Two Re Foundation Projects of Democracy in Contemporary French Philosophy, Castoriadis and Ranciere

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2001 27: 75Philosophy Social CriticismGilles Labelle

philosophy : Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques RancièreTwo refoundation projects of democracy in contemporary French

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Gilles Labelle

Two refoundation projects ofdemocracy in contemporaryFrench philosophyCornelius Castoriadis and JacquesRancière

Abstract In this paper I examine two theories of democracy that can befound in contemporary French philosophy. Both Cornelius Castoriadis andJacques Rancière offer a critique of modern democracy with the purpose ofrefounding it. The ‘refoundation narratives’ they propose are both based onan account of the origins of democracy in ancient Greece. According toCastoriadis, ancient democracy is grounded in a ‘magma’ of ‘socialimaginary significations’ in which ‘autonomy’ is considered the correctresponse to Being defined as an insurmountable ‘Chaos’. On the contrary,modern democracy defines Being as a determinacy and consequently failsto grasp the notion of autonomy. According to Rancière, the origins ofdemocracy are to be found in the invasion of the public space by ‘thosewithout a part’ who consequently have no title to govern. The problem withthe ‘domesticated’ modern democracy is that it denies the existence ofOtherness; that is, of non-citizens excluded from the public space. Thereforeit appears incapable of letting the ‘dis-agreement’ manifest itself and conse-quently incapable of transforming the ‘police’ order. After examining themeaning of both theories, I attempt to elucidate the difficulties encounteredby each author in the attainment of his goal, which is that of refoundingmodern democracy.

Key words ancient democracy · autonomy · Castoriadis · democracy ·dis-agreement · foundational narratives · modern democracy · Rancière

PSCPHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM • vol 27 no 4 • pp. 75–103Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)[0191-4537(200107)27:4;75–103;017598]

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This article discusses the refoundation projects of two contemporaryFrench philosophers, Cornelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière.1

Introduction

The trial of Socrates symbolizes the difficult relationship originallyestablished between political philosophy and democracy. If, as does LeoStrauss, we define the former essentially as an interrogation as to the‘best regime’,2 we recognize how it can be opposed to the latter whichis founded on a series of opinions or beliefs considered to be affirma-tions concerning the ability of the demos to govern. We will recallSocrates’ skepticism regarding Protagoras’ claim that Zeus had giventhe art of governing equally to all men.3 In the Republic, Plato goes evenfurther, making of Socrates the proponent of a regime governed byphilosophers as they alone are thought to have the ability to attainwisdom. At the same time, however, again in the Republic, Plato isforced to admit that only democracy allows philosophers to pursue theirinterrogation as to the nature of the best regime.4

The difficult and ambiguous relationship existing between philo-sophy and democracy has been maintained well into contemporarytimes. That certain modern political philosophers have been morefavourable towards democratic principles, must not lead us to forget thesomewhat conditional character of this assent. Again according to LeoStrauss, moderns did indeed accept the legitimacy of the right of citizensto govern but only inasmuch as universal education enabled them tobecome more like philosophers.5 In the 19th century, a philosopher asliberal as John Stuart Mill set out a series of restrictions and conditionsto universal suffrage.6 The distinction between the ‘mob’ (the ochlos ofthe ancients) and the ‘People’ (in all of its splendour and nobility) keptfor him its full meaning. The least that can be said is that in the 20thcentury, this distrust of democracy by philosophers has remained aliveand well. No need to insist at length on this point since we need onlyrecall to mind the attraction felt by many philosophers for non- or anti-democratic solutions such as the ‘Conservative revolution’, Nazism orvarious forms of Marxism-Leninism. In certain cases, democracy hasbeen considered reprehensible in its very essence, while in others it hasbeen understood as a mere ‘illusion’ called upon to be overcome so thata future free of all forms of alienation may prevail.7

In the last thirty years, however, this landscape has been greatlymodified. We can now say that the vast majority of philosophers inter-ested in politics consider democracy to be an acceptable option or atleast an unavoidable one. However, this apparent (quasi) unanimitymust not blind us to what fundamentally divides the philosophers who

76Philosophy & Social Criticism 27 (4)




make democracy their object of study. To explain briefly, we find on onehand those who adopt an ‘anti-foundationalist’ position. Proponents ofthis view believe that democracy need not be ‘founded’ in order toensure its continued existence. In other words, democracy does not needto rest on metaphysical principles which are inevitably expressed in‘great narratives’ and which they believe have become anachronistic inthis disenchanted era.8 Democracy has reached a point where it nolonger needs to evoke Natural Right, an idea of the Self or of Man, inorder to be legitimate. It can therefore do without ‘the traditionalattempt to dig down to the “philosophical foundation of democracy” ’.9We should therefore postulate the ‘priority of democracy to philo-sophy’.10 On the other hand, we find philosophers who believe thatdemocracy cannot rest merely on the pragmatic fact of its existence inorder to ensure its survival. Consequently it cannot do away with ‘foun-dational narratives’ (in other words, narratives which go beyond the‘settled habits’ and ‘common sense’11) in order to explicitly express thatwhich needs to be shared in common by all citizens.12 As opposed to‘anti-foundationalists’, ‘foundationalists’ believe that foundational nar-ratives do not necessarily have to draw on an arsenal of metaphysicalprinciples (such as God, Nature or the Cosmos) in order to be set out,the challenge of modernity being precisely the elaboration of non-meta-physical narratives that can nonetheless be shared by all and used tofound a stable political order.13

The ‘conversion’ of contemporary philosophers to democracy is par-ticularly noteworthy in the case of French philosophy. As we know,French philosophy remained quite resistant to democratic principlesnamely due to the strong presence of the Communist Party on the politi-cal scene and of what has been called structural Marxism of the 1960sand 1970s on the intellectual scene. Even though there still exist someFrench philosophers who are radical critics of democracy,14 the vastmajority of those interested in politics have come to recognize its merits.Generally speaking, these philosophers rather than accepting theprimacy of democracy over philosophy, side with foundationalists inthat they have undertaken an exercise consisting in the identification ofthe foundations of democracy.15 More precisely, since their methodo-logy often involves a critique of the dominant representations of demo-cracy and a subsequent proposal of new representations, it is better inthis case to speak of attempts at ‘refounding’ democracy.

What follows is an analysis of two such projects of refoundationpresent in contemporary French philosophy. Both Cornelius Castoriadisand Jacques Rancière defend a form of democracy that could be called‘radical’, which they oppose to existing democratic regimes. In order todo so, both authors criticize the representations put forward by existingdemocratic regimes and go on to suggest what may be called ‘narratives

77Labelle: Two refoundation projects of democracy




of refoundation’, which, in both cases, happen to be ‘narratives aboutthe origins’ (récits des origines)16 in that they are based on the birth ofdemocracy in ancient Greece (even though neither author attempts tosimply oppose ‘ancient democracy’ to the modern form17).

The goal of this analysis is threefold. First, I will attempt to under-stand the meaning of the authors’ narratives about the origins whichare meant to demonstrate the relevance and worthiness of radicallyrefounding contemporary democracy. Second, I will try to understandthe critique of existing democratic regimes suggested by both authors.And third, in so doing, I will show that both Castoriadis and Rancièreend up acknowledging defeat, for in the end, they both conclude that itis difficult, not to say impossible, for their foundational narratives toreplace the dominant representations found in contemporary demo-cracy.

I Castoriadis: demos and ‘Chaos’

According to Castoriadis, Athenian democracy rests on a narrativeabout the origins which opposes ‘autonomy’18 with an insurmountableprimal Being defined as ‘Chaos’. In this ensemble of representations, thedemos appears as a ‘form’ which does not have any bearing in Beingand which is erected against ‘formlessness’ otherwise known as theAbyss. Modern democratic regimes, on the other hand, rest on a seriesof narratives and representations that presuppose the demos to be themanifestation of reason in its effort to express the meaning of Being.Being thus appears as a ‘determinacy’ rather than as Chaos. For Cas-toriadis, this is an illusion which is in part responsible for the currentcrisis of democracy, the most obvious symptoms of which are the apathyof citizens and the irrational and inequitable use of the planet’sresources. However, despite his harsh critique of modern democracy,Castoriadis does not suggest we turn away from it. Rather, he suggeststhat we refound it by returning to the principle of autonomy.

1 A narrative about the origins: autonomy, Chaos andAthenian democracy

Since it is through his critique of Marxism that Castoriadis comes tothe problem of autonomy, we must first attempt to elucidate his interpre-tation of Marxist thought before directly addressing the issue of theorigins of ancient democracy. Marxism, according to the author, restson an ontological postulate whereby Being is defined as a determinacyor a self-sufficient positivity that can be decomposed into its basicelements (the economy, the political, etc.) which can be ‘organized’ or





‘mastered’.19 But to the positivity and the self-sufficiency of Being, Cas-toriadis opposes the idea that Being is instituted by ‘social imaginarysignifications’.20

What are we to make of this? Whereas it is commonly understoodthat reality and imaginary exist as opposites (the former being ‘true’,the latter ‘illusionary’), we must learn to think that Being has con-sistency only through the ‘instituting imaginary’ (or the ‘radical im-aginary’). Of course, admits Castoriadis, there exists a layer of‘ensemblistic-identitary logic’ of Being that can be apprehended fromprinciples of identity and of non-contradiction and so on. There are, insum, certain ‘immanent properties of the being-thus of the world’.21 Wecan say, for example, that everywhere and at all times, 1�1�1�3.However, even in a case so simple, an important restriction must benoted. In the Christian ‘arithmetic’ 1�1�1�1 when referring to themystery of the Holy Trinity.22 And he or she who replies that this typeof mystery is merely ‘illusionary’, must be reminded that throughout theMiddle Ages, Being was defined in a way that gave Christian arithmeticif not more importance than, certainly the same importance as, con-ventional arithmetic, the latter being in fact used only insofar as it didnot contradict the former. It is the construction of cathedrals thatimposed the use of complex architectural rules and not the opposite. Inshort, if there exists a stratum of ensemblistic-identitary logic of Being,common to all societies, they differ from one another in that each societyis ‘supported’ by a ‘magma’23 of imaginary significations that not onlydo not correspond to a pre-existing Being but actually institutes it.24

It must be noted, however, that although the imaginary institutionof Being cannot be defined as rational per se (since that which is rationalis in fact defined by it25), it also is not arbitrary. If, in fact, the insti-tution of Being through imaginary significations appears, on the onehand, as an ex nihilo26 creation, thereby defined as practically limit-less,27 it must, on the other hand, obtain support one way or anotheron the ensemblistic-identitary. It is through an analysis of the psychethat we can better understand the question at hand. As dreams demon-strate, the psychical monad ignores linear time, principles of identityand of non-contradiction, etc., and must therefore be considered ‘mad,a-rational and afunctional’.28 As the monads are ‘unfit for life’,29 theycan survive only if the forces that drive them are diverted towards and‘invested’ in external objects shared in common in such a way as tofound their coexistence. So what are these objects that are the productof the instituting imaginary? Their diversity is almost infinite: there weresocieties that focused on the celebration of the gods (‘primitivesocieties’), others on expansion (Rome), on accumulation of wealth(modern England), on mass murder (Nazism), still others on the hap-piness of the individual (modern liberal democracies), etc. However, all





these objects around which societies have been founded must inevitablyhave one thing in common: they must mean something to the psyche.And even though the chosen objects may appear completely irrationalto the outsider, they must actually correspond to something real. Theseobjects cannot therefore be just anything.30

From what has been stated thus far flows the crucial idea, accord-ing to Castoriadis, that every society regardless of the magma of imagin-ary significations that founds it, is ‘self-instituted’ (auto-instituée).31

This does not mean that a society is its own master or that it ‘makes’itself in the same manner as, say, an artisan makes a table. In fact, thetypes of object that a society gives birth to and which aim at channellingthe driving forces in order to found a living-together, rests not on anidentifiable subjectivity but on an instituting movement which, drawingfrom the imaginary, is at the foundation of the genesis of beings. Thisincludes all subjectivity that could pretend to be its master (the samegoes for all otherworldly entities – Gods, Cosmos, Nature, etc. – thatcould present themselves as inspiring it). As the self-institution does notcorrespond in any way, according to Castoriadis, to the sovereignty ofhumanity, humanity being merely the bearer of the imaginary, the placeor the ‘there’ where it manifests itself, this ‘anonymous’32 imaginary canthus be identified with the arkhê understood as the Beginning and theprincipal organizer of all things.33 The irony is that this arkhê fulfills itsrole in an insurmountable an-archical fashion in that it engenders amultiplicity of virtually limitless objects and forms that allow forinvestment and attachment.

Now, paradoxically, we must note that until the invention of demo-cracy in ancient Greece, societies are self-instituted on the basis of amagma of significations that are ignorant of this basic principle; in otherwords, the product of the instituting imaginary is significations thateither limit the imaginary or simply prevent it from manifesting itself.Through complex mechanisms, these societies, allying myths, rites andso on, rest in fact on a magma of significations that present them as‘hetero-determined’, that is, as dependent on transcendent entities(Gods, the Cosmos, etc.). The source of Law, that is, the source of thatwhich holds the world and society together, is believed to be other-worldly and therefore unreachable for humans. This means that societyis organized in such a way that it must endlessly repeat the rules estab-lished once and for all at the very beginning.34

In breaking away from this schema, Castoriadis explains thatAthenian democracy opens the door to the explicit self-institution ofsociety.35 Surely, the demos defined by the exclusion of slaves, meticsand women demonstrates the limits of this form of democracy. Not-withstanding these limits, however, it is important to point out thatAthenian democracy is built upon a series of imaginary significations





that render possible, for the first time, an infinite interrogation as to theinstitution of Being and therefore a kind of permanent self-institution.

We find these significations first elaborated in Hesiod’s account ofthe genesis of the world and of the genealogy of the Gods. If we followCastoriadis’s interpretation, ‘at the beginning’, there is for the author ofthe Theogony, only ‘Chaos’ and the most ‘total void’.36 This concep-tion, far from belonging solely to Hesiod, actually constitutes a kind ofcommon idea found throughout the Greek world. Thus, for Anaxi-mander, in the beginning is the ‘apeiron’, that is, the ‘indefinite’ or the‘indeterminate’, which is ‘another way of thinking Chaos’.37 Yet, boththe philosopher and the poet note that forms as ‘particularized anddeterminate existence’38 are forever rising up against the Chaos. Accord-ing to Anaximander, these forms as products of the hubris (immodera-tion) considered as a manifestation of adikia (injustice), necessarilyinvite a return to diké (justice) identified here as the original Chaos.39

Born against Chaos, the forms are destined to return to Chaos and there-fore perpetually need to be reinstituted in a never-ending movement.

According to Castoriadis, it is on this magma of significations thatthe democratic polis is founded. This does not mean, however, that itdirectly refers to the narratives told by Hesiod or Anaximander since,as mentioned, we are dealing with a common set of beliefs. It is note-worthy, explains Castoriadis, that the laws voted by the Assembly ofAthenian citizens always begin with the statement: ‘It has pleased theCouncil and the People . . . ’ (‘Edoxe te boulè kai to demo . . . ’). As thisstatement indicates, laws are in no way tied back to a transcendent forceor to absolute knowledge. However, even if they are not anchored inthe absolute, these laws are not ‘relative’. They are, in fact, all that canexist in a universe where gods are conceived in such a way that humansalways find themselves threatened by the mortality of all things, by areturn to the original Abyss.40 Therefore humans are condemned to‘autonomy’ that is to raise forms or laws against Chaos in a context oftotal and constant uncertainty. Some sophists, when stipulating that thedoxa is insurmountable and that all forms and all laws can be discussedand rediscussed by the demos, were the first to point out that humanbeings master neither what is nor even what they do. But even thoughthe instituting imaginary is in fact, according to Castoriadis, identifiedhere with the arkhê, that is, with the Beginning and with the originaryprinciple always deploying itself in an an-archical manner, this does notmean that humanity is condemned to an asocial existence or to aninability to act in common. On the contrary, Athenian democracydemonstrates the viability of a common public space based on endlessexchange which rests on the inability of human actors to actually arriveat definite answers to the questions being discussed. That is why Cas-toriadis explains that it can be assumed of the three questions later asked


04 Labelle (bc/d) 21/5/01 1:19 pm 1



by Kant: ‘What can I know?’, ‘What ought I to do?’ and ‘What am Iallowed to hope?’, the Athenians not only would have refused to answerthe last of these but would even have denied its merit.41 The reign ofthe demos indicates that there is nothing to hope for since everythingthat lasts merely represents a temporary victory over death which willnot fail to rear its head once again thereby calling upon humans toforever rise up against it.

However, it should not be deduced from this that the entire polisenthusiastically took part in this magma of significations. In fact, post-Socratic philosophy is erected against the conception of the existence ofa dialectical movement without synthesis where the forms incessantlyrise up against Chaos in a endless battle. And even though Platonicphilosophy is born of the polis, that is, from the interrogation gener-ated by democracy, its goal from the onset is the elaboration of a magmaof significations that would end this impossible battle between form andformlessness and replace Chaos with the ‘cosmos’.42 Following thislogic, everything and everyone, including the demos, would have itsrightful place assigned by the philosopher as the only legitimate bearerof wisdom. According to Castoriadis, Plato’s ‘theological philosophy’cleared the way for Aristotelian thought which introduced and per-petuated in Western thought, the idea of forms founded in Nature or inGod rather than in the imaginary.43

Of course, however, Platonic and post-Platonic philosophy cannotbe held solely responsible for the ultimate demise of Athenian demo-cracy. As Castoriadis points out, the demos in the 4th century is simplynot what it was during the ‘era of Pericles’. It is easily seduced by dem-agogues and is incapable of defending the City against the ambitions ofPhilip of Macedon. We could be tempted to explain that the demise ofdemocracy is due to the exhaustion felt by the Athenians following thePeloponnesian War. Although this is in fact an important factor, in thefinal analysis it cannot explain the fall of Athenian democracy. For itmust be understood that the demos neither is a group possessing apositive existence nor is it a self-constituted subjectivity. As a form bornof the imaginary, it is the ‘there’ whereby a magma of significationsorganized around the Chaos, the Abyss, autonomy, etc., and expressedin the narratives of Hesiod, Anaximander and some sophists manifesteditself and was welcomed and received. In other words, for Castoriadis,the demos is not first and foremost an entity with a positive existenceto which would come to be added the legislative and interrogative activi-ties: it is this activity due to its welcoming an imaginary which it doesnot master. Thus, the existence of the demos does not depend on itselfor on anyone else since, as we explained, it depends on an anonymousimaginary which no one owns or masters. Therefore, in the end, theanalyst can merely note the presence or absence of the demos at any





given moment in history. As indicated by the title of a book dedicatedto May 1968, and to which Castoriadis contributed, the reign of thedemos in Athens and in all of history thereafter is a kind of ‘breach’44

whose appearance or disappearance is unpredictable by any one actorsince it emerges as the ‘there’ where the instituting imaginary is mani-festing itself in an an-archical manner.

It is this breach first opened in Athens that put humans face to facefor the first time with Chaos making them realize that they do not haveaccess to the Absolute. In the end, the defeat of the demos will give wayto the determinacy or to theological philosophy and to the rule ofmonarchies and empires. It is only two thousand years later, states Cas-toriadis, with the modern notions of critique, emancipation and demo-cracy, etc., that this breach is reopened, albeit much more timidly.

2 The crisis of modern democracy

The fact that the agents of modern revolutions call upon memories ofantiquity should not be surprising. On the one hand, modern revol-utionaries hesitantly rediscover the virtues of direct democracy(councils, popular organizations, etc.). On the other, the influence ofphilosophical currents stemming from the Renaissance and from theEnlightenment renders once again possible the idea of autonomy in aworld where God is considered either non-existent or as manifestingHimself in natural laws which have to be interpreted in uncertainty.Once the revolutionary movements give way to bourgeois oligarchy,which identifies emancipation with the ownership of private property,the working-class movement borrows and radicalizes the idea of revol-ution by proclaiming that there is no God and no Saviour. As Hegel hadforeseen through his exploration of the master–slave dialectic beforerelentlessly reinscribing his discovery into the order of determinacy, themodern slave or worker, being forced to transform nature, has the possi-bility to grasp the idea that history is nothing more than an ensembleof forms that humans make emerge without certainty as to their value.For this reason, human activity must be ‘self-limiting’,45 that is, it mustalways include the possibility of being able to reconsider the forms itgenerates.

However, Castoriadis insists on the fact that the conception ofautonomy in modern times is not quite as radical as that which wasinvented by the Greeks. Neither the philosophers of the Enlightenmentnor the Hegelian-Marxists identify Chaos with the Beginning; on thecontrary, they postulate the existence of a ‘cosmos’ which has been lostbut which we must and should rediscover. Whether we postulate as inmodern Natural Right that humans are by nature free and equal, eachpossessing reason, or as in Marx that history contains a reason which





up until now has been hidden from view and which the proletariat canrediscover given their particular position in society, the fact remains,that in the end, moderns are still in the world of determinacy. This iswhat allows them to associate the demos (or the proletariat in the caseof Marxism) not with the ‘hubristic’ effort to rise up against Chaos anddeath but rather with the new embodiment of reason in lieu of thephilosopher; generally speaking, it then becomes possible to associateand even equate the reign of the demos with that of reason. Conse-quently Castoriadis considers modern emancipation movementsambiguous and even contradictory: for how can they posit both a formof autonomy (humans being the only ones who can give themselveslaws) and a limitation of autonomy by reason which is transcendentbecause it corresponds to the determinacy of Being?46 This ambiguityor contradiction stems from denying the fact that there are no ultimatemetaphysical foundational principles of Being, a denial which was firstfound in the thought of Plato and Aristotle when they abandoned thepre-Socratic teachings and which led to the institution of theologicalphilosophy as a way of taming Chaos.

Castoriadis therefore explains that if the demos or proletariat isindeed the embodiment of reason in history, this means (as it did forPlato when he opposed the ‘true’ and ‘false’ philosophers) that we canoppose the intrinsic ‘mission’ of which it is the bearer to its empiricalexistence. In this manner, modern political emancipation movementscan be said to be fundamentally ‘schizoid’ in that they divide the veryroot of their ultimate legitimizing principle, that is, the demos (or theproletariat). Castoriadis stipulates that the current era and in particularthe current state of democracy can be understood in terms of these con-tradictions generated by this form of ‘schizoidism’.

The fate of the socialist project with its original dream of surpass-ing modern democracy and of also fulfilling the latter’s (unkept)promises, can be understood in that light. According to Castoriadis, thefall of the Berlin Wall is in fact the result of the development of whatwas probably the first ‘cynical’ society in history.47 The entire evolutionof Soviet-like political regimes can be understood as the result of thedistance between the promises made by the regime and its reality; inother words, between the proclaimed rule by the proletariat and theactual control by the party as the one, true representative of the prole-tariat’s ‘historical mission’. At a certain stage of its development, theSoviet regime produces a type of individual corresponding to itself; thatis, a schizoid individual, one who formally adheres to the principles ofsocialism on the one hand but who is also profoundly aware thatinstitutionalized lies, ‘brute force’48 and generalized irrationality reignsupreme.49 When this internal psychic cleavage reaches its peak(Brezhnev’s car collection, etc.) it finally becomes obvious that the





regime, which once seemed the most stable, in fact turns out to be themost fragile.50

Whereas Castoriadis deems the situation to be slightly less cata-strophic for the so-called triumphant liberal democratic regimes, henonetheless believes these societies to be structured on much the sameschizoid principle that led to the fall of totalitarian regimes. Just like thetotalitarian regime, democracy has also produced an individual in itsown image. If in theory citizens are sovereign, in fact their sovereigntyis limited, as previously noted by Rousseau, to choosing, at regular inter-vals, a restricted number of seemingly competent representatives who,once in power, decide as to everything without restraint since supposedlymore knowledgeable than the citizens themselves regarding the natureof their needs.51 Citizens are formally sovereign yet in reality areexpected to be disinterested in politics, expected rather to focus simplyon their private existence52 and enjoy the small pleasures of life whichare, as first noted by Plato, virtually endless in number.53 The modernidentification of Being with determinacy rather than with Chaos sustainsa conception of reason as essentially instrumental and which conse-quently constitutes a techno-science whose aim is to seek out and masterthe resources of the planet (even at the risk of eliminating them) in orderto make them available for immediate consumption.54 The reign ofreason which is meant to correspond to the reign of the demos can thenultimately be defined as an era of ‘insignificance’ meaning that all thingspotentially become values which are equivalent to one another.55 It isan era during which occurs a major anthropological mutation, duringwhich appears nothing less than a new variety of human beings ‘zapping. . . from one pleasure . . . to another, without memory or project’56 andblindly trusting politicians, scientists and technicians as they alone canprovide the products capable of satisfying their every whim. In the end,such a logic shows a society which is incapable of and unconcerned withproducing individuals that are interested in the fate of their own societyeven though this interest is crucial to its continued survival.57 It is as ifthe definition of Being as a determinacy goes hand in hand with thefantasy of eternal life.

3 Refounding democracy through a return to autonomy?

As Castoriadis explains, the fact that liberal democracies ritualisticallyevoke the principle of the ‘autonomy of individuals’ cannot let us forgetthat they are actually built upon an imaginary of determinacy whichdenies the very possibility of autonomy understood as the explicit self-institution of society. For this would involve the difficult task ofrenewing or refounding democracy confronted with uncertainty, withfull awareness of the finite and limited nature of the institutions created





by humans which they oppose to Chaos in a never-ending way. So howcan we refound democracy? If the diagnosis proposed by the authorseems without appeal, the manner in which he sees the possibility ofrevitalizing the imaginary in order to resuscitate autonomy is most prob-lematical, to say the least.

Castoriadis is the first to admit that it is now quite difficult toenvisage the possibility of renewing autonomy, so strong is the hold onsociety of the imaginary of determinacy which renders everything avail-able for immediate consumption.58 The working-class movement onceintegrated into bourgeois society, the ‘new social movements’ (in par-ticular those of women and youth), even if they did transform contem-porary society, were unable, even in May 1968, to generate autonomousinstitutions capable of lasting over time. Moreover, this pessimism isreinforced by what we must admit appears as a dominant trend through-out history, that of heteronomy and determinacy predominating overautonomy. Except for Athenian democracy and for certain brief andlimited episodes in modern times (revolutions, radical social movementssuch as May 1968), heteronomy has reigned supreme throughout mostof human history. For that reason, Castoriadis explains that we are notentirely wrong in defining the human as somewhat of a ‘religiousanimal’ in the sense of an ‘animal that desires believing’ and hetero-nomy,59 just as he or she is a ‘lazy animal’60 in preferring pleasure andconsumption over effort and production. In this manner, the imaginaryof moderns, however questionable it may appear in that it reduces Beingto a potentially marketable stock and by the same token discouragescitizens from concerning themselves with public affairs, plays such acrucial role in today’s society that it becomes difficult to envisage howCastoriadis’s refoundation project can compete with it. How imperativecan the Athenian narrative about the origins of democracy or theimaginary of autonomy and Chaos appear in a society whose veryfounding principles are totally opposed to this imaginary? Is it coinci-dental that the working-class movement, which had borrowed from themodern struggles for emancipation their most noble aspects, has leftbehind only ‘garbage’ whereas at least the Roman Empire had left‘ruins’?61 In sum, although Castoriadis is vehemently opposed to thenotion of the ‘end of history’,62 this does not prevent him from actuallyconceptualizing contemporary society as a system which is practicallyclosed in upon itself.

When faced with this pessimistic outlook, we are left with theimpression that nothing less than a miracle is required for humanity toturn itself towards autonomy once again. Even though Castoriadis doesnot make use of this theological vocabulary, it is not quite clear whetheror not this is in fact his point of view. For there is, according to him,no cause or motive for society’s welcoming into its midst the imaginary





of Chaos, of form, etc.; in other words, nothing in Being is predisposedtowards autonomy, which simply has no metaphysical ground or foun-dation63 and is therefore neither necessary (as this would be contradic-tory) nor rational (since rationality is, as we stated, defined by theinstituting movement itself). Autonomy, and the demos which is itsbearer, are therefore a kind of lightning in the grey sky of heteronomythat nothing foreshadows or announces. For that reason, Castoriadis’scritique of democratic regimes, even if quite harsh, ends in nothing morethan a wait-and-see attitude feeding itself on faith in the return ofautonomy and of the demos understood as incessant legislative andinterrogative activity. This faith, in the end, seems to consecrate thefailure of an attempt at refounding democracy which is incapable ofproviding alternate representations around which existing democraticregimes could be effectively reorganized.

II Jacques Rancière: the demos against the police

Rancière, as Castoriadis, reflects upon the meaning of democracythrough the prism of a narrative about the origins anchored in Athens.This similarity, however, should not blind us to the originality of histhought. According to Rancière, democracy emerges from a ‘dis-agree-ment’ (mésentente) between the demos, which defines itself as having‘no part’ in the polis (le demos est sans-part) and against which a‘wrong’ (tort) has been committed, and the ‘police’ order, which alwaysrests on a certain ‘calculation’ of individuals. This conceptual frame-work brings to light the paradox on which modern democracy isfounded: its all-encompassing will, its rejection of inequality and dis-crimination that aims at righting all wrongs and clearing up all dis-agreements, actually makes more visible the fact that entire segments ofthe population remain irreducibly ‘excluded’ from the prevailing ‘con-sensus’. Moreover, it also points towards the need to go against thegeneral trend, to oppose it with ‘dissensus’.

1 A narrative about the origins: the demos, calculation andthe police

According to Rancière, it is important first to look into the historicalorigins of the demos. Solon’s reforms in Athens (594 BCE), which forbidsenslavement for debt, lead to the appearance in the City of a mass of thepoor that cannot be reduced to bondage and that are ‘unsuited to makelaws or to command’64 since they do not have the qualification to govern(granted either through birth, or through wealth or excellence). This lackof title to govern will not prevent the poor (Cleisthenes’ reform of





508–507 BCE helping) from expressing an incredible and shocking claim:that of equally governing the City. The demos, according to Rancière, istherefore, at first, the expression of a sort of ‘scandal’65 according tothose who see themselves as the only legitimate rulers, a scandal becausethose without title are meddling in public affairs rather than doing thatfor which they were meant: simply serving and obeying.

Political philosophy is for Rancière the most explicit attempt toexpress this initial scandal since it is through it that the meaning of thedemos’ activity and the foundations of democracy appear most clearly.66

We will recall that Plato’s work is a downright weapon against thedemos since it stipulates that only the philosophers (rather than thearistocrats or the merchants) have the right to rule the City. In place ofthe arithmetical equality on which democracy is based, which definesall citizens as equally competent and therefore equally able to govern(hence the drawing of magistrates and the privilege granted to allcitizens to participate in the Assembly), Plato wishes to substituteanother, more legitimate type of calculation based on geometricequality67 according to which each individual is assigned the activitybest suited to him by nature. In place of the disorganized rule of thedemos, ‘the anarchic self-regulation of the many by majority decision’68

that involves major decision-making on crucial matters by demagoguesand various factions of incompetent and frivolous people, Plato wishesto substitute an order which assigns to each being an appropriate placeaccording to a calculation as to their rightful share and which in turnmaintains a natural ‘police’ order.69

Therefore, according to Rancière, to ‘refound’70 the public space,we must first ‘calculate’; that is, ‘count’ each individual. This cannot bea mere enumeration though, as this would mean an order based onarithmetical-democratic equality. On the contrary it consists in an evalu-ation by virtue of an appropriate measuring device of the worth, theshare and the titles of each individual. All cities (at least non-democraticcities) therefore rest on a particular method of calculating, judging andassigning a place to every individual and in so doing, refer to a par-ticular narrative which renders legitimate the tool used to calculate.Consequently, Plato’s just City, by referring to a definition of philosophywhich, as we know, uses mythological narratives in its elaboration,borrows a criterion allowing for the evaluation of each individual’sability to govern by judging the respective distance from the Good andfrom the Ideas. To the stormy seas associated with democracy,71 whichan-archically counts individuals without assigning them a place for lackof a real measuring tool,72 Plato opposes the terra firma of the arkhê,that is, of the original principle from which must be reorganized thepublic space73 so as to allow the philosopher to philosophize and togovern, the warrior to defend the City and the other to work and serve.





According to Rancière even though Aristotle criticizes Plato’s idealCity,74 the fact remains that he is nonetheless just as disturbed by thedemos’ scandalous claim to govern. Aristotle as opposed to Plato,however, believes that the demos is an element with which one mustcome to terms.75 We can therefore consider him to be a ‘realist’ and thefirst in a long lineage (not the least famous of which is Tocqueville) ofdefenders of a form of democracy capable of ‘domesticating’ theuntamed demos (la sauvagerie du demos).

As was the case for Plato, Aristotle must also first count. But asRancière notes, Aristotle’s count will take place twice. The first measur-ing tool used by Aristotle is nature. First, nature allows the distinctionbetween humans and animals: the former is endowed with speech(logos) while the latter only with a voice (phônê). So while an animalmerely indicates with sounds its pleasure or its pain, humans have anotion of good and evil, of justice and injustice, etc.76 Nature thenallows us to make a second distinction, this time between those whocultivate the virtues discoverable through speech (goodness, justice, etc.)and those who do not. It is thereby by nature that certain individuals –the most virtuous – have the ability to rule. However, beyond this initialdistinction, Aristotle notes that many cities count individuals a secondtime: indeed many constitutions distinguish between those who ownriches and those who do not. If there are cases where this second typeof tabulation cancels the first, that is where wealth rather than virtuedetermines the ability to rule, many constitutions merge both measur-ing tools and define the rich as the most virtuous given the leisure timeneeded to develop virtues which only wealth can grant. Although thismay appear logical for Aristotle,77 he nonetheless recognizes that theexclusion of the demos from civic life can create conflicts which maythreaten the very existence of the City. For Aristotle, in order to founda stable constitutional order, the second calculation must be somewhatmodified: rather than merely counting and assigning individuals accord-ing to wealth, a second count must aim at redistributing wealth.Although this will not eliminate socio-economic disparities, it willnonetheless lead the poor to adopt a ‘logic of interests’ which has thedual advantage of moderating them and of keeping them away from theagora by tying them to their land.78 In other words, through a cleverredistribution of wealth, the demos can be kept ‘on the shores of politics’and therefore away from the centre of political life. At this centre ofpolitics, we must not find the wealthy as this may arouse the envy ofthe demos hence leading to conflict. It is preferable to put in its placethe middle class, that is, the class that best represents moderationbetween the very rich and the very poor.79 As opposed to Plato, the goodregime for Aristotle must then avoid a direct confrontation with thedemos seeking rather to tame or neutralize it.





Hence if this kind of calculation is more effective because it is morerealistic, it nonetheless involves an uncounted ‘remainder’. All calcu-lations are in fact ‘miscounts’, emphasizes Rancière, at least from theviewpoint of those who reject the validity of the measuring instrumentused. For example, on the one hand the philosopher believes that theproximity to the world of Ideas should determine the political order.But the demos, as Plato notes, does not understand philosophy80 andso cannot recognize the merits of this order. It is also true that if werank individuals according to wealth, or even according to wealth andvirtue where wealth is redistributed, wealth still remains unevenlyshared between rich and poor, inevitably leading the poor to questionthe validity of allowing the rich to govern. Regardless of the instrumentused, it can be deemed legitimate only if all groups speak the samelanguage as those who defend it. To all individuals who do not hear orunderstand this language, the instrument is seen as doing them ‘wrong’81

since it leaves them without any ‘part’82 in society.We must not conclude, however, that for Rancière history is merely

a verbal match where misunderstandings are expressed in an endlessand repetitive cycle.83 If languages are numerous, expressing a wrongsuffered by one group can also be an invitation for the recognition ofthis wrong. In other words, expressing a wrong can be an occasion toenrich the language which can be thrown off-centre from its referencepoint, the measuring instrument. In short, according to Rancière, ifthose who have the right to govern are accustomed to speaking eitherto assert that right or to deny it to others who are forced to listen quietly,the expression of a wrong constitutes an opportunity for the reversal ofthese roles, where those who usually speak are quiet because those whoin theory have nothing to say are speaking.

This communication, which has no basis other than the fact that itoccurs, in other words this communication that nothing at all guaran-tees – thus explaining its rarity throughout history – presupposes thearithmetical equality of all languages. This inevitably contradicts thegeometric order to which all dominant languages refer and which stipu-lates that some possess the gift of speech (logos) while others, not unlikeanimals, are limited to phônê. To be heard, those without a part needto engage in an open struggle and it is only at that precise moment thatthe cries of one group become worthy of attention by the other, whichsuddenly deciphers these sounds as a language, albeit different from itsown. So although it cannot be said that history is limited to struggleand conflict, it also cannot be asserted that it is based only on languageconsidered to be the bearer of a consensual agreement.84 For those whodo not take part in society to be heard, both struggle and language mustbe combined simultaneously.





A first example of this rarely occurring combination is found inRoman history as reported by Livy.85 The episode in question is knownas the secession of the plebeians. The plebs, outraged by patrician domi-nation, go to the Aventine (494 BCE). A patrician delegate attempts toconvince them to return to their rightful place in the City. According tothe patricians, it goes without saying that all notion of negotiating withthe plebs is out of the question. The plebs’ anger is seen as nothing morethan ‘life itself’,86 that is, as a form of suffering that all animals expresswhen exhausted or mistreated, their cries and grunts having nothing todo with language or its associated virtues. Therefore at first there existsbetween the plebs and the patricians, a ‘dis-agreement’ given that thepatricians are deaf to anything their interlocutors may have to say. Sohow do the plebs finally manage to be heard? Their strength lies in theirability to avoid a demonstration of strength that is direct confrontationwith the patricians, as this would be construed as further proof of theiranimality due to their inability to use language. They then act as if theyare engaged in a dialogue with the patricians, as if they are actingtogether on a common stage.87 This common stage does not exist priorto the plebs’ beginning to speak; it emerges from the midst of the wordsbeing spoken and the tales being told.88 In sum, the use of fictioncoupled with might, renders the plebs quite similar to the patricians.They are similar to such an extent that the patricians, troubled by theplebs’ seamless imitation and by the fact that they must use rhetoric tonegotiate with them – but how can one negotiate with animals?89 –finally accept the institution of the tribunes of the plebs. Even thoughthis institution does not suppress existing inequalities, far from it, itnonetheless extends citizenship to those who had thus far been excludedfrom the public space, by recognizing their access to language, an occur-rence that would have been impossible prior to the revolt. The dis-agreement has therefore been somewhat diminished, those who werewithout any part in society now having a small part to play.

2 The domesticated modern democracy

According to Rancière ‘the proletariat’ is the name given to thosewithout a part in modern society. When Blanqui the revolutionary isasked by a judge to state his profession and answers, ‘Proletarian’, heis rebuffed. According to the judge, the concept of a ‘proletarian’ hasno meaning for one who is a citizen and who therefore can legitimatelygovern.90 The proletarian is therefore invisible and inaudible or at leastnot more visible or audible than an animal. If the working class is con-sidered ‘dangerous’, as was often said at that time, it is because, justlike animals, workers may, if exhausted or mistreated, begin to groan





(philanthropy being able to offer some relief) or grunt (requiring policeintervention). We are again faced with a dis-agreement since the prole-tariat, for its part, believes it can speak. As Marx states, the proletariatis the dissolution of all classes91 in that the right to speak it claims tohave, presupposes an arithmetical equality, thereby weakening the hier-archy established between the classes by the dominant measuringinstrument which assigns worth by virtue not of wisdom but of wealth.Like the plebs, the proletariat using words that disturb to tell its story,attempts to gain (and finally succeeds in gaining) the attention of thosewho, up until that point, did not listen. Following a relentless strugglethat lasts throughout the 19th century, the proletariat finally gains accessto the civic space. However, the proletarians, as the plebs before them,disrupt but do not destroy the police order. The difference betweenpatricians and plebs is not erased after the conflict any more than thatbetween the plebs and the slaves or in modernity that between the capi-talists, the proletarians and, for example, women (who obtained accessto citizenship much later than the male members of the working class).In other words, Rancière notes that geometric equality, although it ismodified, is always maintained despite disturbances to the police order,even though the struggle of those without any part in society tendstowards the destruction of it in order to refound it as an order basedon genuine arithmetical equality. These struggles represent but a fleetingmoment rather than a new lasting order: the ‘subjectivation’ resultingfrom the righting of a wrong is threatened and eventually transformedinto an ‘identification’ thus reinscribing the subject within the policeorder as was the case when the proletariat began seeing itself as pro-ducers and wage-earners.92 It is as if struggles for arithmetical equalityalways invite the rehabilitation of an order based on a new geometriccalculation; it is as if an-archy always irresistibly solicits the need foran arkhê. In the 19th century, this means that domesticated democracyas defined by Aristotle and later prophesied by Tocqueville, has wonover a more radical form of which the sans-culottes and revolutionaryworkers were the proponents.

Paradoxically, the taming of modern democracy occurs by way ofa narrative recognizing the merits of arithmetical equality. ForTocqueville, beyond differences in social conditions, all individuals sharein a common humanity through democracy.93 However, this logic ofequality, although undermining the institutions, nonetheless leads eachindividual to the awareness of the importance of the Self thus encour-aging in each what Tocqueville calls ‘a passion for material well-being’.Even more enticing than the land, to which Aristotle had wanted to tiethe poor in order to keep them ‘on the shores of politics’, this modernnotion of interests gives way to a stupendous scene where the majorityof self-governing citizens turn away from public affairs and towards the





various meaningless pleasures. Worst yet, even while equality is pro-claimed high and low, obvious socio-economic disparities persist, dis-parities that citizens consider to be a normal consequence of a regimethat leaves them free to pursue their own interests. In that light, weunderstand how Tocqueville (as opposed to liberal thinkers literallypanic-stricken at the thought of the privileged few being threatened bythe principle of equality) concludes that modern democracies mean theend of great revolutions rather than the era of anarchy. Democracy doesnot lead to class warfare but allows for the deployment of ‘gentlecustoms’ (moeurs douces) and the appeasement of social conflict. InTocqueville’s view, it is nothing less than a genuine miracle, a work ofProvidence.94

According to Rancière, the all-encompassing democracy in whichwe are immersed at the present time is the end-product of what waspredicted by Tocqueville. For the first time in the history of humanity,regimes that are both democratic and liberal rest upon a series of rep-resentations which deny the very legitimacy of any type of discrimi-nation or exclusion. As proof we find the ever-growing recognition ofthe rights and integration into the socio-political order of a multitudeof minority groups. Paradoxically, however, this will-to-include comesat the expense of new forms of exclusion.

To better understand this dynamic we must begin by stipulating thatthe concept of inclusion based on equality, denies the very existence ofany uncounted or wrongly counted individuals by an unfair measuringinstrument. De jure equality is proclaimed high and low thus encom-passing all individuals. If some are still ‘excluded’ this is but a tempor-ary condition to be resolved in the future.95 Prior to the existence of thisall-encompassing democratic system, those excluded from society couldtry to have their voices heard: outside of the public sphere they couldexpress themselves thus disturbing the police order. But in the case ofcontemporary democracy, those excluded cannot hope to publiclyexpress a wrong committed against them since doing so simply meansrepeating the prevailing view which recognizes and deplores exclusion.This all-encompassing democracy is in a way a ‘consensual democracy’.It is a case where Sameness reigns supreme and where Otherness, pre-viously embodied in those without a part, is denied since everyone isalready included in a political order that refuses the idea that anythingcan exist outside of it. Obviously, however, this does not prevent thefact that exclusion does indeed persist beyond the politics and measuresaimed at eliminating it. For the more society defines itself as consensualand all-encompassing and the more it sees itself as ‘one’, the more itmakes appear otherness96 but an otherness existing as a simple factbelonging to a reality that can never have access to its own symbolicorder of discourse. Otherness is therefore a reality that tends to be





reduced to an object to be identified, defined and circumscribed in orderto conjure up the unassimilable oddness it represents. The cleavage wefind between a perfectly integrated society and its monstrous andunanalysable otherness allows for the proliferation of neo-liberal andpopulist rhetoric which states that if the immigrant, the homeless or theunemployed remain unassimilated into society, it is simply by choice, inother words it is due to their refusal to be included. Those excluded aretherefore condemned to either repeat society’s dominant discourse orremain silent (the latter case being compatible with a temptation towithdraw within their own community and even resort to violence). Themore it attempts to include, the more this tamed form of democracyends up creating ghettos and insurmountable barriers between itscitizens. The perversity of this system is that it creates a police order allthe while radically promoting its prohibition.

3 Refounding democracy on the basis of dis-agreement?

What are our options when faced with the police order which excludesthe very possibility of recognizing the existence of those excluded? Wefind in Rancière, as we could expect, prescriptions concerning the needto oppose dis-agreement or ‘dissensus’ to the consensus and the need tooppose the symbolic discourses generated by Otherness to a realitywhich is supposed to rest upon itself without any symbolic mediation.97

Faced with the all-encompassing order, we must hope that the excludedwill once again express the wrong done to them.

But what we need to ask is what this watchword (if we may) actuallymeans. If, as opposed to Castoriadis, Rancière considers the excluded,the demos, as potentially emerging in every situation where there is awrong and therefore not as a kind of miracle, the fact remains thatdemocracy is for him all-encompassing to the point where it appearscompletely closed upon itself. When we understand that the consensuallogic succeeds in ‘eliminating society’s ability to accept Otherness’,98

succeeds also at eliminating the possibility of giving Otherness asymbolic representation, then how can we again call upon the excludedto oppose the police order? What is the point of encouraging this ‘ “fic-tional” exercise consisting in the construction and appearance ofanother world in the current one’99 in a society which is defined by thefact that it is closed in upon itself and by the very fact deaf to the Other,always immediately seen as a grimacing stranger? It is not just that, asfor Castoriadis, the actions of the demos and of those without any partin society go against the very logic of existing democratic regimesleading us to doubt the possibility of ever being able to refound demo-cracy. More tragically, according to Rancière the representations onwhich modern democracies are founded and which stem from two





fathers of political realism, Aristotle and Tocqueville, have the explicitgoal of domesticating the demos and of suppressing its very right tospeech by actually giving it to them.100 Is the way of revitalizing moderndemocracy then not based on a sort of faith in the return of the demos,of those denied their fair part for Rancière just as was the case for Cas-toriadis? If so, are we not faced with the recognition that such a refoun-dation project can only lead to failure because of its inability to becomea reality?

Conclusion

In what preceded, I have attempted to elucidate the meaning of thethought on democracy of two contemporary French philosophers, Cor-nelius Castoriadis and Jacques Rancière. In both cases my first aim wasto question their interpretation of democracy as conceived through theirnarratives about the origins of the democratic imaginary in Athens. Mysecond aim was to identify the tensions and contradictions as they sawthem in today’s representations of democracy; and my third, to evaluatethe meaning and validity of their respective refoundation projects. Inboth of these cases it seems that refounding democracy is based on anact of faith in the abilities and virtues of the demos. This leads us toconclude that both projects constitute a failure since both seem unableto participate in reality.

What can we make of these failed attempts? Philippe Raynaudclaims that in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the sub-sequent collapse of Soviet-type regimes, we saw in France the prolifer-ation of a ‘philosophical extreme left’ (extrême gauche philosophique)whose proclaimed aim is to propose a radical critique of the represen-tations on which rests modern democracy but ‘whose only strategic goalis to have radical thought recognized’ in society.101 This ‘philosophicalextreme left’ would be the expression of real contradictions found inmodern democracy and perhaps even of an ‘authentic aporia’.102 On theone hand, democracy appears to be a kind of insurmountable horizonof modern times – unless we wish to go back on the notion of the con-sensus of individuals of which democracy seems to be the ultimateexpression; on the other hand, it also generates ‘through its very exist-ence the need for a world posterior to the bourgeois and Capital orderwhere could subsist a genuine human community’.103 However, eitherthis community would reveal itself to be a form of ‘advanced’ liberaldemocracy ‘fortified’ by several ‘radical’ institutions or elements,104 orit would be called upon to exist as a mere utopia.105

We could be tempted, and perhaps even justified in the light of theconclusions drawn here, to give reason to Raynaud or at least to place





Castoriadis and Rancière in the utopian extreme left philosophicalcurrent (since the refoundation projects they suggest seem incapable ofreplacing the dominant representations found in existing democracies)and at the same time in the ‘radical-liberal’ current (in that their thoughtcould perhaps lead to practical changes by encouraging a higher levelof militancy without all the while bringing us outside the liberal demo-cratic framework). However, such a conclusion should not necessarilylead us to accept Raynaud’s all-encompassing interpretation. To con-clude that all refoundation projects stemming from the philosophicalleft wing are condemned either to failure or to be eventually reincludedin liberalism, as Fukuyama’s theory suggests, is not an option since thereare no exhaustive findings that allow us to draw such a conclusion.106

Recent historical works having shown that the ‘marriage’ betweenmodern democracy and liberal theory is in no way natural,107 we areprevented from assuming that democracy could not, at some point intime, be refounded on non-liberal accounts, even if they are not thoseproposed by Castoriadis and Rancière.

Department of Political Science, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Notes

I wish to thank Daniel Tanguay and Chedly Belkhodja for their comments onan earlier version of this text. I also wish to thank Nancy Renault for the trans-lation.

1 Existing translations have been used whenever possible and citations ofthem follow the original French references. Otherwise, the translations arethe responsibility of the author.

2 Leo Strauss, ‘What is Political Philosophy’, in What is Political Philo-sophy? And Other Essays (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), p. 34.

3 Plato, Protagoras, 319b–23a.4 Plato, Republic, 557cd.5 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, p. 37 and Leo Strauss, Thoughts on

Machiavelli (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), p. 296. See also GeorgesBurdeau, La démocratie (Paris: Seuil, 1966), pp. 23f. In this manner,moderns seek nothing less than to establish a regime based on wisdom thatancients had held as utopian. See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 139.

6 See C. B. MacPherson, Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 50f.

7 To mention only two authors: we can associate Heidegger with the firstposition; this was still so in 1966, as is indicated in ‘ “Only a God Can Save


PSC




Us”: Der Speigel’s Interview with Martin Heiddeger’, in Richard Wolin(ed.) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MITPress, 1993), p. 104. And we can associate Maurice Merleau-Ponty withthe second, at least until 1950; see Humanism and Terror, trans. JohnO’Neill (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969).

8 Richard Rorty, ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, in MerrillD. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (eds) The Virginia Statute for ReligiousFreedom: Its Evolution and Consequences in American History(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 271–2. The critiqueof ‘great narratives’ refers to Jean-François Lyotard, La condition post-moderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris: Minuit, 1979); English-languageedn, The Postmodern Condition: Report on Knowledge, trans. GeoffBennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, 1984).

9 Rorty, ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, p. 264.10 ibid., p. 270.11 ibid., pp. 266, 270.12 This definition is inspired by Ralph Hancock, ‘Calvin et la raison révélée’,

La pensée politique 2 (1994): 216–19. See also, from the same author,Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics (Ithaca, NY and London:Cornell University Press, 1989), and Fethi Benslama, Une fiction trou-blante. De l’origine en partage (La Tour d’Aigues: Éd. de l’Aube, 1994).The definition ultimately comes from the Aristotelian conception of theCity understood as a community based on sharing: ‘For it is peculiar toman as compared to the other animals that he alone has a perception ofgood and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]; andpartnership in these things is what makes a household and a City.’ SeePolitics, 1253a12; English-language edn, trans. Cairnes Lord (Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 37.

13 Which was, for example, Hannah Arendt’s endeavour: it is because meta-physical foundations have become impossible that we must think foun-dation as the sharing of a common account of an ‘inaugural moment’. Seeher On Revolution (New York, the Viking Press, 1965), pp. 195f. See alsoJohn Seery’s commentary: ‘Castles in the Air: an Essay on Political Foun-dations’, Political Theory 27 (4 August 1999): 472f. In this manner, Rorty’shypothesis, that in this disenchanted era we have a choice only between aset of ‘settled social habits’ and the anachronistic grandiose theological orphilosophical discourses (‘If one feels a need for such legitimations [basedon ‘extrapolitical grounding’] one will want either a religious or a philo-sophical preface to politics’: ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’,p. 264), seems much too narrow a view.

14 See, for example, Alain Badiou, L’éthique: Essai sur la conscience du Mal(Paris: Hatier, 1994) and Abrégé de métapolitique (Paris: Seuil, 1998) p. 37.

15 Except perhaps in the case of Vincent Descombes: see ‘Philosophie dujugement politique’, La pensée politique 2 (1994): 131–57, particularly155–7. See also the position defended by Nicolas Tenzer, Philosophiepolitique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), pp. 7–13.

16 As Benslama explains (see Une fiction troublante, passim), in a certain way





all foundational and refoundation narratives, whether they refer or not tometaphysical principles, can be said to be narratives about the origins orabout a Beginning (in order to convey the immediate proximity we find inFrench between ‘récit de (re)fondation’ and ‘récit des origines’ we preferto use the expression ‘narratives about the origins’ instead of ‘account ofthe origins’ which could seem more appropriate). In both the cases that areof interest here, the foundational or refoundation narratives of democracyhave the particularity of resting on a narrative about the origins that isallegedly historical (that is, empirical or real).

17 As does Moses I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London:Hogarth Press, 1985).

18 To avoid all confusion, let us immediately clarify that this concept hasnothing to do with the Kantian definition of autonomy. See CorneliusCastoriadis, ‘La polis grecque et la création de la démocratie’, in Domainesde l’homme: Les carrefours du labyrinthe, Vol. II (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 38,p. 303; English-language edn, ‘The Greek Polis and the Creation ofDemocracy’, in David Ames Curtis (ed. and trans.) The Castoriadis Reader(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 286.

19 In this manner, Marxism borrows the ontology implicit in capitalistic logic,which explains that reality is an organizable positivity that can be quanti-fied and transformed into merchandise. See Cornelius Castoriadis, L’insti-tution imaginaire de la société (Paris: Seuil, 1975), pp. 56f.;English-language edn, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans.Kathleen Blamey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 41f). And seeCornelius Castoriadis, ‘La question de l’histoire du mouvement ouvrier’,in his L’expérience du mouvement ouvrier, Vol. 1, Comment lutter (Paris:Union générale d’éditions, 1974), pp. 41f.; English-language edn, ‘TheQuestion of the Workers’ Movement’, in Castoriadis, Political and SocialWritings, Vol. 3, 1961–1979: Recommencing the Revolution: fromSocialism to the Autonomous Society, trans. David Ames Curtis(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 171.

20 Castoriadis, L’institution imaginaire de la société, pp. 190f. (TheImaginary Institution of Society, pp. 135f.); and Cornelius Castoriadis,‘Introduction’, in his La société bureaucratique, Vol. 1, Les rapports deproduction en Russie (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1973), pp. 51f.;English-language edn, ‘General Introduction’, in Castoriadis, Political andSocial Writings. Vol. 1, 1946–1955: From the Critique of Bureaucracy tothe Positive Content of Socialism, trans. David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 29f.

21 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Pouvoir, politique, autonomie’, Revue de méta-physique et de morale 1 (1988): 84; English-language edn, ‘Powers,Politics, Autonomy’, in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, trans. David AmesCurtis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 147.

22 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Fait et à faire’, in Giovanni Busino (ed.) ‘Pour unephilosophie militante de la démocratie. Autonomie et autotransformationde la société’, Revue européenne des sciences sociales XXVII (86) (1989):482; English-language edn, ‘Done and To Be Done’, in Curtis, The Casto-riadis Reader, pp. 386–7.





23 Castoriadis, L’institution imaginaire de la société, p. 457 (The ImaginaryInstitution of Society, p. 340).

24 ibid., pp. 204f. (ibid., pp. 146f.).25 ibid., pp. 224f. (ibid., pp. 160f.); Castoriadis, ‘Introduction’, p. 53

(‘General Introduction’, p. 31).26 Castoriadis, L’institution imaginaire de la société, p. 7 (The Imaginary

Institution of Society, p. 3); and Castoriadis, ‘Fait et à faire’, p. 466 (‘Doneand To Be Done’, p. 370).

27 Castoriadis, ‘Pouvoir, politique, autonomie’, p. 100 (‘Powers, Politics,Autonomy’, p. 170).

28 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Socialisme et société autonome’, in Le Contenu dusocialisme (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1979), p. 13; English-languageedn, ‘Socialism and Autonomous Society’, in Political and Social Writings,Vol. 3, p. 315.

29 ibid., p. 12 (ibid., p. 315).30 In other words: if we can institute an entire society by making it turn to

gods that no one has ever seen, we cannot, for example, institute a societythat would aim at levitating the entire population: the imaginary institut-ing principle inevitably has a limit, which stems from the immutable rulesof the ensemblistic identitary.

31 Castoriadis, ‘Introduction’, pp. 53–4 (‘General Introduction’, p. 31).32 Castoriadis, ‘Pouvoir, politique, autonomie’, p. 81 (‘Powers, Politics,

Autonomy’, p. 143).33 Including, as we will see, Chaos, which is a primary reality only by virtue

of the instituting imaginary.34 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Institution de la société et religion’, in Domaines

de l’homme 371f.; English-language edn, ‘Institution of Religion andSociety’, in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psycho-analysis and the Imagination, trans. David Ames Curtis (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 311f.

35 I must point out that what follows is not a discussion as to Castoriadis’sinterpretation of Athenian democracy but simply an attempt to understandits meaning. I am not unaware that this interpretation can be consideredmost unorthodox.

36 Castoriadis, ‘La polis grecque et la création de la démocratie’, p. 284 (‘TheGreek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, p. 273). He refers here toHesiod’s Theogony, 116: ‘The first power to come into Being was Chaos’,trans. R. M. Frazer (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983),p. 30.

37 Castoriadis, ‘La polis grecque et la création de la démocratie’, p. 285 (‘TheGreek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, p. 273). He refers here toAnaximander’s fragment B1. See the various interpretations of thisfragment as summarized by Jean Brun, Les présocratiques (Paris: PressesUniversitaires de France, 1968), pp. 18f.

38 Castoriadis, ‘La polis grecque et la création de la démocratie’, p. 285 (‘TheGreek Polis and the Creation of Democracy’, p. 273).

39 ibid., p. 285 (ibid., pp. 273–4).40 ibid., p. 284 (ibid., p. 273).





41 ibid., pp. 283–4 (ibid., pp. 272–3).42 ibid., p. 284 (ibid., p. 273).43 Castoriadis, ‘Fait et à faire’, p. 468 (‘Done and To Be Done’, p. 372).44 Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis, La brèche. Suivi

de vingt ans après (Brussels: Ed. Complexes, 1988).45 ‘Imaginaire politique grec et moderne’, in Roger-Pol Droit (ed.) Les Grecs,

les Romains et nous: L’Antiquité est-elle moderne? (Paris: Le Monde, 1991),p. 243; English-language edn, ‘The Greek and the Modern PoliticalImaginary’, trans. David Ames Curtis, Salmagundi 100 (Fall 1993): 112.

46 Which is the meaning of Kantian autonomy: moral law ultimately finds itsbearing in reason.

47 Cornelius Castoriadis, Devant la guerre, Vol. 1, Les réalités (Paris: Fayard,1981), p. 27.

48 ibid., pp. 215f.49 Not the least paradoxical aspect of Soviet socialism is the fact that the reign

of Marxist ‘science’ completely disturbed the workings of an entire society.50 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Le plus dur et le plus fragile des régimes’, in

Domaines de l’homme, pp. 56–64; English-language edn, ‘The Toughestand the Most Fragile of Regimes’, Telos 51 (Spring 1982): 186–90.

51 To such a degree that we are dealing with a ‘liberal oligarchy’; CorneliusCastoriadis, ‘Quelle démocratie?’, in Figures du pensable: Les carrefoursdu labyrinthe, Vol. VI (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 154.

52 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘La crise des sociétés occidentales’, Politique inter-nationale 15 (Spring 1982): 141, 144; English-language edn, ‘The Crisis ofWestern Societies’, in Curtis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 260, 262.

53 See, for example, Republic, 561b.54 Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Cornelius Castoriadis, De l’écologie à l’au-

tonomie (Paris: Seuil, 1981); excerpts in ‘From Ecology to Autonomy’, inCurtis, The Castoriadis Reader, pp. 239–52.

55 Cornelius Castoriadis, La montée de l’insignifiance: Les carrefours dulabyrinthe, Vol. IV (Paris: Seuil, 1996).

56 Castoriadis, ‘Fait et à faire’, p. 511 (‘Done and To Be Done’, p. 415).57 Castoriadis, ‘La crise des sociétés occidentales’, passim (‘The Crisis of

Western Societies’, passim).58 Cornelius Castoriadis, Post-scriptum sur l’insignifiance: Entretiens avec

Daniel Mermet (La Tour d’Aigues: Éd. de l’Aube, 1998), p. 13.59 ibid., p. 29.60 ibid., p. 36. Castoriadis borrows this definition from Leon Trotsky:

Terrorism and Communism. A Reply to Karl Kautsky (Ann Arbor, MI:University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 133.

61 Castoriadis, Post-scriptum sur l’insignifiance, p. 31.62 Intervention in Bernard Lefort (ed.) De la fin de l’histoire (Paris: Éd. du

Félin, 1992), pp. 62–71.63 Castoriadis, ‘Introduction’, p. 60 (‘General Introduction’, p. 36); Castori-

adis, ‘Fait et à faire’, p. 489 (‘Done and To Be Done’, p. 394).64 Jacques Rancière: Aux bords du politique (Paris: Osiris, 1990), p. 23;

English-language edn, On The Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron(London: Verso, 1995), p. 13 (translation modified).





65 Jacques Rancière: ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, Carrefour XIX(2) (1997): 23–4.66 It is a fact that with the possible exception of Progatoras’ speech in Plato’s

dialogue of the same name and that of Otanes in Herodotus’ Histories (III,80) none of the ancient authors speaks favorably of Athenian democracy.

67 Jacques Rancière, La mésentente: Politique et philosophie (Paris: Galilée,1995), p. 24; English-language edn, Dis-agreement: Politics and Philo-sophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,1999), p. 6.

68 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, p. 21 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 12).69 This term was coined by Michel Foucault (see La mésentente, p. 51; Dis-

agreement, p. 28).70 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, p. 22 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 12).71 For example: Republic, 488a–9a.72 In democracy, ‘it is the absence of foundations that in the end founds’

(Rancière, ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, p. 24). This is similar to Claude Lefort’shypothesis: democracy is forever ‘in search of its foundation’; see his‘Permanence du théologico-politique?’, in Essais sur le politique:XIXe–XXe siècles (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 270.

73 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, p. 8 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 1).74 See Politics, 1261a10f.75 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, p. 25 (On the Shores of Politics, p. 15).76 Politics, 1253a10f.77 The excellent City should not grant citizenship to artisans: Politics,

1278a5–10.78 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, pp. 25–8 (On the Shores of Politics, pp.

15–18).79 ibid., p. 23 (ibid., p. 14). Most of the contemporary theories in compara-

tive politics that insist that a strong middle class leads to the emergence ofdemocracy, stem from here.

80 ‘[I]t is impossible . . . that a multitude be philosophic’: Republic, 494a,trans. Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 173.

81 Rancière, La mésentente, pp. 43f. (Dis-agreement, pp. 21f.).82 ibid., p. 34 (ibid., p. 14).83 As may be concluded after reading Jean-François Lyotard, Le différend

(Paris: Minuit, 1983); English-language edn, The Differend: Phrases inDispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1988). See Rancière’s critique of Lyotard: Aux bords dupolitique, pp. 74–5 (On the Shores of Politics, pp. 58–60); and La mésen-tente, pp. 79–80 (Dis-agreement, p. 50).

84 See Rancière’s critique of Jürgen Habermas in La mésentente, pp. 71–2(Dis-agreement, p. 44) and in ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, pp. 30–1.

85 Rancière, La mésentente, pp. 45f. (Dis-agreement, pp. 23f.). See Livy, II,32–3.

86 Rancière, La mésentente, p. 45 (Dis-agreement, p. 23).87 ibid., pp. 46, 81 (ibid., pp. 24, 52).88 Rancière, ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, p. 30.89 Menenius Agrippa, sent to harangue the plebs, was ‘an eloquent man

[facundum virum]’, notes Livy (II, 32), trans. B. O. Foster (Cambridge,





MA: Harvard University Press, 1957 and London: Heinemann, 1957),p. 323.

90 Rancière, La mésentente, p. 62 (Dis-agreement, pp. 37–8); Rancière, ‘Ledissensus citoyen’, pp. 29–30.

91 Rancière, ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, p. 29.92 ibid., p. 32.93 Rancière, Aux bords du politique, pp. 30f. (On the Shores of Politics,

pp. 20f.).94 ibid., pp. 31–2 (ibid., pp. 20–1).95 Jacques Rancière, ‘L’immigré et la loi du consensus’, Libération (12 July

1993): 6.96 Rancière, ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, pp. 33–4. Note that ‘Otherness’ refers

here to those without a part who potentially have access to the symbolicorder; and that ‘otherness’ refers to those being incapable of speaking forthemselves and therefore, as we will see, considered by the rest of societymore or less as absolute strangers.

97 ibid., passim.98 Rancière, ‘L’immigré et la loi du consensus’, p. 6.99 Rancière, ‘Le dissensus citoyen’, p. 30.

100 It might be useful to attempt to elucidate the evolution of the idea of freespeech in democratic regimes. After having tolerated and recognized forthe first time in history the right to free speech, democratic regimes nowconstantly solicit their citizens through various consultations and ‘socialdebates’ about anything and everything to the point where everyone mustconfess an opinion even if he or she does not have one. Far from beingmerely anecdotal, the fact that non-respondents are more and morecategorized as respondents in surveys following sophisticated surveyingtechniques, demonstrates the insignificant character of public speech in anall-encompassing democracy which appears more and more as being basedon deafness.

101 Philippe Raynaud, ‘Les nouvelles radicalités. De l’extrême-gauche enphilosophie’, Le Débat 105 (mai–août 1999): 90–1.

102 ibid., p. 90.103 François Furet, Le passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe

siècle (Paris: Robert Laffont et Calmann-Lévy, 1995), as quoted in ibid.,p. 92.

104 ‘The “revolution” has become the surest method for militants of conceal-ing the intimate link that unites their egalitarian claimings . . . to theevolution of liberal democracy’ (‘Les nouvelles radicalités’, p. 98; see alsopp. 103, 110).

105 ibid., p. 114.106 Raynaud refers mostly to Daniel Bensaïd, Pierre Bourdieu, Étienne Balibar,

Alain Badiou and Antonio Negri. He does not discuss Castoriadis orRancière. He also does not mention Claude Lefort who has made afrequent apology for ‘untamed democracy’ (la démocratie sauvage); see,for example, his Éléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris:Gallimard, 1979), p. 23. Also not discussed is Miguel Abensour; see his‘ “Démocratie sauvage” et “Principe d’anarchie” ’, Revue européenne des





sciences sociales XXXI(97) (1993): 225–41 and La démocratie contrel’État: Marx et le moment machiavélien (Paris: Presses Universitaires deFrance, 1997). Nor is Chantal Mouffe; see her Le politique et ses enjeux:pour une démocratie plurielle (Paris: La Découverte/MAUSS, 1994).

107 See J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine PoliticalThought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1975); or Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).





Two Re Foundation Projects of Democracy in Contemporary French Philosophy, Castoriadis and Ranciere

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