Turkish Minority in Germany

The Turkish Minority in Germany:

The Relationship between Politics and Education in the Integration of Parallel Communities

Christine Difato

1

The Turkish Minority in Germany: The Relationship

between Politics and Education in the Integration of Parallel Communities

by Christine Difato

After World War II, the German education system was reconstructed in a climate of extreme

uncertainty. Nonetheless, Länder ministries cooperated in order to build a structure that would

serve the needs of a new set of political and economic challenges. With the cooperation of

Länder representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK), the three-tiered structure of

education was instituted in a more cohesive manner across the Western regions than ever before

(Führ 1997, 11).1 The Basic Law guarantees the cultural sovereignty of the regions, thus granting

regional control of education policies (Grundgesetz 29(1)). While regional leaders saw the

benefits of cooperation, the structures and decisions surrounding education, particularly in terms

of language, remain deeply informed by the political complexion of the region.

In the three-tiered system, pupils are designated to one of three tracks after four years of

primary education, based on their scholastic achievement to that point.2 The three tracks include

Hauptschule (leading to a general certificate), Realschule (leading to an intermediate

qualification), and Gymnasium or ‘grammar school’ (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 108). The

Hauptschule provides general, non-academic education, normally up to the minimum school

leaving age. The Realschule programme usually lasts a total of ten years, leading to jobs in

middle management, engineering, or administration (Baumert and Kohler 1984, 367). Lasting

twelve or thirteen years, Gymnasium is the highest qualification. It prepares students for

academic or professional opportunities such as attending university or medical school. While the

Gymnasium level has expanded to include growing numbers of German students, minorities

appear to remain continuously underrepresented in higher levels of education (Heckmann 2006,

12-13).

Drawing on the experiences of regions with a fairly consistent political leaning, this paper

will trace the relationship between the German education structures and the dominant

conservative and liberal opposition parties, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)

and Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), and how these policies informed the

1 The education structures that were implemented in the German Democratic Republic differ significantly from those in the Federal Republic of Germany before 1990. Since emigration from Turkey was generally to western regions, this paper focuses on the dominant trends in those regions, and ‘Germany’ refers to the western regions before 1990 and including the East after that point. 2 While children in most Länder have four years of primary education, a few regions, including Berlin, designate six years before dividing.



Christine Difato

2

relationship with the Turkish community.3 While the CDU and SPD took opposing stances

regarding the three-tiered structures, recent years have demonstrated a convergence of policies

in language instruction.

Education and the Guest-Workers

In 1961, a bilateral recruitment agreement was signed between Germany and Turkey,

initiating the first wave of Turkish guest-workers to fill labor shortages in factories and foundries in

the Federal Republic of Germany (White 1997, 754; Coleman 2002, 47). Like France and the

Netherlands, Germany’s migration policy was driven by the need for extra labor with

considerations of legal status and integration taking second position (Huysmans 2000, 753-754).

The young men who came in the first waves of the guest-worker programme were soon joined by

wives and children through family reunification allowances. Several decades later, Turkish-

Germans make up the largest ethnic minority in the country, about 2.5-2.6 million people (‘Islam

and Identity in Europe’ 2007). Yet, throughout this era, Germany maintained the self-conception

as ‘not a country of immigration’, a maxim in public policy that reacted to the presence of over

four million foreign workers (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 63-64; Geddes 2003, 79; Joppke 1999,

63).

In the three-tiered system, children of immigrants experienced a distinct disadvantage.

Their performance suffered because of inadequate language skills and insufficient support. In

addition, Turkish youth, in particular, had to cope with low expectations within the schools and

administration (Bommes 2000, 108). Compared with ethnically German migrants, Turkish youth

were expected to have social problems in addition to inhibited abilities to assimilate.

As far back as the 1960s, SPD party leaders began to argue against the selective school

system. They stated that it reinforced generational cycles of deprived children, cutting them off

from higher education (Führ 1997, 128-129). However, in typically conservative regions such as

Baden-Württemberg or Bavaria, leadership pushed to maintain the separation of these tracks,

pointing to the fact that the three tracks should be able to adapt to changing times.

Nonetheless, the SPD and the Education and Science trade union helped to initiate

various forms of comprehensive schools or Gesamtschulen in Hesse, Berlin, Bremen, and

Hamburg (Führ 1997, 128-129). These schools offered more flexibility between subject levels.

Some subjects such as social studies or religion were taught in a general class with only slight

differentiations among students for ‘different needs’, while other subjects, including mathematics

or English, remained differentiated by level (Führ 1997, 125).

3 For the sake of clarity, only the CDU party is mentioned as the conservative component in German politics; however, the reader should note that in Bavaria, the CDU counterpart is referred to as CSU or ‘Christlich-Soziale Union‘.



Christine Difato

3

Länder with conservative governments continued to argue against the Gesamtschule

even after various pilot projects had been positively evaluated. The value of the comprehensive

school for migrant youth was demonstrated in a study by Diefenbach (2005), which showed that

between 1990 and 2000, more migrant students completed Realschule and Gymnasium

certificates in the comprehensive school setting than in separated schools (cited in Heckmann

2008, 25).

The three-tiered structures supported the differentiated levels of society, putting minority

children at a distinct disadvantage next to their German peers. This deficit was revealed in the

Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) of 2003. The gap in performance between

native German pupils and pupils of a minority background was greater in Germany than most

other countries with Turkish having the lowest in comparison to their German peers (Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2006). Furthermore, the increasing

prevalence of the Gymnasium qualification lessens the value of the lower qualifications. While the

education structures were not established to cope with the challenges of large numbers of

minority youth, the continued lack of accommodation seems to be a reflection of the country’s

self-conception as ‘not a country of immigration’, accentuated in conservative Länder even more

than their SPD-led counterparts.

Language and Minority Youth

Compounding the challenges of the three-tiered system, mother-tongue instruction

served to maintain the boundaries between minority youth and their German peers. The CDU and

SPD had different justifications, but when translated into practice, language education only

maintained and perpetuated ethno-linguistic boundaries.

In the beginning of the guest-worker phase, the emphasis of language instruction was on

return migration. Given the implied temporary condition of the guest-workers’ stay, German

language acquisition did not seem urgent (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 34). Most measures

that were taken emphasized preparation of pupils to return to their home country after the work

period of their parents ended (Faas 2007, 46; Faas 2008, 110).

In 1976, the KMK issued a recommendation called the ‘Instruction of children of foreign

workers’, which was intended ‘to enable foreign students to learn the German language, acquire

German school-leaving certificates, and preserve and increase knowledge of their native

language’ (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 113). However, because of the ambiguous terms of

the recommendation, it was implemented inconsistently across the regions. Rohr-Sendlmeier

(1986) identified three tendencies of implementation in the regions (cited in Behrens, Tost, and

Jager 2002, 112-113). The first way emphasized the need to incorporate foreign youth into the

German school system by educating them alongside their German peers, only using German.



Christine Difato

4

The second way tended to support the goal of reintegration into their home culture, arranging

classes in their mother tongue, separate from their German peers. The third way put migrant

youth into classes with their German peers in addition to special classes in their mother tongue, a

dual strategy.

CDU/CSU-led states favored the separation of classes by nationality, preferring the

second option. Bavaria, for example, maintained segregated and homeland-oriented immigrant

minority language instruction for the longest period (Brubaker 2001, 537). In practice, mother-

tongue instruction meant that pupils were separated into classes by nationality and taught by a

teacher from their home country. After several years, German was introduced as a second

language with the goal of bilingualism, but in reality, the strategy was unsuccessful and supported

ethnic and social segregation above integration (Heckmann 2006, 12-13).

In the 1980s and 1990s, native language instruction with the objective of return migration

ceased for the most part and was exchanged in favor of a multiculturalist approach (Baubock

2002, 181). In the SPD-favored multiculturalist frame of reference, foreign youth had the right to

learn their mother tongue as it was part of their cultural identity. At the federal level, it was

believed that mother-tongue instruction was fundamental to pupils’ awareness of their cultural

identity, even while language instruction in German may be crucial to their socio-economic

success (Behrens, Tost, and Jager 2002, 115). Even though the logic of multiculturalism differed

from the conservative emphasis on preparation for return migration, the result was the same. In

essence, the multiculturalist policies in language instruction simply served to maintain the

distance and linguistic boundaries between the German and Turkish communities that were laid

in the national self-conception as ‘not a country of immigration’. Germany appears to have

perpetuated an ethnoculturally defined identity according to community of descent (Brubaker

1992, 14).

In the context of increasing concerns regarding the development of parallel communities

and national security, however, language competency and ethno-linguistic boundaries have risen

to the fore of integration discussions (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 20). A ‘parallel society’ is a

‘politically framed term’ that ‘suggests’ that immigrant community’s ‘actively and deliberately

segregate’, not using state programs to help them acquire basic language or vocational skills,

leading to high rates of unemployment (Cyrus 2005, 16). In a rush to confront fears of terrorism

from within its borders, Germany kept pace with its multiculturalist policy-affirming neighbors like

Sweden and the Netherlands by identifying language and expanding opportunities for

naturalization to close the socio-economic gap between its minority and native community

(Joppke and Morawska 2003, 2; Geddes 2003, 4). The first integration summit was held in July

2006 under the Grand Coalition. The main focus of this summit was to discuss educational

opportunities for minorities as well as German language-learning programs (Faas 2008, 108). In



Christine Difato

5

the National Integration Plan, extra funding was designated for schools with high minority

population in order to employ more teaching staff and social workers (Heckmann 2008, 42).

Yet, it was not long before language requirements were tied to residency. Germany

offered a quicker track to an unlimited residence or work permit to those who passed a German

language test or added delays to family reunification to those who did not learn German (Geddes

2003, 89). On the one hand, this logic is reasonable as language seems to limit interaction and

participation in civil society; however, many are wary of such strategies. Some see it as a reaction

to the loosening citizenship regulations and further evidence of the shift away from

multiculturalism (Kostakopoulou 2008). For example, when the citizenship law of 1999 lowered

the residency requirement from fifteen to eight years, it was accompanied by a tightening

language requirement, and in some states like Bavaria, it became extremely difficult to pass the

language tests (Joppke and Morawska 2003, 19). The responses to the CDU’s wish to include

German as the national language in the constitution demonstrate the tension between the notion

that language will encourage integration but also might serve only to protect ethnolinguistic

components of the national identity.

Conclusion

The challenges of minority integration throughout Western Europe highlight the tensions

within national identities. For Germany, a nation founded on a community of descent with strong

ethnolinguistic ties, the influx of guest-workers at a time when the German nation itself was

divided, deeply influenced the political self-conception as ‘not a country of immigration’. This

rhetoric was translated into support for the three-tiered education system, especially by CDU

policy-makers. In terms of language education, however, there appears to be a convergence

between the goals of return migration and multiculturalist policies when translated into practice,

effectively maintaining ethno-linguistic boundaries. Though stemming from different justifications,

this convergence persisted even as the language of minority accommodation shifted from

multiculturalism to incorporation. This parallel demonstrates the need to explore the way that the

presence of a large minority community challenges core components of German national identity

in addition to reinforcing the value of examining the implementation, interpretation, and translation

from policy to practice.



Christine Difato

6

List of References

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz), 1949-1993. trans.

Inter Nationes, http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm.

Baubock, Rainer. 2002. Cultural Minority Rights in Public Education: Religious and

Language Instruction for Immigrant Communities in Western Europe. In West European

Immigration and Immigrant Policy in the New Century: A Continuing Quandary for States

and Societies, ed. Anthony Messina, 161-189. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press/Praeger

Publishers .

Baumert, Jurgen, and Helmut Kohler. 1984. Trends and Perspectives of Secondary

Education in West Berlin. European Journal of Education 19, 4: 365-384.

Behrens, Ulrike, Sabine Tost, and Reinhold Jager S. 2002. German Policy on

Foreigners and the Education of Immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany. In

Education and Immigration: Settlement Policies and Current Challenges, ed. Pirkko

Pitka ̈nen, Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, and Gajendra K. Verma, 96-123. London:

Routledge.

Bommes, Michael. 2000, National Welfare State, Biography and Migration: Labour

Migrants, Ethnic Germans and the Re-ascription of Welfare State Membership. In

Immigration and Welfare: Challenging the Borders of the Welfare State, ed. Michael

Bommes and Andrew Geddes, 90-108. London: Routledge.

Boukhars, Anouar. 2007. The Threat of Islamist Terrorism to Germany. Jamestown

Foundation 5, 7, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373324.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, Mass.

London : Harvard University Press.

Brubaker, Rogers. 2001. The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on

Immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. Ethnic and

Racial Studies 24, no. 4, 531-548.



Christine Difato

7

Coleman, David. 2002. Mass Migration to Europe: Demographic Salvation, Essential

Labor or Unwanted Foreigners? In West European Immigration and Immigrant Policy in

the New Century: A Continuing Quandary for States and Societies, ed. Anthony Messina,

47-75. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press/Praeger Publishers .

Cyrus, Norbert. 2005. Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany. Country

Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, http://www.uni-

oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/Germany.pdf.

Entzinger , Han and Renske Biezeveld. 2003. Benchmarking in Immigrant

Integration. European Commission Report,

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/doc/study_indicators_integration.pdf.

Faas, Daniel. 2007. The Europeanisation of German Ethnic Identities: the Case of

German and Turkish Students in Two Stuttgart Secondary Schools. International Studies

in Sociology of Education 17, 1: 45-62.

Faas, Daniel. 2008. From Foreigner Pedagogy to Intercultural Education: An

Analysis of the German Responses to Diversity and Its Impact on Schools and Students.

European Educational Research Journal 7, 1: 108-123.

Fredriksson, Ulf. 2003. Changes of Education Policies within the European Union in

the Light of Globalisation. European Educational Research Journal 2, 4: 521-546.

Führ, Christoph. 1997. The German Education System since 1945. Outlines and

Problems. Bonn: Inter Nationes.

Geddes, Andrew. 2003. The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe.

London: SAGE.

Heckmann, Friedrich. 2006. Education for Integration: An Overview on Structures,

Measures and Programmes. In Immigrant Integration and Education: The Role of State

and Civil Society in Germany and the U.S., ed. Friedrich Heckmann and Richard Wolf, 9-

16. Bamberg: Europäisches Forum Für Migrationsstudien (EFMS).



Christine Difato

8

Heckmann, Friedrich. 2008. Education and Migration Strategies for Integrating

Migrant Children in European Schools and Societies: A Synthesis of Research Findings

for Policy-Makers. NESSE network of experts,

http://www.nesse.fr/nesse/nesse_top/activites/education-and-migration.

Huysmans, Jeff. 2000. The European Union and the Securitization of Migration.

Journal of Common Market Studies 38, 5: 751-777.

Islam and Identity in Germany. 2007. Europe Report 181.

Joppke, Christian. 1999. Immigration and the Nation-state : the United States,

Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joppke, Christian and Ewa Morawska. 2003. Integrating Immigrants in Liberal

Nation-States: Policies and Practices. in Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants

in Liberal Nation-states, ed. Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska, 1-36. Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Kostakopoulou, Theodora. 2008. Matters of Control: Integration Tests and

Naturalisation Reform in Western Europe. Paper presented at Centre of International

Studies, University of Cambridge, 9 May, in Cambridge, England.

Mueller, Claus. 2006. Integrating Turkish Communities: a German Dilemma.

Population Research and Policy Review 25, 5-6: 419-441,

http://www.springerlink.com/content/0842318k42m7234v/fulltext.html.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2006. Where

Immigrant Students Succeed: A Comparative Review of Performance and Engagement

in PISA 2003. Pans: OECD.

White, Jenny B. 1997. Turks in the New Germany. American Anthropologist New

Series 99, 4: 754-769.

Turkish Minority in Germany

Documents

Transcript of Turkish Minority in Germany