IMPARTIALITY

Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,G.R. No. 149797-98, February 13, 2004

TOPIC: BIASFACTS:Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest prejudgment and partiality.

Respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the Orders of the court were based on facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals

Appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed Orders by respondent judge.

DOCTRINE:The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where the judges participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.06 which provides:While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on. To our mind, respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial, the final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the peoples faith in our courts.There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to conclude, out of necessity, the existence of aprima faciecase on the basis alone of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is only when the plaintiff demurs to evidence that the trial court may rule on the case before the defense presents its evidence. Moreover, the assailed Order, being interlocutory in nature, is not the final decision. As such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an interlocutory order, on the principal issue that effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the interest of substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between the parties must be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory Order.It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity. In the case ofBautista v. Rebueno, we stated:... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions,whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Courts previous pronouncements that to warrant the judges inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial or extrinsic source,this rule does not apply where the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate predisposition to deviate from established procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision that pertain to the judges judicial functions may not be proper considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be erroneous.However, where said complained orders, taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from the case.PROPRIETYA.M. No. MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994ENGINEER EDGARDO C. GARCIA,complainant,vs.JUDGE MELJOHN DE LA PEA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte [Acting Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Naval, Leyte],respondent.

FACTS:A criminal case for grave oral defamation was filed by Dr. Melencio de la Pea against Ignacia G. Garcia, petitioners wife, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577. Judge Meljohn de la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte took cognizance of the criminal case. He issued a warrant of arrest to petitioners wife and June 8, 1992 and was detained for twenty hours since they cannot process the posting of bail due to respondent judges absence as well as of the Release Order which was unknowingly left with his wife. On June 15, 1992, they received a copy of the criminal complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and respondent judge's inhibition order dated June 15, 1992. Outraged, petitioner filed an administrative case against Judge de la Pea for partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in connection with Criminal Case No. 2577 which was filed by the Judges brother against his wife.Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority.DOCTRINERule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides in part that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.In this case, respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of consanguinity to private complainant. With such situation, it is compulsory that the respondent judge should have inhibited from sitting in the case. Hence, Judge de la Pea, in committing grave abuse of authority, was hereby dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.