1

Trust and Power of Social Movements: The Case of Feminist Solidarity in Tahrir

Dr. Ali Bilgic

Bilkent University, Dpt. of International Relations

To be presented at

Political Science Association Conference

25-27 March 2013

Cardiff

Work in Progress

What power means, how it is performed, and to what end, on which level of politics power can be

studied are questions that have intrigued many students of International Relations (IR). One of the

fundamental matters of disagreement is that study of power also calls for explicitly normative

judgements. As Edward Said once suggested, when he was reflecting on Foucault, “it is sensible to

begin by asking the beginning questions, why imagine power in the first place, and what is the

relationship between one’s motive for imagining power and the image one ends up with”.1 Different

approaches to power from traditional to critical branches are underlined by political and normative

assumptions about why to study power. In particular, while they all problematize the narrow

traditional understandings, critical approaches to power differ from each other as to “what to do with

power”. Power of social movements resisting oppressive power of authoritarian regimes during the

Arab uprisings has re-brought the question to the centre of academic analysis.

This paper, which aligns with critical and explicitly normative approaches, aims to contribute to the

developing literature on power by introducing the concept of trust. Therefore, it attempts to provoke a

new conceptual thinking regarding power. Notwithstanding the immense contributions of the critical

literature on power in IR, they often overlook the role of trust in social movements, such as those in

the Arab Spring, as a source of their power. As will be argued, trust is the central factor which keeps

the movement together in spite of their differences in identity terms. Through developing a trust

relationship, segments of the movements can construct a common identity without dichotomizing the

sub-groups based on their political differences. Finally, the exploration of the trust dimension of power

also reveals a practical implication as to how the social movement should continue in order to retain

the power stemming from trust.

Understanding the dynamics of power (what type of power, how does it work, to what end) of social

movements has recently become necessary with the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East

(MENA). The social movements in several MENA countries represented a diversity transcending race,

class, gender, political opinion, and religious differences. In spite of their diverging, and potentially

conflicting, interests, these political groups constructed an Arendtian “body politic” through trusting

each other. The power of these resisting bodies politic partly stem from their ability to develop trust as

a constitutive element of community.

1 Edward Said, ‘Foucault and the Imagination of Power’ in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A Critical Reader

(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986), p. 151.

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Traditional Approaches

What power means, how it works, and “what to do with power” are questions whose answers are

derived from power scholars' own normative and analytical orientations towards world politics. When

international relations is accepted as an arena of clash and conflict among ethnocentric rational actors

(mainly, states), power is conceptualised accordingly. Consequently, as widely acknowledged in the

literature, the concept of power has been highly associated, and often interchangeably used, with

domination.2

Although some segments of traditional approaches conceive power as a capacity to be possessed by an

actor,3 the common tendency in traditional approaches is to conceptualise power as a relational

phenomenon, rather than “stuff” to be possessed. The relational approach focuses on the practices of at

least two actors in order to see how one actor makes another act in a way that it would not otherwise:

coercion and persuasion are accepted as two main methods. Realist/neorealist approaches prioritise

coercion through violent or non-violent ways and sometimes rewarding (carrots). The

conceptualization of "soft power" by neoliberals reconceptualised the neorealist power as "hard

power". Instead, according to the neoliberal approach, actors exercise “soft power” by becoming a

centre of attraction for others appealing to hearts and minds of people.4 Soft power sometimes appears

as “normative power” whose legitimacy stems from its adoption of internationally held and respected

norms.5

Both hard and soft traditional conceptualizations of power are manifestations of theories' analytical

assumptions about world politics. First, whether through coercion or persuasion, both assume power as

a characteristic of relation of domination. In this hierarchical relationship, the actor with material

and/or social capital directs another's practices in accord with its rationally determined self-interests.

As will be shown below, some feminists call this type of power "power-over". Power as in the relation

of domination is an important dimension of power. However, it would not be accurate to reduce power

relations in world politics to power-over.

Second, this power does not only define a relationship of domination. It also sometimes appears as

repression. Repression, hereby, means the limitation of freedom of choice of an actor by another's

exercise of power over it. As a result, an actor on whom power is exercised is repressed while the

powerful actors' choices are multiplied because of its ability to exercise power. This generates a

question that whether "weak" actors are completely deprived of choices. If no, is it possible to claim

that repressed actors do not exercise power? If they exercise power, is this necessarily the same type of

power the repressor exercises?

Third, this understanding does not effectively explore the relationship between power and

(re)production of political identities. While “hard power” neglects the issue, “soft power” implies a

unidirectional relationship between the two. For example, an actor subjected to soft power can

2 Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science, 2:3 (July, 1957), pp. 201-215; K.J. Holsti, ‘The

Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations’, Background, 7:4 (February, 1964), pp. 179-194;David A. Baldwin, ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, International Organization, 34:4 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 471-506. For a discussion of ethics of power based on coercion and the one based on persuasion see Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Power, Persuasion and Justice’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 33 (2005), pp. 551-581. 3 Structural realism is a good example of this because in this way, power of a state can be scientefically

measured. 4 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 2004).

5 Ian Manner, ‘Normative Power Europe’

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reconstruct its identity along the line of the identity of the other. This is a consequence of exercising

soft power. In contrast, in this paper, it is argued that there is a mutually constitutive relationship

between power and political identity. In feminist IR literature, this constitutive relationship is

conceptualized in the theory of “hegemonic masculinity”. According to this theory, through

domination, power-over, dichotomist identities are constructed between masculinized (rational, strong,

proactive) hegemon and effeminized (emotional, weak, passive) subordinated actors. These

dichotomist identities, in turn, recreate hegemonic power relations.6 This paper aims to explore how

identity is in a mutually constitutive relationship with, not “power-over”, but “power-with”.

Sometimes power emerges when actors are able to construct a collective identity. Understanding the

trust dimension of this identity construction process is necessary.

Foucaultian Power

According to Foucault, power is not a “stuff” to be possessed by an actor, but it exists when it is

exercised.7 However, unlike the traditional approach, Foucault rejects an understanding of power that

transcends time and space, a power that is ahistorical. For him, power is social in the sense that it

interpenetrates in all spheres of social life by producing and reproducing individuals' subjectivities.8

While individual subjectivities are reconstructed through processes of normalization, this results in

reproduction of power. According to Foucault, power is extended into all social spheres of life; there is

nothing immune to the effects of power. As individual subjectivities are shaped through daily deeds

and words, power is reproduced. Here, power is not directly and intentionally inflicted on individuals.

Rather, power emerges when individuals act in accordance with certain norms (such as when a woman

has plastic surgery to conform to the aesthetics of the period). In other words, power (re)emerges

socially, when they act in order to “normalise” themselves within the structures of power.

One of the most important dimensions of Foucaultian power is how the issue of intentionality is dealt

with.9 Traditional approaches to power put intentionality of rational actors at the centre of their power

conceptualizations: actors who rationally determine their self-interests inflict power over others to

make them act in accordance with the former’s self-interests. Although Foucault does not reject that

actors sometimes intentionally inflict power on others through micro-political practices (such as

building prisons, guarding state borders)10

, most power actually emerges when it makes individuals act

in their daily activities in accordance with the norms of power. A Foucaultian power “should not

concern itself with power at level of conscious intention or decision”.11

Rather:

What defines a relationship of power is that is a mode of action which does not directly or

immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on

existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.12

When this approach to the unintentionality of power is combined with the idea of how subjectivities

are formed through power, we arrive at a power approach which cannot be solidified. In other words,

6 Charlotte Hooper, Manly States.

7 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry, 8:4 (Summer, 1982), p. 788.

8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 29.

9 For a discussion of intentionality in Foucaultian power, see Peter Digeser, ‘The Fourth Face of Power’, The

Journal of Politics, 45:4 (November, 1992), pp. 982-984. 10

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1 An Introduction. (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 90-95. 11

Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon, 1980, p. 97. 12

Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 789.

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power becomes a dynamic concept that changes and is changed through practice. This is an important

point to understand the dynamism of power of social movements and how this power transforms

individuals’ own conception of themselves. It is also important because it directs our attention to the

role of agency of those who are subjected to power and its resistance.

The second important dimension of Foucaultian power is the role agency of individuals in the

reproduction of power. As said previously, power emerges when individuals act along the norms of

power (such as norms of citizenship, gender, class, and race). On the one hand, in the Foucaultian

approach, individuals are generally depicted as “docile bodies” whose “disorderly irrational,

irresponsible thoughts and desires are self-capped and self-controlled, yielding the disciplined self. We

become our own jailors and perpetuate disciplinary practices through our own actions”.13

On the other

hand, power needs individuals to reproduce itself. This endows individuals an agency to resist (what

feminists call “power-to”). For the Foucaultian approach, resistance is an integral dimension of power:

“Where there is power, there is resistance”.14

It is accepted as a condition of understanding the

existence of power. In addition, there is always resistance because there are always rejections to

conform to the normalizing norms of power. However, this role of agency to resist power becomes

complicated because the way Foucaltian power is conceptualised leaves almost no room for

understanding the “power” of individuals to resist. That is why Steven Lukes considers Foucaultian

approach as “ultra-radical view of power” and criticises it:

The problem is that the rhetorical, ultra-radical view of power strips the subject of power

of both freedom and reason. In short, on this view it is no longer possible to distinguish

between the exercise of power as indoctrination and the exercise of power that leaves or

renders those subject to it free to live according to the dictates of their nature or

judgement.15

Lukes’ criticism to Foucault might not be fair because Foucault does not overlook the “freedom and

reason” of individuals: in relation to reason, he reminds us that what is called “reason” cannot be

thought of independently from power relations through which individuals are normalised; in relation

to freedom, Foucault underlines the importance of freedom of individuals. For him, “power is

exercised only over free subjects”16

or power exists by enabling free individuals to act in certain way.

That said, Lukes’ comment should be noted because of the extensive and all-encompassing character

of Foucaltian power. Indeed, power is so dominating and subordinating and it penetrates into all

spheres of life that it is not easy to analytically discover and empirically detect how “docile bodies”

can render transformation possible, even if we accept that they can resist. As will be discussed below,

some feminists call this “the paradox of agency”.

Notwithstanding its valuable insight, the Foucaultian approach has important setbacks to analyse

power in relation to trust in social movements. First, although Foucault's normative and political

position about power is critical, there is no clear answer to the question of “what to do with power”.

Foucault surely criticises oppressive power relations and calls for resistance to individuality “which

has been imposed on us for several centuries”.17

However, the problem here is Foucault’s

13

Digeser, ‘The Fourth Face of Power’, p. 994. 14

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 95. 15

Steven Lukes, ‘Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds’, Millennium- Journal of International Studies 33 (2005), p. 492. 16

Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 790. 17

Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, p. 785.

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undifferentiated position towards all types of power which makes his approach normatively

problematic. Ken Booth’s four criticisms to Foucault are worth to quote:

First, not all ‘regimes of truth’ can be allowed to be equal; some are more emancipatory

than others…Two, if knowledge becomes reduced to power in the international realm,

power gets to explain everything. If that becomes the case, power becomes a truism that

explains everything, and therefore nothing. Three, if we accept that there is a relationship

between power and knowledge, a critical approach must seek to help give voice to the

voiceless…Four, the knowledge/power relationship is one reason why we need a concept

of truth, for without it power is the only arbiter.18

Booth’s criticisms are made from the perspective of early Frankfurt School that, first, problematizes

oppressive structures and second, aims to promote the freedoms of individuals. Through the method of

imminent critique, it reveals emancipatory potential within the existing structures. This potential can

only be realized if individuals choose to act in the face of oppressive power. Therefore, it questions the

power understanding that renders individuals powerless “docile bodies” who are deprived from the

ability to resist and transform. The emancipatory power understanding must include empowerment of

the oppressed individuals and social groups. Some feminist approaches walk along this line.

Second, like traditional approaches, Foucault's power is “power-over” and it is a dominating one.

However, there are different types of power in world politics. The third issue is about identity-power

relationship. Surely, Foucaultian approach offers a more elaborated perspective than traditional

approaches on the issue of identity. However, the power he focuses on is power-over, which

configures individual subjectivities. What about the relationship between resistance and identity?

Foucault makes it clear that the resistance to power should not lead to a construction of common

identity, which can be equally dominating. Instead, differences among individuals should be

promoted. However, sometimes, power emerges from the collective identity which can be thought in

relation to trust among individuals.

Feminist Approaches to Power

It would not be accurate to offer a generalizing statement about feminist understanding of power.

While there are competing feminist conceptualizations of power, one can argue that they all unite with

the normative and political claim of addressing women subordination with the purpose of generating

transformation in practice: the objective of “feminist praxis”, which refers not only to understanding

politics, but to studying it in order to change it.19

Feminist approaches to power reflect this praxis. This

section starts with three conceptualizations of power in feminist theory. Here I will use Amy Allen's

classification: power-over, power-to, and power-with. Then I will explore feminists' engagement with

Foucaultian power.

Amy Allen's analysis of feminist understandings of power enables students of international politics to

see what power means, how it is exercised and how it can be dealt with in a different context. In

addition, the three-way classification of power is highly influenced by the explicit normative objective

of feminist theory. They do not study solely with the purpose of understanding (in traditional sense) or

understanding, problematizing and resisting (in Foucaultian sense) existing power relations and

18

Ken Booth, Theory of World Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 242. 19

Sue Wise, ‘Feminist Activism: Continuity and Change’ in Women, Power and Resistance: An Introduction to Women’s Studies, Tess Cosslett, Alison Easton and Penny Summerfield (eds.),Buckhingham: Open University Press, 1996, p. 239. (238-249)

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structures. In general, feminists, by using Booth's words, aim “to give the voice the voiceless” and

therefore, transforming the existing power relations. "Insofar as feminists are interested in studying

power, it is because we have an interest in understanding, criticizing, challenging, subverting, and

ultimately overturning the multiple axes of stratification affecting women".20

As a result, many

feminists are not satisfied with a power conceptualization that fails to serve this political and analytical

objective, that is, feminist praxis.

“Power-over” refers to "the ability of an actor or set of actors to constrain the choices available to

another actor or set of actors in a nontrivial way".21

In this understanding, power works as a restraining

factor on the choices of those who are subjected to this type of power. However, power-over has

variations. In some context, it can be dyadic and intentional that one actor releases power on another to

make it act in the former's interests. Many traditional approaches in IR can be included in this version.

In other contexts, however, power-over is structural and not intentional. For example, even if some

men do not intentionally restrict women's choices in patriarchal societies, patriarchy itself does the job

for men. This version of power-over is similar to Foucaltian power.

The second type of power is “power-to” which refers "to the ability of an individual actor to attain an

end or series of ends".22

This is a type of power that those who are subjected to power-over can

exercise in spite of their subordination. In parallel with their normative objective, many feminist works

in IR focus on analysing this type of power which presumes that subordinated women retain a capacity

to resist domination and inflict power.23

However, subjected to repressive practices of power-over,

women are not rendered powerless.

“Power-with” is the third type of power. It refers to "a collective ability that results from the

receptivity and reciprocity that characterize the relations among individual members of the

collectivity".24

Power here does not take the form of limiting the choices of others, nor does it stem

from individual empowerment and resistance. Rather, power is derived from solidarity among those

who are victimized by power-over. Power-with emerges from collective action. In this paper, the

objective is to explore the role of trust in the formation of power-with.

A caveat is in order. These three types of power "are not best understood as distinct types or forms of

power; rather, they represent analytically distinguishable features of a situation". 25

They can co-exist

together or they can be converted into each other. For example, power-with can have the effects of

power-over. Power-to can be increased through power-with. The important point for my analysis is

that diversifications of power understandings by going beyond power-over enables us to recognize that

victimized and voiceless also have power and sometimes this power originates from collective action.

This will later lead me to bring trust into power-with. Before this, I will explain feminists’ engagement

with Foucaultian power in order to highlight why the Foucaultian power approach cannot be

efficiently used to understand the power-trust relationship.

20

Amy Allen, Power of Feminist Theory, p. 2. 21

Ibid., p. 125. 22

Ibid., p. 126. 23

Cynthia Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism, and Feminist Analysis (London: Zed Books, 2007); Ana Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav Republics’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 10:2 (1997), pp. 130-139; Hughes, Donna M., Lepa Mladjenovic and Zorica Mrsevic, ‘Feminist Resistance in Serbia’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 2:4 (1995), pp. 509-532; Elisabeth Porter, "Building feminist movements and organizations: Global perspectives." Democratiya (2008) 24

Allen, Power of Feminist Theory, p. 126. 25

Ibid., p. 129.

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One contribution of the Foucaultian analysis to feminist theory is the productive interaction between

practices of power and subjectivities. Feminist exploration of contingency of power relations and how

subjectivities are embedded in these relations has led many feminists to revoke the universality of

conception of "women". Therefore, many feminists reject "biological essentialism" in favour of

approaching gender and sex as historically constructed categories in relation to basic truth claims.26

Judith Butler states that genealogical analysis of gender leads to the study of gender "as an effect, an

object of a genealogical investigation that maps out the political parameters of its construction in the

mode of ontology".27

As a result, gender is introduced as a dispositif that female subjectivities are

formed.28

In addition, such understanding has rendered especially postcolonial feminists to explore

how gender interacts with others forms of power relations such as race.29

In relation to power and resistance, however, feminist engagement with Foucault can be described as

tension. On the one hand, many feminists find that the Foucaultian approach to power offers the

theoretical foundation for the long-lasting feminist idea that “the personal is political”.30

Indeed,

Foucault releases power from the narrow conceptualizations that rely on rationality, intentionality, and

hierarchy between the active powerful and subservient passive weak in the public sphere. Instead,

power operates in social relations covering all spheres of life. Removing the boundaries between

public and private, power shapes, produces and is reproduced through daily activities of subjects. As

Nancy Fraser states, "Foucault enables us understand power very broadly, and yet very finely, as

anchored in the multiplicity of what he calls micro-practices, the social practices that constitute

everyday life in modern societies".31

Dynamism and the social character of Foucaultian power have

enabled feminists theoretically to show that gendered power relations are reconstructed daily.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the conflation between the two, feminists have been critical to

some core dimensions of Foucaultian power. One of them is the issue of resistance of "docile bodies".

Feminists who use Foucaultian approach comprehensively analyse and show how women bodies are

formed in docility and obedience through power, but how they can also find spaces of resistance.32

As

discussed above, for Foucault, resistance is an integral part of the exercise of power. However,

“Foucault's insistence on the disciplinary production of docile bodies obscures this point”.33

Indeed,

“he never offers a detailed account of resistance as an empirical phenomenon in any of his

genealogical analyses. Only social actors in those works are the dominating agents; there is no

discussion of the strategies employed by madmen, delinquents, schoolchildren, perverts, or hysterical

26

M.E. Bailey, ‘Foucaldian Feminism: Contesting Bodies, Sexuality and Identity’ in Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism, Caroline Ramazanoğlu (ed.), London: Routledge, 1993, p. 116-117. 27

Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London: Routledge, 1990, p. 32. 28

Patricia Amigot and Margot Pujal, ‘On Power, Freedom, and Gender: A Fruitful Tension between Foucault and Feminism’, Theory and Psychology, 19(5), 2009, p. 651. 29

Ibid. 30

Ibid, 650; J. Sawicki, ‘Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault and Feminism’ in Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, I. Diamond and L. Quinby (eds.), Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988, p. 186-190. 31

Nancy Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions!’, in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 18. (17-34) 32

Butler, Gender Trouble; Susan Bordo, ‘Feminism, Foucault and the Politics of the Body’ in Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism, Caroline Ramazanoğlu (ed.), London: Routledge, 1993, p. 179-202 and Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 193. 33

Amigot and Pujal, ‘On Power, Freedom, and Gender’, p. 652.

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women to modify or contest the disciplinary or biopower exercised over them”.34

The power of

resistance, “power-to” and “power-with”, is missing in the Foucaltian approach. This had led Allen to

argue that Foucault’s power suffers from “the paradox of agency”: individuals are accepted as subjects

who have agency (an ability to act, to resist), while this agency is taken away when a deterministic

account of human actions subjected to power is accepted.35

Paradox of agency generates questions

such as how did individuals during the Arab Spring cope with their docility and form a community to

resist power-over? How did they create transformation? Where did their power rest on? These are the

questions that Foucaltian power approach may fail to answer. In other words, as Booth claims, it can

fail to give “voice the voiceless”.

Another important source of conflict is normativity. Many feminist works have been critical to

Foucault because, for them, he overlooks normative distinctions between different uses of power.

Fraser, for example, accepts that all social practices are embedded in power relations but "it does not

follow that all forms of power are normatively equivalent nor that any social practices are as good as

any other".36

In a more friendly feminist critique to Foucault, Lois McNay argues that Foucault fails to

make the connection between the ethics of the self he purports and his theory of power, although each

criticism of the present should include normative assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate uses of

power.37

Feminists, because of their explicit normative agenda, offer a more practical account about

“what to do with power”.

The last source of disagreement is related to power-with. Foucault rejects the idea of power based on

consensus. This "commits Foucault to a wholesale rejection of any sort of understanding of power that

is generated through reciprocal, collective social action".38

Therefore, feminists take our attention to a

type of power which emerges through collective standing bound by solidarity based on a shared

identity. When power is thought in relation to a body politic resisting the oppressive power-over such

as in the case of Arab Spring, an analytical way would be paved in order to study how this body politic

is formed, where their source of power lies in, or what kind of power they exercise. As will be

discussed below, trust is an important dimension of the answers to these questions.

In this paper, I have so far discussed power conceptualizations in IR that have been vastly used. The

Foucaultian approach revealed the social and dynamic dimension of power and power relations, how

power operates and generates implications for those who are subjected to power. If we think of all

feminist criticisms to Foucault altogether, it is possible to see that these are underlined by the former's

normative and political ideas about “what to do with power”. In parallel with their theoretical

objectives, feminists are not satisfied with the oppressive power versus oppressed women dichotomy

but tend to find power within the practices and ideas of those who are subjected to power-over. This

“power-to” is coupled with another power understanding that stems from collective feminist actions: a

type of power emerging with others, “power-with”. And in this last version I will be enabled to

introduce a theoretical connection between trust and power. In order to understand this, I will explore

Hannah Arendt's power conceptualization.

One of the most important contributions of Arendt is her conceptual differentiation of power from

other concepts such as strength, force and, most importantly for her analysis, violence. Strength, for

34

Allen, Power of Feminist Theory, p. 54. 35

Ibid., p. 55. 36

Fraser, ‘Foucault on Modern Power’, p. 32. 37

Lois McNay, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992, p. 141. 38

Allen, Power of Feminist Theory, p. 56.

9

Arendt, is an individual property inherent in his/her nature or character. Force, on the other hand, is

conceptualized as energy released from actions of physical or social movements. For Arendt, violence

is a critical concept as it has been often confused with the essence of power. In contrast, "violence is

by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through

the end it pursues. And what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of

anything".39

According to Arendt, violence is instrumental and in close relationship with strength:

violence has a multiplier effect on strength. Violence and power are not ends of a continuum, but

completely opposite concepts. When the one exists, the other one disappears.

Then what is power for Arendt? Power "corresponds to the human ability not just to act, but to act in

concert. Power is never a property of individual; it belongs to a group, and remains in existence as

long as the group keeps together".40

As power is not a “stuff” to be possessed, and only emerges when

it is exercised collectively, its potential is limitless. Its actualization, however, depends on action and

speech by a collective group in what she calls the space of appearance. Power, for Arendt, is "what

keeps the public realm - the space of appearance between acting and speaking men, in existence".41

When it is not actualized, power disappears which eventually leads to weakening and disappearance of

the collectivity, or body politic.

Arendt's power conceptualization is useful to understand what feminists call "power-with", which is

disregarded by Foucault. Arendt's power points at a potential of collectivity, a number of individuals

who are able to act and speak together. When they act, power is actualized. Without collectivity, there

is no power, but only, for Arendt, strength. Because of this collective character, feminists, for example

Allen, built power-with on Arendt's concept of power. Arendt also intelligibly disassociates the

concept of power from the concept of violence by rendering the latter simply an instrument which is

sometimes used against power. In addition, Arendt removes power from the realm of destruction. She

states that "power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are

not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities,

and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities".42

In

this way, Arendt offers a normative guideline for the political purposes of power, what to do with

power in political life: not for destruction, but creation by revealing hidden realities.

For Arendt, one of the most important factors of power is the faculty of promising which keeps the

collectivity together. She states that "the force that keeps them together, as distinguished from the

space of appearances in which they gather and the power which keeps this public space in existence, is

the force of mutual promise or contract".43

Power is actualized in a body politic when members of the

group believe that other members will keep promises which brought them together: "sovereignty of a

body of people bound and kept together, not by an identical will which somehow magically inspires

them all, but by an agreed purpose for which alone the promises are valid and binding".44

The body

politic depending on ruling, sovereignty or power-over is not a realm of uncertainty because

domination, and sometimes violence, operates. However, in Arendtian thinking, power and uncertainty

go hand in hand because power depends on keeping mutual promises in the collectivity. Through

39

Hannah Arendt, On Violence, London: A Harvest Book, 1970, p. 51. 40

Arendt, On Violence, p. 44. 41

Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 2nd edition, p. 200. 42

Ibid. 43

Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 244-245. 44

Ibid., p. 245.

10

promises, "certain islands of predictability are thrown and in which certain guideposts of reliability are

erected".45

This is where we need to explore the relation between trust and power-with.

Trust and Power-With

Power conceptualizations in IR offer alternative insights into what power is and how it operates.

Among them, feminist power approaches, mainly because of their commitment to feminist praxis,

conceptualize power as a multifaceted phenomenon that involves the power of the subjected

individuals. Not only individual resistance but also transformation as a result of collective action is

included as a dimension of power. Deriving from Arendt’s power in concert, feminists have paved the

way for understanding power as stemming from collective action. The concept of trust is essential in

the formation of collectivities, or body politic. Therefore, it is also essential to understand relationship

between trust and feminist power-with.

Trust is accepted as an integral component of formation of a collective life. In Niklas Luhmann’s

words, it is the factor which makes collective life possible.46

In a social formation without trust,

ethnocentrism marks relations between individuals. This means that each individual pursues his/her

self-interest without considering the interests of others. The consequence is very similar to what is

presented in the infamous Stag Hunt game: since there is no trust between the hunters, they follow

their self-interests at the expense of common interest of the community. Therefore, the community

ceases to exist. In contrast, when members trust each other, not only a collectivity is formed, but also

common life is flourished and enriched.47

Trust can be defined as one’s belief that s/he will protect and promote others’ interests with the

expectation that others will act in a similar way.48

Trust as a belief or an expectation is risky. Betrayal

of trust generally results in harming the trusting party’s interests. Despite its risky characteristics,

individuals tend to develop trust in others because, as Misztal nicely puts it, “human beings, as

emotional, rational and instrumentally oriented agents, [seek] to ensure that their social relations and

arrangements meet their emotional, cognitive and instrumental needs”.49

The interest dimension of

trust is widely acknowledged in the literature. The trust relationship continues as long as the parties

who encapsulate each others’ interests think that their relationship serves their self-interests.50

As

Richard Dees’ conceptualization points out, ‘trust is rational only if we can reasonably expect

something we value . . . can be gained from it’.51

This interest-based conceptualization of trust

dominates trust understanding in IR literature: rational actors cooperate with each other with the

expectation of gaining benefits from the cooperation.52

45

Ibid., p. 244. 46

Niklas Luhmann, ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives’ in David Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 97. 47

Niklas Luhmann, ‘Familiarity, Confidence, Trust’, p. 104; Martin Hollis, Trust Within Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 4. 48

This is a combination of minimalist and maximalist definition of trust, see Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, p. 230. 49

Barbara Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: the Search for the Basis of Social Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 22. 50

Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 3. 51

Richard H. Dees, Trust and Toleration (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 34. 52

Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Aaron Hoffmann, Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Relations (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006).

11

The interest-based conceptualizations can be contrasted with those which focus on the normative

dimension of trust relations. Martin Hollis is the pioneer of this approach. He criticises the former by

arguing that if a trust relationship is built to further participants’ self-interests, the relationship

becomes fragile. This is because it can be broken when the relationship does not serve the self-

interests of the parties. In contrast, according to Hollis, trust has a normative dimension whose source

lies in ‘social norms and moral qualities’. These norms and moral qualities construct a “bond” between

individuals. Trust therefore becomes an expectation that others will honour this bond and “do what is

right”.53

The normative dimension facilitates a trust relationship stemming from values, norms and

emotions in social relations.

The normative dimension of trust reveals that the trust relationship affects the construction of common

identities. While Hollis defines this as bonding, Booth and Wheeler specifically highlight this effect.

When a trust relationship is developed, it generates a “we-feeling”, a common identity between the

parties.54

However, these approaches, first, do not theoretically explore how this common identity can

be constructed, and second, dichotomize the normative dimension with the interest dimension of trust.

In contrast, it can be argued that even if the trust relationship is primarily motivated by self-interests, if

the relationship continues, the behaviours of actors can transform parties’ identities towards a

construction of a common identity. In other words, the relationship of “trust is in my interest” between

self-interested actors can evolve into a relationship of “trust is my interest” between actors sharing

common interests and a shared identity.55

Following Wendtian social constructivism, actors’ interests

are redefined in a way to include common interest, that is, to keep trust alive.

Why do we need trust to understand power? When the concept of power is released from narrow

conceptualizations of power-over (however sophisticated they are), and enriched by feminist vision of

resistance and transformation as a result of collective action, we arrive at a concept of power that

emerges through collective action, power-with. Trust is a neglected dimension of power-with as there

is no power-with without trust developing among members of a body politic. Arendt hints at the issue

when she underlines the role of promising in exercise of power. What makes individuals believe that

others will uphold their promises is their trust towards them. In collective action, individuals come

together with the expectation that they will protect and promote each others’ interests in unforeseen

circumstances in order to generate transformation. Surely, there is a possibility that trust can be

betrayed. However, if it is not betrayed, the idea of “Trust is in my interest” can evolve into “Trust is

my interest” as their interests are redefined in a way to include common interests. Their basic common

interest is to save trust within the collectivity. As a result, the body politic begins to emerge; the “we-

feeling” is constructed. By building a common identity, trust becomes the source of their power.

The exploration of trust-power relation offers analysis of three important issues in relation to power of

social movements. First, trust offers some level of certainty in political relations. As previously stated,

Arendt made a similar point for promising. This certainly does not mean that trust is not risky. In spite

of its risky character, it provides a foundation upon which power-with is exercised. Without the

certainty trust provides, it is almost possible for social movements to act together against power-over.

Second, building trust can lead to a formation of common identity. Booth and Wheeler explain this as

“we-feeling”. Power-with, as feminists stated, is about solidarity. Trust is an essential dimension of

53

Hollis, Trust Within Reason, p. 10-13. 54

Ken Booth and Nick Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust, (Basingtone: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 233. 55

Ali Bilgic, The Migration Security Dilemma: Trust and Emancipation in Europe, (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 81-83.

12

building solidarity upon which power is exercised. Finally, when trust is betrayed, power-with

disappears.

The Tahrir Case: Power-with through Trust

What happened following the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the brutal

murder of Khalid Said, blogger and activist, in Egypt can be considered, in Hannah Arendt’s words, as

an “event” that interrupted “routine processes and routine procedures” in many North Africa

countries.56

The event, in the most well-known name, was Arab Spring, which was the uprising of

individuals who coped with their powerlessness (ajz) in order to obtain dignity (al-karama).57

Individuals gathered to protest and overthrow authoritarian regimes in their countries. What happened

in the Arab Spring provides a useful case to illustrate how trust interacts with power-with. The

following will mainly focus on women experiences in Tahrir Square both in January 2011.

When Egyptians started to gather in the Tahrir Square in January, they carried their individual

identities along with their negative preconceptions about other protestors. At the beginning, these

negative preconceptions prevented individuals from fully exercising power-with. What connected

them, but not united them, was their resistance to power-over of authoritarian regimes. They had to

cooperate with others. Hence, at the beginning, the structure of the movement reflected “trust is in my

interest” avoiding a common we-feeling. The following reflection of a feminist activist on other

female protesters belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood is illustrative of this:

There would be a group of women – whom I would have once avoided and labeled them

as Muslim Brotherhood – walking in a group around the Square with strength and vitality

calling for the downfall of the regime. I joined them as they passed beside me in the sea

of people in the Square. Remembering the protests of students who called themselves the

youth of the Muslim Brotherhood and how the young women would walk silently after

the men, I would be infuriated.58

However, during the protests, while they were targeted by the police, the trust relationship started to

improve. Individuals not knowing each other and holding different identities stood up together against

the security forces. Although it surprised them at the beginning, the idea that they can trust each other

by building a we-feeling begun to emerge:

The first time I was in Tahrir in the middle of the waves of people I was about to be

trampled on, and suddenly this guy standing beside me lifted me and put me on the curb

we were standing next to so I would be a bit higher. I don't remember his face. What I

remember was that I wasn't scared, or straining my brain to react fast. My sister got on

the curb beside me and a woman whom I personally would never have thought I would

accept - or she would accept me - put her arm around my sister's shoulders, hugging her,

embracing her warmly, as we all stood there chanting and singing. Friends who witnessed

one attempt at harassment at the Square told me how everyone taught the guy a lesson he

wouldn't forget any time soon.59

56

Arendt, On Violence, p. 7. 57

Kawa Hassan, ‘Making Sense of the Arab Spring: Listening to the Voices of Middle Eastern Activists’, Development, 55(2), 2012, p. 234. 58

Zainab Magdy, Two Faces of Revolution, March 8, 2011. Available at www.opendemocracy.net 59

Magdy, Two Faces of Revolution.

13

What once was a loose gathering of individuals against authoritarian regimes started to become a

community of individuals, a body politic, when the trust relationship evolved into the idea of “trust is

my interest”. Behaviours of individuals (for example, helping each other in the face of police brutality)

influenced their identities because they began to believe that when they trusted each other, they could

exercise power-with in a fuller sense. Power stemming from solidarity to make a transformation, as

feminists argue, was operational. The same feminist activist who had been suspicious towards Islamist

female protestors continued:

Now, these women I joined and others are making history, shouting and singing and

sending out trills of joy without thinking that a woman's voice shouldn’t be heard. This

revolution proved that Egyptian women have a voice which they aren't afraid to use.60

Although it is normatively undesirable for Foucaltian power approach, the body politic in Tahrir

showed that power can result from a collective identity which is not necessarily dominating and

hegemonic. This collective identity can be pluralistic, open to differences and inclusive. A feminist

activist reflection on the movement in Tahrir during the first revolution is useful to make this point:

During the weeks Egyptians have spent in Tahrir square, we have come to see another

side of us as a people. In Tahrir square there was no harassment, there was no division in

religion, age, social status, educational status or gender...Women were side by side with

the men and no one stopped to question someone's gender. There was something bigger

holding the people together. Personally, I was always apprehensive about walking in the

streets. The possibility of someone grabbing you or maybe worse was on my mind all the

time.61

A protestor, Muhammed Ramadan, tells the plurality of body politic bound by a common identity

stating that “in my whole life I'd never seen protests like that. Girls! Some wore hijabs, some didn't,

Christians, Muslims — I'd never seen that."62

Another protestor concurs that "I saw all these different

and surprising kinds of people protesting and thought, Wow, this can happen."63

When individuals trust each other, this offers them a type of certainty: a motivation to carry on. Words

of Khalid Abdalla, an Egyptian actor and activist, are the most illuminating expressions of how trust

between them enabled individual protestors to continue their protests given the (elusive) certainty that

trust offers:

When you know there are thousands upon thousands upon thousands behind you, you

don’t stop. People fight for as long as they can. They die, they go to hospitals, they lose

their eyes and there are others behind them. It’s a matter of—-it’s how, kind of,

consensus expresses itself as a movement. And essentially, your heart takes over your

body. It takes over your mind. We’re fighting for things far bigger than this.64

The reflection of a female protestor, Marwa Faroak, showed how subtle the trust relationship in Tahrir

was:

60

İbid. 61

Ibid. 62

Kurt Anderson, ‘The Protestor’, The Time Magazine, December 14, 2011. 63

Kurt Anderson, ‘The Protestor’. 64

Defiant, inspiring voices from Tahrir Square — “This time we won’t go home until we get all our rights.” Available at http://citizenactionmonitor.wordpress.com/2011/11/29/defiant-inspiring-voices-from-tahrir-square-this-time-we-wont-go-home-until-we-get-all-our-rights/

14

One of the things that gave me an incredible sense of wonder was how safe I felt...I spent

the night there, with all kinds of different people, and Tahrir Square became safer than

anywhere else for a woman to be.65

For some women, trust between individuals sharing we-feeling in the Tahrir was an empowering

experience. Mona Ahmed Saif, blogger and activist, said:

I felt accepted and welcome for the first time by young men in my country. They treated

me as a peer, and it was great getting into political discussions with random guys in

Tahrir square feeling completely at ease and safe."

The experience in Tahrir Square has changed herself, Mona says: "It changed how I see myself

among a crowd and the streets of Cairo. It changed my body language in public. I became

stronger and more confident while dealing with others...I walk around alone late at night feeling

safe. I haven't had a single sexual harassment incident. Turns out even Mubarak was responsible

for that.66

Conclusion

This paper aimed to theoretically explore and empirically illustrate one of the most important, albeit

neglected, dimension of power of social movements: trust. It was argued that trust enables the

construction of a common identity in social movements. The “we-feeling” becomes the source of their

power to resist and transform oppressive structures. By combining a feminist approach to power and

Arendt’s power in concert, the paper first clarified the answer to the question of “what to do with

power”. A critical approach to power should not only understand and problematize oppressive and

restraining power structures and relations such as the Foucaltian approach, but should also

acknowledge the existence of alternative power practices. The latter is particularly essential for

explicitly normative approaches in IR because a theoretical recognition of power of “voiceless” can

pave the way for an analysis of transformative effect. This analysis specifically examined power-with

of feminist approaches. Arendt’s power in concert, which is the foundation of power-with, enabled the

integration of concept of trust into it.

65

Kathy Lally, ‘Egypt women stand for equality in the square’, Washington Post, February 18, 2011. 66

Magdy, Two Faces of Revolution.