TSDC – Topicality File

Conditional – Neg

1nc – QPQ

Interp – Engagement must be conditionalResnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 559-560, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence , culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains . Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality . 27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime ; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

Violation – the aff is appeasement – it doesn’t establish long-term contacts w/ the target state Resnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 561-562, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENT In contrast to many prevailing conceptions of engagement, the one proposed in this essay allows a substantive distinction to be drawn between engagement and appeasement . The standard definition of appeasement --which derives from the language of

classical European diplomacy, namely "a policy of attempting to reduce tension between two states by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between them"(n29)--is venerable but nevertheless inadequate.(n30) It does not provide much guidance to the contemporary policymaker or policy analyst, because it conceives of a foreign policy approach in terms of the ends sought while never making clear the precise means involved. The principal causes of conflict between two states can be removed in a number of ways .(n31) A more refined definition of appeasement that not only remains loyal to the traditional connotations but also establishes a firm

conceptual distinction from engagement might be: the attempt to influence

the political behavior of a target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to that state. Indeed, the two best-known cases of appeasement, Great Britain's appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, reveals that much of this appeasement adopted precisely these guises. The key elements of the British appeasement of the US-acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine-permission for the US to build and fortify a Central American canal, and acquiescence to American claims on the border between Alaska and the Yukon--consisted of explicit acknowledgement of American territorial authority.(n32) Meanwhile, the appeasement of the Third Reich by Great Britain was characterized by acquiescence to: Germany's military reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936); annexation of Austria (1938); acquisition of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia as decided at the Munich Conference; and absorption of the remainder of Czechoslovakia (1939).(n33) A more contemporary example of appeasement is the land for peace exchange that represents the centerpiece of the on-again off-again diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian

Authority. Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34)

Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

Vote neg: a) Limits – allowing affs that don’t directly change the

target state explodes aff ground – that means that any unilateral policy the aff can think of would be topical under their ineterp

b) Precision – vague and broad not only making it impossible to be negative because we have to prep for affs that are both conditional and unconditional but it also hijacks education since we don’t have a concise interpretation of what engagement means in the context to US policy

Default to competing interpretations – it’s the most objective and checks judge intervention

Extra Engagement Interps Engagement requires positive incentivesHaass & O’Sullivan, 2k (Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview) CG; AD: 5/29The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives . Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

-Economic Engagement Specific “Engagement” requires active fostering of economic relations using positive sanctions --- passive ceding on an issue is “appeasement”, which is distinct Edelstein, ‘2 (David M. Edelstein, Assistant Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and The Rise of Great Powers”, 12(1), Autumn, p. 5) CG; AD: 6/1This article seeks to explain how beliefs about others’ intentions affects the strategic choices of states. In general, governments pursue predominately co-operative or competitive strategies toward each other. Cooperative strategies range from passive strategies such as simply abstaining from balancing to strategies that actively foster the growth of another state through economic or security relations. Among cooperative strategies are policies labeled as “engagement” or “appeasement.” Engagement is often defined as a strategy of using positive sanctions in the hopes of achieving peaceful relations or other objectives, while appeasement is a strategy of ceding demands to another state in order to placate and pacify it .11 Competitive strategies, on

the other hand, include internal and external balancing, efforts to forestall another state’s growth, or, at an extreme, initiating war.

Even if “engagement” doesn’t require contact, “economic engagement” does --- independent violationKahler, ‘4 (Miles Kahler, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan”, November, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc) CG; AD: 6/1Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the i nternational r elations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

-Diplomatic Engagement interpsDiplomatic engagement requires mutual concessionsTakeyh, ‘9 (Ray is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement”, http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362) CG; AD: 5/30It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace. Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation. Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling a durable international coalition to isolate and pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic indifference. The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a dramatic twist of events, the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of low-enriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

Interp – Policy Changes Affs must be tied to policy changes, must reward behavioral change and must be long-term, the aff is appeasement Litwak, ‘7 (Robert S. Litwak, Director of the Division of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council staff, 2007 (“Strategies for a Change of Regime — or for Change within a Regime?,” Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11, Published by JHU Press, ISBN 0801886422, p. 117) CG; AD: 6/22Conditional EngagementThe conditional engagement strategy is conducted on the government-to- government level and requires reciprocity by the target state on essentially a contractual basis. It is typically focused on a discrete issue but can be broadened to encompass a range of issues in a "grand bargain" (as some have proposed in the case of Iran). "Conditional reciprocity" is a form of conditional engagement, elucidated by George, in which meaningful changes in behavior by the target state would be explicitly linked to each concession or benefit bestowed by the United States.45 The engagement of an adversary under conditional reciprocity has three key features , which clearly distinguish this strategy from appeasement . First, the inducement must be tied to specific policy changes in the target state's behavior, not general expectations of improved behavior. Second, the reward should come only after the specific change in behavior. If the reward is provided in advance of behavior modification or is not linked to a specific behavioral change, it may be legitimately criticized as a bribe . And, third, such an approach depends on mutual adherence to the specific conditional reciprocal steps in the sequence. If the target state does not fulfill its obligations, the process can be halted and the benefit withdrawn .46

Extra Violation Ev“Engagement” is distinct from “appeasement” — it’s long-term, not a one-time policy change. Rock, 2k (Stephen R. Rock is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Vassar College, 2000 (“The Study of Appeasement,” Appeasement in International Politics, Published by the University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 0813132282, p. 22-23) CG; AD: 5/31Engagement, as typically conceived, is not a global national security strategy, but an approach to dealing with a specific state (or states) exhibiting hostile or otherwise undesirable behavior. In this more common sense of the term, "engagement" is often contrasted with "containment." Rather than confronting one's opponent through economic sanctions or even military threats, engagement involves establishing or enhancing contacts, communication, and exchanges, especially in the commercial realm.78 This notion of engagement is articulated in those portions of A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in which the document discusses China and certain other countries, and is the basis of America's current China policy. In fact, however, it predates the Clinton presidency. U.S. administrations from Nixon to Reagan pursued engagement with respect to South Africa and the practice of apartheid. The Bush administration did so in its approach to China before and after the shooting of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tienanmen Square.79Various types of engagement—comprehensive, constructive, conditional, coercive—have been employed or advocated, but they share the same basic objectives : (1) to integrate the adversary into the international system, with its institutions, legal rules, and norms; (2) to maintain open channels for cooperation in areas of mutual interest; and (3) to gain leverage in order to influence the adversary's domestic and/or international behavior.80 Often, as with China, for example, the hope is that engagement will lead to liberalization of the target state's economy and, in turn, to liberalization and democratization of its political system.Critics of engagement—and there are many—consider it "a modern form of appeasement."81 Their insinuation that engagement is therefore doomed to fail can be disputed, but as a matter of definition they have a point. Appeasement and engagement share a number of attributes. Both are nonconfrontational approaches to dealing with an adversary. Each hopes eventually to produce a relaxation of tensions with the opponent and some modification of its internal and/or external behavior. Each relies, in part, on the offering of inducements. Each sees some role for socialization or learning on the part of the adversary as well as the potential value of reassurance.Appeasement and engagement are not identical . Appeasement can be a strategy with short-run aims, while engagement almost necessarily implies a lengthy process and a distant time horizon . More importantly, [end page 22]

engagement is a broader , more wide-ranging approach to dealing with an opponent. It places greater emphasis on cooperation on matters of mutual interest, enmeshing the adversary in a web of commercial connections, rules, and institutions, on the development of increased leverage, and on shaping the long-term evolution of the adversary's economic and/or political system. Appeasement tends to be somewhat narrower in scope , relying

more heavily on inducements to remove the causes of conflict and reduce tensions.

Limits GoodBlurring the distinction between engagement and appeasement wrecks limits and precision — vote negative. Resnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 561-562, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31ENGAGEMENT VS. ISOLATION, APPEASEMENT VS. CONTAINMENTThe proposed definition of engagement helps clarify the distinctions between alternative foreign policy approaches that rely on positive sanctions and also makes understandable distinctions among some frequently mentioned alternative approaches that rely on negative sanctions. In current discussions on US foreign policy toward rogue states, and especially on US foreign policy toward China, engagement and containment are paired as antipodal policies. In fact, one recent scholarly article addressing US-P.R.C. relations decries the fact that "the media and many pundits have constructed US choices as limited to 'engagement' and 'containment.'"(n35) However, in light of the distinction I posit between engagement and appeasement, one could more intuitively construe containment to be the opposite of appeasement rather than engagement. Containment has been traditionally construed as the attempt to prevent the geopolitical expansion of a target state.(n36) If appeasement constitutes the cession of territory and/or spheres of influence to a target state, containment might more appropriately be considered the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope and/or sphere of geopolitical influence. Thus, whereas a sender state can expand contacts across multiple issue areas with a target state while simultaneously deterring it from committing aggression and/or expanding its geopolitical influence by allying with its neighbors (engagement plus containment), it would be impossible for a sender state to cede territory and/or a sphere of influence to a target state while simultaneously preventing that same state from expanding its territory or sphere of geopolitical influence (appeasement plus containment).The opposite of a policy of engagement would be one in which a state comprehensively diminishes and withdraws contacts across multiple issue areas with another state. Although such a policy would be considered a negative sanction, it does not attempt to do so through direct geopolitical means, as does a containment policy. One could label such a policy as disengagement or isolation.(n37) Thus, whereas a state can yield another state territory or an enlarged sphere of influence while simultaneously abrogating contacts with that state (appeasement plus disengagement), it is impossible for a state to expand and diminish contacts with another state across multiple issue-areas (engagement plus disengagement).The distinctions drawn between engagement, appeasement, containment and isolation allow for a more focused and coherent discussion of some of the options available for dealing with rival states. For example, current US policy toward China can be depicted as engagement plus containment. Efforts in recent years to liberalize trade with China, integrate the P.R.C. into international institutions and regimes, facilitate numerous diplomatic visits and summit meetings, and conduct bilateral exchanges of senior military personnel and academics are representative of engagement. However, at the same time, the US has elected to contain rather than appease China by taking steps to prevent the P.R.C. from expanding its territory or sphere of influence in East Asia. Most important, the US has signaled that it would not stand aside if Beijing tries to absorb Taiwan by force. Toward this end, the US has continued to sell large quantities of arms to the Taiwanese government, and, in 1995 and 1996, it played high stakes gunboat diplomacy with China in the Taiwan Straits.(n38) In addition, the United States has retained its Cold War military alliances with both South Korea and Japan and has maintained a strong troop presence in both countries.(n39) The US has also expressed grave concern about "Chinese intrusions" into disputed island territories in the South China Sea.(n40) Taken together, these steps exemplify Columbia University Professor A. Doak Barnett's 1966 injunction to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that American policy toward China should constitute "containment but not isolation."(n41)CONCLUSIONIn matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking . Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They

also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research . Hence, if scholars and policymakers

fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy .

The refined definition I propose as a substitute for existing descriptions of engagement is different in two important ways: First, it clarifies the menu of choices available for policymakers by allowing engagement to be distinguished from related approaches such as appeasement, containment and isolation. Second, it lays the groundwork for systematic and objective research on historical cases of engagement in order to discern the conditions under which it can be used effectively. Such research will, in turn, help policymakers acquire the information necessary to better manage the rogue states of the 21st century.

-Diplomatic Engagement Limits Good Allowing the dialogue concept of diplomatic engagement makes the term all-inclusive, ending limitsHayden, ‘13 (Craig, Assistant Professor, International Communication Program, American University, ““Engagement” is More Convenient than Helpful: Dissecting a Public Diplomacy Term”, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/%E2%80%9Cengagement%E2%80%9D-more-convenient-helpful-dissecting-public-diplomacy-term) CG; AD: 6/1If “engagement” is something that unfolds over time, and involves a number of intervening moments that cumulate into something like influence – it doesn’t fit neatly into existing measurement models that test specific theories of persuasion, attitude change, or whatever the “user” wants out of engagement. But just because measurement is hard doesn’t mean we shouldn’t think clearly about how acts serve the strategic ends of public diplomacy. Wallin offers one route to evaluation – whether or not an act, an event, or the content of a message involved with a public diplomacy program was “engaging.” This is actually a testable proposition. For example, the Elaboration Likelihood Model offers a dual-process concept of persuasion, by examining “central” and “peripheral” routes to persuasion. The key term is “elaboration” or the “systemic thinking about” a topic or issue. How audiences to public diplomacy attend to a topic or key argument is something that can be measured. Yet understandably, public diplomacy policy-makers and practitioners are not often versed in theories of influence. I don’t think that’s a huge problem. What is a bigger problem is that the term “engagement” conceals two visions for influence that are somewhat conflated. Engagement apparently can mean both acts of persuasion and acts of relation-building. If policy-makers and critics are concerned about making sure public diplomacy is guided by strategic purpose – that it serves some policy-end in a way that makes it open to post hoc evaluation – then we need a firmer definition of engagement. Current ambiguity highlights a more pervasive tension in the strategic mandate for public diplomacy. Persuasion and relation-building are often at cross-purposes, yet there is a tacit understanding that the purpose of public diplomacy is ultimately to shape the attitudes, dispositions, and indeed behaviors of target publics. For a good survey of the arguments about persuasion and the broader family of influence concepts that operate within public diplomacy, see Ali Fisher’s "Looking for the Man in the Mirror" essay. Suffice to say, engagement as a public diplomacy term provides both an open-ended license for definition and a shifting warrant for making claims about influence. I think this tension is readily apparent in efforts to use social media for public diplomacy. Case in point – how does the use of Facebook or Twitter constitute engagement ? Does the larger base of people who “Like” an embassy page indicate a successful campaign of engagement? Or, does it reflect a productive use of advertising techniques to recruit “likes,” while not necessarily providing the implied more meaningful connections that social networks can sustain? When an ambassador uses Twitter, does this constitute a robust effort to sustain dialogue with publics, or, does it represent a kind of performance that humanizes the chief of mission? I’m not suggesting one is better than the other. What I am saying is that there a few clear parameters for what constitutes “engagement .” In my research on U.S. digital public diplomacy, I have heard a lot of critiques about what is being done from a practical standpoint, but not so much on the bigger question of “why.” What does this mean for practitioners? For starters, it makes it harder to design the kind of formative research needed to plan an effective public diplomacy program that takes into account both the contextual factors and the strategic needs that the program will serve. The conceptual ambiguity also makes it difficult to pin down how and when a program can be deemed effective in post hoc evaluation. While I readily acknowledge that measurement and evaluation imperatives can ultimately distort the practice of public diplomacy or even conceal the less democratic forms of communication involved in public diplomacy outreach, I think it’s also important to acknowledge that the ambiguity of a term like “engagement” makes it potentially about everything – all the touch-points, communications, and connections that are involved in public diplomacy. I don’t think this helps practitioners, policy-makers, or commentators. Instead, it perpetuates jargon, and elides more persistent questions about both the purpose and the operative theories that underscore efforts to reach foreign publics.

Precision Key*Defining “engagement” as any positive action ruins limits, precision, and topic educationResnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 561-562, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of

engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate , however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement . In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for

drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially

appeasement, isolation and containment.

In the contemporary lexicon of U nited S tates foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement .(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4)A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5)A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7)A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9)A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors : (1) treating engagement as a synonym for

appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.CONFLATING ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENTOne serious flaw in scholarly conceptualizations of engagement is the tendency to view engagement as simply a synonym for appeasement, a policy approach that has fallen into disrepute since the late 1930s. In their book, Force and Statecraft, Gordon Craig and Alexander George make the following case: "constructive engagement...is essentially a policy of appeasement, though the term itself cannot be used."(n11) Similarly, in a recently published article, Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth refer to engagement as "simply a new, 'more acceptable' term for an old policy that used to be called appeasement."(n12) Another scholar, Victor Cha, does try to differentiate appeasement from engagement, though he does so in a manner that nevertheless renders the two policies indistinguishable . Cha claims that

engagement occurs when "non-coercive and non-punitive" means are employed by a strong country toward a weak country, while appeasement is the use of the very same means by a weak country against a strong country.(n13) This suggests that only the strong can engage and only the weak can appease, though the actual means deployed are virtually identical in both cases.

Allowing all positive incentives is too broad --- it makes half of foreign policy topical and undermines nuanced analysis and policy comparisonResnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 561-562, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31DEFINING ENGAGEMENT TOO BROADLYA second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair

lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous . According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16)As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies .

Their interp is the broad version of engagement – Narrow engagement requires incentivesMartin, ‘11 (Curtis is an associate professor of Poli Sci at Merrimack College, “Gauging Engagement: Obama’s “Open Hand” to North Korea and Iran”, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/9/9/5/8/pages499587/p499587-1.php) CG; AD: 6/1There is no commonly agreed definition of “engagement”, and indeed the term is a source of considerable confusion as it has been applied to U.S. foreign policy. 6 For the sake of discussion, we will be considering engagement in two senses that are of special relevance to the Obama experience: what we will call “broad engagement” and “narrow engagement.” Broad engagement will refer to extensive and active involvement in the world--economically, diplomatically and militarily-- the kind of engagement the United States has pursued vigorously since World War II through membership in multilateral political and economic organizations, military alliances, frequent involvement in military conflicts abroad, and participation in global finance and trade. Historically, it is the opposite of the isolationism that dominated the U.S. discourse on foreign affairs in the country’s first century and that returned with a vengeance following World War I. Narrow engagement, however, will refer to the practice of “strategic interaction designed to elicit cooperation from an opposing state.” It will refer to “the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.” The Obama administration has employed both broad and narrow engagement as complementary strategies--with broad engagement seen as an essential condition for the successful pursuit of narrow engagement with adversaries. Though it will consider the administration’s practice of broad engagement, this paper will principally concern its efforts at narrow engagement with Iran and the DPRK

AT: Dialogue Dialogue alone isn’t “engagement” --- topical plans must also provide tangible economic incentivesBuszynski, ‘9 (Dr. Leszek is a visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Professor of International Relations in the Graduate School of International Relations at the International University of Japan, Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative, Ed. Kim, p. 100-101) CG; AD: 6/1Engagement can have different meanings for the actors concerned and has often been used as an antonym to isolation and containment without clear definition of the obligations for the parties

concerned. Engagement should not be confused with dialogue , which is compatible with isolation, and according to which economic and political interaction would be reduced to the minimum. Cold war dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union was intended to resolve particular issues, such as the stability of the strategic nuclear balance, but otherwise was not intended to change either one of the parties. Engagement , however, involves not only regular dialogue but incentives for the target state to change its policies or behavior in desired ways. Those incentives might include the promise of extensive economic aid and investment , humanitarian assistance to alleviate famine and disease, as well as assurances of the target state's security, which might be incorporated in a nonaggression pact or a treaty. The critical issue is how an engagement policy would be related to a target state's nuclear program. Engagement may entail the offering of incentives for the target state to accept international monitoring of its nuclear program, or to surrender it entirely. In this sense engagement may come in three forms: The first is conditional engagement, in which the incentives would follow after the target state has agreed to and accepted international monitoring, or has agreed to dismantle its nuclear program; the second is staged engagement, when the benefits would he offered in phases in response to the dismantling of the nuclear program, which would follow a previously agreed schedule; the third is unconditional engagement, when the target state would receive the benefits first, and then as a product of a general improvement in relations would later surrender its nuclear program.

Diplomatic discussions alone are not sufficient for engagementAlterman, ‘9 (Jon B. is a director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Defining Engagement”, Summer 2009, http://csis.org/files/publication/0709_MENC.pdf) CG; AD: 5/30For much of last month, dramatic images out of Tehran displaced a brewing debate over “engaging Iran.” Similar debates over engaging Hamas and Hezbollah fell by the wayside, too, and the debate over engaging Syria seemed to have been decided in the affirmative, with the announcement that the United States would return an ambassador to Damascus for the first time in more than four years. Just as the isolation of adversaries lay at the heart of the Bush administration’s strategy in the Middle East, properly calibrating engagement lies at the heart of the Obama administration’s strategy. For advocates, engagement with real or potential adversaries is an elixir that softens hostility and builds common interests. For opponents, it is a sign of surrender to dark forces of violence and hatred. Yet, for all of the passion that the issue of engagement excites, no one seems to want to define it . Each side would rather talk about the effects of

engagement than the nature of engagement itself . Part of the problem is a matter of definition . Refusing to have any official contact with a group or country does not constitute engagement. But what then? Engagement must mean more than merely holding diplomatic discussions , but how much more ? How should issues be

sequenced? Should symbolic statements be demanded at the beginning as a sign of positive intentions, or held to the end as part of a final declaration? Even staunch advocates of engagement differ on these key issues.

Engagement requires more than talks; must include pressureCrocker, ‘9 (Chester is a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989, “Terms of Engagement”, September 13th, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=0) CG; AD: 5/30Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement. So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There

is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step . The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior. Diplomatic engagement is proven to work — in the right circumstances. American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and, intermittently, Syria. There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional conflict management in order to stop cross-border attacks and create better conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the Cubans in an effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia (from South Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique, engagement meant building a constructive relationship with the United States, restraining South African interference in Mozambique’s internal conflicts and weaning the country from its Soviet alignment. More recently, the Bush administration’s strategy for engagement with Libya ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the elimination of that country’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court.

Conditional – Aff

Counter-Interp – Could be both Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional — Kahler and Kastner conclude aff.Kahler & Kastner, ‘6 (Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525) CG; AD: 6/2Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional .1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to

deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

Counter-interp – must be unconditionalEconomic engagement excludes short-term policies — it must be unconditional. Çelik, ‘11 (Arda Can Çelik, Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11) CG; AD: 6/22Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy . They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools , they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes . (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

Conditions not Topical QPQ’s are not engagementSmith, ‘5 (Karen E is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics, “Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14) CG; AD: 6/1First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19‘ Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking , by a state or international

organisation, of perceived benefits to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions . ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions ; ‘ negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy

Economic engagement excludes conditionsÇelik, ‘11 (Arda C. is a Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11) CG; AD: 5/31Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state.

Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy . They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence

and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of

target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools , they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes . (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating

greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

-Diplomatic Engagement QPQs not Topical Their QPQ definition doesn’t take into account DE Neumann, ‘9 (Ronald is the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, “Assessing Engagement: Strategy, Tactics, and Content”, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-engagement-strategy-tactics-and-content) CG; AD: 5/21In general, engagement is just one tool among many in the diplomat's arsenal. The choice of which particular tool to use in a given situation should be guided not by ideology, but rather by the underlying policy objective. Yet the United States too often views diplomatic relations in more simplistic terms: as a reward for a country's good behavior, and as something to take away if a country is misbehaving. This creates a double challenge for policymakers -- it endangers Washington's ability to inform and influence while raising the political cost of reengagement once relations have been cut off. Moreover, by requiring target countries to meet preconditions for reengagement, the United States is essentially demanding concessions before negotiations even begin. Conspicuously, there are no examples in the past two decades of diplomatic history where isolation has led to a breakthrough in the Middle East. Engagement need not be viewed as surrender, however. Other diplomatic tools, including pressure, can be judiciously combined with engagement to secure U.S. policy objectives. The notion that one must choose between negotiations and the use of force is therefore a false dichotomy. Remaining engaged even at the most difficult moments can give Washington options and information it might not otherwise have.

Diplomatic engagment is more about signaling than conditions Hannah, ‘9 (John is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, “Assessing Engagement: Strategy, Tactics, and Content”, October 18th, 2009, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-engagement-strategy-tactics-and-content) CG; AD: 5/21Thus far, the Obama administration has placed diplomatic engagement at the forefront of America's relations with its adversaries. This strategy is aimed at convincing these adversaries that a genuine alternative path is available to them, assuming they are willing to change their behavior on matters of critical concern to Washington. As the president has repeatedly stated, this path can lead to new relations with the United States based on mutual respect and mutual interests. The Obama administration's strategic shift was heavily influenced by its negative assessment of Bush-era policies. According to this critique, Washington's approach had been too confrontational, antagonizing adversaries and allies alike while failing to achieve U.S. objectives. Whether accurate or not, this widespread narrative had a significant effect on the Obama administration's conception and pursuit of engagement. With respect to Iran, the shift has meant offering an open hand rather than a closed fist. Instead of threatening isolation, punitive actions, and possible military attack, the administration has repeatedly sought to reassure the Islamic Republic of America's benign intentions and desire to engage in direct negotiations as soon as possible. At the same time, high-level U.S. officials have publicly cast doubt on the viability of a military option, objecting to potential Israeli military action in particular.

-Economic Engagement QPQs not Topical Economic engagement can be unconditionalKahler & Kastner, ‘4 (Miles is a professor at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Scott L. Kastner Department of Government and Politics University of Maryland, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan”, November, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc) CG; AD: 6/5Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical framework through which to examine strategies of economic engagement. Drawing from the existing literature, our framework distinguishes between different forms of economic engagement, and outlines the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these different strategies. With this framework as a guide, we then examine the strategic use of economic interdependence—focusing in particular on economic engagement—in three East Asian States: South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. We use these case studies to draw conclusions about the underlying factors that facilitate the use of a strategy of economic engagement, that determine the particular type of engagement strategy used, and that help to predict the likelihood of success. Because our conclusions are primarily derived inductively from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims of generalizability. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the narratives we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them will help to spur further research into this interesting yet under-studied subject. ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement : conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country,

and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state. Perhaps the most widely accepted theoretical link between economic integration and a reduced danger of military violence centers on the constraints imposed on state behavior by increasing economic exchange. Once established, a disruption in economic relations between countries would be costly on two levels. First, firms might lose assets that could not readily be redeployed elsewhere. For example, direct investments cannot easily be moved, and may be lost (i.e. seized or destroyed) if war breaks out. Second, firms engaged in bilateral economic exchange would be forced to search for next-best alternatives, which could impose significant costs on an economy as a whole if bilateral commercial ties are extensive. In short,

economic interdependence makes war more costly, meaning that states will be less likely to initiate armed conflict against countries with which they are integrated economically. Constraining effects of economic interdependence may also arise more indirectly: as economic integration between two countries increases, an increasing number of economic actors within those two countries benefit directly from bilateral economic ties, who in turn are likely to support—and lobby for—stable bilateral political relations. Economic integration, in other words, creates vested interests in peace (Hirschman 1945; Russett and Oneal 2001; Levy 2003). These interests are likely to become more influential as economic ties grow (Rogowski 1989), suggesting that leaders will pay increasing domestic political costs for implementing policies that destabilize bilateral political relations. Domestic political institutions might act as important intervening variables here. For example, these effects may be most likely to take effect in democracies, which provide actors who benefit from trade clear paths through which to influence the political process (Papayoanou 1999; Gelpi and Grieco 2003; Russett and Oneal 2001). Democracies, of course, likely vary in the influence they give to commercial interests, as do authoritarian polities (e.g. Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). Recently, scholars have questioned whether the increased costs of military conflict associated with economic interdependence necessarily act as a constraint on state leaders. Indeed, without further assumptions, the effects appear indeterminate: while economic interdependence increases the costs of conflict for the target state, it also increases those costs for the engaging state. On the one hand, increased costs for the target might make it less willing to provoke conflict, but on the other hand, the increased costs for the engaging state may paradoxically embolden the target state, believing it could get away with more before provoking a strong response (Morrow 1999, 2003; Gartzke 2003; Gartzke et al. 2001). This critique suggests that for an unconditional engagement policy exploiting the constraining effects of economic interdependence to work, leaders in the target state must value the benefits afforded by economic integration more than leaders in the initiating state (on this point, see also Abdelal and Kirshner 1999/2000). Such asymmetry is most likely to arise when the target state’s economy depends more heavily on bilateral economic exchange than the sending state (Hirschman 1945), and when domestic political institutions in the target state give the benefactors of bilateral exchange considerable political influence (Papayoanou and Kastner 1999/2000). The second mechanism through which economic interdependence might effect improved political relations centers on elite transformation that reshapes state strategies. This transformation can be defined as both an elevation at the national level of goals of economic welfare (and a concurrent devaluation of the old values of military status and territorial acquisition) and a systemic transformation of values away from the military orientation of the Westphalian order. Such arguments have a long heritage, including both Joseph Schumpeter's analysis of imperialism as an atavism that would be superseded by more pacific bourgeois values, and interwar idealists, who sometimes based their arguments on the material transformations underway in the international system. How economic interdependence creates transformed (and more pacific) elites is less clear. Learning may take place at the individual level—the cases of Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping come to mind—but such learning must often take place before policy encourages increased interdependence. Processes of creating shared values and identity and economic influences on broader social learning are more difficult to trace. A different and perhaps more plausible transformational route follows from the vested interests argument outlined above. What appears to be social learning is in effect coalitional change: internationalist elites committed to economic openness and international stability supplant or marginalize nationalist elites wedded to the threat or use of military force. Whether a society is a pluralist democracy or not, interests tied to the international economy become a critical part of the selectorate to whom political elites must respond. Etel Solingen (1998) outlines such a model of transformation in regional orders when strong internationalist coalitions committed to economic liberalization create zones of stable peace. The barriers to a successful unconditional engagement strategy that aims to achieve elite transformation in the target state would appear substantial. Strategies in this vein are likely to encounter substantial resistance in the target state: most elites probably don’t want to be “transformed,” and they certainly don’t want to be replaced. Faced with likely resistance, initiating states pursuing this strategy must be prepared to open economic links unilaterally (i.e. without the cooperation of the target), hoping that the prospect of bilateral economic ties will generate a latent coalition of groups desiring a peaceful environment in which they could take advantage of those ties, and that eventually a political entrepreneur will mobilize this latent coalition in an effort to challenge the existing order. Because transformational strategies may require long time horizons and may also incur repeated disappointments, they are perhaps most likely to be successful when a broad and stable consensus—one able to withstand changes in governing party—exists within the country initiating such a strategy (see, for example, Davis 1999). In summary, we have distinguished between three types of economic engagement : conditional engagement (linkage); unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the constraining effects of economic interdependence; and unconditional engagement seeking to utilize the transforming effects of economic interdependence. We have also outlined a number of expectations, mostly drawn from the existing literature, regarding the conditions likely to facilitate the use of these various strategies. In the remainder of this essay we examine the engagement policies of South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and we use these cases to draw conclusions concerning the conditions facilitating the strategic use of economic interdependence.

Economic engagement does not require conditionalityHaass, 2k (Richard N., Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 2-3, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1)) CG; AD: 6/1Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind

of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target

country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act

will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation. Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid. Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Either is topicalHaass 2k (Richard N., Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1)Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation . Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in

one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms . Conditional engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the U nited S tates

offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior . This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast, unconditional engagement is less contractual, with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

Economic engagement can be either conditioned or unconditional.Kartman, ‘9 (Charles is the former Director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Susan Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), Ho Miu Lam Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego, John Delury, Associate Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 2009 (“North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” Report of an Independent Task Force convened by Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, Available Online: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/north_korea_inside_out.pdf) CG; AD: 6/1A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.

Economic engagement can be unconditionalDelury, ‘9 (John is the associate director of the CCenter on US China Relations, Asia Society. Charles Kartman is the former director of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization. Susan Shirk is the director in the institute on global conflict and cooperation. “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” October, 2009 http://www.slideshare.net/hbroadman/quotnorth-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagementquot) CG; AD: 6/3Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now as first steps in a process of phased engagement. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. We do not claim that economic engagement will resolve the nuclear issue, particularly in the near term. But, in the long run, the mechanisms of engagement we recommend would have a positive influence on the environment in which Pyongyang makes its nuclear security calculations—including its weighing of the costs and benefits of its nuclear weapons.

Economic engagement doesn’t require conditionsDelury, ‘9 (John is the associate director of the CCenter on US China Relations, Asia Society. Charles Kartman is the former director of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization. Susan Shirk is the director in the institute on global conflict and cooperation. “North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” October, 2009 http://www.slideshare.net/hbroadman/quotnorth-korea-inside-out-the-case-for-economic-engagementquot) CG; AD: 6/3A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up. While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement

Reasonability Key Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.Drifte, ‘3 (Reinhard Drifte is a Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, p. 5-6 Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673) CG; AD: 6/2The complex nature of engagement policyThe misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words , have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult . Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the

established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used ; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

Even Haass agrees we meet – Their interp is obviously arbitraryHaass, 2k (Richard N., Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 2-3, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1)) CG; AD: 6/1Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid. Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

AT: PrecisionPrecision impossible—neg definitions undermine conceptual clarity. Capie & Evans, ‘7 (David H., Research Fellow and Co-Director of the Armed Groups Project in the Centre for International Relations at the University of British Columbia, and Paul M., Professor at the Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, 2007 “Engagement,” The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, Published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISBN 9812307230, p. 115-116, https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Asia_Pacific_Security_Lexicon.html?id=GKqcGgv5qBYC) CG; AD: 6/1According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a person's attention", "to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming". In the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific, engagement most

commonly refers to policies regarding the People's Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty . A Business Week

headline summed up the confusion: "Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?"1 Although one of the most important and ubiquitous

terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized . Most of the literature

on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of

engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described it as a "moving target" . This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and officials to offer their own modified interpretations of engagement, for example deep

engagement or conditional engagement. These, in turn, have arguably made for less , rather than greater

conceptual clarity .

Economic Cooperation – Neg

1nc – Cooperation Interp - “Economic” and “diplomatic” engagement is a process to expand or enhance contacts through diplomatic recognition, relations, meetings and institutions, aid, and trade – anything else isn’t topicalResnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnick has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) CG; AD: 5/21Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions ." (n21) However , limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic , military and cultural arenas . Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas. Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits. A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic , military , economic , cultural ). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic

exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends , does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions .

Violation – the aff is foreign investment, not aid or trade Limits – They explode the topic and incentivizes a shift to generics - including cooperation and investment affs allows affs to invest into private markets and cooperate on an infinite number of international issues – impossible to predict Ground – Inclusion of cooperation and investment cuts core neg groud of things like SOI disads and actor CPs which are critical to testing federal state action on this topic Default to competing interpretations – most objective and decreases judge intervention

EE Extra Interps EE means expanding ties via trade Çelik, ‘11 (Arda Can Çelik, Master’s Degree in Politics and International Studies from Uppsala University, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, p. 11Introduction, https://books.google.com/books/about/Economic_Sanctions_and_Engagement_Polici.html?id=kTu-o3lAGS8C) CG; AD: 6/21Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows " It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations " .(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

Only Trade EE is only trade Rose, ‘8 (Andrew K. Rose, Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and Mark M. Spiegel, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, “Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties”, http://halleinstitute.emory.edu/pdfs/PIEF_Rose_Spiegel.pdf) CG; AD: 6/211. IntroductionCountries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions . Some interactions are strictly economic ; for instance, countries engage in international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense . For instance, the U nited S tates seeks to promote human rights and democracy , deter nuclear proliferation , stop the spread of narcotics , and so forth . Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both theory and practice, is positive.

Exports, Imports, and FinanceExports, imports, and finance are “economic” activity – Investment is not Gallagher, ‘1 (Katherine Gallagher, Senior Staff Attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights, “Sanctions' Effects on Human Rights Violations”, The Monitor: Journal of International Studies, 8(1), Fall, http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/08-1/1-gallagher.htm) CG; AD: 6/21Types of SanctionsWorking positively or negatively, sanctions provide inducements or threats to the offenders to encourage compliance. Sanctions are imposed on either a multilateral or unilateral basis; multilateral sanctions are considered more legitimate and more effective by the international community. However, one possible drawback to the involvement of additional countries is the necessity of more complex decision-making methods.[8] In the U.N. Economic and Social Council report evaluating the consequences of sanctions on human rights violations, analyst Marc Bossuyt identifies five types of sanctions: economic, travel, military, diplomatic, and cultural.[9]Economic: Increased worldwide economic interdependence has greatly expanded the popularity of economic sanctions. As the most frequently used type of sanction, these sanctions are employed in both of case studies examined in this report. Economic sanctions are divided into three categories: limiting exports to a country, limiting the imports from that country, and imposing financial sanctions . Financial sanctions entail: [The] blocking of government assets held abroad, limiting access to financial markets and restricting loans and credits, restricting international transfer payments and restricting the sale and trade of property abroad, [as well as]…freezing development aid.[10] The first of these three options is the easiest to implement because exports are more easily controlled, while the source of imports can be difficult to identify.[11] Generally, financial sanctions are more effective than export controls because the sanctioned nation can purchase the exports from another country. However, import controls have the greatest impact on a nation’s economy, severely limiting financial growth.[12]Travel : Travel sanctions limit the travel capabilities of particular individuals as well as their mode of transportation, reducing air travel significantly.[13] These sanctions are also imposed on both countries examined. Such narrowly applied sanctions more effectively punish the government officials and military leaders responsible for the human rights violations, limiting their ability to conduct overseas business and political dealings.Military : These sanctions specifically target the non-compliant government by imposing "arms embargoes or…terminating military assistance or training."[14] The most prevalent issue of debate connected to the use of military sanctions is the impairment of the sanctioned country's self-defense capability.[15] South Africa and Iraq have both subjected to these sanctions.Diplomatic : Diplomatic sanctions focus specifically on "rulers of a sanctioned State: diplomats and political leaders may have their visas revoked and may be forbidden to participate in international bodies and organizations."[16] International actions taken against South Africa, such as Pretoria's exclusion from the U.N. General Assembly and specialized U.N. agencies between 1961 and 1994, exemplify this genre of sanction.[17] The effectiveness of diplomatic sanctions, which use shame and consertation to influence the actions of state leaders, increases when these leaders wish to retain international standing for economic and nationalistic purposes.Cultural : Similar to diplomatic sanctions, cultural sanctions aim to disgrace a nation. The mildest manner of sanctioning, cultural sanctions involve banning "athletes…folk dancers, musicians, and other artists…[as well as] restrictions…on educational and tourist travel."[18] The ban on South African athletes from Olympic competition from 1970 to 1991 exemplifies a cultural sanction.[19]

Precision Key Definitional limits are best for engagement debates Resnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnick has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) CG; AD: 5/21

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this

debate , however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement . In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment. In the contemporary lexicon of U nited S tates foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement .(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam. Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10) Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors : (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner .

Economic Cooperation – Aff

Coutner-Interp – both public and private Economic engagement is aid and trade, private investment, and increasing capital flows

Adelman et al, ‘05 (Adelman, Dr. P.H., Director, Center for Science in Public Policy¶ Jeremiah Norris, Senior Fellow¶ Jean Weicher, Research Associate¶ “America’s Total Economic Engagement¶ with the Developing World:¶ Rethinking the Uses and Nature of¶ Foreign Aid” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F19754%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F96e3f339-7957-44de-ad1f-cf88f8c27449%2Fen%2FRethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf&ei=hS_UUeTrDobUyQH0toDQAw&usg=AFQjCNHFkL5Jho2sMJpXEkjoMyEXZifDNQ&sig2=t3SiDmwsMxngtp3ZDt3FXg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.aWc] CG; AD: 6/23

U.S. Government and Private¶ International Assistance to Developing¶ Countries¶ Based on new research and new data sources, the¶ Hudson Institute has developed a considerably¶ higher figure for 2003 U.S. private international¶ assistance than the year 2000. The following table,¶ using the latest official government figures as well,¶

shows total U.S. economic engagement with developing¶ countries . This engagement includes our government¶ foreign aid or ODA, our private assistance¶ or philanthropy, and our private capital flows or¶ private investment overseas. The table illustrates¶ the small role that ODA plays in America’s economic¶ engagement with the developing world. Over 85¶ percent of that engagement is through the private¶ sector, in either philanthropy or private investment.¶ Presenting this full picture, not just a limited¶ government foreign aid number, is a more accurate¶ way of measuring American generosity and impact¶ in the world than the current system developed¶ under the OECD.

Trade and Investment EE is both trade and investment Orland, ‘8 (Brian Orland, Research Intern at Strategic Foresight Group, Former Research Intern at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, Graduate of Davidson College in Political Science, “India’s Sri Lanka Policy: Towards Economic Engagement”, IPCS Research Papers, April, http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1445888596RP16-Brian-SriLanka.pdf_) CG; AD: 6/23On the economic side, increased trade and investment have been the impetus for improved bilateral relations. India's decision to offer Sri Lanka favorable terms in trade has yielded not only greater economic engagement but political and strategic benefits as well. For instance, more equitable benefits in trade—represented by a narrowing of the trade balance that had titled heavily towards India—helped to diminish the perception within Sri Lanka of India as a hegemonic neighborhood bully. Burgeoning trade and investment between India and Sri Lanka, including in the strategic energy sector, have woven economic inter-dependency into the bilateral relationship and provided the forum for increased communication and cooperation on non-economic issues like counterterrorism .

Perfer our ev

Err neg – capita markets and FDI are central to EE policy Adelman et al, ‘05 (Adelman, Dr. P.H., Director, Center for Science in Public Policy¶ Jeremiah Norris, Senior Fellow¶ Jean Weicher, Research Associate¶ “America’s Total Economic Engagement¶ with the Developing World:¶ Rethinking the Uses and Nature of¶ Foreign Aid” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F19754%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F96e3f339-7957-44de-ad1f-cf88f8c27449%2Fen%2FRethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf&ei=hS_UUeTrDobUyQH0toDQAw&usg=AFQjCNHFkL5Jho2sMJpXEkjoMyEXZifDNQ&sig2=t3SiDmwsMxngtp3ZDt3FXg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.aWc] CG; AD: 6/23

U.S. Private Capital Flows¶ This number includes foreign direct investment and¶ net capital markets in developing and emerging¶ economies, and is an important measure of U.S.¶ total economic engagement with developing¶ nations.10 This category is most indicative of the¶ U.S. contribution to long-lasting economic growth¶ and prosperity in these countries. The number¶ includes direct investment by American companies¶ in agriculture, manufacturing and service industries¶ that creates jobs and income for poor people.¶ It represents the involvement of U.S. companies¶ and institutions in foreign capital markets as well,¶ investment that helps develop permanent economic¶ and social infrastructure in the developing world.

Aff FlexOur interpretation allows sufficient Aff flexibilityBayne 7 – Sir Nicholas Bayne, Fellow at the International Trade Policy Unit of the London School of Economics, and Stephen Woolcock, Lecturer in International Relations at The London School of Economics, The New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, p. 4Economic diplomacy is best defined not by its instruments but by the economic issues that provide its content. We follow the same categories as used by Odell in determining the scope of economic negotiation: 'policies relating to production, movement or exchange of goods, services, investments (including official development assistance), money, information and their regulation’ (Odell 2000. 11). This is a very wide range of issues . A single volume could not cover them all and, of necessity, this book is selective. It concentrates on the central issues of trade, finance, energy and the global environment. These are topics of high political profile, which arouse strong popular concern and bring out well the interplay between different actors in economic diplomacy

Unconditional – Neg

1nc – Unconditional Interp - Engagement is unconditional and excludes coercive policies towards the target state Johnston and Ross, ‘5 (Alastair and Robert, professor of political science at Harvard / professor of political science at Boston College, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, p. xv, https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vE1u7SFvfoYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Engaging+China:+The+Management+of+an+Emerging+Power&ots=CFu50f_GMW&sig=K1k4Unyc3dAiv66ukPN_qZyWnKQ#v=onepage&q=Engaging%20China%3A%20The%20Management%20of%20an%20Emerging%20Power&f=false) CG; AD: 6/24

The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the contributors have vastly different research agendas. To e ncourage a common dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this volume, engagement is defined as follows: The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order. In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as "containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration, preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints. The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition of engagement specifically excludes coercive policies .

Vote negLimits – conditions makes it impossible to be neg – infinite number of combinations of conditions and are always changing/open-ended Ground – Explodes aff ground – allows attaching any condition to any policy whether it’s topical or not – makes it impossible to predict and also lets them spike out of DA links

AT: Must be QPQ QPQs are not EngagementSmith, ‘5 (Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics, “Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14) CG; AD: 6/21

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19‘ Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking , by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions . ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions ; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy

Extra Interp Ev Engagement is structural linkage, not tactical linkage – means it must be unconditionalMastanduno, ‘12 (Michael is the professor of Government at Dartmouth College l, Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases edited by Steve Smith, http://www.oupcanada.com/catalog/9780199596232.html p. 217) CG; AD: 6/24

Positive economic statecraft can be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots' or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement’, involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.Tactical linkage and long-term engagement are each informed by a different logic. Tactical linkage operates at a more immediate level; the sanctioning state calculates that the provision of a particular type of economic reward will be sufficient to convince policy makers in the target to reconsider their existing policies. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the USA offered sizeable reconstruction loans to Britain, France, and the Soviet Union- in exchange for political concessions. The British and French were generally willing to accommodate US demands that they liberalize their domestic and foreign economic policies; the Soviets were not. In 1973, European states and japan offered economic inducements in the form of aid and trade concessions to Arab states during the OPEC crisis in a largely successful attempt to ensure that they would receive access to oil supplies at predictable prices. In 1982, the USA offered to increase sales of coal to its West European allies to discourage them from a gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. This influence attempt failed.Long-term engagement, however, works at a deeper level, and its logic was most clearly articulated in the classic work of Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1980 [1 9451). The sanctioning government provides an ongoing stream of economic benefits which gradually transform domestic political interests in the target state. Over time, ‘internationaIist' coalitions that favour interdependence with the sanctioning state will form and strengthen, and will exert influence over the policy of the weaker state in a direction preferred by the sanctioning state. Hirschman demonstrated how Nazi Germany used an array of economic inducements to inculcate economic dependence, and eventually political acquiescence, on the part of its weaker central European neighbours during the inter-war period.

-EE Specific Interps Economic engagement excludes short-term policies — it must be unconditional. Çelik, ‘11 (Arda Can Çelik, Graduate Student in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University (Sweden), 2011 (Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies, Published by GRIN Verlag, ISBN 9783640962907, p. 11) CG; AD: 6/22Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy . They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender state to change the political behaviour of target state. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools , they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes . (Kahler&Kastner, 2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway to perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows “It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations’’. (p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that ‘’the direct and positive linkage of interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.’’

-DE Specific DE is different than other forms of engagement – must be unconditional Neumann, ‘9 (Ronald is the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy and a former U.S. ambassador to Algeria, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, “Assessing Engagement: Strategy, Tactics, and Content”, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-engagement-strategy-tactics-and-content) CG; AD: 5/21In general, engagement is just one tool among many in the diplomat's arsenal. The choice of which particular tool to use in a given situation should be guided not by ideology, but rather by the underlying policy objective. Yet the United States too often views diplomatic relations in more simplistic terms: as a reward for a country's good behavior, and as something to take away if a country is misbehaving. This creates a double challenge for policymakers -- it endangers Washington's ability to inform and influence while raising the political cost of reengagement once relations have been cut off. Moreover, by requiring target countries to meet preconditions for reengagement, the United States is essentially demanding concessions before negotiations even begin. Conspicuously, there are no examples in the past two decades of diplomatic history where isolation has led to a breakthrough in the Middle East. Engagement need not be viewed as surrender, however. Other diplomatic tools, including pressure, can be judiciously combined with engagement to secure U.S. policy objectives. The notion that one must choose between negotiations and the use of force is therefore a false dichotomy. Remaining engaged even at the most difficult moments can give Washington options and information it might not otherwise have.

AT: Appeasement

It’s only appeasement if the target state is aggressive – China is not Tang, ‘10 (Shiping, Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA), Fudan Univeristy, Shanghai, China, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism, p. 101) CG; AD: 6/25

A strategy of appeasement is to retreat repeatedly (i.e., being accommodating or conciliatory) despite the adversary repeatedly taking advantage of one's goodwill and pressing with its aggressive goals (Edelstein 2002, 5; Resnick 2001, 561-562; Ziring et aL 1995, 264-265).4 Defined as such, a conciliatory gesture or concession can be regarded as an appeasement gesture only if the other side is aggressive . In contrast, a conciliatory gesture or a concession when the other side is not aggressive should not be conflated with an appeasement gesture, even if the gesture was not reciprocated initially (see chapter 5 for details).

Unconditional – Aff

Counter-interp – Must be Conditional Engagement requires positive incentivesHaass & O’Sullivan, 2k (Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview) CG; AD: 5/29The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives . Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

Counter-Interp – Could be both Economic engagement can be conditional or unconditional — Kahler and Kastner conclude aff.Kahler & Kastner, ‘6 (Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525) CG; AD: 6/2Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional .1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to

deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

Extra Interps Affs must be tied to policy changes, must reward behavioral change and must be long-term, the aff is appeasement Litwak, ‘7 (Robert S. Litwak, Director of the Division of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former director for nonproliferation on the National Security Council staff, 2007 (“Strategies for a Change of Regime — or for Change within a Regime?,” Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11, Published by JHU Press, ISBN 0801886422, p. 117) CG; AD: 6/22Conditional EngagementThe conditional engagement strategy is conducted on the government-to- government level and requires reciprocity by the target state on essentially a contractual basis. It is typically focused on a discrete issue but can be broadened to encompass a range of issues in a "grand bargain" (as some have proposed in the case of Iran). "Conditional reciprocity" is a form of conditional engagement, elucidated by George, in which meaningful changes in behavior by the target state would be explicitly linked to each concession or benefit bestowed by the United States.45 The engagement of an adversary under conditional reciprocity has three key features , which clearly distinguish this strategy from appeasement . First, the inducement must be tied to specific policy changes in the target state's behavior, not general expectations of improved behavior. Second, the reward should come only after the specific change in behavior. If the reward is provided in advance of behavior modification or is not linked to a specific behavioral change, it may be legitimately criticized as a bribe . And, third, such an approach depends on mutual adherence to the specific conditional reciprocal steps in the sequence. If the target state does not fulfill its obligations, the process can be halted and the benefit withdrawn .46

Engagement requires positive incentivesHaass & O’Sullivan, 2k (Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview) CG; AD: 5/29The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to

achieve its objectives . Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

-Diplomatic Engagement interpsDiplomatic engagement requires mutual concessionsTakeyh, ‘9 (Ray is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Essence of Diplomatic Engagement”, http://www.cfr.org/diplomacy-and-statecraft/essence-diplomatic-engagement/p20362) CG; AD: 5/30It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace. Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation. Should these regimes fail to grasp the opportunities before them, then Washington has a better chance of assembling a durable international coalition to isolate and pressure them. One of the problems with a unilateralist Bush administration that prided itself on disparaging diplomatic outreach was that it often made America the issue and gave many states an excuse for passivity. The Obama administration's expansive diplomatic vision has deprived fence-sitters of such justifications. An administration that has reached out to North Korea, communicated its sincere desire for better ties to Iran, and dispatched high-level emissaries to Syria cannot be accused of diplomatic indifference. The administration's approach has already yielded results in one of the most intractable global problems: Iran's nuclear imbroglio. The Bush team's years of harsh rhetoric and threats of military retribution failed to adjust Iran's nuclear ambitions in any tangible manner. A country that had no measurable nuclear infrastructure before Bush's inaugural made tremendous strides during his tenure. Unable to gain Iranian capitulation or international cooperation, the Bush administration was left plaintively witnessing Iran's accelerating nuclear time clock. In a dramatic twist of events, the Obama administration's offer of direct diplomacy has altered the landscape and yielded an unprecedented international consensus that has put the recalcitrant theocracy on the defensive. Iran's mounting nuclear infractions and its enveloping isolation caused it to recalibrate its position and open its latest nuclear facility to inspection and potentially ship out its stock of low-enriched uranium for processing in Russia. Deprived of such fuel, Iran would not have the necessary resources to quickly assemble a bomb. In a short amount of time, the administration has succeeded in putting important barriers to Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. The United States will persistently confront crises that require the totality of its national power. The tumultuous Bush years have demonstrated the limitations of military force. Diplomatic interaction requires mutual concessions and acceptance of less than ideal outcomes. Moreover, as the United States charts its course, there is nothing wrong with acknowledging past errors. Instead of clinging to its self-proclaimed exceptionalism, America would be wise to take into account the judgment of other nations that are increasingly central to its economy and security.

Economic Engagement Specific “Engagement” requires active fostering of economic relations using positive sanctions --- passive ceding on an issue is “appeasement”, which is distinct Edelstein, ‘2 (David M. Edelstein, Assistant Professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and The Rise of Great Powers”, 12(1), Autumn, p. 5) CG; AD: 6/1This article seeks to explain how beliefs about others’ intentions affects the strategic choices of states. In general, governments pursue predominately co-operative or competitive strategies toward each other. Cooperative strategies range from passive strategies such as simply abstaining from balancing to strategies that actively foster the growth of another state through economic or security relations. Among cooperative strategies are policies labeled as “engagement” or “appeasement.” Engagement is often defined as a strategy of using positive sanctions in the hopes of achieving peaceful relations or other objectives, while appeasement is a strategy of ceding demands to another state in order to placate and pacify it .11 Competitive strategies, on

the other hand, include internal and external balancing, efforts to forestall another state’s growth, or, at an extreme, initiating war.

Precision Key*Defining “engagement” as any positive action ruins limits, precision, and topic educationResnick, ‘1 (Evan Resnik, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University at the time of writing the journal, since has been awarded the PhD, “Defining Engagement”, pg. 561-562, Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, Spring 2001, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357749) CG; AD: 5/31

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of

engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate , however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement . In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for

drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially

appeasement, isolation and containment.

In the contemporary lexicon of U nited S tates foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement .(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4)A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5)A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7)A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9)A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors : (1) treating engagement as a synonym for

appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.CONFLATING ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENTOne serious flaw in scholarly conceptualizations of engagement is the tendency to view engagement as simply a synonym for appeasement, a policy approach that has fallen into disrepute since the late 1930s. In their book, Force and Statecraft, Gordon Craig and Alexander George make the following case: "constructive engagement...is essentially a policy of appeasement, though the term itself cannot be used."(n11) Similarly, in a recently published article, Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth refer to engagement as "simply a new, 'more acceptable' term for an old policy that used to be called appeasement."(n12) Another scholar, Victor Cha, does try to differentiate appeasement from engagement, though he does so in a manner that nevertheless renders the two policies indistinguishable . Cha claims that

engagement occurs when "non-coercive and non-punitive" means are employed by a strong country toward a weak country, while appeasement is the use of the very same means by a weak country against a strong country.(n13) This suggests that only the strong can engage and only the weak can appease, though the actual means deployed are virtually identical in both cases.

Reasonability Key Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.Drifte, ‘3 (Reinhard Drifte is a Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, p. 5-6 Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673) CG; AD: 6/2The complex nature of engagement policyThe misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words , have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult . Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the

established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used ; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

Their interp is arbitrary – makes it impossible to meet Haass, 2k (Richard N., Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, Survival, 42(2), Summer, p. 2-3, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1)) CG; AD: 6/1Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid. Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Gov-to-Gov – Neg

1nc – G2G Interp and violation – engagement requires direct talks with the government of the topic country, the aff is a unilateral change in policy Crocker, ‘9 (Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Terms of Engagement”, New York Times, 9-13, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=0) CG; AD: 2/11PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon . The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes. Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization , and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to

détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement . So how do you define an engagement strategy ? It does require[s] direct talks . There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

Vote negLimits – direct talks put a functional limit on a limitless topic – lack of direct talks means that any sort of action towards any company, NGO, or the government would be T

Ground – lose access to “say no” args as well as topic disads and CPs specific to engagement

Extra Interp Ev Empirics flow our way – engagement is bilateral between governmentsKane, ‘8 (Brian, US Marine Corps Major, thesis SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES for the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting “Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy “ http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504901) CG; AD: 6/21

Engagement strategies are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement strategy has been called “comprehensive containment, conditional containment, conditional engagement, limited engagement, quid pro quo engagement, congagement, unconditional engagement, and comprehensive engagement.”8 As a result, engagement strategy represents a “conceptual fog” in today’s environment.9 However, the Clinton Administration attempted to dissipate this fog with the first post-Cold War, multi-faceted definition proposed in its NSS, which stated that engagement strategy is: (1) a broad based grand strategic orientation; (2) a specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state; (3) a bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a state; (4) a bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state; and (5) a bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state.10This definition of engagement has been the most successful historically .11

Engagement is the expansion of government ties Kahler & Kastner, ‘6 (Kahler, Miles, Professor of Pacific International Relations at University of California, San Diego, and Kastner, Scott, associate professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, 2006, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California, San Diego) CG; AD: 6/21Economic engagement—a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and effect an improvement in bilateral political relations—is the subject of growing, but still limited, interest in the international relations literature. The bulk of the work on economic statecraft continues to focus on coercive policies such as economic sanctions. The emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well-documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa 1994; Pollins 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how widespread strategies of economic engagement actually are: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies in this regard have focused on policies adopted

by great powers. But engagement policies adopted by South Korea and the other two states examined in this study, Singapore and Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics; instead, it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

Engagement is direct, government contactFields, ‘7 (Jeffery Fields, Senior Analyst at the Department of Defense, “Adversaries and Statecraft: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States”, 2007, Google Books) CG; AD: 6/21 I define engagement as a diplomatic posture that employs direct (even if it is at a low level) political contact as a strategy to foster cooperation, build confidence, reduce tensions, or to create a space for further interaction.1' I separate the use of incentives from the definition, though positive incentives can be an important part of an engagement strategy. Engagement in and of itself without the use of incentives can signal a willingness to cooperate on issues or at a minimum that relations between two states are important enough to maintain a vehicle for direct diplomacy. The United States has engaged Syria for many years. Even after Washington recalled its ambassador in 2005, the United States continued to talk with Syria about regional matters. The negotiations that eventually disarmed Libya look place in secret over the course of a decade - while Washington and Tripoli did not have diplomatic relations. These are notable cases of engagement that stand in contrast the episodes of isolation of Iran and North Korea.

Engagement requires direct, sustained political communication with a target governmentSheen, ‘2 (Seongho is an associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf) CG; AD: 6/24

Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jung’s policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for understanding President Kim’s engagement policy towards the North. In general, engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

Affs must be an active cultivation of relations Lynch, ‘2 (Marc is a prof. at Williams College, “Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement” European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications and ECPR, Vol. 8(2): 187–230 (1354–0661 [200206] 8:2; 187–230; 023827) CG; AD: 6/24

Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as ‘the use of noncoercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major power’s behavior’ (1999: 14).11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power

to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant international order. A strategic mode of action might seem to be built in to such a definition, since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change the behavior of another state. The concept of communicative action does not rule out purposive action, however. The distinction rests upon the orientation of the action and the approach to the other. Whether strategic or communicative, engagement strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations between states, not a condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an unintended byproduct of interaction. Engagement typically involves some combination of the provision of incentives, the increase of trade and investment, diplomatic dialogues, the building of interdependencies and the induction of the target state into international organizations.Strategic engagement strategies follow the logic of strategic action, in which the initiator aims to manipulate the behavior of an actor through threats and incentives in order to bring it in line with one’s preferences.12 What characterizes these strategies as ‘strategic’ is that they are instrumental state policies attempting to shape a targeted state’s behavior in a predetermined direction. They take the target as an object, rather than as an equal partner. These threats and incentives may lead the target to rationally recalculate its interests as it realizes the costs of the proscribed behavior, but the mechanism of change is ultimately a behavioral one (Schimmelfenig, 2000). American engagement policies, for example, rely upon high levels of trade and membership in international economic organizations to moderate the target’s conception of its interests by shifting incentives, building networks of interdependence and giving it a stake in the status quo. Such strategic engagement strategies aim ‘to influence and affect China’s behavior through a consistent penalty-reward mechanism. The problem, however, is that the model does little to accommodate and incorporate China’s strategic concerns and demands’ (Wang, 1998: 70).Taking the reflexivity and awareness of target states seriously forces the state pursuing engagement to deal with the other as a partner rather than as an object (Berejikian and Dryzek, 2000). Rationalist models of engagement seem to assume that the targeted state is not aware of the behavioral modification strategy being employed against it. Behavioral change directly reflects a rational adjustment to environmental incentives, independent of the target’s beliefs, intentions or consciousness. For the targeted actor to acquiesce would require either ignorance (implausible), an acceptance of the desirability of change (likely to be distributed unevenly) or a calculated gamble based on asymmetric information about the regime’s ability to manage change. The engager must implicitly assume a superior understanding of the nature of international relations or of political behavior, which will enable it to trick the target into accepting a Trojan Horse. Such assumptions of ignorance become even harder to sustain when top American officials repeatedly state this logic in public.13Communicative engagement takes seriously the awareness of both actors, who enter into a dialogue oriented towards achieving consensus through the give and take of reasoned argument.14 Rather than a ‘sender’ (the US) using engagement to manipulate a ‘target’ (China) in pursuit of predefined interests, communicative engagement initiates a dialogue to produce international arrangements amenable to the interests of both parties . Within a communicative logic of action, actors should make a sincere effort at empathy, to understand the interests and concerns of the other in order to arrive at a formula which can satisfy both. Ideally, participants in a dialogue temporarily set their self-interest aside, formulating generalizable arguments oriented towards a consensus position acceptable to

all affected parties. Where strategic engagement aims to induce the other to accept a predefined set of institutions, communicative engagement aims to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution which does not rest upon coercion or manipulation. Giving all affected actors a voice in shaping institutions, rather than socializing new actors into existing institutions or punishing deviant behavior, characterizes the underlying logic of communicative engagement.

Engagement is long-term, sustained interaction to boost tied-relations Takamine, ‘6 (Tsukasa is the assistant Professor of Politics in the Department of Integrated Arts and Science at Okinawa National College of Technology, Japan's Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of Engagement, p. 18) CG; AD: 6/21

The various policy objectives pursued by Japan’s China ODA described above illustrate the striking flexibility of Japanese ODA as a foreign policy instrument. Nevertheless, certain key underlying concepts have remained consistent since I979, notably the concept of engagement. In this book, the term engagement means a relationship of sustained interaction over a long period , intended by a state in order to promote positive relations with another state. In turn, such interaction is expected to promote or increase the national interests of the state which initiated it. A policy of engagement is potentially composed of a number of different dimensions, for example, political, economic, military and cultural. Engagement further implies a dynamic interaction and, of course, is a two-way relationship. Japan's engagement policy with China, addressed in this book, essentially consists of Japan`s attempt to interact with China politically and economically, with military and cultural considerations less prominent. As Reinhard Drifte points out, sustained economic and political interaction with China are expected to 'steer China towards a peaceful and sustainable path…while simultaneously hedging against any Chinese strategic breakout or policy failure’. This book will also demonstrate, however, that engaging China is also expected to serve Japan`s own economic and political interests. Of course, in this case as in others, engagement is a two-way street, and Chinese perceptions of Japan’s policy of engagement must be expected to differ from Japan’s. Such considerations, however, are beyond the scope of this research.

AT: Private Sector Actions of private companies are not economic engagement – their investment is under CORPORATE engagementCruz, ‘8 (Elfren S. Cruz is a professor of Strategic Management at the De La Salle Professional Schools, Inc. Graduate School of Business and the author of Setting Frameworks: Family Business and Strategic Management, 2005 National Book Award for Best Book in Business and Economics. “Framework; Corporate citizenship,” June 3rd, 2008, Business world, Lexis) CG AD: 6/23It has become fairly common for businesspeople to talk about social responsibility. But, the use of the term "corporate social responsibility" as a blanket term for all the responsibilities of "corporate citizenship" is an oversimplification that has led to confusion even among business leaders. There a re actually five core concepts that define the different types of corporate engagement in society. These are corporate governance , corporate philanthropy , corporate social responsibility, corporate social entrepreneurship, and global corporate citizenship . The World Economic Forum developed a framework to help business leaders in their task of corporate engagement in society. In 1971, the forum identified the stakeholder concept. This is the idea that a company has clear responsibilities to other sectors aside from its stockholders. These other sectors include employees, customers, suppliers, the community where it operates, and the whole world when it comes to global issues like environmental pollution or destruction. Klaus Schwab is the executive chair of the World Economic Forum. In the January-February 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs, he wrote an article entitled "Global Corporate Citizenship: How Business Can Help Save the World." Among the topics he covered in the article were the five different types of corporate citizenship. Corporate governance is more than the way a corporation is run. Every company is subject to some form of governance; otherwise, it would not have the license to operate. The central issue of corporate governance is the quality of this governance. It means that a company complies with local and international laws, transparency and accountability requirements, ethical norms, and environmental and social codes of conduct. Good corporate governance means that the company's conduct meets or exceeds what is required by laws and possibly even going beyond the mandated minimum. It is how a company behaves when nobody is looking. According to Schwab: "A key part of corporate governance is the development and implementation of internal programs to promote ethics, moral standards and socially acceptable practices. These should include respect for human rights and adherence to labor standards, as well as in- house efforts to prevent bribery and corruption." Corporate philanthropy goes beyond the mandatory requirements of corporate governance. It includes cash contributions, grants, donations, services, and investments . This kind of engagement normally does not go beyond writing a check or handing out donated or relief goods . Social investing is a form of corporate philanthropy in which a company invests in organizations or programs that have social appeal such as education or reading programs and scholarship funds for poor students. Corporate philanthropy continues to be the preferred way for corporations. But, more and more business leaders now recognize that companies can make more efficient contributions through active engagement. According to Schwab: "The framework developed by the forum encourages the stakeholder approach to corporate engagement and refers to this as 'corporate social responsibility .' This involves how a corporation responds to the expectations of its stakeholders - the wide community of all organizations and individuals that are in any way affected by or interested in its actions: shareholders, owners, investors, employees, suppliers, clients, consumers - while trying to increase company's value." Corporate social responsibility is measured through the so-called triple bottom-line account-=ability, according to which a company reports not only its financial results but also on what it is doing and what it is not doing in meeting stakeholder expectations of its environmental and social responsibilities. Again according to Schwab: "Today, corporate social responsibility extends along the whole chain of value creation." Corporate social entrepreneurship is defined as the transformation of socially and environmentally responsible ideas into products and services. Many individuals are now coming up with many innovative ideas to address specific social and environmental needs of

the communities in which they are living. One of the best known examples is the Grameen Bank which provides micro-finance credits to poor rural women in Bangladesh to start livelihood projects. There have also been many initiatives in producing organic foods and so-called "green" products which are environmentally friendly. The World Economic Forum is a strong advocate of global citizenship. This concept goes beyond the other four previously mentioned concepts in that it entails focusing on the global environment which is increasingly shaped by forces beyond the control of nation-states. According to Schwab: "Global corporate citizenship refers to a company's role in addressing issues that have a dramatic impact on the future of the globe , such as climate change, water shortages, infectious diseases, and terrorism. Other challenges include providing access to food, education and information technology , extreme poverty, transnational crime, corruption, failed states, and disaster response and relief . Each of these problems is global in scope, even if the solutions may be locally focused. He continued: "Global corporate citizenship is an extension of the stakeholder concept and involves the corporation acting as a stakeholder in global society, together with government and civil society. Global corporate citizenship can be considered a long-term investment. Since companies depend on global development, which in turn relies on stability and increased prosperity, it is in their direct interest to help improve the state of the world." For corporations which are willing to engage in global citizenship, perhaps the best advice comes from management guru Michael Porter, who wrote in the Harvard Business Review in December 2006: "Each company can identify the particular set of societal problems that it is best equipped to help resolve and from which it can gain the greatest competitive benefit.... When a well-run business applies its vast resources, expertise and management talent to problems that it understands and in which it has a stake, it can have a greater impact on social good than any other institution or philanthropic organization."

Economic engagement happens at the political level – distinct from privateRao, ’13 (Nirupama, Indian ambassador to the United States, Remarks by Ambassador Nirupama Rao at the CSIS Statesmen's Forum, March 15th, 2013, 1http://csis.org/files/attachments/130315_Ambassador_Speech_Final.pdf) CG; AD: 6/22The first of these studies, “BIT and Beyond”, examines the significance of a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in the context of India US economic relations. The second and more recent study, by Ambassador HemantKrishan Singh and TincySoloman – highlights the changing nature of India U.S. trade and economic relations. The study suggests a possible framework for strengthening economic ties between the two countries, which comprises negotiations on concluding a BIT; creating a stable and predictable environment for foreign investments in India; maintaining continuity of political level direction prioritising bilateral economic engagement, including convening meetings of the Trade Policy Forum (TPF); a serious effort on the U.S side to ameliorate the concerns of India’s IT industry; enhancing India’s commitment to advanced Free Trade Agreements (FTAs); and, commencement of negotiation on a India-U.S FTA. While recognizing the ambitious dimensions of this agenda, the study concludes with robust optimism that, “…the politics of aspiration and progress will prevail, bringing the reward of mutual prosperity to these two great democracies…”

Extra Interp Ev Engagement requires contact and dialogue – means that actors of both ends must be involvedLederach, ’12 (John Paul Lederach is professor of international peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. “From Isolation to Engagement: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism,” January 25th, 2012, http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/01/25/from-isolation-to-engagement-strategies-for-countering-violent-extremism/] CG; AD: 6/22

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, proposes a strategy of engagement. Engagement requires contact and deliberative dialogue , inclusive of all views. It develops processes that focus on accurately understanding the sources of violence and addressing them through a range of nonviolent change strategies.

-EE Specific Economic engagement can only occur through state-to-state contact – it’s distinct from civic-engagement Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k (Richard N. Haass, director of foreign policy at Brookings, and Meghan O’Sullivan, fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Survival vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf) CG; AD: 6/21Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military

officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

Economic engagement is exclusively bilateral, government-to-governmentJakštaitė, ‘10 (Gerda Jakštaitė, Doctoral Candidate, Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania), 2010, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES”, Baltic Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2) CG; AD: 6/21The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state’s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94

*-DE Specific – Dialogue “Engagement” requires dialogueLederach 12 – John Paul Lederach, Professor of International Peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame and Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Colorado, “From Isolation to Engagement: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism”, Peace Policy, 1-25, http://peacepolicy.nd.edu/2012/01/25/from-isolation-to-engagement-strategies-for-countering-violent-extremism/The U.S. government’s list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” is a central part of a counter-terrorism strategy based on the isolation of individuals and groups who espouse violence defined as terrorism. This strategy makes it illegal to provide material support to those individuals and groups, which increasingly is interpreted to prohibit any contact or consultation with groups on the list.Peacebuilding, on the other hand, proposes a strategy of engagement . Engagement requires contact and deliberative dialogue , inclusive of all views. It develops processes that focus on accurately understanding the sources of violence and addressing them through a range of nonviolent change strategies.

“Engagement” must contain dialogue---isolation is the opposite of the topicCapie 2 – David H. Capie, and Paul M. Evans, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 118Second, engagement is sometimes used in a slightly narrower sense to describe the political relationship between specific states. Here there are two distinctive usages: first, engagement can be described as a kind of loosely defined informal association or relationship. The example that has received the most attention in the literature on Asia-Pacific security is that of the United States' engagement of China. In this sense, engagement connotes a relationship of dialogue and involvement, and is often contrasted with "containment" or "isolation" .'3 Joseph Nye has said "the attitude that 'engagement' implies is important." He claims the United States' decision to engage China "means that [it] has rejected the argument that conflict is inevitable"." A related use of engagement is to describe formal state policies or strategies. For example, the Clinton administration's "Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" and policy of "Comprehensive Engagement" with China. Different parts of the government often take very differing attitudes to engagement. Robert Sutter notes that under the George VV. Bush administration, there has been "an institutional gap between the Department of Defense and other US departments as far as interaction and engagement with China is concerned".'5

“Engagement” involves expanded interaction with a foreign governmentSutter 11 – Robert G. Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, p. 86Viewed broadly, the Bush and Clinton administrations have followed a policy of engagement toward China. Though hard to define precisely, the policy has emphasized preserving and expanding constructive U.S. interaction with the Chinese government , seeking to manage points of difficulty and conflict, while developing areas of common ground. The policy is assumed to meet broad U.S. goals of

promoting China's greater interaction with the world, especially the developed world. Such interchange, especially trade, investment, and other economic interchange, is seen to make the Chinese leaders realize how interdependent China has become with the rest of the world. In turn, this is presumed to make Chinese leaders more likely to conform to international norms of salient concern to the United States.

*AT: C/I Defining “engagement” as any positive action ruins limits, precision, and topic educationResnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), EbscoWhile the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this

debate , however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement . In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment.In the contemporary lexicon of U nited S tates foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement .(n1) A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."(n2) The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:(n3)A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."(n4)A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."(n5)A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.(n6) Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.(n7)A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.(n8) Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and...develop policies to manage our differences."(n9)A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."(n10)Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors : (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially

constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.CONFLATING ENGAGEMENT AND APPEASEMENTOne serious flaw in scholarly conceptualizations of engagement is the tendency to view engagement as simply a synonym for appeasement, a policy approach that has fallen into disrepute since the late 1930s. In their book, Force and Statecraft, Gordon Craig and Alexander George make the following case: "constructive engagement...is essentially a policy of appeasement, though the term itself cannot be used."(n11) Similarly, in a recently published article, Randall Schweller and William Wohlforth refer to engagement as "simply a new, 'more acceptable' term for an old policy that used to be called appeasement."(n12) Another scholar, Victor Cha, does try to differentiate appeasement from engagement, though he does so in a manner that nevertheless renders the two policies indistinguishable . Cha claims that engagement occurs when "non-coercive and non-punitive" means are employed by a strong country toward a weak country, while appeasement is the use of the very same means by a weak country against a strong country.(n13) This suggests that only the strong can engage and only the weak can appease, though the actual means deployed are virtually identical in both cases.

Limits Ev Even the most expansive definitions are limited to state-to-stateFields, ‘7 (Jeffery Fields, Senior Analyst at the Department of Defense, “Adversaries and Statecraft: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States”, 2007, Google Books) CG; AD: 6/21Stephen Rock's expansive definition conceives engagement as "an approach to dealing with a specific state (or states) exhibiting hostile or otherwise undesirable behavior." THE basic objectives of engagement are "(1) to integrate the adversary into the international system with its institutions, legal rules, and norms; (2) to maintain open channels for cooperation and areas of mutual interest: and [3] to gain leverage in order to influence the adversary's domestic and/or international behavior. Rock also counterposes engagement with containment. His definition implies a gander, strategic purpose of engagement, which is true of some historical cases such as the US. engagement of China during the Nixon administration, but not necessarily true of tactical efforts to end crises like the North Korean nuclear standoff during the George HW Bush and Clinton administrations.

Precision Ev Our interp is specific to China Sutter, ‘11 (Robert G. Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations, p. 86) CG; AD: 6/24

Viewed broadly, the Bush and Clinton administrations have followed a policy of engagement toward China. Though hard to define precisely, the policy has emphasized preserving and expanding constructive U.S. interaction with the Chinese government , seeking to manage points of difficulty and conflict, while developing areas of common ground. The policy is assumed to meet broad U.S. goals of promoting China's greater interaction with the world, especially the developed world. Such interchange, especially trade, investment, and other economic interchange, is seen to make the Chinese leaders realize how interdependent China has become with the rest of the world. In turn, this is presumed to make Chinese leaders more likely to conform to international norms of salient concern to the United States.

Gov-to-Gov – Aff

Counter-InterpEconomic engagement is both conditional gov-to-gov and unconditional private engagementHaass, 2k (Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1) CG; AD: 6//24Engagement as a policy is not merely the antithesis of isolation. Rather, it involves the use of economic, political, or cultural incentives to influence problem countries to alter their behavior in one or more realms. Such a strategy can take a variety of forms. Conditional engagement is a government-to-government affair in which the U nited S tates offers inducements to a target regime in exchange for specified changes in behavior. This was the approach favored in 1994 when the United States and North Korea entered into a framework agreement under which Pyongyang pledged to curtail its nuclear weapons development in exchange for shipments of fuel, construction of a new generation of nuclear power-generating reactors, and a degree of diplomatic normalization. In contrast , unconditional engagement is less contractual , with incentives being extended without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Unconditional engagement makes the most sense in promoting civil society in hopes of creating an environment more conducive to reform.

EE Doesn’t require g2g

Targeting non-state actors is “economic engagement”Haass, 2k (Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, “Engaging Problem Countries”, Brookings Policy Brief, No. 61, June, http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/18245/1/Engaging%20Problem%20Countries.pdf?1) CG; AD: 6//24The provision of economic incentives to the private sector can also be an effective mode of unconditional engagement , particularly when the economy of the target country is not entirely state-controlled. In these more open climates, economic actors nourished by exchanges will often be agents for change and natural allies in some Western causes. To the extent that economic engagement builds the private sector and other non-state elements within the target country, it is likely to widen the base of support for engagement with America specifically and the promotion of international norms more generally. Certainly, U.S. engagement with China has nurtured constituencies which are sympathetic, if not to American ideals per se, then at least to trade and open markets and the maintenance of good relations to secure them.

DE Doesn’t Require g2g Diplomatic engagement doesn’t have to be government – to – government – Iran proves Pollack et al. '9 (Kenneth Pollack is Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. He served as Director for Persian Gulf Affairs and Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Senior Research Professor at National Defense University, and Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA. Martin Indyk is the Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. He served in several senior positions in the U.S. government, most recently as Ambassador to Israel and before that as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and as Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the National Security Council. Daniel Byman is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center at Brookings. He is Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies and an Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Suzanne Maloney is a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. She has worked on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. Michael O’Hanlon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Bruce Riedel is Senior Fellow for Political Transitions in the Middle East and South Asia at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings. “Which Path to Persia?”; Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman ,Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bruce Riedel; June 2009; www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/6/iran-strategy/06_iran_strategy.pdf) CG; AD: 6/21Engagement as defined loosely—the simple act of talking to Tehran—represents an almost inevitable component of any broad strategic approach to dealing with the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic. Diplomacy is by definition the normal conduct of business between sovereign states, and even in the absence of formal relations between governments, the need to communicate directly persists. Throughout their 30-year estrangement, Washington and Tehran have communicated routinely on a range of urgent and mundane questions, largely but not entirely through the intermediation of the Swiss, who represent U.S. interests in Tehran.

Direct Investment is topical EE refers to trade and investment, both public and private

Adelman et al, ‘05 (Adelman, Dr. P.H., Director, Center for Science in Public Policy¶ Jeremiah Norris, Senior Fellow¶ Jean Weicher, Research Associate¶ “America’s Total Economic Engagement¶ with the Developing World:¶ Rethinking the Uses and Nature of¶ Foreign Aid” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F19754%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F96e3f339-7957-44de-ad1f-cf88f8c27449%2Fen%2FRethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf&ei=hS_UUeTrDobUyQH0toDQAw&usg=AFQjCNHFkL5Jho2sMJpXEkjoMyEXZifDNQ&sig2=t3SiDmwsMxngtp3ZDt3FXg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.aWc] CG; AD: 6/23

U.S. Government and Private¶ International Assistance to Developing¶ Countries¶ Based on new research and new data sources, the¶ Hudson Institute has developed a considerably¶ higher figure for 2003 U.S. private international¶ assistance than the year 2000. The following table,¶ using the latest official government figures as well,¶

shows total U.S. economic engagement with developing¶ countries . This engagement includes our government¶ foreign aid or ODA, our private assistance¶ or philanthropy, and our private capital flows or¶ private investment overseas. The table illustrates¶ the small role that ODA plays in America’s economic¶ engagement with the developing world. Over 85¶ percent of that engagement is through the private¶ sector, in either philanthropy or private investment.¶ Presenting this full picture, not just a limited¶ government foreign aid number, is a more accurate¶ way of measuring American generosity and impact¶ in the world than the current system developed¶ under the OECD.

FDI is Topical Err aff – capital markets and FDI are central EE policy

Adelman et al, ‘05 (Adelman, Dr. P.H., Director, Center for Science in Public Policy¶ Jeremiah Norris, Senior Fellow¶ Jean Weicher, Research Associate¶ “America’s Total Economic Engagement¶ with the Developing World:¶ Rethinking the Uses and Nature of¶ Foreign Aid” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F19754%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F96e3f339-7957-44de-ad1f-cf88f8c27449%2Fen%2FRethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf&ei=hS_UUeTrDobUyQH0toDQAw&usg=AFQjCNHFkL5Jho2sMJpXEkjoMyEXZifDNQ&sig2=t3SiDmwsMxngtp3ZDt3FXg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.aWc] CG; AD: 6/23

U.S. Private Capital Flows¶ This number includes foreign direct investment and¶ net capital markets in developing and emerging¶ economies, and is an important measure of U.S.¶ total economic engagement with developing¶ nations.10 This category is most indicative of the¶ U.S. contribution to long-lasting economic growth¶ and prosperity in these countries. The number¶ includes direct investment by American companies¶ in agriculture, manufacturing and service industries¶ that creates jobs and income for poor people.¶ It represents the involvement of U.S. companies¶ and institutions in foreign capital markets as well,¶ investment that helps develop permanent economic¶ and social infrastructure in the developing world.

Reasonability Key Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.Drifte, ‘3 (Reinhard Drifte is a Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, p. 5-6 Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673) CG; AD: 6/2The complex nature of engagement policyThe misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words , have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult . Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the

established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used ; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

Economic Engagement Interps

Energy Cooperation

Economic engagement includes energy cooperation Hormats, ‘12 (Robert, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, "US Economic Engagement with the Asia Pacific" US Department of State -- December 7 -- www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201746.htm) CG; AD: 6/23

During the U.S.-ASEAN Summit last month, President Obama and ASEAN leaders also launched what we called the “U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement” Initiative to promote economic cooperation between the United States and ASEAN. This initiative, which we called the “E3,” will focus on enhancing ASEAN members’ capacity for advancing cooperation in many areas that we think will further enhance trade.¶ In addition, an exciting new area for our outreach is in the energy sector. At the East Asian Summit, President Obama and his counterparts from Brunei and Indonesia announced the U.S.-Asia Pacific Comprehensive Energy Partnership. The Partnership will offer a framework for expanding energy and environmental cooperation to advance efforts to ensure affordable, secure, and cleaner energy throughout the region. We will foster active private sector involvement in the partnership, which will focus on the four key areas of renewable and clean energy, markets and interconnectivity, the emerging role of natural gas, and sustainable development.

Bilateral and Multilateral

Economic engagement can be both bilateral and multilateral Hormats, ‘12 (Robert, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, "US Economic Engagement with the Asia Pacific" US Department of State -- December 7 -- www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201746.htm) CG; AD: 6/23

Let me conclude by simply emphasizing a few of the points that I have raised a few moments ago. In all of the areas of economic engagement I’ve mentioned – whether key bilateral relationships or the emerging importance of multilateral institutions such as APEC – the bottom line is that this engagement can create jobs in the United States and in all of the partner countries engaged in this process.

Long-Term Strategy Economic engagement is a long-term, transformative strategy to initiate change in a target state Mastanduno, ‘3 (Michael, Prof of Gov't + Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences @ Dartmouth, "The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice," Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, p. 180) CG; AD: 5/21

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy . As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

Laundry List Economic engagement includes trade, investment, lending, aid, and macroeconomic cooperation over issues such as defense and food security

Vickery, ‘11 (Raymond, senior director of Albright Stonebridge Group + former Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar, "Book Launch: The Eagle and the Elephant: Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India Economic Engagement," 6/1, http://wilsoncenter.org/event/book-launch-ithe-eagle-and-the-elephant-strategic-aspects-us-india-economic-engagementi) CG: AD: 5/23

According to Raymond E. Vickery, economic engagement— trade, investment, lending, aid, and macroeconomic cooperation —constitutes the "engine" of strategic engagement. This theme is underscored repeatedly in Vickery's new book, The Eagle and the Elephant: Strategic Aspects of U.S.-India Economic Engagement, which was launched by the Asia Program at a June 1 event. Vickery, senior director of Albright Stonebridge Group and of counsel to Hogan Lovells, asserted that the U.S.-India strategic relationship, which he described as "at its highest point ever," would not be where it is today were it not for the economic ties cultivated by the two countries over the last two decades. This economic engagement has influenced not only defense cooperation, but also political collaboration on a range of transnational issues. However, Vickery warned that economic engagement gone wrong can negatively affect relations between the world's two largest democracies.¶ Vickery's book (much of it written while he was a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar in 2008-09) features eight case studies of U.S.-India economic engagement, ranging from defense to food security and economic development . Vickery examines the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative as a primary example of the interaction between economic engagement and strategic cooperation. The Hyde Act—passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2006—authorized civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States, and demonstrated Washington's commitment to a deeper strategic relationship with New Delhi. Yet in fact, Vickery argued, the Hyde Act evolved from earlier efforts to strengthen bilateral economic relations. Soon after September 11, 2001, he explained, New Delhi and Washington formed a High Technology Cooperation Group, which sought to increase trade in high-tech goods. This arrangement led to the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative, which was launched by India and the United States in 2004. Then, in July 2005, the two countries' leaders announced a formal agreement to pursue a civil nuclear accord.

Economic engagement includes trade, tech transfer, investment, financing, tourism, and labor/development cooperation

Acharya, ‘8 (Gyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of Nepal, April 30th, 2008, http://ifa.org.np/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Economic-Diplomacy.pdf) CG; AD: 5/23

It is therefore a great pleasure that the Institute of Foreign Affairs has prepared a guideline¶ on economic diplomacy in order to provide a theoretical framework together with some¶ operational and practical aspects of its promotion. This is indeed what is now required¶ for all our diplomatic missions. We have to move from the initial stage to the comprehensive¶ stage of promoting economic diplomacy. As we move towards successive consolidation¶ of

sustainable peace in Nepal with a vision of creating a new and modern Nepal, there¶ is hardly any need to emphasize here that such a transformation must have profound¶ economic change as its principal constituent element. Business as usual is not adequate¶ in today's fast changing face of the globalized world. Competitiveness, innovativeness,¶ responsiveness and visionary outlook are the defining features for the success in the¶ modern world. Considering Nepal's diverse level of integration with the outside world¶ and the important role that the international community has been playing by providing¶ cooperation for Nepal's development endeavors, such a far reaching transformation is¶ only possible with a proactive, articulate, coordinated and sustained campaign by all to¶ promote the large and comprehensive economic interests of the country. Trade, transfer¶ of technology, investment, finance, tourism, labor and development cooperation are¶ natural areas of our economic engagement with the rest of the world. Therefore, a¶ promotional and facilitatory role in a focused manner in these areas would go a long way¶ towards further enhancing and consolidating our reach beyond the borders of Nepal.

Econ Engagement includes promotion with partners, economic governance improvements, and increasing access to markets

Coons, ‘13 (Senator Chris Coons, Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, March 17 2013, “Embracing Africa’s Economic Potential,” 2013http://thehill.com/images/stories/blogs/globalaffairs/africareport.pdf) CG; AD: 6/21

The Obama Administration has recognized the urgent ¶ need to accelerate and deepen economic engagement in ¶ sub-Saharan Africa. In a June 2012 policy document entitled, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, the Administration laid out a series of policies to meet this objective, ¶ including:¶ • working with ourAfrican partnersto promote an¶ “enabling” environment for trade and investment;¶ • improving economic governance and transparency¶ while reducing corruption; promoting regional integration;¶ • expandingAfrican capacity to access global markets; and¶ • and encouraging U.S. companiesto trade with and¶ invest in Africa.5

Includes Aid Economic engagement includes development assistance

Adelman, ‘9 (Carol Adelman, director of the Center for Global Prosperity, Hudson Institute, “Global Philanthropy and Remittances: Reinventing Foreign Aid” http://www.relooney.info/0_New_7603.pdf) CG; AD: 6/21

As can be seen, religious organizations in the United States gave $8.6 billion in 2007, which is over one-third of all U.S. government aid. American private and voluntary organizations (PVOs), which gave half of U.S. government aid, sent more aid to the developing world than France, the Netherlands, Sweden, or the United Kingdom each gave in government aid in the same year.5 ¶ But even these numbers do not provide a full and accurate picture of America’s economic engagement with developing countries. A more complete way of measuring donor impact on the developing world is to look at a country’s total economic engagement with the developing world, including ODA, philanthropy, re mittances, and private capital flows. Remittances and private capital flows each eclipse official aid in magnitude and efficiency. Remittance outflows from the United States to the developing world, for example, totaled $79 billion in 2007 compared to $21.8 billion in government aid, and they accounted for 34 percent of total U.S. economic engagement with the developing countries.6 These financial flows play a major role in poverty reduction in the developing world and help many families educate their children, build clinics, and start businesses.

Economic engagement includes aid

Milner and Tingley, ‘10 (Helen V. Milner and Dustin H. Tingley, December 1, 2010, “Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of¶ Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy” http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/io-milner-tingley.pdf) CG; AD: 6/21

Surprisingly, this is just as true for aid as for trade. Even though aid is a smaller¶ part of the U.S. economy than trade, aid is often seen as an important means of ¶ economic engagement with the world economy. Legislators hence respond to the¶ political economy pressures of their constituents similarly. This suggests that political economy factors might help shape a broad internationalist policy orientation¶ across multiple policy areas.

Includes SanctionsEconomic engagement includes incentives and sanctions

Roberts, ‘3 (L. Kathleen Roberts, “The United States and the World: Changing¶ Approaches to Human Rights Diplomacy under the Bush Administration” Berkeley Journal of International Law Volume 21, Issue 3 Article 8) CG; AD: 6/21

The most significant change in methods was an increased emphasis on bilateral strategic ¶ diplomatic and economic engagement that was reminiscent of the Clinton era in ¶ form, using economic incentives and sanctions , if not in substance, demonstrating a willingness to dispense with human rights objectives in favor of other¶ policy concerns.

Diplomatic Engagement Interps

Includes “Quiet Diplomacy” Diplomatic engagement includes quiet diplomacyÖzkan, ‘10 (mehmet özkan and birol akgün “Turkey’s Darfur Policy Sevilla University, Spain: Convergences and Differentiations from the Muslim World” Insight Turkey Vol. 12 / No. 4 / 2010 pp. 147-165) CG; AD: 6/21

The term ‘quiet diplomacy’ describes two things: first, the overall framework is diplomacy, rather than sanctions and military actions; while second, the adjective ‘quiet’ refers to the style of the diplomatic engagement defined as a combination of measures that include behind the scene engagements, secret negotiations, and subtle coaxing.36 Basically it is defined as “discussing problems with officials of another country in a calm way”.37 In the literature, as Graham argues, the term ‘quiet diplomacy’ is used extensively to refer to many types of soft diplomatic initiatives but in a loose way without having any agreed definition.38 However, for the purposes of this article, drawing on the existing literature39 we define ‘quiet diplomacy’ using three characteristics. The

first and most important characteristic of any initiative that would be called quiet diplomacy is that there must be some sort of personal and direct diplomacy between the heads of states or governments. This is the most logical first step because only with such type of interaction could the initiator talk, reason and discuss the issue and be able to persuade his counterpart or involved parties in a conflict. This is also important as it shows the seriousness of the initiator and gives assurance to the other side that the initiator indeed cares about the issue in question and is interested in helping solve it. Despite criticism, the visit of Sudanese President Omar Al Basher twice in 2008 and several other meetings at international forums such as the Arab League summit in Khartoum was aimed to serve for this purpose: talking directly to the head of state and criticizing him “in a most sincere and open way”.40 These meetings were also aimed at creating a balanced approach between the EU and the US’s position and those of the Arab and African countries.41

Includes Space Diplomatic engagement includes space diplomacyStewart, ‘15 (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance at the State Department (Mallory, “Formulation, Coordination, and Implementation of Promoting Space Security and Sustainability” 12/9, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250567.htm) CG; AD: 6/21

Protecting the national security of the United States and its allies by preventing conflict from extending into space and avoiding or deterring purposeful interference with our space systems is a major goal of our diplomatic engagements. This goal is described in the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy which makes clear that it is not in anyone’s interest for armed conflict to extend into space. The 2010 Policy also states that purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights. There are two main diplomatic approaches to achieving this goal: (1) we are strengthening space cooperation and information sharing with allies and partners to enhance collective space situational awareness and maximize the interoperability and redundancy of our space assets, and (2) we are encouraging the development of “best practices” and norms of responsible behavior in the space faring community to enhance resiliency through the prevention of mishaps, misperceptions, and the chances of miscalculation. The first category of our diplomatic engagement strives to gain international support for common ends, including sharing space derived information to support ongoing operations. It also prepares the way for closer military-to-military cooperation to address mutual threats and to develop capabilities with shared compatibility standards (and thus greater redundancy in the event of a failure). One mechanism we use to discuss cooperative approaches with our allies and space partners is through space security dialogues. The State Department currently has 15 bilateral and multilateral dialogues around the world. These dialogues address each side’s understanding of the threat, and include discussions of our respective diplomatic and national security goals. Such discussions are critical in developing common positions on issues such as the benefits and challenges of transfers of dual-use technologies or on the development of common positions related to rules of behavior in outer space. Such discussions are also a useful format for discussing further ways of strengthening technical cooperation that could assist with the goal of increasing resiliency. That is why the Department of State works closely with the Department of Defense to strengthen international cooperation in satellite communications and space-based maritime domain awareness. Tomorrow, I will be co-chairing an EU space security dialogue with our EU counterparts to address space security cooperation. These kinds of engagements, coupled with our ongoing discussions with the European Union on opportunities for U.S. Government users to access the full range of the EU’s positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services, are a great example of the types of cooperation we seek with our allies and partners. A final example of this type of diplomatic engagement, for which the State Department and the Department of Defense work in tandem, is the expansion of Space Situational Awareness, or SSA, through SSA information sharing agreements and arrangements with foreign partners. International cooperation on SSA is crucial, as international partnerships multiply capabilities, expertise, and geographical advantages. Furthermore, international cooperation enables us to improve our space object databases and pursue common international data standards and data integrity measures. To date, the United States has signed 11 bilateral SSA agreements and arrangements with national governments and international intergovernmental organizations,

and 51 with commercial entities. And we will continue to pursue opportunities for cooperation on SSA with other nations and nongovernmental space operators around the world. The more we can establish a collective picture of what is happening in space, the more secure we can be in the safety of our own assets. The second category of the State Department’s diplomatic engagement includes the promotion of the responsible use of outer space. Specifically, we aim to further enhance space resiliency through the multilateral development and implementation of voluntary guidelines for space activities. These guidelines can include, for example, establishing appropriate communication and consultation mechanisms and national regulatory frameworks, providing contact information for information exchanges among space owners and operators, and implementing practical measures to eliminate harmful radiofrequency interference. We use diplomatic engagement in this way to reduce the chances for conflict extending into space through the promotion of international norms of behavior, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Such norms matter because they help define boundaries and distinguish good behavior from bad behavior.

Direct Interactions Diplomatic engagement is a process to expand diplomatic relations with the target state Maller, 9 (Tara is a research fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, “The Dangers of Diplomatic Disengagement in Counterterrorism”, DOI: 10.1080/10576100902888479) CG; AD: 6/21

Different forms of non-engagement have been employed throughout history. Haas and O’Sullivan define engagement as “a foreign policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives.” 2 They also correctly point out that an engagement strategy does not mean there cannot also be concurrent military pressure and sanctions. The present author adds to their definition

the notion that engagement also tends to entail diplomatic relations with a state , a diplomatic presence in that state and a substantial amount of interaction between high and low level diplomats. Building on their definition of engagement, the present author defines non-engagement as a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on punitive measures, a lack of positive incentives, and a general aversion to diplomatic interaction with a state to achieve foreign policy objectives. Non-engagement strategies typically are characterized by punitive strategies across the military, economic, and diplomatic realms. This article will focus specifically on the diplomatic component of non-engagement, which is characterized by severing formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes. 3 It is also worth noting that in most cases of U.S.-initiated diplomatic sanctions, there may also be economic sanctions aimed at the economic isolation of the target state. In addition, once diplomatic ties with a state have been severed, the United States still faces choices about the degree to which it is willing to engage with a severed or downgraded state. Third party state actors may be used as a diplomatic go between for states without diplomatic relations and there may be very little face-to-face interaction between U.S. officials and officials of the target state. In some cases, certain types of diplomacy may be permissible (i.e., multiparty talks), whereas other forms of direct talks are not (i.e., bilateral talks). Regardless of the acceptable threshold for communication, cutting diplomatic ties with a state and opting for diplomatic disengagement sends a strong signal about U.S. willingness and desire to communicate and creates substantial barriers to doing so.

Laundry List Diplomatic engagement is positive incentives that serve the primary function of directly normalizing diplomatic relations, upgrading diplomatic presence, or regularizing interaction between high and/or low level diplomatsKrain, ’12 (Matthew Krain is a Professor of Political Science and Global & International Studies at the College of Wooster, former Visiting Scholar, Department of Political Science, Kansas State University 2012 “THE EFFECTS OF DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT” ON THE SEVERITY OF ONGOING GENOCIDES OR POLITICIDES” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108849) CG; AD: 6/21One set of foreign policy options available to states in such instances is the use of diplomatic engagement and/or disengagement (Maller 2011). Engagement is “a foreign policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives” (Haass and O’Sullivan 2000, 114). Types of diplomatic engagement that hold out the greatest allure to potential target regimes include normalizing diplomatic relations with a state, upgrading the diplomatic presence in that state, or regularizing interaction between high and low level diplomats. These actions legitimize the actor and signal a willingness to pursue a diplomatic resolution to disputes. They also insure more communication of information between actors (Maller 2010a; 2010b). Conversely, diplomatic sanctions include “severing formal diplomatic ties with a country or significantly downgrading ties from the normal level of diplomatic activity for foreign policy purposes” (Maller 2009, 512).4 This is usually done to signal disapproval of the target regime’s behavior, and to also signal the possibility of subsequent punitive measures should that behavior not change. Neither diplomatic engagement nor sanctions rule out other options. Indeed, “in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies” (Haass and O’Sullivan 2000, 114). Unfortunately, we have little information about the effect of either set of diplomatic actions in situations of ongoing mass killing.5

DE = Documents Diplomatic engagement means cooperation on treaties, agreements, and official documents Tillotson, ‘5 (Dianne Tillotson Archeology and anthropology educator, interactive multimedia for medieval history teaching since 1995, 2005 “Diplomatic (without tears)” http://medievalwriting.50megs.com/whyread/diploma.htm) CG; AD: 6/20Diplomatic is the study of the form and structure of documents, deriving from the term diploma used to designate the most formal grade of legal documents on the continent of Europe. It can be a highly detailed and intricate art which allows documents to be provenanced with some accuracy, and which can be used for the detection of forgeries. Knowledge of the diplomatic of a class of documents enables the reader to decode them more easily, and to separate the purely ceremonial language, often highly formularised, from the individualised information in the document. The term diplomatic tends to be used in relation to very formal documents such as royal charters or papal bulls, but the basic principle can be applied to any class of document. Every type of document has its particular characteristics. This is not merely stylistic conservatism by the drafters of such documents, but serves as part of the symbolic language of validation. If it looks in every detail like it is supposed to, then it is probably what it is supposed to be. Modern scholars sniff out diplomatic anomalies to detect forgeries, and no doubt medieval experts did the same.

Substantial Interps

10%Less than 10% is insubstantialMickels, ‘8 (Alissa, JD Candidate – Hastings College of Law, “Summary of Existing US Law Affecting Fourth Sector Organizations”, 7-17, http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/7/original/Summary_of_US_Law_Affecting_ FS.pdf?1229493187) CG; AD: 5/22

Substantial v. insubstantial: Modern courts consider competition with commercial firms as “strong evidence of a substantial nonexempt purpose.” Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. 710, 713 (1990). Although the tax court has held that the definition of insubstantial is fact specific , it has found that less than ten percent of a charity’s total efforts is “insubstantial” , World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), where as unrelated business activity generating one-third of an organizations revenue does not qualify for tax-exempt status. Orange County Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d 893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990). However, this may be changing after an increasing emphasis on commensurate test.

33%“Substantially” means 33 percentMaples, ‘7 (Larry, “Pitfalls in Preserving Net Operating Losses”, The CPA Journal, 3-1, Lexis) CG; AD: 5/22

If a new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets, the value of the old loss corporation must be reduced by the amount of the nonbusiness assets less liabilities attributable to those assets. "Substantial" is defined as one-third of total assets. This is a difficult provision to interpret. IRC section 382(1)(4) provides that a value reduction in the old loss corporation is required if, just after an ownership change, the new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets. This language seems odd because the purpose of IRC section 382 is to prevent loss trafficking, so it would seem that the asset test ought to apply to the old loss corporation.

40%“Substantially” means 40% --- strict quantification avoids vaguenessSchwartz, ‘4 (Arthur, Lawyer – Schwartz + Goldberg, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1609, Lexis) CG; AD: 5/22

In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be a way to avoid vagueness issues . (Pet. App., at 13-14) Indeed, one of the Amici supporting the City in this case, the American Planning Association, produced a publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure that should be adopted by municipalities in establishing zoning [*37]  regulations for adult businesses. n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms " substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent for floor space or inventory of a business in the definition of adult business. n9 (Resp. Br. App., at 15-16)

50%Less than 50% is insubstantialBrown, ‘94 (Mark R., Professor of Law – Stetson University College of Law, “The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?”, Iowa Law Review, January, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, Lexis) CG; AD: 5/22n241 I am assuming here that "foreseeable" means "probable," as in "more probable than not." This appears to be a safe assumption given the proliferance of cases granting immunity to officials who offend the Constitution. If this definition is correct, deterrence only works and liability should only attach if one's conduct, viewed ex ante, is more likely illegal than legal: the risk of illegality must be more than fifty percent. In other words, one cannot face deterrence, and liability will not attach, if the risk of illegality is less than fifty percent. (When viewed in this fashion, one might perceive a risk of illegality but still not be deterrable because the risk is not substantial, i.e., not greater than fifty percent .). Lawful conduct, of course, need not be probably lawful. That is what risk is about. Situations might arise where the objective risk is that conduct is unlawful, but ex post it is lawful. Lest judicial reasoning be completely askew, a fairly strong correlation exists, however, between action that is ex ante probably lawful and that which is lawful ex post in the courts. If this is not true, then courts are reaching objectively improbable conclusions, and the whole idea of reliance is illusory.

50% - 100%“Substantial increase” must be at least 50%UNEP 2 (United Nations Environmental Program, 10-2, www.unep.org/geo/geo3/english/584.htm)Change in selected pressures on natural ecosystems 2002-32. For the ecosystem quality component, see the explanation of the Natural Capital Index. Values for the cumulative pressures were derived as described under Natural Capital Index. The maps show the relative increase or decrease in pressure between 2002 and 2032. 'No change' means less than 10 per cent change in pressure over the scenario period; small increase or decrease means between 10 and 50 per cent change; substantial increase or decrease means 50 to 100 per cent change ; strong increase means more than doubling of pressure. Areas which switch between natural and domesticated land uses are recorded separately.

90%“Substantially” means at least 90%Words & Phrases, ‘5 (40B, p. 329) CG; AD: 5/22

N.H. 1949. -The word "substantially" as used in provision of Unemployment Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may transferred to' an employing unit which acquires the organization, -trade, or business, or "substantially" all of the assets thereof, is 'an elastic term which does not include a definite, fixed amount of percentage, and the transfer does not have to be 100 per cent but cannot be less than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation. R.L c. 218, § 6, subd. F, as added by Laws 1945, c. 138, § 16.-Auclair Transp. v. Riley, 69 A.2d 861, 96 N.H. l.-Tax347.1.

Must be Real "Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to substanceWords and Phrases, ‘2 (Volume 40A) p. 460) CG; AD: 5/22

Ala. 1909. “Substantial” means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; *** not seeming or imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable

AT: Arbitrary Substantially’ isn’t precise --- but still must be given meaning. The most objective way to define it contextually.Devinsky, ‘2 (Paul, “Is Claim "Substantially" Definite?  Ask Person of Skill in the Art”, IP Update, 5(11), November, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/c2c73bdb-9b1a-42bf-a2b7-075812dc0e2d.cfm) CG; AD: 5/22

In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the district court, by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to consider what a person of skill in the art would understand in a "technologic context," erroneously concluded the term "substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite .   Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417 (Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related to an improved push rod for an internal combustion engine.  The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is larger at the middle than at the ends and has "substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and rounded seats at the tips.  The district court found that the expression "substantially constant wall thickness" was not supported in the specification and prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition of "substantially" and was, therefore, indefinite.  The district court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be definite in some cases but ruled that in this case it was indefinite because it was not further defined. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in requiring that the meaning of the term "substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found solely in intrinsic evidence:  "While reference to intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the meaning of words as they would be understood by persons in the field of the invention."  Thus, the Federal Circuit instructed that "resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification may be aided by extrinsic evidence of usage and meaning of a term in the context of the invention."  The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that "[t]he question is not whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of mechanics, upon reading the patent documents."

Contextualized definitions resolve their arbitrary arg Viscasillas, ‘4 (Pilar is a professor at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid “Contracts for the Sale of Goods to Be Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 3 CISG)”, CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 4, 10-24, http://cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=146&sid=146) CG; AD: 5/222.8. Legal writers who follow the economic value criterion have generally quantified the term "substantial part" by comparing Article 3(1) CISG (substantial) with Article 3(2) CISG (preponderant): substantial being less than preponderant. In this way, legal writers have used the following percentages to quantify substantial: 15%,[14] between 40% and 50%,[15] or more generally 50%.[16] At the same time, other authors, although they have not fixed any numbers in regard to the quantification of the term "substantial" have declared that "preponderant" means "considerably more than 50% of the price" or "clearly in excess of 50%".[17] Thus it seems that for the latter authors, the quantification of the term "substantial" is placed above the 50% figure. Also, some Courts have followed this approach.[18]2.9. To consider a fixed percentage might be arbitrary due to the fact that the particularities of each case ought to be taken into account; that the scholars are in disagreement; and that the origin of those figures is not clear.[19]Therefore, it does not seem to be advisable to quantify the word "substantial"   a priori   in percentages. A case-by-case analysis is preferable and thus it should be determined on the basis of an overall assessment.