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ELCANO V. HILL 77 SCRA Hill accidentally killed the son of Elcano Hill was acquitted form the criminal case due to the defense of minority Elcano filed a civil case for damages against Reginald Hill and his father. Hills moved to dismiss the case claiming

o that the case was barred by res ajudicata and o that father was relieved from guardianship of the defendant through emancipation by

marriage. Lower court ruled in favor of Hill, hence this appealHELD: THE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES IS NOT BARRED BY THE ACQUITTAL OF HILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. Acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case has NOT extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence

the acquittal is not a bar to the civil case for damages against him. Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or

quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.

Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and

distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Likewise, emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

CINCO V. CANONOY Vehicular accident complaint filed by Cinco against jeepney driver Hilot, operated by Val Pepito

and Carlos Pepito During the pre trial of the civil case, respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending final

determination of criminal suit. o Rule 113 Sec 3 of RoC states that

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted

Civil action shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in criminal proceeding

City court suspended the civil case Wrong

HELD: There can be an independent civil action for damage to property during pendency of criminal action.

Nature and character of Cinco was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

o Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

Primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

o SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. 

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

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Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property

word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm doneCANGCO V. MANILA RAILROADDistinction of Liability of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.

It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages. Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V. COURT OF APPEALS AND LUNA G.R. NO. 108164 Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna.

Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The

vice-president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis. Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for

damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC. On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision

ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.

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HELD: FEBTC winsIn culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held: The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCO 18 SCRA 155

When culpa aquiliana may arise even when there is a pre-existing contract between the parties

Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a first class passenger of Air France on his way to Rome for a pilgrimage.

From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in ‘first class,’ But at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat in favor of a ‘white man’

who had a ‘better right to the seat.’ Carrascoso filed for moral damages, averring in his complaint the contract of carriage between Air

France and himself. Air France claims that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, upon which Carrascoso’s complaint is silent.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to award for moral damages

The foregoing substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That there was bad faith when petitioner’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.