19J. Chamberlln, "Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of GroupSize," American Political Science Review. LXVIII (2) (1975), pp. 707-716.

20George J. Stigler, "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix toTheories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Manage-ment Science, 5 (1975), pp. 359-369. Of course, Stigler departed fromthe assumption that individuals have only a negligible impact on thegroup.

Two Perspectives on the Assessment of Criminal JusticeDaniel Orr and VVolfhard RammUniversity of Caiifornia, San Diego

Very few undertakings, public or private, are sosketchily defined as to objective, or so weakly and inef-fectively monitored, as criminal rehabilitation (or criminalpunishment) has been. A priori, it is hard to judge whythis should be so. The problem of crime affects nearlyeveryone, and crime has perenially ranked at or near the topof the list of public concerns; so the efficiency with whichconvicted felons are processed deserves attention.

The efficiency of social arrangements is a major preoc-cupation of economists, but it is often overlooked as anissue by other members of the intellectual community andsociety at large. Efficiency to an economist hinges onobtaining the highest valued output from the use of resourceswhich can be used for alternative purposes. If a collectionof resources can be made to yield a higher valued output,then they are inefficiently used. As applied to the pro-cessing of felons, the payoff is measured in terms of gainsin the social values, especially security and liberty, perunit of real economic resources used in the processingactivity.

The dominant analytic style of the past forty years ineconomics has been to construct formal models of socialprocesses, in which some individual decision-maker maxi-mizes an objective function subject to various constraintsimposed by social institutions and resource availability.That style has been productive in generating testablehypotheses and thereby serving as a basis of and stimulus toeconometric research. It has also occasionally been defi-cient in the attention given to large and important issueswhich are not easily comprehended in formal models. Theseissues: of liberty, equality, security, etc., were theprincipal concerns of "political economists" throughoutmost of the nineteenth century,! until the division of intel-lectual labor separated them for discussion by political ormoral philosophers; by and large the discussion of theseissues has stagnated subsequent to that division. Freshrestatements of old ideas,2 and promising new approaches^have, however, been recently observed in moral philosophyand economics; and there is some hope of fruitful reunionbetween formal theory with its attendant testing of hypo-theses, and the less easily quantified but nonethelessimportant philosophical concerns. The issues of crime andpunishment can not be adequately treated without significantinput from both intellectual traditions.

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In this brief paper, we will try to orient the analysisof felon processing, the name we give to the varied collec-tion of punitive and rehabilitative experiences to which theindividual convicted of a major crime is formally subjectedby society. We will remark on both formal modeling, and thelarger ethical issues.

THE FORMAL MODELING APPROACH. Perhaps the most effectiveway of analyzing the workings of the criminal justice systemis to look at the impact of policies on criminal decision-making. The traditional approach to such an investigationamong economists is exemplified in the work of Ehrlichand forcefully advocated by Tullock. That approachbriefly, is to model criminal activity as an enterprise.Resource flows respond to returns prospects: if we seek tounderstand why crime is burgeoning, we must understand whythe rate of return to criminal activity is perceived by someindividuals to be so persistently high. One of the directeffects of the felon processing technology is its impact onthis perceived rate of return.

The felon processing technology (i.e., the speed inwhich an arrested suspect is tried and sentenced, the sever-ity of sentencing, parole and probation policies, the effec-tiveness of rehabilitation, etc.) also has a significantimpact on society through its production of various types ofindividuals, and the characteristics it embodies in theseindividuals. An individual that is an ex convict, on paroleor on probation will obviously face different opportunitiesand have different perceptions than an individual who hasnever been processed as a felon. The proportion of thepopulation that is in each of these states will affect thecrime rate and is in turn affected by the crime rate. Theseproportions, and the attendant crime rates, will in turnaffect society's sense of security and its perception of thejustice and fairness of the felon processing system.

A formal modeling approach to felon processing shouldthus take into account the possibility of interdependenciesbetween the crime rate, the number of criminals and ex crimi-nals produced, and the characteristics of the felon proces-sing technology. This would require the use of a simultaneousequations (i.e., general equilibrium type framework) approach;rather than the piecemeal or separate estimation of the ef-fects of specific policies, such as the effect of the sever-ity of prison sentences on social indicators such as crimerates and recidivism rates, with which much of the tradi-tional literature has concerned itself.^

Once estimated, a model of this type could be used topredict the equilibrium crime rates, felon population, etc.,that are produced by the existing felon processing tech-nology and social and economic conditions. Such a modelcould also be used to simulate and predict the effects ofchanges in corrections policies, and changes in the socialenvironment to the extent that these have been incorporatedinto the model. The model would have policy relevance inthat it could provide information about some of the objectiveconsequences of changes in policies (i.e., effects on crimerates and other social indicators). The model may alsoprovide a useful input into the normative question ofefficiency (i.e., cost-benefit analyses of law enforcementprocedures).5

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The political and social impacts of correctionalpolicies, their second-and-higher order effects, and theconstraints political and social conditions place on thecriminal correction process, are obviously also very impor-tant. Some sociological and political variables can beincorporated readily in a formal model of the type suggestedabove since they have a direct effect on the dependent vari-ables, such as crime rates, that would be included in such amodel.

There may, however, be significant effects which cannot be readily modeled in formal frameworks of the typediscussed above. For example, greater use of probation andearlier parole may affect the population's sense of security,causing people to avoid walking the streets at night, and tomove into buildings or suburbs offering more security, thussignificantly affecting the general pattern or urban socialinteraction.

Changes in the crime rate may also have significantpolitical impacts, affecting the patterns of rights andliberties available to the population. Recent examples ofsuch an effect include the passage of the "no-knock" law indrug investigations, and proposals for preventive detentionas a means of dealing with rising urban crime rates.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that social andpolitical pressures place significant constraints on thecriminal corrections technology. For example, if a punish-ment is "too harsh" for a crime, a jury may be unwilling toconvict a felon; or police may be unwilling to arrest anindividual, leading to uneven and capricious enforcement ofthe law. Such second and higher order effects are likely tobe glossed over in formal economic analysis, since they areless amenable to formal modeling than the direct effects.

THE SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF ETHICAL INTUITION. The formalmodeling approach discussed above can do little in a way ofinforming us as to the desirability of alternative correctionsprocesses. However, a useful assessment might emerge from ananalysis of the effects of the felon processing technologyon widely subscribed values which we, following Rawlswill call "primary social goods." The systematic considera-tion of these values and ideas drawn from the intellectualtradition of moral philosophy, may provide considerableinsight into the desirability of correctional alternatives.They can, in particular, make us more sensitive to higher-order effects and their importance; and they can assist in aclearer and more useful definition of objectives. It is aplatitude that a study is no better than its premises re-garding objectives; and a clear and full understanding ofobjectives is necessary if a study is to be applied in auseful way.

How do the traditional views of moral and politicalphilosophy bear on the definition of objectives? It seemsto be the common presumption that felon processing has fourmajor objectives. These are (1) the protection of societyagainst further crimes by the felon. (2) The rehabilitationof the felon. (3) The punishment of the felon. (4) Thedeterrence of felonious activity by others.^ Those objec-tives reflect a concern for security, and the technology of

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felon processing certainly bears strongly on that socialgood. But it has impact on liberty and equality as well.

Liberty. Although the extent of liberty may be thoughtto be more affected by methods of apprehension than bymethods of processing, the degree to which a felon is de-prived of liberty is an important dimension in processing.

The common practice of disenfranchising convictedfelons, and depriving them of other important "civil rights,"is an aspect that requires attention. Do these practicesconvey benefits in terms of other social goods which offsetthe negative implications for the conservation of libertywithin the society? Incarceration itself, of course, re-flects the idea that withdrawal of liberty is severely puni-tive. Insofar as redemption of the felon is concerned, itis difficult to see how deprivation of liberty serves thatend; and it has lately been argued (see Rothman) thatdeprivation of liberty also is inimical to the protection ofsociety.

The present criminal justice system also has a seriousimpact on the liberty of individuals who have been arrestedbut not tried and are not granted bail or are unable toafford the bail which has been set.

Security. A major motive in felon processing is toenhance the security of the public at large (i.e., to pro-tect the extension of the rights of life and 'pursuit ofhappiness'). One major problem with the system as it hasevolved is the virtually complete lack of personal securityfor the incarcerated felon; predatory practices within theprison systems have reportedly become disgracefully prevalent.This abrogation of personal security of the felon may haveadverse consequences for his behavior upon parole orrelease.

Equality. To what extent is the ideal realized in theprocessing system that equal behavior merits equal punish-ment, regardless of any other attributes of the involvedfelons? This particular issue bears upon the entire rangeof action against felons: collection of evidence, apprehen-sion, sentencing and post-sentencing processing. In theprocessing phase, subsequent to conviction, the issue hangson whether favoritism is manifested toward certain members ofthe prison population, and hence is of little more thanpassing interest.

How can perceptions of these "primary social goods"enter into an assessment of social policy? At a primitivelevel, judgment must be exercised regarding tradeoffs: anypolicy action that is worth considering will probably havepositive impacts on some goods, negative impacts on others.For example, recent proposals for preventive detention wouldpresumably increase security at the expense of liberty.

On occasion, however, it may emerge that a particularline of action has uniformly negative impact on all primarysocial goods, a finding that is not unusual in policy studies.When such instances are encountered, a strong case can bemade that the action in question is an unwise one.'

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It is also possible that a more systematically defined"social objective function," such as is provided by Rawls'"principles of justice," can be extended in an intellectuallysatisfying way to the problem of criminal justice." Theemphasis in Rawls' work is on finding a resolution of theliberty-equality conflict in designing economic and socialinstitutions. Rawls shows briefly that his principles canbe reconciled with the punishment of crimes, but he makes noattempt to extend his principles to the problem of designingpunishment and correction systems.

CONCLUSION. The foregoing commentary can be viewed as a pleafor the proper degree of "sophistication" in approaching theissues of criminal justice. The objectives of policy in thisarea must not be defined too narrowly: in that regard, asystematic consideration of social values can help. Thedebate over the relative importance of different "primarysocial goods" proceeds more or less continuously in society.At times it has been a hidden debate. Advocates of dif-ferent ends argued over the appropriateness of alternativemeans, without clarifying the differences in objectiveswhich separated them. The attempt to systematize the con-sideration of primary social goods, to keep the characterand where possible the dimension of tradeoffs in view, can bea constructive step.

How can this explicit consideration of primary socialgoods enter into a modeling approach? We are somewhat pes-simistic regarding the prospects for the traditional approachof maximizing a constrained objective function as a guide topolicy design. In part our pessimism is grounded in a con-cern that any explicit objective function is bound to be toosimplistic. Take, for example, the question: how should therights and preferences of convicted criminals enter the"social utility function" that is optimized by anti-crimepolicies? Clearly their preferences cannot be ignoredentirely; otherwise, sentences would be arranged so thatthe marginal deterrent effect of an extra day in prison iszero even if the prisoner has been rehabilitated to the pointwhere the probability that he will commit another crime isless than that for anyone outside of prison. A convictedcriminal becomes nothing more than an object example tothe rest of society. Conversely, criminal rights can beacknowledged as primary, with the consequence that non-criminals are victimized.

Thus, as we see it, there is a right kind and a wrongkind of formalistic approach that can be brought to bear inconsidering the large issues of criminal justice. Formalmodels of the type discussed in Section 1 may usefully pro-vide information about the effects of alternative policieson social indicators (though we do have some reservationabout the ability of such models to take into account allrelevant social and political interactions given currentlyavailable data and theory). Such models will remain useful,even in the face of major shifts in concensus regarding therelative importance of different primary social goods; ashift in concensus may change the interpretation of the pre-dicted effects of policy actions, but can not change thepredicted effects themselves.

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NOTES

John Stuart Mill exemplifies the nineteenth century tradition: a power-ful contributor to moral philosophy who also was an outstanding economictheorist and analyst.

2See Nozick.

3See Rawls and Buchanan.

4In an extended version of this paper we suggest the use of a Markovchain model as a means of incorporating such interdependencies and dis-cuss some of the issues which arise in the specification and estimationof such a model (see Orr and Ramm). For another example of an econo-metric model of crime rates see Carr-Hill and Stern.

We argue below that the relevance of the formal approach for thesequestions may be limited by the importance of, and difficulty of incor-porating, second and higher order effects.

These four objectives are in some measure conflicting or contradictory.See Robinson.

Orr and Ramm offer several examples of social policies which areinimical to both liberty and equality.

Q

See Rawls and Orr-Ramm.

REFERENCES

Buchanan, J., The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan.Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Carr-Hill, R. A. and N. H. Stern, "An Econometric Model of the Supplyand Control of Recorded Offenses in England and Wales," Journal ofPublic Economy 2, 1973, pp. 289-318.

Ehrlich, I., "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question ofLife and Death," American Economic Review 65, 1975, pp. 397-417.

Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York Basic Books, 1974.

Orr, D. and W. Ramm, "Rawls' Justice and Classical Liberalism: Ethicsand Welfare Economics," Economic Enquiry 12, 1974, pp. 337-398.

, "Toward a Synthesis of Two Perspective on the Assessment ofCriminal Justice," Working Paper 75-14, Department of Economics,University of California at San Diego, 1974.

Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard UniversityPress, 1971.

Robinson, L., "Contradictory Purposes in Prisons," Journal of Law andCriminology 37, 1947, pp. 449-457.

Rothman, D. J., "Of Prisons, Asylums and Other Decaying Institutions,"The Public Interest 26, 1972, pp. 3-17.

Tullock, G., "An Economic Approach to Crime," Social Science Quarterly50, 1969, pp. 59-71.

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