UK Bribery Digest - EY - United · PDF file16 UK Bribery Digest cases — Edition 3, ......

Edition 3 August 2013

UK Bribery DigestFraud Investigation & Dispute Services

1UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

Contents

1 Contents

2 Introduction

3 Overview of past UK bribery prosecutions

7 Recent legal developments

12 The impact of the internet and social media on exposing corruption

14 Table of cases

15 Cases in the first half of 2013

16 UK Bribery Digest cases — Edition 3, July 2013

“ The overall effect of recent developments is a tougher stance on corporate offences and greater scope for whistleblowing.”

2 UK Bribery Digest — Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

We briefly comment in this update on the one further prosecution in the first half of 2013 and analyse the underlying bribery

1

activities of the thirty cases since 2008. We note important legal developments: the enabling legislation for Deferred Prosecution Agreements, new sentencing proposals and changes to whistleblower protection. The overall effect of these recent developments is a tougher stance on corporate offences and greater scope for whistleblowing. We also comment briefly on the rumours regarding revision of the Bribery Act itself. Finally, we examine the potential impact of social media in disclosing corrupt activity.

We hope you enjoy this edition and find it useful in your work.

Jonathan MiddupPartner, UK Head of Anti-Bribery and CorruptionErnst & Young LLP

Introduction

Welcome to the third edition of our UK Bribery Digest, examining completed UK bribery and corruption cases. This edition covers cases in the first half of 2013.1

There has been one further prosecution in the first half of 2013, bringing the total of cases covered by this Bribery Digest up to thirty. There have been three prosecutions under the Bribery Act so far, which includes the prosecution in 2013. All have been against individuals in low profile cases. We still await a corporate prosecution under the Bribery Act and therefore the insights into how the SFO will seek to enforce it against larger businesses. Whilst frustrating to many businesses who have (rightly) geared up their compliance programmes, to a degree this wait is understandable: the Act only applies to bribery after 1 July 2011. The three cases against individuals were notable in how quickly they passed through the courts, however large corporate wrongdoing takes longer to be discovered and for the cases to be prepared.

Looking at bribery and corruption cases more widely, developments should be expected soon:

• David Green (Director of the SFO) told reporters in April 2013 that “very significant progress” had been made on two of the SFO’s biggest corruption investigations (both pre-Bribery Act) and there will be developments on these two cases by the end of the year.

• In May 2013 it was reported that a major UK company “is close to resolving civil charges with the SFO for bribery in China, Indonesia, and other countries”. Again, these incidents appear to pre-date the Bribery Act.

• In July 2013 it was reported that the SFO is investigating two cases relating to the Bribery Act and nine other matters under development that pre-dated the Bribery Act (presumably including the three noted above).

• In July 2013 it was also reported that the City of London Police is investigating around 25 separate cases of bribery.

1

Edition 1 of the UK Bribery Digest commented on all completed cases from 2008 to December 2011; the Edition 1 update extended this to cover the first half of 2012; and Edition 2 through to the end of 2012


Overview of past UK bribery prosecutions

The analysis that follows is based on the thirty completed prosecutions covered by the Bribery Digest from 2008 (when a sustained level of UK enforcement commenced) to date.

Three of these cases (20, 29 and 30 — the three completed Bribery Act prosecutions to date) concern individuals outside of a business context. Where appropriate, we distinguish these three cases from the other 27 business related corruption prosecutions.

Value of bribes

A surprising feature of the 27 business related corruption cases is that the value of the bribes involved may be relatively small, considering the size of the companies involved. Of the 19 cases where sufficiently detailed information has been reported, seven involved bribes in the range of £83,000 (Case 2) to £300,000.

The remainder of the cases involved bribery in the low £m, with Case 12 at the top end of this range (some £8m (US$12.4m) of payments to intermediaries). These figures highlight the attentiveness required in identifying corrupt payments: figures of these magnitudes may not appear significant in large scale contracts. It also puts into perspective the audit concept of materiality which is irrelevent in most of these cases.

The one “monster” bribery scheme that has featured in UK prosecutions to date is the reported US$182m of payments to intermediaries in the scheme that gave rise to Case 14, although only an ancillary aspect of this involving a £7m dividend payment was dealt with by the SFO.

What is also evident is that the size of the bribe has no correlation to the value of underlying business that the bribe is seeking to influence. It is not just high value contracts that might induce bribery (see for example Cases 2 and 9 which involved no more than £1.3m of contract value).

“ Our analysis shows that the risk of bribery within the UK should not be underestimated and that there is a global exposure that is not limited to emerging economies.”

“ While the traditionally recognised higher risk sectors of oil and gas and engineering account for many UK cases, in total twelve separate sectors have featured.

This demonstrates that bribery is a real risk across a broad range of business.”


How bribes are paid

Information regarding the modus operandi of the bribery is readily available for 20 cases:

• Traditional kickbacks or similar inducements paid through intermediaries appear high up the list: at least seven cases

• The familiar “consultancy” services or, more imaginatively, “marketing work”, “services rendered”, “advance sales commissions”, “after sales service fees”, “local taxes”: at least seven cases

• Cash payments, especially for smaller bribes: five cases

• Gifts and hospitality: notably in only one case

• Each of the following features were also mentioned to create the necessary corruption funding: inflated supplier contract prices; fictitious employees in marketing; fictitious supplier; bank transfers to little known banks; payments to family and associated companies of government officials

• Multiple schemes may be involved in a particular corrupt scenario: Case 26 involved inflated supplier contract prices, lavish hospitality and free holidays, offshore payments, a “consultancy report” and large and frequent cash payments

How bribes are discovered

Information regarding the discovery of the bribery is readily available for 23 cases:

• UN Independent Inquiry Committee, enforcing The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000: five cases

• Whistleblowers (see below for further comment): four cases

• Press investigation: three cases

• Suspicious Activity Reports: three cases

• Audit and tax audit: two cases

• Referral to UK agencies from overseas agencies: two cases

• World Bank inquiries: two cases

• Complaints from parties offered bribes: two cases

Setting aside the UN Independent Inquiry Committee, enforcing The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000 and which is now only of historical interest, there are a broad range of current channels for discovering bribery. Whistleblowing unsurprisingly tops the list and we comment below on recent legal changes that seek to further encourage whistleblowing by employees.

Overview of past UK bribery prosecutions continued…


Timelines for bribery cases

The 18 business related corruption prosecutions for which the relevant data is available indicate that there may be a considerable time lag between the commencement of the bribery scheme itself and the prosecutor becoming involved. At a minimum the bribery giving rise to the case goes back two years, more typically between three and nine years and as much as 14 years (see Case 14), summarised as follows:

Between 2 and 3 years 3



9 years or more 3

These figures give an indication of the “long-tail” nature of bribery exposure.

The 19 business related corruption prosecutions for which the relevant data is available indicate that there may be a considerable period from the enforcement agency being notified to the final resolution of the case, summarised as follows:

Between 0 and 1 year 2










10 years and more 1

Based on these cases, the shortest “bribery to resolution” period was 16 months (Cases 2 and 21) and the longest about 19 years, including ancillary actions (Cases 5, 13 and 22 involving Mabey & Johnson: the bribes date back to 1993 and the enforcement actions were between January 2007 and January 2012).

This puts into context the lack of corporate prosecutions under the Bribery Act which only became enforceable in July 2011.

Bribery risk applies to all business sectors

Excluding the three prosecutions concerning individuals outside of a business context (two of which were in the public sector and the other in education) and also ancillary actions arising from a single corruption event, there are 24 cases that can be analysed as regards the business sector involved:

• Oil and gas and associated services accounts for five cases broadly in line with the global enforcement profile

• Engineering/construction/project management and insurance /insurance broking account for three cases each

• Educational publishing, medical goods, the public sector/public sector procurement and banking/investment account for two cases each

• There has been one case in each of the following sectors: food retailing, sports/gambling, defence, chemicals and security consulting

While the traditionally recognised higher risk sectors of oil and gas and engineering account for many UK cases, in total twelve separate sectors have featured — including sectors such as food retailing and publishing which would not usually be seen to be prone to corruption risk. This demonstrates that bribery is a real risk across a broad range of business.

“ There may be a considerable time lag between the commencement of the bribery scheme itself and the prosecutor becoming involved.”


2cases

North America

6cases

United Kingdom

6cases

Europe/Russia

2cases

Central & South America

7cases

Africa

7cases

Asia

10casesMiddle East/

Egypt

Overview of past UK bribery prosecutions continued…

Geographical exposure

There are 24 distinct business cases that can be analysed as regards the geographies involved:

• Five of these involved bribery exclusively within the UK

• Of the remaining 19 cases, some of these cases involved more than one country. The countries where the bribing activity took place (listed in alphabetical order, multiple instances noted in parenthesis) is as follows:

Abu Dhabi, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt (3), East Africa (countries not specified), France, Greece, Indonesia (2), Iran, Iraq (4), Italy, Myanmar, Nigeria, Russia (2), Rwanda, Singapore, South Korea, UK, Tanzania, Uganda (2), United States, Vietnam and Zambia

Our analysis shows that the risk of bribery within the UK should not be underestimated and that there is a global exposure that is not limited to emerging economies.

Geographical exposure to bribery in terms of regions


Changes in whistleblowing

In June 2013 important changes for whistleblowing in the UK were introduced by Sections 17 to 20 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act. These changes in part introduce requirements to address perceived abuses of whistleblowing (e.g. by unscrupulous employees outside the qualifying periods bringing an unfair dismissal claim) while also introducing further rights and protections to encourage whistleblowing by employees. It is the latter that make the changes of interest for corruption risk management: while it is fair to say that it is concerns other than bribery that have prompted the changes, because whistleblowing is an important mechanism for the identification of corruption (whistleblowing reports were the second most prevalent source for cases) any changes in this area are worthy of attention.

While these recent changes should remove some of the concerns a potential whistleblower might previously have had, the changes fall short of the sort of encouragement whistleblowers are provided in the US, in particular through financial rewards.

In brief, the changes mean that:

• A whistleblower is protected where he or she has reasonable belief that the disclosure is in the public interest. Perhaps surprisingly, previous legislation made no reference to public interest.

• The requirement that a disclosure is “in good faith” no longer applies (replaced by the belief in the public interest, irrespective of any underlying motive).

• Employers become liable for the acts of employees and at the same time employees become personally liable for detrimental actions against the whistleblower.

Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs)

In April 2013 DPAs were introduced into law in England and Wales, as set out in Section 45 and Schedule 17 of The Crime and Courts Act 2013, which is expected to become effective in early 2014. The Act introduces DPAs for various financial crimes including bribery offences.

DPAs will comprise a major new feature in the corruption risk management landscape: any corporate that is at risk of alleged breaches of the Bribery Act needs to understand how a DPA may affect the outcome.

In brief, a DPA is an agreement for a defined period between the prosecutor and a corporate (i.e. a corporate body, partnership or unincorporates association, but not an individual) that the prosecutor is considering prosecuting under which:

• The corporate agrees to the requirements and timetable imposed by the agreement. This may include a financial penalty; disgorgement of profits made from the alleged offence; compensation of victims, charitable or other third party donation; implementation of, or improvements to, a compliance programme; co-operation in any related investigation; payment of the prosecutor’s costs.

• There is a statement of facts relating to the alleged offence, which may include admissions made by the corporate.

• Proceedings are instituted but immediately suspended; the corporate cannot be prosecuted for the alleged offence during the DPA.

The DPA must be approved by the court. If the corporate does not comply with the DPA, the court may terminate it or oversee its revision, giving the reasons.

Provided that a company fulfils the conditions of the DPA, then at the expiry date of the DPA, the suspended proceedings in relation to the offence will be discontinued. No further criminal proceedings can then be brought against the company in respect of the same offence (unless it is discovered that the corporate provided inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information to the prosecutor during the negotiations for the DPA).

Recent legal developments1

1 Our point of view on legal developments is from the perspective of forensic investigators and compliance advisors and therefore examines the implications for corporates in building corruption risk management systems and planning for and responding to corruption incidents as they arise. Our comments do not comprise legal advice.


A key question a corporate faced with seeking a DPA is likely to ask is: what information has to be disclosed during the DPA negotiation and what happens to it subsequently, in particular if the DPA negotiation is unsuccessful? This will be an area in which legal advice will be critical. In overview, full disclosure needs to be made and little information is protected from subsequent use by the prosecutor against the corporate, and the process is largely overseen in open court. In short, a DPA does not appear to offer greater privacy in comparison to prosecution.

A further key question is likely to be: what are the financial consequences of a DPA compared with prosecution? The financial penalty under a DPA is required to be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed upon conviction. When you consider potentially in addition disgorgement of profits, compensation or other payments, the costs of investigation and compliance programme improvements, any expectation of a financial benefit from a DPA versus prosecution disappears.

DPAs set out to address certain of the criticisms of recent corruption enforcement in the UK (emphasis on civil settlements that many saw as resulting in a too-light punishment for a serious offence and an opaque form of justice).

It is too soon to predict whether DPAs will result in more cases of alleged corruption and a more predictable outcome for corporates. In theory, by providing a clearer framework and a faster process, DPAs should fulfil both of these objectives.

While it is difficult to generalise, what remains clear is that the particular circumstances of the corporate and of the alleged offence(s) will remain fundamentally important. For example, a corporate in the business of government contracting and for which blacklisting due to a criminal conviction could prove disastrous, is likely to find a DPA attractive.

Prior to the Act coming into force, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) are required to issue a joint code for prosecutors. A consultation draft of this joint code has been issued (see right).

DPP/SFO Code on DPAs

The draft DPP/SFO Code on DPAs was issued for comment in late June 2013. The draft code is detailed (over one hundred paragraphs) and we provide only a selective overview below.

The draft code includes a number of general statements that position DPAs:

• A prosecution will usually take place unless there are public interest factors against prosecution.

• A DPA is a discretionary tool — a corporate may be invited into negotiations to agree a DPA (but has no right to be invited); the prosecutor is not obliged to offer an invitation.

• A DPA is voluntary between the parties — an invitation to enter DPA discussions is not a guarantee a DPA will be offered.

• A DPA is a serious sanction for criminal conduct and will be approved by the court on that basis: all of its terms must be complied with.

• Transparency is a key aspect of the success and proper operation of DPAs.

The draft code describes a two stage test of evidence and public interest for determining whether a DPA will be appropriate. The draft code emphasises that the public interest test requires a balancing exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion. It follows that it may not be predictable for the corporates involved.

Recent legal developments continued…


The following non-exhaustive list of public interest factors is set out in the draft code:

Factors in favour of prosecution Factors against prosecution

A history of similar conduct No history of similar conduct

Alleged conduct is part of the established business practices of the corporate

Offending represents isolated actions by individuals, for example by a rogue director

Offending is not recent; company in its current form is effectively a different body to that which offended (through acquisition, operating in a different industry or market, all culpable individuals having left or been dismissed, corporate structures and processes having been changed to make repetition of the offending impossible)

Ineffective corporate compliance programme at the relevant time

Existence of genuinely proactive and effective corporate compliance programme

Corporate has not taken adequate action in response to previous warning, sanction or criminal charges

Failure to report wrongdoing within a reasonable time (action against officers responsible for the failure will also need to be considered)

Failure to report properly and fully the true extent of wrongdoing

A genuinely proactive approach once the offending is brought to the notice of management: self-reporting; remedial actions; compensation of victims

Adverse impact on the economic reputation of England and Wales

Severe economic harm to victims of the wrongdoing

Conviction likely to have unduly adverse consequences for the corporate under the law of another jurisdiction, including European law

It is evident from the draft code that the type of corporate that may be offered a DPA is one that has genuinely sought to manage corruption risks and incidents.

The draft code envisages the corporate will warrant that information provided during the DPA negotiation contains no inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information. Given the nature of corruption issues, this is a warranty that a corporate may struggle with.

On financial terms of the DPA, the draft code states that it is “particularly desirable” to achieve redress for victims. This is not addressed in depth in the draft code. Does it for example include compensation of competitor businesses? How might compensation of the country affected be estimated? Any financial penalty may attract a discount in accordance with sentencing practice for the equivalent of an early guilty plea and assistance with the investigation and prosecution of others.

The draft code deals extensively with the use of monitors to oversee compliance improvements at the corporate and, where applicable, envisages the use of the monitor as an integral term of the DPA.

Proposals for harsher sentencing

In late June 2013 the Sentencing Council of England and Wales issued for comment a draft of Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences Guideline, including proposals for sentencing for corporate offences which, if adopted, will give England and Wales one of the harshest regimes for penalties in the world. The Bribery Act itself already allows unlimited fines for corporate offences. The new sentencing guidelines provide for the first time visibility of proposed financial implications for failing to prevent bribery (Section 7). The guidelines will be an essential consideration for a corporate assessing its approach to a DPA because a key element of the DPA is the requirement that the penalty to be broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed upon conviction.

The draft guideline is detailed (over one hundred pages) and we provide only a selective overview below and in respect of Bribery Act offences only.

The draft guideline sets out a multi-step approach. An initial step is to “consider the principal factors of the offence” under the headings of culpability of the offender and harm caused.

Bribery Act Section 1, 2 and 6 offences by individuals (as distinct from corporate offences — see below)

The guideline sets out three levels of culpability and four categories of harm (and thus twelve possible permutations, attracting differing levels of sentence) and the characteristics of each of these levels and categories.

“ It is evident from the draft code that the type of corporate that may be offered a DPA is one that has genuinely sought to manage corruption risks and incidents.“

“ The draft code deals extensively with the use of monitors to oversee compliance improvements at the corporate and, where applicable, envisages the use of the monitor as an integral term of the DPA.”


We do not repeat these characteristics in this brief summary, but we do make the following observations:

• In contrast to the approach for fraud and money laundering which adopt prescriptive financial categories, no financial amounts are used to define “harm” for bribery offences (due to the perceived difficulty in quantifying the financial value of harm in the different situations of bribery) although the financial gain or loss is taken into account more generally.

• The highest sentence set out in the guideline is eight years.

By way of illustration, the draft guideline provides an example of the head of a UK division of an IT company overseeing over a period of two years corrupt payments totalling £1.5m to an overseas government official to secure business worth £25m. The individual’s bonus was increased as a result by £500,000 and the corrupt activities inflated the price of the contract by £5m. These characteristics would place this head of a UK division of an IT company in the highest level of culpability and harm, attracting a sentence in the highest range of five to eight years.

Bribery Act Section 7 corporate offence

The only available punishment is a fine.

For corporate offences, harm is represented by a financial figure, in principle the gross amount obtained or loss avoided as a result of the offence. For offences under the Bribery Act, this will normally be the gross profit from the contract or alternatively:

• Where the gain cannot be established, the amount that was likely to be achieved or 10% of the relevant revenue is suggested or

• The likely cost avoided by failing to put in place appropriate measures to prevent bribery.

The (non-exhaustive) characteristics of the three levels of culpability may be briefly summarised as follows:

• High

• A culture of wilful disregard of the commission of offences by employees or agents with no effort to put effective systems in place

• Offences committed over a sustained period of time

• Abuse of dominant market position or position of trust or responsibility

• Corruption of officials performing a law enforcement role

• Corruption of local or national government officials or ministers

• Targeting of vulnerable victims or a large number of victims

• Involving others (e.g. employers or suppliers) through pressure or coercion

• Corporate plays a leading role in organised, planned unlawful activity (whether acting alone or with others)

• Medium

• Corporate plays a significant role in unlawful activity organised by others

• Activity not unlawful from the outset

• Lesser

• Corporate plays a minor, peripheral role in unlawful activity organised by others

• Some effort made to put bribery prevention measures in place but insufficient to amount to a defence under Section 7

In defining the level of culpability, the draft sentencing guidelines echo the code on DPAs in referring to the efforts the corporate has made to manage corruption risks and incidents.

Recent legal developments continued…

“ Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering Offences Guidelines... if adopted, will give England and Wales one of the harshest, regimes for penalties in the world.”


The harm figure is multiplied by the culpability category as follows (as the guideline points out, the model is broadly based on the US system for determining corporate fines):

Higher culpability

Medium culpability

Lesser culpability

Starting point 300% 200% 100%

Category range 250% to 400% 100% to 300% 20% to 150%

The starting points define the position within the category range from which to start calculating the sentence and apply to all offenders in all cases. The court should then consider any further aggravating and mitigating factors to adjust the sentence within the range and use its discretion in applying them. The (non-exhaustive) factors are as follows:

• Aggravating factors

• Previous relevant convictions or civil/regulatory enforcement actions

• Corporate set up to commit the bribing activity

• Corruption endemic within the organisation

• Attempts made to conceal the misconduct

• Substantial harm (financial or otherwise) suffered by victims or by third parties affected by the offending

• Risk of harm greater than the actual or intended harm

• Substantial harm caused to integrity or confidence of markets

• Substantial harm caused to integrity of local or national governments

• Offence committed across borders or jurisdictions

• Mitigating factors

• No previous relevant convictions or civil/regulatory enforcement actions

• Victims voluntarily reimbursed/compensated

• No actual loss to victims

• Little or no actual gain to corporate from offending

• Co-operation with investigations, early admissions and/or voluntary reporting of offending — especially in complex cases

• Offending committed under previous directors/managers

Amendment of the Bribery Act?

Press reports in May 2013 suggested that the Bribery Act may be subject to review as part of the government’s drive to reduce “red tape” for SMEs in particular regarding facilitation payments. The reported concern of businesses is, in view of the uncertainty around the definition of adequate procedures, that they may be prosecuted unfairly for making facilitation payments. At the time of writing no review has been announced.

“ The new sentencing guidelines provide for the first time visibility of the financial implications for corporates failing to prevent bribery.”


The internet and social media — blogs, chat rooms, Facebook, Twitter, and the like have impact on the visibility of corruption and, therefore, the likelihood of corrupt activity coming to the attention of enforcement agencies. The internet and social media have a number of distinctive features compared to traditional information channels:

• Most importantly, it is uncensored and unfiltered, at least in most parts of the world

• It has open access, again at least in most parts of the world, and global availability

• Large volumes of information can be uploaded

• This information can be searched in a targeted way by activists, interest groups and enforcement agencies among others

The use of social media in exposing corruption has been more evident outside the UK to date, but UK based businesses operating in territories where social media are already actively used for disclosing corruption are at risk of exposure (see the case history right, for example).

While these social media tend to report “low level” corruption among public officials, there is no reason to assume they would not be used for more substantial issues. Nor should it be assumed that prosecutors would fail to pick the reports up.

Social media also gives rise to the downsides, most importantly, there is often no quality control over the information posted. A business is as much at risk from inaccurate, or even malevolent, reports as it is from accurate ones.

Case history: Rolls Royce The circumstances in which bribery allegations against the aero-engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce came to light received extended coverage in the UK press. Dick Taylor, a former Rolls-Royce engineer, had reportedly been campaigning about the alleged corruption for about six years and very actively used online posts on blogs, chat rooms and newspaper websites.

In May 2012, the SFO picked up on his posts and requested Rolls-Royce to investigate them. Rolls-Royce appointed a major law firm, who contacted Dick Taylor. Around the same time, further allegations against Rolls-Royce in respect of China were reported, arising out of posts on American websites by a blogger under the name of Soaring Dragon. By December, Rolls-Royce was passing evidence to the SFO, which commenced its own investigation.

One of Dick Taylor’s postings read: “Just one example is that Tommy Suharto [son of the former Indonesian President] was given about $20m and a new blue Rolls-Royce car… to force the Indonesian airline Garuda [not accused of any wrongdoing] to take the Rolls-Royce Trent 700 engine on the A330 aircraft they were buying…”.

The story prompts the following observations:

• As well as highlighting low level incidents the internet and social media may be used to raise allegations of large scale corruption, in the case of Rolls-Royce in respect of multi-billion dollar contracts.

• It is reported that part of Dick Taylor’s motivation to go online with his campaign was that his complaints were not taken seriously internally within the business.

The impact of the internet and social media on exposing corruption


Social media is already playing a central part in efforts to combat bribery in certain countries of the world.

IndiaIpaidabribe.com is a website established in India encouraging citizens to share bribe experiences. As at June 2013 the Indian site had received 2.3 million visits and over 20,000 bribes have been reported on it. Ipaidabribe.com has launched sites for Kenya, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Greece, Pakistan and Kosovo with websites planned for Hungary, Mexico, Syria, South Africa, Tunisia, Brazil, Italy and Liberia.

ChinaIn 2011 the Chinese website ibribery.com which set out to allow anonymous tips-offs on official bribery was closed. The website drew over 200,000 site visitors in two weeks; posts included ones about officials demanding luxury cars and villas, police officers requesting inducements and doctors requesting cash to ensure safe procedures. According to press reports, a vice minister in charge of the National Development and Reform Commission was dismissed for “suspected serious violations of discipline” after alleged indiscretions were reported on a micro-blogging platform.

RussiaProminent Russian blogger, lawyer and political activist Alexei Navalny launched Rospil.net in December 2010 to collect information on violations within the states’ procurement system. His rise as a force in Russian politics began in 2008 when he started blogging about allegations of malpractice and corruption at some of Russia’s big state-controlled corporations. Rospil employs a small number of lawyers full time and is funded by voluntary donations and relies heavily on crowd sourcing to report, vet and expose corruption in Russia. Rospil has an application available from the iTunes store to enable reporting of bribery on smartphones and tablets.

AfricaCorruption Watch was launched in South Africa in January 2012 as a platform to report corruption. Reports can be made via the website, SMS line, social media, email or post. There were 3,838 reports made in its first fourteen months. The organisation investigates selected cases and reports to the authorities.

Nigeria’s Whistleblowers Forum launched in 2012 and utilises social media such as Facebook and Twitter to share, highlight and discuss issues surrounding public sector bribery in the country.

GlobalBribespot is a website with global access which allows users to anonymously report bribes.

“ The use of social media in exposing corruption has been more evident outside the UK to date.”


Table of cases

Case name Case reference Date completedPage in previous

editions

Mawia Mushtaq 29 Dec 12 9

Abbott Group 28 Nov 12 8

Oxford University Press 27 Jul 12 7

Andrew Behagg, David Baxter and John Maylam 26 Jun 12 11

Bank of Ireland v Jaffery and Gill 25 May 12 11

James McGeown, William Marks, John Symington and Carol Kealey 24 Mar 12 11

Andrew Rybak, Ronald Saunders, Philip Hammond and Barry Smith 23 Jan 12 10

Mabey Engineering (Holdings) Limited 22 Jan 12 10

Mazhar Majeed, Salman Butt, Mohammed Asif and Mohammed Amir 21 Nov 11 7

Munir Yakub Patel 20 Oct 11 7

Macmillan Publishers Limited 19 Jul 11 7

Willis Limited 18 Jul 11 8

DePuy International Limited 17 Apr 11 9

Mark Jessop 16 Apr 11 10

Aftab Noor Al-Hassan and Riad El-Taher 15 Feb 11 10

MW Kellogg Limited 14 Feb 11 11

Richard Forsyth, David Mabey and Richard Gledhill (Mabey & Johnson Limited)

13 Feb 11 11

BAE Systems plc 12 Dec 10 12

Weir Group plc 11 Dec 10 14

Julian Messent (PWS International Limited) 10 Oct 10 14

Paul Kent, Silinder Singh Sidhu, Stuart Ford, Rebecca Hoyle and Sarah Kent (Learning Skills Council)

9 Jun 10 15

Robert Dougall (DePuy International Limited) 8 Apr 10 15

Innospec Limited 7 Mar 10 15

Amec plc 6 Oct 09 17

Mabey & Johnson Limited 5 Sep 09 17

Aon Limited 4 Jan 09 17

Balfour Beatty plc 3 Oct 08 18

Niels Tobiasen and Ananias Tumukunbe (CBRN) 2 Sep 08 19

Dobb White & Co 1 Apr 08 19

Covered in Edition 1 and 2 of the UK Bribery Digest

Case name Case reference Date completed Page

Yang Li 30 Apr 13 15

Covered in this update


30. Yang Li (April 2013)

April 2013 saw the third prosecution under the UK Bribery Act. As with the two previous Bribery Act cases this is a prosecution of an individual.

Yang Li, a student at the University of Bath, was awarded a 37% mark for his dissertation, just short of the 40% pass mark. He visited two of his tutors. They set out three options: resubmit the dissertation, appeal against the marking or accept it and withdraw from the course. The court heard that Mr Li set out a fourth option: he placed £5,000 in cash on the table and proposed “… you can keep the money if you give me a pass mark…”. His tutor declined the offer and asked Mr Li to leave, but as Mr Li picked up his coat and put the money away, a 0.177 air pistol fell from his pocket onto the floor. Mr Li’s defence counsel argued that Mr Li was carrying £5,000 as he had withdrawn it that morning intending to use it at the weekend but instead impulsively offered it as a bribe, and that Mr Li thought it safer to take the air pistol to the meeting rather than leave it in the car — he had planned a shooting session in his garden after the meeting.

Mr Li received a twelve month prison sentence for the bribery offence and six months concurrently for the firearm offence.

The case indicates that simpler bribery scenarios can move through the legal system quite swiftly: the bribing incident was in November 2012 and Mr Li was convicted in April 2013.

This case prompts a number of observations:

• The courts regard bribery as a serious offence, as was made clear by the judge and as reflected in the sentence

• The bribe does not need to be successful to commit an offence — the offer of the bribe is itself an offence and, indeed, the person offered the bribe may file the complaint

• A foreign national committing offences in the UK will of course be liable to prosecution in the UK

Cases in the first half of 2013


UK Bribery Digest cases — Edition 3, July 2013Case reference Date Name Sector

Enforcement agency notified

Enforcement agency Source of enquiry

Self-reported?

Date of transactions Value of Business Advantage gained Value of Bribe Location of transactions Legal basis of action

Financial penalty Basis of financial penalty Other penalties Other financial effects

30 April 2013 Yang Li Education Avon and Somerset Constabulary

Individual who was offered bribe

No November 2012 £5k UK Bribery Act £4,880 Prosecution costs 12 month bribery, 6 months firearms charge

29 December 2012 Mawia Mushtaq Public service October 2011 Greater Manchester Police CPS


No October 2011 £200 or £300 UK Bribery Act 2 months imprisonment suspended for 12 months and a 2 month curfew from 6pm to 6am

28 November 2012 Abbot Group Limited Oil and gas July 2012 COPFS Tax audit Yes 2007 Contracts with profit totaling $8.9m (£5.6m) Contracts with profit of $8.9m (£5.6m)

Not known Civil Recovery Order: POCA £5.6m Profit on contract

27 July 2012 Oxford Publishing Limited (Part of Oxford University Press)

Publishing November 2011 SFO World Bank investigation Yes 2007 to 2010 Contracts with profit totaling $2.9m (£1.9m) East Africa Civil Recovery Order: POCA £1,895,435 Revenue generated from unlawful conduct World Bank debarment for 3 yearsIndependent monitor for 12 months

£12,500 of costs to the SFOUS $500k paid to World BankVoluntary contribution of £2m to not-for-profit organisation

26 June 2012 Andrew Behagg David Baxter John Maylam

Food retailing 2008 CoLP Audit No January 2006 to January 2008

Total of £8.7m overcharge of contracts totaling £40m

£4.9m UK Criminal: S.1 PCA 1906Criminal: S.329 POCA

3 years and 6 months imprisonment2 years and 6 months imprisonment4 years imprisonment

25 May 2012 Syed Jaffery Pritpal Gill

Banking No May 2007 to May 2010

Approx £16m (value of loans) UK Civil: Breach of fiduciary duty and bribery Not reported Not reported

24 March 2012 James McGeown William Marks John Symington Carol Kealey

Government procurement (CCTV contracts)

2002 Ministry of Defence Police (MDP)SFO

Whistleblower No January 1998 to February 2004

£16.2m (value of contracts) £84.5m UK Criminal: S.1 PCACriminal: article 47 (2) Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996Criminal: S.89 Police Act 1996

3 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 7 years disqualification as a director2 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years9 months imprisonment suspended for 2 yearsConditional discharge

Confiscation orders of £1m

Confiscation order of £24.6k

23 January 2012 Andrew Rybak Ronald Saunders Philip Hammond Barry Smith

Oil and gas April 2008 SFO CoLP

Whistleblower No 2001 to 2009 Approx £70m (value of contracts) $100k (10% of Styrene Monomer Project, Iran)$250k (for info re QASR Gas gathering Project, Egypt)$357k and $225k (for info re Sakhalin Island Project)

Iran, Egypt, Russia, Singapore and Abu Dhabi

Criminal: CJA 1967 5 years imprisonment and 10 years disqualification as a director3 years and 6 months imprisonment3 years imprisonment and 10 years disqualification as a director12 months imprisonment suspended for 18 months

22 January 2012 Mabey Engineering (Holdings) Limited (parent company of Mabey & Johnson Limited)

Engineering(temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO No 2001 and 2002 Contracts totaling £8m+ (in Jamaica), £26m (in Ghana), €4.2m (in Iraq)

£131k (value of dividends)

Iraq Civil: POCA (Part 5) £131k Dividends received by parent company derived from contracts won by subsidiary through unlawful conduct

£2k in costs

21 November 2011 Mazhar Majeed Salman Butt Mohammed Asif Mohammed Amir

Cricket/gambling N/A N/A Press investigation No August 2010 £150k UK Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt 32 months imprisonment30 months imprisonment12 months imprisonment6 months imprisonment

£105k between them in prosecution costs

20 October 2011 Munir Yakub Patel Public service Not known CPS Press investigation No August 2011 £500 UK S.2 Bribery Act 3 years imprisonment

19 July 2011 Macmillan Publishers Limited (MPL) Educational materials December 2009 SFOCoLP

World Bank report Yes 2002 to 2009 £11.26m (value of contracts) Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia Civil: POCA (Part 5) £11.26m Revenue received from potentially unlawful conduct MPL debarred from World Bank contracts for minimum 3 years SFO approved monitor put in place

MPL pay all investigation costs. MPL pay £27k SFO costs. MPL withdrew from all public tenders in education business in East and West Africa. Loss of bid securities

18 July 2011 Willis Limited Wholesale insurance and reinsurance broking

Not known FSA FSA and SARs filed with SOCA

No 2005 to 2009 £32.7m (net insurance commissions earned)£27m (insurance commissions paid)

£140.6k “High risk jurisdictions” Egypt, Russia and Argentina cited

Civil: FSMA (Section 206) £6.895m FSA fine considering “all relevant circumstances”High standards of regulatory conduct

Willis to carry out a review of past payments to overseas third parties “Significant” financial and management time costs per the FSA

17 April 2011 DePuy International Limited Medical goods October 2007 SFO Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

No 1998 to 2006 £14.8m (profit on contracts)£4.5m (payments to Greek officials)

US$7.37m (£4.5m) Greece Civil Recovery Order: POCA £4.829m Had regard to penalties, settlements and seizures in US and Greece

DePuy pays prosecution costs

16 April 2011 Mark Jessop Medical goods December 2005 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2000 to 2003 US$12.3m (value of contracts) €339.9k Iraq Criminal: The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000

£150k Fine — payable to the Development Fund for Iraq 24 weeks custodial sentence Jessop pays prosecution costs of £25k

15 February 2011 Aftab Noor al-HassanRiad El-Taher

Oil and gas October 2005 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2001 to 2002 US$220m oil value (with profits of US$4.4m)US$50m oil value (with profits of US$600k)

US$1.6mUS$0.5m

Iraq Criminal: The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000

16 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years10 months imprisonment

14 February 2011 MW Kellogg Limited (MWKL) Oil and gas October 2009 SFO French prosecutors Yes 1995 to 2004 US$6bn (total value of contracts) US$182m (paid to government officials)

Nigeria Civil: POCA (Part 5) £7.028m Amount of share dividends payable from profits of parent company derived from contracts obtained by bribery and corruption

MWKL to overhaul its internal audit and control measures MWKL pay costs of investigation

13 February 2011 Richard Forsyth David MabeyRichard Gledhill (Re Mabey & Johnson Limited)

Engineering (temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO No 2001 and 2002

€4.2m (contract revenues) £420k payments to Iraq government


21 months imprisonment and 5 years disqualification as a director8 months imprisonment and 2 years disqualification as a director8 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years

£75k of prosecution costs


12 December 2010 BAE Systems plc Defence 2004 SFO Investigative journalism No 1999 to 2005 US$39.97m (contract value) US$12.4m (payments to intermediaries)

Tanzania Criminal: S.221 Companies Act 1985 £500k£29.5m

FineEx-gratia payment for the benefit of the people of Tanzania

Remediation as set out in the Report of Lord Woolf£225k in SFO costs

11 December 2010 Weir Group plc Oil and gas services 2004 Scotland’s Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service

UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2000 to 2002 £13.9m (profit on contracts) £3m kickbacks Iraq Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)Criminal: The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000

£13,945,962£3m

Profit on contractsFine

10 October 2010 Julian Messent (PWS International Limited)

Insurance broking October 2005 SFOCoLP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

No February 1999 to June 2002

US$1,982,230 as inducements or rewards

Costa Rica Criminal: S.1 PCA £100k Compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica 21 months imprisonment and 5 years disqualification as a director

9 June 2010 Paul Kent Silinder Singh Sidhu Stuart Ford Rebecca HoyleSarah Kent (Learning Skills Council (LSC))

Government funded training programmes

July 2006 SFO West Mercia Police

LSC Whistleblower No June 2003 to August 2005

£1.3m (contract value) £270k kickbacks UK Criminal: S.1 PCACriminal: S.329(1)(b) POCA (money laundering)Criminal: S.328(1) POCA (acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property)Criminal: S.16 Theft Act 1968 (pecuniary advantage by deception)

4.5 years imprisonment3 years imprisonment2 years imprisonment1 year imprisonment suspended for 2 years12 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 200 hours unpaid work and 12 month supervision order

8 April 2010 Robert Dougall (DePuy International Limited)

Medical goods Not known SFOWest Yorkshire Police

Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

1998 to 2006 £14.8m (profit on contracts) £4.5m (payments to Greek officials)

Greece Criminal: S.1 PCA 12 months prison term suspended for 2 years on appeal

7 March 2010 Innospec Limited Chemicals October 2007 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 14 February 2002 to 31 December 2006 (indictment period)

US$160m (value of contracts) US$2.9m in kickbacks Indonesia Criminal: S.1 Criminal Law Act 1977 (conspiracy to corrupt)Criminal: S.1 PCA

US$6.7mUS$6m

Confiscation penalty in respect of Indonesian corruption Civil recovery of which US$5m to UN Development Fund for Iraq (penalties taking into account the ability to pay)

SFO appointed monitor No further funds available to fund confiscation or compensation Innospec to pay costs of a monitor for up to three years

6 October 2009 AMEC plc Engineering and project management

March 2008 SFO Yes 2005 to 2007 US$9m South Korea Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)

£4.95m Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External consultant appointed

5 September 2009 Mabey & Johnson Limited Engineering (temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO Yes 1993 to 2002 Iraq: €4.2m (contract revenues)Jamaica: £8m+ (contract revenues)Ghana: £26m (contract revenues)

Iraq: £420k payments to governmentJamaica: £200k payments to officialsGhana: £470k payments to officials

Iraq, Jamaica and Ghana Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt Iraq £2mJamaica £750kGhana £750k

FineFineFine

Iraq reparations £618kJamaica reparations £139kGhana reparations £658kConfiscation order £1.1m

First year monitoring costs up to £250kSFO costs £350k

4 January 2009 Aon Limited Insurance broking April 2007 FSA SAR filed with SOCA and FSA

No January 2005 to September 2007

US$7.1m and €1m (revenues arising) US$2.5m and €3.4m to intermediaries

Bahrain,Bulgaria, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam

Civil: S.206 FSMA £5.25m

3 October 2008 Balfour Beatty plc Engineering and construction services

April 2005 SFO Yes 1998 to 2001 Not known Egypt Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)

£2.25m Not known Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External monitor appointed

2 September 2008 Niels Tobiasen (CBRN)Ananias Tumukumbe

Security consulting services Not known CoLPCPS

SAR No May 2007 £500k+ (value of contracts) £83k payments to officials

Uganda Criminal: S.1 PCA 5 months jail sentence suspended for a year1 year jail sentence; subsequently deported

1 April 2008 Shinder Singh Gangar Alan WhiteNigel Heath (Dobb White & Co)

High yield investments September 2002 SFOLeicestershire Police ECU

A separate SFO investigation No Not known US$500k bribe United States Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt and conspiracy to defraud 18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud6 months jail sentence

Case reference Date Name Sector

Enforcement agency notified

Enforcement agency Source of enquiry

Self-reported?

Date of transactions Value of Business Advantage gained Value of Bribe Location of transactions Legal basis of action

Financial penalty Basis of financial penalty Other penalties Other financial effects

30 April 2013 Yang Li Education Avon and Somerset Constabulary


No November 2012 £5k UK Bribery Act £4,880 Prosecution costs 12 month bribery, 6 months firearms charge

29 December 2012 Mawia Mushtaq Public service October 2011 Greater Manchester Police CPS


No October 2011 £200 or £300 UK Bribery Act 2 months imprisonment suspended for 12 months and a 2 month curfew from 6pm to 6am

28 November 2012 Abbot Group Limited Oil and gas July 2012 COPFS Tax audit Yes 2007 Contracts with profit totaling $8.9m (£5.6m) Contracts with profit of $8.9m (£5.6m)

Not known Civil Recovery Order: POCA £5.6m Profit on contract

27 July 2012 Oxford Publishing Limited (Part of Oxford University Press)

Publishing November 2011 SFO World Bank investigation Yes 2007 to 2010 Contracts with profit totaling $2.9m (£1.9m) East Africa Civil Recovery Order: POCA £1,895,435 Revenue generated from unlawful conduct World Bank debarment for 3 yearsIndependent monitor for 12 months

£12,500 of costs to the SFOUS $500k paid to World BankVoluntary contribution of £2m to not-for-profit organisation

26 June 2012 Andrew Behagg David Baxter John Maylam

Food retailing 2008 CoLP Audit No January 2006 to January 2008

Total of £8.7m overcharge of contracts totaling £40m

£4.9m UK Criminal: S.1 PCA 1906Criminal: S.329 POCA

3 years and 6 months imprisonment2 years and 6 months imprisonment4 years imprisonment

25 May 2012 Syed Jaffery Pritpal Gill

Banking No May 2007 to May 2010

Approx £16m (value of loans) UK Civil: Breach of fiduciary duty and bribery Not reported Not reported

24 March 2012 James McGeown William Marks John Symington Carol Kealey

Government procurement (CCTV contracts)

2002 Ministry of Defence Police (MDP)SFO

Whistleblower No January 1998 to February 2004

£16.2m (value of contracts) £84.5m UK Criminal: S.1 PCACriminal: article 47 (2) Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996Criminal: S.89 Police Act 1996

3 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 7 years disqualification as a director2 years imprisonment suspended for 2 years9 months imprisonment suspended for 2 yearsConditional discharge

Confiscation orders of £1m

Confiscation order of £24.6k

23 January 2012 Andrew Rybak Ronald Saunders Philip Hammond Barry Smith

Oil and gas April 2008 SFO CoLP

Whistleblower No 2001 to 2009 Approx £70m (value of contracts) $100k (10% of Styrene Monomer Project, Iran)$250k (for info re QASR Gas gathering Project, Egypt)$357k and $225k (for info re Sakhalin Island Project)

Iran, Egypt, Russia, Singapore and Abu Dhabi

Criminal: CJA 1967 5 years imprisonment and 10 years disqualification as a director3 years and 6 months imprisonment3 years imprisonment and 10 years disqualification as a director12 months imprisonment suspended for 18 months

22 January 2012 Mabey Engineering (Holdings) Limited (parent company of Mabey & Johnson Limited)

Engineering(temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO No 2001 and 2002 Contracts totaling £8m+ (in Jamaica), £26m (in Ghana), €4.2m (in Iraq)

£131k (value of dividends)

Iraq Civil: POCA (Part 5) £131k Dividends received by parent company derived from contracts won by subsidiary through unlawful conduct

£2k in costs

21 November 2011 Mazhar Majeed Salman Butt Mohammed Asif Mohammed Amir

Cricket/gambling N/A N/A Press investigation No August 2010 £150k UK Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt 32 months imprisonment30 months imprisonment12 months imprisonment6 months imprisonment

£105k between them in prosecution costs

20 October 2011 Munir Yakub Patel Public service Not known CPS Press investigation No August 2011 £500 UK S.2 Bribery Act 3 years imprisonment

19 July 2011 Macmillan Publishers Limited (MPL) Educational materials December 2009 SFOCoLP

World Bank report Yes 2002 to 2009 £11.26m (value of contracts) Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia Civil: POCA (Part 5) £11.26m Revenue received from potentially unlawful conduct MPL debarred from World Bank contracts for minimum 3 years SFO approved monitor put in place

MPL pay all investigation costs. MPL pay £27k SFO costs. MPL withdrew from all public tenders in education business in East and West Africa. Loss of bid securities

18 July 2011 Willis Limited Wholesale insurance and reinsurance broking

Not known FSA FSA and SARs filed with SOCA

No 2005 to 2009 £32.7m (net insurance commissions earned)£27m (insurance commissions paid)

£140.6k “High risk jurisdictions” Egypt, Russia and Argentina cited

Civil: FSMA (Section 206) £6.895m FSA fine considering “all relevant circumstances”High standards of regulatory conduct

Willis to carry out a review of past payments to overseas third parties “Significant” financial and management time costs per the FSA

17 April 2011 DePuy International Limited Medical goods October 2007 SFO Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

No 1998 to 2006 £14.8m (profit on contracts)£4.5m (payments to Greek officials)

US$7.37m (£4.5m) Greece Civil Recovery Order: POCA £4.829m Had regard to penalties, settlements and seizures in US and Greece

DePuy pays prosecution costs

16 April 2011 Mark Jessop Medical goods December 2005 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2000 to 2003 US$12.3m (value of contracts) €339.9k Iraq Criminal: The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000

£150k Fine — payable to the Development Fund for Iraq 24 weeks custodial sentence Jessop pays prosecution costs of £25k

15 February 2011 Aftab Noor al-HassanRiad El-Taher

Oil and gas October 2005 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2001 to 2002 US$220m oil value (with profits of US$4.4m)US$50m oil value (with profits of US$600k)

US$1.6mUS$0.5m


16 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years10 months imprisonment

14 February 2011 MW Kellogg Limited (MWKL) Oil and gas October 2009 SFO French prosecutors Yes 1995 to 2004 US$6bn (total value of contracts) US$182m (paid to government officials)

Nigeria Civil: POCA (Part 5) £7.028m Amount of share dividends payable from profits of parent company derived from contracts obtained by bribery and corruption

MWKL to overhaul its internal audit and control measures MWKL pay costs of investigation

13 February 2011 Richard Forsyth David MabeyRichard Gledhill (Re Mabey & Johnson Limited)

Engineering (temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO No 2001 and 2002

€4.2m (contract revenues) £420k payments to Iraq government


21 months imprisonment and 5 years disqualification as a director8 months imprisonment and 2 years disqualification as a director8 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years



12 December 2010 BAE Systems plc Defence 2004 SFO Investigative journalism No 1999 to 2005 US$39.97m (contract value) US$12.4m (payments to intermediaries)

Tanzania Criminal: S.221 Companies Act 1985 £500k£29.5m

FineEx-gratia payment for the benefit of the people of Tanzania

Remediation as set out in the Report of Lord Woolf£225k in SFO costs

11 December 2010 Weir Group plc Oil and gas services 2004 Scotland’s Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service

UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 2000 to 2002 £13.9m (profit on contracts) £3m kickbacks Iraq Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)Criminal: The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2000

£13,945,962£3m

Profit on contractsFine

10 October 2010 Julian Messent (PWS International Limited)

Insurance broking October 2005 SFOCoLP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

No February 1999 to June 2002

US$1,982,230 as inducements or rewards

Costa Rica Criminal: S.1 PCA £100k Compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica 21 months imprisonment and 5 years disqualification as a director

9 June 2010 Paul Kent Silinder Singh Sidhu Stuart Ford Rebecca HoyleSarah Kent (Learning Skills Council (LSC))

Government funded training programmes

July 2006 SFO West Mercia Police

LSC Whistleblower No June 2003 to August 2005

£1.3m (contract value) £270k kickbacks UK Criminal: S.1 PCACriminal: S.329(1)(b) POCA (money laundering)Criminal: S.328(1) POCA (acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property)Criminal: S.16 Theft Act 1968 (pecuniary advantage by deception)

4.5 years imprisonment3 years imprisonment2 years imprisonment1 year imprisonment suspended for 2 years12 months imprisonment suspended for 2 years and 200 hours unpaid work and 12 month supervision order

8 April 2010 Robert Dougall (DePuy International Limited)

Medical goods Not known SFOWest Yorkshire Police

Internal whistleblowerReferred to SFO by DoJ

1998 to 2006 £14.8m (profit on contracts) £4.5m (payments to Greek officials)

Greece Criminal: S.1 PCA 12 months prison term suspended for 2 years on appeal

7 March 2010 Innospec Limited Chemicals October 2007 SFO UN Independent Inquiry Committee

No 14 February 2002 to 31 December 2006 (indictment period)

US$160m (value of contracts) US$2.9m in kickbacks Indonesia Criminal: S.1 Criminal Law Act 1977 (conspiracy to corrupt)Criminal: S.1 PCA

US$6.7mUS$6m

Confiscation penalty in respect of Indonesian corruption Civil recovery of which US$5m to UN Development Fund for Iraq (penalties taking into account the ability to pay)

SFO appointed monitor No further funds available to fund confiscation or compensation Innospec to pay costs of a monitor for up to three years

6 October 2009 AMEC plc Engineering and project management

March 2008 SFO Yes 2005 to 2007 US$9m South Korea Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)

£4.95m Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External consultant appointed

5 September 2009 Mabey & Johnson Limited Engineering (temporary bridges)

January 2007 SFO Yes 1993 to 2002 Iraq: €4.2m (contract revenues)Jamaica: £8m+ (contract revenues)Ghana: £26m (contract revenues)

Iraq: £420k payments to governmentJamaica: £200k payments to officialsGhana: £470k payments to officials

Iraq, Jamaica and Ghana Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt Iraq £2mJamaica £750kGhana £750k

FineFineFine

Iraq reparations £618kJamaica reparations £139kGhana reparations £658kConfiscation order £1.1m

First year monitoring costs up to £250kSFO costs £350k

4 January 2009 Aon Limited Insurance broking April 2007 FSA SAR filed with SOCA and FSA

No January 2005 to September 2007

US$7.1m and €1m (revenues arising) US$2.5m and €3.4m to intermediaries

Bahrain,Bulgaria, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Vietnam

Civil: S.206 FSMA £5.25m

3 October 2008 Balfour Beatty plc Engineering and construction services

April 2005 SFO Yes 1998 to 2001 Not known Egypt Civil Recovery Order: POCA (referencing S.221 Companies Act 1985)

£2.25m Not known Contribution to costs of the Civil Recovery Order External monitor appointed

2 September 2008 Niels Tobiasen (CBRN)Ananias Tumukumbe

Security consulting services Not known CoLPCPS

SAR No May 2007 £500k+ (value of contracts) £83k payments to officials

Uganda Criminal: S.1 PCA 5 months jail sentence suspended for a year1 year jail sentence; subsequently deported

1 April 2008 Shinder Singh Gangar Alan WhiteNigel Heath (Dobb White & Co)

High yield investments September 2002 SFOLeicestershire Police ECU

A separate SFO investigation No Not known US$500k bribe United States Criminal: Conspiracy to corrupt and conspiracy to defraud 18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud18 months jail sentence for corruption and 6 years for fraud6 months jail sentence

Abbreviations

CoLP City of London Police

COPFS Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (Scotland)

CJA Criminal Justice Act

CPS Crown Prosecution Service

CRO Civil Recovery Order

DoJ US Department of Justice

DPA Deferred Prosecution Agreement

ECU Economic Crime Unit

FCA Financial Conduct Authority

FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act

PCA Prevention of Corruption Act 1906

POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

SAR Suspicious Activity Report

SFO Serious Fraud Office

SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency

Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services

John Smart +44 (0) 20 7951 3401

[email protected]

Jonathan Middup +44 (0) 121 535 2104

[email protected]

David Lister +44 (0) 131 777 2308

[email protected]

Steve Caine +44 (0) 20 7951 4433

[email protected]

Contacts

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