Triangular Desire extracts.docx

7/28/2019 Triangular Desire extracts.docx

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Girard, Rene. "Triangular Desire." Girard, Rene. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary

Structure. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1965. 1-52.

The discipline pursues objects which are determined for him, or at least seem to be determined

for him, but the model of all chivalry. We shall call this model the mediatorof desire.

On Literary Criticism

The triangle is no Gestalt. The real structures are inter-subjective. They cannot be

localized anywhere the triangle has no reality whatever; it is a systematic metaphor,

systematically pursued. Because changes in size and shape do not destroy the identity of this

figure, as we will see later, the diversity as well as the unity of the works can be simultaneously

illustrated. The purpose and limitations of this structural geometry may become clearer through areference to structural models. The triangle is a model of a sort, or rather a whole family of

models. But these models are not mechanical like those of Claude Levi-Strauss. They will

allude to the mystery, transparent yet opaque, of human relations. All types of structural thinking

assume that human reality is intelligible; it is a logos, and as such, it is an incipient logic, or it

degrades itself into a logic. It can thus be systematized, at least up top a point, however

unsystematic, irrational, and chaotic it may appear even to those, or rather especially to those

who operate the system. A basic contention of this essay is that the great writers comprehend

intuitively and concretely, through the medium of their art, if not formally, the system in which

they were first imprisoned together with their contemporaries. Literary interpretation must be

systematic because it is the continuation of literature. It should formalize implicit or already half-explicit systems. To maintain that criticism will never be real knowledge. The value of a critical

thought dpends not on how it cleverly manages to disguise its own systematic nature or on how

many fundamental issues it manages to shirk or to dissolve but on how much literary substance it

really embraces, comprehends, and makes articulate. The goal may be too ambitious but it is not

outside the scope of literary criticism. It is the very essence of literary criticism. Failure to reach

it should be condemned but not the attempt. Everything else has already been done. (Girard, p. 3)

Definition of Desire

Desire according to the Other and the seminal function of literature are also found in the

novels of Flaubert. Emma Bovary desires through the romantic heroines who fill her

imagination. The second-rate books which she devoured in her youth have destroyed her

spontaneity. We must turn to Jules de Gaultier for the definition of this bovarysm which he

reveals in every one of Flauberts characters: The same ignorance, the same inconsistency, the

same absence of individual reaction seem to make them fated to obey the suggestion of an


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external milieu, for lack of an auto-suggestion from within. In his famous essay, entitled

Bovarysm, Gaultier goes on to observe that in order to reach their goal, which is to see

themselves as they are not, Flauberts heroines find a model for themselves and imitate from

the person they have decided to be, all that can be imitated, everything exterior, appearance,

gesture, intonation, and dress.

The external aspects of imitation are the most striking; but we must above all remember

that the characters of Cervantes and Flaubert are imitating, or believe they are imitating, the

desires of models they have freely chosen.

Here history is nothing but a kind of literature; it suggests to all Stendhals characters

feelings and, especially, desires that they do not experience spontaneously. When he enters the

service of the Renal family, Julien borrows from Rousseaus Confessions the desire to eat at his

mas- [end of p. 5] ters table rather than at that of the servants. Stendhal uses the word vanity

(vanite) to indicate all these forms of copying and imitating. The vaniteux is brother to Don

Quixote and Emma Bovary. And so in Stendhal we again find triangular desire. (Girard, p. 6)

Vaniteux

A vaniteux will desire any object so long as he is convinced that it is already desired by

another person whom he admires. The mediator here is a rival, brought into existence as a rival

by vanity, and that same vanity demands his defeat. The rivalry between mediator and the person

who desires constitutes an essential difference between this desire and that of Don Quixote, or ofMadame BovaryValenod, on the other hand, can steal the tutor from the M. de Renal; the

Marechale de Fervacques can take Julien from Mathilde de la Mole. In most of Standhals desire

it: it is mediator himself desires the object or could desire it, it is even this very desire, real or

presumed, which makes this object infinitely desirable in the eyes of the subject. The mediation

begets a second desire exactly the same as the mediators. This means that one is always

confronted with two competingdesires. The mediator can no longer act his role of model without

also acting or appearing to act the role of the obstacle. Like the relentless sentry of the Kafka

[end of p. 7]

Internal Mediation and External Mediation

Romantic works are, therefore, grouped into two fundamental categories---but within

these categories there can be an infinite number of secondary distinctions. We shall speak of

External mediation when the distance is sufficient to eliminate any contact between the two

spheres ofpossibilities of which the mediator and the subject occupy the respective centeres. We


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shall speak ofinternal mediation when this same distance is sufficiently reduced to allow these

two spheres to penetrate each other more or less profoundly.

Obviously it is not physical space that measures the gap between mediator and the

desiring subject. Although geographical location might be one factor, he distancebetween

mediator and the subject is primarily spiritual. (Girard, p. 9)

The hero of external mediation proclaims aloud the true nature of his desire. He worships

his model openly and declares himself his disciple. We have seen Don Quixote himself explain

to Sancho the privileged part Amadis plays in his life. Mme Bovary and Leon also admit the

truth about their desires in their lyric confessions. The parallel betweenDon Quixote and

Madame Bovary has become classic. It is always easy to recognize analogies between two novels

of external mediation.

Imitation in Stendals work at first seems less absurd since there is less of that divergence

between the worlds of disciple and model which makes a Don Quixote or an Emma Bovary sogrotesque. And yet the imitation is no less strict and literal in internal mediation than in external

mediation. If it seems surprising it is not only because the imitation refers to a model who is

close, but also because the hero of internal mediation, far from boasting of his efforts to

imitate, carefully hides them.

The impulse toward the object is ultimately an impulse toward the mediator; in internal

mediation this impulse is checked by the mediator himself since he desires, or perhaps possesses,

the object. Fascinated by his model, the disciple inevitablu sees, in the mechanical obstacle

which he puts in his way, proof of the ill will borne him. Far from declaring himself a faithful

vassal, he thinks only of repudiating the bonds of mediation. But these bonds are stronger thanever, for the mediators apparent hostility does not diminish his prestige but instead augments it.

The subject is convinced that the model considers himself too superior to accept him as a dciple.

The subject is torn between two opposite feelings toward his model---the most submissive

reverence and the most intense malice. This is the passion we call hatred.

Only someone who prevents us from satisfying a desire which he himself has inspired in

us is truly an object of [end of p. 11] hatred, The person who hates himself for the secret

admiration concealed by his hatred. In an effort to hide this desperate admiration from others,

and from himself, he no longer wants to see in his mediator anything but an obstacle. The

secondary role of the mediator thus becomes primary, concealing his original function of amodel scrupulously imitated.

In the quarrel which puts him in opposition to his rival, the subject reverses the logical

and chronological order of desires in order to hide his imitation. He asserts that his own desire is

prior to that of his rival; according to him, it is the mediator who is responsible for the rivalry.

Everything that originates with this mediator is systematically belittled although still secretly


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desired. Now the mediator is a shrewd and diabolical enemy; he tries to rob the subject of his

most prized possessions; he obstinately thwarts his most legitimate ambitions. (Girard, p. 11)

Jealousy and envy

Jealousy and envy imply a third presence: object, subject, and a third person toward

whom the jealousy or envy is directed. These two vices are therefore triangular; however we

never recognize a model in the person who arouses jealousy because we always take a jealous

persons attitude toward the problem of jealousy. Like all victims of internal mediation, the

jealous person easily convinces himself that his desire is spontaneous, in other words, that is

deeply rooted in the object and in this object alone. As a result he always maintains that his

desire preceded the intervention of the mediator. He would have us see him as an intruder, a

bore, a terzo incomodo who interrupts a delightful tete-a-tete. Jealousy is thus reduced to the

irritation we all experience when one of our desires is accidentally thwarted. But true jealousy is

infinitely more profound and complex; it walways contains an element of fascination with the

insolent rival. Furthermore, it is always the same people who suffer from jealousy. Is it possible

that they are all victims by repeated accidents? Is itfate that creates for them so many rivals and

throws so many obstacles in the way of their desires? We do not believe it ourselves, since we

say that these chronic victims of jealousy or of envy have a jealous temperament or an envious

nature. What exactly then does such a temperament or nature imply if not an irresistible

impulse to desire what Others desire, in other words to imitate the desires of others?

Max Schelernumbers envy, jealousy, and rivalry among the sources ofressentiment.

He defines envy as a feeling of impotence which vitiates our attempt to acquire [end of p. 12]

something because it belongs to another. He observes, on the other hand, that there would be no

envy, in the strong sense of the word, if the envious persons imagination did not transform into

concerted opposition the passive obstacle which the possessor puts in his way by the mere fact of

possession. Mere regret at not possessing something which belongs to another and which we

covet is not enough in itself to give rise to envy since it might also be an incentive for acquiring

the desired object or something similarEnvy occurs only when, our efforts to acquire it fail and

we are left with a feeling of impotence. (Girard, p. 13)

The analysis is accurate and complete ; it omits neither the envious persons self-

deception with regard to the cause of his failure, nor the paralysis that accompanies envy. But

these elements remain isolated; scheler has not really perceived their relationship. On the other

hand everything becomes clear, everything fits into a coherent structure if, in order to explain

envby, we abandon the object of rivalry as a staring point and choose instead the rival himself,


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i.e., the mediator, as both a point of departure for our analysis and its conclusion. Possession is

merely a passive obstacle; it is frustrating and seems a deliberate expression of contempt only

because the rival is secretly revered. The demigod seems to answer homage with a curse. He

seems to render evil for good. The subject would like to think of himself as the victim of an

atrocious injustice but in his anguish he wonders whether perhaps he does not deserve his

apparent condemnation. Rivalry therefore only aggravates mediation; it increases the mediators

prestige and strengthens the bond which links the object to this mediator by forcing him to affirm

openly his right or desire of possession. Thus the subject is less capable than ever of giving up

the inaccessible object: it is on this object and it alone that the mediator con- [end of p. 13]fers

his prestige, by possessing or wanting to possess it. Other objects have no worth at all in the eyes

of the envious person, even though they may be similar to or indeed identical with the mediated

object.

Everything becomes clear when one see that the loathed rival is actually a mediator. Max

Scheler himself is not far from the truth when he stares inRessentimentthat the fact of choosing

a model foroneself is the result of a certain tendency, common to all men, to compare oneself

with others, and he goes on to say, all jealousy, all ambition, and even an ideal like the

imitation of Christ is based on such comparisons. But this intuition remains isolated. Only the

great artists attribute to the mediator the position usurped by the object; only they reverse the

commonly accepted hierarchy of desire.

The Romantic Vaniteux

The romantic vaniteux always wants to convince himself that his desire is written into thenature of things, or which amounts to the same thing, that it is the emanation of a serene

subjectivity, the creation ofex nihilo of a quasi-divine ego. Desire is no longer rooted in the

object perhaps, but it is rooted in the subject; it is certainly not [end of p. 15] rooted in the Other.

The objective and subjective fallacies are one and the same; both originate in the image which

we all have our own desires. Subjectivisms and objectivisms, romanticisms and realisms,

individualisms and scienticisms, idealisms and positivisms appear to be in opposition but are

secretly in agreement to conceal the presence of the mediator. All these dogmas are the aesthetic

or philosophic translation of world views peculiar to internal mediation. They all depend directly

or indirectly on the lie of spontaneous desire. They all defend the same illusion of autonomy to

which modern man is passionately devoted. (Girard, p. 16)

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