manas airbase.39 The interest ofboth countries in sustaining positive relations withKyrgyzstan, for interactive strategic reasons, shapethis response, one that differs from that of interna-tional actors in most of the unconstitutionalchanges of government in Africa.The appointment of officials with crossover

experience in other organizations facilitatedcollaboration among mediators. SRSG Kubišpreviously served as foreign minister of Slovakia, aschairman of the Committee of Ministers of theCouncil of Europe, as SRSG for the UN Mission ofObservers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and asSecretary-General of the OSCE for six years.Similarly, SRSG Jenča, also a former Slovakiandiplomat, had previously served as head of theoffice of the OSCE in Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent,including during the 2005 outbreak of violence inAndijan, Uzbekistan.

Charles T. Call 29

39 Nichol, “The April 2010 Coup,” p. 11.

Table 1. Key Characteristics of Five Cases of Departures from Constitutional Order

Country Kenya Mauritania Guinea Madagascar Kyrgyzstan(Date of event) (Dec. 2007) (Aug. 2008) (Dec. 2008) (Mar. 2009) (Apr. 2010)

Transition achieved? Yes Yes Yes Not yet Yes

Primary mediator AU panel AU-led AU-led Multiple OSCE-EU-UN

Unconstitutional President/ Civilian protestersaction by government Military coup Military coup & military Civilian protesters

Date of elections March 2013 July 2009 June & Nov. 2010 Postponed Oct. 2010 & 2011

Months to election? n/a 12 23 (18 for first n/a 6 (legislative)round)

Unconstitutionalleader(s) eligible? Yes Yes No Unclear No

Prior presidentinvolved in transitionalarrangement? Yes Yes, briefly n/a Unclear No

Constitutional reforms? Yes No Yes Yes Yes

Political power sharing? Yes For 2-month Yes Agreed, but not Yestransition adopted

Decentralization Yes, in reformedadopted? constitution No No No Yes

Elections accepted byinternationalcommunity? n/a Yes Yes n/a Yes

Type of inquiry Human rightslaunched? & electoral n/a Human rights n/a Human rights

Trends Across the Cases

Table 1 below categorizes some of the key featuresacross the cases. The table is not intended topresent clear trends or subcategories, but to offer aquick, accessible way to see some of the salientfeatures of these transitions. A number of patternsmerit mention:

First, the African Union, as well as ECOWAS andSADC, denounced departures from constitutionalorder in all cases within their respective memberstates, except for the electoral dispute in Kenya.However, the ouster of Kyrgyzstan’s president wasnot condemned by the OSCE and was onlycondemned by the Collective Security TreatyOrganisation a month later. That country’s interimauthorities received financial support within weeksfrom the OSCE, Russia, and the US.

Second, mediation efforts involving regional (andin some cases subregional) organizations occurred

in all cases. In each case, the United Nations playeda salient role in supporting mediation efforts. Inthree cases, a mediated process culminated inpresidential elections whose results wererecognized by the international community. Thelapse of time between departure from constitu-tional rule and these elections ranged from six totwenty-three months. In the other two cases,Madagascar and Kenya, interim arrangementsremain in place and scheduled elections of a newhead of state have yet to occur.

Finally, all of the transitions except Mauritaniainvolved constitutional revisions, passed by popularreferendum, seeking to legitimate the new order.Because of these constitutional reforms, in somecases international and internal acceptance of atransitional process will likely occur even thoughthe process does not technically represent a restora-tion of the prior constitutional order.


Charles T. Call 31

Conclusion

This concluding section seeks to answer a numberof questions, however tentatively. It will makereference mainly to the five cases examined, butalso to others, such as Fiji, Niger, and Honduras,where relevant. Are there commonalities to theseexperiences? What conditions shape whethermediation succeeds and constitutional order can berestored? What sorts of transitional arrangementsseem most prevalent? What are the consequences ofdifferent transitional arrangements? What do thesecases suggest about the UN’s ability to affect newcoup regimes or other unconstitutional govern-ments? What do they suggest about the way theelements of the UN system work together, and howthe UN relates to regional and subregional organi-zations? I divide below lessons related to the transi-tional political arrangements themselves and theinternational and national mediation efforts thatshaped those arrangements.LESSONS REGARDING TRANSITIONALPOLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The role of the military is crucial indetermining whether a sitting president can fendoff a coup or a popular challenge to authority. The military often plays the role of arbiter of consti-tutional crises. This finding is, perhaps, moreobvious now that the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt,and others have brought these questions into globalpublic consciousness, but it remains importantnonetheless. In Madagascar (as in Egypt), themilitary initially wavered but then decided tosupport protesters, ending any hopes that PresidentRavalomanana would retain office. The Honduranmilitary played a similar role in ousting PresidentZelaya, just as the Togolese army was crucial innaming the son of Togolese President Eyadema tosucceed his father in 2005, contrary to constitu-tional specifications. In Mauritania and Guinea,army officers themselves executed coups, seekingultimately to legitimate their rule through elections.In Niger, in both 1999 and 2010, military coupswere actually instrumental in facilitating a return toconstitutional order. In Kenya and Kyrgyzstan,where more institutionalized political parties held

center stage, the armed forces were less importantactors.2. Related to this, the political context—and thustransitional political arrangements—are highlyinfluenced by whether the previously-servingpresident has departed the country or remains in-country, seeking to retain some power. Of the five cases examined, the departure of theconstitutional presidents of Kyrgyzstan andMadagascar gave the empowered opposition forcesthe wherewithal to outlast mediation efforts andextend their transition for many months. In thesecases, as in Mauritania, the coup-generated leaderswere able to negotiate a transition process thatcould claim some return to constitutionality, insome cases through a revised constitution or lawsthat favored their ability to be elected or retainunelected office. 3. The cases suggest that the use of power-sharingmechanisms to resolve either unconstitutionalousters of elected presidents or electoral disputesraises questions for legitimacy, democracy, andstate-society relations—more serious questionsthan when power sharing is used to resolve armedconflicts.Bearing in mind the positive potential for powersharing for ending armed conflicts, scholars haveraised many critiques of power sharing for (a)inflexibility in the face of demographic and otherchanges; (b) reinforcing rather than underminingidentities as a key element in social life and politics;and (c) excluding third parties, possibly drivingthem to violence.

However, power sharing in departures fromconstitutional rule often hold additional perils,including the risks of:

1. overturning the legitimacy of the constitution; 2. undermining the legitimacy of elections and

democracy, as neither rulers nor their policiesend up reflecting voters’ preferences;

3. undermining incentives to participate infuture elections; and

4. encouraging others inside and outside thecountry to resort to departures from constitu-tional rule.40

40 On these problems, see A. Carl LeVan, “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy,Administration, and Institutions 24, No. 1 (January 2011): 31–53.

It is important to recognize that, in cases likeKyrgyzstan and Mauritania where existing electedgovernments are widely perceived to havethemselves undermined the legitimacy of theconstitution or electoral or democratic processes,many citizens may welcome a given departure fromconstitutional rule. Under any circumstances,however, unconstitutional remedies suffer fromsome of the above deficiencies.

National and international actors, therefore,confront tensions between short-term resolution ofa constitutional crisis and long-term support forconstitutional and legitimate political processes.Even where a specific country’s citizens believe theybenefit from unconstitutional change of govern-ment, any outcome that tacitly accepts the outcomeof such a change undermines the norms supportingconstitutionality and representative government.Of course, a negotiated arrangement that departsfrom the prior constitutional order may be the lastor best option for “restoring” constitutional orderwithout the eruption of mass violence. Wherepower sharing is part of this arrangement, “sunset”provisions can be adopted that diminish some ofthe negative effects of power sharing over time.4. The case of Kenya (and Zimbabwe) suggeststhat electoral disputes pose more risks for legiti-mation than unconstitutional ousters of duly-elected governments.First, electoral processes themselves are directlyimpugned, further undermining the legitimacy ofelectoral processes as mechanisms of representa-tion, of expressing policy preferences, and ofholding rulers accountable.

Second, elections become problematic remediesfor restoring constitutional order after an electoraldispute. Restoring constitutional order after a coup,for instance, tends to involve transitional arrange-ments culminating in an election that is the mostsalient mark of restored constitutionality.Unfortunately, electoral disputes severely cripplethe main remedy for resolving constitutional crises:elections themselves. The experiences of Zimbabweand Côte d’Ivoire in recent years underscore thesedifficulties, along with Kenya. As the UN’s ElectoralAffairs Division eventually convinced the twodisputants in Kenya, rerunning the elections poseda number of technical and political challenges,including enabling tens of thousands of displaced

persons to vote; guaranteeing their physicalsecurity; ensuring trust in the electoral commis-sion; and preventing even a well-documented, fairoutcome from leading to renewed violence.Consequently, time and effort is required to restorefaith in electoral processes after electoral disputes,making non-electoral remedies (such as temporarypower sharing or a non-elected but purportedlyrepresentative national assembly) more likely andnecessary in the short run.

Third, if power sharing is adopted as a remedy forelectoral disputes, it may endure for a few years,whereas coups and other ousters of constitutionalgovernments can be resolved within months or twoyears through an election (even though this oftendoes not occur). Power sharing after electoraldisputes effectively kicks the can down the road interms of resolving not just who has the legitimateright to rule, but what process of selecting rulers willbe widely acceptable to the main groups in society.While unconstitutional ousters can also encounterthis problem, it is intrinsic to electoral disputes.5. Commissions of inquiry offer opportunitiesnot just to clarify the circumstances of disputedevents, but also to facilitate the restoration ofconstitutional order without sacrificing justice. In Guinea, Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan, commissions ofinquiry were formed to investigate incidentsinvolving mass violations of human rights. InKenya, a commission was also created to investigatethe disputed 2007 election. Such commissionshelped create a single authoritative account of pastevents. They also helped assure the public thatjustice had not been entirely set aside as negotia-tions proceeded concerning a political transition,and that some public account of the parties’ respon-sibility would be forthcoming. They facilitated themediation process by “bracketing” the heatedcontroversies over these disputed events, removingthem from the purview of immediate negotiations,and entrusting them to a body that would offer amore impartial and reliable account. Of course,such a commission can also be misused to advanceone version of the truth when its composition,mandate, or methods reflect bias. However, thesecommissions served to remove the immediatedisputes over elections and violence in the Kenyacase, to undermine the legitimacy of Dadis Camaraand top junta leaders in the Guinea case, and to


lower tensions over ethnic violence in theKyrgyzstan case. Despite their flaws, these commis-sions facilitated greater public acceptance of thetransitional arrangements in all three cases.6. Although legislatures often contribute toconstitutional crises, they can also provide somestability or offer a forum for dialogue or negotia-tions. In Mauritania, the parliament helped legitimate thecoup, with a majority bloc supporting the newjunta, the High Council of State (HCE). Thesubsequent resignation of a large number of legisla-tors helped pressure the de facto authorities into anew election following a brief, mediated power-sharing transitional arrangement. The legislatureprovided a semblance of state continuitythroughout the transition. In Kenya, the parliamentratified the power-sharing arrangement pending anew constitution. In Kyrgyzstan, the election of anew legislature provided an important milestone inthe return to constitutional order, even as InterimPresident Otunbaeva’s term continued. And inGuinea, the absence of an elected legislaturecontinues to cast a shadow over the elected govern-ment of President Condé. LESSONS REGARDING INTERNATIONALMEDIATION AND OTHER ROLES

1. International mediation played an importantrole in moving the actors toward compromise inalmost every case; and the UN was vital to thosemediation efforts. Kenya best illustrates the use of internationalmediation to elicit significant concessions from twoparties and forge a power-sharing arrangement thataverted mass violence and still offers hope of asustainable, plural political system, touching evenbroader issues of socioeconomic development,justice, impunity, and reconciliation. The joint AU-UN-ECOWAS mediation in Guinea persuaded amilitary-coup regime that had indicated it wishedto stand in elections not to stand in such elections,leading ultimately to the election of a presidentialcandidate who had opposed the coup. InMauritania, Gen. Abdel Aziz’s implacable rejectionof a mediation role for the detained president gaveway to a transition in which a free election was heldunder the oversight of the opposition-controlledNational Elections Commission, even though thecoup leader won as expected. In Madagascar, the

mediation failed—and “is still failing,” as one UNofficial put it—but did bring the High TransitionalAuthority (HAT) to accept a transitional power-sharing arrangement, which only failed in the finaldetails.2. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize thelimits of international mediation efforts. Where determined leaders come to power withwidespread popular support through massmobilization against an unpopular president,internal support for their cause may trump evenstrong external pressures. Madagascar epitomizesthe severe limits facing mediation when internalsupport for the coup-generated leadership is highand broad, and newly oppositional forces enjoylittle popular support.

Two other cases—Mauritania and Guinea—seemto portray success, as mediated transitions to new,post-coup, elected governments received interna-tional recognition. However, in Guinea,Mauritania, and Madagascar, the coup leadersseemed bent on retaining power through aneventual election (a plan altered in Guinea only bythe unpredictable gunshot injury to DadisCamara). Thus, even in cases where internationallyrecognized governments emerged from technicallyfree and fair elections after coups (namely, Guinea,Mauritania, and probably Honduras), the poweradvantages of coup leaders is apparent.

Kyrgyzstan stands as an example of both thelimits of international mediation and of thecommitment of the interim government to acompetitive electoral process. The joint OSCE-UN-EU mediation had relatively little impact on thecontent and pace of the constitutional reform orelections, even though the results have beenwelcomed by the international community. Nor didthe mediation anticipate or prevent mass ethnickillings and displacement after the coup. At thesame time, the interim government seemedcommitted to competitive elections and to erectinga system of government that would prevent eventhemselves from gaining and wielding tremendouspower. In the 2010 parliamentary elections, apolitical party that included numerous formersupporters of the ousted president won a pluralityof parliamentary seats and formed part of theruling coalition.3. International mediators can influence the

Charles T. Call 33

menu of options for transitional political arrange-ments, and even the selection process; however,such influence is uncommon. The content oftransitional arrangements and electoral systemstend to be shaped heavily by precedent. In the case of Kenya, Mr. Annan and the mediationteam actively and successfully pressed for a power-sharing arrangement, and brought in two interna-tional consultants who helped persuade the partiesof its value and shaped its content. However,international mediators or consultants had verylittle involvement in shaping transitional politicalarrangements or the content of constitutionalchanges in Madagascar, Kyrgyzstan, Guinea, orMauritania. In Madagascar, Kyrgyzstan, andMauritania, proposals drew on past constitutionalproposals or past transitional arrangements. 4. International mediation, however, caninfluence electoral processes and the creation ofspecial commissions of inquiry into violence orelections, often as a result of technical capacities. In the cases of Guinea, Mauritania, and in theMaputo Agreement for Madagascar, internationalmediators helped persuade interim leaders thatthey must resign in order to compete for thepresidency (this principle has been espoused by theAU in recent years; Kyrgyzstani Interim PresidentOtunbaeva voluntarily committed not to run).Mediators also shaped the creation of the commis-sion of inquiry into the September 2009 atrocitiesin Conakry, and the commissions of inquiry intothe violence and into the elections in Kenya. Theseexamples illustrate how pressing for full truth andaccountability for human rights violations cancomplement efforts at political transitions.

DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) wasalso very influential in convincing the parties inKenya that a rerun or recount of the electionswould be imprudent. These measures all provedimportant to the success of the overall transitionand restoration of constitutional order. Electoralassistance also proved crucial in Guinea’s transitionafter prolonged disputes over the electoral commis-sion. Numerous UN special political missions haveencountered contested results or irregularities inelections (e.g., Afghanistan, Burundi, CentralAfrican Republic), even if these have not precipi-tated constitutional crises. In strengthening itspreventive diplomacy and mediation supportcapacities, the UN system should prepare itself as

systematically as possible for addressing electoraldisputes.5. The cases reveal the remarkable ability of theUN and the AU, the EU, the OSCE, and ECOWASto work collaboratively and effectively inmediation efforts. Intergovernmental organizations face real difficul-ties in working together, not least because ofperverse institutional incentives, past bureaucraticclashes, and personal or professional competitionbetween individuals. Yet these cases show howsuccessful the UN and regional and subregionalorganizations have become in responding topolitical crises through joint or collaborativeefforts. The UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)and its head, regional SRSG Said Djinnit, providedswift and strategic support for AU-led mediation,with technical support, strategic inputs, and (notleast) transport via a UN airplane that shuttled keymediation personnel to strategic meetings at crucialmoments. The UN provided key capacity for theAU-led mediation in Mauritania and Guinea, aswell as most of the staffing for the AU panel’s workin Kenya. Regional SRSG Miroslav Jenča workedactively and closely with the OSCE and EU envoysin responding to the ouster of President Bakiev andthe June violence.

Senior mediators’ prior professional experiencesin other multilateral organizations contributed tothe effective collaboration among international andregional organizations. SRSG Djinnit and SRSGJenča had both held senior positions in the regionalorganizations with which they coordinated, whileKofi Annan, the AU-appointed lead mediator forKenya, had obviously held senior posts in the UN.The Secretariat should value such crossoverbackgrounds in making senior appointments, andcontinue supporting the crucial mediation roleplayed by the regional SRSGs in political crises.

Only the case of Madagascar suggests thatproblems of agreed-upon leadership, disunity ofeffort, and discordant personalities will continue toconfront cases of mediation, and that further stepsare required to enhance collaboration. Such stepsmight include collective planning of mediationstrategies, standing mechanisms for differentintergovernmental organizations to familiarizetheir different staffs and working routines,exchanges of personnel, and hiring practices thatvalue experience in other organizations. Despite


Mr. Drame’s skill and efforts, the mediation effortmay have borne more fruit had there existed aregional SRSG for southern Africa. Although jointmediation was unsuccessful in Madagascar and isprobably less preferable to a single lead mediator, itproved effective in Kyrgyzstan.6. The UN system can adopt a number ofmeasures to ensure that preventive diplomacy andmediation support are coherent throughout thesystem and adequately resourced. The UN system and its member states have madestrides forward in recent years with the increaseddeployment of peace and development advisers(PDAs) and the creation of DPA’s MediationSupport Unit (MSU) and its Standby Team of sixthematic experts. The MSU has become a hub ofaccumulated knowledge and has been deployed inseveral cases. These strengths should be preserved.The ability to deploy advisers swiftly—be theypolitical, electoral, power-sharing, or othertechnical specialists—is paramount in these consti-tutional crises. Given the signal contribution ofspecial political missions, especially regional offices(including those of other organizations, like theOSCE), such offices should be recognized andexpanded. The creation of new DPA regionaloffices (such as the new UN Regional Office forCentral Africa) in other subregions, like southernAfrica, would obviate the need to appoint ad hocenvoys. It would also create a standing, high-levelcapacity, affording the opportunity to appointsomeone with a serious regional background andreputation. Specific deployments of preventivediplomacy are rare, since they may be unwelcomeby the time tensions have escalated to the point thata deployment is called for. Regional politicalmissions represent a constant preventive-diplomacy mechanism, even though the casesexamined here all represent implicit failures toprevent the onset of constitutional crisis. Electoralassistance represents another mechanism that canin effect serve to prevent constitutional crises.

DPA could also enhance its general level ofcommunication with resident coordinators and, inconjunction with UNDP’s Bureau for CrisisPrevention and Recovery, help ensure that UNcountry teams are as well prepared as possible forthe sorts of challenges likely to arise during apolitical crisis. DPA and UNDP should also findways to expedite the process of appointment and

deployment of peace and development advisers.Standby experts can also prove useful, and envoysshould be apprised of their potential contributionsand limitations. Drawing critically from the Kenyaexperience, the UN system should find ways toeffectively create mechanisms to monitor transi-tional arrangements, including power sharing andother efforts at reconciliation, justice, and inclusive,conflict-sensitive development. Monitoring power-sharing arrangements would offer a reference pointfor national and civil society actors seeking toensure inclusion and broaden elite deals to thewider population. The UN must harmonize itsentire system after political crises, so that issues ofprotocol and recognition; humanitarian anddevelopment efforts; and mediation effortsreinforce rather than contradict one another.

Finally, these cases show that the UN shouldcarefully weigh the pros and cons of adopting ablanket policy of denouncing all departures fromconstitutional order. On the one hand, a policy ofuniform condemnation would strengthen the normagainst such departures, putting the UN on thesame footing as regional and subregional organiza-tions that have committed to condemn anyunconstitutional change of government. It wouldstrengthen the normative environment against suchcoups and other departures, something that couldhave strong, positive long-run effects.

On the other hand, a policy of blanket condem-nation would pose challenges for the UN. First, itmight limit the room for maneuver for mediators,mediation support efforts, and other UN goodoffices. In Madagascar, the UN’s choice not to jointhe AU and SADC in condemning the coupenabled it to play an initial role in supportingmediation, even as the regional organizations’ rolewas debilitated. That choice shows the advantage ofnot having a policy of blanket condemnation ofcoups. Second, sometimes constitutional govern-ments have become exclusionary or otherwiseunjust regimes. The Arab Spring exemplifies thisphenomenon, as some constitutional orders wereupended by popular protests with the approval ofmost of the world. The principle of self-determina-tion coheres with a right to change one’s govern-ment, calling into question the wisdom of a UNpolicy to condemn all unconstitutional changes ofgovernment.

Charles T. Call 35

Annex

Persons Interviewed and Consulted

Tadjoudine Ali-Diabacte, Electoral Assistance Division, UN DPAPeter Barwick, Mediation Support Unit, UN DPAGerald Bennett, Africa I Division, UN DPAAndrew Bruce, Electoral Assistance Division, UN DPAAlice Chow, Mediation Support Unit, UN DPAValerie de Campos Mello, Africa I Division, UN DPABakary Dabo, Senior Mediation Adviser in Conakry, ECOWASSebastian von Einsiedel, Policy Planning Unit, UN DPAPriya Gajraj, Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDPPatrick Gavigan, Mediation Standby Team, MSU, UN DPAJoão Honwana, Africa I Division, UN DPAStephen Jackson, Policy Planning Unit, UN DPAFedor Klimtchouk, Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, UN DPA, AshgabatSebastien Lapierre, Mediation Support Unit, UN DPAKaterina Limenopoulou, Africa II Division, UN DPARenato Mariani, Africa I Division, UN DPAMeredith Preston McGhie, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, NairobiAdrian Morrice, Policy Planning Unit, UN DPAGumisai Mutume, Africa II Division, UN DPALuc Ngowet, Africa I Division, UN DPABrendan O’Leary, Mediation Standby Team, MSU, UN DPAKelvin Ong, Mediation Support Unit, UN DPAMaria do Valle Ribeiro, former Resident Coordinator in Mauritania, UNDPPeter Sampson, UN Office for West Africa, DakarVarious Program Officers, Staff of the Mediation Support Unit, DPAAlexander Vinnikov, OSCE Centre in BishkekBrian Vitunic, Central Asia and Gulf Team, UN DPAMargaret Vogt, Africa I Division, UN DPAChristie Warren, Mediation Standby Team, MSU, UN DPAVanessa Wyeth, International Peace Institute, New YorkAtajan Yazmuradov, Mediation Support Unit, DPA

36

Further Reading

Power Sharing

Choudry, Sujit. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2008.

Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell. “Power Sharing in Peace Agreements.” In Donald Rothchild andPhilip Roeder, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2005.

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

LeVan, A. Carl. “Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa’s Uncertain Democracies.” Governance: AnInternational Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 24, No. 1 (January 2011): 31–53.

Lijphart, Arend. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21, No. 2 (1969): 207-225.

McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary. The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2004.

Reilly, Ben and Andrew Reynolds. Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. Washington, DC:National Academies Press, 1999.

Roeder, Philip G. “Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing.” In Philip G. Roeder andDonald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press, 2005, pp. 51-82.

Rothchild, Donald and Philip Roeder. “Power Sharing as an Impediment to Peace and Democracy.” In PhilipG. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 29-50.

Kenya

African Union Panel of the Wise. “Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence: Strengthening the Role ofthe African Union in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict.” The African Union Series, NewYork: International Peace Institute, July 2010.

Lindenmayer, Elisabeth and Josie Lianna Kaye. “A Choice for Peace?: The Story of Forty-One Days ofMediation in Kenya.” New York: International Peace Institute, August 2009.

Preston-McGhie, Meredith and E. Njoki Wamai. “Beyond the Numbers: Women’s Participation in the KenyaNational Dialogue.” HD Centre report, March 2011, available atwww.hdcentre.org/publications/beyond-numbers-womens-participation-kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation .

Guinea

International Crisis Group. “Guinea: The Transition has Only Just Begun.” Africa Briefing No. 58, March 5,2009.

International Crisis Group. “Guinea: Military Rule Must End.” Africa Briefing No. 66, October 16, 2009.

International Crisis Group. “Guinea: Reforming the Army.” Africa Report No. 164, September 23, 2010.

Charles T. Call 37

Madagascar

International Crisis Group. “Madagascar: Ending the Crisis.” Africa Report No. 156, March 18, 2010.

International Crisis Group. “Madagascar: Crisis Heating Up?” Africa Report No. 166, November 18, 2010.

Kyrgyzstan

International Crisis Group. “Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses.” Asia Briefing No. 102, April 27, 2010.

International Crisis Group. “The Pogroms of Kyrgyzstan.” Asia Report No. 193, August 23, 2010.

O’Leary, Brendan, Christie Warren, and Atajan Yazmuradov. “Draft Report of the Mediation Support UnitMission to the Kyrgyz Republic.” Period of Mission May 18-June 13, 2010.

Nichol, Jim. “The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S.Interests.” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2010.

38 ANNEX

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