Trust Jason Chalecki Usable Privacy and Security – Spring 2006.

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Trust Jason Chalecki Usable Privacy and Security – Spring 2006

Transcript of Trust Jason Chalecki Usable Privacy and Security – Spring 2006.

Page 1: Trust Jason Chalecki Usable Privacy and Security – Spring 2006.

TrustJason Chalecki

Usable Privacy and Security – Spring 2006

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Not much trust e-commerce sites

29% trust either "just about always" or "most of the time"

64% trust "only some of the time" or "never"

consumer advice sites 33% trust 59% low levels of trust

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An online problem? small businesses

68% trust newspapers and television news

58% trust financial companies such as banks, insurance

companies and stockbrokers 55% trust

charities and other nonprofit organizations 54% trust

federal government 47% trust at least most of the time

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From A Matter of Trust: What Users Want From Web Sites

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Lost or lacking trust Napster (2003)

Very long pauses between songs. I dropped the service and haven’t been back, even though, when it worked, I loved it.

Jakob Nielsen (Alertbox 1999) Would probably love the eFax service, but didn’t sign up because he

would be locked in. Amazon.com (1999)

They admitted that many favorable reviews had been paid for But the flawed policy was terminated and the damage to the customer

relationship was mended by an offer to refund any purchase that had been based on a paid recommendation.

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Trust is fundamental to security Lack of trust results in systems being ill-used

or used not at all Lack of understanding of trust results in

wrong decisions or no decisions Too much trust can be more dangerous than

too little E.g. I can open any file attachment because I run

anti-virus software

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Fundamental questions How to reliably represent trust in different

interactions and interfaces How to transform trust-based decisions into

security decisions while maintaining the meaning of the trust-based decisions

What are the building blocks of trust How is trust fallible How can trust’s fallibility be addressed

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Definition assured reliance on the character, ability,

strength, or truth of someone or something (Merriam-Webster)

Concerns a positive expectation regarding the behavior of somebody or something in a situation that entails risk to the trusting party (Patrick, Briggs, and Marsh)

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Layers Dispositional trust

Psychological disposition or personality trait to be trusting or not

Learned trust A person’s general tendency to trust, or not to

trust, as a result of experience Situational trust

Basic tendencies are adjusted in response to situational cues

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Granularity I trust you

I trust you this much

I trust you this much to do this thing

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Another axis Hard trust

technology

Soft trust social

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Processing strategies Heuristic approach making quick judgments

from the obvious information

Systematic approach involving detailed analysis of information

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Credibility How is this different than trust?

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Credibility How is this different than trust?

Credibility is believability Trust is dependability

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“Credibility and Computing Technology”

Four Types of Credibility Presumed credibility. Reputed credibility. Surface credibility. Experienced credibility.

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Presumed credibility Belief based on general assumptions

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Reputed credibility Belief based on third-party reports

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Surface credibility Belief based on simple inspection

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Experienced credibility Belief based on one’s own experience

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“Credibility and Computing Technology”

Four Types of Credibility Presumed credibility. Reputed credibility. Surface credibility. Experienced credibility.

How do these relate to the layers of trust?

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Judgments of credibility Prominence

Involvement of the user Topic of the web site Nature of the user’s task User’s experience Individual differences

Interpretation Assumptions in a user’s mind Skills and knowledge possessed by user Context for the user

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Time Initial trust Interactions Long-term trusted relationship

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Trustworthiness Ability

Capacity to keep promises Integrity

Actually keeping promises Benevolence

Acting in another’s best interest

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Bhattacherjee’s Model

Familiarity

Trust

Willingness to Transact

+ +

+

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Lee, Kim, & Moon’s ModelComprehensive

Information

Shared Value

Communication

Uncertainty

Number of Competitors

Specificity

Trust

Transaction Cost

Customer Loyalty

+

+

-

+

+

+

-

-

+

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Corritore’s Model

Credibility

Ease of Use

Risk

External Factors Trust

Perception of:

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Egger’s Model (revised)

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McKnight’s Model

Disposition to Trust

Institution-Based Trust (perceptions of the

Internet environment)

Trust Beliefs (perceptions of specific web vendor attributes)

Trusting Intentions (intention to engage in

trust-related behaviors with a specific web vendor)

Trust-Related Behaviors

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Riegelsberger’s Model

TRUSTER TRUSTEE

OutsideOption

Withdrawal

Fulfillment

Separation in Space

+UNCERTAINTY

Separation in Time

+UNCERTAINTY

Trusting Action

Signals

Nonfulfillment

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Models Comparison Can be successfully operationalized, typically

into questionnaires Components of trust

Ability Integrity Benevolence

Many factors may affect trust

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Trust Design Guidelines1. Ensure good ease of use.2. Use attractive design.3. Create a professional image – avoid

spelling mistakes and other simple errors.

4. Don’t mix advertising and content – avoid sales pitches and banner advertisements.

5. Convey a “real-world” look and feel – for example, with use of high-quality photographs of real places and people.

6. Maximize the consistency, familiarity, or predictability of an interaction both in terms of process and visually.

7. Include seals of approval such as TRUSTe.

8. Provide explanations, justifying the advice or information given.

9. Include independent peer evaluation such as references from past and current users and independent message boards.

10. Provide clearly stated security and privacy statements, and also rights to compensation and returns.

11. Include alternative views, including good links to independent sites with the same business area.

12. Include background information such as indicators of expertise and patterns of past performance.

13. Clearly assign responsibilities (to the vendor and the customer).

14. Ensure that communication remains open and responsive, and offer order tracking or an alternative means of getting in touch.

15. Offer a personalized service that takes account of each client’s needs and preferences and reflects its social identity.

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Stanford Guidelines for Web Credibility

1. Make it easy to verify the accuracy of the information on your site.

2. Show that there's a real organization behind your site.

3. Highlight the expertise in your organization and in the content and services you provide.

4. Show that honest and trustworthy people stand behind your site.

5. Make it easy to contact you.

6. Design your site so it looks professional (or is appropriate for your purpose).

7. Make your site easy to use – and useful.

8. Update your site's content often (at least show it's been reviewed recently).

9. Use restraint with any promotional content (e.g., ads, offers).

10. Avoid errors of all types, no matter how small they seem.

Stanford Persuasive Technology Labhttp://www.webcredibility.org/guidelines/

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Jakob Nielsen’s Guidelines Design quality Up-front disclosure Comprehensive, correct, and current Connected to the rest of the Web

Trust or Bust: Communicating Trustworthiness in Web DesignJakob Nielsen's Alertbox, March 7, 1999http://www.useit.com/alertbox/990307.html

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Guidelines Comparison

Professional appearance and ease of use are very important

Be correct and verifiable Be part of a larger community

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Microsoft and Users and Trust

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Trust Question Failings Often, the question being presented is a

dilemma rather than a decision Computers can’t help interpret emotional cues

because they behave in a purely logical way Users don’t want to deal with the trust issues

presented to them Users don’t want to reveal personal data

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User Behavior What users say they do and what they actually do

often differ Users don’t necessarily want to think about the

consequences of their behavior Users make one-off decisions about trust Users conceive of security and privacy issues

differently than developers do Users have many superstitions about how viruses are

propagated

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Before XP SP2

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XP SP2

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Help for “downloading” decision

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Help for “running” decision

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Recommendations Let users make trust decisions in context Make the most trusted option the default

selection Present users with choices, not dilemmas Always respect the user’s decision