Turning to the Market for Human Security [Completed]

TURNING TO THE MARKET FOR HUMAN SECURITY: IMPACT OF

PRIVATISATION ON THE SECURITY LANDSCAPE

A Thesis

Submitted in Fulfillment of the Regulations for the Degree of

Masters of Science in Global Studies

of the University of the West Indies

by

Joshua Hamlet

807006371

20th August, 2012

Institute of International Relations

Faculty of Social Sciences

St Augustine Campus

ii Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLES AND FIGURES............................................................................................ iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................v

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................ vi

CHAPTER ONE..........................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................1

PROBLEM DEFINITION.........................................................................................2

THESIS STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS........................................6

CHAPTER TWO..........................................................................................................8

LITERATURE REVIEW...........................................................................................8

Recurrent Limitations in the concept of “security”.............................................8

Major Pillars of the Security Discourse: Referent Object, Nature of Threats and

Mechanics..........................................................................................................11

Human Security: Creating a Market Environment for Privatisation.................18

Rationale for Privatising Security and Governance Outcomes..........................22

Historical Management of Force and Typology of Private Security Companies

........................................................................................................................... 28

Caribbean Security Agenda: A Response to Vulnerability................................34

CHAPTER THREE....................................................................................................36

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK............................................36

CHAPTER FOUR......................................................................................................41

METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW.........................................................................41

Indicators of incidents of threats to physical safety and security; against

property.............................................................................................................42

Indicators of incidence of threat to physical safety and security; against

persons..............................................................................................................43

iii Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

Perceptions of Safety and Threats of Violence..................................................44

CHAPTER FIVE........................................................................................................46

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS..............................................................46

Recent Trends in Private Security Companies..................................................46

A Case Study of Private Security in Trinidad and Tobago....................................50

CHAPTER SIX..........................................................................................................53

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................53

Factors Influencing the Role of Non-State Actors.............................................53

Security as a Good and Sovereignty..................................................................56

The Montreux Document and Regulation..........................................................58

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................59

Bibliography.............................................................................................................60

Appendix 1...............................................................................................................70

Appendix 2...............................................................................................................71

Appendix 3...............................................................................................................72

Appendix 4...............................................................................................................73

iv Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Violent Crimes against Persons in Trinidad and Tobago 2005-2011 (CAPA:

Reported and Detected).............................................................................................5

Table 2: Violent Crimes against property in Trinidad and Tobago 2005-2011(CAPA:

Reported and Detected).............................................................................................5

Table 3: Epistemic Distinctions of Security Agendas..............................................12

Figure 1: Four Dimensions of Extended Security....................................................20

Table 4: Thompson’s Analytical Framework for Organisation of Violence..............29

Figure 2: Tip of the Spear Typology: PMFs Distinguished by Range of Services and

Force Levels.............................................................................................................32

Table 5: Scope, Purpose and Forms of Privatised Security.....................................33

Table 6: Fawcett and Daugjberg Governance Outcomes.........................................40

Figure 3: Global Activity of Private Military Industry.............................................46

Table 7: Private Security Personnel in Latin America.............................................47

Table 8: Private Security Personnel in the US and Europe.....................................47

Figure 4 UK Private Security Industry Turnover with various services..................48

Figure 5: PSC growth in weak bureaucracies and failed states..............................48

Table 9: Distribution of PSC services according to the PSD in weak bureaucracies

................................................................................................................................. 49

Table 10: State vs. Private Security Figures in the Caribbean and Latin America. 50

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

v Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

I would like to summarise my sentiments by paraphrasing Deborah Avant “in writing this paper I

have incurred debts to countless people”. This paper is an ambitious attempt to provide new

pathways of analysis towards a continually debated phenomenon. The idea was firstly brought to

my attention by Dr. Mark Kirton to conduct a small review on private security however it

sparked my interest enough to dedicate my research paper to the topic. Of particular interest were

debates surrounding the tricky question of which services should be privatised and why not.

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Annita Montoute for her continual support and

patience as supervising a student such as I can be a difficult endeavour. I am grateful for her

networking with experts in the field of security whom provided invaluable guidance towards this

paper. These are inclusive of but not limited to Mr. Sheridon Hill, Dr. Wendell Wallace and Mr.

Curtis Belford.

Mention and continuous gratitude must be given to my family in particular my parents whom in

their different ways supported my endeavours, quirkiness and pursuits. I am grateful to my

colleagues from the Institute of International Relations (IIR) for engaging in critical debate and

always being a source of support whenever needed. Let no candidate ever attend IIR without the

words “friends and family forever” impressed upon their hearts. Finally, I would like to send

personal gratitude to Dr. Marlon Anatol for being the pragmatic and honest leader, mentor and

exemplar. As a graduate student, I would not be in this position without his support and I wish

that more persons such as him find their way to IIR.

“La hora mas oscura es la mas proxima a la aurora”

vi Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

ABSTRACT

Debates on privatisation focus on state functions versus that of the market and can be particularly

contentious when it relates to traditionally state based services such as security. Since the end of

the Cold War, there has been a broadening of the notion of security with new threats creating

space for non-state actors to participate actively in the security landscape. Globally, the private

security industry has grown significantly in size and scope over the last decade supplying a broad

range of services to various clients. The market for security services is connected to changing

notions of security such as human security and the unchallenged securitisation of threats. The

growing security demands of human security highlight state limitation while demonstrating the

need to find adequate models of outsource security functions to the market.

As such, this paper examines the complexities of supplying traditionally state based services via

the market by focusing on security and the private security industry. It argues not from liberalist

thought but utilising critical perspectives to critique notions of security while incorporating the

network governance and policy network analysis schools to examine governance arrangements

within the security landscape. The research utilises secondary data to describe global trends and

semi-structured interviews to create a brief case study of the private security industry in Trinidad

and Tobago. It concludes that security services require collaborative (state-society) governance

arrangements whose configuration is affected by the diversification of security services, threat

definition and the capacity of public bureaucracy while suggesting that regulation is critical to

governance to promote legitimacy and recommends policy principles from Montreux Document.

Therefore focusing on the nature of service provides a more focused debate than merely using

the broad macro context of liberalist thought.

vii Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

1 Turning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on the Security Landscape

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary growth trends in private security highlight two issues for investigation:

firstly, the role of the state in providing security, and secondly how the changing nature of threats

at a global scale is reinforcing the demand for services of private security companies1 (PSCs).

The Small Arms Survey (2011) which reviewed 70 nations estimates that the formal private

security sector2 employs between 19.5 and 25.5 million persons worldwide at an increasing rate

that is outnumbering public authorities. Globally, private security industry records an estimated

worth of USD 100-165 billion annually with an annual growth rate of 7-8 percent. However the

rapid growth of the sector is occurring with minimal oversight and regulations as initiatives are

still in their infancy.

Hill (2010) estimates in Trinidad and Tobago the official list of PSC personnel at 13,610

with unofficial figures being as high as 55,000 in comparison to 6,415 police officers. These

trends in private security figures show a vast number of PSCs personnel compared to public

authorities. Alongside personnel statistics, the range of traditional and non-traditional services

offered by the markets3 through PSCs, spanning from small local outfits to large multinationals

attracts diverse clients from public and private sector. From such a context it becomes necessary

1 Private Security Company is defined using the Hallcrest Report as “those self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organisations providing security-related services to specific clientele for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to protect their persons, private property, or interests from various hazards”.2 This paper emphasise s Branovic (2011) top-down privatisation model with focus on commercial entities that offer security services for profit usually based on a contract format.3 The following studying utilises the market in a narrow sense to mean the production and sale of various goods and services to private individuals and organisations by profit-seeking entrepreneurial firm. See Benson (1998).


to investigate the different dimensions of supplying traditionally state based services such as

security via the market.

PROBLEM DEFINITION

The economics of privatising security surround the downsizing of the public sector coupled

with an increased outsourcing of security functions to satisfy individuals’ heightened awareness

of security risks and growing demand for protective technology. Trends in the provision of

security services however can also be linked to global trends in threats. The Human Security

Report 2009/2010 Figure 10.1 highlights conflict4trends, with the majority being waged within

states involving non-state and state actors. Such conflicts increased between 1989 and 1992,

decreased till 2003 with a resurgence between 2004 and 2008 (Sundberg, 2009).

The World Report on Violence and Health (2002) correspondingly notes an elevated threat

of violence whether self-inflicted, inter-personal or collective with an estimated 5.06 million

people dying from violent injuries. The vast majority however occurs in low and middle income

countries. This increase in interpersonal violence takes place in a policy climate wherein states

4 Uppsala Conflict Data Program provides the following definitions; one-sided violence is the use of violence by the government of a state, or by formally organised groups, against civilians. A non-state conflict involves the use of armed force between two groups neither of which is the government of a state, that results in more than 25 deaths in a calendar year.


argue that contracting private sector increases flexibility, efficiency and affordability as opposed

to maintaining permanent in-house capability (Small Arms Survey 2011). As such, this paper

considers whether private sector5 contributions should be treated as a threat to the state’s

monopoly on force or an alternative means of regulating the use of force within a political space.

Concomitantly, early twenty-first century publications such as the UN Report on Threats,

Challenges and Change (2004) indicates that threats are becoming progressively inter-related

with a threat to one becoming a threat to all. The extensive nature of threats draws attention to

potential limitations in the state’s protective capacity and the need to collaborate with non-state

actors and individuals to manage today’s threats. Sequentially, collaborative measures to threat

management become responses to the perceived possible erosion of sovereignty. The report

emphasises that the sovereign responsibility of states to protect their citizens facilitates

innovative ways to articulate sovereignty such as contractual agreements with the private sector

to fulfil security services. Likewise, post-Cold War dynamics eliminated the ideological

patronage system of bloc parties hence creating a ‘security gap6’ which requires weak

bureaucracies to find alternative market-based avenues to satisfy the military resource gap and

increased demand for military goods and services (Branovic, 2011).

These phenomena stem from a continuing global focus on security issues which intensifies

a security culture (Daase, 2010), wherein security concerns dominate strategic debates and

programmes. Society’s escalating reliance on PSCs for crime prevention and protection reflects

such dominance, requiring a parallel examination of ‘notions of’ and the ‘commoditization’ of

5 Companies that offer offensive services designed to have military impact are defined as private military companies while defensive services mainly to protect individuals and property are private security companies (Shearer 1998; Singer 2008)6 Argued to be an absence of an ideological ordering system in which there is a natural reflex, i.e. clear perceptions and expectations about who has to respond to security demands or security threats. (Branovic, 2011)


security. These trends directly challenge traditional state-centric assumptions facilitating a

broadening of threats and possible reconfigurations of the security landscape. The broadening of

threats is strongly linked to academic challenges towards traditional notions of security with the

most pervasive being the human security paradigm. These create research opportunities into the

impact of the privatisation of security services relating to the number of PSCs, sovereignty,

securitisation and the possible configuration of the security landscape.

The World Bank Crime, Violence and Development Report for the Caribbean (2007) cites

the Caribbean region as having an overall murder rate of 30 per 100,000 with high levels of other

violent crimes, reporting that high rates of crime and violence undermine growth and threaten

human welfare. The report illustrates the inertia effects of crime (once crime rates are high, it

may be difficult to reduce them), and growing levels of inequality associated with violent and

property crime as Caribbean countries display patterns similar to those seen worldwide however

at higher overall crime rates. Regionally, murder and robbery rates are higher in countries with

low economic growth and in communities with large population of poor young men. The

Caribbean’s vulnerability to violent crime is expounded by being geographically situated

between world’s primary source of cocaine and its primary consumer market. Its location

highlights the region’s limited capacity to protect its shores and the inefficiency of the criminal

justice system. Therefore a growing regional security demand has outpaced supply despite

growth in private and public security facilitating a market for the provision of security services

which is strongly correlated to increasing private sector contributions through PSCs.

The intensifying nature, quantity of, and propensity towards violent crimes reinforce

Diprose (2007) conclusion that violence impedes human freedom to live safely and securely. As

such, the changing role of the state given its limited capacity to equally address every single


security issues becomes a core question. Locally, Trinidad and Tobago experiences an increasing

number of violent crimes against persons annually (Table.1) amplifying tensions and a lack of

confidence in public authorities. Barring that a large proportion of violent crimes remains

Table 1: Violent Crimes against Persons in Trinidad and Tobago 2005-2011 (CAPA: Reported and Detected)

Years

Murders

Woundings &

Shootings

Rapes, Incest

& Other Sexual

Off

Serious Indecen

cy

Kidnapping

Kidnapping for

Ransom

Robberies

rep

det

rep det rep

det

rep det rep det rep det rep det

2005

386

96 801 282 744

546

59 41 222 148 58 15 4868

911

2006

371

93 657 243 903

646

81 56 197 113 17 8 5633

921

2007

391

74 680 286 825

550

76 52 164 90 14 2 4965

849

2008

547

99 771 205 724

405

55 28 138 62 17 5 5043

567

2009

507

134

689 195 760

393

44 27 147 49 8 6 6107

753

2010

473

106

616 154 706

362

61 28 108 41 7 4 5123

555

2011

352

74 535 129 650

257

59 26 119 57 3 1 3718

434

unrecorded, it can be argued that these trends demonstrate the need for more personalized

security services as crimes against property also follows a similar trend (Table.2). Overall

however, violent personal and property crimes have somewhat diverged with decreasing figures

in certain categories of violent property crime.

Table 2: Violent Crimes against property in Trinidad and Tobago 2005-2011(CAPA: Reported and Detected)

Years Burglaries & Break-

ins

Fraud Offences

General Larceny

Larceny Motor

Vehicles

Larceny Dwelling House

Malicious Damage

rep det rep

det rep det rep det rep

det rep

det

2005 4582

659 300

283 2752

353 1329

112

408

53 413

192

2006 4973

719 322

315 3064

363 1496

84 452

69 401

222


2007 4958

676 236

213 3570

450 1795

118

453

56 519

232

2008 4855

464 234

152 4407

333 1750

63 446

48 620

165

2009 5765

560 268

224 3987

345 1706

93 613

57 626

190

2010 5226

615 211

160 4089

319 1371

68 623

60 639

138

2011 4221

531 224

121 3119

300 900 69 481

64 549

89

Gang-related violence and unconstrained gun usage has been a major security concern

given the increase of 159 gang-related murders and 269 firearms used in 2006 to 293 gang-

related murders and 437 firearms used in 2008. Gun-related criminality related to narcotics

trafficking facilitates the availability of firearms, as the firearms required to protect contraband

are smuggled in and can remain in the country. Such in reflected in the Trinidad and Tobago

Police Service seized firearms statistics more than doubling from 211 in 2005 to 425 in 2011.

The spill-over violence caused by the symbiotic link between narcotics and violent crime diverts

criminal justice system resources from other aspects of the nation’s security while embedding

violence within Trinidad and Tobago. To counteract such violence the population is becoming

increasingly reliant on PSCs with the majority being small and local targeting niche sectors while

others establish regional and international links. Simultaneously, existing regulatory mechanisms

for PSCs highlight a critical deficiency in our national security strategy as exemplified in the lax

package of legislation7 governing the private security industry. The problem definition for

marketization of traditionally state based security services via can be summarised as: the

expansive nature of threats reconfigures the security landscape such that the increase in

private security companies occurs with minimal regulation.

7 In The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago the legislation are; Trinidad and Tobago Supplemental Police Act 15:02 (1906), Trinidad and Tobago Police Service Act 15:01 (2006) and the Firearms and Companies Act. The Private Security Bill lapsed upon the dissolution of the 6th Parliament on 9th

October, 2001.


THESIS STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study examines the factors influencing the configuration of the security landscape

of Trinidad and Tobago that is directly related to an increase in private security companies in

an environment of minimal regulation in the first decade of the 21st century. Firstly, this paper

aims to provide a brief critique of the concept of security through potential recurrent limitations

and major pillars while acknowledging the increasing demands of the human security paradigm.

Secondly, it investigates the characteristics of the global increase in PSCs and the extent to

which Trinidad and Tobago follow such trends. Thirdly, it will suggest possible changes to the

roles of actors (state, civil society and PSCs) in the security landscape through governance

arrangement. Finally, this paper advocates utilising the principles of the Montreux Document8

and the framework of Griffith (2004) Discrete Multidimensional Security Framework (DMSF)

(Appendix 1) in relation to a regulation model for the industry. The research questions are as

follows:

1) To what extent has there been an increase in private security companies globally and

specifically in Trinidad and Tobago?

2) How does an increase in private security companies reconfigure the security landscape in

Trinidad and Tobago? Given particular emphasis on the role of the state, civil society and

private security companies:

8 Created by the Swiss Initiative and signed by seventeen states(notably including Afghanistan, China, France, Germany, Iraq, the UK, the US, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. , the document reaffirms existing international law obligations and good practices for contracting and regulating PSC. It is explicitly non-binding with no legal obligations however it serves as the most coherent, precise and consensually development ‘good practice’ statement for the industry that is supported by multiple states.


a) Focusing on human security, securitisation and symbols of security; what are the

ways in which these factors influence the role of non-state security actors and

highlight minimal regulations?

b) What are the possible characteristics of a model of regulation for private security

companies in Trinidad and Tobago?

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This review seeks to briefly critique security notions utilising human security as a guide

while discussing its privatisation in the context of a Caribbean security based on vulnerability.

First section attempts to summarize some recurrent limitations of the concept of security, second

section deconstructs security into major pillars (referent object, nature of threats and mechanics)

while the third section reviews the human security paradigm as creating space for non-state

security actors and privatisation. The fourth section reviews the rationale and incentives behind

privatisation while considering network governance and policy network analysis as frameworks

for actor arrangements and regulatory mechanisms for security services. The fifth section looks

at the relationship between security and sovereignty through the management of coercion and

various private security typologies. The final section outlines the context of the study through

reviewing the securitisation process of Caribbean security as a response to vulnerability and the

consistency of recent conceptions with the deepening and broadening arguments of the Welsh

and Copenhagen Schools. Therefore the goal is not to merely bottle the privatisation debate in


mainstream liberalist thought but to uncover a richer debate by focusing on the nature of the

service itself and its impact through critical perspectives.

Recurrent Limitations in the concept of “security”

Contemporary discussions on security surround questions of ‘from what’ and ‘for whom,

by whom’ from a standpoint that precludes absolute security. Security becomes difficult to

conceptualize due to its conventional usage, contestability and the historicised nature of its

academic debate. Therefore a major problem occurs as security becomes conflated with related

concepts such as ‘politics’ and ‘power’, highlighting the critical significance of context in

security studies and discourse. Vasciannie (2004; 54) argues that the non-value neutral nature of

security is founded on three propositions: (1) security as an important social good, (2) its

importance to all societies and (3) the special steps required to preserve security. The complexity

of security is thus more philosophical as a function of the continual change and negotiation of

questions and answers on security.

Firstly, security’s conventional usages analytically underdevelop the concept. It is viewed

as one of those ‘common-sense, pre-defined terms in international relations orthodoxy’ (Booth

2007, 96), that plays either a subsidiary role in theoretical debates or policy interest for particular

actors or groups (Buzan, 1983). Security practices subsequently endure a ‘take-for-grantedness’

in formulating threats and policy solutions. Secondly, despite consensus on its general attributes-

being or feeling safe from threats and danger- its contestability (lack of agreement over the

meaning of a concept) is continually debated. Buzan (1983) argues that security is an ‘essentially

contested concept’ as it “generates unsolvable debates about (their) meaning and application

because...... they contain an ideological element which renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a


means of resolving the dispute” (Buzan 1983, 6). Contrastingly, McSweeney (2004, 59) defines

such concepts as ‘contingently contested’ creating space for negotiable meanings between actors

while Rothchild (1995, 58-59) speaks towards previous conceptions purposefully contesting each

other to create new ones. Therefore security is neither neutral nor simplistic but has dynamic

intersubjective meanings, entrenched in time, describing the relationship between actors and

their external contexts as well as the multiplicity of definitions revolving around core IR

concepts (Griffith 2004,11; Booth 2005, 23; Balzacq, 2011;).

Finally, realist strands of analysis have historicised the concept (Krause and Williams,

1997), disguising themselves as the essence of security (Guzzini 2011, 335; Booth 2005, 4-10;

Smith, 2010). Hence conclusions based on power struggles between relatively empowered

political units are traditionally privileged, favouring some in the production of a dominant-

subordinate relationship. Recently, globalist deterritorialisation reject state-centrism of realist

orthodoxy in preference for ‘global markets, capitalism and other forms of world society’ (Buzan

and Waever, 2003). As aforementioned, security hence points towards an intersubjective rather

than objective reality (Balzacq 2011, 6 &12). Wolfers (1952) highlights such intersubjectivity by

recognizing security as an aspired value and identifying the normative character of security

policies in acquiring increments of security given the improbability of absolute security.

Security hence becomes an entire domain within social sciences rather than a fixed concept

as emphasis on ‘areas of concern’ expands conceptions of security with recognition that such

expansions can be perceived as tautologically (Krause and Williams, 1997). The conceptual

framework of the security debate encompasses; examining potential threats involving varying

referent objects possessing different interest, resources and preferences. This evokes two

primary images, firstly a freedom from threats and secondly an adjectival form reflecting the


needed tangible conditions to facilitate the first image (McSweeney 2004, 14). Security’s

etymology affixes its conventional meaning to the material means needed to ensure an absence

of threats and an understanding of security from conditions of insecurity. Private actors’

contribution towards such conditions is important as security becomes a human value entangled

with the values of ‘freedom, order and solidarity’ (McSweeney 2004, 18). Security thus becomes

inherently connected with concepts of power, politics and legitimacy requiring ‘analysis beyond

solutions within these status-quos to engaging the problem of such status-quos’ (Booth 2005, 10).

The saliency of context determines the influence of cultural and societal factors on security

issues (Stritzel and Schmittchen 2011, 170-171). Arguments encompass two features; firstly the

degree to which security exists as a reality prior to language (Waever, 1995) and secondly

whether such reality provides an orienting device for understandings specific contexts (Williams

2011, 214). The ad hoc synonymy of security with political and desirable ends creates infinite

meanings that limits analysis across circumstances of ‘securitising agent and audience’ resulting

in a disparity between theoretically described principles of security and policy practice

(Rothchild, 1995). Bearing in mind that context matters, its circumstantial relevance determines

whether debates circumvent the security conflation or enhance the analysis of the roles of

security actors while considering the special nature of security.

Major Pillars of the Security Discourse: Referent Object, Nature of Threats and Mechanics

Booth (2007; 100, 110) simplifies security as the ‘absence of threats and the condition of

being or feeling safe’. Three major implications arise from such formulation: first, the existence

of referent objects (what is threatened), second, an impending or actual danger (nature of

threats) and third, the outcomes of a desire to escape harmful possibilities (mechanics). These


pillars categorise the inter-related flow of literature from the Copenhagen School, Critical

Security Studies, Poststructuralism and Constructivist Security Studies. Each inter-disciplinary

approach varies in its treatment of referent object, threats and mechanisms of threat

aversion/resolution. Approaches theoretically converge at investigating security’s interwoven

nature with politics and the consequence of varying interpretations on its engagement with

principles of order and authority (Buzan 1983; Booth, 2007; Ayoob, 2005; McSweeney, 2004;

Rothschild, 1995). Each perspective carries an epistemic epoch of broadening and deepening

security agendas and threat. Buzan and Hansen (2009) develop these epistemic distinctions in

categorising each disciplines treatment of these pillars (Table.3).

Table 3: Epistemic Distinctions of Security Agendas

Objective Conceptions Subjective

Conceptions

Discursive Conceptions

-The absence/presence

of concrete threat.

- Usually defines

security in relative

material terms

-The feeling of being

threatened or not.

-Emphasises social

context, history and

the psychologies of

fear and

(mis)perceptions.

-Maintains an

objective reference

-Security cannot be

defined in objective

terms.

-Security is a speech act

-Focuses on the

intersubjective process

through which ‘threats’

manifest themselves as

security problems on

the political agenda.

Source: Buzan and Hansen 2009

Traditionally realist-neorealist employ security in a state-centric manner under conditions

of the classical social contract addressing questions of identity, boundaries, authority, legitimacy

and sovereignty at a state level (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Buzan, 1983; Smith, 2010). Such

arguments follow Buzan’s assertion of the state coping with security at varying levels of analysis


as the primary agent in alleviation of insecurity as well as a central actor in the international

political system. Krause and Williams (1997) underline the pervasiveness of the state in

neorealist tradition through its assumption of individual subjects having a “self-contained

instrumentally rational subjectivities used to confront an external reality to which they relate to

objectively”. The state therefore becomes an extrapolation and aggregation of individuals’ self-

interest and its actions become the rational pursuit towards such interest. Henceforth, security

cannot exist in absence of the state and its citizens’ security becomes affixed to the state.

Buzan (1993) notes the security of the individuals becomes inseparably entangled with that

of the state and conceptually avoids the individual as referent object because “threats are very

vague and the subjective feeling of safety has no necessary connection with actually being safe”.

Contrasting arguments indicate an ambiguity and lack of uniformity in addressing security issue

through state centric platforms. Wolfers (1952; 483) though traditionally realist, cautions that the

term ‘security’ engages “a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be

interpreted as policies of security”, within an environment where state traditionally prioritise

security. Wolfers furthermore criticise the resulting policy disparity, varying efforts and the

indistinctness of ‘national security’.

Critical Security Studies and Copenhagen School provide alternatives to state-centrism

utilising the individual or group identity as the referent object. McSweeney (1996) discussing the

Copenhagen School note their conception of identity as a negotiation among people and interest

groups. Krause and Williams (1997) support the alternative that security becomes a condition

that individuals enjoy and as such given primacy in defining threats and object of security. Such

alternative opens the state to critical scrutiny as individual’s security becomes disentangled from


the state highlighting the dynamics of threats as not entirely coming from anarchic structures but

also from institutions of organised violence within states.

Smith (2005) mentions Ayoob’s reaffirmation of this argument citing situations where the

state is not the guarantor but rather the greatest threat to the security of its citizens. Such theorists

reject the modus tollens assumption that a secure state equates to secure people. Individualistic

referent object removes the disjuncture between state and society allowing for engagement with

widespread global threats. Similarly, referent objects can be the groups which “individuals find

their identity and through which they undertake collective projects”. Usually such groups replace

the state’s position as objects of analysis and the provision of security. McSweeney (1996)

outline that such cases engage security by deconstructing “the processes and practices by which

people and groups construct their self-image”. McSweeney furthermore problematised the

cohering of a diverse range of individual choices and how identity disputes with security

implications are settled.

Presuppositions of the referent object determine whether security is perceived as a

commodity or a relationship and thus the methodology of the research (McSweeney, 2004).

Williams (2008) notes these philosophies posit either an accumulation of power (commodity) or

based on emancipation (relationship) calculus towards security. McSweeney firmly opposes sole

emphasis on quantifying conditions required for security, favouring dual approaches in

recognition of its nominative-commodity as well as the adjectival usage as a relationship. Krause

and Williams (1997, 49) identifies such as an epistemic shift “from abstract individualism and

contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization and identity...... of that which is being

secured”. For this reason interpretive analyses as applied in this paper are becoming favoured to


an objectivist rationalist approach towards comprehending, as Rothchild (1995, 55) notes, the

changing security needs of entities.

Changing conceptions of the referent object progressively require examining the nature of

the threats. Krause and Williams (1996) notes three origins for shift in threat perception: a

discontent with realist foundation, response to Post-Cold War security challenges and the

continuing desire make the discipline relevant to contemporary concerns. Ullman (1983)

acknowledges that defining security primarily in militaristic terms presents a profoundly false

image of reality. Such image neglects other dangers hence reducing total security and increases

the pervasive militarization of studies that can only increase insecurity. Ulman further notes,

society may only recognize a threat as it attacks hence security is understood in relation to such

threat, implying “that we may not know what it is or how important it is until we are threatened

by losing it” (Ullman 1983, 132). McSweeney (1996, 86-87) observes the importance of

perceptions of a collective identity and privileged elite perceptions within a society towards

determining the nature of threats. Similar to Giddens (1998) manufactured uncertainty which

examines human’s involvement in changing the course of history and the creation of threats.

Buzan’s People, States and Fear began an analytical trend of engaging Post-Cold War

security challenges and extending the nature of threats. Though subsequent works diverge (Wyn

Jones, 1999; McSweeney, 1996), his overall discourse posited five major sectors that affected

security; military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Rothchild (1995, 55-56)

identifies four main forms of security’s extension; from state downwards to individual referent

groups, from security of nations to security of international system, inclusion horizontally of

different types of security and the political responsibility for ensuring security. Williams (2008,

8) stresses the importance of analysing threat construction and being cognizant of which referent


object’s values are threaten and by who. Pettman (2005) strengthens such arguments by asserting

security and danger as products of a culturally based ‘us’ versus ‘them’ perception. Change in

threat perceptions occur against warnings that notions of security invoke universal acknowledged

realities within vague generalities about everything and nothing (Walker, 1997). Bigo and

Tsoukala (2008) suggestion is critical, that threat identification occurs via conditions of

insecurity determined by the capacities of various societies to live and accept certain forms of

violence. Walker acknowledges influence of historical and structural context within demands on

defining security and whose security is at stake.

Finally, the mechanics of security consider its significance to the referent object

simultaneously with the sequences involved in establishing a security issue. Academic discourse

hints at the implicit link between security and availability of opportunities. Wolfers (1952)

suggests security as a value that nations aspire more of, as it indicates the absence of threats to

acquired values and absence of fear that such values are attacked. Generally authors agree to

security’s importance as a fundamental public good however diverge on whether it is survival

based or additional to survival. Booth (2005; 2007) asserts the instrumental value of security

being survival plus as the result of its pursuits frees individuals to engage with other issues than

threats to their human being. Contrastingly Buzan, Waever and Vilde (1997, 21-23) indicate its

instrumental value through its mitigation of existential threats to the five sectors in Buzan

previous work.

McGhee (2010) subtly introduced that shared values become our yardstick for security

which unites a society based on commonality, identity and belonging. Increased interdependence

in various relations such as economic, technology diffusion, communication and value sharing

are outcomes of relatively satisfactory level of security (Blechman, 1998). Furthermore,


Blechman implicitly connects such trends as assets to maintain security and create new security

frameworks. Security’s instrumental value plays out in Giddens’ (1998, 312) reflexivity wherein

“everyone must confront, and deal with, multiple sources of information and knowledge,

including fragmented and contested knowledge claims.” As such different reflections on the

conditions of life are allowed as levels of security facilitates increasing forms of autonomy.

Apart from survival plus dynamics, Booth refers to the instrumental value through the relativity

of security and the subjectivity of threats as notions of insecurity become a life-determining

condition. Instrumental value asserts the liberating function of security to allow persons to enjoy

other aspects of life within the security mechanics.

The construction of security issues is commonly referred to as securitisation as pioneered

by Ole Waever. Waever (1995) argues that security as a concept does not formally exist for non-

state referent objects however discourse is melded from a modification and limitation of

traditional national security. Hence broadening security discourse takes meaning from simply

contrasting national security rather than an original academic debate. Waever posits that security

at non-state levels mimic various dynamics and political processes occurring at the state level.

Securitisation details the process that an issue becomes a security issue through discursive

politics (Balzacq 2011, 1). Hence, Waever asserts that conditions of insecurity and security share

the same problematique whereby the presence of a security problem requires either a response by

some measure or no response. He disputes the focus on referent objects or threats by questioning

the validity of a phenomenon itself being treated in terms of a security concern.

Balzacq (2011, 3) launching from such a foundation defines securitisation as,

an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes,


emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitising actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitising actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development

Balzacq frames securitisation within three hypotheses ((i) centrality of audience, (ii) co-

dependency of agency and context and (iii) the structuring force of the dispositif) attached to the

theoretical assumptions of speech act theory. The debate connects ‘security’ to the triadic

characterization of speech act theory wherein the locutionary (utterance of an expression)

combines with the illocutionary (action performing in articulating the utterance) empowering the

effect of the perlocutionary (consequential effects to the target audience). Waever (2011, 468)

indicates the theory places power within the community with ‘securityness’ being a quality of

how threats are handled. Phenomena become security issues through discourse between

securitising actor and society wherein society either affirms or denies such an agenda. Waever

(1995) concludes that security discussions move issues towards a security frame to achieve

effects different from those that would ensue if handled in a non-security mode.

Human Security: Creating a Market Environment for Privatisation

Conceptually, security has simultaneously evolved and expanded from traditional analysis.

A divergence occurred from an emphasis on ‘military threats to national territories’ as

exemplified in nation-state realist philosophy to a new concept of ‘human security’ in which

human beings and their complex social and economic relations are given primacy with or over

states (Williams 2001, 161). The UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR: 1994) developed

this dimension of security focusing on citizen’s concerns in their daily lives. The report indicates


that “human security is not a concern of weapons; it is a concern with human life and dignity”

therefore transforming security into a reactive and proactive concept.

Linklater (2005, 120) merging Kantian liberalism and critical theory highlights the

significance of membership in an integrated political community which has an inclination to

communicative policies to promoting human security. Linklater advocates political frameworks

that support communicative action providing the assured material and other conditions that

advance the accessibility of minority groups to self determination within dialogic arrangements.

Reinforcing the need for comprehensive models of public sector collaboration, Alkire (2003)

institutional focus aptly states the “objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of

all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human

fulfilment.”

The basic tenets of human security are (1) safety from violent and non-violent threats, (2)

freedom from pervasive threats (social and economic) and (3) the individual as the central point

of reference without impeding long-term human fulfilment (Suhrke, 1999; Paris, 2001; Thomas,

2001; Alkire, 2003). HDR (1994) highlights the need to change the concept of security; from

exclusive stress on territorial security to stress on people’s security, from security through

armaments to security through sustainable human development. Dasse (2010) consequently

itemized four dimensions in which security has altered from traditional analysis in terms of

referent object, issue area, geographical scope and the conceptualization of danger itself.

Concluding that within new conceptions of security (Figure 1) the individual supersedes the state

as the main referent object while issue area shifts from solely military to include economic,

environmental and humanitarian concerns. The geographical scope continually transcends the

nation state to include regional and international issues while simultaneously, dangers are


modified to the management of risk. Illustrating the progression of security conceptions; focus

extends from narrow traditional perceptions to encompass the individual and from a global

reference of managing risk under a humanitarian scope. This extension suggests that adequately

supplying security becomes a task beyond the ambit of the nation state.

HDR (1994) outline the two major components of human security as ‘freedom from want’

and ‘freedom from fear9’. Alkire (2003) summarizes human security as deliberatively protective,

contained in scope and people-centred. Protection is institutionalized within the vital space of

capabilities, freedoms and human activities that represent a minimal subset of human

development and rights. Hence conceptually, human security simultaneously requires the

prevention of violence while ensuring conditions that facilitate an abundant life.

Figure 1: Four Dimensions of Extended Security

9 ‘Freedom from want’ interpreted as “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the world”. Consequently ‘freedom from fear’ relates to “world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour-anywhere in the world”. Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1941. State of the Union Address “Four Freedoms”. Congressional Record 87


Suhrke’s (1999) argument on national interest and human security notes the difficulty in

creating an authoritative and consensual definition for human security across varying

interpretations. Paris (2002) further acknowledges the difficulty in utilising the term due to its

ambiguity and the purpose of such ambiguity. Paris highlights, such ambiguity permit diverse

perspectives and objectives hence unifying a wide range of supporters as its holism and

inclusivity reflects that all issues should be equally valid. However the truism that issues are

fundamentally inter-related is not a convincing justification for treating all issues as equally

important. The lack of precise definition and the desire of its supporters to keep the term

expansive and vague reduce its practicality to research or policymaking.

Sustained violence within state borders represents one of the greatest impediments to

human security. Diprose (2007) indicates such violence simultaneously reverse development

gains and impedes ‘human freedom to live safely, securely and maintain poverty traps in many


communities’. Baker (2010) articulates the continuing trend of decreasing credibility of the state

security and justice system to offer an effective and accessible service. Decline in credibility

strongly merged with increase internal violence fuels the perception that it is not a question of

whether to engage with private companies but rather how. Gradually the Hobbesian ideal of the

state as the primary instrument for maintenance of public order and permission of civilized life is

diminishing.

Van Crefeld (2006) comments that,

whether because the government has ordered them to......or because they simply do not trust the state to provide them with reasonable security, individuals and private industry have, in fact, been looking after themselves to a growing extent and on a constantly increasing scale.

Human security is thus indivisible and cannot be pursued by or for one group at the expense of

another, therefore requiring conditions that combat the insecurity resulting from existing power

structures that determine who enjoys the entitlement of security (Thomas, 2001). Thomas

underlines that state-society relations come under the spotlight with the demands of human

security with emphasis on fundamental questions of state capacity, legitimacy and collapse.

Theoretically, human security ensures that security remains a public good however the required

services from private actors create a privilege available to those who can afford it (Brabant 25,

2002).

Shifting the focus of security from the nation state to the individual supports the individual

liberty to evaluate the state’s capacity to provide security and the ability to choose one’s security

provider. Suhrke (1999, 271) utilisation of vulnerability as a defining concept of human security

promotes initiatives for immediate protective measures and/or long-term investments required

for minimal stability and development. The eminence of human security issues requires

specializations usually exclusive of state bureaucracy and public authorities. Paris (2001, 94-95)


illustration of the source of threats as military and non-military affecting societies, groups and

individuals shifts the paradigm for security providers. These implications concentrate society’s

focus on security and create an environment whereby non-state actors can provide security as a

service available on the market.

Rationale for Privatising Security and Governance Outcomes

Private security research commonly follows Argueta (2010, 6) methodology of focusing on

the “historical delegation of security functions by the state to private security organisations and

the continuity of control mechanisms”. Such creates an analysis incorporating three overarching

themes: (1) the meaning and incentives of privatisation, (2) management and application of

coercion and (3) the nature of the relationship between security providers as models of

governance arrangements. Similarly, the privatisation paradigm has spread like wildfire within

the last three decades, as a solution to clumsy and cost-intensive public administrations by

emphasising improved efficiency and effectiveness (Branovic, 2011). It embodies a liberal

philosophy of simultaneously creating and limiting power (Starr, 2007) as (within the context of

such limitations) the authority to use coercion, in the pursuit of security, becomes fundamental to

identifying probable reasons for the increase in PSCs numbers (Mandel, 2001).

Literature corresponds with Feigenbaum and Henig’s (1984) broad definition of

privatisation through shifting functions:

the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector; involves the increased reliance on private actors and market forces to pursue social goals.

Starr (1988) categorical construction of privatisation as an idea, theory and rhetoric and a

political practice10 provides however a more dynamic accountant of privatisation. It follows the 10 Starr’s framework of privatisation argues beyond return of services to their original location in the private sphere. As an idea firstly refers to ideological public-private


Anglo-governance school11 philosophy of state’s power being “hollowed out upwards to

international organisations, downwards by the marketisation of the public sector and sidewards

by the creation of arm’s length agencies” (Fawcett and Daugbjerg 2012, 196-197). Benson

(1998) advocates that public-sector production of crime control is inefficient and hence requires

placing faith in the market. Therefore, the propensity to privatise hinges on the link between

economic efficiency and societal equity with that of adequate governance arrangements and

outcomes.

Efficiency and equity debates emphasise the aforementioned liberal wisdom of limiting

state power while enabling the state to become more powerful within such limits. It considers the

theory of market failure to illustrate where and why the market fails as the incision points for

public ownership and regulation (Starr 1988; & 2007, 53).Sappington and Stiglitz’s (1987, 568)

argues for efficiency and equity utilising the similarities in private and public organisational

structure to question privatisation. Their discussion emphasises that economic efficiency

incentives centre on “when certain conditions are satisfied” such that “government involvement

cannot improve upon the performance of the private market”. Therefore given an avenue of

production (public/private) and a degree of government intervention, privatisation becomes

driven by the probability of a Pareto-efficient12 being established. Such support the “government

to governance” transition as Starr (1988) further purports that privatisation alters the institutional

distinction with the withdrawal from the state ensuring the pursuit of private gain serves the larger social order as well as the political consequences. Theory and rhetoric refers to normative justification of privatisation as a policy directive based on various visions of a good society. Starr’s discussion on political practice refers to the meaning of privatisation to respective nations acknowledging that altering the public-private balance.11 Anglo-Governance School emerged from the UK with the concern of explaining public sector reform in the 1980s which main features were: policy networks; governance rather than government; core executive; hollowed out state; and the differentiated polity.12 An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other allocation in which some other individual is better off and no individual is worst off. Not a guarantee of equity, Pareto efficiency calculus provides policy solutions and institutions that strive to make at least one person better without hurting anyone.


framework in which citizens interact hence becoming political and affecting the equity amongst

groups (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1984).

Similarly Avant (2005) utilises ‘private’ to indicate non-state actors acknowledging the

blurry public/private divide, wherein the capacity of the state to act independently is weakened,

that can be somewhat distinguished through either collective ends or profit maximization pursuit.

Starr (1988) notes that privatisation serves as a direction change in accessibility and distribution

without denoting the destination such that both good(s)/service(s) and as such actors become

embedded within the context. Williamson (1999, 307) and Starr (1988, 9) draws attention to the

functional differentiation of stakeholders wherein public agencies are well suited for some

purposes and unsuitable for others, admitting that private agencies cannot replicate public

agencies as all feasible organisational modes possess flaws in terms of governance. Therefore

adequately providing human security requires governance outcomes that are mindful of the

fragmented but overlapping networks which structure security actors’ collaboration.

The characteristics of governance outcomes depend on the ‘right to intervention’ and the

associated transaction cost economics of different types of adaptation. Sappington and Stigiltz

(1984) indicated the extremely limited ability of government to intervene directly in private

companies due to the lack of incentives and an inability to commit to intervention in light of its

increasingly high cost. The added bureaucratic cost and extensive administrative control can

detract actors from public sector transactions. Hindrances to public intervention negatively affect

accountability with unconventional measures being created, as highlighted by Michaels (2010,

719) ‘workarounds13’, which can “directly change the outcome of regulatory rulemaking and

enforcement proceedings”. Actors arrangement in the security landscape creates a governance 13 Michaels used the term ‘workaround’ to refer to government contracts or provisions within contracts that provide the outsourcing agency with the means of achieving distinct public policy goals that are improbable or difficult to attain through ordinary public administration.


structure wherein governance refers to “the means by which order is accomplished in a relation

in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains”

(Williamson 1999, 312). Avant (2005) concurs that privatisation’s inevitable redistribution of the

control of violence between state and non-state actors requires re-examining “who guards the

guardians”.

In addressing governance outcomes, this study accommodates ideas on differing

governance arrangements from the network governance14 (NWG) and policy network analysis15

(PNA) schools. Such arrangements encompass a spectrum of interaction wherein, the former

stresses state-society relations while the latter investigates interest intermediation and its impact

on policy-making outcomes (Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012). Most governance arrangements are

hybridised forms of guiding social processes that mitigate the market’s lack of mandate,

resources and facilitating elements through public sector collaboration. Fawcett and Daugbjerg

utilises the NWG School to provide an understanding of the impact of the broader context within

which governance arrangements operate while applying the PNA as a practical tool to

operationalise these arrangements. Notably, these perspectives provide an analytical tool for

understanding the changing configuration of the security landscape while considering that

security services are not fully privatise and intimate public interest to which the industry is

responsible.

Conceptually, Tolkki et al. (2011) point out that due to the interdependency of actors and

the hybridised arrangements, governance inherently includes a regulative side as well. As such,

14 Literature surrounds the inclusion of a range of government and civil society actors as co-participants in policy development and implementation (White, 2009). Change in analytical focus from narrowly defined policy communities to issue networks, from public agencies to relations between these and civil society and from intentions, interests and preferences to concrete practices, mechanisms and devices of steering policy (Triantafillou, 2008).15 Based on the premise that actors within policy networks need to exchange resources with one another in order to achieve their goals and simultaneously create varying power-dependent relationships.


the market may determine the operational environment (power to govern) however public sector

provides the restrictions for the environment (governing bodies power over the arrangement) to

pursue their aims. Therefore governance and regulation are not synonymous as governance tends

to encompass the order of the structure while regulation designates the means and rules.

Regulation is the normative dimension of governance as Tolkki et al. also stress that meta-

governance approaches underline regulatory mechanisms as political authorities engage in

guiding the self-organisation of governance through rules, organisational knowledge and other

political strategies. Furthermore, understanding industry regulation becomes necessary as PSCs

challenge political and military control, the rules governing PSCs are unclear, and the industry

suffers from lack of transparency as PSCs are insufficiently accountable for their actions (Percy,

2006).

Utilising constitutional liberalism, Starr (2007) acknowledges the difference in

transparency and accountability values of private and public companies, affirming the liberal

perception of private companies’ protection from unreasonable demands unless violating laws.

Market mechanics surprisingly may serve a regulatory purpose of specialized functions and

divided powers similar to the checks and balances of the separation of powers (Starr, 2007).

Consequently privatising security confirms a traditional liberal belief in the individual’s

obligation to ensure living conditions that enable persons the opportunity of success in life with

minimum standard of security being one such standard. Considering the discriminating

alignment thesis16, the type of adaptation required also influences governance. Williamson (1999,

312), emphasising autonomous and cooperative adaption, argues that while markets benefit from

autonomous, hierarchical (public bureaucracy) systems benefit from cooperative adaptation thus

16 Williamson (1999, 2005) posits “according to which transaction, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost and competence so as to affect an economizing result.”


a decisive factor is adaption which relates to the associated transaction cost. Notably, structures

featuring autonomy encourage independence and enterprise while those of cooperation reinforce

compliance and stronger mission orientation.

On the other hand, increasing confidence in privatisation represents a reduction in

government’s responsibilities while promoting “the relocation of service implementation

activities from public to private for-profit or non-profit venues” (Auger, 1999). Such confidence

is a response to public insecurity which intensifies the security agenda as privatisation engenders

an alternative mechanism to statecraft (Argueta, 2010). The momentum for alternative

mechanisms emerges from the perceived erosion in the state’s legitimacy and capacity to provide

protection from internal danger as Townsend (2009) highlights that locally fewer than 20 percent

of violent crimes are solved. Concomitantly, public perception fuelled by sensationalist mass

media combined with a growing sense of personal responsibility for individual protection tends

to increase the demand for private security (Thumala, Goold & Loader, 2011).

Mandel (2001) argues that,

in wealthy countries people believe that public police are inadequately staffed to provide all of their demanding security needs, and in many Third World countries, the widespread corruption of the police all but eliminates the possibility of official government protection from these dangers.

Privatisation’s combination of high powered incentives with little administrative control and

legal dispute resolution mechanism encourages independence and autonomy by streamlining

delivery (Williamson 1999, 312-313). Agrueta (2010, 9) warns however that excessive

confidence in private security can undermine government services leading to an unequal security

distribution and access to public services. Consequently a false security perception and

inappropriate evaluations of real security necessities can be created. Hence it is with concern to


access and equity issues within governance arrangements that privatisation of security services

and regulation should progress.

Historical Management of Force and Typology of Private Security Companies

Privatising security alters the control, sanctioning and use of force such that the monopoly

of coercive abilities is redistributed. Avant’s discussion merges the political (who gets to

control), the functional (capabilities) and the social (degree to which use of force is integrated)

aspects of control, highlighting that “control of force has been most stable, effective and

legitimate when all three aspects have reinforced each other” (Avant 2005, 6). For Avant, the

capacity of the state becomes the intervening factor in determining the distribution of force

within privatisation. Arguing that stronger public bureaucracy increases risk management

however multiplies the negative impact if privatisation undermines the state. Contrastingly weak

public bureaucracies have the most to gain from privatisation but are least able to manage its

risk. In strong bureaucracies there is a higher probability of ensuring security remains publicly

administered than weak bureaucracies. The differing capacities of states in light of the growing

recognition for PSCs mark a shift in the norm of state monopoly on violence in Western

democracies. Authors argue private actors’ ability to provide services beyond the states

capability or in which the state is inefficient, erodes its monopoly on force (Avant, 2005; Singer,

2001; Mandel, 2001; & Baker, 2010).

Privatisation of security is part of a larger historical trend within the longue durée of

security and use of coercion. Thompson (1994) historical analysis suggests that the organisation

of violence is neither timeless nor natural but distinctively modern through the transition from

heteronomy to state, political and domestic realms of authority. Thompson’s analytical

framework for control utilises decision-making authority, allocation and ownership as distinct


dimensions of control17 (Table.4). Distribution of coercive authority between state and non-state

actors decides the ownership of the means of violence as well as the ends of violence.

Fluctuating trends of state and private control of coercion reject the realist traditional state-

centric assumptions of sovereignty and challenge the ability of realist paradigms to adequately

account for these contextual changes.

Table 4: Thompson’s Analytical Framework for Organisation of Violence

Singer (2001) attributes recent privatisation momentum to the security market created by

the post-Cold War ‘security gap’ which changed nature of conflict and facilitated the normative

rise of privatisation. Global proliferation of PSC contradict conclusions that shift in power

towards private interest occurs primarily in less developed states (Brayton, 2002). Private

security personnel outnumber police officers at a ratio of 2:1 in the United Kingdom, United

States ratio at 3:1 and in Japan the sector has grown from 41, 146 in 1972 to 459,305 in 2003.

Ungar quotes increases in developed countries of 7-9% in industrialized countries and 11% in

developing region (Ungar, 2007; & Frigo, 2003:2).

Gumedze (2007; 195) expound that as a concept private security can mean mercenaries,

official companies or even vigilantes with discussions often focusing on adequate regulatory

frameworks (Gumedze, 2007: Ungar, 2007: Mandel, 2001 & Auger, 1999). Mandel (2001:133)

17 Decision making authority decides the ends to which violence is deployed. Allocation considers the way in which such authority distributes its coercive abilities while ownership addresses control over the means of violence (Thompson, 1994).


aptly identifies the core quandary of regulation being “who has and who should have the

legitimate authority to use physical coercion in pursuit of security”. Mandel further argues that

perceptions combined with,

public fears about the seemingly uncontrollable spread of violence, crime, and social decay, the absence of visibly effective state protection the resistance to government intrusion in people’s daily lives stemming from the spread of individualistic democratic values, and the rise in power of unruly groups serve to accelerate questioning the value of state monopoly on instruments of violence.

Thus ideas on private security are rooted in a larger public narrative on state responsibility and

the extent to which citizens can take their security into their own hands. Critical analysis of this

narrative requires comprehension of private security actors and the subsequent networks created

through application of their services.

Ungar’s two dimensional typology (2007) serves as a foundation for analysing private

security actors by understanding what they do and for whom they do it. The first dimension

relates to the ‘mission’ of the actor encompassing the “stated and unstated services of non-state

agencies”, reflecting a wide range of activities from specific to mandates to maintain public

order. Services are categorised into four main categories: (1) technical and physical, (2) control

of physical access, (3) training, consulting and information services and finally (4) management

of emergencies or high-risk situation. The second dimension questions the level of state

involvement in private security, recognizing the recurrent overlapping of private and public

security spheres amidst industry growth. Ungar warns against trends where “diminished state

capacity to reassert authority undermines the legitimacy and relevance of state programs and

laws among citizens”. Decreased confidence in the ability of state authorities to resolve problems

increases the necessity of relations between PSCs and public administrations.


Baker (2010) illustrates the necessity for state and non-state security providers to build

links to properly address public safety concerns. The proliferation of PSCs as aforementioned

should not equate to the complete replacement of state responsibilities. Investing in ‘human

security’ requires partnership between state and non-state actors as, Daase (2010) comments, the

concept endures “the conviction that human beings, not states, have an intrinsic value and should

be protected”. Market involvement fragments the state’s monopoly of violence and security but

cannot abdicate its responsibilities. Market mechanics alter “the institutional framework through

which citizens normally articulate, mediate and promote their individual and shared interest”

(Feigenbaum & Henig, 1984). This alteration cannot be independent of the state’s inputs and

regulation thus creates inherent connections between actors in security governance arrangements.

The interaction between non-state actors and state actors in security governance can be

scrutinized through their features and scope of their mission. Baker (2010) framed four wide-

ranging features being “mentalities (ways of thinking about the security concerns they seek to

govern); technologies (methods for exerting influence over security events); resources; and

institutions (habitual organised forms that mobilise resources, mentalities and technologies).

Figure 2: Tip of the Spear Typology: PMFs Distinguished by Range of Services and Force Levels


Similarly most writers utilise the Singer(2001) “tip of the spear” (Figure.2) typology which

differentiates by lethality whereby “units of the armed force are distinguished based on their

location in the battle space in terms of level of impact, training, prestige and so on” (Singer 2001,

201). Avant (2005) summarize this typology as “operational support, military advice and

training, and logistical support”. Brayton (2002) identifies three similar functional types being

directly applicable military skills, general military staff skills and highly specialized services

with military application. Mandel’s taxonomic breakdown (Table 5) represents the scope of

privatised security and its different forms respectively. The characteristics of actors within the

typology are influenced by Baker’s features and define their function within the space of security

governance with state actors.


Table 5: Scope, Purpose and Forms of Privatised Security

Scope of Privatised Security Purpose and Form of Privatised Security

Foreign Assistance

Vs

Domestic Substitution

Top-Down

Vs.

Bottom-Up

Direct Combat

Vs

Military Advice

Defensive

Vs.

Offensive

Privatised Foreign Security

Assistance; Non-governmental

sources in one state provide

privatised security services to

either governmental or

nongovernmental parties.

Privatised Domestic Security

Substitution; Privatised security

services provided by unofficial

individuals or groups indigenous to

a given society replace national

government police services

responsible for maintaining

internal order

Privatised Top Down Security

Services; Governments hire

out their internal and external

security functions to private

foreign or domestic providers.

Bottom-Up Security Services;

Individuals or loosely

organised societal groups

(vigilantes, militias,

neighbourhood watches and

gangs) initiate provision of

security services to

themselves or others.

Direct Combat;

Private providers either

supply the fighting force

themselves or the tools of

violence

Military Advice;

Private providers supply

classroom education on

fighting strategy and

tactics or no-site battle

training.

Privatised Defensive

Services;

Recipients receive

private security so as to

keep order, guard

against threats and

maintain the status-quo

Privatised Offensive

Services;

Recipients obtain

private security services

so as to overthrow

legitimate governments.


Caribbean Security Agenda: A Response to Vulnerability

Griffith (1995; 1996; 2004) discussions on Caribbean security emphasise four themes

subsumed under the umbrella of vulnerability. Vulnerability is viewed as a multidimensional

phenomenon wherein “geographic, political, economic or other factors” compromise the security

of states (Griffith 1995, 3). Branching from vulnerability are themes of geopolitics,

militarization, intervention and instability within a context of existing deficiencies. Caribbean

nations consequentially possess structural features of ‘smallness’ which heighten their

vulnerability as external and internal issues are aggregated within expanding security concerns

emphasising the link between security and development (Griffith 2004; 5). Thus most of the

region’s security concerns are influenced externally but manifested internally as social instability

with failure to address their multiple dimensions (Thorburn, 1997).

The complexity of security in the region is increased by the observation that challenges

facing one or a few states does not automatically qualify as challenges of the region.

Securitisation of these challenges becomes a political choice rather than objective facts as

concerns exceed simple military-political terms to connect with development. Structurally, the

limited resource availability18 of Caribbean small states contributes to their relative weakness and

subordination to extra-regional countries. As such policy reprioritisations of states with

traditional interest as well as establishing new relationships become critical to mitigating the

region’s vulnerability. PSCs find markets in the Caribbean mainly due to varying impact of

threats and the limited responses available to states within the region.

18 Ivelaw Griffith emphasise d that the few limited valuable natural resources of the Caribbean connects to its economic vulnerability and narrow economic bases focusing on (a) agriculture, (b) mining and manufacturing and (c) services.


The region’s vulnerability outlines the framework for major security discourses and trends.

Traditionally, US relations shaped the regions security agenda through leveraging its

vulnerability within the context of Cold-War anti-communist geopolitical rivalries (Verasammy,

2009). At the end of the Cold-War reduced the region’s strategic significance to the US while

facilitating increased authoritative involvement by technocrats and statesmen to redefine

security. Broadening and deepening accompanied with the redefinition of security may adjust the

focus however the region’s inherent vulnerability remains constant denominator.

Instituto De Altos Estudios De La Defensa Naccional (1998) incorporated these realities

in defining the region’s security as,

based on democratic stability, observance of human rights, environmental protection, the promotion of development and peace, collective coexistence, regional integration, the resolution of domestic socio-economic problems and the reduction of domestic social conflict.

Versammy’s analysis furthered the notion of the regional shift towards human security with

emphasis on principles of solidarity and emancipation. In relation to this paper, the political and

normative act of securitisation influences the intensity and specificity of the security services

demanded. Following Griffith’s DMSF and salience factor assessment, an indirect result of

expansive securitisation is the reconfiguration of roles within the governance arrangement of the

security landscape.


CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Critiquing security within International Relations (IR) requires considering a broad range

of theoretical frameworks whilst comprehending its unique nature. Traditional IR perspectives of

realism and liberalism are central theories which provide the background for the security

discourse. Challenging these mainstream approaches are critical perspectives which contest

previous assumptions about the nature of the world and its constituent actors. The theoretical

framework is divided into two parts whereby the security concept formulated by mainstream IR

theories is evaluated utilising critical perspectives. Privatisation and the subsequent increase in

PSC shall be analysed in light of the human security paradigm and securitisation while utilising

Fawcett and Daugbjerg NWG and PNA combined governance outcomes to outline possible

configurations of the security landscape.

The realist paradigm focuses on the traditional Westphalian notion of protecting territorial

integrity and political sovereignty of the state with an emphasis on guarding against external

military threat. The nation-state is the legitimate protector of its citizens and the unit of analysis

as a rational actor pursuing national interest. Liberalist thought similarly focuses on preservation

of the nation-state however by recognition of the plurality of actors and their involvement

especially through multilateralism. Complex inter-dependence, cooperation of institutions and

multilateralism serve as avenues to achieve and maintain security (Edwards and Ferstman 2009,

10). Critical perspectives such as constructivism and critical security studies (CSS) maintain a

micro-analytical focus. Constructivism emphasise s the way in which ideas, interest and politics

in security are socially constructed and arise from social processes and interaction. Critical

perspectives question what it means to be secure, causes of insecurity and who or what the


concept of security should be apply to. Peoples and Vaughn-Williams (2010: 2) highlight that

critical perspective “refute the idea that security has a constant definitively settled meaning and

content that can be taken for granted”. Critical perspectives analyse security as a derivative

concept, understanding the idea of a broadening security and challenging traditional state-

centrism.

The key concepts (Box 1.1) of critical perspectives dispute political realism’s emphasis on

the state as well as war being the main threat within the cycle of the ‘security dilemma’. It

promotes a “broadening” and “deepening” of the security agenda. The former relates to an

expansion of the analytical horizon of studying security beyond the military while the latter

refers to the extension of the referent object to beyond the state. This expansion also recognizes a

multiplicity of actors beyond the state as a site of insecurity such as individual human beings.

Box 1: Key Concepts of Critical Security Studies

Referent Object: An entity that is taken to be the focus for analysis in security studies or put differently, “that which is being secured”.

Traditional Approaches/Traditional Security Studies: A shorthand most likely used by writers in or sympathetic to critical security studies, which refers to realist, liberalist, peace studies and strategic studies perspectives in the study of security that prioritise the state as the referent object of security, and the focus primarily on military threats to the security of the state.

Broadening: Relates to the move away from a narrow focus on the military sector to analysis of issues in other sectors.

Deepening: Relates to the idea that the state is not the only referent object of security.

Normative: A position that explicitly takes a stance on what should or ought to be analysed, achieved and/or secured.

Security as a derivative concept: The idea, common among critical approaches to security that the way we think about security derives from the way we think the world works broadly.


CSS also challenge the ontological assumption of state-centrism by recognizing that

understandings of security reflect deeper assumptions about the nature of politics and the role of

conflict in political life. It analyses the theory-practice nexus wherein theories inform security

practices and vice-versa with the normative goal of emancipation. Booth (2005b) refers to this

emancipation as the “freeing of people from those physical and human constraints which stop

them from carrying out what they freely choose to do”. CSS objects to the static picture of

security under the traditional approaches by analysing the language of security to understand the

divergence between the material world and various inter-subjective meanings of the word.

The critical perspective of securitisation is applied to understand the link between

increasing demands for security services and the mechanisms of threat definition. Securitisation

refers to shifting an issue out of the realm of ‘normal’ politics into the realm of emergency

politics by presenting it as an existential threat. It is initiated through ‘speech acts’ whereby an

issue becomes a security threat by being spoken of by important security actors. Threats gain

acceptance through intersubjective recognition and some degree of agreement between the

perpetrators of the securitising speech and the relevant audience. Understanding the interaction

between securitising actors and audience requires looking at the security landscape and

regulation.

In analysing the security landscape and regulation, Fawcett and Daugbjerg critical realist

epistemology will be applied. Cockayne (2009) indicates that regulation within varying

governance outcomes span between being state-centred or society-centred with each having its

respective criticisms. State-centred modes are criticised for failing to address systematic labour

law violations, legislation being outdated and failing to account for the realities of the industry,

being poorly supported by administrative resources and bureaucratic incentives and failing to


provide operational guide to the industry. Society-centred self-regulation is criticism mainly for

being self-serving, lack credible monitoring and enforcement arrangements, inadequate

transparency and accountability as well as a lack of support from the state. The critical realist

perspective incorporates the role of the state in varying governance outcomes as means of

addressing these regulatory criticisms through the view of meta-governance.

Critical realism encapsulates meta-governance as “the different ways in which the state has

re-conceptualised its role in response to the changing context within which practices of

governance take place” (Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012). As a result though states may be

outsourcing and becoming less hierarchical, the activities of the market are negotiated within the

political space of the hierarchy which can impose rules to change profit maximization calculation

to voluntary agreements for the common good. Therefore the theoretical framework must

address the possible regulatory framework within such hierarchical space.

Tolkki et al. (2011) application of Gunningham (2009) theoretical framework presents an

applicable tool for describing possible regulatory frameworks. It outlines meta-governance forms

such as firstly, definitional guidance referring to the state describing the nature of the

collaborative governance arrangement. Secondly, enforcement capability wherein state-provided

enforcement role ensures that regional development networks fulfil their obligations. Finally,

participatory incentives which consist of inducements and punitive sanctions for the actors set

out by the state. These meta-governance forms were linked to Fawcett and Daugbjerg (Table. 6)

combined NWG and PNA governance outcomes operating through critical realism. These

governance outcomes combine ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy as the former involves the process

through which decisions are reached and the latter engages policy outcomes and their

effectiveness.


Table 6: Fawcett and Daugjberg Governance Outcomes

Explaining Governance OutcomesHorizontal Coordination

Exclusion InclusionVertical Coordination

IMedium Input LegitimacyHigh Output LegitimacyIII

Low Input legitimacyMedium Output Legitimacy

IIHigh Input LegitimacyMedium Output LegitimacyIV

High Input LegitimacyLow Output Legitimacy

State-Centred Governance

Society-Centred Governance

Source: Fawcett and Daugbjerb “Explaining Governance Outcomes” (2012).

This study contributes to the sovereignty debate as it pertains to the complexity of

supplying political goods and their preconditions via the market by examining the private

security industry. For this reason, this framework occurs within discourse of the constructed,

written, advertised and deployed notions of security in the Caribbean. Human security and

securitisation address part of the security dynamics within the Caribbean as cultural and

symbolic meanings of security discourse reveal responses to the inherent vulnerability of the

region. Caribbean security notions assist in examining the possible reconfigurations of the

security landscape in Trinidad and Tobago. This framework is applied through the Discrete

Multidimensional Security Framework (DMSF) which facilitates explanation and interpretation

of the structure of the security landscape in varying governance arrangements.


CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

The research questions focus on the utilisation of PSCs for defensive services to protect

against physical violence (personal and community security19) towards individuals and property.

Security services are tailored to respective needs hence facilitating the demand for security

services that the state may not be able to provide. This paper attempts to map possible changes to

the security landscape in Trinidad and Tobago caused by the significant increase in PSCs.

Emphasis is placed on the internal actors of Trinidad and Tobago’s security landscape however it

is acknowledged that external influences to the configuration of the national security landscape

exist. Internal actors cover three categories: (1) public authorities inclusive of constabulary,

supplementary police officers and the Ministry of National Security (MONS) officials, (2) civil

society inclusive of NGOs, interest groups and the media. Finally (3), private sector20 (PSCs)

forms a distinct category in data collection and analysis.

Data collection was divided into two aspects utilising a mixed methodology design; (1)

empirical review of secondary data related and (2) semi-structured interviews with relevant

internal actors were conducted to create a brief case study of the private security industry in

Trinidad and Tobago. Question 1 was examined using quantitative secondary data from surveys,

reports and statistics from the United Nations, International Relations and Security Network,

Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research), Small Arms Survey,

Confederation of European Security Services (COESS), Stockholm International Peace Research

19 Personal security emphasises the individual whilst community security refers to the freedoms associated with membership to a particular group

20 Trinidad and Tobago does not manufacture firearms hence armament corporations are not included however the distribution of arms through the Police Commissioner is considered.


Institute (SIPRI), Private Security Database (PSD) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic

Control of Armed Forces. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials

from the Ministry of National Security (MONS), CARICOM IMPACS and officials from well

renowned local PSCs to address Question 2 (a) (b) which created a brief case study of the

industry in Trinidad and Tobago.

Semi-structured interviews were based on the indicators and survey instruments from the

Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) working paper “Safety and Security:

A Proposal for Internationally Comparable”. Interviews incorporated three indicators21of the

working paper’s comprehensive survey module on physical safety and security. An interview

schedule (Appendix 2) was created with questions from the respective indicators. These

indicators provide a measure of the security risk in Trinidad and Tobago and the capacity of state

and other agencies to protect individuals under the demands of human security. Interviews were

conducted to gather qualitative data on the composition of the security landscape and perceptions

of the current/suggested roles of the major actors in Trinidad and Tobago. The use of the

indicators followed the rationale of the OPHI report:

Indicators of incidents of threats to physical safety and security; against property

Diprose (2007) notes that property based crime regardless of whether assault occurs can be

debilitating for the poor and contribute to their feelings of security and safety. Central Statistical

Office (CSO) crime data statistics illustrate a steady increase in property crimes22 between the

periods of 1998-2008. The interview focused on the extent property crime was perceived to be a

21 The four parts of the module are: (1) indicators of threats to physical safety and security against property, (2) indicators of threats to physical safety and security against person and (3) perceptions of safety and threats of violence22 Central Statistical Office cites (1998 data set, 2008 data set); breaking and burglary (6112, 4855), robbery (2780, 5043), larceny (2686, 6159) and other property crimes (553, 897).


serious concern in Trinidad and Tobago as well as the capacity of PSCs to provide such security

services. Indicator emphasises six sub-types of property related crimes that can be connected

across rural and urban contexts and include threats to human security. The questions from this

indicator are:

1. On a scale of 1-5, what is your likelihood of being a victim of crime against your

property?

2. On a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the degree to which property crime is a

problem?

3. If you were a victim, what do you believe is the likelihood of the incident being dealt

with in a satisfactory manner by public authorities?

4. Do you think that private security companies can provide superior protection against

property crime? Please explain why?

Indicators of incidence of threat to physical safety and security; against persons

Similarly, six sub-categories were used to determine such incidents which by their very

nature exert violence against a person. Trinidad and Tobago has an increasing murder rate and

other crimes involving violence against persons. Sub-categories hence includes assault without a

weapon, assault involving weapons, shootings, injuries involving explosive devices, kidnappings

and sexual assault. Sexual assault was not made a focus as protection from such is difficult and

PSCs may not provide services for victims but may be under the ambit of social services. The

questions from this indicator are:

5. On a scale of 1-5, what is your likelihood of being a victim of violent crimes?


6. On a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the degree to which violent crimes against

persons is a problem?

7. If you were a victim, what do you believe is the likelihood of the incident being dealt

with in a satisfactory manner by public authorities?

8. Do you think that private security companies can provide superior protection against

violent crimes against?

Perceptions of Safety and Threats of Violence

Perception questions can produce answers that are situated in time and related to

psychological factors not related to actual threats to security and safety. Human Security Report

(HSR, 2005; 47) notes that human security is based on perceptions as well as realities. Such

perceptions are important to determining at risk communities and facilitating individual’s right to

participate in decisions directly affecting the safety of their communities especially in

circumstances that necessitate difficult trade-offs between different security goals (HSR, 2005).

Increasing demand for PSCs seemingly stems from strong perceptions of various security threats,

their significance and the avenues of redress.

9. In your opinion, what would you consider to the country’s most important problem?

10. Thinking of all the threats that you might face in your life, which three are the most

concern to you now?

11. If you had to choose between top-down or bottom-up, how would you describe the

nation’s method of developing threats?

12. Do you think that there is credible challenge to government’s or media’s portrayal of

issues of national security?


13. Do you think that the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago are law abiding and conscious of

their obligations and duties?

14. How safe do you feel against criminal in your own house?

15. In the next twelve months, what is the likelihood that you will become a victim of

violence?

16. Do you think that there are governmental avenues for redress and satisfaction when it

comes to your safety?

17. Do you support citizens being able to purchase security services from businesses?

18. How much confidence do you have in public authorities?

Following these indicators, questions were asked directly based on the private security industry

and its landscape in Trinidad and Tobago. These questions are:

19. Do you think that private security companies are a necessity in Trinidad and Tobago?

20. Would you support completely shifting security services to be provided by companies?

21. Given the large number of PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago, what do you think is the role

of government in such an environment?

22. What are three features of regulation that you believe the local private security industry

needs at this point?

23. How do you think the role of other actors in the security landscape is affected by the

increase in PSCs?


CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Recent Trends in Private Security Companies

Despite consensus on industry growth, the lack of global data collection and monitoring

systems impedes accounting for the private security industry however available data though not

always reflecting numerical increases can provide substantial support for our claims. In regards

to Question 1, data collection suggests a global increase in the number of PSCs through

personnel growth and the diversity of their activities. Singer (2001) highlighted that between

1991-2001 private military industry activity expanded globally through Western democracies,

Central and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Eastern Europe. Small Arms Survey (2011) indicates

that the total number of PSC personnel outnumber police officers by a ratio of 1.8:1 and

increasing given large markets such as China, India and the United States.

Figure 3: Global Activity of Private Military Industry

Argueta (2010) demonstrates this trend in Latin America through the increasing number of

personnel (Table.7) as well as their ratio to the population. Krahman (2009) noted that in UK,


Poland, the US and Turkey PSC personnel is nearly twice of public forces while figures in

France and Germany suggest PSC size as two-thirds of state police (Table.8).

Table 7: Private Security Personnel in Latin America

Country Inhabitant

Number of Guards

Guards per hundred thousand inhabitants

Police Officers per hundred thousand inhabitants

Brazil 177.3 million

580,000 327 146**

Mexico 103.3 million

450,000 435 324*

Central America

38.4 million

234,941 611 187****

Colombia 44.5 million

190,000 427 266**

Argentina 38.4 million

110,000 286 549*

Venezuela 27 million 65,000 240 429***

Peru 26.9 million

55,000 204 234**

Chile 15.7 million

60,000 382 225**

Total 471.5 million

1,744,941 370

Notes: *2003; **2004; *** 2007; ****2008.

Source: Author’s own compilation with data from Arias (2009): Seguridad Privada en América Latina: el lucro y los dilemas de una regulación deficitaria, FLACSO/Chile; Informe de Desarrollo Humano 2009–2010, UNDP; Observatorio Centroamericano sobre Violencia; Policía Nacional de Colombia; Comisión Nacional para la Reforma Policial de Venezuela (CONAREPOL).Source: Argueta “Private Security in Guatemala” (2010)

Table 8: Private Security Personnel in the US and Europe

Country Public Police Private Security Personnel

Armed Security Guards

Ratio Police/Private Security

United Kingdom 141, 398 250,000 - 0.6Poland 100,000 165,000 No Data 0.6United States 861,000 1,200,000 No Data 0.7Turkey 145,000 218,660 35, 263 0.7Germany 250,000 177,000 10,000 1.4France 250,000 159,000 - 1.6Spain 223, 000 92,000 20,000 2.4Source: Krahman “Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence” (2009)


Another supportive indicator is industry growth; the Confederation of European Security

Services noted a yearly turnover of approximately €35 billion with annual market growth of

13.30 per cent in the private security industry and an average of 52, 300 PSCs. Small Arms

Survey Research Note (2011) data connects this growth trend to the industry’s high firearm

usage within different contexts (Appendix 3). The rising diversity of security services alters

interaction between security actors (Appendix 4) and can also result increased turnover such as

that occurring in the UK (Figure 4). As such the rise in diversity of services can be correlated to

an overall increase in the industry.

Figure 4 UK Private Security Industry Turnover with various services

Figure 5: PSC growth in weak bureaucracies and failed states


Private Security Database (PSD) accounts for instances of military outsourcing by public

actors in the period 1990-2007 (Figure 5). It demonstrates the global nature of PSC by observing

growth trends in weak bureaucracies and failing states. PSD statistics also indicate an increasing

functional diversification especially at the end of the 1990s with a large change in client base.

The increases on the supply side (Table. 9) within such a context enhance competition and create

better market opportunities for industry growth. The functional diversification of the growing

PSC trend in weak bureaucracies however is highly biased towards the ‘tip of the spear’ (Figure

2). Overall increase in PSCs can be a good indicator for the growth of the market and the extent

that PSCs are integrated and the level of public reliance on the private sector.

Table 9: Distribution of PSC services according to the PSD in weak bureaucracies

In the Caribbean (Table 10), private security personnel outnumber police officers in non-

OECS countries with overall industry growth in the region. Changing ratios between public and

private security officials demonstrate an overall industry growth. Such growth has occurred in

most jurisdictions however with limited statistical records and a large divergence between

official and unofficial statistics. Hill (2010) estimates an unofficial 55,000 personnel compared


to the Trinidad and Tobago the official 13,610 figures. Locally, the Ministry of National Security

reports 157 PSCs registered in their database while Trinidad and Tobago Yellow Pages figures

suggest at least 225 companies providing private security services.

Table 10: State vs. Private Security Figures in the Caribbean and Latin America

Overall, the quantitative secondary data provides adequate statistical justification for a

perceived global and local increase in PSCs. The data suggests various conclusions primarily that

the growth is not being merely numerical but also has a functional diversity dimension in the

type and intensity of services. Private security services are quickly adapting to situations hence

creating the adequate market opportunities and facilitating competition. Security’s intangibility

and importance to public interest suggests that its demand is continuous with companies

increasingly willing to supply. The important issue in delivering such key political goods

becomes the type of collaboration the market has with public administration.

A Case Study of Private Security in Trinidad and Tobago

The interview schedule does not represent a significant sample size but provides expert

opinion on issues surrounding PSCs as it pertains to Trinidad and Tobago. Interviews focused on

three major themes (1) construction and perception of threats, (2) adequacy of the increasing

reliance on PSCs and (3) state collaboration with PSCs for regulation of the industry. As it


relates to research questions 2(a), human security provides the framework as theme (1) addresses

securitisation with theme (2) and (3) discussing the mitigation of the “security gap” vulnerability

that defines the nation’s security policy. These discussions gave insight into the peculiar nature

of the private security industry as well as posit important areas for future research. Notably,

industry statistics are complicated and limited which hinder researchers from adequately

describing the characteristics of the industry.

In contrast to statistical trends, participants indicated that they were most likely to become

victim to violent property crime. Crime reduction was hinted as a national impetus along with

poverty alleviation and increasing public service efficiency. In Trinidad and Tobago threat

construction was viewed mainly to be top down with few tangible challenges to the abundance of

securitising actions of public authority and the media. These securitising actions were largely

perceived to have various agendas without independent challenges to qualify them .Some threats

were considered to be ‘ground level’ threats which are generally felt intensely by the grassroots

population. These ground level threats included mostly violent crimes against property and

persons as well as the perceived fear of these crimes. Participants however identified the

difference between reality and perception of security as a major influence on the intensity of

ground level threats. Threats are also confluent with other illegal activities within the informal

economy such as narcotics and a budding wildlife smuggling industry. The range of threats

facing individuals was perceived to be outside the scope of public authorities and their

institutional limitations.

Overall, there was agreement that the avenue of security services should remain open to

persons who wish for such. Private security services were viewed as a surplus to satisfy security

expectations that the state would not be able to. Application of PSCs focused on services within


a human security framework towards the individual or enterprise. Especially, in the purview of

companies that require private security presence as an insurance requirement. This market

alternative is generally viewed as more than a negative response to public sector failure but also

the opportunity to provide outputs superior to public bureaucracies. The inefficiencies in the

public sector were perceived to remain constant as PSCs were attributed with superior

management structures. Negative perception of public authority and lack intense public scrutiny

towards private security positively affects the state’s growing reliance on PSCs. Their capacity to

provide services at an adequate standard was integral to the adequacy of the sector. Quality

security services facilitated an instrumental value towards enterprises and individuals to engage

in other activities despite a heightened fear of crime and inefficient public sector.

Despite public sector inefficiency, the role of the state is invaluable to creating a regulated

market environment for PSCs. The fundamental protective role and the legal powers of public

authorities are to remain constant. Security’s intimate connection with the public interest

mandates government active involvement especially within regulation. Public authority and

private security ratios is a common issue of concern with the state serving to monitor the

industry’s growth. Interviews highlighted that the public authority should ensure a minimal

standard for the quality security services be it prevention or response. Industry regulation was

highly believed to require private sector collaboration for its legitimization given the increasing

spectrum of professionalism and expertise. Balanced state participation in regulation addresses

the demands of small and large PSCs, with the former preferring increased participation and the

latter preferring market based regulation to increase the industry’s legitimacy.


CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Factors Influencing the Role of Non-State Actors

Human security, securitisation and symbols of security were three common factors

throughout the interviews and the literature reviewed as affecting the dynamics of the security

landscape. These are explained however through diversification of security functions, threat

definition and the capacity of public bureaucracy. The first two factors outline the market

environment for security services while public bureaucracy influences the role of other actors

either through direct or indirect interaction. In light of these factors, there exist the need for a

strong public bureaucracy capable of enforcing a regulatory framework for PSCs and the

delivery of security services.

Increasing diversification of security services supply the demands of human security which

creates the market avenue for specific needs catered only by the private sector. Fulfilling specific

needs through market alternatives is accepted as a means of adjusting to the security gap with

PSCs market oriented logic encouraging service diversification especially in situations of

increasing threat intensity. However the mis-selling of security services develop as the effect of

its intangibility along with the inexplicable relation between ‘what such goods promise’ and

‘what the customer is seeking’ results in a distrust in the quality of security service (Thumala,

Goold and Loader, 2011). Hence increasing service diversification requires a combined use of

hierarchical and market structures to facilitate the governance of security services and their

quality through adaptation, assuming that inadequate adaption underlie most organisational

problems.


Threat definition applies to the securitisation process of core and peripheral threats23

wherein peripheral threats can be conflated as being core. Accordingly to Ivelaw’s DMSF, the

salience of an issue is a function of the threat type and threat intensity however locally, the

perlocutionary rarely adequately challenges the securitising act. As such, threats that were

traditionally considered as peripheral such as violent crime (property and against persons) are

promoted to existential threats. Peripheral threats tend to actively involve a great cross-section of

society and not merely specialized groups, conflation promotes the type and level while keeping

constant the large target audience. The outcome is a populist demand for security services

fuelling a self perpetuating industry. Assisting threat creation is the definition of situations by

relevant elites of state coupled with the amount of resources invested by public bureaucracy.

The capacity of public bureaucracies determines the enforcement level of regulations. In

Trinidad and Tobago there is no direct legislation for PSCs with most regulation being informal

and dominated by non-state actors. Ironically, though a stable Western democracy, there has not

been concentrated efforts to formalizing industry regulations and subsequently a large number of

loopholes exist that are somewhat partially addressed in other legislation. Stable bureaucracies

can easily facilitate cooperative adaptations which are purpose oriented and encourage

collaboration. Such makes Trinidad and Tobago unique that despite the presence of a stable,

momentum currently favours enterprise and high powered incentives with little administrative

control.

Fawcett and Daugjberg meta-governance forms present possible descriptions and

recommendations for the security landscape. Firstly, possible trade-offs in selecting governance

23 Ivelaw Griffith denotes core threats to be “actions or a sequence of events that affects the vital interest of nation-states and peripheral threats to refer to actions or sequence of events that affect the secondary inters of the national state.


arrangements should be noted with considerations being given to adequacy in context and time.

Locally, the viability of governance arrangement is dependent on whether non-state actors play a

dominant role and industry legitimacy. Contradictory to current practices, the interviews

indicated a preference for state authorities playing a central role of coordinating collaborative

arrangements as a best-practice for regulation.

Applying Tolkki et al. conclusions, the definitional guidance and participatory incentives

capacity of the state represent the critical meta-governance forms for the local industry.

Currently the industry can be described as a Cell III (Table 6) arrangement where a limited

amount of societal actors take a central management role and the state control is attritioned

(Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012). It is categorised as low input legitimacy and medium output

legitimacy, meaning that the policy network is relatively exclusive with a high degree of

autonomy from the state hence quality assurance and industry legitimacy are difficult issues.

Similarly, the limited role of the state created the opportunity for non-state actors to implement

short-term and narrowly focused rent seeking behaviour without taking broader concerns into

account.

Locally, a recommended model would be Cell II (Table 6) which provides a high input

legitimacy and medium output legitimacy. In such situations the state performs a central role in

the arrangement which is inclusive to the involvement of non-state actors. The state becomes

increasingly engaged in meta-governance as diversity in actors may reduce agreement on the

‘rules of the arrangement’. A high degree of legitimacy in participation is critical to the local

industry to dispel concerns of quality, participation as well as the accessibility and equity of

security services. Recent context indicate legitimacy is a critical factor for the industry hence


Cell II is systematically favourable than other governance outcomes (see Fawcett and Daugjberg

for explanation on Cell I and Cell IV).

Security as a Good and Sovereignty

The role of non-state actors is influenced by articulations of sovereignty as common

throughout the research is the need for the state to remain involved in security services. Such

perspectives combine varying views on articulation of sovereignty and security as a ‘sovereign

transaction’24. Sovereignty encompass two dimensions of firstly claiming ultimate authority in a

particular political space (constitutive dimension) and secondly the boundaries between the

political and economic as well as the state and non-state realms of authority (functional

dimension) (Thomson, 1994). As the functional dimension claims authority over a range of

activities, it simultaneously disclaims authority over another set of activities. Locally, the

functional dimension creates norms of centralization and fragmentation spanning the spectrum of

national sovereignty and the marketisation of social relations. Congruently, increased PSC

presence indicates the state’s willingness to marketise the delivery of security services while

retaining regulative responsibilities of governance arrangements.

Security services privatisation questions the applicability of profit maximization and other

key liberal principles to security service. On the supply view, functional diversification becomes

critical to PSCs keeping pace with expanding security responsibilities within a political space of

limited resources, expertise and divergent interest. Conversely, the market of force is inscrutable

since usual market indicators like productivity and efficiency of services are inapplicable due to

the varying complexity of threats (Branovic 2011, 12). Threat definition generates market

24 Wilson (1989) used the term to denote public bureaucratic transactions that have special needs for probity and implicate the security of the state in which management duties is given to the executive. These transactions are organised by governments because it alone embodies public authority.


demands especially in Trinidad and Tobago’s relative unchallenged modes of securitisation.

Similarly the indeterminate nature of human security limits the possibility of prioritising threats.

Therefore influential public and private security actors simultaneously established a monopoly

on the delivery of security services and outlining the community’s security needs.

The exogenous pressure of the world polity sharing common norms and values creates a

sovereign expectation of the provision of security and control of violence. ‘Sovereignty’ as the

final authority can be attributed by the world polity and other state rulers towards the state as

recognition of its duty to supply political goods25 of which security is an important precondition.

The means of realising expectations vary across time and territories reflecting a global appraisal

of the degree of state’s involvement in meeting the expectation. Hence though domestic politics

influence the delivery of security services and the use of violence, another strong influencing

factor is global trends and best practices of other nations.

Conclusions on the delivery of security bring to the forefront the capacity of state

institutions. Satisfying the requirements for human security meant that states had to face dynamic

expectation in which it was not prepared for. The use of PSCs can be seen as beneficial in the

short-run capacity however can weaken the prospect for long-term institutional growth.

Ironically, privatisation may simultaneously increase the efficiency of security services but

cripple the state’s ability to provide an adequate basic security package for its citizens. Public

bureaucracies are neither asset nor product specific serving a very broad purpose and target

audience. For citizens that cannot afford private security nor require such, there remains the need

for a strong public bureaucracy that creates the conditions that satisfy human security. This study

25 These goods encompass ‘expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between rulers and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interaction’. See Rothberg, 2003.


focused on physical violence with data collection acknowledging the instrumental mechanics of

security as important.

The Montreux Document and Regulation

In discussing research question 2 (b), the Montreux document provide guidelines to

suggest practical legal and policy regulatory considerations. In the national context, focus should

be placed on legislative as well as contracting and procurement practices for utilising PSC

especially in law enforcement and protective capacities. The document outlines good practices

for the operation of PSC within two categories26 which are applicable to Trinidad and Tobago in

respect to determination of services as well as legal jurisdiction and accountability.

Regardless the category, states are required to outline the services which may or may not

be contracted as well as carried out. States are cautious about the level of involvement required

in providing particular services especially given the cross sectional nature of human security.

The selection criteria for companies should include indicators relevant to ensuring respect for

national and international law such as past conduct, financial and economic capacity,

authorization and training as well as organisation structure. Legal jurisdiction provides avenues

of accountability for the selection and actions of PSC. This includes providing criminal

jurisdiction and non-criminal accountability mechanisms for improper and unlawful conduct of

private security personnel. In adapting to the changing security demands, public authorities

should ensure that PSC is continuously in conformity with national and international law.

26 These categories are contracting, territorial and home states; “contracting states” are states that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, including, as appropriate, where such a PMSC subcontracts with another PMSC, “territorial States” are States on whose territory PMSCs operate. “Home States” are States of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered or incorporated; if the State where the PMSC is incorporated is not the one where it has its principal place of management, then the State where the PMSC has its principal place of management is the “Home State”.


CONCLUSION

This paper contributes to debates on the intricacy of supplying traditionally state

monopolised services via the market through examining the privatisation of security and by

extension the configuration of the security landscape. Contemporary data indicates the growth in

PSCs in an environment of limited regulation created by growing public concern about security

fuelled by sensationalist securitisation and an increasing sense of personal responsibility for

individual protection through human security. This growth requires adequate regulation to ensure

the quality of services and the legitimacy of the industry. The security landscape consists of

collaborative governance arrangements wherein regulation involves training and recruitment

standards, determination of PSC services as well as legal jurisdiction and accountability.

As it relates to Trinidad and Tobago, policy consideration for this regulation can be

obtained by utilising the Montreux document. The security landscape should include

collaborative efforts embodied by Cell II (high input and medium output legitimacy) with the

state being required to lead the regulation impetus. Locally, threat creation though expansive

within the scope of human security can be exacerbated due to the lack of adequate challenges to

the mainstream top-down securitisation. Notably, though the functional sovereign dimension

supports defensive security services however the possibility exists of PSCs being offensively

deployed.

The privatisation of security is neither a new phenomenon nor area of research however its

salience remains. Security’s instrumental value makes it a pre-condition to any undertaking

towards development. The provision of security inevitably involves utilising force and hence the

authority of force must be monitored as well. Finally, this brief case study highlights three areas


for future research such as (1) examining characteristics of ‘security services’ that necessitates

collaboration, (2) possibility of an increase efficiency in public bureaucracies and (3) the

applicability of vulnerability as the starting point of Caribbean security discourse. Therefore, in

addressing the privatisation of traditionally state based services, focusing on the service itself

provides a more critical and applicable debate than merely applying macro liberalist thought.

Bibliography

Alkire, Sabina. 2003. A conceptual framework for human security. Centre for Research on

Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. University of Oxford.

Auger, Deborah A. 1999. “Privatisation, Contracting and the States: Lessons from State

Government Experience”. Public Productivity and Management Review 22(4): 435-454.

Avant, Deborah D. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. The

Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University Press.

Aydinli, Ersel,. and Rosenau, James N. 2005. Globalisation, Security and the Nation State:

Paradigms in Transitions. #90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207: State

University of New York Press.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 2005. “Security in the Age of Globalisation; Separating Appearance from

Reality”. In Globalisation, Security and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transitions

edited by Aydinli, Ersel,. and Rosenau, James N, 9-26. #90 State Street, Suite 700,

Albany, NY 12207: State University of New York Press.

Baker, Bruce. 2010. “Linking State and Non-State Security and Justice”. Development Policy

Review, 28(5): 597-616.

Balzacq, Thierry. 2011. Securitisation Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve.

Talyor and Francis.


Benson, Bruce L. 1998. “Crime Control through Private Enterprise”. The Independent Review,

2(3): 341-371.

Biais, Bruno., and Perotti, Enrico. 2002. “Machiavellian Privatisation”. The American Economic

Review, 92(1): 240-258.

Bigo, Didier and Tsoukala. 2008. “Understanding (In)Security”. In Terror, Insecurity and

Liberty: Illiberal practices of a liberal regime after 9/11 by Bigo, Didier., and Tsoukala,

Anastassia, 1-10. 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016. Routledge Publishers

Limited

Bigo, Didier., and Tsoukala, Anastassia. 2008. Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal practices

of a liberal regime after 9/11. 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016. Routledge

Publishers Limited

Blechman, Barry B. 1998. “International Peace in the Twenty-first Century”. In Statecraft and

Security: The Cold War and Beyond by Booth, Ken (ed), 289-307. The Edinburgh

Building: Cambridge University Press.

Booth, Ken. 1998. Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond. The Edinburgh Building:

Cambridge University Press.

Booth, Ken. 2005. “Two Terrors, One Problem.” ”. In Globalisation, Security and the Nation

State: Paradigms in Transitions edited by Aydinli, Ersel,. and Rosenau, James N, 27-48.

#90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207: State University of New York Press.

Booth, Ken. 2005b. Critical Security Studies and World Politics. 1800 30th Street, Boulder,

Colorado 80301. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Booth, Ken. 2007. Theory of World Security. The Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University

Press.


Branovic, Zeljko. 2011. “The Privatisation of Security in Failing States- A Quantitative

Assessment”. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, no.24.

Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene. 2009. The Evolution of International Security Studies. The

Edinburgh Building Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry. 1983. Peoples, States and Fear. #16 Ship Street, Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf

Books Limited.

Buzan, Barry., and Waever, Ole. 2003. Regions and Powers: The structure of International

Security. The Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University Press.

Cockayne., James. 2009. Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry. #777

United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017: International Peace Institute.

Daase, Christopher. 2010. “National, Societal and Human Security: On the Transformation of

Political Language”. Historical Social Research 35(4): 22-37.

Diprose, Rachael. 2007. “Physical Safety and Security: A Proposal for Internationally

Comparable Indicators of Violence”. Oxford Development Studies, 35(4): 431-458.

Edwards, Alice., and Ferstman, Carla. 2009. “Humanising non-citizens: the convergence of

human rights and human security”. In Human Security and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy

and International Affairs by Edwards, Alice and Ferstman, Carla, 3-46. The Edinburgh

Building: Cambridge University Press

Edwards, Alice., and Ferstman, Carla. 2009. Human Security and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy and

International Affairs. The Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University Press.

Fawcett, Paul., and Daugbjerg, Carsten. 2012. “Explaining Governance Outcomes:

Epistemology, Network Governance and Policy Network”. Political Studies Review

10(2): 195-207.


Feigenbaum, Harvey B., and Henig, Jeffrey R. 1994. “The Political Underpinnings of

Privatisation: A Typology”. World Politics, 46: 185-208.

Giddens, Anthony. 1998. “Affluence, Poverty and the idea of the Post-Scarcity Society”. In

Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond by Booth, Ken (ed), 308-322. The

Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University Press.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. 1995. “Caribbean Security: Retrospect and Prospect”. Latin America

Research Review, 30(2):3-32

Griffith, Ivelaw L. 1996. “Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st Century”. McNair Papers

54:1-74.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. 2004. “Understanding Caribbean Security: Back to basics and building

blocks”. Social and Economic Studies 53(1): 1-33.

Griffith, Ivelaw L. 2004b.Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change,

Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.

Gumedze, Sabelo. 2008. “Regulating the Private Security Sector in South Africa”. Social Justice

34(3-4): 195-207.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2011. “Securitisation as a Causal Mechanism”. Security Dialogue 42(4-5):

329-341.

Hill, Sheridon. 2010. Regulations of Private Security Companies Regional Perspective.

Organisation of American States. www.oas.org

Human Security Report Project. 2010. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Cause of Peace

and the Shrinking Cost of War. Simon Fraiser University: Oxford University Press.


Instituto De Altos Estudios De La Defensa Nacional. 1998. “New Issues on the Regional

SecurityAgenda For the Caribbean Basin”. In From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-

Cold War Caribbean Security Environment, Albany: State University of New York Press

Krahman, Elke. 2003. “The Privatisation of Security Governance: Developments, Problems,

Solutions”. Lehrstuhl Internationale Politik, Universitat zu Koln.

Krahman, Elke. 2009. “Private Security Companies and the State Monopoly on Violence: A

Case of Norm Change?” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Krause, Keith., and Williams, Michael C. 1996. “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:

Politics and Methods”. Mershon International Studies Review 40(2): 229-254.

Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank. 2007. Crime, Violence and

Development: Trends, Cost and Policy Options in the Caribbean. World Bank

Publications.

Linklater, Andrew. 2005. “Political Community and Human Security”. In Critical Security

Studies and World Politics edited by Ken Booth, 113-127. 1800 30th Street, Boulder,


Mandel, Robert. 2001. “The Privatisation of Security”. Armed Forces and Society, 28(1):129-

151.

McGhee, Derek. 2010. Security, Citizenship, and Human Rights: Share Values in Uncertain

Times. 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmilian.

McSweeney, Bill. 1996. “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”. Review of

International Studies 22(1): 81-93.

McSweeney, Bill. 2004. Security, Identity and Interest: A Sociology of International Relations.

The Edinburgh Building: Cambridge University Press.


Michaels, Jon D. 2010. “Privatisation’s Pretensions”. The University of Chicago Law Review

77(2): 717-780.

Otto, Argueta. 2010. “Private Security in Guatemala: The Pathway to its Proliferation.” GIGA

Research Unit: Institute of Latin American Studies 144: 5-35.

Paris, Roland. 2001. “Human Security: New Paradigm or Hot Air?” International Politics, 26(2):

87-102.

Peoples, Columba., and Vaughan-Williams., Nick. 2010. Critical Security Studies: An

Introduction. #2 Park Square, Milton Park: Routeledge Publishers.

Percy, Sarah. 2006. “An Overview of the Industry and the Need for Regulation”. Adelphi Series

46(384): 11-24.

Pettman, Jan Jindy. 2005. “Questions of Identity: Australia and Asia”. In Critical Security

Studies and World Politics edited by Ken Booth, 159-177. 1800 30th Street, Boulder,


Pram Gad, Ulrik., and Petersen, Karen Lund. 2011. “Concepts of politics in securitisation

studies”. Security Dialogue 42(4-5): 315-328.

Prenzler, Tim., Earle, Karen., and Sarre, Rick. 2009. “Private Security Issues in Australia: trends

and key perspectives”. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No.374: 1-7.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1941. State of the Union Address “Four Freedoms”. Congressional

Record 87.

Rothschild, Emma. 1995. “What is Security?” Daedalus 124(3): 53-98.

Sappington, David E.M., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1987. “Privatisation, Information and

Incentives”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6(4): 567-582.


Singer, Peter Warren. 2001. “The Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military

Industry and its Ramification for International Security”. International Security 26(3):

186-220.

Smith, Steve. 2005. “The Contested Concept of Security”. In Critical Security Studies and World

Politics edited by Ken Booth, 27-62. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301. Lynne

Rienner Publishers Inc.

Starr, Paul. 1988."The Meaning of Privatisation". Yale Law and Policy Review 6: 6-41

Starr, Paul. 2007. Freedom’s Power: The History and Promise of Liberalism. 387 Park Avenue

South, New York, NY 10016-8810. Basic Books.

Strizel, Holger., and Schmittchen, Dirk. “Securitisation, Culture and Power: Rogue States in US

and German Discourse”. In Securitisation Theory: how security problems emerge and

dissolve. Talyor and Francis.

Suhrke, Astri. 1999. “Human Security and the Interest of States”. Security Dialogue, 30 (3): 265-

276.

Sundberg, Ralph. 2009. Revisiting One-sided Violence - A Global and Regional Analysis.

UCPD Paper No.3, Uppsala Conflict Data Program. University of the Uppsala.

Tavits, Margit. 2007. “Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption”. American Journal of Political

Science, 51(1):218-229.

Thomas, Caroline. 2001. “Global Governance, Development and Human Security: Exploring the

links”. Third World Quarterly 22(2): 159-175.

Thompson, Janice E. 1994. Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns. #41 William Street Princeton:

Princeton University Press.


Thumala, Angelica,. Goold, Benjamin, and Loader, Ian. 2011. A Tainted Trade? Moral

ambivalence and legitimation work in the private security industry. The British Journal of

Sociology 62(2): 283-303.

Tolkki, Helena., Haveri, Arto., Airaksinen, Jenni., and Valkonen, Emilia. 2011. “Governance in

Regional Development- Between Regulation and Self-regulation. Public Organization

Review 11: 313-333.

Townsend, Dorn. 2009. No Other Life: Gangs, Guns and Governance in Trinidad and Tobago.

Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; #47

Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland.

Turbiville, Graham Hall Jr. 2006. “Outlaw Private Security Companies: Criminal and Terrorist

Agendas Undermine Private Security Alternative”. Global Crime 7(3-4): 561-582.

Ullman, Richard H. 1983. “Redefining Security”. International Security, 8(1): 129-153.

Ungar, Mark. 2008. “The Privatisation of Citizenry Security in Latin America: From Elite

Guards to Neighborhood Vigilantes”. Social Justice 34(3-4): 20-37.

United Nations. 1994. “New Dimensions on Human Security”. United Nations Development

Report: 23-46.

United Nations. 2004. A more secure world: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level

Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

van Brabant, Koenraad. 2002. “Humanitarian action and Private Security Companies”.

Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 20:24-26.

van Creveld, Martin. 2006. “The Fate of the State Revisited”. Global Crime, 7(3-4): 329-350.


Vascianne, Stephen. “Security, Terrorism and International Law: A Skeptical Comment.” In

Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror by Griffith, Ivelaw L., 52-71. Kingston: Ian

Randle Publishers.

Verasammy, Gail D. 2009. “Toward a Reconceptualization of Caribbean Basin Security”. In-

Spire Journal of Law, Politics and Societies 4(1): 61- 82.

Waever, Ole. 1995. “Securitisation and Desecuritisation”. In On Security by Lipschutz, Ronny

(ed): 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waever, Ole. 2011. “Politics, Security, Theory”. Security Dialogue 42(4-5): 465-480.

Walker, R.B.J. 1997. “Subject of Security”. In Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases

edited by Williams, Michael C., and Keith, Krause, 61-81. #1 Gunpowder Square,

London EC4A 3DE: UCL Press Limited.

Williams, Michael C., and Keith, Krause. 1997. “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of

Critical Security Studies.” In Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases edited by

Williams, Michael C., and Keith, Krause, 33-59. #1 Gunpowder Square, London EC4A

3DE: UCL Press Limited.

Williams, Michael C., and Keith, Krause. 1997. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases.

#1 Gunpowder Square, London EC4A 3DE: UCL Press Limited.

Williams, Paul D. 2008. “Security Studies: An Introduction”. In Security Studies: An

Introduction by Williams, Paul D, 1-12. 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

Routledge Publishers Limited

Williams, Paul D. 2008. Security Studies: An Introduction. 270 Madison Avenue, New York,

NY 10016. Routledge Publishers Limited


Williamson, Oliver E. 1999. “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economic

Perspective”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisations, 15(1): 306-342.

Wolfers, Arnold. 1952. “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”. Political Science

Quarterly, IIXVII (4): 481-502.

Wyn Jones, Richard. 1999. Strategy, Security and Critical Theory. 1800 30th Street, Boulder,

Colorado 80301.Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Zwierlein, Cornel. and Graf, Rudiger. 2010. “The Production of Human Security in Pre-modern

and Contemporary History”. Historical Social Research, 35(4): 7-21.


Appendix 1

Discrete Multidimensional Security Framework


Appendix 2Semi-Structured Interview Schedules

1. On a scale of 1-5, what is your likelihood of being a victim of crime against your property?

2. On a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the degree to which property crime is a problem?

3. If you were a victim, what do you believe is the likelihood of the incident being dealt with in a satisfactory manner by public authorities?

4. Do you think that private security companies can provide superior protection against property crime? Please explain why?

5. On a scale of 1-5, what is your likelihood of being a victim of violent crimes? 6. On a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the degree to which violent crimes against

persons is a problem?7. If you were a victim, what do you believe is the likelihood of the incident being dealt

with in a satisfactory manner by public authorities?8. Do you think that private security companies can provide superior protection against

violent crimes against?9. In your opinion, what would you consider to the country’s most important problem?10. Thinking of all the threats that you might face in your life, which three are the most

concern to you now?11. If you had to choose between top-down or bottom-up, how would you describe the

nation’s method of developing threats?12. Do you think that there is credible challenge to government’s or media’s portrayal of

issues of national security?13. Do you think that the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago are law abiding and conscious of

their obligations and duties?14. How safe do you feel against criminal in your own house?15. In the next twelve months, what is the likelihood that you will become a victim of

violence?16. Do you think that there are governmental avenues for redress and satisfaction when it

comes to your safety?17. Do you support citizens being able to purchase security services from businesses?18. How much confidence do you have in public authorities?19. Do you think that private security companies are a necessity in Trinidad and Tobago?20. Would you support completely shifting security services to be provided by companies?21. Given the large number of PSCs in Trinidad and Tobago, what do you think is the role

of government in such an environment?22. What are three features of regulation that you believe the local private security industry

needs at this point?23. How do you think the role of other actors in the security landscape is affected by the

increase in PSCs?


Appendix 3


Appendix 4

tTurning to the Market for Human Security: Impact of Privatisation on Security

Turning to the Market for Human Security [Completed]

Documents

Transcript of Turning to the Market for Human Security [Completed]