2016

The Marginalia of Russia’s Foreign Policy Today

Photo:REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin

The strengthening of Russia’s positions in the international arena as a result of its integration into global and regional political and economic institutions, as well as the desire to restore its positions in significant regions around the world still has not led to the shaping of a comprehensive strategy regarding its closest neighbours, that is, in relations with the countries of the former Soviet countries. For the most part, these countries remain outside the scope of Russia’s active foreign policy; Russia’s political elites perceive them as partners “by default,” as a priori economically dependent entities.

The author proposes applying a metaphor of “marginalia” to this group of countries; they are significant from both the political and economic points of view, yet they are not among the priorities of Russia’s real foreign policy efforts. No comprehensive work is being carried out with these countries; there is no long-term planning regarding them. The lack of goal-setting with regard to these countries leads to the fact that Russian diplomacy has to react to the signals already coming from in the former Soviet countries; Russian diplomacy does not independently shape its foreign policy in this area. At the same time, Russia’s desire to be an equal partner for the key world actors cannot be implemented without ensuring a loyal and friendly geopolitical environment. One of the measures to form such an environment is the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Today, however, given the economic instability and escalating external threats, this institution requires greater attention and work on a future-oriented strategy. This article discusses the current possibilities that Russian diplomacy could use in its relations with former Soviet countries to shape a politically loyal and economically predictable border zone. In its methodology, the article relies on comparative analysis, document analysis and case studies.

In the course of the research, groups of medium-term goals for Russia’s foreign policy regarding its closest neighbours were developed; the article also developed recommendation for optimizing Russian strategy in the post-Soviet space.

Russia’s Strategy for Interacting with Neighbouring Countries

The societies of these new states are entering a stage where those who were born in new political circumstances dominate the social landscape. The fight to win the minds of these people is on. For Russia, it is important not to lose the productive component of its image as the successor of the large country.

Since Primakov’s famous “U-turn over the Atlantic,” Russian diplomacy has had a great deal of success in global politics. And the early 2010s were no exception. Russia fully demonstrated foreign policy features: multi-vector nature, support for the multilateral diplomacy institutions, and a desire to develop a dialogue with the world’s leading states. Some of the more glaring examples are the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and theTreaty signing between the United States of America and the Russian

Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty), Russia’s participation in the negotiations on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, and its support of the negotiation process on Iran’s nuclear programme.

The list could go on. But one thing is already clear: all these successes apply to countries and regions that are fairly distant geographically. This is easily explainable, since Russia is a world power, involved in solving problems of the world’s political development. However, Russia’s relations with its immediate neighbours have remained outside the scope of these developments. The achievements of Russian diplomacy in this area have rarely been cause for foreign policy pride. For any country (and world powers are no exception here), reliable, friendly and constructive relations along their borders are a guarantee of successful development.

REUTERS/Ints Kalnins

Goodbye Post-Soviet Space?

The picture started to change in response to the increasing political dialogue between Russia and China, and also to the (EEU) becoming fully operational. This shift of focus in Russia’s foreign policy toward its neighbours must be considered separately.

Since the geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union began to develop, there was the notion that Russia’s near-abroad was a region where certain political and economic developments occur by default in the most-favoured-nation regime. Such a conceptual vision was begotten by the belief that, over the years of living together in the USSR, Russia had formed fairly stable ties with the republics, including stable industrial and economic and infrastructural chains, and well-established research, development and production ties. Accordingly, even when developing independently, former Soviet republics were supposed to gravitate toward each other on the basis of the already-formed common manufacturing needs and humanistic space. Hence, the invariable mentions of the post-Soviet space as a priority of Russia’s foreign policy concepts. However, over the years, a special strategy aimed at developing ties with “new” neighbours under the new conditions of global development and open international competition for resources has failed to materialize. All the suggestions about developing relations with the former Soviet republics remained a sort of marginalia, notes in the margins of Russia’s foreign policy that had not been put together into a logically structured multilevel system of interactions. Influenced primarily by external challenges, Russia is currently revising its relations with its closest neighbours in favour of creating more pragmatic ties.

In order to increase the efficiency of Russian foreign policy, especially in its relations with its neighbours in the former Soviet Union, a strategizing element must be introduced.

This raises a series of strategic questions, the answers to which will allow us to assess the stability of foreign policy relations along the Russian Federation’s border.

Firstly, will the status of the neighbouring post-Soviet states increase in terms of Russia’s real foreign policy framework?

Secondly, can Russia fully restore its relations with all the CIS countries? Thirdly, is it expedient for Russia to develop a clear strategy of interaction with its neighbouring countries?

Without finding the answers to these questions, it is hard to imagine an efficient foreign policy for Russia.

Development Potential and Conflict Potential

The differences that exist between the former Soviet countries pose a significant challenge for Russia itself. The states are different in terms of economic and societal structures, the historical conditions of shaping bilateral relations with Russia, and the participation of the countries in various international organizations, unions and alliances. All these factors leave their footprints on Russia’s relations with its neighbours.

Today, joint work on infrastructural projects, including developing power grids, constructing highways and railways and the related infrastructure could bring best results./blockquote>

Simple analysis demonstrates that Russia’s geopolitical contours are rather imbalanced. If we take Russia’s common border with new states that have emerged within former Soviet countries, even such an indicator as length will vary from 70 kilometres with South Ossetia and over 7,500 kilometres with Kazakhstan.

Given such heterogeneity, is it even possible to form a common strategy for interacting with neighbouring countries? However, understanding Russia’s fundamental tasks in its relations with the neighbouring post-Soviet states helps formulate the principal approaches to the strategic and comprehensive interaction with them.

The first group of tasks is connected with preserving and strengthening Russia’s bilateral diplomatic relations with its neighbours. By the second decade of the 21st century, implementation of this task had moved from merely maintaining connections to “playing on multiple boards at once.” After the Russia–Georgia conflict in August 2008, Russia acquired two new foreign political partners: South Ossetia and Abkhazia, losing direct diplomatic contacts with Georgia. A formal, even mathematical, approach to this issue would state that the number of states with which Russia has diplomatic relations grew by one. In terms of the goals of the “Foreign Political Activity” state program of the Russian Federation, this is a positive result.[1] However, the task of maintaining previously established connections turned out to be more difficult in case of Georgia.

AP /EPA / Maxim ShipenkovEurasia in Russian Foreign Policy:   Interests, Opportunities and   Constraints

Since 2014, Russia–Ukraine relations have been extremely tense. Today, they are far from the understanding stipulated in the 2013 Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation: “…build up relations with Ukraine as a priority partner within the CIS, contribute to its participation in extended integration processes.”[2] The unresolved issue of South-East Ukraine and the fact that the international community does not recognize Crimea as a legal entity of the Russian Federation escalate tensions on the Russian borders.

In this connection, Russia’s primary task is to have its borders legally confirmed and to solve territorial disputes. Guided by this goal, in the 2000s, Russia signed (fine-tuned or exchanged instruments of ratification) a series of treaties (or agreements) related to its borders, and not only with the newly independent states, but also with: Lithuania (2003); Kazakhstan (2005); China (2005); Latvia (2007); Azerbaijan (2011); Norway (2011); and Estonia (2014).

The full implementation of this task has a direct impact on the subsequent resolution of issues connected with the functioning of customs services and the intensity of the border-zone activities.

In order to form Russia’s foreign political strategy, it is necessary to create and promote an open database of legal information that reflects the development of Russia’s relations with its neighbouring states.

The second group of tasks inolves specifying the international subject status and state identity of the countries that declared their independence 25 years ago after the dissolution of the USSR. The actions of Russia’s new neighbours were directed primarily at establishing their selfhood and refusing to support the past Soviet experience, including the objective factors of their infrastructure and industries having been built through the efforts of the entire USSR. To realize their desire for independence, they select the strongest foreign economic partners. The goal of such partnerships is to ensure a country’s guaranteed socioeconomic development, while retaining the specific features of forming the political elite. This approach essentially disregards profound cultural and family ties and the powerful civilizational influence of the Russian language, as well as Russian science on all the former Soviet states.

The struggle in these countries against such developments produces a particularly stark emotional reaction and hinders productive dialogue.

It has become more and more difficult to rely on the historical memory of the generations that lived and worked in the USSR. The societies of these new states –former Soviet republics – are entering a stage where those who were born in new political circumstances dominate the social landscape. The fight to win the minds of these people is on. For Russia, it is important not to lose the productive component of its image as the successor of the large country. Here it is also important to preserve comprehensive support for projects aimed at maintaining interest in studying the Russian language, which opens a wide range of opportunities for developing cognitive activities. While statehood is still being formed within the post-Soviet space, it is still difficult to predict the results of this process, and the most effective tactic is to strengthen bilateral interactions with the new neighbouring countries while continuing to work actively on preparing and implementing a more general strategy regarding those states.

REUTERS/Alexei Druzhinin/Sputnik/Kremlin

Eurasian Integration: In Search of the Lost

The third group of tasks is linked to developing multilateral regional institutions and forming responsibility with regard to common processes in politics and economics. Serious thought is required here to resolve the problems realated to implementing large-scale economic initiatives and regional security projects. It is obvious even now that the CIS, as an economically driven project, is facing greater and greater geopolitical challenges with regard to state security. For the same reasons, the possibility of including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the project to tie the EEU and China’s Silk Road Economic

Belt (SREB) project together are being discussed. The question of the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is, therefore, logical.

At the same time, stability within the CIS is guaranteed by maintaining an intensive regional dialogue on all the challenges and threats common to the entire space of the newly independent states. These threats and challenges are, above all, drug trafficking, Islamic radicalism, terrorism and smuggling. It is hardly possible to name a country in the region that does not have to deal with at least two or three of these problems.

Currently, all the new tasks in this group remain the “marginalia” of Russia’s foreign policy. There is an understanding, but no clear vision – as there are no clear approaches to solving these problems, there is no comprehensive strategy. It should be noted that such a situation cannot continue forever; the development of each separate country and its surroundings will force certain decisions to be made. It is important to be ready to anticipate major changes that affect Russia’s interests, and to respond to them in a timely manner.

Recommendations on Shaping the Russian Strategy of Relations with Other Countries

Given the current crisis in Russia’s relations with Europe and the United States, the logic of “one-day planning” gains momentum. Tactical steps are being actively discussed, and the measures already taken are having a visible and tangible effect. Unlike the western elites, who think in the categories of linearity and predictability, Russian leaders master their skills using the tactics of “delayed action” and “accurate response.” Long-term planning, on the contrary, appears difficult and little in demand among decision-makers. That leads to reactive policies dominating over pro-active steps. In order to increase the efficiency of Russian foreign policy, especially in its relations with its neighbours in the former Soviet Union, a strategizing element must be introduced. Advice from the outside will hardly help Russia to overcome the difficulties that have emerged in relations with its neighbours. A unique combination of geography and cultural and historical ties makes interaction between bordering countries inevitable.

What approaches could be adopted in this case?

One of the key approaches must be formulating strategies for interacting with neighbouring states. This could be done by developing a foreign policy strategy for all the new neighbours, as well as for groups of countries or a region; alternatively, it could touch upon individual interaction aspects, for instance, humanistic or border-zone cooperation. Certain steps in this direction have already been taken. The legal foundations for such documents were laid down in Federal Law 172-FZ “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation,” dated June 28, 2014.[3] What is more, Russia’s border-zone regions could successfully participate in implementing this task. On the whole, it would appear to be a productive course of action if efforts aimed at strategizing relations with neighbouring countries could be distributed between all the interested parties in Russia.

REUTERS/Felix Ordonez: “A Thousand Threads” Policy:  

Russia’s “Soft Power” in the   Post-Soviet Space

Implementing this approach is closely linked with resolving the tasks of making Russia’s relations with its neighbours progressively more pragmatic and defining Russia’s interests in each bordering state. Forming a kind of a “matrix” of interests would allow for resources to be used more efficiently and promising lines in regional cooperation to be defined. Today, when more and more attention is being paid to tying together the EEU and the SREB, joint work on infrastructural projects, including developing power grids, constructing highways and railways and the related infrastructure could bring best results.

Special attention should be paid to setting up active monitoring of possible processes in the neighbouring states. Today, there is no shortage of organizations that are ready to provide this kind of information. Such work could be done ad hoc, at the request of the interested state or commercial bodies. The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) held its summer school “The Situation in Central Asia: Security, Economy, Human Development,” which could serve as an example of developing such situational scenarios.[4] Its participants – young experts – created scenarios of Central Asia’s development after NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. The key problem of such analytical products is promoting them: getting high-level politicians to consider them as a matter of “FYI,” discussing them at expert meetings, getting them covered by both traditional and online media.

A more positive attitude to the monitoring results could be adopted as well. Periodical cross-sections of information, particularly when presented as statistical data, have a greater chance of becoming a necessary argument in political decision-making. Yet such information will be of power only if there is an algorithm for both collecting it from reliable sources and processing it.

Taking these assumptions into account, it would be correct to say that, in order to form Russia’s foreign political strategy, it is necessary to create and promote an open database of legal information that reflects the development of Russia’s relations with its neighbouring states. Currently, this information exists in bits and pieces and is not always complete and timely. It appears that the best solution would be to upload the texts of agreements signed between Russia and its neighbouring countries on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation website and update this section regularly. Such an approach would provide the expert community with a reliable basis for assessing the effectiveness of the measures being implemented and creating new strategies for developing relations with bordering countries.

Focusing Russia’s attention on developing a strategic approach to neighbouring countries agrees both with the incontrovertible logic of geographic proximity and with the processes in the post-Soviet space. Today, experts note a growing trend of moving away from the notion of “post-Soviet states” [1]. This is connected with international economic processes shaped by large global and regional powers making active inroads into those countries. Simultaneously, the search for identity among the new states is under way, and the desire to strengthen this identity is clear. Against the background of these processes, it is important for Russia to formulate a multilevel strategy of relations with new bordering states.

11 august2016

No surprise in Russia-Turkey Reconciliation. Reasons Why

Photo:EPA/ANATOLY MALTSEV/Vostock Photo Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan andRussian President Vladimir Putin meet in theKonstantinovsky Palace in Strelna, outsideSt. Petersburg, Russia, 09 August 2016

What was praised to become a breakthrough meeting which would get Russia-Turkey relations back to their pre-November 2015 incident times and even better, did not deliver any surprises.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in St. Petersburg on August 9 to meet with his counterpart Vladimir Putin for the first time since G-20 meeting in Antalya in November, 2015. Shortly after the relations between the two countries got frayed after Turkey downed the Russian bomber jet Su-24 along Syria-Turkey border. Earlier in June, 2016 Erdogan sent a letter to Putin expressing regrets about the downed jet and offering condolence to the family of the killed pilot. That gesture laid down the road towards reconciliation between Moscow and Ankara which resulted in both leaders pledging to repair ruined relations during the latest meeting in St. Petersburg.

Firstly, the mere fact that Erdogan’s Russia visit comes against a backdrop of rising tensions between Turkey and the West over Ankara’s harsh response to the failed coup attempt and over Turkish approach to Syrian Kurds is very telling. Secondly, it is the first visit Turkish president makes after the failed coup attempt which underlines, among other things, the special relations between the two leaders which they decide to set against the current dissatisfaction of the West with both, Moscow and Ankara.

Besides, Turkey being a NATO member makes this moment quite awkward for the United States. In couple of weeks the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is scheduled to visit Ankara to deliver some important messages or proposals to Erdogan, which makes Washington look quite lagged behind the unfolding changes in Turkey and in its improving relations with Russia.

REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin 

the West is not the only option for Russia andTurkey

Some can justly argue that Turkey, being a NATO member, is dependent on Washington and its decisions to some extent, so Ankara will ultimately act in line with NATO’s policies. However, it would be more accurate to say that it is a two-way road, and the U.S. also depends on Turkey especially when it comes to dealing with the Middle East and regional conflicts there. Let’s not forget, that Turkey is NATO’s outpost in the Middle East having the second largest army in the Alliance and playing the role of a buffer between this volatile region and Europe. Besides, Turkey hosts U.S. troops and warplanes at its Incirlik Air Base, an important foothold for the U.S.-led fight against Islamic State terrorists in neighboring Iraq and Syria.

This is why despite being somewhat regionally and globally isolated Turkey still has some room for manoeuvre when it comes to playing on the differences between Russia and the U.S., Russia and Europe.

During the last month Turkish political establishment was sending mixed signals with regard to sensitive foreign policy and security issues which very much indicates that Ankara is testing waters in a complicated regional and international environment. It wants to understand and clarify who will be the easiest partner to negotiate on Syria and issues connected with it (terrorist, refugees flow, Kurds, etc.), so, it has to compromise less.

Ankara is testing waters in a complicated regional and international environment. It wants to understand and clarify who will be the easiest partner to negotiate on Syria and issues connected with it.

On the one hand, there are calls from Turkey to normalize relations with all its neighbors and to come back to its old formula “zero problems with neighbors” (even calls to normalize relations with Syria were voiced) which basically means Turkish foreign policy U-turn. On the other hand, Erdogan still insists that Syria’s future is impossible with Assad and Syrian Kurds Democratic Union Party (PYD) is an offshoot of the ‘terrorist’ Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which is supported by the U.S. and Russia. Besides Erdogan uses refugee crisis in Europe and EU-Turkey deal as a lever on the EU. Such approach gives Turkey more flexibility while negotiating, exploiting different sensitive issues.

As for Russia-Turkey relations, the most fundamental disagreements lie in political and geopolitical spheres, mainly concentrating around Syrian crisis and include Assad's fate, Syrian Kurds, terrorist groups designation and Turkey-Syria border. It means that Russia-Turkey economic relations are quite easy to restore as there are no obstacles for them to come back to the pre-crisis level and even to develop further except for political will of both leaders.

REUTERS/Alkis KonstantinidisTurkey’s Pivot: Back on the Path to “ZeroProblems with its Neighbours”?

In fact, this is exactly what happened in St. Petersburg. Parties started their talks discussing economic, trade and humanitarian issues which even did not experience any significant misunderstandings or problems before November 2015, despite Russia-Turkey disagreements on Syria.

So, statements made by Putin and Erdogan on restoring Russia-Turkey relations in all spheres should not be perceived as something outstanding. Resumption of strategic projects like Akuyyu nuclear power plant construction in Turkey and Turkish Stream gas pipeline is mutually beneficial for Moscow and Ankara and

meets both parties’ long-term interests. Lifting Russia’s food embargo and tourist ban on Turkey is also a matter of time. However, as politics often drives economics, Russia received certain leverage over Turkey. Most likely, Moscow will tie restoration of economic relations with Turkey to Ankara’s policy change in Syria.

Nevertheless, big progress on Syria is quite unlikely as both Russia and Turkey have already invested too much in the settlement process to change their positions substantially. However, such technical aspects as pilots' code of conduct and military and air force cooperation to avoid incidents like the one with Russia’s Su-24 in November of 2015 are relatively easy to agree on. Russia's Defense Ministry prepared a package of such documents for Turkey prior to Erdogan’s visit.

Moscow and Ankara will both benefit from restoring bilateral relations. The signals to the west are clear: Moscow demonstrates its successful approach in dealing with a NATO ally while Ankara shows that it can quite easily change its policies and keeps all doors opened. Besides, Moscow is likely to be more assertive with Ankara now, getting more economic levers on Turkey.

Russia and Europe: Somewhat Different, Somewhat the Same?

Tatiana RomanovaDoctor in Political Studies, Associate Professor at European Studies Department, Saint Petersburg State University, Head of Jean Monnet Chair

Turkey’s Pivot: Back on the Path to “Zero Problems with its Neighbours”?

Ruslan MamedovMGIMO-University Graduate Student

Photo:REUTERS/Alkis Konstantinidis

Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years has limited its room for manoeuvre in the international arena. The course of former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu – "zero problems with our neighbours” – that had underpinned the policy of the ruling Justice and Development Party since the end of the 2000s, has been replaced by what some observers (1,2,) describe as “zero neighbours with no problems.” The current policy aimed at normalizing relations with Russia, Israel and other countries reflects the change of the balance of forces in the Turkish leadership and is intended to demonstrate its pragmatism. The strategic nature of the new course, however, is open to doubt, though it is likely to continue in the short term.

From “Zero Problems with Neighbours” to “Zero Neighbours with no Problems”

Stability in the neighbouring regions was a pre-condition for the development of the Republic of Turkey, which has since the early 2000s been forging mutually beneficial relations with other players, aimed mainly at close economic interaction. The only interest Turkey ever showed in the internal affairs of other states was when they affected the interests of Turkish business. The rest of the time, the Recep Erdogan government maintained a neutral stance. However, turbulence in and around the Middle East forced the Turkish Government to respond to the mounting threats.

Turbulence in and around the Middle East forced the Turkish Government to respond to the mounting threats.

On the one hand, some decisions were prompted by the fact that Erdogan had to clarify his position regarding the transformations that took place in 2011–2012 in previously authoritarian Arab countries. Turkey’s policy was meant to be a response to the Arab street, which demanded democratization and transparent governance. On the other hand, the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in these countries, especially on Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Syria, spelled new opportunities as well as risks.

The risks proved to be higher and the result of the new course was the growing isolation of Turkey. Analysts in Europe (and elsewhere) spoke of a policy of “Neo-Ottomanism,” a movement dictated by the imperial thinking of the descendants of the Ottomans. More specifically, “Neo-Ottomanism” referred to Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy, which made pragmatic use of, and unifying the Kemalist, Islamist and Pan-Turkic character of the state. The media and academics attributed the authorship of this course to the former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, though we do not find the term “Neo-Ottomanism” in his “strategic depth” concepts. The concept had been used in academia before, but it began to be used more frequently in the works of European, as well as some Balkan, scholars and was then picked up by the media and other analysts. It was Erdogan, not Davutoglu, who played the leading role in strengthening this strand of foreign policy. However, references to historical events of the Ottoman Empire were made by both leaders (1, 2), especially Erdogan, to boost his status within the country and the region.

REUTERS/Baz RatneTurkey After the Attempted Military Coup.Keeping the Foreign Policy Course

In Egypt and Tunisia, Turkey supported the former opposition Islamist projects of the Muslim Brotherhood, which brought Mohamed Morsi to power in Egypt and Rached Ghannouchi’s Al-Nahda to power in Tunisia through democratic elections. Later, the Tunisian Al-Nahda party yielded power to the secular Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) party, but remained a legal entity. It was at this time that the Egyptian army managed to topple President Mohamed Morsi and outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood. The failing of the Muslim Brotherhood was that, while it was successful in developing anti-government

propaganda, it had no experience dealing with state affairs, especially socioeconomic ones. Turkey declared the 2013 events in Egypt a military coup that overthrew a democratically elected president, and relations deteriorated.]

At the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey assumed an anti-Assad position, apparently expecting the situation in that country to develop according to the Tunisian or Egyptian scenarios. However, that did not happen. And since relations with the Bashar Assad administration had soured, Turkey started supporting opposition groups, which, as society was radicalized and the conflict dragged on, became less secular and, to use Western analytical terminology, was becoming openly Salafist and Jihadist. The war, which destroyed state institutions in Iraq and Syria, brought about a humanitarian disaster and spawned various radical Islamist organizations, confronting Turkey with several major challenges. The lucrative pre-crisis trade and economic relations with Syria and Iraq were replaced by the influx of 2.7 million refugees, multi-billion dollar losses, terrorist attacks and the deterioration of the internal political situation. However, at that point in time, the main threat to the Turkish administration came not from the Islamic State, but from Kurdish separatists, fuelled by the Syrian crisis.

At the start of the Syrian crisis, Turkey apparently expecting the situation in that country to develop according to the Tunisian or Egyptian scenarios.

The Kurds had the backing of the global community, especially since they were fighting the Islamic State. People’s Protection Units (YPG) fought alongside soldiers from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party – considered to be a terrorist group in Turkey – to defeat the Islamic State in the border town of Kobani or Ayn al-Arab. At a critical moment, Turkey yielded to U.S .pressure andallowed Peshmerga, the military forces of Iraqi Kurdistan, to use its territory to render limited assistance to the Kurds in Kobani. With air support of the U.S.-led coalition, the Kurds managed to push the Islamic State far to the south. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which were formed in 2016 and consist of Kurdish and small Arab units, continue fighting several dozen kilometres from the Islamic State’s Syrian capital of Rakka with the aim, at this stage, of taking full control of Manbij.

The possible formation of a Kurdish belt in northern Syria and Iraq is Ankara’s main headache because these territories may be used by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and other extremist forces to destabilize the situation in Turkey’s less developed, Kurdish-occupied southeast. Because of this, Turkey seeks to prevent the establishment of close contacts between Russia and the Kurds, and it is one more reason for normalizing relations with Russia. The Turkish government forged mutually beneficial relations with the Iraqi Kurds. Since 2014, Erbil has been pumping oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey (and on to Israel) via a pipeline, while the market in the Kurdish part of Iraq is saturated with Turkish goods, and Turkish business has a big presence in the region. All this, along with the temporary presence of Turkish advisers in Iraq, could not but worry the central government in Baghdad, which was left out of these deals.

REUTERS/Murad Sezer Recep Erdogan’s Letter Is anAcknowledgement that the Attack on SU-24Failed to Achieve its Goals

The rift between Russia and Turkey occurred over the Syrian issue. The confrontation with Russia and Syria, support for the (mostly Sunni) Syrian opposition and the controversial policy in Iraq prompted Erdogan to use pro-Sunni policy and rhetoric. Naturally, this approach brought Turkey into the Sunni camp in the region, where the shots are called by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and distanced it from Shiite Iran, another extremely important partner.

Normalization of Relations and the Interests of All the Sides

All this time the debate continued within the Turkish establishment about the further development of the country in view of its internal political situation. In May 2016, Ahmet Davutoglu was succeeded as Prime Minister by Binali Yildirim. The move need not mislead anyone. The adjustment of the foreign policy course took place not because Davutoglu left (he actually favoured normalization and a resumption of talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), but because of the changed balance of forces within the Turkish establishment and the pressure exerted on decision-making by the architect of the previous foreign policy course, Recep Erdogan, who retained his position after Ahmet Davutoglu quit. Normalizing relations with its neighbours became a pragmatic necessity for the Republic of Turkey.

The possible formation of a Kurdish belt in northern Syria and Iraq is Ankara’s main headache.

The day before Turkey apologized to Russia, Turkey and Israel signed an agreement on restoring relations in Rome. Relations had been broken off six years earlier, in May 2010, when the Erdogan Government sent a Mavi Marmara humanitarian vessel – the so-called Freedom Flotilla – to the Palestinian side of the Gaza Strip, with the aim of breaking the blockade there. The vessel was seized by Israel, and ten Turkish citizens were killed in the process. In 2013, Israel made a formal apology under pressure from U.S. President Barack Obama, but that did not meet all the Turkish demands, one of which was the lifting of the blockade of Gaza Strip. That goal was never achieved, so the current Turkey–Israel agreement keeps a total blockade of the Gaza Strip in place. Nevertheless, Israel allowed Turkey to take part in humanitarian projects in the Gaza Strip, notably in power and water supply, provided it did not jeopardize Israel’s security. Humanitarian cargoes were initially to be sent to the Israeli port of Ashdod before being transferred to Gaza. The first 11,000 tonnes of cargo have already arrived at the port and after an inspection were delivered to Gaza.

The rift between Russia and Turkey occurred over the Syrian issue.

Turkey is attempting to prevent terrorist activities from being carried out against Israel, including fundraising at home, and to act as a mediator in the return of missing Israel Defense Forces fighters and civilians who had been detained by Hamas, the leading political force in Gaza. According to Israeli sources, Turkey will also help Israel join the international organizations of which it is a member. Above all, this means NATO, Israel’s accession to which had been invariably blocked by Turkey.

REUTERS/Amir Cohen “Ankara–Tel Aviv” Orient Express: Course Setfor Rapprochement?

Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu also said that a normalization of relations would bring substantial economic benefits to Israel. Likely referencing major projects, trade between Turkey and Israel, in spite of the crisis, more than doubled over five years to $5.6 billion as of the beginning of 2015. The sale of Israeli natural gas is strategically important for Turkey and Israel as Israeli gas flows supply Turkey’s needs before going to Europe. The project to build a new market and infrastructure may be joined by Egypt and Cyprus, where massive natural gas deposits have also been discovered. That move, however, needs further work in order to resolve existing contradictions. Gas from the Levantine Basin may become important when it comes to diversifying supplies to Europe, and in the longer term may compete with Russian gas. Frequent personal meetings between Netanyahu and Putin produced a common position on the issue. Russia could be given a part in this project: Russian companies may be brought in to develop it (over possible resistance from the United States). Russia may also offer stability and gas transport infrastructure security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the warming of Israel–Russia–Turkey relations is aimed at securing and stabilizing the region, calling for closer interaction among the security services of the three countries.

While work to restore relations between Turkey and Israel had been going on for a long time without economic relations being interrupted, Turkey had to proceed differently and from a different basis in its relations with Russia. In spite of continuing economic growth in Turkey, Russian sanctions dealt a blow to certain sectors of the Turkish economy, causing jobs and money to be lost. Besides this, the security situation in the country was deteriorating andterrorist attacks had become more frequent.

Analysts today compare Turkey with pre-crisis Syria, which also flirted with radical Islamists, secure in the knowledge that its special services were monitoring the situation. While Syria was used by radical Islamists to make their way to Iraq to destabilize the situation there and undermine the U.S. mission, Turkey was the conduit of material and human resources heading for Syria (the paths to Iraq continued to function too). Such networks tend to be autonomous and, as the Syria case has shown, they can be used for transit to a neighbouring country and for anti-government actions inside the country.

Russia may also offer stability and gas transport infrastructure security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To ensure its security, Turkey will probably fight these networks within the country – not abruptly, but rather gradually. The fight has already started (since March 2015, hundreds of members of extremist groups have been put behind bars) and it will be accompanied by terrorist attacks. It will take time for the Turkish special services to destroy these networks, choke off their supply channels and arrest all the (often influential) individuals linked with this business. It would be very hard for Turkey to meet that

challenge without coordination with such actors as Russia and Israel. Ankara’s diplomatic activity is prompted by the need to cooperate with states that could become partners in fighting radical groups.

In addition to Russia and Israel, Ankara is mending fences with Iraq, and also looking towards Egypt. In connection with the recent explosions in Baghdad, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi was told by his Turkish counterpart Binali Yildirim that Turkish hospitals were ready to take the wounded from Karrada in eastern Baghdad. The Iraqi Prime Minister noted that Iraq and Turkey had the same enemy, terrorism, “which kills innocent citizens during this holy month.” The Iraqi media then reported that Recep Erdogan had sent condolences to the President of Iraq Fuad Masum, stressing that Turkey supports Iraq in its war against the Islamic State.

Restoring contacts with Egypt would be a slow process and require extensive diplomatic efforts. Turkey has not recognized the legitimacy of the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi administration, which is the key condition set by the Egyptian side for the further development of relations. Perhaps Israel can be instrumental in bringing about a rapprochement, considering that it recently received, for the first time in nine years, an Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs – Sameh Shoukry. The Turkish government dispatched a delegation to seek ways of bridging the gaps between positions.

Ankara’s diplomatic activity is prompted by the need to cooperate with states that could become partners in fighting radical groups.

Turkey is worried by the regional policy of Iran, which has a military presence in Syria and Iraq, and very serious influence on political decision-making in the Middle East. The lifting of the sanctions against Iran will strengthen the country and open up a range of possibilities for it. This is what the states in the region fear, especially in the absence of a regional security institution. However, Iran was one of the first states to immediately declare its position regarding the abortive military coup in Turkey, declaring its support for President Erdogan. The foreign ministers, presidents and parliament speakers of the two countries were in permanent contact during and after the coup. Barack Obama spoke in support of democracy in Turkey when it became clear that the coup had failed, while the King of Saudi Arabia only broke the silence two days later.

Normalization of relations between Turkey and Russia means that certain agreements on the Syrian crisis exist. At this stage, Russia’s support for the Assad government remains unchanged. This suggests that Turkey may change its stance. The Prime Minister of Turkey Binali Yildirim has already announced that Turkey intends to foster “good relations” with Syria. The following day, though, he said that constructive interaction with Damascus is impossible unless Bashar Assad goes. Even so, the signal has come through. The reasons for a change of stance may vary: U.S. support for the Syrian Kurds; awareness of the need to forge relations with Bashar Assad, who has held on to power; the sprouting of a wide spectrum of extremist organizations on the borders and within the country; and isolation from regional projects.

The question is: How will Ankara’s allies react? Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for instance, are not fond of this course. The recent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia may force King Salman to revise his position. But in that case the monarchies may lose their partners in Syria. It was Turkey’s participation in the “pro-Sunni” coalition that enabled Saudi Arabia to support anti-government groups in Syria. If the supply routes via Turkey are cut, it would be a heavy blow to pro-Saudi groups in the negotiating process. Jordan is extremely inconvenient for that purpose. Moreover, the Hashemite Kingdom is well aware of the danger of continuing instability. Not so long ago, the Islamic State carried out a terrorist attack on a

border post by blowing up a Jordanian army vehicle they had stuffed with explosives, killing seven Jordanian border guards.

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Although Turkey’s relations with the United States have taken a turn for the worse because of the problems that have piled up, Ankara and Washington continue to cooperate in various spheres, including the defence industry. The high degree of interdependence and the need to preserve cooperation channels will force the two countries to look for balance in their relations.

Wide-scale purges in Turkey and suggestions that the death penalty may be reintroduced make the prospect of the Republic of Turkey joining the European Union more remote. While relations with the United States and Europe have cooled, the process of normalizing relations with Russia will continue, partly because of Russia’s position on the attempted coup. The reaction of the European Union to Erdogan’s domestic policy moves is likely to strengthen Turkey’s short-term course for cooperation with Russia and Iran, since the Iranian leadership was one of the first to support President Erdogan.

Teheran and Moscow expect Turkey to soften its stand on Syria. However, at this juncture, the Turkish government is more concerned with internal problems. The Turkish army and intelligence services are undergoing massive purges. This rules out the possibility of Turkish troops being sent to Syria. Turkey has also withdrawn its troops from Iraq. If talks about coordinated actions on Syria were conducted between Moscow and Ankara before the coup, under the new conditions, it will take several months to establish cooperation between the relevant structures. The developments in the region and Ankara’s policy will in many ways be determined by the internal political situation in Turkey, which is still far from stable.

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